INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP)

WORKING PAPER

by Vali KALEJI

Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)

VIENNA 2020

THE 2020 NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

FROM IRAN’S PERSPECTIVE

The COVID-19 pandemic: impact for the post-Soviet space and Russia’s aspirations

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 3

II. CURRENT FLOW OF WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SECURITY CONCERNS IN IRAN'S

NORTHWESTERN BORDERS ................................................................................................................................. 5

III. IRAN SECURITY AND MILITARY REACTIONS .......................................................................................... 13

IV. IRAN’S DIPLOMATIC DYNAMISM ............................................................................................................. 17

V. ANALYZING IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE 2020 NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT ....... 26

VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 29

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran. His recent

publications in Persian: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Goals, Functions

and Perspectives (2010), South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex, (2014), Political

Developments in the Republic of Armenia, 1988- 2013 (2014), Iran, Russia and China in

Central Asia, Cooperation and Conflict with US Foreign Policy in Central Asia, (2015), US

Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Process and Perspectives (2015) and Iran and the South

Caucasus Republics (2017). Publications in English: Current Trends and Tendencies in the

Political and Security Dimension of the North and South Caucasus: A View from Iran,

Vienna based Institute for Security Policy (ISP) (September 2020), “Expanding Armenia -

Israel Relations: Implications for Iran’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus”, The Central

Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI), American Foreign Policy Council (September 10, 2020),

Eight Principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy towards The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Valdai

Discussion Club, Moscow (October 9, 2020) and Nagorno-Karabakh: Transformation from

an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict, The Russian International Affairs Council

(RIAC), Moscow (October 21, 2020), From Ceasefire to Peace: The Necessity for a Russia, Iran

and Turkey Partnership in the Karabakh Peace Talks, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow

(October 30, 2020).

E-mail address: vali.kaleji@gmail.com

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I. INTRODUCTION

The name Karabakh is more associated with one of the most permanent ethnical conflicts

of the last decades than its outstanding history and culture or its beautiful nature. In the

political literature of the South Caucasus, the Karabakh conflict together with other ethnic

crises of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are normally referred to as “frozen conflicts” or

“unresolved conflicts”. The Karabakh conflict and the military encounter between Armenia

and Azerbaijan that extended from February 20, 1988, to May 12, 1994, culminated in

Armenia’s control of 14167 square kilometres of lands including the cities of Kalbajar,

Qubadli, Jabrayil, Füzuli, Zanglan, Agdam, Lachin and Shusha. As a result of the war, more

than 35 thousand people were dead and 800 thousand others displaced and forced to

migrate from the disputed lands. This protracted and costly war came to an end by the

Bishkek agreement of May 8, 1994, through a truce and not a peace accord. It is clear that a

truce is a temporary halt of a war or military encounter and is essentially different from a

peace treaty that results in a complete and permanent end to a dispute. The transition from

the truce to a peace treaty in the Karabakh dispute was assigned to the representatives of the

Minsk Group affiliated to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

comprising of the three countries of Russia, France and the United States. However, despite

two decades of efforts and negotiation, the Karabakh region is yet to get passed the truce

phase into a peace.

During the past two decades, the ceasefire is breached in the Karabakh and the contact lines

of its surrounding regions for several times by the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties. The

most significant cases of violation of truce are the relatively comprehensive military

encounter in the course of the four days war of April 2016, the four days war of July 2020

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and the latest conflict between the two sides starting from the morning of Sunday,

September 27, 2020. The recent clashes in Karabakh are highly significant in terms of their

extension and intensity, the volume of human and financial loses the level of preparedness,

the curfew impositions and the general mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as

the all-out political and military support provided by the Turkish government and military

to the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, fragile back-to-back ceasefires brokered first by Russia

and then the United States this month have given way to renewed fighting by Armenia and

Azerbaijan. Much of the recent fighting has concentrated along the border with Iran, where

ethnic Armenian forces have accused Azerbaijani personnel of taking shelter, and over

which Azerbaijani drones have crashed.1

1 Tom O'Connor, Iran Boosts Border Defense against Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, Israel and ISIS, The Newsweek, October 27, 2020.

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II. CURRENT FLOW OF WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH:

SECURITY CONCERNS IN IRAN'S NORTHWESTERN

BORDERS

Geographically, Iran has a special situation in the southern borders of South Caucasus.

Among three neighbours of the region including Iran, Russia and Turkey, only Iran has a

border with Nagorno-Karabakh and is the only country that has a border with two parts of

the Republic of Azerbaijan including mainland of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan

Autonomous Republic. Iran's north-western borders with the South Caucasus are 800

kilometres in length. The Iranian provinces of Ardabil and Eastern Azerbaijan have 369

kilometres and 200 kilometres of joint borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan respectively.

Eastern Azarbaijan is the only Iranian province that shares borders with Armenia. This

borderline is 35 kilometres long. This border is termed as a lifeline for three million

population of Armenia. Iran is also the only country adjacent to the disputed region of

Karabakh. None of Georgia, Russia and Turkey is in such close proximity to these disputes.

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Therefore, the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has directly affected Iran's northwestern

areas. Since the beginning of the war, several rockets and mortar shells have landed inside

Iran. Especially the Iranian village of Khoda Afarin, located on the Eastern Azarbaijan

Province in Armenia border, has been hit by the artilleries of the conflicting parties several

times. Aliyar Rastgoo, the political and security deputy governor of East Azerbaijan, stated

21 October 2020 that from the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a total of 68

rockets had hit the border areas of Iran, adding: "Only today, 71 rockets have hit the village

of Khodaafarin.”.2

Indeed, many drones came down inside northwestern Iranian territories along Iran’s

borders with Armenia and Republic of Azerbaijan. For example, a drone crashed in the

border county of Parsabad-Moghan in the northwestern Iranian province of Ardebil on

October 13, 2020. In another case, a drone crashed in national and grassland areas near the

village of Qara Qouch in Manjavan district, Khoda Afarin region in East Azarbaijan province

2 More than 70 rockets hit northwestern Iran today in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran Press, 21 October 2020.

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on 20 October 2020. In reaction to these events, Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent

official letters to the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia and has voiced the

Iranian government’s strong protest at the violation of the country’s territorial integrity, the

harm to security, and the financial damages inflicted on the Iranian citizens after shells and

rockets fired in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hit the territory of Iran.3

Indeed, the sound of the bullets, shells and missiles fired by the Armenian and Azerbaijani

armed forces are heard in other Iranian villages close to the northwestern border. This puts

Iran in a sensitive situation so that tension and war in Karabakh region and its surrounding

areas directly impact the security of Iran’s northwestern borders.

The firing of projectiles toward the Iranian territories was so repetitive that the Iranian

Foreign Ministry warned Azerbaijan and Armenia against violating the Iranian soil.

"Movements in the border areas of our country are being seriously and sensitively

monitored by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in this regard, while declaring any attack by

any of the warring parties in the region on our country is intolerable, we seriously warn all

3 Iran Sends Protest Letters to Baku, Yerevan after Being Hit by War Shells, Tasnim News, October, 07, 2020.

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parties to seriously take care in this regard", the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.4

Indeed, Iran's Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli has made it clear that should the

fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh

spread to Iranian soil, his country would react. Fazli made the remark after a missile from

the combat zone hit a village in the border region in the northwest of Iran.5

Another Iran’s security concern was Azerbaijani drones. According to the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, between 2006 and 2019, Israel provided Baku with

around 825 million USD in arms. No doubt that drones are one of the important military

exports to the Republic of Azerbaijan. In the recent war on Karabakh, Azerbaijan has used its

drones much more liberally than Armenia, which has a far smaller fleet, and Baku has

targeted Armenian tanks, artillery, and even air-defence systems. 6 As Hikmet Hajiyev,

assistant to the president of Azerbaijan mentioned an interview with the Israeli Walla news

outlet, the Azeri military has been using Israeli-made attack drones during the recent uptick

in violence with neighbouring Armenia.7 According to many drones came down including

Israeli-made drone IAI Harop inside northwestern Iranian territories along Iran’s borders

with Armenia and Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran concerns that Isreal uses the drones for spy

targets in Iran.

Indeed, the spread of various and occasionally contradictory news about the transit of

members of the Syria Free Army and Syrian Turkmens to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led

to a security concern for Iran. The conflicts and wars in the South Caucasus, including those

4 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict from Iran’s perspective, Tehran Times, October 19, 2020. 5 Shabnam von Hein and Kersten Knipp, Iran fears spillover from Nagorno-Karabakh, Deutsche Welle, Ocotober 12, 2020. 6 Mike Eckel, Drone Wars: In Nagorno-Karabakh, The Future Of Warfare Is Now, Radio Free Europe, Radio

Liberty, October 09, 2020. 7 Azeris use Israeli-made drones as conflict escalates with Armenia, The Times of Isreal, September 30, 2020.

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in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are more of ethnical than religious

nature, therefore, the transit of terrorists and Salafi forces to the South Caucasus can

transform the Karabakh conflict from an ethnic-territorial to an ethnic-religious one. In fact,

with extended and superficial understanding from the concept of jihadism, the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict goes beyond the ethnic-territorial dispute between Azeris and

Armenians, for religious disputes in the region would ultimately lead to the Kishmirization

of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. With the addition of religious conflicts, more violence

and human casualties would occur, and the prospects for durable peace in the region would

be bleaker than before in the area. Although thousands of people have lost their lives in the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in bitter incidences such as the massacres in Khojaly and

Sumgait in the past three decades, the Caucasus has never seen the crimes as violent as the

ones committed in Syria and Iraq against the Izadi and Kurdish minorities.8

Under these circumstances, the Karabakh conflict might lead to security threats from the

terrorist and takfiri groups, whose anti-Shia and anti-Iranian attitudes manifested in the

Syrian Civil War. For this reason, Iranian officials such as President Hassan Ruhani and Ali

Akbar Velayati, the international relations advisor to the Supreme Leader, have warned

against the danger of takfiri and jihadi groups on Iran’s border. Indeed, Iran’s Foreign

Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif warned about the transfer of Daesh remnants to the

Nagorno-Karabakh region and noted that: "the Islamic Republic will not tolerate the

presence of Takfiri terrorists near its borders. In recent talks and even before, we informed

the officials of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as those of Russia and Turkey, that the

Islamic Republic of Iran will not tolerate such a thing. Currently, these terrorists are not

8 Vali Kaleji, Nagorno-Karabakh: Transformation from an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict, The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow, October 21, 2020.

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present along our borders, but the probability that they will be present at a distance from our

frontiers is still high, and we have declared this concern to both sides".9

On the other hand, Iran was anxious about the security of Khoda Afarin Dam, an earth-fill

embankment dam on the Aras River straddling the international border between Iran and

Azerbaijan. It is located 8 kilometres west of Khomarlu in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran and

14 kilometres southwest of Soltanli in Jabrayil District. De facto independent Nagorno-

Karabakh Republic took control of the area in 1993, during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, but

on 18 October 2020, the Azerbaijani forces retook control of the dam during 2020 Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict. 10 Humanitarian catastrophe could have happened inside Iranian

northwestern borders if rockets and missiles from both sides of war lob into the Khoda

Afarin Dam.

Finally, the negative impacts of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on Iran’s national

unity was another security concern for Iran. From cultural viewpoints, the South Caucasus

is important for Iran according to living million Iranian Azerbaijanis in the north-west of

9 Zarif on Karabakh conflict: Iran won’t tolerate terrorists’ presence near bordersǁ, Press TV, November 1, 2020. 10 Азербайджан взял под контроль Худаферинский мост в Карабахе, заявил Алиев [Azerbaijan has taken control of Khudaferin bridge in Karabakh, Aliyev said], RIA Novosti. 18 October 2020.

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Iran including provinces of East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and West Azerbaijan,

thousands of Armenian people in Tabriz, Tehran, Salmas and Isfahan's Jolfa. Therefore, in

addition to the security and border-related considerations mentioned above, Iran is in a very

different position compared with Georgia, Russia and Turkey. The presence of millions of

Azeris in the north-western provinces of Iran who are sensitive to the position of the

Republic of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh issue, as well as the presence of a hundred thousand

of Armenians in Iran who sympathize with Armenia, has made the Karabakh dispute

outstanding for Iran from an ethnic perspective.

The other dimension is the religious considerations that the Shia seminaries, particularly in

the cities of Qom and Mashhad inside Iran and Najaf in Iraq, have about supporting the Shia

Muslims of the Republic of Azerbaijan and expects the Iranian government to support the

Republic of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh dispute more actively. It is also noteworthy that

there are close ties between the two religious and ethnic considerations in many parts of

Northwestern Iran with an Azeri majority population and we should differ between ethnic

and religious feelings of millions of Iranian Azeris with political goals of Pan-Azeri and Pan-

Turkish currents.

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, some Pan-Azeri and Pan-Turkish currents

activate the religious and ethnical sentiments in these Azeri settling areas of Iran. These

groups tend to involve Iran as a party to the conflict and provoke the ethnic feelings of

millions of Iranian Azeris in East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and West Azerbaijan. In recent

years they have constantly pumped the idea of Pan-Turkism and the thought of Greater

Azerbaijan, as well as the image of North and South Azerbaijan. Therefore, the 2020

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a great opportunity for some Pan Turks and Pan Azeri

groups. In this regard, a group of the protesting groups demanded Iranian authorities close

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the country’s border with Armenia and the Norduz border gate, through which military

equipment has reportedly been transferred to Armenia.

In reaction to this event, Iran’s foreign ministry denied reports about transferring weapons

and military equipment to Armenia. Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said: "Iran is

carefully examining the goods that pass through its borders and will not allow any kind of

weapon and ammunition transfer.". 11 Indeed, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev

dismissed news by some media outlets about the transfer of weapons and military

equipment to Armenia through the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In an interview

he mentioned that: "We have no information regarding the transfer of arms from Iran to

Armenia. On the contrary, I can say that Iran and Georgia have closed their skies and land

borders to send weapons to Armenia. Therefore, we thank the Iranian government and the

Georgian government once again for this.".12

11 Iran denies transferring military equipment to Armenia, AA News Broadcasting System (HAS), September

29, 2020. 12 Aliyev rejects allegations on Iran’s arms transfer to Armenia, Mehrnews Agency, October 17, 2020.

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III. IRAN SECURITY AND MILITARY REACTIONS

In reaction to the threat of Iran's northwestern borders, Tehran tried to secure his borders.

In this regard, Iranian border guards have pursued the case in meetings with the Azeri and

Armenian border guards and submitted formal letters of protest over the violation of the

Iranian border territories by the two neighbours. Iran's Army Ground Force launched a one-

day military drill in the northwestern region of the country on October 9, 2020. The Chief

Commander of the Iranian Army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi attended the

unannounced exercise. The military exercise is held to enhance the preparedness of the

army to counter possible threats against the country. The war game includes mechanized

infantry and armoured units, drone squads, and artillery units.

Also, Iran's Revolutionary Guards also sent military reinforcements to its borders with

Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan to protect its civilians from any projectiles coming

from the conflict zone. Especially Tanks, ground troops and military equipment have been

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deployed in the cities of Khoda Afarin and Jolfa, which are on the Azerbaijan border and also

near Iran’s boundary with Armenia.

The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Ground Forces, Mohammad

Pakpour visited Parsabad and Aslandooz, Mil-o-Moghan Dam, and a training border

barracks north of Ardabil province on the border between Iran and the Republic of

Azerbaijan on 27 October. He also visited the border county of Khoda Afarin and said that

"the units of (the Guards) ground forces have been dispatched to and stationed in the region.

Their mission is to protect national interests and maintain peace and security. Any shift in

border geopolitics is the Islamic Republic of Iran's red line.".13

With the continuation of exchange of fire between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan

forces, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, a senior spokesman for the General Staff of the

Iranian Armed Forces urged the warring sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to avoid

further confrontations, warning against the endangering of Iran’s border security.

13 Iran troops deployed on border near Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, France 24, 25 October, 2020.

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He confirmed that "the Iranian military will take the necessary measures to reinforce its

borderlines, the general warned the warring sides that security along the country's borders

is a red line for the Islamic Republic and Iran will give a tough response to any form of threat

and violation.".14

Indeed, Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Force Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari

visited the border areas of Jolfa and Khodaafarin on October 30, 2020, and emphasized that

the peace of the border residents is the red line of the armed forces and no danger threatens

the northwestern borders of the country. He noted that "The increasing capabilities of the

Armed Forces have made us very well prepared to carry out missions and protect the borders

and honourable people of the country so that nothing threatens the northwestern

borders.".15

Also in the wake of repeated cross-border shelling from ethnic Armenian forces and

airspace violations by Azerbaijani drones, Iranian Army commander Major General

Abdolrahim Mousavi who also serves as commanding officer of the Khatam Al-Anbia Air

Defense Base, announced on October 27, 2020, that "the air defence units in the

14 Any Violation of Iran Borders to Draw Tough Response, Tasnim News, October, 23, 2020. 15 No danger threatens northwestern borders of Iran: Army Commander, Iran Press, October 30, 2020.

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northwestern region have been strengthened and more will be added if needed. The peace

of the people is of special importance to us".16

16 Tom O'Connor, Iran Boosts Border Defense against Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, Israel and ISIS, The Newsweek, October 27, 2020.

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IV. IRAN’S DIPLOMATIC DYNAMISM

Iran’s first response to the conflict was delivered in a message by the Iranian Foreign

Ministry spokesman, Saeed Khatibzadeh, who said on Sunday, September 27, 2020, that

Iran has been monitoring the military clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia closely and

with great sensitivity. He also called on the two sides to show restraint, put an immediate

end to the conflict, and to begin with talks. The spokesman further stressed Iran’s readiness

to use all its capacities to establish a ceasefire and facilitate the process of talks between the

two countries.17 Also, Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif in a tweet on Sunday

night, September 27, 2020, wrote that "Iran is closely monitoring the alarming violence in

Nagorno-Karabakh. We call for an immediate end to hostilities and urge dialogue to resolve

differences. Our neighbours are our priority and we are ready to provide good offices to

enable talks. Our region needs peace now.".18

The second response to the conflict was telephone conversations with officials of Armenia,

Republic of Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. In this regard, Javad Zarif held separate

telephone conversations with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov and

Armenian Foreign Minister, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on September 27, Russia Foreign

Minister, Sergey Lavrov on October 6, 2020. Indeed, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had

a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashynian19 on 6 September, President of

17 Iran's positions on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Mehr News Agency, October 4, 2020. 18 Ibid. 19 President Rouhani in a telephone conversation with Nikol Pashinyan noted that: "It is important for us to stop these conflicts, and we expect the two countries to take a step in this direction with tact and restraint. War and conflict are not a good solution to problems and disputes and will complicate the situation.". President

Rouhani added while emphasizing Iran's readiness to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan to overcome their existing problems: "Our region cannot withstand instability and a new war.". Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that "any tension and conflict would be to the detriment of all countries in the region and

welcomed any practical initiative to stop the violence". (Source: President Rouhani voices Iran's readiness to resolve Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute, Islamic Republic News agency (IRNA), September 30, 2020).

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the Republic of Azerbaijan Elham Aliev20 on 6 October, President of Russia Vladimir Putin21

on 10 October (after Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement in Moscow among the foreign

ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip

Erdogan 22 on October 22, 2020. In these conversations, Iran stressed on immediate

ceasefire, stability and security in the Caucasus, peace negotiations in Karabakh conflict and

Iran's readiness to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan to overcome their existing

problems.

20 Iran's President Hassan Rouhani in a telephone conversation with his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev said that "the Iranians have very close historical, cultural, and religious commonalities with their Azeri brothers

and the two countries' governments have always had very close relations with each other, also Iran's authorities have taken clear and explicit positions regarding the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The security, stability, and tranquillity of the region, especially the northern borders of Iran, are very important to

us, and this conflict, as well as border insecurity continuation, should not pave the way for the infiltration of some terrorist groups. However, Iran is ready for any action to resolve the Baku-Yerevan disputes based on

international law and recognized borders between the two countries.". The Azeri president considered the fight against terrorism in the region as one of the fields of Tehran-Baku cooperation, adding that maintaining peace, stability, and tranquillity in the region is essential and "we should all strive to achieve it". (Source:

Rouhani: Iran ready to help resolve Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, Islamic Republic News agency (IRNA) October 6 2020). 21 In this telephone conversation the Iranian president "expressed his support for the agreements on the

ceasefire for humanitarian purposes reached after the trilateral consultations of the foreign ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and on the launch of substantive negotiations for the sake of achieving

peaceful settlement as soon as possible.". And furthermore: "The sides held a detailed exchange of opinions on the situation in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Vladimir Putin informed his Iranian counterpart in detail about the efforts being taken with Russia’s mediation to de-escalate tension in that region.". (Source:

Rouhani Voices Support for Nagorno-Karabakh Truce in Talks with Putin, Tasnim News Agency, October 10, 2020). 22 The phone calls come just as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced on the 26th day of the conflict

in Nagorno-Karabakh that the entire territory on the Azerbaijan-Iran border that was held by Yerevan for almost 30 years has been liberated. Aliyev celebrated the victory for the people of Azerbaijan and Iran.

President Rouhani in his telephone conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted that: "Our position in this regard is quite clear and we believe that war is not the solution, and problems should be resolved through negotiation. I believe that Iran and Turkey, as two powerful countries in the region, as well as Russia, can help

to establish peace and stability in the region and witness the establishment of peace in the region by implementing international law and territorial integrity". President Erdogan expressed hope that "Iran-Turkey cooperation on the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis would lead to a solution to the crisis through dialogue and the

return of peace to the region.". (Source: Dr. Rouhani in a phone call with his Turkish counterpartǁ, Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, October 22, 2020).

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The third response to the conflict was the position of the Iranian government spokesman,

Ali Rabiei on October 6, 2020. He noted that "Iran holds a very clear position on the need to

observe and recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and it has

repeatedly emphasized this legitimate right within the framework of international law and

UN resolutions. We also believe that the dispute between the two neighbouring countries of

the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia has a peaceful solution and that

Iran, Turkey, and Russia can help the two neighbours to implement UN resolutions and

resolve their differences in a peaceful manner.".23

The fourth response to the conflict was the interview of Ali Akbar Velayati, the advisor to the

Supreme Leader of Iran on international affairs that served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in

1981- 1997 and mediator of Karabakh war at the beginning of 1990s. Velayati in an

interview with Iranian daily Kayhan on October 6, 2020, noted that: "We call on Armenia to

return those occupied parts to the Republic of Azerbaijan. More than one million Azeris

have been displaced after the occupation of those areas and must return home soon.". The

Leader’s adviser underlined that Iran takes the same stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict that it has adopted on the Palestinian territories. Velayati made it clear that the

dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan has no military solution whatsoever, and must be

resolved politically. He further deplored the foreign parties, such as Israel and Turkey, for

fanning the flames of war, adding: "Why is Turkey insisting on the continuation of war? This

country must help end the war if it can do so, provided that the occupied cities of the

Republic of Azerbaijan be liberated definitely.".24

23 Azerbaijan Republic’s Territorial Integrity Should Be Respected: Spokesman, Government of the Islamic

Republic of Iran, October 6, 2020. 24 Leader’s Adviser: Armenia Should Leave Occupied Azeri Lands, Tasnim News Agency, October, 06, 2020.

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The fifth response to the conflict was a joint statement from the Representatives of the

Supreme Leader of Iran (The Vali-e-Faqih representatives)25 from the provinces of East

Azerbaijan (Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem), West Azerbaijan (Seyyed Mehdi

Ghoreishi), Ardabil (Hassan Ameli) and Zanjan (Ali Khatami). The four imams declared that

the Azerbaijani government’s move to retake Karabakh was "completely legal".

Sixth Iran’s response to the conflict was a regional diplomatic tour by Iranian Deputy Foreign

Minister for Political Affairs Seyed Abbas Araqchi to Baku, Moscow, Yerevan and Ankara in

Pursuit of Nagorno-Karabakh Peace. As Iran's Special Envoy for Settlement of Karabakh

Conflict, Araqchi tried to present the proposed initiative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to

resolve this conflict and achieve a lasting peace between Armenia and the Republic of

Azerbaijan and, consequently, the region. Although details of Tehran’s plan have not been

publicised, Araqchibelives that "Iran's proposed plan which is based on a series of accepted

international principles, including respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity,

25 The Vali-e-Faqih representatives in provinces of Iran are the appointees of the Vali-e-Faqih Seyyed Ali

Khamenei based in each of the country’s provinces. They are also Imam of Friday Prayers in the capital of each province, and some of them are also members of Assembly of Experts.

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ending the occupation, inviolability of borders and return of refugees can contribute to a

peaceful settlement of Karabakh conflict.".26

Before the regional diplomatic tour, the deputy minister visited Iranian northwestern

border regions to see first-hand the latest developments on the ground. And then, in the first

step, Araqchi travelled to Baku on 28 October and held talks with Azeri President Ilham

Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov during his visit. Hikmet Hajiyev, an assistant

to the Azerbaijani president who met with Araghchi, said the Iranian diplomat held "very

fruitful" talks with the Azerbaijani officials. Indeed, Araghchi said: "We always support

Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate its occupied cities and areas. The territorial integrity of the

Republic of Azerbaijan and other countries in the region and the inviolability of borders is

an important and unbreakable principle that must be respected.".27

In the second step, Araghchi held talks with Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister for Central

Asia and the South Caucasus, Andrei Rudenko in Moscow on 29 October. After the meeting,

26 Iran's initiative can help end Karabakh conflict: Deputy FM, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), November 1, 2020. 27 IRI Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi: We Always Support Azerbaijan’s Efforts to Liberate Its Occupied Cities and Areasǁ, SAED News, October 29, 2020.

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Araghci said in a tweet: "Today in Moscow, I had a useful meeting and proposed the Iran

initiative. Iran and Russia share common approaches toward the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict.".28

In the third step, Araghchi held talks with Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashniyan. In the meeting with Pashniyan, introducing

Iran’s approaches to settling the regional situation, Seyyed Abbas Araghchi voiced deep

concerns over the ongoing hostilities. He offered condolences for civilian casualties and

condemned the attacks on civilian infrastructure and human settlements.29

In the fourth step, Araghchi held talks with Turkey’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal in

Ankara on 30 October. During the meeting, the diplomats discussed a range of issues

regarding the latest developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as Iran’s

initiative to improve the situation. During the meeting, Araghchi discussed a proposal that

foresees the Islamic Republic, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia boosting a standing

Minsk Group that has failed to resolve decades of the territorial dispute between Baku and

28 2nd round of talks on Tehran's initiative for Nagorno-Karabakh held in Moscow, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), October 29, 2020. 29 PM Pashinyan receives Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, October 30, 2020.

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Yerevan. Referring to the features of Tehran’s initiative, which includes a ceasefire,

discontinuation of attacks on residential areas and civilians, as well as the return of the

displaced to their homes, Araghchi pointed to the inability of the previous approaches to

providing a final solution to the ongoing crisis.1 Following the meeting, Araghchi wrote on

his official Twitter account, "frank and productive discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister

Sedat Önal in Ankara. Iran and Turkey are two major players with an undeniable role in

peace and stability of the region.".30

After returning from the regional diplomatic tour, Iran's Special Envoy for Settlement of

Karabakh Conflict criticized function of the Minsk Group and emphasised that “we do not

reject other mechanisms such as the Minsk Group, our initiative is not a substitute for the

Minsk initiatives but a complement to it, and we seek to contribute to the current efforts of

the Minsk Group through a regional approach and engaging all effective regional players to

resolve this crisis. However, some of the member countries of this group are not even in the

region and their inefficiency has been proven. The foreign players of the Minsk Group –

France and the US – are far away from the region and are disconnected from it not only

30 Araghchi meets with his Turkish counterpart, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), October 31, 2020.

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politically, but emotionally and ethically, while having no real desire to establish peace in

Karabakh.".31 Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif elaborated on Iran’s

peace plan for the settlement of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Zarif

said that “the Iranian plan does not seek to compete with other existing peace efforts such

as those pursued by Minsk Group. Iran’s plan does not intend only to establish a temporary

ceasefire in the battle zone. Rather, the Iranian peace plan is seeking to introduce a

settlement to the conflict which will then lead to a complete withdrawal of forces from the

occupied lands. Iran is waiting for Azerbaijan and Armenia and other regional players such

as Russia and Turkey to announce their viewpoints about the Iranian peace plan.”.32

Finally, seventh Iran’s response to the conflict was by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei on November 3, 2020. In his speech on the auspicious occasion of the birth

anniversary of Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him), he commented on the ongoing

conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabakh and said the war between Iran's two neighbouring

countries is a bitter issue which has to speedily come to an end. He said the territories

31 Araghchi: Iran's initiative to cover weaknesses of Minsk Group's plans, Mehr News Agency, October 31, 2020. 32 Zarif elaborates on Iran’s peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), November 1, 2020.

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belonging to the Azerbaijan Republic should be liberated and the security f the Armenian

nationals too should be guaranteed. The Leader further stressed that the international

borders should be respected and terrorists should never think of approaching Iranian

borders because if they do so they will be strongly dealt with.33

33 Leader: Iran not to be affected by who becomes next US president, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), November 3, 2020.

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V. ANALYZING IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE

2020 NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

According to the position of Iranian officials such as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, the advisor to the Supreme Leader of Iran on international

affairs, the joint statement from the four Representatives of the Supreme Leader of Iran in

northwestern of Iran and Iran's Special Envoy for Settlement of Karabakh Conflict, Seyed

Abbas Araqchi support the Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate its occupied cities and areas and

territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, some experts believed that Iran’s position

toward Karabakh Conflict has changed from "neutrality" to "approach of Pro-Azerbaijan". For

example, Turan Gafarli mentioned to "Iran’s Shifting Position on Nagorno-Karabakh" in his

publication by The World Center Research in London.34

Other experts believed that the reason for this position are the protests of the Azeri minority

in Iran. For example, Omid Shokri in his analytical article entitled "Between Neutrality and

Fighting Internal Dissatisfaction: Iran’s Policy on Karabakh", in Eurasia Daily Monitor

mentioned that "Iran’s stance in the first days of the latest outbreak of heavy violence over

Karabakh caused dissatisfaction within the country’s Azerbaijani minority. Concerns arose

among Iranian authorities that the Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes were provoking heated,

ethnically charged sentiments in parts of the country. Indeed, Iran’s ethnic-Azerbaijani

community quickly began agitating for Tehran to declare a position in favour of one of the

parties to the dispute—specifically Azerbaijan. Faced with domestic agitation related to the

current clashes in Karabakh, Iran is attempting to preserve national harmony by, on the one

hand, maintaining official neutrality, while simultaneously putting extra pressure on

34 Turan Gafarli, Iran’s Shifting Position on Nagorno-Karabakh, The World Center Research, London, August 2020.

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Armenia to implement its obligations under the four previous United Nations resolutions

on the conflict.".35 We had seen that same approach by Golnaz Esfandiari in "Trying to Be

Neutral: Iran Worried Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Could Turn into Wider War"36 and Paul

Keaveny in "Nagorno-Karabakh: why Iran is trying to remain neutral over the conflict on its

doorstep.".37

But if pay attention to the principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh

Conflict in the last three decades, we understand that the position of Iranian officials in

current war between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan is not new. It is true that the

Iranian government have not announced any specific strategy or official document on

foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, principles of Iran’s foreign

policy towards the conflict can be understood via analysis of the positions taken by Iranian

officials and also Iran’s practical approaches in the last three decades that can be referred to

which can clear up many probable ambiguities:

1. Recognizing the government of Azerbaijan’s right to sovereignty over the Karabakh

region and the seven regions around it.

2. Non-recognition of the Republic of Artsakh and other political developments in the

Karabakh region.

3. The balanced approach and maintenance of relations with both Armenia and the

Republic of Azerbaijan.

4. Opposing the war and using force to resolve the Karabakh crisis.

35 Omid Shokri, Between Neutrality and Fighting Internal Dissatisfaction: Iran’s Policy on Karabakhǁ, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 17, Issue: 148, October 21, 2020. 36 Golnaz Esfandiari, Trying to Be Neutral: Iran Worried Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Could Turn into Wider War, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 08, 2020. 37 Paul Keaveny, Nagorno-Karabakh: why Iran is trying to remain neutral over the conflict on its doorstep, The Conversation, October 7, 2020.

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5. Maintaining the rights and security of the Armenians of Karabakh in the Karabakh

peace plans.

6. Opposing the interference of trans-regional powers in resolution of the Karabakh

crisis.

7. Opposing the stationing of international peacekeeping forces in the Karabakh

contact lines along the Iranian border.

8. Mediating the process of peace and dispute resolution upon the request from the

governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia.38

But what is new in Iran’s position toward the conflict is opposition with the presence of

takfiri terrorists in Karabakh and Iranian borders. This position comes back to the spread of

various and occasionally contradictory news about the transit of members of the Syria Free

Army and Syrian Turkmens to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that led to a security concern

for Iran. Therefore, this issue is a new redline for Iran and according to experience in Syria

and Iraq, Tehran sees the terrorist and takfiri groups in Karabakh whose anti-Shia and anti-

Iranian attitudes manifested in the Syrian Civil War, as a threat for his national security in

northwestern borders.

38 For further details: Vali Kaleji, Eight Principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy towards The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow, October 9, 2020.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Iran is also the only country adjacent to the disputed region of Karabakh. None of Georgia,

Russia and Turkey is in such close proximity to these disputes. Republic of Azerbaijan and

Armenia have friendly relations and joint borders with Iran, factors that make the war in

Nagorno-Karabakh a matter of national security for Iran. Furthermore, the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict has directly affected Iran’s border areas. Since the beginning of the war,

several rockets and mortar shells have landed inside Iran.2 Iran’s demand in the current

situation is a quick ceasefire by the two parties to prevent more human and financial losses

and to curb the intensification of the conflict into an all-out war in the Caucasus that would

make the conditions uncontrollable with all the three countries in the Caucasus (Armenia,

the Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the three neighbouring countries of Iran, Russia

and Turkey the losers.39

Therefore, the 3+2 mechanism (Iran, Turkey and Russia with Armenia and the Republic of

Azerbaijan) can give practical and tangible guarantees to the Armenian and Azeri parties

through coordination between the leaders of Iran, Russia and Turkey which would give more

confidence and trust to the parties to the dispute to transit from ceasefire to peace in the

long-lasting dispute of Karabakh. 40 Although it should be mentioned that the 3+2

mechanism (Iran, Turkey, Russia and Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan) should not

be seen in contradiction with other mediating initiatives such as the Minsk Group. This is

similar to the Syria crisis in which the Astana peace talks were conducted in parallel to peace

talks in Geneva, mediated by the United Nations. Logic and reason dictate that any possible

instrument be utilized to advance the peace process in the Karabakh conflict. In light of the

39 Vali Kaleji, From Ceasefire to Peace: The Necessity for a Russia, Iran and Turkey Partnership in the Karabakh

Peace Talks, The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow, October 21, 2020. 40 Ibid.

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experiences of past three decades and the composition of the Minsk Group, the participation

of the neighbouring countries of the South Caucasus that are Iran, Russia and Turkey could

be a more serious trigger for the Karabakh peace negotiations. This could lead to

materialization of the immaterialized objectives of the Minsk Group.