BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AND PROCEDURES 3-10.2

1 MARCH 2008

Tactical Doctrine

INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

_________________________________________________________________________________ ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-

Publishing.af.mil (will convert to www.af.mil/e-publishing on AF Link) for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication. _________________________________________________________________________________ OPR: HQ USAF/A7S0 (Lt Col Bargery) Certified by: HQ USAF/A4/7

(Lt Gen Kevin J. Sullivan) Pages: 29 _________________________________________________________________________________ PURPOSE : This Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) document describes the command relationships and organizational processes required of an effective command and control center to support integrated base defense operations. APPLICABILTY : This AFTTP is authoritative in nature, but requires judgment in application. The principles and processes of this AFTTP must be translated into unit type code (UTC) and force module capabilities by the appropriate agencies and pilot units. SCOPE: While the processes set forth in this AFTTP are scoped for implementation at expeditionary, high-threat locations, the tactical doctrine principles remain the same for garrison operations at low-threat locations, with certain exceptions in the intelligence mission area. The principles and processes of this AFTTP should be utilized in routine operations to improve base defense integration and to better prepare the Air Force defense force for its combat mission. However, applying this AFTTP in routine, garrison operations may not require full time manning of some staff processes discussed. In these cases, processes should be in place (manned as additional duties, networked organizational constructs, and/or chartered working groups) to ensure the intended integration and planning is accomplished as required within operational and legal constraints. This document does not address the details of the installation control center (ICC) or emergency operations center (EOC) as they are discussed in separate, complementary guidance. The successful execution of integrated base defense (IBD) command and control (C2) operations requires the integration of the base defense operations center (BDOC) and EOC within the ICC construct.

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Chapter 1--COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) RELATIONSHIPS 3

1.1. Background 3 Figure 1. Base Defense Command Relationships 4

1.2. Battlefield Control Measures 5 Figure 2. Base Defense Concept of ISR and Effects 5

1.3. Base Security Zone Command Relationships 7 Figure 3. Notional Example of Optimal Base Boundary. 7 Figure 4. Notional Example of a Suboptimal Base Boundary 9

Chapter 2--BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER TASK ORGANIZATION 10

2.1. BDOC Capabilities 10 2.2. BDOC Deployability 11 2.3. BDOC Organization 12

Figure 5. Typical BDOC Organization 13 2.4. Intelligence Fusion Cell 13 2.5. BDOC Future Operations Cell Processes 15 2.6. BDOC Current Operations Cell Processes 18 2.7. Mission Specific Capability Cell 20 2.8. BDOC Staff Size Considerations 21

Chapter 3--PLANNING, TRAINING, AND REQUIREMENTS 22 3.1. BDOC Air and Space Expeditionary Force Structure Requirements 22 3.2. Training and Certification 22 3.3. Equipment Requirements 23

Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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Chapter 1

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

1.1. Background. Base defense command relationships are prescribed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. Base defense command authority is delegated from the joint force commander (JFC), who assigns base command to the Service with primary interest in the installation.

1.1.1. Air bases provide the joint warfighting team with a strategic line of communication as well as airpower for the JFC’s operations. As such, they are high value targets for the enemy both by being highly symbolic and lucrative if the attack degrades airpower’s advantages. Additionally, the strategic implications of a successful attack are profound. The successful destruction of a strategic global mobility asset loaded with American troops could have overwhelming effects on national resolve while motivating widespread resistance to American operations in the theater. After the immediate effect on the joint force’s operations, critical air assets can only be replaced with significant expense and time.

1.1.2. Past experience has shown forward operating bases (FOBs) are inherently joint. This trend will continue, if not increase, as the United States armed forces transform to a networked force adept at countering asymmetric enemies. As a result, joint warfare will move towards larger FOBs with numerous high value, critical assets from more than one Service’s component. These critical assets must be provided with a secure operating location from which to base their operations and store their high-value assets.

1.1.3. To the air component of the joint force, effective air and space operations require a level of security higher than other FOBs. While hardening airfield facilities and aircraft provides some ability for airpower to withstand or mitigate enemy attacks, air operations are difficult to sustain in an environment where the enemy freely attacks the air base with either penetrating or standoff attacks.

1.1.4. In large FOBs, the land component personnel will likely outnumber the air component personnel. The principles of unity of command and unity of effort suggest the component with the most stringent defense requirements, rather than the component with the preponderance of personnel, should command the defense priorities for the joint base. To ignore this best practice risks the defense priorities for air operations becoming a secondary or tertiary consideration rather than driving the operation.

1.1.4.1. The component commander responsible for air operations (when the Air Force is the air component, the Commander of Air Force Forces [COMAFFOR]) at FOBs containing an active airfield should lead base defense operations since air operations drive more robust defensive requirements.

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Figure 1. Base Defense Command Relationships.

1.1.5. Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, states the base commander appointed by the JFC is responsible for base defense. This, in turn, drives the service identity of the Defense Force Commander (DFC) and the Service that will lead in organizing, training, and equipping the BDOC as discussed in JP 3-10. When operating in joint or coalition environments, BDOCs are sometimes referred to as JDOCs or CDOCs respectively.

1.1.6. The command relationships for a BDOC are depicted in Figure 1. The BDOC is part of the ICC and serves as the installation commander’s tactical operation center for the base defense effort and in that role should function as the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) integrator for the base defense battlespace.

1.1.6.1. The Service with the designated installation commander normally provides the lead in establishing the nature and quantity of forces dedicated to base defense. However, when capability gaps exist, JP 3-10 states the JFC can attach other forces to the installation commander with specification of tactical control (TACON).

1.1.6.2. In the case of air base defense, other components may have excess combat capacity in the area of the air base potentially able to support both the component’s and

Command Relationships For Base Defense

Joint Force Commander

Service Component Commander

Service Component Commander

Tenant Base Defense Forces Provided for BSZ Missions

Defense Force Commander

Base Tenant Units

Base Commander

BDOC

Service Component Forces Assigned / Attached for Base

Defense

Other Component Forces Made Available for BSZ

Missions

OPCON

TACON

ADCON

ICC

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base defense priorities. In this case, these forces should be under the TACON of the DFC for the particular mission.

1.1.6.3. Other Service components residing on the installation may provide some defense capability as part of operating on the installation or as a result of a component unique defense requirement. For unity of command and fratricide prevention, these forces should operate under the TACON of the DFC for the duration of the specific base defense task(s) they are performing.

1.1.6.4. During air base opening operations, the BDOC functionality must phase in based on mission requirements and report to the base commander as the situation requires.

1.2. Battlefield Control Measures. The base security zone (BSZ) depicted in Figure 2 is, in its simplest terms, the battlespace from which the enemy can launch an attack against base personnel and resources or aircraft approaching/departing the base. The geography of a BSZ should be determined by factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). However, historical experience with irregular threat forces and their use of rockets, mortars, and shoulder-launched surface to air missiles gives a planning factor of five kilometers, as a minimum, from base resources (e.g., aircraft operating surfaces, maintenance facilities, and billeting locations). Base defense operations within the BSZ should be accomplished by dedicated base defense forces, host nation forces, and other coalition forces. All of these efforts should be integrated by the DFC for unity of command and unity of effort. The area of interest reaches beyond the BSZ to anticipate and counter enemy threats. While base defense forces do not influence effects in the area of interest, they can shape the environment by coordination with joint/coalition forces and/or the host nation.

Figure 2. Base Defense Concept of ISR and Effects.

Base Defense Area of Interest

Fusion of All Source Intelligence

Base Security Zone

Joint Air Base Defense PrioritiesMet by Joint Forces

Installation Perimeter

Organic Security ZoneEffectsFocused ISR for the Air Base

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1.2.1. Experience and enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), both historic and current, show the standoff attacker presents a fleeting target. Insurgents, terrorists and special operations forces depend on blending in with the legitimate populace and typically only reveal themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act. It is not feasible to catch every enemy before he attacks, so the best practice is to shape a more secure BSZ. Interacting with the local populace in a positive manner is one method of shaping a secure BSZ. Robust defense operations denying the enemy the ability to plan, organize, conduct reconnaissance and use key terrain will also help secure the BSZ. Persistent, tactical, real-time intelligence assets (including human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery assets) and proactive combat operations within the BSZ and area of interest provide an early threat warning capability and cue organic/joint fires and forces. Some of these tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets may also need to be employed in the area of interest to provide early warning of threats.

1.2.2. In non-linear warfare, the BSZ will often overlap with terrain where the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) also operates. This could create a conflict between the base commander and the other component area commander. In this case, the JFLCC/JFSOCC and base commander may have separate, but equally important, tactical tasks that need servicing within the BSZ. This may create a situation where commanders are competing for limited resources

1.2.3. Battlespace issues in joint warfare are solved by creating battlefield control measures where all forces operating in the area have equal opportunity to conduct operations, managed by a single commander responsible for the area. In the context of base defense, JP 3-10 creates a battlefield control measure called a “base boundary.” Chapter I of JP 3-10 states “the base boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter, rather it should be established based on the factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support available, and Time available (METT-T), specifically balancing the need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission.” The term BSZ as defined in paragraph 1.2 is Air Force-specific and should be used intra-Service only and ideally will equate to the base boundary in a joint operation.

1.2.4. As previously stated, the JFLCC, JFSOCC, host nation, and base commander may have competing interests in the terrain surrounding the base. To solve this dilemma, the base boundary is determined between the base commander and area commander. The optimal configuration for the base commander is when the base boundary and base security zone encompass the same terrain as depicted in Figure 3. However, host nation or other component considerations could result in the base boundary not encompassing all of the terrain within the BSZ as depicted in Figure 4, despite the base commander’s need for unity of command within the standoff footprint.

1.2.5. The ideal situation for air base defense is when the base commander is also the Senior Airfield Authority (SAA). In those instances when the base commander and SAA are not the same person then the SAA’s base defense concerns and tasks must be coordinated with the base commander and other component area commanders. The base defense requirements of the SAA include actions to mitigate or assume risks within the shoulder-launched surface to air missile engagement zone of the airfield as well as creating an acceptable security environment

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for air operations. These security requirements should be included in the base defense plan and could require the SAA to provide additional base defense capability to shape the base security environment.

1.3. BSZ Command Relationships. Since enemy forces in the BSZ are extremely fleeting targets, the BDOC must orchestrate C4ISR within the BSZ. In an ideal situation the BSZ and the base boundary encompass the same terrain. This means the base boundary will function as an area of operations (AO) where both base defense forces and joint/coalition forces may concurrently execute separate tasks that are managed within the BDOC for the terrain within the base boundary.

Figure 3. Notional Example of Optimal Base Boundary.

Air Base

Base Security Zone

Base Boundary

Urban Area

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Figure 4. Notional Example of a Suboptimal Base Boundary.

1.3.1. The BDOC is the tactical operations center for all operations occurring within the base boundary and the DFC is the JFLCC equivalent of a battalion AO commander. JFLCC battalion commanders do not normally have directly task organized assets such as civil affairs teams, tactical air control parties (TACPs), and artillery. Rather, battalions request these capabilities through their brigade combat team (BCT), which normally allocate these resources based on the BCT’s priorities. The Air Force expeditionary base commander, through the COMAFFOR, should ensure the appropriate memoranda of understanding (MOUs) are in place with the JFLCC, JFSOCC, or JFC to allow the DFC access to joint capabilities on the same level and priority as a battalion AO commander.

1.3.2. When the base boundary is constrained, the base commander retains a tactical base defense requirement in the portion of the BSZ that remains outside the base boundary (e.g., the shoulder-launched surface to air missile footprint). Accordingly, the base commander should coordinate/integrate proactive security operations with the appropriate AO commander or host

Air Base

Base Security Zone

Base Boundary

Urban Area

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nation commander to counter the standoff threat or assume the risk. The DFC will normally conduct this coordination/integration on behalf of the base commander.

1.3.3. For terrain outside of the base boundary but within the BSZ, the DFC should coordinate with the area/host nation commander any request for joint/coalition forces necessary to conduct base defense tasks within the area. If area commander/host nation forces are not available due to competing requirements, then the DFC should coordinate with the appropriate area commander for base defense forces to conduct the base defense task. When base defense forces operate outside the base boundary, they should fall under the TACON of the appropriate AO commander in coordination with the host nation to ensure unity of effort to engage the enemy with a more compressed kill chain and to prevent fratricide.

1.3.4. Joint and coalition forces entering the base boundary must inform the BDOC before they enter the base boundary and monitor the BDOC’s communication net while operating in the area. Prior coordination with the BDOC regarding forces planning to enter the base boundary will prevent conflicts with other operations and reduce the potential for fratricide.

1.3.5. Deconflicting the tactical tasks of separate commanders is discussed in Chapter 2.

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Chapter 2

BDOC TASK ORGANIZATION

2.1. BDOC Capabilities. The BDOC acts, on behalf of the base commander and DFC, as a C4ISR center to integrate the application of offensive and defensive actions, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the force protection (FP) battlespace. As the organization charged with integrating and coordinating all base defense efforts, the BDOC is responsible for enabling the integrated base defense (IBD) objectives of see first, understand first, and act first (for additional information on IBD, see AFTTP 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense).

2.1.1. The base defense effort for a joint forward operating location on a nonlinear battlefield bears striking similarities to the operational command and control issues faced by the air component commander at the operational level of war. Both missions require centralized control and decentralized execution of forces as well as capabilities brought together from several components. Both the BDOC and the air and space operations center (AOC) have some of these forces/capabilities, but must also integrate forces and support from other components and coalition partners. Additionally, both missions require predictive analysis to conduct direct action combat missions that counter expected enemy courses of action (COAs) and position forces to swiftly react to enemy forces that are not deterred or defeated by the proactive measures. Therefore, the BDOC can benchmark applicable lessons from some of the AOC’s battle-proven processes and methods.

2.1.2. History shows the active force protection effort requires a C2 node focused on finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assessing (F2T2EA) threats to the base. However, the BDOC is a subordinate control center to the base commander’s mission command center (for an Air Force-commanded base, the ICC). Additionally, a separate C2 node (for an Air Force commanded base, the EOC) focused on complementary passive force protection and recovery after attack efforts is needed to deal with the massive amount of data/communication that occurs during an incident. The EOC and BDOC are coequal C2 nodes and part of the ICC. These relationships are discussed in detail in Air Force ICC guidance.

2.1.2.1. These three C2 nodes must share a collaborative common operating picture (COP) to ensure the entire base defense effort is integrated and deconflicted. In this manner, the ICC, BDOC, and EOC act as one C2 capability for the installation commander, but do not overwhelm each other with data.

2.1.2.2. The geographic locations of these three C2 nodes are less relevant to individual integration provided a real-time collaborative COP is utilized. If a COP is not possible, then consider geographically collocating these three operations centers, provided they are able to isolate themselves from each other adequately to focus on their span of control and do not create an unnecessary force protection vulnerability.

2.1.2.3. Additionally, all joint/coalition forces operating in or adjacent to the BSZ should have access to the COP for unity of effort and situational awareness. In order to accomplish this, the COP must have the ability to integrate data from a variety of security levels (Unclassified, Coalition, Secret, and Top Secret/Sensitive

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Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)) and display them in a coherent manner to the user at their authorized clearance level.

2.1.3. For joint base operations, these arrangements remain the same if the Air Force provides the base commander. Tenant units are required to integrate into the base commander’s base defense plan.

2.1.4. When the Air Force does not provide the base commander, the Air Force will retain a Security Forces (SF) C2 capability primarily for executing Air Force-specific security requirements. This SF C2 capability could be collocated with the BDOC, but only the BDOC controls base defense forces executing tactical tasks in the BSZ. When Air Force Security Forces are executing Service-specific security operations within the base, they fall under the command and control of the Air Force SF unit commander operating out of the BDOC to ensure consistency with ongoing base defense security operations.

2.1.5. When Air Force forces and capabilities are performing BSZ tactical tasks, they will be under mission-specific TACON to the DFC through the BDOC when executing the mission with the exception of Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) counter threat operations (CTO). AFOSI CTO will be coordinated with and in communication with the BDOC to ensure mission focus, unity of effort, and safety of forces.

2.2. BDOC Deployability. In order to effectively support expeditionary warfare, BDOC capabilities should be deployable. The BDOC should be included in the first command center capability established during air base opening to ensure the active defense of Air Force assets as they deploy into the expeditionary operating location. BDOC capability is scalable and when first established may be as simple as the DFC and a radio operator. An air expeditionary wing (AEW) is most vulnerable to attack during the initial deployment of forces; an added benefit to the enemy is a tactical action could result in the strategic effect of preventing the deployment/sustainment of US Forces into the theater.

2.2.1. Only at bases where an Air Force commander is designated as the base commander by the JFC does the Air Force need to provide the BDOC as part of base command responsibility. At locations where the Air Force is a tenant on other Service-hosted bases (preferably where air operations are not routine) the Air Force should be prepared to provide a continuous liaison in the host Service BDOC as well as BDOC staffing manpower or other enabling capabilities commensurate with the Air Force’s “fair share” of base defense force responsibility.

2.2.2. BDOC capability should be postured in scalable UTCs to provide initial and full operational capability to deployment locations whether they are steady-state expeditionary operating locations or operating locations opened for a specific, short-term mission.

2.2.3. BDOCs should also be scalable based on the factors of METT-TC. A more robust threat will require a more robust staff to handle an increased volume of workload and span of control. Additionally, the presence of more robust threats could require additive modules such as the capability to facilitate organic and sister Service indirect fires; facilitate close air support (CAS); recognize and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE); or conduct post-attack crater analysis. These capabilities may not reside

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in the core BDOC UTC but should be task identified as a force module and, as such, personnel should train together during the pre-deployment training cycle.

2.2.4. Just as the Air Force organizes the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) into separate capability packages (air and space expeditionary task forces [AETF]) to sustain expeditionary operations, expeditionary BDOCs should be organized, trained, and equipped to support the expected AEF force structure.

2.3. BDOC Organization. Exact BDOC organization and manning depends on the joint warfighting team present on an operating base, according to the responsibility each component shares in the defense of the location. As such the DFC will exercise command and control over all personnel assigned to the BDOC (with the exception of tenant liaisons). This ensures unity of command with a single command and control architecture and a single commander for the integrated base defense effort.

2.3.1. At a minimum, major tenant organizations identified by the base commander should provide the BDOC with a liaison representative.

2.3.2. Based on component-specific capabilities, other components on the base may bring mission-specific capabilities to the BDOC that should be utilized to enhance the unity of command and capabilities of the base defense effort. While these capabilities may not be required to be present in the BDOC continually, these capabilities should be attached with a specification of TACON or provided in direct support to the base commander for base defense purposes. Shared capabilities should be responsive to requests from the BDOC for assistance commensurate with other component priorities.

2.3.3. A BDOC is a tactical operation center for integrating fires and effects, not a squadron unit control center. Accordingly, the S-1 and S-4 functions that are part of a squadron staff are not part of the BDOC so they are not discussed in this TTP.

2.3.4. Since the BDOC is a C2 center for commanding or controlling forces executing tactical tasks, it only requires those functions necessary to the C2 mission. The typical BDOC organization is outlined in figure 5.

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Figure 5. Typical BDOC Organization.

2.4. Intelligence Fusion Cell. The intelligence fusion cell provides the base defense force with analyzed or vetted all-source information that drives effective force protection decisions and operations. The intelligence fusion cell is inherently multi-disciplined but does not need to possess all capabilities locally. Many of these capabilities can be obtained through theater and strategic reachback. This cell should provide the DFC with the ability to predict enemy COAs based on initial and continuous intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). This cell must have situational awareness of events throughout the base’s area of interest (that area where tactical intelligence information must be immediately available to the base defense force in order for the base to be able to effectively counter enemy COAs).

2.4.1. Effective intelligence and counterintelligence efforts are critical to identifying, analyzing, and disseminating threat information to the DFC. Potential threats to the base may

Base Commander

Defense Force Commander (DFC may appoint a BDOC OIC to manage daily operations if required)

Intelligence Fusion Cell

(S-2)

Future Operations Cell

(S-5)

Current Operations Cell

(S-3)

Mission Specific Capability Cells

Liaisons (e.g. Host Nation, Sister

Services, etc.) Base Tenant Unit

Liaisons

Mission Support

Analysis

Collection Management

Control

Coordination

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include: conventional military units, special forces, foreign intelligence agents and services, terrorist groups, aggressive civil populations, cyberterrorists, criminal elements, extremist groups or insider threats, and anti-government and hate groups. The enemy may use weapons such as: mortars, rockets, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), computer viruses, and CBRNE material and agents. Considering the wide range of possible threats, Intelligence Fusion Cell members should focus on developing force protection intelligence (FPI), defined as analyzed, all-source information concerning threats to DoD missions, people or resources arising from terrorists, criminal entities, foreign intelligence and security services and opposing military forces. Commanders should develop critical information requirements to guide FPI work supporting their decision-making and operations. Intelligence Fusion Cell personnel should coordinate with their cross-functional counterparts (e.g., AFOSI, Security Forces, Antiterrorism Officers, etc.) to ensure FPI requirements are satisfied. Once FPI has been fused, personnel should swiftly disseminate it to the S3, S5, DFC, base commander, and throughout applicable intelligence channels.

2.4.2. Intelligence Fusion Cell members will collect and analyze pertinent information to support force protection missions. The cell should possess the capability to gather theater and tactical level intelligence on relevant threats affecting the base, perform analysis, and provide mission support to force protection operations. The cell should be organized, trained, and equipped to support DFC planning. Members will perform collections, analysis, and mission support tasks. Once collected and analyzed, it is crucial that this intelligence feedback into operations and intelligence reporting chains.

2.4.2.1. Collection Management. Cell members will need to prioritize intelligence requirements, task organic assets and coordinate with JTF and theater intelligence collection managers to employ ISR assets and capabilities to support IBD. Additionally, they will need to coordinate development of a Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan utilizing local assets. Cell personnel should also seek to develop joint-force and coalition intelligence liaisons with the intent of gathering sufficient information to build a complete threat picture.

2.4.2.2. Analysis. Cell members will use analytical methods (e.g., IPB, trends and events analysis, link analysis, etc.) to assess the impact of asymmetric threats on Air Force missions. During this process, they will take advantage of all available information to include counterintelligence, SIGINT, Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and HUMINT. Analytical products should include shoulder-launched surface to air missile, indirect fire (IDF) and direct fire assessments; intelligence estimates; enemy COAs; and should support the construction of target intelligence packages for high value targets (HVTs) and high value individuals (HVIs).

2.4.2.3. Mission Support. Cell members will conduct a variety of mission support tasks. Of primary importance, the cell will brief the DFC and staff on enemy COAs. They will also need to perform ground combat focused mapping functions, develop target intelligence packages for FP operations, and conduct pre- and post-mission briefings/debriefings as needed. These briefings may include situation briefs, COA briefs, guard-mount/ground patrol/convoy briefings, and direct action mission briefs.

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2.4.2.4. Reporting. Cell members may need to provide intelligence input to the following reports: Mission Reports (MISREPS), Intelligence Reports (INTREPS), Spot Reports (SPOTREPS) and other after-action reports. They will also write a daily intelligence summary covering all significant events within the AO and write the intelligence input to daily Situation Reports (SITREPs).

2.4.3. Manning of this cell should minimally consist of Air Force Intelligence, AFOSI, and Security Forces specialists. Component capabilities should be added to this cell as their fair share of the base defense effort dictates or if they bring a required special capability to the operation.

2.4.4. For task organization, it is important to note AFOSI, Army Military Intelligence, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service are the only military organizations authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities and operations in accordance with DOD Directive 5240.2, DOD Counterintelligence.

2.5. BDOC Future Operations Cell Processes. The future operations cell performs a function similar to an AOC’s Strategy and Combat Plans Divisions, but for base defense at the tactical level. The future operations cell takes the intelligence fusion cell’s analysis and devises a strategy to counter enemy activities proactively for the next 24 hours and beyond. Additionally, the future operations cell identifies expected shortfalls in defense force capability and recommends appropriate requests for forces or capabilities for the base commander to forward to the AEW Commander and up the chain of command to the JFC. As a base becomes fully operational, the future operations cell is also responsible for drafting and coordinating the base defense plan.

2.5.1. The first step in building a BSZ ground tasking order (GTO) is to formulate a strategy. The future operations cell translates the DFC’s BSZ strategy into a rolling GTO for the next 24 hours. The GTO postures and deconflicts forces for what is anticipated to provide a strategy “playbook” to execute. The GTO should integrate, deconflict and document all planned friendly force activities within the BSZ to include those planned activities of the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFSOCC, and with host nation activities. When constructing a BSZ GTO, the BDOC will coordinate with the JFSOCC/JFLCC forces operating in the AOs in or adjacent to the BSZ to minimize risks to all forces. The BSZ GTO must also consider the effects required to support the AOC’s Air Tasking Order (ATO). The GTO should be flexible and able to be modified during execution in response to urgent circumstances and/or developing situations.

2.5.2. Using the postulated enemy COAs from the intelligence fusion cell, the future operations cell determines the best methods to counter the enemy COAs by building an operations plan. These methods can include the following types of tactical tasks within the BSZ:

2.5.2.1. Occupy named areas of interest to deny the enemy the ability to maneuver and canalize through avenues of approach or engage the air base from key terrain.

2.5.2.2. Conduct random checkpoints on avenues of approach within the BSZ to identify enemy forces prior to their mounting an attack.

2.5.2.3. Conduct offensive combat operations within the BSZ to shape the battlespace.

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2.5.2.3.1. Integrate these operations with planned effects of non-kinetic operations to further shape the battlespace.

2.5.2.4. Conduct aggressive patrols to dominate the BSZ, thereby deterring/denying enemy activities while providing tactical information to the intelligence fusion cell.

2.5.2.4.1. These activities can be conducted with or without AFOSI, joint collection teams and Army civil affairs teams responsible for conducting operations in the area.

2.5.2.4.2. Conducting patrols with AFOSI and civil affairs personnel provides these personnel with often required tactical force protection for their operations.

2.5.2.4.3. Conducting patrols with AFOSI and civil affairs personnel also helps defense force personnel to be perceived as interested in the good order and prosperity of the local community. Such perceptions could increase the likelihood that community members will then provide tactical intelligence information and thus aid in denying enemies within the BSZ freedom of movement.

2.5.2.4.4. Plan and execute tactical reconnaissance and surveillance activities within the named areas of interest utilizing patrols, sharpshooter teams, observation posts, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc.

2.5.2.5. Conduct ambush operations at likely enemy infiltration routes and weapons caches to fix and engage enemy forces as they move into position to attack.

2.5.2.6. Position precision engagement teams and quick reaction forces strategically within the BSZ to fix and engage enemy forces attempting to conduct an attack.

2.5.2.7. Coordinate use of local or regional strategic communication or information operations activities to deter enemy forces, enhance local cooperation and mitigate unintended effects of operations in the BSZ.

2.5.3. After the BSZ operations plan strategy is approved by the DFC for the next 24 hour period, the future operations cell integrates the capabilities of the JFLCC’s and JFSOCC’s forces, host nation forces, available joint fires, and base defense forces to match capabilities to tactical tasks.

2.5.3.1. Due to capabilities and their overlapping mission to conduct surface operations within the BSZ, the future operations cell should initially strive to integrate capabilities and overlapping tactical tasks from the JFLCC and JFSOCC commanders. Missions that can serve both the surface and base security missions are mutually beneficial. Depending on the availability of forces and current mission taskings of land component forces, many base security tactical tasks can be conducted by land component forces. However, surface component commanders should also answer to the JFLCC or JFSOCC for their primary tasks, so these commanders may not always be able to provide enough capability for base defense commensurate with the base commander’s

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ability to assume prudent risk. If the land component commander is unable to provide enough capability toward base defense then the Air Force will need to leverage the appropriate capability either through the request for forces process or by bringing additional organic Air Force capabilities forward. The availability of forces from other component commanders for base defense purposes must occur through predetermined and preestablished command relationships. Guidance should flow from the JFC’s intent for base defense responsibilities.

2.5.3.2. Host nation forces should also be utilized as much as possible to conduct base security missions within the BSZ. These forces are often most familiar with the local populace and terrain. BSZ tactical tasks conducted by host nation forces can often be conducted jointly with base defense forces; such operations build bonds of friendship as well as provide important tactical intelligence to the intelligence fusion cell. However, combined patrols face special challenges such as language barriers, cultural issues, and training differences that the DFC should address. Combined patrols should only be undertaken with senior leader commitment from both nations as well as combined briefings and rehearsals to reduce the possibility of unfortunate incidents.

2.5.3.3. Joint and coalition fires available for use in the BSZ should be planned for and coordinated in advance through the appropriate tactical operations center or AOC to ensure their availability and deconflict the requirements to leverage these capabilities. The base commander is responsible for ensuring coordination for these capabilities is planned for and established with the relevant C2 centers. These fires include, but are not limited to:

2.5.3.3.1. Joint and combined indirect fires (rockets, artillery, and mortars).

2.5.3.3.2. CAS. Regardless of Service, joint air bases should not have dedicated CAS assets unless the JFC determines it necessary. Air bases can request immediate CAS missions for defense of the base.

2.5.3.4. Those BSZ tactical tasks not yet planned for should be analyzed to determine what the risk to air operations and friendly personnel would be if any follow-on tasks were not executed. Base defense forces should be utilized to conduct the remaining tactical tasks until the level of risk to operations and personnel is acceptable to the base commander. The future operations cell should be cautious to ensure the tactical requirements of the task do not exceed the capabilities of the base defense force tasked to conduct the mission. If a capability/task mismatch occurs another capability should be used for the mission. Dedicated (full-time) base defense forces come from four sources:

2.5.3.4.1. Base defense forces provided by the base commander’s Service as part of the force protection package operating at the base. These forces normally conduct Service-specific security requirements, such as protection of major weapon systems or logistical areas.

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2.5.3.4.2. Base defense forces provided by the host nation. These forces and their responsibilities are normally outlined in a status of forces agreement or memorandum of agreement.

2.5.3.4.3. Base defense forces apportioned by the JFC. These forces are normally under the TACON of the base commander with mission-specific and routine taskings provided to the DFC by the base commander.

2.5.3.4.4. Base defense forces provided by tenants operating on the joint base. These forces normally conduct Service-specific security requirements, but may be able to provide additional base defense capability depending on the threat facing the base.

2.5.3.5. When base defense tactical tasks routinely exceed capabilities, the DFC should upchannel a request for additional forces to the base commander for consideration up the component chain of command to the JFC. This request for forces (RFF) is a key process for mitigating an unacceptable level of risk to air operations. RFF is also required if the base threat assessment anticipates need for CAS C2 requiring a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). If the RFF for additional dedicated base defense capability is denied, then the base commander should devise other means to mitigate the risk, accept the risk, or cease the operations at risk.

2.5.3.6. The future operations cell should coordinate the mission specific requirements and expectations for each tactical task. This advanced coordination (24 hours in advance of operations) is done with liaisons of all forces that plan to operate within the BSZ. This daily scheduling and deconfliction meeting is essential to ensure coordinated and integrated operations within the BSZ. Conducting a coordination meeting in advance also ensures adequate time is available for the tactical leaders to issue the proper operations order to their troops, and reduces the possibility of fratricide.

2.5.4. Once the BSZ tactical tasks are assigned, all the expected friendly activities within the BSZ are integrated together into a BSZ GTO. This GTO is the basis of operations for the following 24 hours and is the product the future operations cell provides to the current operations cell for execution.

2.6. BDOC Current Operations Cell Processes. The current operations cell monitors GTO execution and exercises C2 of all forces operating within the base boundary on behalf of the DFC. This is the traditional S-3 function of Air Force base defense and Army units. The current operation cell also maintains current situational awareness of joint/coalition operations outside the base boundary, but within the BSZ. Furthermore, it monitors the status of base defense forces operating outside the base boundary under the TACON of adjacent area commanders for base defense tasks.

2.6.1. The current operations cell acts as the C2 communications network control station for the base boundary. Other forces operating within or transiting through the base boundary must identify themselves to the BDOC C2 communications net and continue to monitor the BDOC net to prevent fratricide and deconflict fires.

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2.6.2. To ensure unity of command and unity of effort for base defense, the DFC exercises TACON for all forces conducting base defense tactical tasks within the base boundary. The current operations cell provides this command and control capability for all forces conducting these tasks, regardless of nationality or Service.

2.6.2.1. This does not include AFOSI CTO. While not under direct TACON of the DFC, AFOSI CTO will be coordinated with the DFC and in communication with the BDOC to ensure mission focus, unity of effort, and safety of forces.

2.6.3. For effective operations, the liaison officers from all agencies providing critical capabilities within the BSZ or agencies routinely operating in the BSZ should be present in the current operations cell. This ensures rapid communication between affected agencies. These liaisons should be knowledgeable of their parent unit’s operations within the BSZ as well as able to provide critical information for deconfliction of fires. If the capabilities are specific to base defense, the personnel tasked to operate in the operations cell should be attached to that cell rather than merely acting as liaisons, in order to provide greater responsiveness to the needs of the ongoing operations.

2.6.4. The current operations cell executes the following key processes for the DFC:

2.6.4.1. Execute the GTO and strategy from the future operations cell.

2.6.4.2. Act as the base boundary net control station.

2.6.4.2.1. Receive reports from subordinate units.

2.6.4.2.2. Upchannel reports as required.

2.6.4.2.3. Communicate and coordinate with contiguous units.

2.6.4.3. Track friendly forces within the BSZ.

2.6.4.4. Integrate local and organic ISR capabilities into real time situational awareness of the base battlespace.

2.6.4.5. Dispatch/coordinate friendly forces as required.

2.6.4.6. Call for required joint fires.

2.6.4.7. Formulate and execute strategy to counter real-time enemy actions.

2.6.4.7.1. Formulate a COA taking into account METT-TC.

2.6.4.7.2. Garner DFC or shift officer in charge (OIC) (if delegated this authority by the DFC) approval to execute a COA.

2.6.4.7.3. Execute a COA.

2.6.4.7.4. Reconstitute forces as required.

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2.6.4.8. Notify the ICC when active defense measures are complete and post attack response and recovery measures are required.

2.7. Mission Specific Capability Cell. In order to be effective, a BDOC requires certain enablers. They include, but are not limited to, the following:

2.7.1. BDOC Equipment Support. The BDOC is a tactical operations center and does not execute the administrative control responsibilities of a unit. However, at least one member of the BDOC staff should be designated with the task of establishing and coordinating equipment requirements for BDOC operations.

2.7.2. Spectrum Management (frequency allocation).

2.7.2.1. BDOC operations rely heavily on communications equipment to include sensors and assessment devices that are linked to the BDOC. Therefore, a BDOC should have a designated individual to interface with the installation frequency spectrum management agency to ensure adequate capability is authorized for operations. This person does not need to be a frequency spectrum manager, but must be knowledgeable of all operating frequency requirements and able to interface with host nation personnel (as applicable) to secure use of the required frequencies.

2.7.2.2. The most effective means for working out these frequency allocation issues is during the planning phase of the operation. Therefore the BDOC staff should ensure their frequency requirements are made known to the geographic combatant commander’s J6 and included in the Joint Communication Electronic Operating Instruction (JCEOI) and are vetted through the applicable host nation channels.

2.7.3. Other enablers may be required based on specific mission requirements. Some examples are:

2.7.3.1. Translators/Interpreters (contract or military).

2.7.3.2. Crater analysis teams.

2.7.3.3. Fire support element (FSE).

2.7.3.3.1. Identifies and plans for use of joint/coalition indirect fires and CAS in support of base defense.

2.7.3.3.2. Once a target is identified, the FSE facilitates the indirect fire or CAS mission through the theater air control system (TACS) governed by JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support. Indirect fire capability requires specialized expertise normally associated with artillery forward observers and joint fires observers (JFOs). C2 of CAS requires a JTAC or Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) to perform terminal attack control. The artillery observer, JFO, or an unmanned aerial system may be utilized to provide real-time targeting data for the JTAC or FAC(A).

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2.7.3.3.3. Integration of non-organic indirect fires and CAS ensures economy of force by preventing the defense force from bringing an organic capability that is already available as part of the joint warfighting team.

2.7.3.4. Fire direction center to control assigned/attached fires and effects.

2.7.3.5. Top Secret (TS)/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) facility with associated communications systems and connectivity.

2.8. BDOC Staff Size Considerations. While every base in the Air Force should execute its IBD C2 functions by mirroring the deployable BDOC key processes, the size of the BDOC staff is mission- and situation-dependent. The basic UTC for BDOC staff should be built for a high threat in an austere environment and should be tailored based on actual threat/conditions.

2.8.1. Expeditionary BDOCs should be established assuming a baseline threat of irregular forces operating in a non-linear battlefield. Therefore, an expeditionary Air Force BDOC should be able to conduct BSZ integration and tactical C4ISR (for base defense) for an AEW in a high threat environment. The BDOC should have enough personnel to conduct continuous operations in an austere operational environment. Separate functional UTCs may be tasked in a force module built to support the BDOC.

2.8.2. Additional capabilities are included in the planning phase of the deployment or as the situation dictates.

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Chapter 3

PLANNING, TRAINING, AND REQUIREMENTS

3.1. BDOC AEF Force Structure Requirements. In the nature of expeditionary, non-linear warfare, BDOC capabilities should be deployable and apportioned to meet the force structure needs of the AEF.

3.1.1. Just as the Air Force organizes the AEF into separate capability packages to sustain expeditionary operations, expeditionary BDOCs should be organized, trained, and equipped to support the expected AEF force structure. For the Air Force to open and operate an additional operating location above this requirement might cause the Air Force to reach forward into future AEF capabilities to meet this surge requirement.

3.1.2. The Air Force employment of BDOCs and the number organized, trained, and equipped for deployable operations should be considerations in planning AEF capabilities.

3.1.3. The COMAFFOR should also ensure adequate IBD C2 capability will deploy with Air Force forces. For those air operations occurring on a joint base where the Air Force does not provide the base commander, a subset of IBD C2 capability may be provided by the Air Force to pay its “fair share” for defense operations, especially in light of the fact air operations drive higher defense requirements.

3.2. Training and Certification. BDOC personnel must be task certified. This task certification includes individual tasks based on assigned duties and responsibilities in the BDOC as well as tasks executed as a team.

3.2.1. Training on required tasks should occur during the predeployment phase of the AEF cycle.

3.2.2. Home station individual and team training should culminate in a certification exercise that simulates the expected deployed environment and forces as closely as possible. Whenever practical, BDOC attendance at regional training centers (RTCs) should be paired to allow this C2 element to train with all other SF UTCs deploying to the same location. Since BDOC operations are inherently joint, predeployment certification should occur in a realistic, joint environment such as a mission rehearsal exercise when possible.

3.2.3. The Air Force Security Forces Center establishes individual and team task list for BDOC personnel and, if tasked to support an AEF requirement, will certify associated tasked UTCs, ensure they are incorporated into appropriate Mission Capability Statements (MISCAPs) and that unit’s status is reflected correctly in the AEF UTC reporting tool.

3.2.4. Air Force intelligence personnel should attend either the RTC intelligence training block or the Force Protection Intelligence Formal Training Unit (FP IFTU) prior to deploying in a FP UTC.

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3.3. Equipment Requirements. In the nature of expeditionary, non-linear warfare, BDOC equipment should be deployable and maintainable in austere conditions.

3.3.1. Communications. BDOCs should be equipped with secure, flexible, tactical communication equipment able to communicate with the tactical teams and air support of all members of the joint and coalition warfighting team. The most common capabilities of coalition partners must also reside in the BDOC’s equipment package to ensure host and allied armed forces are integrated into BSZ operations. While the BDOC staff will require some tactical radio capabilities, the primary requirement is a suite of base station and tactical repeater communications systems to communicate to all of the forces operating in the BSZ. Additionally the BDOC should also have secure phones, satellite communications (SATCOM), SIPRNet and JWICS capabilities as the mission requires. To the maximum extent possible, these various communications systems should be consolidated into a simplified interface; ideally one that links directly to the COP. This would allow the controllers to visually “see” the location and identity of personnel who are making transmissions. The joint doctrine requirement for a redundant BDOC facility should also be considered when building the BDOC UTC’s equipment package.

3.3.2. Sensors and Assessment Devices. The BDOC should be equipped with long-range, persistent tactical surveillance and reconnaissance technologies. These sensors and imagers should be able to operate and provide tactical ISR capability for the base commander throughout the entire BSZ if properly emplaced on key terrain and avenues of approach. These tactical ISR assets should be interoperable with JFLCC forces operating in/around the BSZ as well as being able to push/pull to AOC resources.

3.3.2.1. An Air Force BDOC should be equipped with the sensors and assessment devices needed to provide situational awareness for the BSZ. For planning purposes, the baseline BDOC ISR package should be able to provide tactical situational awareness 10 kilometers outside of the installation perimeter in deployed environments. In CONUS, standard SF sensors may be used; however, use of traditional ISR assets will require additional coordination and review for Intelligence Oversight considerations. Additional scalable sensor and imagery equipment UTCs should also be established to provide more robust capabilities based on threat or terrain. Additional theater and national ISR assets may also provide BDOC personnel with BSZ situational awareness.

3.3.2.2. The BDOC must be equipped with a suite of equipment able to integrate the sensor and organic imagers into a single, common operating picture. In order to accomplish this, the BDOC should have a system or process in place that is capable of rapidly sharing between systems that operate on different classification levels (unclassified, coalition classified, US-only secret and top secret). This COP should also be able to integrate other Air Force tactical sensors as well as common ISR feeds (e.g., Predator, Global Hawk, and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)). Lastly, this system should be able to integrate tactical ISR feeds from common joint and coalition ISR systems such as tactical UAVs and aerostats.

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3.3.2.3. The BDOC’s COP should also be able to integrate friendly force tracking capabilities that either are manually entered or rely on transponder data. These tracking capabilities must be interoperable with JFLCC forces operating in/around the BSZ.

3.3.3. Collaborative COP. The BDOC C2 suite should provide machine-to-machine interface to the ICC and EOC for a collaborative planning and information COP to reduce the demands for voice reporting. This collaborative COP should also be available to the command centers of other forces routinely operating in the BSZ. In order to accomplish this, the BDOC should have a system or process in place that is capable of rapidly sharing between systems that operate on different classification levels (e.g. unclassified, coalition, secret, and TS/SCI).

3.3.4. Secure/Non-Secure Communications. IBD operational information becomes an OPSEC issue when linked to a particular military mission or operation. While the information itself is not normally classified, in the context of a mission it should be protected as part of the combatant commander’s overall OPSEC program to deny information to the enemy.

KEVIN J. SULLIVAN, Lieutenant General, USAF DCS/Logistics, Installations & Mission Support

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Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

Air Force Publications. 1. AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection

2. Air Force Policy Directive 31-3, Air Base Defense

3. Air Force Instruction 14-119, Intelligence Support to Force Protection

4. Air Force Instruction 31-301, Air Base Defense

5. AFTTP 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense (IBD)

Joint Publications. 1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

2. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

3. Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations in a Theater

4. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0

5. Protection Joint Functional Concept

Other Publications

1. Army-Air Force OIF/OEF Joint Airfield Operations Study, Joint Airfield/Airbase Initial Impressions Report, March 2005

2. Fox, Roger P. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973. Office of Air Force History. 1979

3. Fighting Air Bases Under Attack: Forward Operating Bases (Draft), RAND Corporation Study, October 2005

4. HQ ACC/SF Force Protection Study (Iraq Trip Report), Col Mary Kay Hertog, December 2003

5. Shalapak, David A & Vick, Alan, Check Six Begins on the Ground: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threats to U.S. Air Force Bases, RAND Corporation, 1995

6. Vick, Alan, Snakes in The Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases, 1940-1992, RAND Corporation, 1995

Abbreviations and Acronyms AEF--Air and Space Expeditionary Force AETF--Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force AEW--Air Expeditionary Wing AFOSI--Air Force Office of Special Investigations AFTTP--Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures AO--Area of Operations

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AOC--Air and Space Operations Center ART--AEF Reporting Tool ATO--Air Tasking Order BCT--Brigade Combat Team BDOC--Base Defense Operations Center BSZ--Base Security Zone C2--Command and Control C4ISR--Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CAS--Close Air Support CBRNE--Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives CENTRIX--Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System COA--Course of Action COMAFFOR--Commander of Air Force Forces CONUS--Continental United States COP--Common Operating Picture CTO--Counter Threat Operations DFC--Defense Force Commander EOC--Emergency Operations Center FAC(A)--Forward Air Controller (Airborne) F2T2EA--Finding, Fixing, Tracking, Targeting, Engaging, and Assessing FOB--Forward Operating Base FSE--Fire Support Element GTO--Ground Tasking Order HUMINT--Human Intelligence HVI--High Value Individual HVT--High Value Target IBD--Integrated Base Defense ICC--Installation Control Center IDF--Indirect Fire IMINT--Imagery Intelligence INTREP--Intelligence Report IO--Information Operations IPB--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace JCEOI--Joint Communication Electronic Operating Instruction JFC--Joint Forces Commander JFLCC--Joint Force Land Component Commander JFO--Joint Fires Observer JFSOCC--Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander JSTARS--Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JP--Joint Publication JTAC--Joint Terminal Attack Controller JTF--Joint Task Force JWICS--Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System MANPADS--Man-portable Air Defense System MASINT--Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

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METT-TC--Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civilian Considerations MISCAP--Mission Capabilities MISREP--Mission Reports MOU--Memorandum of Understanding NIPRNet--Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network OIC--Officer In Charge OPCON--Operational Control RFF--Request for Forces RTC--Regional Training Center SAA--Senior Airfield Authority SATCOM--Satellite Communications SF--Security Forces SIGINT--Signals Intelligence SIPRNet--Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SITREP--Situation Report SPOTREP--Spot Report TACON--Tactical Control TACP--Tactical Air Control Party TACS--Theater Air Control System TS/SCI--Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information TTPs--Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UAV--Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UTC--Unit Type Code Terms Area Command--A command which is composed of those organized elements of one or more of the Armed Services, designated to operate in a specific geographical area, which are placed under a single commander. (JP 1-02) Area of Influence--A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 1-02) Area of Interest--That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02) Base Boundary--A line that delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 1-02) [The base boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter, rather it should be established based upon the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and other support available, time available (METT-T), specifically balancing the need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission.] {Italicized definition in brackets is not included in the

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JP 1-02 definition of base boundary, but found in the text of JP 3-10 as clarification of the base boundary} Base Defense Operations Center--A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts. Also called BDOC. (JP 1-02). Base Security Zone--The area outside the base perimeter from which the base may be vulnerable from standoff threats (e.g. mortars, rockets, MANPADS). The base commander is responsible for identifying the base security zone and coordinate with the host nation or area commander for the base security zone to be identified as the base boundary. If the base boundary does not include all of the terrain of the base security zone, the base commander is still responsible for either mitigating (though coordination with the area commander of host nation) or accepting the risks of enemy attack from the area the terrain outside the base boundary. Base security zone is an Air Force-specific term that should be used intra-Service only. Also called BSZ. Common Operating Picture--A broad view of the overall situation as reflected by situation reports, aerial photography and other information or intelligence. Also called COP. (AFI 10-2501) Defense Force Commander--The senior Air Force commander responsible for the air base normally delegates operational authority to conduct integrated defense to the defense force commandeer. The Defense force commander exercises command and control through an established chain of command and directs the planning and execution of base defense operations. Also called DFC. (AFTTP 3-10.1). Emergency Operations Center--The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, State, regional, county, city, tribal) or by some combination thereof. Also called EOC. (Installation Control Center Enabling Concept) Fires--The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02) Integrated Base Defense--The integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the force protection battlespace to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection. Also called IBD. (AFDD 2-4.1) Installation Control Center--The Installation Control Center provides the installation commander a single, consolidated C2 center from which to monitor and execute the installation’s missions, to include specific tenant, joint and combined missions for which the installation commander bears supporting responsibility. In general, all Installation Control Center functions are already being performed by assigned personnel. The Installation Control Center functionally aligns and may help consolidate the personnel now performing these functions independently at each installation. There is no change to those traditional “on call” positions such as the Emergency Operations Center

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(formerly known as the Survival Recovery Center). Depending on the operational and threat situation, the Emergency Operations Center, or any other “on-call” function, may be manned only during times of crisis or emergency. Also called ICC. (Installation Control Center Enabling Concept) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace--An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerting the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02) Senior Airfield Authority--An individual designated / appointed by the component responsible for airfield operations at the direction of the JFC. This individual is responsible for the control, priorities, operation, and maintenance of an airfield to include the runways, associated taxiways, parking ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity affect airfield operations. Inherent in the ability to manage these responsibilities is the early designation of the Senior Airfield Authority, his participation in the planning phases and the task to develop a formal Security Plan to address security requirements for airfield operations. Also called SAA (Air Base Opening Enabling Concept)