afghanistan-the strengthening northern insurgency in afghanistan 2011

8/3/2019 Afghanistan-The Strengthening Northern Insurgency in Afghanistan 2011

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C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E

Mark ChecchiaSecurity & Force ProtectionKnowledge [email protected]

he Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) indicates that, until recently, the Taliban, which wastraditionally identified with the Pashtun ethnic group, would have trouble finding a solid foothold in

northern Afghanistan. The Taliban was seen as having little appeal outside the Pashtun ethnic group, and

the AAN notes there is only a limited Pashtun presence in Afghanistan s northern provinces as opposed to larger

groups of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens, among others. The lack of a strong Pashtun presencewas seen by the

AAN to deny the Taliban the relatively greater degree of support or tolerance they enjoyed in the southern and

eastern parts of the country.

The Taliban, however, appears to be increasinglymotivated by religious ideologyrather than by ethnicity, says

the International Crisis Group (ICG). Therefore, by developing a religious rather than ethnic ideology, the Taliban

has gradually been able to extend its strength in northern Afghanistan. According to ICG, the Taliban hasfound

support for its religious ideology among clerics in Uzbek and Turkmen communities. Tajiks, who comprise thelargest ethnic bloc in northern Afghanistan and have previously fought against the Taliban, have reportedly shown

less involvement in the insurgency thus far.

The US Military Academys Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) pointed out in 2007 that the Taliban had begun a

concerted effortto establish a stronger presence in the North of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders had reportedly talked

about expanding into northern Afghanistan, where international and Afghan security forces were less prepared to

repel the insurgency, according to the CTC. By 2008, insurgent leaders were calling for more attacks in the North.

Such calls were followed by asurge of anti-government (i.e., insurgent) activitythat seriously destabilised parts of

the North and West of the country. The Taliban growth in the Northinitially was under-recognisedbecause of the

belief that the lack of Pashtuns would render this area inaccessible for the insurgency. However, insurgent activity

in the North became evident in 2008, according to the aforementioned AAN report. Furthermore, the Talibandeveloped plans to introduce sympathetic mullahs in local madrassas and mosques. Such a strategy reflected the

belief that clerics would be among the strongest Taliban supporters, according to the ICG report noted above.

Some religious figures were already preaching against the Afghan government and international community and,

hence, needed little urging to support the Taliban. Furthermore, ICG analysts estimate that up to 70% of mullahs

in the North have been trained in Pakistan, where the Taliban first emerged in the mid-1990s.

T

This document outlines the reported expansion of the insurgency into northern

Afghanistan and presents a number of implications for Central Asia. Related

information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source materialare highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

The Strengthening Northern

Insurgency in Afghanistan

August 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises

A F G H A N I ST A N T H E M A T I C R E P O R T S E C U R I T Y & F O R C E P R O T E C T I O N
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tensions-rise-between-hizb-i-islami-and-the-taliban-in-afghanistanhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspxhttp://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1mailto:[email protected]


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T h e m a t i c R e p o r t : T h e N o r t h e r n I n s u r g e n c y i n A f g h a n i s t a n

Relations with Other Insurgent GroupsThe Taliban did have to operate in an environment in northern

Afghanistan which included other militant and insurgent

groups, according to the CTC. The largestinsurgent faction in

the North is Hezb-e Islami, a group controlled by Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar. Additionally, the control of key transit routes,

such as the one running throughKunduzandBaghlan, led to

significant competition between the Taliban and Hezb-e

Islami, asserts the CTC. Domination of these routes allows

whichever insurgent group controls them to reap benefits,

such as added revenue (from informal taxation and extortion)

and a strengthened ability to recruit.

The CTC estimates the Taliban to have300 to 600 hard core

fighters, most of whom are locals, along with scores of foreign

fighters in northern Afghanistan. On the other hand, CTC saysHezb-e Islami has afighting force of 400-600 by conservative

estimates; other analysts say Hezb-e Islami has close to 1,500

full-time fighters. A 2010 report by AAN puts insurgent

numbers at 1,150, organised in 95 groups, in north-eastern

Afghanistan and 872 insurgents organised in 75 groups in the

North. The CTC says that by late 2009,turf battlesover key

pieces of terrain, including fertile farming areas and key

logistical hubs, exploded between [Hezb-e Islami] and the

Taliban. In March 2010, Hezb-e-Islami and the Taliban

clashed in Baghlan province, which resulted in hundreds of

casualties, according to the CTC. Both insurgent groups

fought again inWardakprovince in July 2010. The CTC notes

that the Talibans growth in northern Afghanistan and that

subsequent competition for terrain between insurgent groups

had generated a significant fissure in the countrys militant

movement. Hekmatyars and Hezb-e Islamis willingness to

pursue a political settlementwith the Afghan government has

reportedly irritated the Taliban. Some observers noted in the

aforementioned CTC report suggest Hekmatyars moves to

negotiate are impelled by the fact that a portion of his base is being lost to the Taliban. In addition, the

insurgencyspenetration of the greater Kabularea has intensified competition between Taliban fighters, the North

Waziristan-based Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e Islami, says ICG. Violent rivalries between these insurgent

groups in places such asKapisa,Logarand Wardak have resulted in hundreds of lives lost.

The Afghan government is concerned about the Talibans growth in the North and is taking actions to address the

situation. According to the CTC, President Hamid Karzai appointed Hajji Abdul Munshi Majeed, the long-

standing governor of Badakhshan province, who has strong ties to Hezb-e Islami, to be governor of Baghlan

province. This step, which is intended to prevent further Taliban infiltration, demonstrates the seriousness in

which the government views the increase in Taliban activities and consolidation in the northern districts of

Kunduz and Baghlan, states the CTC.

Selected Insurgent Groups in Northern

Afghanistan

Haqqani Network: The Haqqani Network

is an insurgent group in Afghanistan that isbased out of North Wazirstan in Pakistan.

Sometimes it is in conflict with the Taliban

The two groups also periodically

collaborate.

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin(HIG): Led by

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, HIG is an insurgent

group active in Afghanistan. HIG is believed

to have local alliances with the Taliban and

al Qaida.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU):

An Uzbek terrorist organization which hastargeted ISAF and ANSF forces from safe

havens in the Pakistani border region.

Taliban: Islamic fundamentalist militia in

Afghanistan, originally consisting mainly of

Sunni Pashtun religious students. In 1996

they controlled much of Afghanistan either

by force or through forming alliances with

other groups. It was unseated in 2001 by

international forces collaborating with

Afghan fighters.

United Tajik Opposition (UTO): A

militant group which opposes the

government of Tajikistan. Their more

aggressive followers have been known to

cooperate in actions with other Islamic

Fundamentalist groups.
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ControlInsurgency in provinces north of Kabul, particularlyParwan, Kapisa andLaghman, is heavily influenced by Hezb-

e Islami, which has historically been active in those areas, according to the ICG. The Taliban also has developed

substantial influencein the region, further exacerbating the tensions between the two groups discussed above. The

Taliban resurgence in Kapisa province in particular gained traction in 2006 and gathered momentum in 2007,

exploiting deep-seated distrust between the Tajik and Pashtun groups in the province, according to the ICG study.

The aggressiveness of Taliban leaders in Kapisa, when campaigning against NATOs International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), has been widely reported. They

worked at consolidating a hold over Pashtun populationgroups through intimidation and assassination of local

government officials. In addition, the ICG says that the Taliban took advantage of distrust between Tajik-

dominated areas and Pashtun-dominated areas of the province in order to expand its influence among Pashtuns.

The Taliban influence in Kapisa is important because of its strategic place as a staging ground for attacks on

Kabul. For that reason, as the ICG indicates, Kapisa has time and again proven pivotal for insurgent operations

targeting the capital.

Figure 1. The Provinces and Regional Borders of Afghanistan

Note: For a larger map and security, governance and development indicators for each province, see the Afghanistan Provincial

Indicators (APIs) . Source:Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin
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From 2009 onwards, AAN says there was evidence that the Taliban was activelyrecruiting Uzbeks and Turkmens

as well as smaller numbers of Tajiks. In the spring of 2010, ethnically-mixed insurgent groups were already

reported. The AAN says that by 2010, the Taliban was increasingly influential in northern Baghlan, southern and

northern districts in Kunduz, northernTakharand parts ofFaryabandJowzjanprovinces.

Recruiting and Wider AppealAn Outlook Afghanistan article from July 2011 says that the Taliban is attempting towiden its baseby recruiting

militants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which reportedly hasties

to al Qaeda, is both assisting and benefitting from Taliban recruiting and training. The Taliban, according to

Outlook Afghanistan , trains IMU volunteers and eventually recruits the most eager fighters to join them in

launching attacks. The article asserts that northern regions of Afghanistan are increasinglybecoming infested with

militancy spearheaded by the Taliban in alliance with groups such as the IMU. Mohammad Asim, a former

lawmaker from the Baghlan, says the IMU hascarved out their nichein northern Afghanistan, according toRadio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Although the IMU campaigns and has demonstrated a willingness to fight

against ISAF and Afghan forces in the region, their ultimate aim, Asim says, is to build a base in Afghanistan foroperations across Central Asia.

Figure 2. Ethnic Group and Taliban Presence in Afghanistan, Dec 2009

Adeadly attack on the governors officesin Takhar on 28 May 2011, in which the Afghan National Police (ANP)

commander and the provinces police chief were killed, gave insight into the cross-group cooperation among

insurgent groups in northern Afghanistan, saysRFE/RL. Afghan and ISAF forces arrested an IMU recruit working

for the Taliban in connection with the Takhar attack.RFE/RL says that rising violence, recruitment of locals and

Source:Carnegie Endowment; available via thePerry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679https://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Takhar.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Takhar.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Takhar.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Faryab.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Faryab.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Faryab.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Jowzjan.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Jowzjan.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Jowzjan.aspxhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfmhttp://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfmhttp://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfmhttp://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-national-police-anphttp://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-national-police-anphttp://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-national-police-anphttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnicities_and_taliban_presence_map_15Dec2009.jpghttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnicities_and_taliban_presence_map_15Dec2009.jpghttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnicities_and_taliban_presence_map_15Dec2009.jpghttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnicities_and_taliban_presence_map_15Dec2009.jpghttp://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-national-police-anphttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://www.rferl.org/content/in_afghanistan_imu_taliban_alliance_chips_away_at_the_stone/24230127.htmlhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62514http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfmhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192https://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Jowzjan.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Faryab.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Takhar.aspxhttp://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679


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more sophisticated attacks are all signs that the IMU has made inroads into the Uzbek community in northern

Afghanistan by playing on their grievances. The IMUs base, saysRFE/RL, has grown and, by extension, so too

has the Talibans. . Waheed Mozdaha respected Afghan historian and Taliban expert, say that the Taliban and

IMU may even have jointly infiltrated the ANSF in northern Afghanistan. The RFE/RL piece further notes that

[i]f left uncheckedalliances between the Al-Qaeda linked IMU and the Taliban could not only destabilize

northern Afghanistan but establish it as a launching pad for attacks across Central Asia and beyond.

The July article in the Outlook Afghanistan reports that [t]he recent increase in militant activity in Northern

Afghanistan, involving a resurgent Taliban regrouping in alliance with IMU, can very well change the dynamics

of militancy in the region towards increasing destabilization of not only Afghanistan but also the Central Asian

countries.

Implications for Afghanistan and Central AsiaICG cites the followingstatement from the US Director of National Intelligence(DNI), James Clapper: as the US

increases reliance on Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan, the regions political and social stability is

becoming more important. Additionally, the DNI stated that in 2010, Tajikistans President Rakhmon wasforced to negotiate with regional warlords after failing to defeat them militarily, an indicator that Dushanbe is

potentially more vulnerable to an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with renewed interests in Central Asia. The

Outlook Afghanistan article says the IMU is dangerous because it is developingcross-border terror networks. For

example, the organisation has taken refuge in Pakistani tribal areas and has taken advantage of familial, tribal and

ethnic ties to Central Asian states. Hence, it is important for both Afghanistan and its neighbours to the north

to understand the northern insurgencys implications for former-Soviet, Central Asian republics, particularly

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan

The ideal role forTajikistan in US Afghanistan strategy, the ICG assesses, is to remain stable and to allow for

unfettered over-flight and transit of forces. However, challenges facing Tajikistan became increasingly clear after

September 2010, when Tajik security forces were unable to fully quell an uprising by warlords and a group of

young extremists led byMullo Abdullo, head of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and a leader of the Islamist

forces as well. AAN asserts that Tajikistan is increasingly vulnerable to militant activity from a mix of

dissatisfied Islamists at home, and armed groups over the border in Afghanistan.

The ICG says that difficulty controllingthe lengthy borderbetween Tajikistan and Uzbekistan poses a significant

challenge to security. In addition, ICG analysts find that up to a quarter of Afghanistans drug output moves

through Central Asia annually, the majority through Tajikistan. The ICG cites other research which suggests that

it is unlikely that opiate trafficking adds less than 30% to the recorded GDP [of Tajikistan]. The Institute for

War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) reiterates the speculation by retired police Col. Aliakbar Abdulloev that the

formerly dormant UTO might be evolving as the kind offranchise operationused by al Qaeda for recruiting andfunding. Additionally, he notes the IMU may be looking to identify willing recruits for domestic insurgency

operations within Tajikistan.

Uzbekistan

Several groups operate in border areas between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan and are linked to the Taliban. The

previously discussed IMU is the most noteworthy. Ballpark estimates from the ICG put theIMUs fighting force

in the low thousands. On the other hand, according to the ICG, many observers agree the IMU and its allies are
http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.eurasianet.org/node/61971http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61971http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/profiles.phphttp://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/profiles.phphttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3688http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://iwpr.net/report-news/assessing-tajikistans-mujahedinhttp://iwpr.net/report-news/assessing-tajikistans-mujahedinhttp://iwpr.net/report-news/assessing-tajikistans-mujahedinhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://iwpr.net/report-news/assessing-tajikistans-mujahedinhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1679http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3688http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/profiles.phphttp://www.eurasianet.org/node/61971http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspxhttp://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1192


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increasingly active in northern Afghanistan. ICG analysts speculate it may be because they view the battle for

Afghanistan as the central international obligation of all jihadists.

Since 2009, the ICG mentions there have beenincreasing reportsof Central Asian guerrillas operating in northern

provinces of Afghanistan, and most are described as members of IMU. The IMU first shifted their main base to

Afghanistan after breaking alliance with UTO over the 1997 peace deal that ended the Tajik civil war and their

unsuccessful incursion into Kyrgyzstan in 1999. After the Taliban defeat in 2001 in Afghanistan, the IMU

relocated to Waziristan, Pakistan, where they were seemingly inactive; the ICG says most analysts thought they

were finished. However, they go on to say it is likely they were rebuilding instead of dying. The first influx of

IMU recruits was Chechen fighters in 2000, relocating after the quashing of their rebellion by Russian Federation

forces. This movement made sense as the Taliban, allied with the IMU, was the only quasi-governmental entity

that recognised Chechnya as an independent nation.

The ICG says the next infusion of fighters into Uzbekistan and the IMU came when the Islamist guerrilla

movement inDagestanwas dying down in 2001-2002; they fled from Russian Federation forces to Afghanistan,

where many became affiliated with the IMU. Subsequent reports confirmedyoung Dagestanis leaving home for

Afghanistanin the following years. The ICG notes that claims of Central Asian fighters training in Afghanistanare as recent as April 2011.

ConclusionRFE/RL notes that the expansion of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in northern Afghanistan may have

implications for thehandover of security responsibilitiesfrom ISAF to the ANSF. TheJoint Afghan-ISAFInteqal

Board, responsible for the transition process, is expected to announce the second tranche in late September or

early October 2011. As Asim, the former politician from Baghlan referenced earlier in this report, says in his

RFE/RL interview, instability in the north means it will beunsuitable as a testing ground for Afghan forces.

RFE/RL says the insurgency in northern Afghanistan will be a difficult test for the ANSF in those locations where

ISAF will play a smaller role. As the ANSF takes more responsibility for security, the Taliban will quickly test

them in places like Kapisa. The ICG assertion that insurgentinfluence in Kapisais particularly important because

of its utility as astaging ground for attacks on Kabul make it pivotal for operations against the capital.

ICG indicates that Afghanistan faces significant challenges as ISAF continues its withdrawal. The situation is

exacerbated by challenges facing the Afghan government, not just military, but also those related toeffective and

accountable public administration, providing security and services impartially. The ICG further states that the

concentration of ISAF troops and donor resources in the south has left the rest of the country vulnerable to

insurgent encroachment, with the Taliban opening new fronts in the North and penetrating even deeper into the

central-eastern provinces. If the Afghan government is slow to address the public good, it provides an opening

for the Taliban and its allies to step into that vacuum.

The Taliban movement into the North, the RFE/RL article notes, demonstrates its intent to become a genuinelynation-wide movement. The ICG states that while ISAF and Afghan forces have combated insurgents in the

North, such efforts have not been followed up with astrategy to hold the areasand ensure maintained stability.

Accordingly, it remains an open subject of debate not only how to counter the insurgency in northern Afghanistan

but also how to ensure that it is unable to return.
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Annex A. Further Readings Giustozzi, Antonio and Christoph Reuter. 2011. The Insurgents of the Afghan North. Kabul: Afghanistan

Analysts Network.

Gopal, Anand and Matthew DuPee. 2010. Tensions Rise Between Hezb-e-Islami and the Taliban inAfghanistan. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy.

International Crisis Group. 2011. Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats. Brussels: International CrisisGroup

International Crisis Group. 2011. The Insurgency in Afghanistans Heartland. Brussels: International CrisisGroup.

Mohammad, Wahidullah. 2009. Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan. Washington, DC: TheJamestown Foundation.

Olimova, Lola.2011.Assessing Tajikistans Mujahedin,Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 30 May. Rezale, Mehdi.2011. The Rise of the Taliban-IMU Nexus in Northern Afghanistan, Outlook Afghanistan,

11 July.

Siddique, Abubakar. 2011. In Afghanistan, IMU-Taliban Alliance Chips Away at the Stone,Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty , 09 June.

United States Department of Defense. 2011.Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,Washington, DC: US DOD
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