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Amartya Sen's Unequal WorldAuthor(s): G. A. CohenSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 40 (Oct. 2, 1993), pp. 2156-2160Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4400230

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Amartya S e n ' s Unequa l W o r ldG A Cohen

In Section I of this article the authordescribes the leading idea- 'capability'-whichAmartyaSen has broughtto thediscourseonproblemsof equalityandits absence in his book InequalityReexamined. He then takes upone of the book'ssub-themes,the connectionor lack of it between reedomand control. In thefinal section he defendsSen against somescepticismabout the practical relevanceof his work expressed n this olurnalafew monthsago.

INEQUAL17-Y REEXAMiNED exhibits(often, perforce, only in fleeting cameo) thecurrentstate of AmartyaSens's decades-long engagementwithproblemsof equalityand ts absence.The book provides not onlyan exhilaratingtour d'horizon of ideas de-veloped at greaterease elsewhere, butalsofresh nuances that are designed to accom-modate and deflect some of the extensivecriticism and comment which Sen's mag-netic work has attracted.In Section I of this article, I describe heleading idea-'"capability"-which Sen hasbrought o this field of discourse.I then takeupone of the book's sub-themes,regardingthe connectionorlackof it between reedomand control. Finally in Section111), defendSenagainstsome scepticism abbut heprac-tical relevance of his work that was ex-pressed in these pages a few months ago.

ITwo questions arise with regard to themeasurement of inequality. The first.con-cerns the respecz(ineconomists' language,the space) in w'ch people should be ac-counted equal cG unequal:what is the righttype of advantage o examinewhenequality

and its absence areatissue? Representativeanswers to this first question are: utility(some economists andsome philosophers),income (other economists and no philoso-phers), primary goods (John Rawls), andresources, capaciously conceived (RonaldDworkin).The issue wasbroaclhed y RawlsinA Theoryof Justice (1971), which arguedthatnot utility orwelfare butprimarygoods(things everyone needs to pursue heirgoalsin life, whatever hose goals may be)consti-tutethe right metric for distributive ustice.But it was in Sen's 1979 TannerLecture,called 'Equalityof Wlhat?', hat thatques-tion was first put in an expressly generalform,andit was there that Sen venturedhisnowquite well known thesis thatcapabilityis the right thing to look at when judginghow well a person's life is going.The second and ndependent uestionwithregard to the measurementof inequality ishow to compute the degree of inequalitythat obtains, for given sets of scores ofadvantage (whatever may be the right re-spect in which to reckon advantage,whichwas the first question). That second ques-tiondominatedSen's OnEconomnicnequial-ity (1973), and, although it is briefly ad-dressed in the work underdiscussion, notit

but the first question, aboutthe appropriatetype of advantage to focus on, dominatesInequality Reexamined. Accordingly, thepresent "reexamination" s not, as the titlesof the two books might suggest, preciselyandcentrallyof the topic of On EconomicInequality. Theearlierwork,one couldsay,has a comparativeadvantage in the strict,Ricardian,sense) with respect to the inter-ests (as opposed to the needs) of econo-mists, while the recentone has a compara-tive advantagewithrespect to the interestsand needs of political theorists andphiloso-phers.Now, althoughSen's official topic is in-equality, his motivating nterest s poverty,which appears,when it does, at the down-wardend of the spectrumof advantage,andwhich is a phenomenon distinct from in-equality, since everyone might be equallypoor, and since there is (at least) moneyinequalitybetweenmillionairesandbillion-aires.Hisspecial nterest n poverty s shownin Sen's choiceof capabilityas the premierspace of advantage:capability provides ahighly suitable measure of the deprivationthat poverty imposes, but it is not so evi-dently serviceable when the object is to

identify degreesof inequalityas such.Letme explain.WhatSen calls "capabil-ity" is determinedbythe differentforms oflife thatarepossible for aperson:aperson'scapability is a disjunctionof the combina-tions available to her of what Sen calls"functionings", which arestatesof activityand/orbeing. Thesefunctioningsvary, Sensays,from mostelementary nes, such as beingwell-nourished,voiding scapablemorbid-ity andprematuremortality, tc, to quitecomplexandsophisticated achievements,suchashaving elf-respect eingable otakepartn the ifeof thecommunity, nd o on.2Now,the"elementary" unctioningsistedherehave ceilings of accomplishment:youcan get richer and richer, but you cannotkeeponrisinginthedimensionsof nourish-ment andhealth. And somethingsimilaristrue of the more ''sophisticated'functionings:you cannotkeep on adding oyourstockof self-respect. andthere s nec-essarily alimit to howmuch you can, or canwant, to take part n the life of the commu-nity. Theserecurrently itedexamplesshowthat wlhatSen really cares about is basiccapability,3 the prerequisite of adequatefunctioning,which, he rightly complained,

was a form of advantage neglected in theliterature,despitebeingthe mostfundamen-tal one of all. Capacities beyond the basic(can I run amile? can I impress Ukrainianswith my impersonationof Russians? can Isew more quickly than you?) seem quiteirrelevant to measurement of deprivation,inequality or anything else of urgentcon-cern fromthepoint of view ofjustice. (Thispoint, that poverty is the key theme of thebook, will prove to be consequentialwhenIcome to comment in Section III on somecriticisms of Sen made by AndreBeteille.)Whether or not capability deserves itsassigned roleas a metric of advantage,Sen'svery identification of thecapability dimen-sion of assessment was impressive, in thelightof itspreviouscomplete neglect. Capa-bility lies, causally, between incomp orprimarygoods or resources on theonehandandutility or welfare on theother. Focus oncapability means emphasising notgoods assuch, but what they enable a person to do,and t also meansdisemphasising the(oftenvagariously nduced)utilityassociatedwithhis doing it. The trouble with a metric ofgoods or resources or income is that thepoint of goods (and so forth) is to generatepossibilities of choice for the individual:muchbetter, hen,Sen argued, o look not attheir generators but at those possibilitiesthemselves, which do not vary uniformlywithwhat generates hem,because of varia-tions in people's physical (climatic, topo-graphical, etc) and social circumstances,and in their biological constitutions. Andthe troublewith a metric of utility is that itis blindto the fact thatpeople adjust theirexpectationsdownwardlywhen in povertyand upwardly when in wealth. This andothersubjectivevagaries mean thatutilityisnot therightquantitytofocus on: it is unfairto a poor person to resource him less be-cause he has developed modest tastes andtlerefore needs less wherewithalto achievea given level of welfare. What matters s thecausalintermediary, he effect of goodsthatcauses utility: functioning, and capability,as such.4A person's functionings matter becausethey are his life, considered apart rom theutility he gets out of it. And capabilitymatters at least instrumentally, sincefunctionings matter, and adequatefunc-tioning can obtain only if it lies within aperson's capability set. But capability alsomatters in tlhreeotlherways. Freedom to

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-choose sgoodinitself, apart romthegoodsit provides access to; freedom to choosewith adequate unctioningwithinthe scopeof that choice is a person's right;andcapa-bility also contributesdirectly to well-be-ing,becauseaperson'slife is "richer"whenthe "opportunityof reflective choice." ap-pears withinit:capability is good notonly,then,as a space of choice, but also becausefreechoosing, aprocess thatrequiressuch aspace, is itself a good (pp 40-42, 51-52).Capability s a formof freedom, the free-dom, specifically, to choose a set offunctionings.When the value of that free-dom is measured in termsof the forms ofwell-beingthose sets of functioningsconsti-tute, then what Sen calls a person's "well-being reedom" s displayed.Butwell-beingfreedomis not freedom as such. It must bedistinguishedrom"agency reedom",whichis a person's freedom to achieve whatevergoalsshehas, including goals otherthanherown well-being. It diminishes a persons'sagency freedom that she cannot pursue acause to which she is committed, but therestriction need not commensurately de-tractfrom her well-being freedom.The capability focus makes a differencetotheanalysisof poverty, and,consequently,to anti-povertypolicy. Thus, for example,womenoften require, for biological, socialand cultural reasons, higher income thanmen do to secure the same capability;andfactors such as age, location,andepidemio-logical atmosphere also strongly affect aperson's power to convert money into theelements of a worthwhile life (p 113). Ac-cordingly, the plea for attention n povertyanalysis not to low income as such but toincome inadequate o sustainbasic capabil-ityin given circumstances hasconsiderablepractical significance. To be sure, it maysometimesbe toodifficultand/or oo nvasiveforastate authority oidentify each person'scapabilityrequirements, nd ailor hisorherincome supportto them. But, even then, itmaybepossible to identify aggregatediffer-ences between sub-populations which af-fect the convertibility of income into capa-bility, differences whichjustify unequalpercapita funds dispersal across regions andgroups. And apart rom the sheerly quanti-tativequestionof whatincome is needed, indifferent conditions, to generate a givenamountof capability,attention o capabilitydesideratauggestsmodes of intervention ndenablementwhichsecure ubstantialmprove-ments for comparatively ittle expenditure.5Thebenefitsof theshift ocapability how that"conceptsmatter"6npractice.

III turn to my selected sub-theme: therelationshipbetween freedom andcontrol.Senclaims7 hat here s asignificant forn ofpersonal freedom enjoymentof whichdoesnot involve (as freedom usuallydoes, and sgenerallyhoughtlways lo do) excrciseof

control over what happensby the relevantfree agent. A supposedcase in point is thefreedomenjoyed by someone who lives inan environmentwithout malaria. Sen doesnot mean, by thatfreedom, the freedomtodo things that can only be done when ma-laria is absent, for, in that consequent free-domcontrol smanifestlypresent.8He meansthe(supposed) reedom hatapersonenjoysjust in that her environmenthasno malariain it.This, Senargues, s indeed apartof theperson'sfreedom,even thoughshe does not(and cannot)control whether there will bemalarianherenvironment.Sen used to callthis (supposed) freedom, where control ismissing, thefreedomof power. Criticspro-tested that the situationof a person benefit-ing froma salubriousenvironmentno moremanifestsherpowerthan tdoes hercontrol.Sen now accedesto thiscriticism, dropstheword"power", andcalls his theme "effee-tive freedom".Sen has here, once again, identified anundoubtedly mportantandneglected phe-nomenon, but it is not freedom withoutcontrol. In this section, I show that Sen'sargument or the existence of such a free-dom is unsuccessful, and I then indicatewhatI think s the true shape of the impor-tantphenomenon hat he hasdiscerned.The failure of Sen's argumentbecomesapparentwhenwe askwhyapersonbenefit-ing from an environment rid of malariaqualifies in thatrespect as free. Sen vacil-lates between two different answersto thatquestion, corresponding o two conditions,one strongand one weak,each of which hetakes to be sufficient for "effective free-dom". The strongcondition indeed identi-fies a form of freedom, but one in which,contraryto what Sen requires, control ispresent, however (literally) remote. Theweaker conditionindeed involves no con-trol, but also, pari passu, no freedom.Through ailing todistinguishthe two con-ditions Sen produces his fallacious result,that freedom can obtain without controlover whathappens.The strongerconditionconjoins two ele-ments, correspondingto the two phrasesitalicised by Sen in his statementof it: "Aslong as the levers of control aresystemati-cally exercised in line with what I wouldchoose andforthat exactreason, my 'effec-tive freedom' is uncompromised, thoughmy 'freedom as control'may be limitedorabsent'"(pp 64-65). In illustrationof thispoint, Sen instances the relationship be-tween me and a proof-readerof my book,who correctsthe text as he does because heknows I would want it to be corrected thatway.9Now it is true,in this example, that "thelevers of control" are not "directly oper-ated" by me (p 64), but the fact that Senemphasises "directly" betrays hat heyareindirectlyoperatedby me, whichmeansthatI do control what happens. I can be free

withoutexercising the levers of control pre-cisely because I can control without exer-cising the levers of control. (WhenI tell myobedientchauffeurwhere andhow to driveI donotexercise the levers whichcontrol hecar10 utInevertheless control what tdoes.)Satisfaction of the strong condition indeedyields freedom, but not freedom withoutcontrol.But Sen often uses a weakercondition for"effective freedom"or(supposed)freedomwithout control, which is yielded by pre-serving the first talicised elementbutdelet-ing the second one in his statement of thestrong condition which I gave two para-graphs ago. The weaker condition is thatwhoevercontrols what happensdoes what Iwould choose if I were in control, nomatterfor whatreason, and, in particular,whetheror not he "knowswhatmyinstructionswouldhave been fsought" (p 64). So, forexample,it may conform to my will thatmy environ-ment has been rid of malaria,even thoughIdidnot, and could nothave, made it so, andeven though those who did makeit so wererelevantly unmindful of my wishes in thematter. I believe that this phenomenon, inwhichthings conform tomy will althoughIdo not exercise it, is of greatphilosophicalinterest, but that it is not freedom.An indication, apartfrom his actual for-mulations andexamples, thatSen also usesthe stated weaker condition for freedomwithout control is that, as I reported, heacceptedthe criticism thatfreedom withoutcontrolcould not be said toqualifyaspower.For satisfaction of the first condition, asillustrated in the proof-reader case, doesentail power: I do not let the proof-readeroperateunless I am satisfied that hewill actas I want hiim to. (If the proof-reader isimposed on me willy-nilly," then at mosttheweakercondition holds, andfreedomofchoice disappears.)Another ndicationthatSen also relies on theweakercondition s hisdescription of the relevant form of (sup-posed) reedomas "outcome-based" p135).For the second element in the strongercon-dition for "effective freedom" ("for thatexact reason") is a matter of process, notoutcome.Consider the malaria clearance case, inwhich the controlling agent is the state, orsome state body. If the policy of malariaelimination s adopteddemocratically, thenpeople, together, control what happens tothem, and thereforeexercise freedom and,for good measure, power: but Sen's claim,that there exists freedom without control,remainsunillustrated. f, on theother hand,the malaria clearance is achieved by anundemocratic(but, at least in this respect,benign) administration, or, as Sen at onepoint suggests (p 65), by an internationalagency underdistant direction, then there sneither control nor freedom, but it remainstruethat whateventuates conforms to whatpeoplewould hoose,and spro tanlo com-

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mendable. Sen says thatwhat he calls "ef-fective freedom" is importantbecause, in amodem complex society, there s muchthatyve can secure not individually but onlycollectively.-2As thecontrastbetweendemo-cratic and other malaria clearance shows,that s not a reason forconcludingthat.thereexists freedom withoutcontrol.We havetodo, in sum, with twophenom-ena, one more general than the other, andonly the more specific one involves free-dom.Thespecific one, in.which hings go asI will because it is my will, even thoughmyhands areoff thelevers of control, is politi-cally importantbutphilosophically notveryinteresting.The moregeneralone, in whichthings go in accordance with my will, buttruly without my control, is politically less(*, not) interestingbut philosophically eryinteresting, lthoughnotrightlycalled"free-dom". I agree with Sen that the fact thatacentral aspect of a person's situationmayconform to his will other than because hehimselfarranges rsustains hatconformityopens a "momentous perspective" (p 69).First, a bit more on why the perspective isnot one of freedom.Then, anattempt o saywhythe perspective s neverthelessmomen-tous.Contrary o what Sen says, when apersongets an unchosen thing that she wouldhavechosen, no "ability" on her pArt "tochoose to live as [shel desires" is therebyindicated(p 67). "Ability" is hereinfelici-tous njusttheway itscogrtate"power" was:abilities, like powers, are things that areexercised, and there is, ex hypothesi, norelevant exercise of anything in this ex-ample.'3 It is also false, in the pertinentsense, 14 thatif peopledo desire a life withouthunger rmalaria, he eliminationof these maladiesthroughpublic policy does enhance their"liberty ochoose tolive asthey desire".""Ability ochoose" and"libety tochoose"obtain only when it is possible to choose,andmuch of the interestof the phenomenonmisdescribed in these dictions is that theagent has no choice in the matter (for ex-ample,of whetheror not there is malaria nhisenvironment). Especially) when apply-ing the weaker condition, Sen emphasisesabsenceof control, while insisting on libertyto choose, butliberty to choose entails con-trolover what happcns.So, whileI agree withSen that heissue ofwhetherpeople have what hey wouldchoose"is amomentousperspective",Ido notthinkthatwhentheyhave what hey would choosethey are pro tanto free. To see the truesignificance of the phenomenon to whichSen draws our attention, let us begin bydistinguishingbetween aperson'sgood andaperson'swill. Following atrafficaccident,my Christian scientist friend lies uncon-scious on the road. I must decide betweentaking'himhome, as I know h1ewouldwishme to, and takinghim to hospital, asI thinlk

would do him more good. I do what con-forms to his will if andonly if I take himhome. A person's will is how he wouldmakethingsgo if hecould,whetheror notheis in a position to make them go thatway,whetheror not it would be good for him ifthey go thatway, and whatever nterest orlack of it he has in his own good.'6Noticethat the Christianscientist's fate in thisexampleconforms, hanks ome, tohis will,but thathis will does not "systematically"(Sen's word'7) determine his fate. It justhappened o be me who came along, ratherthan, for example, a thief, or a differently-minded riendwhomighthaveputtheman'swelfarefirst, or not known abouthis will.Now, standardly,'8 hen freedom s exer-cised, the agentexercising it aims to makethe world(in therelevantrespect)conformto hiswill. Butwhat Sencorrectlynotes,andrightly emphasises, is that the world mayconform to a person's will other thanas aresult of his control(or, aswe canthereforesafely add, of his exercise of a freedom).This is shownbytheChristiancientistcase,and, ndeed, byacase inwhich, unlike whatholds in thatone, theworldconformsto mywill not only not as a result of my exerciseof a freedom butnot at all becausemy willhas the character t does: when a publicauthority,perhaps acting for my good, butnot outofrespect ormy will, delivers goodsthat I wouldchoose to get if I could.The real substance of Sen's innovativefocus, then, is that the standard aim ofexercises of freedom s achievablenotonlythrough exercises of it but also by othermeans: a frienddoes whatheknows is yourwill because it is your will, a benign (orotherwise)agencydoes whathappens o beyour will. In these cases, the necessaryeffect of a successful exercise of freedom,conformityof theworldto the will, occurswithoutany suchexercise. But although hestandardeffect of a successful exercise offreedom, world/willconformity, s therebywrought, t is not thereforerightto call thepersonwhosewill is satisfiedfree, orto saythat he has freedom without control. TheChristian cientist is notmorefree in beingat home than he would be if he were inhospital, thoughhis will is bettersatisfied.Freedom,the "ability toget whatwe valueandwant"(p64), obtainsonly when t is theagent who secures the conformity of theworldto its will.My will is howI wouldmakethings go ifI coulddo so. If they go thatway withoutmyintervention, hen,except inspecial cases, Iwill unambivalentlywelcomethlat.Specialcases areones inwhich it matters ome thatI be the person who secures what I will: Iwant it to be me, not someone else, whonursesmy spouse backto health.) And themalariacase is not arelevantlyspecialone:I shall not feel thatI have missed anoppor-tunity to eliminate noxious mosquitoes ifthlegovernmentdoes it for me (or even if it

does it not strictly for me). There are twovalues associated with successful exercisesof freedom. One is thatthe worldconformsto my will and the other is that it is I whoachieve thatresult. Sometimes, the secondvaluedoes notmattermuch, andthemalariaexample is a case in point.There s apolitical reasonwhy Seninsistson the phrasings that I have stigmatised asinappropriate."Freedom", hesays, "is oneof the most powerful social ideas" (p 69),and he is thereforeconcerned (so I hazard)to prevent ideological enemies of state in-tervention romobscuringthe factthatfree-dom is among the benefits thatsuch inter-vention can bring. Right-wing ideologuesregardall state intervention as diminishingfreedom (whetherornottheyconcede that tmightbejustified onothergrounds).Againstthat, I agree with Sen that freedom is protanto enhanced when the state functions asan instrument of the democratic will. Butwhat shouldbe said to the right-wing ideo-logue who finds no freedom in a malariaclearancewhich is notdemocratically nsti-tuted?Not what Sen would say to her, thatshe is blind to the fact thatthereis freedomheretoo. Rather his: thatallor mostof whatwould make this situation valuable if it didrepresentanexercise of freedom is presenthere.Theideologue is blind,specifically, tothat. She so makes a fetish of freedom thatshe fails tonotice thatalarge partof itsvaluecan bepresentwhenfreedomitself does notobtain.19

IIII remarked n Section 1 thatSen's animat-ing concern is not so much inequality aspoverty,andI indicatedsome waysin whichareorientation romboth ncome andutilityto capability both helps us to appreciatewhat the central evil of poverty is and haspracticalforce in thestruggle against it. It istheaspect of practiceon which I shall con-centrate in this closing section, which is areply to AndreBeteille's review of Inequal-ityReexamined n theEconomicandPoliti-cal Weeklyof April 17, 1993.Beteille called hisreview 'AmartyaSen'sUtopia'21 I think that phrase was bothungenerousandunjustified.It suggests that

Sen is a head-in-the-clouds theorist yearn-ing after anunattainable galitarian deal attheexpense of what can actually be done toimprove the world. Now, that is certainlyfalse at the level of aspiration. In Povertyand Famines, Sen confessed himself "im-modest enough to believe that the analysispresented . this monograph has a certainamount6f relevance to mattersof practicalconcern" [Sen 1981:xi], andthefinalpara-graphof the book under discussion avowsthat ts "analysi.shas beenverysubstantiallysmotivated"by its ' directbearingonmattersof practicalconcern" (p 152, andsee, too,p 11).

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I have indicated, sketchily (see the finalparagraphof Section I above), how thatbearing goes, and thereby how the aspira-tiontopracticalrelevance is in some degreefulfilled, with respectto povertyin general.Butconsider,for amoment,Sen's extensiveworkon famine.Before I had readanyof it,I foundwhat I knew to be its leading propo-sition puzzling, not because I thought itfalse, but because it seemed all too obvi-ously true: that famines occur when andbecausepeople lose theircustomary egiti-mateentitlementto (sufficient) life-sustain-ing matter.One may satisfy oneself of thetruthof thatgeneralisationaftera shortboutof clear-headedarmchairreflection. It is atruism,andnot, as Sen sometimes mislead-ingly suggests, somethingto be establishedby amassing and analysing observationaldata.21WhenI came to readtherelevantwriting,I discovered thatthe intellectual interestofthestated truism ies precisely in its practi-cal implications. For, properly applied, itdefeats the unthinking presumption, stillwidespreadat least in countrieswhere fam-inesareunknown, hat heyoccur f andonlyif, and because, food supply shrinks. Intruth, he immediatecause of loss of accessto food is, necessarily, the fracturingorshrinking of individual entitlement to itthroughwages, trading relations, personalproduction, etc, a fracturing or shrinkingsometimes, ndeed, caused by sheer short-ageof food, but often occurringin the faceof continuedphysical availability of food,becauseof price shifts, vagariesof wages,andunintelligentor callous public policy.The identification of entitlement as whatfinally mattersimplies that (1) food short-age need not be pivotal with respect tofamine (and-this is an empirical fact, ofenormouspractical import-in several ma-jor famines t has not actuallyoccurred)andthat 2) whetherornotfood shortageobtainsin agivencase of famine, famine preventionandrelief requires identifying, sustainingand repairing lines of entitlement whosedecay is what actually causes death.22Now, it might be said, in defence ofBeteille's characterisation of InequalityReexamined, hat this particularbook is notabout famines. But it does contain somediscussion of the topic, and in any case noone should be charged with Utopianismbecausehis more practical work happens obe laid out in places other thanthe one thatmisgenerates he stated charge. To call SenUtopian on the basis of this book is likecomplaining that a physician's manual ofdiagnosticstells us little abouthowto cure;wvlichis anyhowbeside the point, andwhichis doubly unfairwhen the same physicianhasalso written a manual of therapeutics.But let us turnfrom poverty and famineelimination o the less urgent ssue of equal-ity itself. If someone whlofavours less in-equality offers a circumspect ccoun)t of

what equality is, does it follow, that heUtopianly ondemnsanything hat allsshortof it? If someone explains what it wouldmean for theAugeanstablesto beperfectlyclean, is it pertinent o stigmatise him as aUtopianbecause t is notpossible to elimi-nate all the dirt? There is no rhapsodicdepictionof complete equalityin this bookor elsewhere in Sen's work, and noaffirmation hatsuch a thingis feasible, oreven desirable (since increases in equalitycan reduce aggregate utility, income, andcapability)."Thereis a cogent demandformore equality andan excellent identifica-tionof whereandhowto start.Senoffersnota Utopia but a practicallyfruitfulcriterion.Beteille writes thatthose, like Sen,who dwell upon ideals tend to be alittleimpatient bout helittleconstraints f theactualworldand t is thentheobligation fthesociologist o bring heseconstraintsotheirattention.24But Sendoes notneed to be advisedthat,forexample, therearestructuralendenciesin society to inequalities of status andpower.25 enre-examines nequality,buthedoes not undertake o say everything rel-evant to every aspect of that theme. Hedescribeshis aimsclearlyinChapter of thebook, andone cannotsay thathe does nothave enough significant ones, and shouldtherefore also have addressed the ratherdifferent issues whichengage Beteille.Pursuinghis theme hatUtopia s difficultto achieve, Beteille asks:

Can the equal evaluationof persons andpositions egeneratedhroughheconstruc-tion of a social arrangementn which allpersonsand all positions will be equallyesteemed,moreor less?(p 755)A negative answer o thisquestionis lesstellingthanBeteilleappears osuppose.Wecandistinguishthtee typesof inequalityofesteem. There s, first, thetype thatreflectsdifferentialachievements,which is not thesame as inequalityof esteem that derivesfromdifferences n income andpower, andneitherof those is the sameas inequalityofesteem sustainedby explicitly inegalitarianideology which assigns people to differentcategories of quality or being. I shall ad-dress these threetypes of inequalityof es-teemin reverseorder,withaview to remov-

ingthesting fromBeteille' s semi-rhetoricalquestion.The thirdtype of inequalityof esteem iswell illustratedby the Hindu caste system.Tenacious and savage though it is, it issurelynotthis status nequality hatBeteillehas nmind when he askshisquestion,sincehe cannot believe that it is impossible, asopposed to difficult, to eliminate it. Proofthat it can be eliminated is the fact that itdoes not exist in every society, and thatanaloguesof it disappeared rom many so-cieties where they were once strong: theanti-feudalbourgeoisrevolution n Europeis a salientmacro-example.Nor is it myste-

rious how to proceed against it in incom;pletely bourgeois states like India: by out-lawing and punishing the practice of un-touclhability, ystrugglingagainstdiscrimi-natory caste taboos, by instituting intelli-gently designedprogrammesof affirmativeaction.Caste inequalities of esteem differ fromthetwo othertypes distinguished above, inthat the lattersupervene on other inequali-ties, representativeexamples of which areinequality of income on the one hand, andinequalityof intellectual attainmenton theother. To the extent that it supervenes onincomeinequality,there s nosensein point-ing at statusinequalityas asupposedtrumpcard that the egalitarian carelessly or wil-fully forgot was in the deck. Foryou couldnot say, on this basis, that even if the in-equalities that egalitarians fix on (money,power,etc) weresomehoweliminated, therewould still be this other big one to reckonwith.To the extent, finally, that inequality ofesteem superveneson differential achieve-ment, the only ways of suppressing it en-tirelyarebyrestrictinghumanachievementthroughdenial of equality of opportunityorby some awfully complicated and repug-nant disinformation programme whichspreads lies about people's accomplish-ments. Accordingly, no one should want toeliminatethe nequalityofesteem that racksdifferential achievement. That inequalitywould appear in the best of all possiblesocial worlds.An oldright-wing notionsays that eftistsseek to eliminate all significant inequali-ties, yet cannothope to eliminate ones likeinequalityof esteem. But one of the signalmerits of Sen's new book is itsacknowledgement-indeed, its subtle andcircumspect demonstration-that, becauseof humandiversity, equality in one dimen-sion (e g, of opportunity o develop talent)means inequality in others (thus, here, ofachievement and esteem).26So it is espe-cially unfair to parade before Sen a proofthat not all inequalities are eliminable(whether or not there exist less reflectiveegalitarianswho are ess awareof that ruth).Since all equalities generatecompanioninequalities, we have to decide which onesto combat and which to tolerate. If we setaside caste differences, we can say thatinequalities of esteem should be tolerated,for at least two reasons. First, the disjunc-tiveone givenabove,thattheycan be elimi-nated only by telling lies and/or by sup-pressing equality of opportunity. Second,that they do not involve transferable re-sources: maybe you can prevent someonefromobtainingthehighi egardhewouldgetin the normal course of things, but youcannot take it from him and give it tosomebody else. Consequently, the case forthe (indep)endent27)njustice of status dif-ferenltialss extremelyweak, andit is there-

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fore not the right inequality to combat.Under capability equality, and inevitablydifferent uses of it, inequalityof esteem isboth unavoidable andacceptable.Beteilleremarks hatwhile we knowthatactual ocialarrangementsredifferent romtheone [Sen]prefers, he]hastoldus verylittleaboutwhatweought o do-or whatwecan do-to bring the preferred ocial ar-rangement nto being, and at what cost(p 756).Sen paints no picture of the total socialarrangement hathe would like to see, nor,afortiori (to this extent Beteille's commentiscorrect),does he tellus howtorealisesucha thing. Sen's focus, in theory and in prac-tice, is on particularevils. His concern iswith poverty and hunger, and one couldhardlymaintain that he has said very littleaboutwhatwe ought to do aboutthem. Thedetaileddiscussion in this bookof appropri-ate indices of illfareand welfare, and, moreso, the related discussions in Poverty andFamines, targetedon poverty in particular,for example in its Chapter 3, are entirelyrelevant to appropriate orms, levels, andmeansof delivery of public provision andsupport. If 'Utopian' means starry-eyed,Sen is not. If it means wantingtheworld tobe better,buthaving no idea how to make itso, then, again, that is not Sen. If it meanswanting the world to be better, then he is,commendably, guilty as charged.

Notes,[IthankVKRamachandranndArnoldZubofffor finecriticismsof anearlierversionof thisarticle.]1 Senhimself makesclearatp 4.2 P 5. It s indicativeof Sen's primaryocuson poverty hatthelist of "functionings"given here o illustrate hatconcept ngen-eral s virtually denticalwith thelistusedelsewhere p 1 O)ocharacteriseoverty ssuch.3 The section of 'Equalityof What?' ntro-ducing henotionofcapabilitywasentitled'BasicCapabilityEquality'.Thephrase assomething f thecharacterofan xymoron.For people can all have basic capabilitywithoutbeingequal ncapability,ncome,oranything lse. "Universalbasiccapabil-ity"wouldbebothmore elicitous ndmoreappropriateor whatSenhas nmindwhen

hespeaks f "basiccapability quality".4 There are two powerful motivations orpointing to something other than eithergoods or utilitywhenconcerningoneselfwithegalitarian olicy,but hemotivationspoint at differentthings. lThere s goodreason o ookatwhataperson an achieve,independentlyf his actual tate; nid hereis goodreasonnottoreduce heevaluationof thatactial stateeither oanexaminationof hisstockof resources rtoanassessmentof hisutilityevel.Thesearedistinctpoints,and, so I complain n Cohen(1992), theyhaveoften beenconflated n Sen'spresen-tation.I shall nothereresunmehecriticism

pursued n thatarticle of this and otherminordislocations n theconceptual caf-folding hatSen haserected,orrespondoSen'streatmentf it nSen(1992a),orpassjudgment n the extent o whichthecriti-cismapplies oformulations ffered n thebookunderdiscussion.5 Forstriking llustrations f this truth, eeSection3 of Chapter of InequalityReex-ainined.6 'DoConceptsMatter?'s thetitleofSection4 of Chapter of InequalityReexamined.7 As he did nearlier ssays:see, inparticu-lar,Sen(1982),Section5.8 See fn 17, p 67, whereSenacknowledgesthat"freedomshatresultfrom othavingmalaria are]not ndispute"betweenhimandactualand potential ritics.Theques-tion is not whetheryou are freer n theabsence f malariabecause ouare ree odothingsyoucouldotherwisenotdo),butwhetherts absence s itself partof yourfreedom.Unless hisdistinctionsgrasped,the criticism f Senin thissectionwill notbeunderstood.9 It s notentirely lear hatSenmeansus totake heproof-readerxample nthisfash-ion, but it must be so construed or thephrase"forthatexactreason"to haveap-plication.10 Asopposed othe everswhichcontrol hechauffeur:mycommandsmightbesaid tobe such evers.11 It is unclear-see note 9 above-whetheror notSen wouldregardhatas a relevantvariant f his proof-readerxample.12 P65, andsee Sen(1982),pp216, 218.13 People do, of course,have abilities thattheydo notexercise,butI cannot ee howthepersonntheexample ouldbe shown ohaveanabilityunlessshe s shown ohaveexercisedone.14 Thequalifications necessarybecauseofthedistinctionmade n note 8 above.15 P 67,quotingBerlin 1969),p 179.16 TheChristiancientist'swill does aim athis own eternal) ood,butwecould mag-ine adifferent xample,n which he acci-dent victim wouldwish to be elsewherethan the hospital or self-sacrificing ea-sons.17 Seethequotation romp64 above.18 Thereareexceptionswhichhaveno bear-inghere:when(perhaps ecauseI amact-ingunder uress) hope ofail,orwhen ampicking ndifferently etweenpossibilitiesandI donot carewhichoneis realised.19 IamalsounpersuadedySen'sattempt ovindicate he phrase"freedom rom ma-laria"as fitting"intoa broad eneral on-ceptof freedom" p 68)andnot ustsigni-fyingabsence f something ndesired,ikeacupboardhats freeofdirt,but shallnotpursue hatrelativelyminormatterhere.SeeCohen 1992), pp24-25.20 Andhegarnishedhat itlewithBrowning'scouplet:"Ah, buta man's reach shouldexceedhisgrasp/orwhat'sa Heaven or?"21 Hefrequently ounterposes isown "en-titlement" onceptiono "foodavailabilitydecline" as thoughtheywerecompeting

empirical heories.22 See Sen (1981), pp 8, 78-83, 123-29andDrezeandSen (1989), pp26-27, forcom-pendiouspresentation f thesepoints.23 See pp7-8, 92-93, 136-47.24 Beteille(1993), p 754.25 Beteille s, by theway,unclear,atleast tome,astowhether emeans oemphasiseheintrinsicorthecausal importance f suchinequalities."Inequalitysatbottom mat-ter of social esteem" (p 755, my italics)invites,given tscontext, he irstconstrual.Butunequal steem s alsodescribed s "afar deepersource of inequality hanun-equal ncome(p 755, myitalics),andthatmustbeacausalclaim.Beteillemightwantto makebothclaims,but he shouldnever-thelessdistinguish hem.One canask,re-garding hecausalclaim,ofwhatinequalityare inequalities of esteem (and, Beteilleadds, power) "deepersources" thanun-equal ncome s? Ifindno hintof ananswerto thatquestion n Beteille's review.Whatheperhapsmeans s notthat nequalities fstatusandpowerareeither ntrinsically rcausally more important han others butthat heyareespeciallytenaciousbecauserobustlyelf-reproducing.This hird nter-pretation f whatBeteillesays s suggestedmorebytheactual ruth hanby Beteille'swords.)26 See pp ix-xi, 1-3, 19-21, 27-28, 129-31,139. Beteille himselfhighlightsthis ele-ment in Sen's book: see Beteille (1993),p 753.27 Independent, hat is, of the injustices tsometimesreflects,suchas thatof grosslyunequal ncome:recall that the ladderofesteem thatgoes with caste is not undercomment n this paragraph.ReferencesBerlin, saiah 1969):FourEssaysonLiberty,OxfordUniversityPress,London.Beteille,Andre 1993): 'Amartya en's Uto-pia',Economic ndPoliticalWeekly,April17, 1993.Cohen, G A (1992): 'Equalityof What?OnWelfare, Goods and Capabilities' inMarthaC Nussbaumand AmartyaSen(eds), The Quality of Life, Oxford:ClarendonPress.Dreze,JeanandSen,Amartya1989):HungerandPublicAction,Oxford:larendonPress.Rawls,John 1971):ATheory fJustice,Cam-bridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress.Sen,Amartya1980): 'Equality f What?' inSterlingMcMurrined), TheTannier ec-tureson HumanValues,Vol I, SaltLakeCity:Universityof UtahPress.

- (1981):PovertyandFaminies: nEssayonEntitlemenitantd Deprivationt,Oxford:Clarendon ress.- (1982): 'Liberty s Control:AnAppraisal',MidwestStudies n Philosophy,Vol 7.- (1992a): 'Capabilityand Well-Being' inMarthaCNussbaumiandmartyaSeneds),The Quality of Life, Oxford:ClarendonPress.- (1 992b): IntequalityReexam)inted,xford:Clarendon ress.

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