afkar.11.2010 05.hamid.metafizik

7/28/2019 Afkar.11.2010 05.Hamid.metafizik

1/24

H. F. Zarkasyi, Ibn Taymiyyahs Critique,Afkar(2010), 11: 167-190

167

IBN TAYMIYYAHS CRITIQUE OFARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICSHamid Fahmy Zarkasyi

KhulasahSatu dari persoalan utama perdebatan di antara para ahli falsafahIslam, khususnya di antara Ibn Taymiyyah dan Ibn Sn, adalahmetafizik, terutama berkenaan persoalan utamanya. Bagi IbnTaymiyyah, persoalan utama metafizik adalah wujud kulli yangmutlak (al-wujd al-kull al-mulaq), iaitu Allah SWT dan iadapat dicapai dengan mengkaji Sifat-sifat DhatNya (lawiq al-dhtiyyah). Manakala bagi Ibn Sn pula, ia adalah kewujudan (al-mawjdt), segala kewujudan berilat (kullu mawjd mall) atauusul bagi segala kewujudan berilat, dan bukannya Allah SWT.Pemahaman yang berbeza ini telah mempengaruhi pandangan yangberbeza tentang kewujudan Allah SWT dan tentang penciptaan alam.

Katakunci: Metafizik; kulli; wujud; kewujudan; Allah SWT; wujudwajib; wujud mumkin; penciptaan alam.

AbstractMetaphysics has always been one of the pivotal topics of debate betweenMuslim philosophers; this may especially be said about Ibn Taymiyyahand Ibn Sn. For Ibn Taymiyyah, the subject matter of metaphysicsis absolute and universal Existence (al-wujd al-kull al-mulaq),namely God, which is known by investigating the intrinsicattributes of His essence (lawhiq al-dhtiyyah). For Ibn Sn, it isal-mawjdt(existing beings), the whole of caused being (kullumawjd mall), or the principle abstracted from the whole of causedbeing, and not God. Such clear and discrete views resulted in differentnotions of Gods existence as well as of the origination of the universe.

Keywords: Metaphysics; universal; al-wujd; al-mawjd; God; necessaryexistence; contingent existence; origination of the universe.


2/24


168

IntroductionIbn Taymiyyah was an eminent Muslim scholar reputed withhis criticism of Aristotelian logic, especially in his works al-Raddalal-Manqiyynand Naqd al-Maniq. Inherent in hiscriticism of logic was his refutation of metaphysics, the actualtarget of his criticism of logic.1 Ibn Taymiyyah thought thatMuslim philosophers (had) approached some metaphysicalproblems pertaining to Islam from an almost exclusivelyAristotelian perspective,2 even despite their attempts to harmonise

Greek metaphysics with the Islamic teachings.3

Their approacheswere, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, rather incompatible with

1 Ibn Taymiyyah (1993), al-Radd al al-Maniqiyyn, ed. Rafq Ajam,vol. I, Beirut: Dr al-Fikr al-Lubnn, p. 29.

2 The most eminent work of Aristotle on metaphysics known by theMuslim was his collection of the 14 articles, called as Kitb al-urf(The Book of Letters). Madhkr and Rahman suggest that Aristotleused nowhere the term metaphysic. The term used by him was TheFirst Philosophy or Theologik (theology). According to Madhkr,quoting Ross, AristotlesMetaphysics,t. I, p. XXXII, the first who usedthe term metaphysics was Nicolas al-Dimashq who took fromAndronicus. See Ibn Sn (1960), al-Shif (al-Ilhiyyt), 2 vols. ed.

Ibrhm Madhkr, Cairo: Hayah al-mmah li-shu'n al-Mabi al-Amriyyah, see editors introduction, p. 11; See also M.A.RamnMaraban (1975), Min al-Falsafah al-Ynniyyah il al-Falsafah al-Islmiyyah, Beirut: ManshrtUwaydah, p. 178.

3 Al-Kind wrote a treatise called On The First Philosophy, al-Frbwrote a treatise on the objectives ofAristotles articles of metaphysicscalled FAghral-akmfkullimaqltminKitbihial-Mawsmbi-l-urf (On The Objectives of the Wise in all Articles of his Book,called Letters). Ibn Sn wrote ten articles on metaphysics known as al-Shif, in which he adapted Aristotles works. Ibn Rushd eventranslated Aristotles work Alpha Minor called Tafsr al-Maqlah al-lminmbadaal-abah (The commentary of the First Article ofMetaphysics) and many other works. See M.A.RamnMaraban,Minal-Falsafah al-Ynniyyah, p. 34; See also Ibn Sn, al-Shif (al-Ilhiyyt), see editorsintroduction, p. 6.


3/24


169

the metaphysical doctrines taught by the Qurn and theProphetic tradition as understood by the earlier generationof Muslims (al-salaf al-li). It is interesting to elaborate onthe incompatibility ofAristotles metaphysics with its Islamiccounterpart upheld by Ibn Taymiyyah. There are at leastthree aspects of metaphysics that Ibn Taymiyyah believed tobe contradictory, which he consequently rebutted earnestly.The three aspects are the subject matter of metaphysics were(1) the concept of universal, (2) the issue of the contingent

being and Gods existence, and (3) the origination of theuniverse.4 This article will elaborate on these three aspects.

On the Subject-matter of MetaphysicsThere are two reasons why Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism of thesubject matter of metaphysics is significant: (1) because it isthe starting point of the Muslim philosophers in their metaphysicaldiscourse and (2) because this discloses Ibn Taymiyyahsfundamental principles, on which his whole criticism is based.The main issue here is not only its designation, but also thetheory of existence (al-wujd) and the existing being (al-

mawjd), where the basic concept of the universal is disputed.The term metaphysicsis made up of two Greek lexemes,

namely meta and physis. Meta is translated into Arabic asbada(after), wara(behind), or qabla(before), andphysisasal-abah. Metaphysics was therefore known among the Muslimphilosophers as ilm m bada (wara, or qabla) al-abah,meaning the science about the things after, behind or beforethe physical nature.5 It was also called al-Falsafah al-l

4 This is based on his major work on philosophical refutation, DarTarual-Aqlwa al-Naql, published in 11 volumes.

5 M.A.Rahman Maraban, Min al-Falsafah al-Ynniyyah, p. 187; IbnSn preferred to call this science as al-ilmmqabla al-abah(before


4/24


170

(The First Philosophy), implying that it was the science thatdeals with the first thing(s) in existence and the first thing(s)in general. Beside those two appellation, it was also called al-ilm al-ilh (theology), seen as the science of God and ofthings abstracted from matter, both in the mind as well as inthe external world.6

It appears from the above definitions that metaphysics,first philosophy, and theology (al-ilm al-ilh) were differentnames for the same science, called metaphysics in the Greek

tradition.7

Although al-Frb and Ibn Sn distinguishedmetaphysics from theology,8 they seemed to still have regardedboth of them as the universal science and the highest form ofknowledge.9

the nature) because the subject matter dealt with in this science is,essentially (bi al-dht) and generally (bi al-umm), before the nature.As regards the mathematical or arithmetical sciences, he called it al-ilm m bad al-abah (after the nature) because its subject is notseparated from nature. But, he did not mention the designation of theterm war al-abah (behind the nature). See Ibn Sn, al-Shif (al-

Ilhiyyt), vol. I, p. 22.6 This second meaning falls under the philosophers classification of

science, which are three in number: physics (a science that cannot beabstracted from matter, neither in the mind nor in the external world),mathematics(a science that is abstracted from matter in the mind, butnot in the external world) and metaphysics(a science that is abstractedfrom matter in both the mind and the external world). See Ibn Sn,al-Shif (al-ilhiyyt), vol. I, p. 15; al-Radd, ed. R. Ajam, vol. I,pp.133-134; See also M.A.Ramn Maraban, Min al-Falsafah al-Ynniyyah,p. 187.

7 Nasr & O.Leaman (1996), History of Islamic Philosophy, London:Routledge, Part II, p. 784.

8 Ibid, p. 785.9 Nasr (1993), An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, State

University of New York Press, p. 197.


5/24


171

Due to this diversity of definitions, Ibn Taymiyyah foundit hard to determine on which of the two he should focus hiscriticism. Therefore, in his Raddhe criticised specifically thesubject matter of theology (al-ilm al-ilh), while in his DarTaru, he rebutted the designation of the subject matter ofthe first philosophy (al-Falsafah al-l). It must be added,though, that the term theology does not refer here to Kalm,but to the term employed by the philosophers to specify theirdiscourse on God.

Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism of the designation of thesubject matter of theology was levelled against Ibn Sn andhis followers. According to Ibn Sna in his al-Ilhiyt, thesubject matter of theology is that which exists as it exists or isas being (al-mawjd bim huwa mawjd).10 Being, or theexisting thing (al-mawjd), in this sense would refer to thewhole of existing things (kullu mawjd), which can further beunderstood in two ways: as the whole of being that has noprinciple (mabda) and/or as the whole of caused being (kullumawjd mall), which is part of all beings or entities (bad al-mawjdt).11

According to Ibn Sn, the study of the properties ofbeing (al-mawjd) is at the same time a study of its principles andwill lead to the knowledge of the principle of the principles,

10 Ibn Sn, al-Shif (al-ilhiyyt), vol. I, p. 13. In the metaphysics ofAristotle, being in general indicates the material, the movement, thequantity, the possibility to know and the cause of existence; all of thembecame objects of the science of physics, mathematics, logic andmetaphysics, respectively. See M.A. Ramn Maraban, Min al-Falsafah al-Ynniyyah, p. 186.

11 The meaning of being as alluded to by Ibn Taymiyyah can be relatedto Ibn Sns division of being into NecessaryBeing and contingentbeing (or substance and accident). See al-Radd, ed.R. Ajam, vol. I, p.134.


6/24


172

the ultimate causes (al-asbb al-quw), or the cause of thecauses, namely God.12 The principle here is not the principleof the whole of being (mabdakullu mawjd), since the wholeof being in this sense is the principle (mabda) itself.13 Theprinciple here means the principle of the caused being (mall)or the causes of the caused being as it is caused (asbb al-mawjd al-mall bi m huwa mawjd mall). Thus, thesubject matter (maw) of theology would in such a case notbe God, but the whole of caused being. God would be the

goal (malb) of this science.Taking Ibn Sns definition into account, the knowledge

about God (the Cause) should be obtained by constructingthe principle abstracted from the caused being. The mentaljourney would thus start off at the caused being and seek toreach the cause or, said otherwise, at the creature seeking togain knowledge about the Creator.

Against the above delineation, Ibn Taymiyyah questioned IbnSns designation of al-mawjd as the subject matter oftheology, because it differs from the usual philosophicaldenotation ofal-mawjd, which means an absolute universal

being (al-wujd al-mulaq al-kull), namely God. IbnTaymiyyah asserts that if Ibn Sn understands existence (al-wujd) either as all existing being (kullu mawjd) or aslimited to the whole of caused being (kullu mawjd mall),and then he divides it into necessary and possible, then such aconcept is erroneous.14 The mistake would lie in the thoughtthat the necessary and the possible being become parts of thewhole of caused being (kullu mawjd mall),while existence

12 Ibn Sn,al-Shif(al-ilhiyyt), vol. I, pp. 4-6; 15.13 Ibid, p.14.14 Al-Radd, ed. R. Ajam, vol. I, p. 140.


7/24


173

(al-wujd) would refer to the universal existence (al-wujd al-kull). The universal can only be divided into particulars(juziyyt), while the whole (kullu) is divided into parts(ajz), and this concerns a general principle.15

Thus, the universal existence (al-wujd al-kull) is differentfrom the whole of existing things (kullu mawjd). Theformer is in the mind, while the latter is in the externalworld. Therefore, since theology elaborates on the universal,absolute matter, it cannot be something in the external

world, for it has no knowable object in the external world(laysa malm f al-khrij) as it does not exist as universal(given that the universal exists only in the mind).16

The foregoing argument demonstrates that the twoopponents basically had the same idea that theology ormetaphysics is a science about universal being, but theydiffered on their understanding of the concept of theuniversal. While Ibn Sn posited that the subject matter ofmetaphysics is the whole of existing things (kullu mawjd),Ibn Taymiyyah believed that the whole of existing things isan external reality that can be neither universal nor the

subject matter of metaphysics. It is only God who is theuniversal being. Thus, the subject matter of theology ormetaphysics for Ibn Taymiyyah is not the whole of existingthings, but God Himself.

15 The example of universal division is like the division of animal intospeaking and speechless, which refers to the division of genus intospecies and of species into individuals. The division of thewhole(kullu) is like the division of inheritance, lands, parts of the humanbody, etc. See ibid.

16 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, ed. R.Ajam, vol. I, pp.146-147; Majmatal-Fatw li Ibn Taymiyyah, ed. Abd al-Ramn Ibn Qsim, vol. IX,Cairo: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, n.d. p. 130.


8/24


174

Ibn Taymiyyah probably misunderstood Ibn Sns conceptof the whole of existing things, as the term itself isambiguous, because sometimes it means kullu mawjd and,other times, kullu mawjd mall. Ibn Taymiyyah understoodit as something in the external world, though Ibn Sn meantit as something abstracted from matter, allowing it to beuniversal. To gain a better perspective on Ibn Taymiyyahsconcept of the universal, we shall go further into his criticism.

In his DarTaru, Ibn Taymiyyah refuted the grounds

on which the universal absolute being (al-wujd al-kull al-mulaq) is designated as the subject matter of the First Philosophy.The Philosophers view was based on their depiction of theontological status of an essence as essence, or a quiddity asquiddity. To them, essence exists neither in the mind nor inthe external world, neither universally nor particularly. Inorder for it to become universal, universality must be addedto the essence, since universality is an accident that existsonly in the mind. To add the universality to the essence, themind must abstract the essence from a particular that isexternal to the mind or from that which is common to many

external realities.17 Hence, universality does not exist in theexternal world if it is separated from the essence; it only existswhen the essence is added to it. Yet, this is not applicable toGod, as in God essence and existence are inseparable.

Against this concept, Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that thereis nothing that can exist neither in the external worlds nor inthe mind as posited by the philosophers.18 He also denies the

17 Ibn Taymiyyah (1989), Dar Taru al- Aql wa al-Naql, vol. I, ed.M.Rishd Slim, Cairo: Dr al-Kunz al-Adabiyyah, 11 vols, p. 293;See also Nasr, Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, p. 189.

18 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, p. 67; Ibn Taymiyyah, Tawd al-Ulhiyyah, in Majmatal-Fatwvol. I, p. 158.


9/24


175

philosophers distinction of essence or quiddity and existence,especially in extra mental existence. To him, essence canonly be described in one of two modes of existence: in theexternal world or in the mind. The former indicates thatessence is the very thing which exists, that is the particular orthe individual, while in the latter essence is the representation ofthat particular or individual.19 Thus, essence is no more thana generalisation or abstraction of individuals which existexternally.20 If the existence of the creature in the extra

mental world is the very essence and existence, the existenceof God is a fortiori (awl) to be His very essence.21 Thisprinciple will appear more clearly in his criticism of the issueof Gods existence and His attributes.

Similarly, according to Ibn Taymiyyahs concept ofessence, the universal can never exist externally; it exists onlyin the mind. It is nothing more than a common, generalmeaning retained by the mind in order to signify theindividual in the real and natural world.22 In other words, themental description corresponds to the reality in the externalworld, like the name corresponds to the named object (al-

musamm).23 Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah rejects the philosophersnotion that the natural universal exists externally and remainsuniversal at the time of its existence. He maintains that it isuniversal only as long as it is in the mind and it becomesparticular and real when it exists in reality. The universalityof a thing, he asserts, is conditional upon its being in the

19 Al-Radd,A.amad, p. 67.20 Ibid, p. 118; Majmatal-Fatw, IX, p. 118.21 DarTaru, vol. I, p. 293.22 Ibid, p. 290; Tawid al-Ulhiyyah, in Majmatal-Fatwvol. I pp.

88, 94.23 DarTaru,vol. I, pp. 290-291.


10/24


176

mind.24 From this it follows that the whole of existing things(kullu mawjd) that exist in the external world are particularand different from other particulars, and cannot therefore beregarded as universal.

Accordingly, for Ibn Taymiyyah, al-wujd (existence) isuniversal and unreal, while al-mawjdt(existent beings) arereal and particular. The philosophers notion that NecessaryExistence (wjib al-wujd) is the highest of all existent beings(al-mawjdt) is unacceptable. This is because Necessary Existence

is universal and the universal cannot be compared to theparticular and has nothing in common with the particular,while the particular can be compared to other particular. Theformer has no plurality, while the latter consists of plurality.Since the philosophers subsume Necessary Existence underthe category that the existent beings (al-mawjdt) have incommon with it, it will no longer be the object of metaphysicalinvestigation.25 For the subject matter of theology to Ibn Taymiyyahis not al-mawjd (the existent being), which includes thecreature and all things that exist, but al-wujd (existence),which is the universal (al-kull).

The above criticism shows that Ibn Taymiyyah wanted tomaintain that the subject matter of theology is the absoluteuniversal existence (al-wujd al-kulli al-mulaq), namely God.Since God is universal existence, He does not have qualities incommon with the existent beings (al-mawjdt). Consequentlyto know God as universal existence (al-wujd kull) is toinvestigate the intrinsic attributes of His essence (lawiq al-dhtiyyah),26 which is in contrast with Ibn Sns idea that the

24 Al-Radd, ed. R.Ajam,vol. I, p. 144.25 Ibid, p. 135.26 Ibid, p. 140.


11/24


177

subject matter of this science is the whole of caused being(kullu mawjd mall) or the principle abstracted from thewhole of caused being, and not God.

Ibn Taymiyyahs objection against metaphysics beingconcerned with the whole of caused being (kullu mawjd mall)was that it may allow comparison between the caused beingsand God, thus running the risk of sowing confusion betweenthe two. Ibn Sn, however, wanted to make the NecessaryBeing the goal of metaphysics, and not its subject matter, in

order to show that this science leads towards knowledge ofthe existence of God (even though it does not provideknowledge of His being).27 Ibn Taymiyyah preferred to stressthe absolute incomparability of God, while Ibn Sn wasinclined to follow the doctrine of the philosophers.

The pivotal point that we should underline here is theobvious distinction between Ibn Taymiyyah and the philosophers,particularly Ibn Sn, on the starting point of the knowledgeabout God. On the one hand, the philosophers start fromsomething other than God, upon which they make logicaldeductions and draw general principles abstracted from

matter. God, to them, cannot be posited as the starting point,as doing so will make Him a means for this intellectualsearch, while God is the goal and cannot be a means. On theother hand, for Ibn Taymiyyah the starting point of knowledgeabout God is God Himself, and it is known from God and nottaken from any other source. Using something other thanGod to gain knowledge of the deity would implicitly suggestthat there are principles applicable both to God and to thingsthat are not God. Consequently, God would be subsumedunder the principle that is shared in common between His

27 Ibn Sn,al-Shif(al-ilhiyyt), vol. I, pp. 5-7.


12/24


178

own creatures and could therefore not be held to be universalanymore. In order to maintain His universality, the knowledgeabout God should be derived from God Himself, which wasnot difficult for Ibn Taymiyyah since he believed that Godhas given ample information about Himself revealed throughthe Prophet and understandable by reason.

On Contingent Being and Gods ExistenceProviding knowledge about God is not only the major task

carried out by the Muslim philosophers and the mutakallimn,

but also a fundamental part of the Islamic faith. Some oftheir theories were sound, while others were untenable; it isto the latter ones that Ibn Taymiyyah directs his criticism.However, reading thoroughly his DarTaru, we will findthat he criticises the ideas of the mutakallimn more thanthose of the philosophers,28 for he believes that the ideas ofthe former are less valid than the latters.29 The basic assumptionof Ibn Taymiyyah is that their theories are too abstract, obscureand general and that they consist of dubious demonstrations,sometimes creating ambiguity between qualities particular to

the Creator and those peculiar to creatures.30As mentioned in Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism of metaphysics,

the philosophers in particular Ibn Sn started off byenquiring into the knowledge of God from the generalprinciple of the mode of being. In addition, they also built atheory to prove the existence of the Necessary Being or Godby applying the theory of movement. These two theories became

28 DarTaru,vol. III, pp. 88-93; 128-134; 179-181; 210-223.29 DarTaru,vol. VIII,p. 356.30 Tawd al-Ulhiyyah, in Majmatal-Fatw, vol.I, pp. 49-50.


13/24


179

the target of Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism that will be elaboratedon in the following section of this contribution.

The theory of being introduced by Ibn Sn starts from asimple postulate: being itself can be necessary (wjib), possible(mumkin) or impossible (mumtani). However, this theory,and especially the question of possible being, seems obscureand Ibn Taymiyyah finds it unacceptable and contradictory. Inhis al-Ishrt wa al-Tanbht, (Remarks and Admonitions),31as Ibn Taymiyyah quotes it, Ibn Sn says:

If every being is considered with respect to its essence, itis either necessary being or not necessary being. If itis necessary, it is eternal and the necessary existent byits essence. But, if not necessary, it cannot be impossible,since it has been determined as being. If the essenceof being is conjoined by a condition (shar) 32it becomesimpossible (mumtani) or necessary (wjib), but if it isnot conjoined by a condition the third alternative isleft, which is the possible (al-mumkin). This possiblebeing, with respect to its essence, is a thing which isneither necessary nor impossible. Therefore, every being

is either necessary or possible being by its essence.33

Ibn Taymiyyah did not question Ibn Sns concept ofnecessary being (wjib al-wujd), but he disagreed with theconcept of determining possible being. He adduced eleven

31 Ibn Sn(1958),al-Ishrtwa al-Tanbht,ed. SulaymnDuny, Cairo:al-Marif.

32 What Ibn Sn means by condition (shar) here is the presence or theabsence of the cause of this being. See DarTaru, vol. III, p. 336.

33 Dar Taru,vol. III, pp. 166-167, 336; cf. Ibn Sn, al-Ishrt,vol.III, pp. 447-448.


14/24


180

arguments34 that can be summarised in three points: (1) onthe determination of possible existence (mumkin al-wujd),(2) on the conjoinment of condition, and (3) on the essenceof the possible.

1) With regard to the first point, namely the determination ofpossible existence (mumkin al-wujd), Ibn Taymiyyahunderstood Ibn Sns statement to refer to the whole ofbeing (kullu mawjd), including extra mental existence (al-mawjd fal-khrij).35 He argues therefore that ifthepossible is

determined as the alternative of the necessary and impossible, itimplies that it is neither necessary nor impossible. This isagainst extra mental existence or reality, because there isnothing in reality which is neither necessary nor impossible.Even if it is understood as an unreal thing and merely amental perception, the notion that there is an essence thatcan be either existing or non-existing, is also unacceptable. Itis because if an essence does not exist, it still can be presentin the mind, which is called mental existence (al-wujd al-dhihn).36 This mental existence will become an externalexistence when it is found in external reality.

We can now understand the differences between IbnTaymiyyah and Ibn Sn on the theory of essence and existence.According to Ibn Taymiyyah, essence exists only in the mind,while existence exists in the extra-mental world. The essenceof a thing is the very existence of that thing.37 Therefore, in

34 DarTaru,vol.III, pp. 337-349.35 The expression mawjd f al-khrij (existents in the extra mental

world) is used by Ibn Taymiyyah as the that which exists beyond themind (i.e. in the world that we can see and observe). See Ibid.

36 DarTaru,vol. III,p. 344.37 al-Radd, ed. R. Ajam, vol. I, pp. 118; 368; Majmatal-Fatw,IX, p.

118. In this principle, Ibn Taymiyyah coincidentally shared the same


15/24


181

the external existence of a thing, essence and existence areinseparable,38 and, in the case of God, His essence is His veryexistence.39 According to Ibn Sn in beings other than God,existence is only accidentally added to their essence or quiddity,meaning that essence is separated from existence, while inthe Necessary Being or God, essence is inseparable fromexistence.40 The two have a totally different view, especially inrelation to beings other than God, but they have almost thesame idea concerning God. The difference in the case of God

is that, to Ibn Taymiyyah, essence is concomitant with existence;while, to Ibn Sn, essence and existence are one.

Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism is justifiable if we accept hisprinciple of the inseparability of essence and existence, eventhough it might hardly be acceptable for one who shares IbnSns standpoint. It was difficult for a theologian such as IbnTaymiyyah to allow that there can be essences separate fromexistence in things other than God. A modern writer likeShehadi 41 suggests that Ibn Sns theory of existence as anaccident added to essence only leads to confusion and alsoshattersAristotles teaching. However, on Necessary Existence,

Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Sn seem to have been in agreement.Just as Ibn Sn saw that God is a Necessary Existence andwhatever is different from God is a possible existent, Ibn

idea of Ibn Rushd, who also attacked Ibn Sns theory that existence isan accident of the essence. See Averroes' Tahfut al-Tahfut, vol. IItranslated by Simon Van Den Bergh (1954), University Press Oxford,p. 137.

38 DarTaru, vol. III, pp. 338, 350.39 DarTaru, vol. I, p. 293.40 Ibn Sn (1938), Kitbal-Najt, Cairo: MabaahMuy al-Dnabr al-

Kurd, pp. 224-225; Ibn Sn,al-Shif: al-ilhiyyt,pp. 7-11.41 Shehadi, Fadlou (1982), Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, Delmar,

New York: Caravan Books, p. 76.


16/24


182

Taymiyyah saw that to put the division of being into Necessary,which is necessary in itself, and possible, which exists byanother, is a sound proposition. This suggests that Ibn Taymiyyahagreed on elements that maintained a clear distinctionbetween God and creation.

2) The other point criticised by Ibn Taymiyyah was IbnSns conjoinment of the condition. To him, if the essence ofa possible existent is determined by excluding the conditionby which the essence will be neither caused (associated with a

cause) nor uncaused (without a cause), the result is not thepossible, but the impossible. This is because the essence ofthe existing thing is always conjoined with a condition. Whenthe essence is conjoined with a cause, it becomes necessaryand considered as existing (mawjdah); it therefore nolonger has the quality of being possible. As a result, thedivision of necessary and possible is invalid and cannot beapplied.42

Alternatively, Ibn Taymiyyah asserted the division ofnecessary and possible as conceivable when the possible issometimes determined as qualified as existing and other

times as not existing: thus, it sometimes exists and sometimesdoes not. It is qualified as possible when it does not exist,because it has the possibility to exist, and when it exists it hasthe possibility of not existing. Moreover, he also put thepossible as a being that exists through another since it iscreated. But, he refused to designate the possible as havingan essence that is in isolation from existence (al-wujd) andnon-existence (al-adam).43

42 DarTaru, vol. III, pp. 346-347.43 Ibid, p. 347.


17/24


183

The core of Ibn Taymiyyahs argumentation on thispoint concerns the essence and the existence of the possible.To Ibn Taymiyyah, the possible can only refer to whateveractually exists in the real world: since God created essenceand existence, together, the category of necessary andpossible must therefore be based on the inseparability of bothof them. What exists cannot be seen as something that cannotexist at all; it can therefore never be impossible. Likewise, thenon-existing thing that cannot exist cannot be qualified as

not possible. The possible is not a thing that can either existor not exist.44 For Ibn Sn, however, possibility refers to theessence, which has no existence. It can become necessary onlywhen existence is added to it or if it receives the quality of thenecessary from the First cause.45

The important aspect of Ibn Taymiyyahs argument hereis that he wanted to make a clear distinction between possibleand necessary existence, and thus preclude the idea of thepossible being necessary in any way. In a wider context, hemight also have intended to maintain the idea that thepossible being is created from nothing by the Necessary

Being, thus vindicating the doctrine of creation ex-nihilo.3) The last point concerns Ibn Sns division of essences

into Necessary, possible and impossible. He identified thepossible as the case in which the essence is neither necessarynor impossible and it hence cannot exist apart from the

44 Ibid, p. 345.45 Nasr, Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, p. 199. Ibn Rushd also

disagreed with Ibn Sn that the possible can become necessary. SeeIbn Rushd (1968), Fal al-Maql f m Bayna al-ikmah wa al-Sharah min al-Ittil, in KitbFalsafat Ibn Rushd, ed. MuafAbdal-Jawd Imrn, Cairo: Maktabah al-Muammadiyyah al-Tijriyyah,pp. 41-42.


18/24


184

Necessary Being. As for the essence, he asserted that a thingcannot exist unless another has made it exist or, in other words,that it cannot have existence without the Necessary. Thus,Ibn Taymiyyah concluded that the application of Ibn Snstheory to a being which exists by another results in a beingthat has no essence or no existence and that cannot thereforebe regarded as possible existence.46 It is clear that these twothinkers had different standpoints. Ibn Taymiyyah maintained hisconviction that existence is actually made by the Necessary,

whereas Ibn Sn held that existence is an accident added tothe essence and that it has nothing to do with the process ofmaking. However, when Ibn Sns principle is applied to thedesignation of possible existence, it becomes untenable.

Furthermore, in the context of the affirmation of theNecessary Existence, Ibn Taymiyyah identified a contradictoryidea of Ibn Sns. The latter posited that the possible (al-mumkin), which allows the state of being and non-being, canbe eternal sempiternal (qadm azal).47 The idea can be tracedto Ibn Sns al-Najt, where he divided the contingent being(mumkin al-wujdor mumkint) into two. One is the contingent

by itself and receives the quality of being necessary from theFirst Cause; i.e. it is the eternal effect of the Creator, such asthe intelligences and angelic substances. The other is onlycontingent: it comes into being and passes away, such as thecomposed bodies of the sublunary sphere.48 Ibn Taymiyyahsobjection to this postulate concerns the conjoinment of theeternal sempiternal quality in the contingent with the created

46 DarTaru, vol. III, pp. 347-348.47 Ibid, pp. 139-141; 337; cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhj al-Sunnah al-

NabawiyyahfNaqdKalmal-Shahal-Qadariyyah, ed. RashdSlim,Maktabah al-Khayy, 2 vols. n.d., ed. R.Slim, vol. I. p. 127.

48 Ibn Sn,al-Najt, pp. 224-225.


19/24


185

being or the caused object from the beginning and forever,though temporal things sometimes exist and sometime donot.49 Not only did Ibn Taymiyyah find that this idea wascontradictory in itself, he also thought that it contradictedIbn Sns own ideas expressed in his al-Shif,where he saidthat the possible being is new (dith) and preceded by non-being and only the Necessary Being is eternal (since all otherthings are brought into being, i.e. mudath).50 Ibn Taymiyyahagreed particularly with the latter idea, but he questioned Ibn

Sns whole concept of the Necessary and the possible being.Observing Ibn Taymiyyahs criticism, it appears that he

did not directly focus on Ibn Sns theory of the NecessaryExistence as he admitted it to be true. He only rebutted thetheory that there could be a possible being with its owncharacteristics that could be confused with the NecessaryExistence. His criticism seemed to be intended to keep theproof of Gods existence as a simple process. Therefore, hisargument is so simple that ambiguity is precluded withoutthe metaphysical ramifications of Ibn Sns proof.

The Origination of the UniverseHaving closely examined and criticised the philosopherstheory about the mode of being as a general principle thatmay provide knowledge about God, Ibn Taymiyyah turned toanalyse their concept of God in relation to the origination ofthe universe. The crucial point, he found, is that, inter alia,the philosophers rejected God as Creator by teaching the

49 DarTaru, vol. III, pp. 139-140.50 Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned that Ibn Rushd had also noticed this

contradiction, although al-Rz supported Ibn Sns idea. See DarTaru, vol. III, pp. 140-141. Nasr also notices this contradiction. SeeNasr, Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, p. 199, note: 8.


20/24


186

eternity of the world and by positing its emanation from Godin place of the creation ofex nihilo.

In fact, the philosophers principle of emanation relatedclosely to their concept of God including their proof of Hisexistence. To prove the existence of God they used the theoryof movement, in which God is posited as the agent (fil). Theproof begins with recognizing that there are two types ofagents (fil). The first is an agent from which emanates anobject. The act of this agent is related to the object during the

process of its emanation, but after completing the process theobject becomes independent of its agent. The second, is anagent from which only emanates an act related to an object.The existence of this object is dependent upon the act, withoutwhich no object can exist. Thus, the agent is the Mover(muarrik) and the act is the movement (arakah). The agentof the movement is the agent of the universe.51

Moreover, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, in Aristotlesthought movement is the act of the agent (fil). Seen that theworld cannot exist completely without movement, movementitself must be the agent of the world. Since all movement

requires a mover (muarrik) and since there cannot be aninfinite series of movers, the series must ultimately stop at theUnmoved First Mover,52 namely God. Similarly, in his IlhiyytIbn Sn admitted the existence of an infinite incorporealpower (quwwah ghayr mutanhiyah ghayr mujassimah) thatis the origin of the first movement (mabda al-arakah al-awwaliyyah).53 In this way, Ibn Sn, Ibn Rushd and Aristotle

51 DarTaru, vol. VIII, pp. 137-138.52 Ibid, p.138; see also Netton, Ian Richard (1989), Allah Transcendent,

London: Routledge, p. 172.53 Ibn Sn,al-Shif(al-ilhiyyt),vol.II, p. 373.


21/24


187

advocated the proof of Gods existence from the theory ofmovement.

Ibn Taymiyyah criticises this argument from two differentperspectives. The first is the idea that prevailed amongAristotelian traditions, and the second is the basis uponwhich the Muslim philosophers justified their ideas.

1) With regard to the first, Ibn Taymiyyah found that thephilosophers erred since they had not regarded God as theagent (fil) of the movement of the celestial spheres. Although

He was seen as the Beloved (mabb/ mashq) and themovement of the celestial spheres imitates Him, He was notperceived as the Innovator and the Creator of their movement.Although He was viewed as the final cause (illah ghiyyah),He was not understood as the efficient cause (illah f ilah).Therefore, they did not determine the Self-necessary Existence asthe agent of temporal phenomena (al-awdith) or the cause oftemporally emerging and originated phenomena (al-muwalladtor al-awdith). He was deemed to only be the cause of themovement of the spheres. Aristotle and his followers evenadmitted that the origin (al-awwal) does nothing, knows

nothing and wills nothing.54 Thus, God is not the sufficientand eternal cause of the universe or, in other words, God isnot the active God.

Ibn Taymiyyah went on to say that they had posited Godas the agent of the existence of the universe, but not as theCreator of its substances (jawhir) and accidents. He was seenonly as the agent of one among all accidents, namely ofmovement. This assumption, to Ibn Taymiyyah, fell short ofdescribing the true nature of the Creator of the universe.55 In

54 DarTaru, vol. VIII, p. 139.55 Ibid, p. 140; pp. 218-9.


22/24


188

addition, their supposition that the universe cannot exist withoutmovement was, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, a statementwithout proof. If it could not exist without movement, then itwould or could be deficient; but deficiency does not necessarilymean non-being.56 It was clear to Ibn Taymyah thatAristotles concept of God derived from the theory of movementwas indefensible. That is why he rejected the philosophersconcept of God as a passive First Principle, which was verydifferent from the active Qurnic vision of the sovereign

creative God.2) As seen by Ibn Taymiyyah, the proof for the existence

of God based on movement, as used in Muslim philosophicalthought, originated from the method employed by themutakallimn ,57 which was based upon the story of Abrahamin the Qurn. However, the philosophers do not give us avalid argument for this as the mutakallimn. The problemcentres on the identification of the wordfiln(those that set) inthe Qurn58 as movement. Movement (al-afwal) is postulatedas an aspect of the contingent because all things other thanGod move. It is an inherent quality (waf lzim) of the sun,

the stars and the moon. They move because they are contingent(mumkinah), and they are contingent because they move.Based on this premise and in conjunction with the story ofAbraham, the philosophers inferred that since movement

56 Ibid, p. 219.57 The first who used the proof from the story of Abraham, according to

Ibn Taymiyyah, were Jahmite and Mutazilite. They interpreted thewords This is my Lord in the Qurn as the creator of the universe.The word al-afwal meant, to them, movement and change. SeeMinhjal-Sunnah, ed. R.Slim, vol. II, p. 142.

58 The verse reads: When the night covered him over, he saw a star. Hesaid:ThismyLord, but when it set, he said :I love not those thatset(filn). The Qurn, 6: 76.


23/24


189

occurs after it previously did not, it is a temporal phenomenon(dith).59 Thus, movement is not only a proof of the negationof the divinity, but also an argument for the temporality(udth) of the body and the universe.

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the philosophers misunderstoodthis Qurnic text and its historical context. To him, the wordal-afwal (passing thing) meant the absent (al-mughb) andhiddenness (al-itijb). For this interpretation, he foundsupport among language experts and the majority ofmufassirn.

It had nothing to do with the theory of movement or accident,which is inseparable from the body. In the Qurnic story, theconcept suggests that Abraham did not think movementcontradictory to his goal of finding God, but that the thing thatwas passing down (al-afwal) was incompatible with his goal.60

Since the philosophers understanding of movement inthe Qurn was incorrect, their theories were also untenable.Ibn Taymiyyahs repudiation of the philosophers theory ofmovement as a means to prove the existence of God isconvincing, as he was able to claim a better understanding ofthe Qurnic text than the philosophers. Their theory in

general and their final analysis in particular were much moreindefensible seen that they portrayed the existence of a godwith limited power.

ConclusionIbn Taymiyyahs critique of Aristotelian metaphysics seems tobe driven by a desire to follow the way of the earlier generationsof pious Muslims (salaf al-li), who had posited that theonly source of Muslim thought was revelation. He therefore

59 DarTaru, vol. VIII, p. 310-56.60 Ibid, p. 355-56.


24/24


190

held that the subject matter of metaphysics could not be thereality of created being (al-mawjd), but God Himself (al-wujd). He argued that placing the created being as thesubject matter of metaphysics could lead to the application ofa principle that God has in common with all of His owncreatures, thus reducing His universality. However, he didnot clarify that in some places the revelation also commandsthat Muslims should understand God by way of His creature.The dispute would then evolve around the concept of

universal. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyahs concern to avoidpositing any resemblance between God and creation was alsomanifest in his repudiation of Ibn Sns theory of possiblebeing in relation to the Necessary Being, especially inrelation to the theory of emanation. Yet, the philosopher stheory of emanation was against the principle of creation.Envisaged from this angle, the philosophers metaphysics wasincompatible with Qurnic thought as understood andvindicated by Ibn Taymiyyah and by other Muslim thinkers,too.

afkar.11.2010 05.hamid.metafizik

Documents