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Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression

ISSN: 1943-4472 (Print) 1943-4480 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rirt20

Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan:new communication and mobilization strategiesfor the Twitter generation

David Drissel

To cite this article:David Drissel (2015) Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new

communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation, Behavioral Sciences ofTerrorism and Political Aggression, 7:2, 97-128, DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2014.986496

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.986496

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Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan:new communication and mobilization strategies

for the Twitter generation

David Drissel

Social Sciences, Iowa Central Community College, Fort Dodge, IA, USA

(Received 6 June 2014; accepted 3 November 2014)

The USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been waging war

against the Taliban in Afghanistan for more than a decade, with territorial gains bycoalition forces often proving to be ephemeral. This paper traces the origins andevolution of the current Afghan insurgency and explores the framing of theTaliban movements discourse on Twitter and other interactive websites. Thepaper postulates that Taliban activists are utilizing social media to disseminatetheir views and frame their movement in the phraseology of militant Islamism,traditional Pashtun folklore, anti-imperialism, social justice, and universal humanrights. Taliban militants are attempting to align their discursive frames withvarious transnational ideologies that resonate not only with prospective recruitsand supporters in Central and South Asia and the Middle East, but alsopotentially receptive audiences in the West. Such frame alignments are essentialcomponents in the micro-mobilization of movement participants. Taliban

activists apparently recognize that there are important symbols, narratives, andchannels already in existence that can facilitate the growth of their insurgency,while effectively discrediting coalition forces. This paper examines framealignments and other insurgent-mobilization communication strategies byconducting a content analysis of recent tweets and blogs written by Talibancyber-activists.

Keywords: Taliban; social media; framing theory; Afghanistan; insurgency;Twitter

Introduction

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, hundreds of bil-lions of dollars have been spent by the US government and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) in Afghanistan, while over 3450 coalition soldiers have beenkilled on the battlefield.1 Though coalition forces were successful initially in topplingthe Taliban from power and installing a new central government in the capital city ofKabul, the Taliban eventually reconstituted itself and launched a new revolutionaryinsurgency that includes an innovative reliance on information and communicationtechnologies (ICTs). The current rebellion not only has serious potential consequencesfor Afghanistan, but also for international security, given the Talibans strong ties to al-Qaida (the Base) and other radical-Islamist networks. Problematically for coalition

forces, Afghanistan shares a permeable frontier border-region with Pakistan that is

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Vol. 7, No. 2, 97 128, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.986496
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relatively resistant to central government control. Consequently, Taliban insurgents andother militants have found a partial refuge in this remote mountainous area, which pro-vides an unofficial launching pad for attacks against coalition forces and Afghan mili-tary and civilian targets.

Due to the Talibans close association with al-Qaida and other radical-Islamist ter-rorist groups, international security interests have become linked directly to the futureof Afghanistan. Even though Afghanistan had relatively little strategic value to theWest prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the very real threat of a reacquisition ofstate power by the Taliban raises serious security concerns (Jones, 2010). Indeed, thespillover effects from a failed or re-radicalized state in Afghanistan would almost cer-tainly imperil Pakistan and other neighboring states in South Asia, Central Asia, and theMiddle East. Furthermore, the form that this spillover might assume could becomemanifested as terrorism directed either internally or at real or imagined outsideenemies in the West (Snow, 2011, p. 338). Even if the Taliban does not reassumestate power in Afghanistan, al-Qaida or similar global jihadist groups could easily

find a new safe haven there if the country plunges into turmoil or civil war (Miller,2012). And given Pakistans nuclear weapons capabilities, the twin Taliban insurgen-cies in Afghanistan and Pakistan potentially could have dire or catastrophic inter-national consequences. To be sure, the prospect of a new radical-Islamic regime inIslamabad passing nuclear technology on to other Islamic states or even worse,non-state organizations comprises the ultimate nightmare in Americas War onTerror (Tanner,2009, p. 338).

This paper traces the origins and evolution of the current Afghan insurgency andexplores how the Taliban movement has dramatically revised its discursive communi-cation and mobilization strategies to include a new dependence on Internet websites,

social media, mobile phones, text messages, underground radio stations, music CDs,videos, and other contemporary modes of communication. Reversing their previous

ban on the use of the Internet and other digital technologies, Taliban leaders now com-municate with many of their followers and potential supporters on Twitter, YouTube,Facebook, and other social media websites. The Taliban apparently is attempting tomobilize new sources of support from the so-called Twitter Generation, that is, rela-tively younger people who tend to utilize social media websites and other ICTs exten-sively. In effect, the Taliban is undertaking a rapprochement with elements ofmodernity by embracing the Twitter Revolution (Boone, 2011). In particular,younger Muslims in the West, and especially those who have been marginalized by

society and undergone re-Islamization (or a neo-fundamentalist born-again trans-formation), are potentially susceptible to online appeals from the Taliban, al-Qaida,the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other radical-Islamist groups.2

More specifically, this paper postulates that Afghan Taliban activists are utilizinginnovative modes of communication in order to disseminate their political stancesand frame their social movement in the transnational phraseology of radical Islamism,social justice, anti-imperialism, national self-determination, and universal humanrights. Frames, by definition, are a schemata of interpretations that enable individualsto locate, perceive, identify, and label various events and occurrences within theirown life experiences (Buechler, 2011, p. 146). In other words, a frame simplifiesand condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects,situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within ones present or pastenvironment (Snow & Benford,1992, p. 137). Specific social phenomena do not nor-mally become meaningful to individuals until they have been framed, that is, socially

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and cognitively organized as part of a discourse (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford,1986, p. 211).

Thus, the paper asserts that the Taliban movement is engaging inglobal framing3 orthe utilization of international symbols to frame domestic issues for the purpose ofmobilizing support both at home and abroad. In particular, Taliban militants areattempting implicitly to align their discursive indigenous frames with various transna-tional ideologies that resonate not only with prospective recruits and supporters inAfghanistan and the surrounding region, but also potentially receptive audiences inthe West. The Taliban leadership evidently recognizes that there are important domesticand global symbols, narratives, and channels already in existence that can facilitate col-lective action and spur the growth of their insurgency, while effectively delegitimizingthe current Afghan government and coalition forces stationed in Afghanistan. Hence,one of the main challenges for the USA and NATO is to develop effective counterin-surgent discursive-frames that effectively blunt the appeal of Taliban propaganda,especially when it comes to relatively youthful, impressionable audiences.

Relevant research questions addressed in this paper include the following: Whatsociocultural, political, economic, and technological factors have given rise to thenew Afghan insurgency and facilitated the reframing of the Taliban as a viable,modern movement? How has the Taliban movement evolved in its communicationstrategies and mobilization approaches since being dislodged from power in 2001?What are the main reasons why Taliban leaders and activists have decided to employonline social media and other innovative means of communication in rallying suppor-ters and recruiting prospective participants? How have Taliban spokesmen utilizedsocial media and other websites to frame (and reframe) their guerrilla struggle in thediscursive rhetoric of both indigenous and globalized norms and values? And how

has the collective identity of the Taliban been socially constructed (and reconstructed)by online framing approaches employed by cyber-activists? In order to answer thesequestions, specific examples of Taliban postings on various websites and Twitter

pages are described, compared, and analyzed.In analyzing the new communication strategies of the Taliban insurgent movement,

this paper utilizes a relatively novel discourse analysis approach that draws heavilyfrom both framing theory and collective-identity theory. In contrast to most otherresearch projects dealing with the Taliban, this paper examines multiple interpretiveframeworks for perceiving issues and events in Afghanistan, rather than simplyrelying on conventional Western frames of reference. In particular, micro-mobilization

strategies are examined by conducting a content analysis of particular frames articu-lated in the context of social media and other website postings written by Taliban acti-vists. Over 400 tweets (micro-blogs) and essay-style weblogs were retrieved, reviewed,and analyzed by this researcher during the period of FebruaryJune 2012. All of thetweets and other social media commentary examined in this project were posted onvarious Taliban Twitter accounts contemporaneously during this four-month period;however, several of the more lengthy blogs cited in this paper were first posted onthe main English-language Taliban website, shahamat-english.com, as early asJanuary 2010, and were later retrieved online by this researcher during the period ofstudy in FebruaryJune 2012.

The subjective, symbolic meanings of the Talibans online discourse are examinedin this paper, based on particularcoding frames,4 which are identified and analyzedaccordingly. Specific thematic and narrative frames retrieved from online materialswere carefully coded and grouped into seven distinct categories based on frequently

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appearing keywords and concepts Islamic jihad, mujahideen and Soviet inva-sion, September 11th attacks and terrorism, social justice, human rights, colo-nialism and imperialism, and Pashtun and Afghan culture. It should be noted thatthis list of discursive communication categories is not exhaustive, and was assembledthrough purely qualitative means, after a preliminary assessment of over 100 tweets and

blogs, prior to the start of the main research project. Thus, this paper endeavors to ident-ify several of the most common global frames utilized by the Taliban, particularly thosethat are intended to amplify and extend the appeal of the movement beyond its tra-ditional national/regional habitus and into the geopolitical realm of the West.

The paper begins with an overview of the origins and evolution of the Talibanmovement, describing its rise to power and ostensible demise in the immediate after-math of the 9/11 attacks. The next section of the paper describes and analyzes manyof the sociocultural, economic, and political reasons for the resurgence of theTaliban insurgency and its reemergence over the past decade as a viable threat toAfghan political stability and international security. Next, the paper examines several

notable theories of social movement mobilization in cyberspace, emphasizing theimportance of the Internet, social media, and frame alignments in targeting and poten-tially mobilizing specific audiences. The fourth major section focuses on new insurgentcommunication strategies that are being utilized by the radical-Islamist movement ingeneral and the new Taliban movement specifically, with an emphasis on the use ofsocial media and related websites.

The last major section of the paper is subdivided into two parts that reflect the dis-cursive transnational binary of global jihad and global justice, which includesnumerous examples of Taliban tweets and blogs that are examined for their framingcontent. The main reason why these two overarching though seemingly antithetical

headings have been selected for this research project is due to their frequent depictionas two alternativeglobalizations from below(or broad-based transnational social move-ments), which rarely have been examined in tandem. From this vantage point, theWestern-centric, market globalism is only one variant of globalization, albeit thedominant one.5 But market globalism is facing serious opposition from two major ideo-logical cultural challengers justice globalism and jihadist globalism. In its own way,each alternative globalism is contesting the power and prerogatives of the reputedlyhegemonic, market-oriented model of globalization that predominates in the West.

Rise and fall of the Taliban

To understand the contemporary communication and mobilization strategies of theAfghan Taliban movement, it is first important to describe briefly the modern historyof international and domestic conflict in Afghanistan. Tellingly, Afghanistan has

been known as the graveyard of empires for well over a century (Isby,2010). Thismacabre soubriquet has been applied for a very apt reason: Powerful foreign armiesthat have entered the rugged, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan tend to encounterfierce resistance and often lose battles and wars to zealous, tribal fighters. Many suchempires, even those that temporarily prevailed militarily in Afghanistan, overextendedtheir imperial reach, depleted their budgets, and seriously weakened their respectivehomelands in the process. From Alexander the Great in 330 BCE to the BritishEmpire in the 1840s and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, numerous great powershave met their match in Afghanistan and hastened their imperial decline as a result. 6

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Although Afghanistan is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, the country is sharplydivided culturally, politically, and militarily along tribalethnic lines. There are atleast 55 distinct ethnic groups and a dozen major languages in the country, withoutany group having a clear demographic majority among a growing population ofapproximately 33 million people. Though the largest and most powerful ethnicgroup in Afghanistan is the Pashtun (4045% of the population), various minoritygroups often compete with the Pashtun for power and influence, including the Tajiks(25%), Uzbeks (10%), Hazaras (10%), and Aimaqs (10%). In addition, the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Turkmen collectively comprise approximately 10% of the popu-lation. The Pashtun population is located primarily in the southern and eastern regionsof the country, while other ethnic groups tend to be concentrated in the northern andcentral areas (Rashid,2011).

Significantly, Pashtun elites have dominated top leadership positions in the Afghangovernment, bureaucracy, and military throughout most of the countrys history including the Taliban era (Harpviken,1997). In fact, the term Pashtun (or its linguistic

variations) is often considered to be synonymous with the Afghan people (Snow,2011,p. 308). Sharing a relatively strong sense of ethnic identity, the Pashtun tend to exhibitseveral cultural commonalities, including a genealogical claim to a putative mythicancestor named Qais, universal fluency in the Indo-Iranian language of Pashto, aSunni-Muslim affiliation, and a strong identification with the communal code ofconduct known asPashtunwali (Riphenburg, 2005, p. 37). Emphasizing the importanceof maintaining ones honor and reputation at all costs, Pashtunwali requires that anyinsult or attack on an individual be met with an equally forceful, collective response(Barfield, 2010, pp. 5859). Paradoxically, Pashtunwali also mandates that foreignguests be provided with sanctuary and protection from any external adversary

(Snow,2011, p. 305).As an Arabic loanword in the Pashto language, Taliban literally means one who is

seeking, or more specifically someone who is seeking religious knowledge (Rashid,2011, p. 40). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the relatedmujahedeen(i.e. strugglers, or people doing jihad) insurgency in the 1980s, thousands ofAfghan Pashtun men fled their homeland and became refugees in the mountainousPakistani borderlands. While living in refugee camps, these relatively youthful talibs(religious students) attended deeni madrassas (religious seminaries); and wereexposed to a radical interpretation of Deobandism an Indian Sunni-Islamic reformmovement that first coalesced during the British colonial period (Kakar, 2000). In

the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, thecountry became torn by civil war yet again, this time between rival Afghan politicalfactions. Backed financially and militarily by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and inspired

by radical-Islamist ideologues such as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban was officiallyestablished in mid-1994 in the southern Afghan (mostly Pashtun) city of Qandahar(Barfield,2010, p. 257).

Much of the Pashtun population of Afghanistan initially had remained relativelydetached from the civil war, since the (Pashtun-dominated) southern region had

become virtually autonomous after the Soviet withdrawal, thus avoiding directcontrol by the Kabul government or foreign-backed militias. But this began tochange with the return of the predominantly Pashtun Sunni talibsto southern Afghani-stan in the early 1990s. Fully entering the civil war in February 1995, the Talibanattacked government positions near Kabul from their base in the south, with coverthelp from Pakistani intelligence operatives. The Taliban leadership vowed to bring



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peace to Afghanistan, establish law and order, disarm the population, and imposesharia(Islamic law) (Rashid,2011, p. 40). After suffering their first major defeat atthe hands of government forces in March 1995, the Taliban made a military comebackand seized control of Kabul in September 1996. Fundamentally altering the strategicand ethnic balance of power in Afghanistan, the Taliban established the new IslamicEmirate of Afghanistan (Harpviken,1997, p. 280).

Prior to the Taliban takeover, Islamic law in Afghanistan had been relatively toler-ant toward non-Muslims and non-Islamic practices. But once in power, the Talibansoon began to repress and at times massacre people from non-Sunni Muslim andnon-Pashtun minority backgrounds such as Hazara Shiites, while invoking Salafist-style Islamic dogma as a religious and political justification (Tanner, 2009, p. 285).In response to the Taliban takeover and repressive tactics, militia groups in the northern

part of the country composed mainly of non-Pashtun minorities such as Tajiks,Uzbeks, and Hazaras banded together as the United Front for the Liberation ofAfghanistan (commonly known as the Northern Alliance) and sought to dislodge

the Taliban from power. But by 1998, the Taliban had pushed the Northern Allianceback to a relatively small enclave in the northeast, while successfully securingcontrol over most of the country (Rashid, 2011).

Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became a highly totalitarian Islamist state in whichmorality was rigidly defined and policed by agents of the government. In such a reac-tionary theocracy, there was rule by self-proclaimed morally pure people whose goalwas to Islamacize the society (McDaniel,2005, p. 50). Assuming the title of Com-mander of the Faithful, Taliban leader Mullah Omar began issuing commands thatrequired absolute obedience and were considered to be religiously mandatory (Barfield,2010, p. 261). Consequently, females were officially precluded from educational insti-

tutions and faced rampant employment discrimination, and everyone was required todress in traditional Muslim/Pashtun garb including full body coverings forwomen, and a hat and beard for men. The new Taliban legal code included an official

ban on music, television, photography, whistling, kite flying, and the Internet (Tanner,2009, p. 284). The Taliban began to enforce strict Islamic practices with harsh physical

punishments, often administered summarily. Several women were stoned to death bythe government after having been accused of adultery (Katzman, 2012, p. 5).

Lacking diplomatic recognition from most states (with the notable exceptions ofPakistan and Saudi Arabia), due to such restrictive policies, the Taliban quicklyturned Afghanistan into an international pariah (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 16). Most

worrisome for the US and other Western countries, the Taliban leadership was provid-ing a safe haven to al-Qaida, including bin Laden one of the most notorious terroristsin the world. Maintaining close connections with the Taliban leadership, bin Ladenrelocated his main base of operations to Afghanistan in 1997. For the Taliban, provid-ing sanctuary to bin Laden was justified not only by their similar Islamist beliefs, butalso the Pashtunwali imperative of protecting guests from non-Muslim outsiders(Snow, 2011, p. 305). While in Afghanistan, al-Qaida leaders successfully plannedand orchestrated terrorist attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania inAugust 1998. And though the USA responded with a cruise-missile attack on al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan, the jihadist network remained relatively unscathed.

Using Afghanistan as their main base of operations, al-Qaida masterminded ahighly destructive attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September2001. The apparent strategy of al-Qaida was to provoke the US government into a dis-

proportionate retaliation, thereby revealing the extremist character of the enemy for

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all to see (Lake,2002, p. 20). In response to the 9/11 attacks and refusal of the Talibanto assist in capturing bin Laden, President George W. Bush initiated a massive globalwar on terrorism that included a significant deployment of military forces to Afghani-stan beginning in October 2001, codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom. The USgovernment was focused initially on toppling the Taliban and hunting down orkilling al-Qaida militants in Afghanistan; claiming that the operation was a war ofnecessity (Snow,2011, p. 305).

By November 2001, the US-led coalition (which included British and Australiantroops and Afghan Northern Militia fighters) had been successful in toppling theTaliban from power and dislodging al-Qaida from its safe haven. An effective combi-nation of precision-based American air power and Special Operations Forces relayingtargeting information to pilots was instrumental in achieving such objectives (Biddle,2010, p. 268). In the initial post-Taliban era, there was broad support for the contentio nthat the war had been successful, despite the mysterious disappearance of bin Laden.7

However, Afghan security continued to be threatened by lingering Taliban and

al-Qaida elements, rampant crime and lawlessness, and various local warlords andmilitia groups. Such problems were compounded by fleeing Taliban militants relocat-ing from Afghanistan to the contiguous Pakistani lands of Baluchistan and the Feder-ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),8 thus forming a new base of operations(Riedel,2011). Many other Islamist radicals including al-Qaida operatives alsofled into the Pakistani frontier (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 1).

Soon after the overthrow of the Taliban government, prominent Afghans from awide variety of ethnicities and political orientations met with representatives of theUS government and United Nations in Bonn, Germany, to recreate the governmentof Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement, drafted and ratified by the conference,

established a new government that was intended to help reduce ethnic tensions inpost-war Afghanistan (Dobbins et al.,2003, p. 132). Significantly, the Bonn delegateshandpicked Hamid Karzai a Pashtun politician from a prominent family to be theinterim Afghan president in early 2002. The Bonn delegates also decided to includeseveral members of the Northern Alliance in the new cabinet. Officially sanctioned

by an emergencyLoya Jirga(Grand Council) in Kabul, de facto control over the mili-tary, police and intelligence agencies was awarded (at least temporarily) to Tajiks andother non-Pashtun northerners, thus prompting deep suspicion and outrage amongmany Pashtuns in the south. Indeed, there was a growing popular perception that thenew president had betrayed his fellow Pashtuns (Riphenburg, 2005, p. 39).

Problematically, corruption quickly became endemic within the new Afghan gov-ernment and political system. Karzai was elected to office officially in 2005 andreelected amid allegations of voter fraud in 2009. Soon after Karzais initial selec-tion as president, the USA allowed and even encouraged constitutional revisions thatgranted the Afghan president the power to appoint all provincial governors, militarycommanders, and police leaders.9 Karzai in turn placed tribal relatives and croniesin those positions of power, West (2011) observes. Command positions were putup for sale, requiring payoffs and political connections; the result was corrupt, unpro-fessional leadership that allowed the Taliban to reassert control in the countryside eastand south of Kabul (p. 89). Thus, the new Afghan government became hyper-centra-lized, patrimonial, and overly dependent on American military and financial support,which delegitimized Karzai and his regime in the eyes of many Afghans (Barfield,2010, p. 310).



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Furthermore, the original international force of approximately 5000 peacekeepingtroops, initially under British command in post-Taliban Afghanistan, did not adequately

provide for security and stability in the countryside, instead allocating most humanresources to Kabul. There were only 8000 other US and coalition troops in thecountry for the first few years of the occupation. In outlying areas of the country,coalition forces attempted to promote stability primarily through Special Forces andCivil Affairs teams, stationed in major cities. But there were vastly insufficient trooplevels to establish a secure environment throughout the country (Dobbins et al.,2003, p. 136).

Meanwhile, various local militia groups and warlords attempted to provide securityin other urban and rural areas, but at times engaged in armed conflict with each other.Most such militias and other armed groups were only nominally affiliated with the newKarzai regime; thus, they were not integrated into the national security structures of the

post-Taliban state. Consequently, the lack of sufficient coalition troops, coupled withrampant warlordism, prompted relatively low levels of public security, especially in

areas furthest away from Kabul. As Dobbins, Jones, Crane, and DeGrasse (2007)observe, Failure to deploy sufficient numbers in a peace enforcement operation canlead to incipient local resistance taking organized and violent form, as has occurredin Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (p. 38).

The new Taliban insurgency

The current insurgency in Afghanistan began soon after Taliban militants started toreturn to their homeland from the Pakistani borderlands in 2003. The so-called neo-Taliban movement began to operate with impunity in many areas of Afghanistan, par-ticularly in rural Pashtun-majority areas in the south and southeast (Deshpande,2008,

p. 33). US bases in Afghanistan started to be attacked by the spring of 2003, withwhole salvos of rockets and more sophisticated ambushes on road patrols (Giustozzi,2008, p. 3). Most worrisome, the use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) againstcoalition and Afghan forces began to increase dramatically at this time. The utilizationof IEDs by the neo-Taliban in such attacks suggests that they were borrowing terrorist-style tactics from their fellow insurgents in the Iraq War.10

Moreover, the neo-Taliban movement began resorting to suicide attacks againstcoalition forces and Afghan government targets by 2003, thus apparently reversinga previous religious ban on such self-triggered acts of martyrdom. For years, the orig-

inal Taliban had refused to condone suicide bombings, claiming that such tacticswere un-Islamic. But a major wave of Taliban suicide missions had begun by2005,11 illustrating the growing influence of the global jihadist movement in Afgha-nistan, and thus the reframing of the Taliban as a transnational (and not merely dom-estic) movement. Several leaders of the Taliban have openly asserted that this

particular tactical innovation is imperative to their success.12 Indeed, the Talibansuse of suicide attacks is based on a wider strategy of demoralization, which isintent on debilitating the enemy though psychological warfare. As Giustozzi(2008) explains:

The purpose of the suicide attacks was not to terrorize the population, but to show theTalibans commitment and determination in the struggle, as well as to inflict casualtieson the military and turn every civilian into a potential bomber in the eyes of theenemy. (p. 109)

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According to reports, there are approximately 60,00070,000 active members of thenew Afghan Taliban, including not only combatants, but also non-fighting memberssuch as informants and providers of supplies, housing, food, and other accommodations(Nijssen,2011). One major factor fueling the growth of the Taliban has been the dra-matic increase in the Afghan population of young men over the past several decades,including many who are either unemployed or underemployed. Though the Afghan

population as a whole has almost quadrupled in the past 60 years (Cutler, 2010),approximately 27% of the present population is between the ages of 15 and 29 yearsold (MacDonald, 2011, p. 6). This youth bulge is particularly dramatic given thefact over half of all adults are within this age cohort (Cincotta, 2009), thus providinga relatively large pool of potential new Taliban recruits. Indeed, the Taliban wontwaste an opportunity to recruit the fence-sitting unemployed youth bulge, adding expo-nentially to the local, part-time fighters that make up by some estimates as much as 75%of the Taliban (Amin,2012).

In contrast to Karzai and hisDurrani Pashtun tribal network, the Taliban is based

primarily on the rival Ghilzais.13 Notably, Taliban leader Mullah Omar comes fromthe Hotak Ghilzai tribe, which has sought to dislodge the Durannis from power for cen-turies. The Ghilzai have traditionally held a strong animosity towards the DurraniPashtuns, who took power from the Ghilzai and held it almost continuously for thelast 300 years, Johnson (2007, p. 324) explains. However, the neo-Taliban has appar-ently sought to expand its ranks beyond the original Ghilzai Pashtun cohort. Since thedawn of the new insurgency in 2003, the Taliban has recruited a growing number ofDuranni tribesmen. Though the Taliban continues to be predominantly Pashtun in eth-nicity (approximately 93%), there have been concerted attempts by activists in recentyears to recruit fighters from other ethnic groups including Uzbeks, Tajiks,

Pashais, and Hazaras. Indeed, spokesmen for the new Taliban have sought toreframe the movement as transcending such inter-community rivalries, whichmakes it easier for Taliban fighters to traverse tribal territories without provoking thelocals (Giustozzi,2008, pp. 4748).

Problematically for coalition forces, the Pakistani borderlands have become the newde facto base of radical Islam in South and Central Asia. The mountainous borderlandshave provided the Afghan Taliban with a protective cover from which to conduct guer-rilla operations in an asymmetrical war (Snow, 2011, p. 284). Moreover, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban, has become entrenched in FATA since2007, increasingly conducting terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets

(Jones & Fair,2010, p. 33). Part of the problem is that there is no popularly recognizednational boundary (or border security) separating Afghanistan from the semi-auton-omous Pashtun tribal lands of FATA.14 And the code ofPashtunwali is largely ben-eficial to the Afghan insurgents, who rely on melmastia (hospitality) to acquire foodand shelter when they travel within the Pashtun belt (Nijssen, 2011, p. 61). Most trou-

blesome, Afghan and Pakistani military and security forces lack the numbers, skills,equipment, and motivation to confront the growing insurgencies in the two countries(Rashid,2008).

Fueling the ranks of the Afghan insurgency have been noticeable setbacks in thecoalition-sponsored reconstruction project. Contrary to public pronouncements in theimmediate aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, international financial assistancefor statebuilding in Afghanistan has been largely insufficient and unsystematic, and wasreportedly not taken seriously by many top officials in the former Bush Administration.Expectations among the populace for substantial improvements were raised during the



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early days of the coalition mission, only to be largely dashed by a deteriorating econ-omic and security situation in the countryside, thus sparking feelings of relative depri-vation. In terms of governance, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the USA

pushed to reestablish a highly centralized government, which reportedly had not beensuccessful in past incarnations. Such steps had the effect of delegitimizing and even-tually weakening the central government in Kabul, thus fueling the new Taliban insur-gency (Barfield,2010, p. 302).

Jones (2010) contends that the insurgency in Afghanistan was not inevitable; rather,it was primarily the result of US decision-makers who opted not to listen to seasoneddiplomats, military commanders, and other experts in the field. Such experts had beencalling for significantly larger troop levels and major investments in infrastructure.Mostly disinterested in statebuilding in Afghanistan and distracted by the Iraq War,the Bush Administration reportedly rejected requests for greater monetary resourcesto be spent on reconstruction projects in rural Afghanistan. In effect, the USA and

NATO opted for a light footprint in post-Taliban Afghanistan, which for years

after the initial operation included vastly insufficient troop levels needed to stabilizethe country.15 Though US troop levels were raised to 30,000 soldiers by 2006, thedamage had already been done by that time and would prove to be a seriousmisstep that contributed to the collapse of governance in Afghanistan, Jones (2010,

p. 115) alleges.Additionally, it appears as though insufficient coalition resources were committed

to the reconstruction of the Afghan National Army (ANA). For the first years afterthe Talibans toppling, there was no sustained training program for ANA battalionsfollowing graduation (Dobbins et al.,2003, p. 137). Moreover, the fact that the BonnAgreement awarded control over the ANA, police and intelligence agencies to Tajiks

and other non-Pashtun northerners, prompted deep suspicion and outrage amongmany Pashtuns in the south. Indeed, there was a growing popular perception that thenew President had betrayed his fellow Pashtuns (Riphenburg, 2005, p. 39).Though Tajik dominance eventually ended, perceptions of ethnic favoritism in the mili-tary caused serious problems.16 Compounding the problem of inadequate security inAfghanistan has been the lack of sufficient numbers of both local and international

police. Local police units in particular are crucial in waging effective counterinsurgency(COIN) operations (Jones & Lbicki,2008).

Given the relatively low coalition troop levels and police in Afghanistan, manybasic law enforcement functions were simply ignored or relegated to corruption-

prone local militias and warlords. In addition, the subsequent use of counterinsurgentbombing campaigns by the USA placed civilian population centers at high risk. Thelack of good governance and public security throughout Afghanistan has generatedcountless thousands of alienated villagers, with many becoming prone to cooptationand recruitment by the ideologically driven Taliban leadership. Tribal youth in particu-lar are often ready-recruits, due in part to the breakdown of the established tribal order.Frequent military operations in tribal territories, especially in the PakistaniAfghan

border regions, have diminished the influence of village elders. In effect, the tribalsystem is in crisis and it can no longer provide peace, income, a sense of purpose, asocial network to the local youth, who then turn to radical movements mostnotably, the Taliban. Joining an insurgent movement becomes the only outlet wherethey can express their frustration and earn the prestige once offered by the tribalsystem (Giustozzi,2008, p. 39).

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Faced with a breakdown of law and order, widespread corruption, dysfunctionaltribal structures, and a lack of essential services in the countryside due to insufficientallied and central government support, many villagers have joined the ranks of theinsurgency out of a deep sense of frustration, despair, and desperation. Generally speak-ing, insurgencies feed off of a disillusioned population (Jones & Fair, 2010, pp. 8889). The neo-Taliban has developed a coherent grassroots strategy that is designed totake advantage of a government vacuum in rural areas, especially Pashtun areas(Jones, 2010, p. 335). Invoking the code of Pashtunwali, the Taliban has assertedthe traditional imperative of badal (revenge) to recruit new fighters after civiliandeaths caused by coalition bombings and hard-knock operations (Nijssen, 2011,

p. 61). Reorienting their military strategy to fight a Maoist-style war of the flea,the Taliban is carrying out assassinations and village-level attacks against demoralizedAfghan police and the largely inefficient Afghan National Army (Deshpandie,2008,

p. 33).Complicating matters further for coalition forces, countless thousands of Afghan

rural residents are highly dependent upon poppy cultivation, which is used primarilyfor opium and heroin production. Afghanistan is the largest heroin producer in theworld with an opium crop that on average is three times larger than the rest of theworld put together (Rashid,2011). Afghanistans illegal drug industry is the financialequivalent in export value to at least 50% of the Afghan economy (Rashid, 2008) andhas become a major source of financing ($70 million-$100 million per year) for the newTaliban (Katzman,2012, p. 18). Problematically, drug dealers operate the only viable

banking system for farmers in the country. And the drug trade has grown much worsesince the US-led invasion and is fueling insurgencies on both sides of the AfghanPakistani border, thus weakening states throughout the region (Rashid, 2011, p. 49).

Strangely enough, the Taliban have created their own powerful shadow govern-ment in much of Afghanistan, which is a parallel political power structure that includesinformal provincial and district governors, police chiefs, judges, and other officials.Though the Talibans organizational structure is increasingly decentralized, the so-called Leadership Council (Quetta Shura) at the top of the hierarchy sets the overalldirection of the movement. However, operational decisions are made by the middleand mostly lower levels of the shadow government, based on local conditions. Sucha high degree of operational flexibility has enabled the Taliban to plan locally andmake expeditious adjustments in the field. And Taliban operations have been facilitated

by a vast network of informants, which makes it exceedingly difficult for the Afghan

government and coalition forces to weaken the Talibans operations by simply remov-ing a single point in the command structure (Nijssen, 2011, p. 2).Following several months of debate within the Barack Obama Administration, the

President announced his decision to order a significant surge of an additional 30,000troops over the next 18 months, beginning in early 2010. The surge of troops was a dra-matic departure from the more limited military strategy of his presidential predecessor,which had emphasized a light footprint in Afghanistan. At the time Obama tookoffice, there were approximately 32,000 US troops in Afghanistan; but the figure hadmore than tripled by late spring 2011 raised to a high of 99,000 soldiers(Katzman, 2012, p. 24). Moreover, Obama articulated a new population-centeredCOIN approach that focuses on training competent Afghan security forces, whichis designed to facilitate a conditions-based phased transfer of responsibility to theAfghan government beginning in 2011 (Fair, 2010, p. 114). Thus, the new approach



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has been framed as enhancing security for the general populace throughout the country,which would lead to greater legitimacy for the Afghan state.

In terms of the surges success or failure, the results have been mixed. Prior to thesurge, approximately 30% of the countryside was under the control of the Karzai gov-ernment, the Taliban controlled about 4% of Afghan territory, and another 30% fea-tured a significant presence of Taliban insurgents. By late 2011, several top USofficials were citing major territorial gains by coalition forces, noting that Taliban insur-gents had largely lost control of the south. Nonetheless, there has been a substantialincrease in terrorist-style attacks in Kabul, Qandahar, and other cities recently(Katzman,2012, pp. 2526). And the central government has not been strengthenedto any great extent by the new strategy (Kaplan, 2013, p. 90). The drawdown of USforces that began in July 2011 was originally touted as leading to a complete withdra-wal of combat troops by the end of 2014. However, the Obama Administration has out-lined a new timetable that foresees a reduction from 32,000 to 9800 troops by the end of2014, and subsequent reductions leading to the presence of a small residual force by

the end of 2016 (Landler,2014).

Social movement mobilization in cyberspace

Given the resurgence of the Taliban and the myriad-related problems facing Afghani-stan, it is important to understand the theoretical basis and practical implications for theutilization of the Internet and other ICTs in mobilizing social movements. Certainly, theInternet and other ICTs are facilitating unprecedented levels of transnational interper-sonal communication, cultural diffusion, and political interaction throughout the world.As an inherently non-hierarchical and highly dispersed technology, the Internet has

enabled geographically dispersed individuals with common interests and concerns tointeract across borders, thereby facilitating the negotiation and construction of transna-tional social movements. This deterritorializing character of the Internet has deeply

penetrated most localities worldwide (Tomlinson,2003, p. 273). Thus, cyberspace isthe ideal terrain for movement networks to take root, particularly since the Internet isakin to a rhizome; that is, a subterranean stem lacking a definite beginning or endthat continues to grow in all directions, constantly building new connections whileold ones die (Froehling,1997, p. 293).

But in order for any social movement (or insurgency) to gain active supporters, anawareness of collective identity must first emerge. Based primarily on the shared

experiences of everyday life, collective identity refers to an individuals cognitive,moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, orinstitution (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 285). Movement activists often seek to linktheir movement to relevant collective identities as a means for raising group conscious-ness, publicizing their cause, forging alliances, and diffusing opposition. Hence, one ofthe main strengths of cyberspace in mobilizing movements is that many different indi-viduals and groups are easily able to propagate and propagandize for their causeoutside the media and norms traditionally instituted by the pre-Internet society(Kahn & Kellner,2003, p. 300). Put simply, cyberspace enables previously margina-lized voices to be heard (Mazepa, 1996).

Within the past decade, social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have risen to the digital forefront of social movement activism through the use ofhighly novel, user-driven profiling systems. In spite of their underlying technologicalcomplexity, social media have a simple mission, which is to network through existing

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and compound relations (i.e. friends of friends) (Murthy, 2008, p. 844). Moreover,social media websites have enabled like-minded members (including those with politi-cal or cultural affinities) to connect with each other one-on-one, thereby forging expan-sive social networks based on friendly consensus building. The relatively high levelsof immediacy, intimacy, and communal interactivity found on social media sites tend toenhance interpersonal performances and impression management. Members of suchsites effectively contextualizetheir online personas for various audiences, by postingstatus updates and tweets;17 uploading photographs, music, and videos on their

profile page for public perusal; listing their interests and activities, including politicalideologies and social movement affiliations; and leaving public comments on otherfriends pages that may include selected images, memes, videos, or web links(Tufekci,2008).

Increasingly, Twitter and other social media are shifting from a broadcaster of cul-tural identities to a translator or even author of cultural identities (Turner, 2010,

p. 3), particularly for young people. And social media increasingly are being utilized

not only by social movements involved in peaceful protests, but also by movementsengaged in violent insurgencies. In contrast to standard (symmetrical) warfare

between states found primarily in the West, insurgencies in developing countriestend to be based on asymmetrical warfare, that is, warring parties lack proportionalityand are highly dissimilar in their methods of organization, purpose, affiliation, andintent (Snow,2011, p. 277). Lacking the military resources to engage in overt conven-tional warfare, weaker actors in asymmetrical battlefields presumably have no choice

but to utilize unorthodox or unconventional tactics and strategy (Lansford, Pauly, &Covarrubias, 2006, p. 20). In particular, insurgent movements have in recent yearsemployed one of the newest weapons of the weak, cyber-mobilization.18 Through

the use of electronic forms of communication, insurgents increasingly are cooperatingand cross-pollinating with other movements around the world. Establishing a virtualsanctuary on the web, insurgent groups are able to post claims of responsibility, oper-ational particulars, and tips for tactical success (Cronin, 2006, p. 499). In addition,insurgents are using their virtual sanctuary to recruit and train new members, engagein financial transfers, and collaborate in the planning of new missions (Kilcullen,2009, p. 488).

As an intrinsically polycentric and interconnected technology, the Internet and otherICTs enable social movement activists to frame and circulate their ideas with relativeease to geographically dispersed individuals who hold common interests and concerns.

In particular, activists utilize frames online to recruit or mobilize movement partici-pants, focusing, for instance, on the injustice of particular situations and the needfor a collective agency to successfully challenge such problems. Moreover,framing serves as a simplified method for distinguishing in-groups from out-groups;or differentiating us from them as a means of enhancing and delineating a collec-tive identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Consequently, the identification of a tangibleenemy (or adversarial component) through the framing process is a necessary ingredi-ent in developing an individuals collective consciousness. Otherwise, the potentialtarget of collective action is likely to remain simply an abstraction such as hunger,inequality, or poverty (Gamson,1992, p. 232).

Political activists and movement leaders frequently attempt to mobilize prospectivesupporters for their cause both online and offline by linking particular frames withthe social experiences, values, beliefs, and concerns of a sympathetic audience. Suchframe alignments are essential components in the micro-mobilization of social



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movement participants (Snow & Benford,1988, p. 198). When individual movementframes are connected to a larger ideological belief system that has been embraced by

potential movement participants, a frame alignment occurs (Snow et al., 1986,p. 464). Frame alignments effectively mobilize supporters by appealing to a familiarset of symbols, beliefs, and values, which resonate with individualized conceptionsof social norms (Snow et al., 1986, p. 211). For frame alignments to be successful,the movement must frame (or reframe) its ideology, activities, and goals as compatibleand complimentary with conceptions widely held by particular sentiment pools insociety, or else devise another discursive means for linking the movement with the

public (Buechler,2011, p. 146).Generally speaking, leaders of insurgent movements publicly enunciate their

reasons for violent collective action in order to elicit popular support. Otherwise,they run the risk of losing their legitimacy, which can be potentially damaging to themovement. In particular, insurgents seek to legitimize their use of violence and trans-late this into meaningful support for their cause by demonstrating moral superiority

over those who represent the state, supplanting the state at the local level, and spreadinga persuasive message (Kiras,2010, p. 193). Attempting to disseminate their messageas widely as possible, movement activists frequently utilize compelling discursive nar-ratives, which are framed ideally to resonate with a potential target audience, throughthe use of movement communiques and other propaganda-laden messages. The narra-tive storyline is especially important for conceptualizing and understanding any eventinvolving an insurgency or interstate conflict. Only when an event has been integratedinto a sequence of occurrences (the narrative storyline) does it truly become significantand attain the status of reality in society. Narrative frames are often used as resourcesin contemporary political struggles, within both the domestic and international arenas

(Devetak,2009, pp. 186187).Due to the surreptitious character of most insurgencies, the focus of recruitment

drives and propaganda campaigns is on the micro-mobilization of individuals insmall groups and through underground (or social) media, rather than any type ofmacro-mobilization involving large group meetings and mass media. In an attempt tomobilize prospective supporters at the micro-level, movement leaders utilize wordsand phrases that they believe will resonate with particular demographic groups. Theidea is to connect their movements frames to familiar cultural constructs of the popu-lace, thus achieving a frame alignment between the goals of the movement and existingnorms and values (Snow & Benford,1988, p. 198). In effect, movement activists are

engaging in frame lifting, which involves shaping collective action to match aninstitutionally embedded frame (Morris,2000). Put simply, movement leaders recog-nize that there are important symbols, narratives, and channels already in existence thatcan be lifted from one domain to facilitate collective action in another. Martin LutherKing Jr., for instance, framed the emerging civil rights movement of the 1950s andearly 1960s in the language of Christianity (freedom and justice). This kind offrame lifting, Morris argues, resonated with large numbers of people who werealready culturally linked to the black church.

New communication strategies of the Taliban

The decentralized structure of the Internet is tailor-made for the diffusion of identity-based Islamic movements and networks including those associated with theTaliban and other radical-Islamist groups. According to Bunt (2003), online expression

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and interactivity have directly influenced the negotiation and formation of new transna-tional-Islamic identities. As he states, The Internet has not superseded traditionalforms of political expression, but is a means through which conventional boundariesand barriers can be transcended (p. 11). Due in part to the seemingly ubiquitousand dispersed character of the Internet and other communications media, Muslimsaround the world increasingly are organizing their religious life at the individuallevel no longer compelled to follow the rigid discursive orthodoxies propagated

by traditional Islamic religious elites. As a result of the Information Revolution,many Muslims have in effect privatized their religion, since they are able toselect their creed from a plethora of Islamic authorities, including those on the Internet

just as Muslims everywhere now choose their preachers and muftis from an increas-ingly media-intensive market (Kurzman,2007, p. 523).

Moreover, various forms of online communication have encouraged the growth ofwhat Roy (2004) terms a deculturalized Islam (p. 23). Previously, Islam was almostalways tied to specific nations, states, and territories that varied widely in practices

depending on the specific cultural milieu. Islamic customs involving womens headcoverings, for instance, fluctuate enormously depending on the culture. Though thisis still the case in many locales, the globalization of Islam has resulted in the growthof pan-Islamic identities and networks that often transcend geography. In manyrespects, the migration of large numbers of Muslims to Western Europe and NorthAmerica necessitated that Islam undergo such a transformation. Away from theircountries of origin, Muslim migrants and their progeny have created new religious-

based identities that largely supersede their specific ethno-national origins. As Roy(2004) notes, cyberspace has provided an opening for the coalescence of neo-funda-mentalist networks that seek to reconstruct a Muslim community based solely on

Islamic tenets, essentially stripping the faith of any non-Islamic customs and tra-ditions tied to particular nationalities (pp. 2930).

All of these trends have facilitated the coalescence of the global jihadist movement,which has been mobilized to some extent by the Internet and other innovative modes ofcommunication. In the years immediately preceding the attacks of 9/11, for instance, anumber of websites acting as front operations for al-Qaida and related radical or neo-fundamentalist Islamist groups emerged. One notable example was the Center forIslamic Studies and Research (alneda.com) that disseminated encrypted and embeddedmessages to would-be terrorists and other supporters. The site, which was entirely inArabic, also promoted strong anti-American sentiments and featured commentary,

poetry, and streaming audio and video glorifying various acts of terror. Such sites dis-seminated cultural folklore about suicide bombers, referring to them honorifically asmujahedeen(Gambetta,2005, p. 148). Thus, the Internet facilitated the rapid diffusionof global frames linking al-Qaida to the earlier, highly popular, Afghan insurgencyagainst the Soviet Union in the 1980s. As Benjamin and Simon ( 2005) have observed,Without the Internet, bin Laden still could have taken his jihad global videotapesand compact discs were already spreading the word before Netscape but itsgrowth would be at a comparative snails pace (p. 59).

Since 911, there has been an exponential increase in the number of radical-Isla-mist websites (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). English-language sites in particular have

become increasingly commonplace, with a wide array of material posted online includ-ing everything from inflammatory sermons by radical sheiks to video clips of roadside

bomb blasts and hostage beheadings. In effect, al-Qaida, the ISIS, and other extremistgroups have managed to market militant jihadism to sympathizers in a wide variety of



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nations. The so-called homegrown jihadists in Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands,Germany, Canada, the USA, and other countries have plotted and implemented actsof terror in recent years. Known as franchising, this has been accomplished at leastin part through the employment of online propaganda and cyber-mobilization. Andsocial media in particular have provided a highly functional tableau for framing militantIslamist values, due to the deliberative and often targeted dissemination of text, images,video and audio. There are even al-Qaida-related pages on Facebook and Twitter,which often fuse apocalyptic pan-Islamist militancy with Western-influenced youthargot and hybridized forms of popular culture (Drissel, 2011).

Over the past decade, the Taliban have become increasing integrated into the trans-national jihadist movement, as evidenced by their pan-Islamist propaganda. In their

public rhetoric, they often stress their solidarity with jihadist movements around theworld (Giustozzi,2008, p. 13), indicating that they are involved in a common inter-national struggle against the West. The proliferation of radical-Islamist websites hasapparently encouraged the Taliban to abandon their previous technophobic stance

and enter the Information Age with newfound zeal. Following the lead of al-Qaidaand related radical-Islamist insurgents in Iraq, the neo-Taliban movement has begunto utilize social media and other forms of online communication to publicize theircause, even posting instantaneous updates from the field of battle. In addition,Taliban activists increasingly are using the Internet (including social media) torecruit new members, train and prepare for missions, and engage in fundraising activi-ties for insurgent/terrorist operations (Wilson,2008, p. 3).

Ironically, the Taliban and other anti-Western militants are benefiting to someextent from Western-driven globalization, which enables them to have a worldwideaudience for the first time. Within the realm of cyberspace, the Taliban have been

able to create a strategic hinterland or virtual sanctuary that is largely beyondthe reach of counterinsurgent forces or neighboring governments, and its effects are dif-ficult to quarantine (Kilcullen,2009, p. 488). And even though the number of personalcomputers in Afghanistan is relatively small, there are an estimated 20 million mobile

phone accounts in the country, which has enabled more than 90% of the population togain access to telecommunication services.19 The dramatic increase in the availabilityof mobile phone service, facilitated by recent Afghan government initiatives, inadver-tently has provided an important medium for receiving and disseminating Taliban pro-

paganda. Moreover, Taliban militants have recently begun using global positioningsystem (GPS) technology to identify targets for guerrilla operations in Kabul and

other urban centers. One 25-year-old Taliban operative (as quoted in Moreau & You-safzai,2012) explains that his main role is to engage in reconnaissance to prepare forfedayeen(suicide) missions. The work is both easy and difficult, he says. We have tophotograph and survey the area, get the exact GPS coordinates, and note the dailymovements of the security forces guarding the installation, without getting caught.

One novel offline communication tactic adopted by the new Taliban is the tra-ditional practice ofshabnamah(night letters). These letters are designed to persuade

people (especially in rural areas) to oppose state authority and support the insurgency.Mujahedeen insurgents had used night letters and oral narratives previously during theSoviet occupation of the 1980s. The Taliban movement has adopted this cost-efficientmethod of resistance literature, thereby seeking to assert greater social control over themasses by posting instructional and threatening communiques in public places, includ-ing the walls of mosques and government buildings. One of the major discursivethemes of night letters is Islamic solidarity against anyone who cooperates with

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Western infidels. The Taliban regularly posts such letters or leaflets during the night,warning of the wrath villagers will face if they cooperate with U.S. forces (the Chris-tian invaders) or the Karzai regime (a U.S. puppet), Johnson (2007, pp. 320 321)explains. Night letters are often addressed to specific individuals who have beenaccused of collaborating with coalition forces (Foxley,2007, p. 9).

This type of exclusionary rhetoric is designed to distinguish between the in-groupand out-group, thus depicting anyone who supports the current regime or even worksfor the government as a puppet of the Christian invaders. In addition, the use of nightletters is designed to link the neo-Taliban to the legendary mujahedeen, who were ableto drive out an ostensibly similar adversary. The fact that the mujahedeenwere the oneswho first pioneered night letters against suspected Soviet collaborators, frames thecurrent Taliban insurgency in analogous heroic terms that resonate with manyAfghans. By adopting a communication method made famous by the mujahedeen,Taliban activists are effectively establishing a frame alignment with an earlier,highly popular, insurgent movement. Reacting to coalition-sponsored programs

designed to disarm local militia groups, night letters also often invoke the hyper-mascu-line tribal symbolism ofPashtunwali, which emphasizes the ownership of firearms as ayouthful rite of passage. Indeed, the Taliban understands that taking away a Pashtunsgun is equivalent to taking away his manhood (Johnson,2007, p. 326). SuchPashtun-wali-tinged missives critical of militia demobilization are an example of a frame align-ment, in which the Taliban are attempting to connect their political agenda to thetraditional values, norms, and artifacts of Pashtun culture. As a recruitment tool,Taliban activists have lifted the gun frame and rite of passage narrative from thePash-tunwalicode, for the express purpose of mobilizing young Pashtun males.

Another fairly new communication tactic utilized by the neo-Taliban is the pro-

duction of cassette tapes and CDs featuring message-laden radical-Islamist songs though all are non-instrumental, in accordance with ultraconservative Islamic tradition.In sharp contrast to paleo-Taliban practices, the neo-Taliban movement has abandonedthe previous ban on vocal music, video, photos, magazines, and many other forms of

popular culture. As part of the movements propaganda campaign, Taliban activistsand artists have produced hundreds of different CDs and tapes, which are widely avail-able in village shops and bazaars. Ironically, the Afghan government has prohibited thesale of pro-insurgency CDs and tapes, though sales reportedly have increased dramati-cally in recent years (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 121). Meanwhile, there is a simultaneousTaliban campaign against Western-influenced music and video in Afghanistan and

Pakistan. There have been several cases in recent years of Taliban militants assaultingor killing musicians even at traditional weddings. In addition, militants have targetedmusic stores characterized as non-Islamic, with several being bombed or ownersthreatened and attacked (Shukoor,2010).

Even though the Taliban leadership banned public access to the Internet and broad-cast media when they controlled the Afghan government, they have reversed theirstance apparently for strategic reasons since launching the new insurgency. TheTaliban have established an underground radio station, known as the Voice of Sharia, for instance, which has mobile transmitters in several Afghan provinces. Thestation even has its own website (www.alemarah.org) that regularly posts newsupdates from the field of battle with a decidedly pro-Taliban bias (Giustozzi, 2008,

p. 121). The Taliban also produces and distributes DVDs featuring mini-documentariesof Taliban exploits. Most of these DVDs are produced by the Taliban at their mediacenter in Quetta, Pakistan (Dorronsoro, 2009, p. 11), in conjunction with al-Qaidas

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media production company, Al-Sahab Media (Jones, 2010, p. 107). Taliban videosfeature actual footage of coalition troops being ambushed by rebels and IED attacks,Islamist preachers calling for jihad against the West, and other radical images.Shorter videos are disseminated through mobile phones and posted on YouTube andother websites, often linked to Twitter. The Taliban build on the growing discontentof Afghans through a relatively sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which employsradio, video, and night letters to a devastating effect, Dorronsoro (2009, p. 11)observes.

There are currently at least six major Taliban websites that regularly publish anddisseminate militant propaganda, including shahamat-urdu.com, shahamat-english.-com, shahamat-arabic.com, shahamat-farsi.com, shahamat.info, alsomod-iea.info, andshahamat-movie.com. Each website utilizes a different language, thus aiming itsmessage at a distinct target market, though operating under the common heading ofThe Voice of Jihad. The main English-language Taliban webpage, listed under theaddress of shahamat-english.com, also carries the banner heading, Islamic Emirate

of Afghanistan (the name of the former Taliban state). The main Taliban Twitteraccount, @alemarahweb, was launched in December 2010, and began disseminatingEnglish-language tweets soon thereafter. In addition to @alemarahweb, otherTaliban-related Twitter pages include @ABalkhi and @alsomood, @malhamah,@zabihullahmujahid, @Qariyusufahmadi, @alsomood, @GhazniwalTariq,@NaSiH_G, @alemarahweb, and @samishinwari1. In an apparent attempt to collect

pertinent information from various sources, Taliban Twitter pages follow theaccounts of major news organizations, Afghan charities, the ANA, and even individualAmerican and British soldiers.

Taliban-related Twitter accounts post frequent tweets and updates that include links

to lengthy official communiques, press releases, interviews, videos, poems, and essay-style blogs posted on one or more of the main Taliban websites, including shahamat-english.com.20 Taliban cyber-activists issue regular Twitter updates that relay hyper-

bolic and often erroneous, boastful claims of specific attacks on so-called Christianinvaders, Western crusaders, infidel forces, Afghan puppets, and the Karzai

puppet regime. During the course of this research project, tweets were frequentlyobserved that claimed responsibility for IED strikes, sniper attacks, and grenade-

based ambushes on both coalition forces and the Afghan Army in particular. Examplesobserved on Taliban Twitter pages include the following news-related tweets: 5 U.S.-led invaders killed, tank eliminated in Wardag, Landmine blast kills 2 NATO inva-

ders, 4 invaders killed, tank destroyed in mujahideen attack, 2 puppets includingcommander killed, 3 hurt in mutual conflict in Kunduz, Mujahid snipes twopuppets in Kunar, and 3 U.S. invaders killed in Khost province.

In response to the relatively new threat of cyber-mobilization and other high-techinnovations by the Taliban and other insurgent movements, COIN operations havemoved aggressively into the electronic realm. In particular, signals intelligence oper-ations has become a major focus of US-based COIN approaches, including covert sur-veillance tracking the electronic discourse of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Inaddition, Taliban websites and cell phones have been temporarily hijacked on severaloccasions in recent years, though the US government will neither confirm nor denytheir involvement in such covert hacking operations. In June 2011, for instance,hackers disseminated erroneous messages announcing the death of Taliban leader,Mullah Muhammad Omar. And hackers posted pictures of alleged Taliban atrocitiesand messages of support for the Afghan government in April 2012. In response to

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such incidents, Taliban activists have conceded that their website was hacked again byenemies and foreign intelligence services. As one spokesman claims, The enemy triesto push its propaganda. The enemy is worried by what gets published in our webpage.Its confusing for them, so they try to react (Taylor, 2012).

Taliban frames of global Jihad

Now that this paper has explained how the Taliban is taking advantage of innovativemodes of communication, we will turn our attention to the myriad ways in whichTaliban activists have sought to frame (and reframe) their movement on variousTwitter accounts that publish tweets mainly in English (e.g. @alemarahweb,@ABalkhi and @alsomood) and on the main English-language Taliban website, sha-hamat-english.com, which operates under the twin banners of Islamic Emirate ofAfghanistan and The Voice of Jihad.21 To begin with, we will examine examples

of frames that are broadly categorized under the overarching heading of globaljihad, which includes specific frames such as the mujahideen and the related Sovietinvasion. In particular, this researcher uncovered numerous examples of commentsin tweets and blogs comparing the successful expulsion of Soviet troops by the muja-hedeento the current insurgency against the USA.

One blogger posting on shahamat-english.com, for instance, claims collective creditfor defeating the Soviets, and notes that the Afghan people withstood the Red Delugeand permanently effaced the arrogant empire of the former Soviet Union. He assertsthat the past Soviet experience is being replicated in the present era with the USA.The Red Army invasion of Afghanistan ended in defeat, which is an importantlesson for America, he states. Another blogger on the same webpage observes thatfor decades, Afghanistan was the victim of Cold War machinations, which involvedthe two main blocs of the world capitalism and communism. Noting that ColdWar bipolarity has ended, several Taliban bloggers accuse the USA of hegemonicactions. As one post on shahamat-english.com asserts:

They (Americans) also claim that the world is unipolar and there is only one superpowerand that is America. However, they are forgetting that in the near past, in this land, by thehands of these Afghans, an empire stronger than theirs did collapse and fell tosmithereens.

On the other hand, an Afghan news reporter with obvious Taliban sympathiesacknowledges in an interview posted on shahamat-english.com that the unipolar pos-ition of the USA generates serious challenges for the Taliban, compared to the muja-hedeen during the bipolar Cold War era. The Cold War rivalry provided a uniqueopportunity for rebel forces fighting Soviet troops in the 1980s, he claims, notingthat the Afghan jihad received material and moral support from the world as aresult. But the situation is the opposite today, given the unipolar position of theUSA and the lack of external financial and military support to Taliban insurgents.He thus raises the question, How can the mujahedeen resist this great force andtriumph against them with empty hands? In response, Sheik Jalaluddin Haqani,head of the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network, asserts that the current IslamicJihad will provide a strong impetus to the collapse of the American occupation.He explains that the unipolar position of the USA will ultimately contribute to itsdownfall. As he states:



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The strong hatred around the world towards Americans and huge costs of the war arefactors that play a tangible role in the failure of those predatory forces. Indeed, Ibelieve that Americas current policy and its violation of all international agreementsare considered a threat to the entire world. It is not farfetched that the world will oneday act against it and adopt a unified policy towards (Americas) failed policy.

On virtually every social media site and webpage examined, the Taliban refer to them-selves asmujahedeenand occasionally use the ironic moniker, freedom fighters. Themovement is evidently attempting to create a frame alignment between the Taliban andthe earlier Afghan revolutionary movement that successfully expelled Soviet troops.Accordingly, Taliban rhetoric on the web is designed to resonate with the Afghan col-lective memory (Nissen,2007, p. 6), thereby facilitating the creation of an oppositionalconsciousness based on an analogous connection between the Soviet occupation of the1980s and the US and other coalition partners in the current era. In an attempt to directlylink themujahedeenof the 1980s to todays Taliban, several commentators are appar-ently engaging in a bit of revisionist history. One blogger on shahamat-english.com, for

instance, claims that the mujahedeenstarted the Taliban movement, after corruptionbecame endemic in the post-Cold War Afghan government. As he asserts:

To put an end to the corruption, anarchy, and mischief, some honest Afghans who felttheir obligation, rose to the occasion in the shape of the Taliban Islamic Movement,launching their struggle for restoration of security and establishment of Islamic system.

However, this is a vast overgeneralization by the author that almost completely ignoresthe major schism within the mujahedeen and subsequent civil war of the 1990s thatoccurred soon after Soviet troops withdrew. Moreover, not a single online posting

observed in this research project mentions the strong Pakistani religiouspolitical influ-ence in the Talibans origins and assistance provided by Pakistani factions to the earlyTaliban, instead portraying the movement as the natural indigenous successor to theoriginal Afghanmujahedeenof the 1980s.

The most obvious type of discursive framework found on Taliban websites andsocial media is the argot of radical pan-Islamism. In particular, there are frequent refer-ences in tweetsand blogs to the global Muslim ummah(community of believers) andIslamic jihad,22 contextualized for a national-liberation struggle. For instance, one blogposted on shahamat-english.com proclaims that the Taliban are nearing victory in theirarmed jihad to establish an independent Islamic Emirate, which is deeply rootedinternally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic ummah. Revea-

lingly, jihad is frequently framed by Taliban cyber-activists as a sacred duty that isdepicted mainly in the context of collective violence rather than peaceful struggle.Though Taliban cyber-activists tend to focus primarily on waging a national jihad,they often use the language of a broader holy war against the West. For example,one blogger posting on shahamat-english.com claims that jihad is necessary tocombat the enemies of Islam and Afghanistan. Trumpeting the tremendous lifecasualties of the enemy as well as the downing of their aircrafts, he notes there has

been a recent expansion of the area of jihad to every part of the country. Anotherblogger on the same webpage states that jihad is necessary to achieve the sovereigntyof the motherland.

Posting a statement commemorating the ninth anniversary of the American invasionof Afghanistan in 2010, a Taliban cyber-activist observes approvingly on shahamat-english.com that every day tens of invaders lose their lives. Taking credit for the

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deaths of thousands of coalition troops, over the past decade, the writer claims, Jihadagainst the invading Americans is an Islamic obligation. He goes on to praise theJihadic activities of the Muslim Afghans for making recent gains against the occupy-ing forces, emphasizing the continued importance of self-sacrifice in the face of Amer-ican military force. Framing jihad as a defensive measure, he states:

The Mujahid Afghans consider every sacrifice including martyrdom at the strongholds ofJihad and defense as a pride, even now after nine years of continuous Jihad and resistance.

It is noteworthy that several tweets and blogs refer to the importance of establishing anIslamic system and Islamic sovereignty in Afghanistan. Moreover, Sheik Haqqaniclaims in an interview posted on shahamat-english.com that martyrdom and deathare his strongest wishes. In his view, themujahedeenwill eventually repulse the cru-sader occupation of Afghanistan, even though they are facing an asymmetricalthreat. The huge monetary sums America is spending on the occupation of Afghani-

stan and the deaths of dozens of their forces every day at the hand of the Mujahedeenand the defeat of all aggressor Crusader forces before them, he states. In terms of inter-national jihad, Haqqani claims that there is both a global and regional struggle againstthe so-called crusaders. As he observes:

The jihadist zeal present among the residents of this region remains and they yearn forsacrifice for the sake of aiding the Mujahedeen and elevating the word of Tawheed (mono-theism). We for our part support their participation in the Jihad and consider it as a reli-gious duty to be performed.

Common radical-Islamist epithets such as infidels andkuffars(unbelievers) are used

repeatedly in Taliban tweets and blogs to denigrate not only coalition troops, but alsoPresidents Bush and Obama. Even so, the strongest criticism by Taliban cyber-activistsis reserved for former President Bush. For example, a blog on shahamat-english.comclaims that the Bush Administration attacked Afghanistan in the name of furtheringthe Crusade. While it is true that Bush did indeed use the term crusade at leastonce publicly in reference to the war on terrorism, frequent use of the term by theTaliban is designed to resonate with the collective memory of the Muslim masses,thus creating a frame alignment between two historic epochal struggles with the Chris-tian West. The term puppet is frequently invoked as an apparent warning to thecurrent Afghan regime, but also paradoxically as an invitation to government officials

to join the Taliban. As one blogger pontificates on shahamat-english.com:

The rulers of the puppet Karzai Administration should take lessons for the consequencesof the henchmen of the Kremlin, the defeated communists. They should abstain frombowing before their foreign masters and instead side with the people and the nation.They must trust their own people and not let them be prosecuted at the hand of theforeigners.

Meanwhile, several tweets and blogs remind readers that killing the infidel occupiers. . . earns one a place in Paradise. Advertising tacitly for suicide bombers and othermartyrs, one blog on shahamat-english.com states in somber tones:

Such warriors are. . .

honored and remembered as heroes amongst the people in their life-time and after their death. Those courageous youth who intend to carry out such heroic



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strikes will be supported and given a lending hand in every way possible by the IslamicEmirate as part of its religious obligation.

Numerous tweets and blogs focus on the allegedly negative influence of the Americanoccupation and its deleterious effect on Afghan society especially young people.

Such commentary frames the current conflict as a culture-based clash of civilizationsbetween the Muslim world and the West, parroting ironically the late Huntingtons(1996) identity-laden construct.

Our younger generation is being pushed towards misguidance and ethical deviationsunder the slogan of freedom and new doors of corruption are being flung open forthem every day; blind imitation of the western infidels is being encouraged in our citiesand villages

one blog on shahamat-english.com states in near-apocalyptic terms. Bemoaning thespread of Western values and practices, the author claims:

the veil of modesty and dignity is being lifted from our women under the slogans ofwomens rights; our countrymen are being called towards the abrogated religion ofChristianity and hundreds of similar misfortunes have befallen every facet of our livesfrom the onset of the invasion which pushes us away from our religion and culture.

Making a zealous pitch for spiritual and national redemption, the blogger stronglyencourages young men to abandon the army, police forces, and security apparatus ofthe Afghan government and instead join forces with the Taliban. Stating that suchyoung men need to repent of their past sins, he implores them to turn their gunson the foreign infidel invaders instead of their own people as part of their Islamic con-

scious brotherhood.There are several online references to historic battles that occurred during Muham-

mads lifetime, which Taliban bloggers claim are analogous to the present-day Afghaninsurgency. One blog posted on shahamat-english.com, for instance, refers to the Battleof Badr which was a major turning point in Muhammads struggle with his politicalopponents in Mecca. According to Muslim folklore, this great battle was decided inMuhammads favor due to divine intervention. In the essay, the author apparentlyendeavors to construct a frame alignment among three pivotal events Muhammadsvictory at Badr, the attacks of 9/11, and the ongoing Taliban insurgency. His main pointis that America essentially has become the contemporary version of Muhammads

enemies at Badr. As he proclaims:

The Battle of Badr changed the face of history and was a turning point between truth andfalsehood. . .He who defeated the hosts at Badr is capable of bringing down those whoare weaker than they. He who brought down the towers of America as if they were theleast of its structures. . .will not be unable to remove that which is more oppressiveand powerful.

Taliban frames of global justice

The next overarching framing category to be examined is that of global justice, whichgenerally refers to a broad spectrum of specific concerns around the world includingcolonialism and imperialism, foreign interventionism, universal human rights, nationalself-determination, economic inequality, and the abuse of power by corporations,

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financial institutions, and governments.

reframing the taliban insurgency in afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for...

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