action tendencies and characteristics of environmental risks_gisela bohm.pdf

Action tendencies and characteristics of environmental risks

Gisela Bohm a,*, Hans-Rudiger Pfister b,1

a Department of Educational Psychology and Sociology, PH Ludwigsburg, P.O. Box 220, D-71602

Ludwigsburg, Germanyb Department of Psychology, Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

Abstract

It is assumed that the mental representation of the causal structure of environmental risks,

i.e., the type of cause and the type of potential consequence, determines which sort of action

tendencies are formed. We propose a model of risk evaluation that includes consequentialist

and deontological judgments as well as specific emotions as mediators of action tendencies.

Four hundred participants took part in an experiment which presented scenario information

about environmental risks. The scenarios diered with respect to (a) causation (human vs.

natural cause; single vs. aggregate causation), (b) consequence (harm to self vs. harm to other

people vs. harm to nature), and (c) geographical distance (proximate vs. distant). Participants

indicated how much they preferred each of 31 prospective behaviors. Factor analyses yielded

five types of action tendencies: help, aggression, escape, political action, and self-focus. The

causal structure of the risks was systematically related to action tendencies, e.g., environ-

mental risks that are caused by humans, and in particular those caused by a single human

agent, elicit aggressive action tendencies. The findings confirm that the perceived causal

structure of a specific risk determines whether the focus is upon consequentialist or deonto-

logical judgments, which, in turn, elicit specific types of action tendency, mediated by

emotions. 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

PsycINFO classification: 3040; 4070

Keywords: Risk perception; Environmental psychology; Emotional responses

Acta Psychologica 104 (2000) 317337

www.elsevier.com/locate/actpsy

* Corresponding author. Visiting address: Reuteallee 46, D-71634, Ludwigsburg, Germany. Tel.: +49-

7141-140 685; fax: +49-7141-140 434.

E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Bohm).1 Present address: German National Research Center for Information Technology, GMD, Darmstadt,

Germany.

0001-6918/00/$ - see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.PII: S 0 0 0 1 - 6 9 1 8 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 3 5 - 4

Environmental risks, especially global environmental risks such as ozone layerdepletion or global warming, are among the most urgent problems to be addressedby political and societal decision makers. Most of these global risks originate fromhuman activities. However, the connection between individual choice and action, onthe one hand, and long-term environmental consequences, on the other, is ratherindirect. In this paper, we analyze action tendencies that are elicited by past,present, or anticipated eects of environmental risks. We argue that action ten-dencies are determined by the way in which the environmental risk is mentallyconstrued, i.e., by the cognitive representation of the risks causal structure. Fur-thermore, we assume that specific emotions function as mediating factors of actiontendencies in the face of environmental risks.

In the next section, we consider the notion of environmental risk and describe itstypical characteristics. Then, we propose a model of the mental representation ofenvironmental risks, how risk evaluation is mediated by emotions, and how actiontendencies are formed. Third, an experiment is reported that tests some of themodels main assumptions.

1. The structure of environmental risks

We use the term environmental risk in a rather broad sense, including any largescale environmental process with potentially negative consequences, i.e., any envi-ronmental hazard that is publicly perceived and discussed as a risk (BayerischeRuck, 1993). A large number of environmental risks are anthropogenic, i.e., origi-nate from human activities. On the other hand, since the natural environmentprovides important resources for humans, environmental damage can have perilousconsequences for human health and/or living conditions. Hence, humans are both,perpetrators and victims of environmental risks (Kruse, 1995). Environmental riskscan be seen from two perspectives: As risks for the natural environment, or as risksfrom the natural environment (Bohm, Rost & Spada, 1998). In the former case,human activities cause environmental damage; e.g., clearing of forests. In the lattercase, environmental changes cause negative eects for humans, e.g., the increasedprobability of skin cancer resulting from stratospheric ozone depletion.

A causal chain going from human actions via environmental changes to negativeconsequences for mankind is typical for environmental risks. Four basic types of riskscan be distinguished according to the causal structure of human and environmentalfactors. The four types result from a 2 2 categorization of anthropogenic vs. naturalcausation and consequences for humans vs. those for the natural environment: (1)ME-risks (manenvironment) occur when humans endanger the natural environmentper se, without necessarily causing negative eects for themselves, e.g., deposing ra-dioactive waste on the moon. (2) EM-risks (environmentman) are environmentalchanges beyond human control which jeopardize humans, e.g., volcano eruptions. (3)MEM-risks (manenvironmentman) are anthropogenic environmental changeswhich in turn put humans at risk, e.g., ozone layer depletion (MM-risks, i.e., thosewithout involvement of the natural environment, of course also exist, but in this paper

318 G. Bohm, H.-R. Pfister / Acta Psychologica 104 (2000) 317337

we will only be concerned with environmental risks). Finally, one can think of (4) EE-risks (environmentenvironment), i.e., environmental changes that jeopardize theenvironment (e.g., forest fires in remote areas). The fourth type is not relevant for thepresent study. Since no humans are involved in this case, it will not be further dis-cussed in the present paper. Most public debate is probably about MEM-risks such aspollution. Our main assumption is that these risk types imply specific causal repre-sentations that dier with respect to which types of action they most likely produce.

A classification that is similar to our distinction between EM- and MEM-risks hasbeen proposed by Baum, Fleming and Davidson (1983). These authors distinguishbetween natural disasters and technological catastrophes. They argue that manycharacteristics of these two types of events are dierent, most notably, natural di-sasters reflect a lack of control whereas technological catastrophes reflect a loss ofcontrol over a system that once was under control. Furthermore, technological ca-tastrophes dier from natural disasters in that there are agencies or people to blamewhich may result in more focused anger than will natural disasters. Baum et al.(1983) also show that the psychological eects of these two types of events dier.Technological catastrophes produce more chronic stress, and the eects are notlimited to the victims of the disaster, which is usually the case for natural disasters.Rather, loss of confidence and credibility may engender eects in people that are notdirectly victimized. Thus, Baum et al. (1983) distinguish two event types that re-semble two of our risk types. Their argument, that the two types dier with respect tothe psychological eects they produce, is also similar to ours. The dierence betweenthe two approaches is that we distinguish four types of risk, not only two, and thatour notion of MEM-risks includes, but is not limited to, technological catastrophes.

Apart from their causal structure, environmental risks typically have several ofthe following characteristics (Bohm et al., 1998):

(a) Complex causal processes. Particularly global environmental changes e.g.,climate change follow an intricate and complex pattern of causal interdepen-dencies that are often nonlinear (Pawlik, 1991).(b) Delayed and geographically far-reaching consequences. Again, global changesin particular may have negative consequences that are often extremely delayedand geographically far-reaching (Frankenberg, 1990; Pawlik, 1991).(c) Aggregated causation. Normally, e.g., with air pollution, the contribution of asingle individual is neglectably small. Risks arise through the aggregated actionsof many (millions) individuals.(d) Social dilemma structure. The positive consequences of environmentallyharmful behavior options, e.g., the conveniency of driving a car, are usually im-mediate and experienced personally by the decision maker, but the negative con-sequences are delayed and collective, they may even not aict those who causethem. Vlek (1996), among others, has pointed out that environmental risks con-stitute a kind of social dilemma situation: The option which is individually ratio-nal in the short run turns out to be collectively disastrous in the long run.(e) Low controllability. Due to the aggregated causation of many environmentalrisks, there is little opportunity for an individual to control or prevent potentialdamage.

G. Bohm, H.-R. Pfister / Acta Psychologica 104 (2000) 317337 319

(f) Relevance of ethical considerations. Due to the social dilemma structure of en-vironmental risks, solutions of the dilemma often hinge on ethical or moral con-siderations. Morally, the best choice is not necessarily the one with the bestconsequences, but one which satisfies some deontological rule. Such rules oftentouch upon ethical considerations such as justice and equity.

2. Components of the evaluative process

In this study, we focus on action tendencies caused by the perception of an en-vironmental risk; i.e., action tendencies as reactions to an event with potentialnegative consequences. For instance, how do people react to an instance of pollutionabout which they learn that harmful consequences may result? We do not study thedecisions and actions that lead to the risky event in the first place, such as actionsthat lead to pollution in the example above, as is done in studies on pro-environ-mental or environmentally harmful behavior (Gardner & Stern, 1996). We assumethat actions with respect to risks are at the end of a process that starts with a mentalrepresentation of the perceived risk, which then is cognitively evaluated, and thisevaluation in turn causes specific emotions, which eventually elicit specific actiontendencies.

2.1. Cognitive evaluation: consequentialist vs. deontological

We assume that two evaluative components are relevant when evaluating envi-ronmental risks: Evaluation of consequences and evaluation with respect to deon-tological principles. Consequentialist evaluations are about potential losses, i.e., theyrefer to the anticipation of uncertain negative consequences, and to an assessment ofthe seriousness of these consequences (Yates & Stone, 1992a). Deontological evalu-ation refers to the judgment whether ethical values or principles concerning what oneought to do are violated, no matter what the consequences are. Deontologicalevaluations focus upon the actions themselves (i.e., the actions causing the risk), notupon the consequences and their harmfulness, i.e., they are non-consequentialist(Baron, 1994). Philosophers distinguish between teleological, i.e., consequence-based(e.g., utilitarism), and deontological moral theories. Deontological moral theoriesdeal with the morality of actions, irrespective of their consequences. We interpret thenotion of moral values in the latter sense and use the term deontological evaluations.

Human actions are usually perceived as intentional, which implies that the agentis seen as responsible and that the consequences are considered avoidable. However,in the context of environmental behavior, the issue of responsibility is often morecomplex, particularly because of the aggregated causation and the social dilemmastructure of many environmental risks. We therefore assume that it is not necessarythat a human agent who causes detrimental eects for the environment, explicitlyintended to cause that damage in order to elicit deontological evaluations. Thedamage might be a side-eect or be altogether unwanted; this can hold for aggre-gated as well as for individual causation. Consider, for instance, a truck driver, who


has a heart attack resulting in an accident with hazardous chemicals. We assume thatit is primarily the involvement of a human agent, not intentionality, that triggersdeontological considerations and judgments of moral blameworthiness (e.g., infer-ences about the truck drivers boss as being irresponsible). The human agent neednot be a specific individual, but can also be an organization, acting more or lessintentionally.

We propose that it is the perceived causal structure of risks which determines therelative salience of consequentialist and deontological evaluations. If a personthinks that the risk is caused by natural forces, which are normally construed as aninevitable fact of life, he or she will focus on the risks consequences. Hence, loss-based evaluations of consequences will dominate. If, in contrast, a person thinksthat the risk is caused by human agents, then he or she will focus on the actionswhich caused the risk; here, deontological evaluations of the agents actions willdominate. Deontological evaluations, we assume, are even more pronounced if thecausal agent is clearly identifiable, e.g., a specific person, or a specific organization.On the other hand, if the agent is not identifiable as a single unit, because theaggregate actions of a larger number of individuals are the cause of the risk,deontological evaluations will be attenuated (though still more intense than in thecase of natural causal forces). Of course, consequentialist evaluations are alwaysmore or less relevant, since the very concept of risk implies some type of potentialnegative outcome. Thus, the basic assumption here is that the relative salience ofthe two evaluative components is largely determined by the perceived causalstructure of the risk.

2.2. Loss-based and ethical emotions

It has been shown that ecological risks can lead to very intense emotional reac-tions, such as anger, fear, and outrage (McDaniels, Axelrod & Slovic, 1995). Weassume that both evaluative aspects consequentialist and deontological elicitemotional reactions, but that dierent specific emotions result from these two as-pects. We distinguish two types of emotions, which correspond to the evaluativecomponents: loss-based and ethical (or moral) emotions. Loss-based emotions resultfrom risk perception in the narrow sense, i.e., from the subjective experience of loss,harm, and danger. More specifically, prospective loss-based emotions are based uponthe anticipation of future negative events, e.g., fear, worry, or apprehension; retro-spective loss-based emotions are aective reactions to events that have already takenplace, e.g., sadness, pity, or frustration. Ethical emotions, on the other hand, mayresult from violations of deontological principles, examples are anger, outrage, andguilt (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).Which of these emotions actually occurs depends, among other factors, on the se-riousness of the loss, or the seriousness of the violation of a deontological principle;e.g., small anticipated losses might lead to worry, large losses to fear. Also, the twoevaluative paths are not entirely independent. For instance, the size of a loss thatresults from a blameworthy action may increase anger and fury.


2.3. Action tendencies

Emotions motivate behavior, and dierent specific emotions initiate dierenttypes of action tendencies (Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest &Swartz, 1994). Recent neuropsychological studies yield even stronger evidence thatwithout the ability to experience emotions, no tendencies, no decisions, hence nointentional actions can be formed, even if cognitive functions work properly(Damasio, 1994). Hence, we assume that emotions are closely associated with theformation of action tendencies. Prospective emotions such as fear or worry motivateto prevent potential damage and may thus initiate pro-environmental behavior(Kannapin, Pawlik & Zinn, 1998; Martens & Rost, 1998). Retrospective emotionssuch as anger and sadness may give rise to intentions to remedy, rehabilitation, orpunishment (Nerb, Spada & Wahl, 1998).

Confronted with an environmental risk, a large variety of action tendencies canarise. For example, one might try to act towards the agent who caused the risk, e.g.,to prevent him or her from further detrimental actions, or to attack or punish him orher. This class of aggressive actions is directed towards the causal agent of the en-vironmental risk, if such a causal agent can be identified. A second class of actions,i.e., helping behavior, is directed towards the victims that suer from the negativeconsequences of environmental risks. A person might want to help directly, or mightwant to partake in actions that indirectly prevent further harm or damage, e.g.,donations. A third class of actions consists of social or political actions, these may bedirected towards the prevention of the risk in the future, e.g., voting for a particularparty or participating in a demonstration, or towards punishing the responsibleagent, e.g., boycotting. Finally, there is the class of do-nothing actions, such asavoiding to deal with the risk and its consequences, denial of the severity of theproblem, or escape from the situation.

All of these action classes are associated with emotion types that are typical forthem: fury or anger might lead to aggressive behavior, pity to helping behavior, fearand worry to preventive political actions, and frustration and sorrow to avoidanceand escape. However, a unique correspondence between one specific emotion andone specific action will hardly be observed; under realistic conditions, mixtures orblends of emotions as well as of action tendencies will arise. Again, we assume thatthe relative salience of action tendencies is a function of the salient emotions, and,hence, originate in the mental representation of the risks causal structure.

2.4. Hypotheses

In sum, we expect that the relative salience of the two evaluative components,consequentialist and deontological, depends on the risks perceived causal structure,i.e., whether the risk is of type ME, EM, or MEM. These three types dier withrespect to their causation in that they are either anthropogenic or of natural origin.The consequences of the three types dier in that they aect either the natural en-vironment or humans. Deontological evaluation is expected to be dominant when therisk is anthropogenic as compared to caused by natural processes. Correspondingly,


ethical emotions such as anger and, hence, aggressive action tendencies should bestronger when the evaluative focus is deontological rather than consequentialist. Onthe other hand, loss-based emotions such as fear, and, hence, preventive politicalaction tendencies should be more pronounced when the focus is on potential lossesrather than on deontological considerations. In addition, we generally assume thataective reactions and action tendencies are more intense if the consequences of therisk are geographically near, as this implies greater personal relevance. In the fol-lowing experiment, characteristics of the environmental risks (causation, conse-quences, geographical distance) are varied by providing specific scenariodescriptions; evaluative focus, consequentialist and deontological evaluations,emotions, and action tendencies are assessed as dependent variables.

3. Method

3.1. Participants

Four hundred citizens of the city of Bremen, Germany, volunteered to participate,59% were female and 41% male, their age ranges from 16 to 77 yr (mean age: 33.61).They were recruited by advertisements in a local newspaper and were paid forparticipation. We did not aim at a sample that is fully representative of the generalpopulation, since this is not as relevant in this type of experimental work as it is insurvey research. As one may expect from the recruitment procedure, there are somedeviations from representativeness with respect to age, sex, and education: females,young persons (age 1524), and persons with higher education (high school diploma)are overrepresented.

3.2. Design

Four independent variables were manipulated by providing dierent scenarioinformation:

(a) Causation with three levels: natural causation, anthropogenic-aggregate cau-sation, and anthropogenic-single (identifiable) agent causation.(b) Consequences with four levels: no negative consequences, negative conse-quences for the natural environment, negative consequences for other humans,negative consequences for oneself.(c) Geographic distance (as a proxy for personal relevance) with two levels: closevs. far from the evaluating person.(d) Scenario with four levels: Four semantically dierent but formally equivalentscenarios (vulcano, gas, spores, and mosquitoes).

3.3. Materials

Four fictitious scenarios about environmental risks were constructed. We usedfour scenarios rather than only one in order to increase reliability of eects by


comparing scenarios and to increase generalizability across dierent risk domains.The core events in these four scenarios are:

(a) a vulcano starts erupting gases and ashes;(b) a new gas called Polypiperin arises in the atmosphere;(c) spores from new water plants accumulate in a river;(d) mosquitoes spread out in a new area.

For each scenario 19 versions were constructed that correspond to the possiblecombinations of causation, consequences, and geographic distance with three, four,and two levels, respectively. Complete orthogonal manipulation would yield 24versions, but the following combinations were omitted:

(a) all three combinations of negative consequences for self with large geographicdistance, and(b) the two combinations of causation by nature with negative consequences on-ly for nature (this combination corresponds to EE risks, i.e., risks without hu-man involvement).

An abbreviated description of the versions of the vulcano scenario follows as anexample (for descriptions of the other scenarios see Appendix A).

A vulcano, after having been inactive for a long period, becomes active and emitsgases and ashes. The vulcano is either close to where the participant lives or far awayin the West of USA (geographic distance). The eruption is caused either by minorearthquakes (natural causation), or by drillings for mineral resources that are un-dertaken either by the mining company Metal Industries (anthropogenic causation single agent), or by many individuals (anthropogenic causation aggregate). Expertsagree either that no negative consequences for humans or nature are to be expected(no negative consequences), or that the gases and ashes are harmless to people butmay damage the metabolism of plants (negative consequences for nature), or that thegases and ashes may lead to serious damages to the health of children (negativeconsequences for others), or that gases are detrimental to the health of people ingeneral, including the self (negative consequences for self ).

3.4. Dependent variables

Five types of dependent variables were measured that correspond to the com-ponents of the evaluative process.

3.4.1. Evaluative focusThe evaluative focus, i.e., whether the participant focuses upon potential conse-

quences or deontological principles, was measured by providing six consequentialistand six deontological arguments why something should be done about the situationdescribed in the scenario. Participants ranked the 12 arguments according to theirpersuasiveness if they were to convince an acquaintance to sign a list. Examples ofdeontological arguments are . . . because the rights of other humans should not beviolated, . . . because future generations should not be deprived of their basis ofsubsistence, . . . because the life of animals and plants should not be disregarded;examples of consequentialist arguments are . . . because the potential harmful


consequences may be very serious, . . . because high financial costs could result,. . . because of the possible impact on health. The deontological arguments werechosen in such a way that they expressed principles that are directed towards valuingeither other human beings or the natural environment. The consequentialist argu-ments emphasize either a specific loss category (financial costs, health damage, en-vironmental damage), or one of Yates and Stones (1992b) risk components(uncertainty, probability of loss, significance of loss). Each participants mean rankof the deontological arguments was used as the dependent measure; lower ranksindicate higher importance of deontological arguments compared to consequentialistarguments.

3.4.2. Moral blameworthinessBlameworthiness serves as a measure of the result of deontological evaluation,

i.e., whether the participant thinks that deontological principles are violated. Par-ticipants indicated on a seven-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (verystrongly) the extent to which they considered the situation described in the scenarioas morally blameworthy.

3.4.3. Perceived riskinessPerceived riskiness serves as a measure of the result of a consequentialist evalu-

ation, i.e., whether the participant fears serious consequences. Perceived riskinesswas measured by four ratings, obtained on seven-point scales: (a) How high wouldyou rate the overall risk of the situation? (no risk at all very high risk), (b) Howthreatening do you find the situation? (not at all threatening very threatening), (c)How dangerous do you find the situation? (not at all dangerous very dangerous), (d)How probable is it that the situation will lead to harmful consequences? (very un-likely very likely). The mean of these ratings was used as an index for perceivedriskiness.

3.4.4. EmotionsParticipants rated the intensity of each of 18 specific emotions: anger, pride, in-

dignation, relief, fear, trouble, regret, envy, worry, sadness, contempt, guilt, fury,outrage, hope, helplessness, admiration, sympathy. The question was: When youthink of this situation, how intensely do you feel ... ?, the rating scale ranged from 1(not at all) to 7 (very strongly). The emotion terms were selected from Ortony et al.,(1988) and from pilot studies in which we obtained emotions in free-response format.The emotions were chosen in such a way that about as many ethical as loss-basedemotions were included and that the emotion was plausible vis a vis the scenario.

3.4.5. Action tendenciesA sample of 31 behaviors was presented to participants who rated for each be-

havior how much they felt inclined to perform it. A complete list of the behaviors isincluded in Table 2. The behaviors were selected so that (a) they covered all sorts ofbehaviors that are relevant in the context of environmental risks, (b) for eachemotion some behaviors were included that matched that emotion, and (c) the action


types discussed in the section about evaluative components were covered: aggression,help, political action, and escape/avoidance.

3.5. Procedure

The study was run in groups of approximately eight, but not more than 10 par-ticipants. Each participant completed a questionnaire in which he or she performedall tasks four times, i.e., for each of the four scenarios, but each scenario was pre-sented in a dierent version. Versions of scenarios (i.e., experimental conditions)were randomized, but with the restrictions that for each participant each scenariowas presented in a dierent version, and that each experimental condition eventuallyincluded the same number of participants. Order of scenarios was also randomized.For each of the four scenarios evaluative focus, perceived riskiness, moral blame-worthiness, aective evaluation, and action tendencies were assessed. Questionswithin each group of dependent measures were presented in random order.

4. Results

First, we report factor analyses that provide derived measures for analyses ofvariance. Then, eects of the independent variables on evaluations, emotions, andaction tendencies are analyzed by multifactorial analyses of variance.

4.1. Factor analyses

4.1.1. Specific emotionsA factor analysis (based on the complete correlation matrix with correlations

computed across all participant scenario combinations as cases, N 1619) yieldedfour factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 (see Table 1; percentages of explainedvariance: 22.9%, 13.1%, 12.6%, and 12.6%). The first factor is interpreted as referringto Ethical Emotions, reflecting outrage, indignation, fury, anger, and contempt. Thesecond factor is interpreted as a Retrospective Loss-Based Emotions factor, withhigh loadings for regret, sympathy, trouble and sadness. Emotions with high load-ings on Factor 3, Positive Valence, are relief, pride, and admiration, but also envy.The fourth factor is interpreted as a Prospective Loss-based Emotions factor, re-flecting fear, worry, and helplessness. The results of this factor analysis support ourproposed theoretical distinction between ethical, prospective loss-based, and retro-spective loss-based emotions.

An index for each of the three emotion types (positive emotions are not furtherconsidered in this paper) was computed by taking the mean of those emotions withhigh loadings on the respective factor. Thus, the ethical emotion index was computedas the mean intensity rating for outrage, indignation, fury, anger, and contempt, theprospective loss-based emotion index as the mean of fear, worry, and helplessness, andthe retrospective loss-based emotion index as the mean of regret, sympathy, trouble,and sadness.


4.1.2. Action tendenciesThe factor analysis of the 31 behaviors resulted in five factors with eigenvalues

greater than 1, the rotated loadings are depicted in Table 2. The five factors accountfor 20.5%, 13.1%, 10.1%, 9.9%, and 5.7% of the variance, respectively. The factorscan be interpreted as Tendency to Help/Prevention (Factor 1), Tendency to Ag-gression/Retaliation (Factor 2), Tendency to Escape/Avoidance (Factor 3), Social/Political Actions (Factor 4), and Self-focused Behaviors (Factor 5). An index foreach action type (i.e., help, agression, escape, political action, self-focus) was com-puted by taking the mean rating of all behaviors corresponding to the respectivefactor (Table 2).

4.2. Analyses of variance

The dependent variables evaluative focus, moral blameworthiness, perceivedriskiness, emotions, and action tendencies were each analyzed with a 3 4 2 4(Causation Consequences Geographic Distance Scenario) multifactorial analy-sis of variance. Significant eects were further analyzed by Bonferroni post-hoccomparisons.

4.2.1. Evaluative focusOnly causation was found to be significant, F 2; 1532 4:46; p 0:012:

Deontological arguments are more important for anthropogenic causation both

Table 1

Rotated (VARIMAX) factor loadings of specific emotionsa

Emotion Factor 1

(ethical)

Factor 2

(loss-based retrospective)

Factor 3

(positive)

Factor 4

(loss-based prospective)

Outrage 0.86 0.14 )0.08 0.16Indignation 0.84 0.09 )0.04 0.19Fury 0.84 0.17 )0.04 0.20Anger 0.84 0.08 )0.07 0.22Contempt 0.73 0.24 0.06 0.02

Regret 0.12 0.77 0.00 0.26

Sympathy 0.11 0.74 0.06 0.09

Trouble 0.33 0.59 )0.02 0.47Sadness 0.38 0.58 0.04 0.41

Guilt 0.39 0.43 0.14 )0.04Relief )0.01 )0.01 0.78 )0.02Pride 0.02 )0.03 0.77 0.02Admiration )0.18 0.02 0.68 )0.05Envy 0.05 0.08 0.61 )0.04Hope 0.01 0.36 0.42 0.00

Fear 0.39 0.13 )0.04 0.76Worry 0.35 0.20 )0.11 0.74Helplessness )0.02 0.13 0.01 0.72

a Italiced loadings indicate that the emotion item was used to compute the index of the corresponding

emotion factor.


Table 2

Rotated (VARIMAX) factor loadings of action tendenciesa

Action tendency Factor 1

(help)

Factor 2

(aggr.)

Factor 3

(escape)

Factor 4

(political)

Factor 5

(self)

Help/prevention

. . . I would try to help to reduce

or limit damage

0.83 0.08 )0.03 0.17 0.07

. . . I would do something to

improve the situation

0.81 0.09 )0.02 0.26 )0.03

. . . I would personally help

those aicted

0.76 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.23

. . . I would do something so

that potential harmful

consequences may be prevented

or at least mitigated

0.75 0.09 )0.06 0.32 0.02

. . . I would try to employ

preventive measures

0.75 0.07 0.12 0.07 )0.13

. . . I would personally initiateactions to improve the situation

0.70 0.16 )0.16 0.32 0.14

. . . I would do anything to stop

what is going on

0.69 0.25 )0.05 0.35 0.02

. . . I would try to comfort thoseaicted.

0.69 0.12 0.22 )0.08 0.21

. . . I would personally

participate in actions to

improve the situation

0.67 0.15 )0.11 0.37 0.18

. . . I would donate to an

environmental or relief

organization that takes action

against the situationb

0.48 0.01 0.09 0.47 0.18

Aggression/retaliation

. . . I feel like hitting the one

who is responsible

0.10 0.87 0.10 0.09 0.09

. . . I feel ready to spit the one

who is responsible into the face

0.13 0.83 0.07 0.18 0.15

. . . I feel like yelling at the one

who is responsible

0.10 0.82 0.13 0.18 0.16

. . . I feel like taking vengeance 0.09 0.75 0.16 0.05 0.21

. . . I would like to sue the onewho is responsible

0.26 0.61 0.03 0.49 0.05

. . . I would try to coerce the one

responsible into rehabilitating

for what happened

0.33 0.55 )0.02 0.47 )0.03

Escape/avoidance

. . . I feel like running away 0.16 0.05 0.76 )0.04 0.09

. . . I would like not to know

anything about it

)0.15 )0.04 0.64 0.12 0.23

. . . I would like to forgeteverything as soon as possible

)0.10 0.10 0.63 )0.03 0.04

. . . I feel like lamentating 0.09 0.10 0.61 0.15 0.37


for the single causation (mean rating M 6:57 and aggregate causation conditionM 6:58 than for the natural causation condition M 7:02. Thus, the relativesalience of the evaluative focus on deontological or on consequentialist consider-ations only depends on the type of causation of the risk.

4.2.2. Moral blameworthinessThe analysis of moral blameworthiness only yields a significant main eect for

causation, F 2; 1517 11:27; p < 0:001. Ratings of moral blameworthiness arehighest in the anthropogenic-single condition M 4:96, second highest if the risk iscaused by aggregate anthropogenic causation M 4:24, and natural causation isthe least morally blameworthy situation M 2:67.

Table 2 (continued)

Action tendency Factor 1

(help)

Factor 2

(aggr.)

Factor 3

(escape)

Factor 4

(political)

Factor 5

(self)

. . . I would try to get as far

away as possible

0.28 0.18 0.61 )0.22 )0.20

. . . I would not know what todo

)0.25 0.03 0.59 )0.01 0.01

. . . I wish that I could undo

everything that happened

0.33 0.22 0.48 0.26 )0.11

Social/political action

. . . I would like to make it a big

issue in the media

0.35 0.21 0.10 0.63 )0.01

. . . I would participate in a

demonstration so that the

situation or potential damage

gets prevented

0.44 0.16 )0.03 0.62 0.10

. . . I would boycott the one

who caused the situation

0.10 0.43 0.07 0.60 )0.14

. . . I would write a letter to thenewspaper

0.34 0.25 )0.06 0.55 0.18

Self-focus

. . . I feel like patting myself on

my shoulder

0.05 0.11 )0.01 )0.11 0.62

. . . I feel like slapping myself inthe face

0.06 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.57

. . . I feel like crying 0.28 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.48

. . . I would like to pour out my

heart to a friend

0.37 0.03 0.30 0.27 0.44

a Italicized loadings indicate that the behavior item was used to compute the index of the corresponding

action tendency factor. Ratings were obtained on scales ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree

totally). Participants responded to the following question: To what extent do you agree with the fol-

lowing statements?b This item was not used when computing action indices, since it does not have a high loading only on one

single factor.


4.2.3. Perceived riskinessThe four ratings used to measure perceived riskiness proved to be suciently

internally consistent to be averaged as a risk index (alpha 0.94). Significant maineects for consequences, F 3; 1536 75:96; p < 0:001, for scenario,F 3; 1536 4:32; p 0:005, and a significant interaction between consequencesand scenario were found, F 9; 1536 6:41; p < 0:001. The vulcano scenario israted as the most risky M 5:83, and the spores scenario is the least riskyM 4:91. Consequences that aict humans self M 5:93 or othersM 5:87 are most risky, no negative consequences are least risky M 4:78,and negative consequences for nature are in between M 5:44.

4.2.4. EmotionsFor ethical emotions such as anger two significant main eects are found, one for

causation, F 2; 1537 10:31; p < 0:001, and one for consequences, F 3; 1537 23:25; p < 0:001. Ethical emotions are rated as more intense if negative conse-quences are expected (mean index is 4.20, 4.12, and 4.18 for the three levels nature,others, and self, respectively, of the consequences factor) than if no negative con-sequences are expected M 3:33. With respect to the causation eect, a singlehuman agent leads to the most intense ethical emotions M 4:60, aggregate an-thropogenic causation is second M 4:01, and natural causes M 2:73 arousethe least ethical emotions. This pattern parallels that of moral blameworthiness.

For prospective loss-based emotions, e.g., fear, a significant main eect of geo-graphic distance is found, F 1; 1538 4:65; p 0:031. Ratings are more intensewhen geographic distance is close M 4:99 than when it is far (M 4.69). Also, asignificant main eect of consequences is found, F 3; 1538 23:91; p < 0:001.Potential negative consequences for humans self M 5:37 or others M 5:09 evoke more intense prospective loss-based emotions than negative consequences fornature (M 4.77), which in turn evoke higher ratings than if no negative conse-quences occur (M 4.45). This consequence eect parallels the eect found forperceived riskiness.

For retrospective loss-based emotions such as sadness only the main eect of typeof consequence proved to be significant, F 3; 1537 20:36; p < 0:001. Retrospec-tive emotions are more intense if negative consequences are possible (mean ratingsare 3.46, 3.53, and 3.34 for self, others, and nature, respectively) than if there are nopotential negative consequences M 2:83.

4.2.5. Action tendenciesAn analysis of the derived dependent variable Help/Prevention yields significant

main eects for geographic distance, F 1; 1533 8:12; p 0:004, and for type ofconsequences, F 3; 1533 14:40; p < 0:001. Tendency to help and prevent isstronger if the risk is geographicly distant M 4:74 than if it is close M 4:37.Concerning the main eect for consequences, tendency to help increases from nonegative consequences M 4:27 via consequences for nature M 4:52 to con-sequences for humans self M 4:58 or others M 4:77.


For Aggression/Retaliation, the main eects of causation, F 2; 1531 5:03;p 0:007, and consequences, F 3; 1531 7:08; p < 0:001, proved to be significant.With respect to consequences, there is more aggression if negative consequencesoccur (mean index is 3.25, 3.24, and 3.22 for self, others, and nature, respectively)than if no negative consequences are expected M 2:80. There is a clear dier-entiation concerning causation: Aggression is strongest if the situation is caused by asingle human agent M 3:52, it is less strong for aggregate anthropogenic cau-sation M 3:14, and weakest if the situation is caused by nature M 2:44. Thispattern parallels those of moral blameworthiness and ethical emotions. Thus, angerand aggression covary with moral blameworthiness, but there must be some po-tential loss involved in order to evoke those responses.

The results of the tendency to Social/Political Action closely parallel those ofAggression/Retaliation. Social/Political Actions are significantly aected by causa-tion, F 2; 1541 5:78; p 0:003, and by type of consequences, F 3; 1541 3:41; p 0:017. Tendency to Social/Political Action increases from natural causa-tion M 3:72 via anthropogenic aggregate causation M 4:40 to anthropogeniccausation with a single agent M 4:98.

No significant eect was found for the tendency to Escape, even though the entiremodel is significant, F 75; 1533 1:77; p < 0:001.

For self-focus, only a significant main eect for type of consequences was found,F 3; 1534 9:73; p 0:007. Self-focus is generally low; stronger for consequencesthat aect humans M 1:84 and M 1:94 for others and self, respectively) than forconsequences for nature M 1:71 or no consequences M 1:66.

4.3. Mediational analyses

The reported analyses of variance show eects of the risks perceived causalstructure on each of the dependent variables evaluative focus, perceived risk, moralblameworthiness, emotions, and action tendencies. In our model, however, we as-sume specific directional causal relationships. The causal relations are assumed to gofrom evaluative focus via cognitive judgments (consequentialist or deontological) toemotions (loss-based or ethical), and, finally, to action tendencies. Specifically,emotions are assumed to mediate the impact of cognitive judgments on actions. As apreliminary test, we conducted a mediational analysis as proposed by Baron andKenny (1986). These authors suggest that a series of three regression models becomputed in order to establish that the relationship between an independent and adependent variable is mediated by a third variable, the mediator (Baron & Kenny,1986, p. 1177):

(a) regressing the mediator on the independent variable;(b) regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable, and(c) regressing the dependent variable on both the mediator and the independentvariable.

Mediation can be inferred if the following three conditions hold:(a) the independent variable significantly predicts the mediator in the firstregression;


(b) the independent variable also significantly predicts the dependent variable inthe second regression, and(c) the mediator significantly predicts the dependent variable in the thirdregression.

If all three conditions are met, the eect of the independent variable should beweaker in the third equation than in the second; mediation would be perfect ifthe eect of the independent variable vanishes after controlling for themediator.

We carried out a preliminary analysis to find some evidence for the mediationalassumptions; it would be premature and the data do not allow us to test a full fledgedmodel of all causal relationships. We considered two of the action tendencies: Help/Prevention and Aggression/Retaliation, which are the ones that can be assigned mostclearly to consequentialist and deontological evaluation, respectively. Mediationalanalyses were conducted for three chains of mediation:

(a) perceived riskiness aects help/prevention tendencies, mediated by prospec-tive loss-based emotions;(b) perceived riskiness aects help/prevention tendencies, mediated by retrospec-tive loss-based emotions, and(c) moral blameworthiness aects aggression/retaliation tendencies, mediated byethical emotions.

Results are shown in Table 3. The three conditions described above are met for allthree causal chains. Thus, for all three chains, the independent variable aects themediator in regression (a), the independent variable aects the dependent variable inregression (b), and in regression (c) the mediator aects the dependent variable, andthe regression weight of the independent variable is smaller than in regression (b).Hence, the results of these analyses provide preliminary support for the assumptionthat the causal relations go from cognitive evaluations via emotional reactions to

Table 3

Mediational analyses: regression modelsa

Regression (a):

IV ! MVRegression (b):

IV ! DVRegression (c): IVMV ! DV

b (IV) R2 b (IV) R2 b (IV) b (MV) R2

(1) Perceived riskiness!prospective loss-based emotions!help/prevention0.64 0.37 0.58 0.33 0.45 0.20 0.35

(2) Perceived riskiness! retrospective loss-based emotions!help/prevention0.48 0.19 0.58 0.33 0.46 0.24 0.38

(3) Moral blameworthiness!ethical emotions!aggression/retaliation0.52 0.37 0.39 0.25 0.15 0.48 0.41

a IV: Independent variable; DV: Dependent variable; MV: Mediator variable; b: Unstandardizedregression coecient. All regression coecients and all R2s are significant at p < 0:0001.


action tendencies. This causal chain has been documented for the consequentialist aswell as for the deontological evaluative branch of our model.

5. Discussion

We will first briefly summarize the results. Next, results on action tendencies arediscussed in more detail. Finally, some problems and future research issues arediscussed.

In general, there are remarkably few eects of the four dierent semantic sce-narios. Only perceived risk is aected by the type of scenario, especially, the volcanoscenario was perceived as very risky. Thus, some situations are obviously conceivedper se as more risky than others. However, the absence of any eect of the scenarioon the other dependent variables indicates that the model components and theirrelations are largely independent of the semantic underpinning. Deontologicalevaluations are more salient when causation is anthropogenic than when it is nat-ural. Moral blameworthiness is highest for a single human agent, aggregate an-thropogenic causation is less blameworthy, and natural causation is least morallyblameworthy. These basic findings are all in accordance with our model. Conse-quentialist evaluations such as perceived riskiness depend on the type of potentialconsequences. As expected, negative consequences for humans are perceived asriskier than negative consequences for nature. Also, the theoretical distinction be-tween prospective loss-based, retrospective loss-based and ethical emotions wassupported by factor analyses. Moral blameworthiness, ethical emotions, tendency toaggression/retaliation, and tendency to social/political action all show a paralleleect pattern. They are all influenced by the risks perceived causation: Risks causedby a single, identifiable human agent are perceived as most blameworthy, give rise tothe most intense ethical emotions and most strongly elicit tendencies to aggression/retaliation as well as to social/political action. The second group of variables thatexhibits a parallel eect pattern is perceived risk, loss-based emotions particularlyprospective and tendency to help/prevention. These variables are aected by thetype of potential consequences: Perceived risk, loss-based emotions, and tendency tohelp/prevention are strongest if consequences are involved that may be harmful tohumans.

In sum, as expected we found that evaluative focus depends on the perceivedcausal structure of the risk that is evaluated. Furthermore, we found that deonto-logical considerations (moral blameworthiness) goes together with ethical emotionsand aggressive behavior tendencies. Consequentialist considerations (perceived risk),on the other hand, correspond to loss-based emotions and a tendency to help. Theseresults are in accordance with our theoretical model and were corroborated bymediational analyses.

In this study, the main focus was on the action component, i.e., on the questionwhich actions or action tendencies are elicited by perceived instances of risky events.A factor analysis identified five classes of action tendencies: helping behavior,aggressive behavior, political action, escape, and self-focus. However, only help,


aggression and political action are clearly related to the perceived structure of therisk. As predicted, a preference to help the victims of a risk is caused by geographicdistance. Aggression, in contrast, is determined by the perceived cause of the risk: if asingle human agent can be identified, he or she will be the target of aggressive actiontendencies. Surprisingly, political action is also related to the cause of the risk. Wehad expected political actions to result from loss-based emotions, but they covarywith ethical emotions. Interestingly, all three action classes are also influenced by therisks consequences, i.e., if consequences are negative, the tendency to act in a specificway is more intense. Negativity of consequences seems to be the most general factorthat elicits action tendencies; without the potential for negative consequences, thesituation might not be classified as a risk in the first place, and, hence, no actiontendencies might result. On the other hand, type of cause and geographical distanceare more specific to dierent action classes such as help or aggression. These findingsindicate a possible modification of the model: if the risks mental representationimplies negative consequences, a general tendency to act is activated; if the repre-sentation allows further inferences about causes and distance, specific action ten-dencies are emphasized and others are inhibited.

All in all, a systematic pattern exists which relates characteristics of the mentalrepresentation of a risk to specific action tendencies. Of course, the mental repre-sentation might not be a valid representation of the true structure of the risk. Inthe experiment, we assume that participants take the risks description as valid andconstrue a corresponding mental representation. It remains an open question if andhow seriously people verify their subjective mental model before any action is taken.The degree of uncertainty about ones knowledge of the situation might be an im-portant mediator: if one is not highly confident about ones knowledge and infer-ences, one might refrain from real action.

Note that what in the experiment was assessed are only action tendencies, not realactions. It has long been known in attitude research that the correlation betweenattitudes, i.e., action tendencies, and behavior, i.e., real action, is far from perfect(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As plausible as the general relationship between the rep-resentation of a risk and action tendencies may seem, it does not imply that therelationship with real actions follows the same pattern.

What we found in this experiment is an eect of the risks perceived causalstructure on a group of dependent variables evaluative focus, moral blamewor-thiness, perceived risk, emotions, and action tendencies. In a preliminary medi-ational analysis, we also found some support for the hypothesized directionalrelationships among those variables, i.e., that the causal relations go from cognitivejudgments to emotions to action tendencies. Note that this implies a clear stancetowards one of the basic problems of emotion research, i.e., if emotions are causedby cognitive judgments, or if, vice versa, emotions come first and change the waycognitive processes are executed, or are independent of cognitive processing alto-gether (Zajonc, 1980). This issue remains to be investigated in future studies. A firststep could be to apply structural equation modeling, a second step would be toexperimentally manipulate emotions and to test their eects on cognition andbehavior.


Acknowledgements

This research was supported by Grant He 1449/2-2 from the German ResearchAssociation (DFG) as part of the program Human Dimensions of Global Change.The authors wish to thank Marcus Ladineo, Dorothee Korner, and Hans JorgHenning for their help in conducting the experiments and for many constructivediscussions.

Appendix A. Scenarios

A.1. Versions of the gas scenario

In the gas scenario, chemical reactions in the atmosphere produce a new gas calledPolypiperin. This takes place either in Germany, which is where our participantslive, or in Japan (geographical distance). The chemical reaction is due either to achange in the suns activity (natural causation), or to a new extremely ecientcordless transmission procedure that was either developed by the TV station UltraTV that can now transmit many more channels (anthropogenic causation singleagent) or is used for a new kind of mobile phone that has become very wide-spreadand is used by many individuals (anthropogenic causation aggregate). The potentialnegative consequences expressed in the expert statements were the same as in thevulcano scenario.

A.2. Versions of the spores scenario

The core event in the spores scenario is that spores from new water plants arefound in a river. This river was either close to where the participant lives or in theMid West of the USA (geographic distance). The new spores stem either from theaquaria of a fun park called Oceanworld (anthropogenic causation single agent),from aquaria of individual households (anthropogenic causation aggregate), or arecarried to the river by water birds (natural causation). According to experts, therewere either no negative consequences to be expected (no negative consequences), theecological balance may be seriously disturbed (negative consequences for nature), or because of contamination of drinking water serious health eects either for chil-dren (negative consequences for others) or for humans in general, including the self(negative consequences for self), could result.

A.3. Versions of the mosquito scenario

In the mosquito scenario, a new kind of mosquito spreads out either in Germanyor in the Northern part of Africa (geographical distance). The mosquitoes are im-ported from the jungle either by migrant birds (natural causation), by the freight ship


company Afro Line (anthropogenic causation single agent), or by many tourists(anthropogenic causation aggregate). Experts agree that either no negative conse-quences for humans or nature are likely to occur (no negative consequences), or dueto a pathogenic agent carried by the mosquitoes that epidemics among red deermay spread out so that some species could even become extinct (negative conse-quences for nature), or that an infection may seriously damage the health of children(negative consequences for others), or the health of humans in general, including theself (negative consequences for self ).

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