acp compendium of risk knowledge

ACP Compendium of Risk Knowledge

Mapping Risk in the AfRican, CaRibbean & Pacific gRoup of states (ACP)

ACP Secretariat, 2015

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Disclaimerthe contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views or positions of the acp secretariat.

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For more information:

Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States Secretariatavenue georges henri 451b 1200, brussels, belgiumemail: [email protected]: +32 2 743 06 00fax: +32 2 735 55 73internet: http://www.acp.int

this publication has been funded by the european union. the contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the european union

EUROPEAN UNION

Authors: Lezlie C. Morinire, Ph.D., and Luis Sanchez Zimmerman Editors and contributors: David Clare, Tim Redford Design and graphic support: www.mardi.be 2015 - 88 pages in English. Also available in French, Spanish and Portuguese. FWC Nr.2014/345765/1: implemented by PARTICIP


MAPPINg RISk IN ThE AFRICAN, CARIbbEAN & PACIFIC gRouP oF STATES (ACP)


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The authors are very grateful for the hospitality shown, rich exchange of knowledge and information gleaned from each of the ACP regions and sub-regions visited or interviewed. They include, in order of exchange:

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Disaster Risk Reduction unit (DRRu); Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Ig AD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC); Pacific Islands Applied geoscience Commission (SoP AC) of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) Disaster

Reduction Programme (DRP); Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Association (CDEMA), Coordination unit (Cu); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change programme (DRRCC); Economic Community of West African States (ECoWAS), Disaster Risk Reduction Division (DRRD).

They are thankful for the time and technical assistance generously afforded them by the following institutions:

Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); European Commissions Joint Research Centre (JRC); global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (gFDRR). united Nations office for Disaster Reduction (uNISDR);

The authors also wish to personally thank Ms. Michle Dominique Raymond, Assistant Secretary general of the ACP group of States and Mr. Pedro oliveira, Programme Manager External Relations Advisor in unit E3 of the European Commissions Directorate general for International Cooperation and Development, for their excellent guidance in the preparation of the compendium.

A special thanks to PARTICIPs team, for their guidance and technical support throughout the whole process.

Last but not least, all unnamed governmental and international bodies, civil society and research entities that have shared their knowledge on DRR lessons learned in ACP countries are likewise warmly thanked.

ACkNoWLEDgEMENTS


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Foreword At this time of dwindling global natural and economic resources, accompanied by complex, volatile and intricately linked changes in both geopolitics and climate-environment relations, the importance of a more engaged focus on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation cannot be overestimated. Although progress has been made since the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), the advances are feeble when compared to the levels of risk in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) member states that assessments are disclosing with increasing clarity.

Indeed, nearly one million lives have been lost to 2560 natural hazard events in ACP countries since 1980. both the number of hazard events and the economic damage related to them have been rising regularly in ACP countries, linked to the effect of climate change on hazard behaviour and to the increase in exposed assets (growing populations and increasing density of built environments) across ACP. The average annual loss due to all hazards combined (damage and loss of capital) in ACP countries is uSD 6.9 billion (united Nations International Secretariat for Disaster Reduction, 2014). This represents no less than 8% of ACPs total gross fixed capital formation and 2.3% of the combined gDP (2013).

The ACP Compendium of Risk Knowledge presents the start-of-the-art in disaster risk reduction (DRR) knowledge concerning ACP countries. More importantly, it highlights valuable DRR efforts -categorized under hazards, vulnerability and capacity in the three regions- made in and by ACP member states that merit continued or heightened support and replication.

The intra-ACP cooperation has been pivotal in supporting efforts to reduce the risk described in this document. The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement or Cotonou Agreement (annex IV, art 12) defines Intra-ACP cooperation as a supra-regional cooperation addressing the shared challenges facing ACP States through operations that

transcend the concept of geographic location and benefit many or all ACP States. As a Cotonou instrument, the Intra-ACP cooperation is jointly programmed and used in a way that guarantees ownership, political support and involvement from ACP stakeholders at all stages of the project cycle.

Despite many competing priorities and challenges, ACP countries have today an opportunity to capitalize on this wealth of knowledge and sustained efforts, to provide the next generations born in ACP member states a future they can thrive in -with a level of risk they will be fully equipped to manage. It is desired that future global risk managers come forth from ACP member states, lauded graduates of the most vulnerable areas of the world in which the only thing absolutely certain is uncertainty itself.

Although huge strides have been made in understanding and tracking hazards, and in developing Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies and action plans, far too few ACP countries have passed legislation to make it impossible to sustain existing or even create new risk. Inaction can no longer be blamed on lack of evidence.

You have a role in making this happen. ACP countries count on your support in raising awareness and putting joint political will behind the reduction of risk.

Ms Michle Dominique Raymond, Assistant Secretary general (Dept. of Political Affairs and human Development)Secretariat of the ACP group of States


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CAT I / Study Coordinator: LEZLIE C. MoRINIRE, Ph.D.

building on academic grounding in Climate Science (specializing in Arid Lands) and Nutritional Epidemiology (biostatistics) and a 24-year career in DRR/M and humanitarian action, Lezlie C. Morinire has a long history in unravelling stories from columns of numbers. her passion is connecting science to society (manifest in her efforts in low-tech community early warning system development with IFRC/MSb) and compiling datasets to produce risk indices and maps. her most recent adventure has been with the Indian ocean Commission (IoC) in a uNISDR-guided effort to build capacity for risk-optimized public investment in the Ministries of Finance of five islands. In 2014, she conducted a global mapping exercise on Technological Risk for uNEP/oChAs Joint Environment unit and another on South-South Cooperation for uNICEF. The previous year she mapped Climate Science and Early Warning Institutional Capacity in West Africa / ECoWAS and authored the Au/uNISDR Africa Status Report for DRR (hFA). her earliest mapping efforts were for the Famine Early Warning System in Malawi, 1993-97. For the ACP Compendium, Lezlie also drew on a gIS certificate, her work with the World banks global Environment Facility and on-going experience in teaching and large-scale evaluations. Lezlie is French-Italian and lives in the Sonoran Desert (she is Adjunct Research Scientist at the u. of Arizona).

CAT II / Expert: MR. LuIS SANChEZ ZIMMERMAN

holding a graduate degree in Economics, Luis Sanchez Zimmerman has more than twenty years of professional experience devoted to development. Since 2001, his scope of work has focused mainly on disaster risk reduction, emergency response and climate change adaptation. he has acquired solid expertise in all phases of project cycle management, including identification, design, management, and monitoring and evaluation of emergency and disaster risk reduction and preparedness programmes. Mr. Sanchez Zimmerman is up to date with all latest developments in the area of DRR, mostly around the discussions of post-2015 hFA, and is familiar with the work of international players such as uN-ISDR, gFDRR, CRED, etc. his career has evolved around the problems of prevention and mitigation in ACP countries, mainly in Africa and the Caribbean and he has previous experience working directly with sub-regional organisations, such as SADC.

Authors


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Summary for ACP decision makers 7

1 Introduction 81.1 objectives of the compendium 81.2 Intended audience 81.3 Methodology 81.4 organisation: how to use this compendium 9

2 Understanding Risk 11 2.1 general knowledge primer: Risk 101 112.2 hazards 101 132.3 Vulnerability 101 142.4 Capacity 101 15

3 Risk in ACP Regions 173.1 overall risk in ACP 173.2 hazards in ACP 20 3.2.1 What we know 20 3.2.2 What ACP countries are doing 243.3 Vulnerability in ACP 27 3.3.1 What we know 27 3.3.2 What ACP countries are doing 273.4 Capacity in ACP 33 3.4.1 What we know 33 3.4.2 What ACP countries are doing 36

4 Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa 404.1 overall Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa 404.2 hazards in Sub-Saharan Africa 42 4.2.1 What we know 42 4.2.2 What ACP countries are doing 444.3 Vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa 48 4.3.1 What we know 48 4.3.2 What ACP countries are doing 504.4 Capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa 52 4.4.1 What we know 52 4.4.2 What ACP countries are doing 54

5 Risk in the Carribean 585.1 overall risk in the Caribbean 585.2 hazards in the Caribbean 60 5.2.1 What we know 60 5.2.2 What ACP countries are doing 625.3 Vulnerability in the Caribbean 64 5.3.1 What we know 64 5.3.2 What ACP countries are doing 665.4 Capacity in the Caribbean 68 5.4.1 What we know 68 5.4.2 What ACP countries are doing 68

6 Risk In The Pacific 726.1 overall risk in the Pacific 726.2 hazards in the Pacific 74 6.2.1 What we know 74 6.2.2 What ACP countries are doing 766.3 Vulnerability in the Pacific 78 6.3.1 What we know 78 6.3.2 What ACP countries are doing 806.4 Capacity in the Pacific 82 6.4.1 What we know 82 6.4.2 What ACP countries are doing 82

7 Conclusions 85 general and overall risk 85

Abbreviations & Acronyms

TAbLE oF CoNTENTS


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Tables:Table 1: Risk Analysis 12Table 2: DRR Strategies and Legislation 16Table 3: hFA in ACP 33Table 4: DRR Entities in ACP 37Table 5: Risk Financing Efforts 39Table 6: CCRIF Pay-outs 67

Figures:Figure 1: organisation of the Compendium 9Figure 2: Position of Selected Case Studies 10Figure 3: Risk Management 11Figure 4: hazards in ACP 21Figure 5: Disaster Frequency and Fatality 21Figure 6: Need for Legislation and Enforcement 87

Side Bars:Side bar 1: Risk Identification 25Side bar 2: DRR knowledge Portals 26Side bar 3: DRR Strategies and Policy / Legislation in ACP Countries 30Side bar 4: Regional Entities and their DRR units 37Side bar 5: Risk optimisation of Public Investment and Risk Financing in ACP Countries 39

Case Studies:Case Study 1: Financial Protection Against Disasters in the Indian ocean 45Case Study 2: IgAD hazard Maps and Atlas 46Case Study 3: Disaster Preparedness and Earth observation 47Case Study 4: IgAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) 51Case Study 5: DIMSuR Regional Technical Centre 51Case Study 6: Community Early Warning Systems 55Case Study 7: Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA) 56Case Study 8: Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) 58Case Study 9: CDEMA Roving Team 70Case Study 10: ACP-Eu Disaster Risk Management in the CARIFoRuM 71Case Study 11: Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) 77Case Study 12: building Safety and Resilience in the Pacific (bSRP) 81Case Study 13: Private Sector business Continuity Plans 84

Infographics: Infographic: Risk in ACP 18Infographic: hazards in ACP 22Infographic: Vulnerability in ACP 28Infographic: Capacity in ACP 34

Infographic: Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa 41Infographic: hazards in Sub-Saharan Africa 43Infographic: Vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa 49Infographic: Capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa 53

Infographic: Risk in the Caribbean 59Infographic: hazards in the Caribbean 61 Infographic: Vulnerability in the Caribbean 65Infographic: Capacity in the Caribbean 69

Infographic: Risk in the Pacific 73Infographic: hazards in the Pacific 75Infographic: Vulnerability in the Pacific 79Infographic: Capacity in the Pacific 83

LIST oF TAbLES, FIguRES, SIDE bARS, CASE STuDIES AND INFo-gRAPhICS


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Summary for ACP decision makersEvery five days, an ACP country confronts a major hazard that could become the next deadly disaster, destroying years of development. Out of the top 20 most at-risk countries in the world (InfoRM, v303 2015), 13 are ACP countries. Nearly one million lives have been lost to 2560 natural hazard events in ACP countries since 1980 (EM-DAT). Both the number of hazard events and the economic damage due to those events has been rising regularly due to the effect of climate change on hazard behaviour and to the increase in exposed assets (populations and built environments) across ACP. The average annual loss due to all hazards combined (damage and loss of capital) in ACP countries is USD 6.9 billion (UNISDR, 2014). This represents no less than 8% of ACPs total gross fixed capital formation and 2.3% of the combined GDP in 2013.

Lack of capacity and high levels of vulnerability are the key features of risk in ACP countries much more so than the actual incidence of hazards. The most certain way to reduce risk in ACP countries, therefore, is to focus more adamantly on developing capacity and building resilience. Sustainable development in the form of risk-optimised public and private investment will greatly reduce future risk in ACP countries.

Risk has a very different profile in each ACP region, and generalisations mask insightful detail. While all three regions have higher scores for lack of capacity (than for hazards or vulnerability), Pacific countries are moderately exposed to all studied hazards, Caribbean countries are the least vulnerable and Sub-Saharan Africa ranks riskier on all three dimensions. A closer look, though, reveals that while Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest levels of human hazards (violence and conflict) the Caribbean has the greatest exposure to natural hazards. Although the vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised above all by deprivation and uprooted people, in the Caribbean vulnerability manifests itself as inequality and in the Pacific, it is evidenced by aid dependency. While the lack of capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven largely by feeble physical infrastructure, in the Caribbean it is hampered by low access to health care and in the Pacific by weak communication networks.

While every ACP region has made progress towards achieving the five priorities set out in the hyogo Framework for Action (hFA, 2005-2015), the rhythm of the advances is no match for the rising levels of risk. Although huge strides have been made in understanding and tracking hazards, and in developing Disaster Risk Management and Reduction (DRM/ DRR) strategies and action plans, far too few ACP countries have passed legislation to make it impossible to sustain existing or even create new risk. Inaction can no longer be blamed on lack of evidence.

This compendium describes many valid models, tools, structures and products in ACP regions that have already passed the test of time, and many more that hold

great promise for DRR. before creating anything new, decision-makers should take stock of, complete, reinforce, embellish, and expand the efforts with potential for replication in other regions. The Intra-ACP cooperation instrument continue DRM/DRR to be an opportunity for the three regions to learn from each other and to further cooperate in areas of common interest. The compendium also enables the visualization (through maps and info-graphics) of the current state-of-knowledge and effort in ACP countries.

Since reducing the risk of disaster is synonymous with reducing risk in development, wise investors readily see the logic of prevention and DRR. Insufficient funding for DRR in ACP countries, therefore, points to one of two unfortunate conclusions: gaps in awareness at high-levels and/or lack of political will. While this compendium targets gaps in awareness, even the best efforts to develop sustainable capacity become futile when political will lacks.

If you are not already convinced that prevention and DRM/DRR will make the development of your country more robust and sustainable, take a look inside this compendium to see if we can change your mind.

If you are a firm believer in disaster prevention and DRR, show us by putting existing DRR strategies to good use. Lobby for protective legislation, such as the use of disaster impact assessments and land use and building codes. Invest in risk-optimised infrastructure, including health and communication. Promote equality. Insist on integrated DRR and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) strategies and efforts avoiding duplication. Examine your national and private sector budgets to register, track and take credit for current and future investment in disaster risk management (DRM). Identify and develop ways to be more self-sufficient such as with levies linked to DRR, dedicated budget lines for DRM and risk financing schemes to share the burden. Invest in and incentivise your regional, national and local DRR entities: they will help you keep DRR on the tip of your tongue, until the risk levels in ACP start to fall.


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1. Introduction

1.1 obJECTIVES oF ThE CoMPENDIuM

The global objective of the ACP Risk Compendium is to maintain the existing momentum towards Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) after the hyogo Framework for Action (hFA) programme ends in 2015, and to stay true to the post-2015 International Development Agenda. The needs are to raise awareness, to remind decision-makers of the risk of natural hazards faced by the regions, sub-regions and countries, to create a culture of DRR advocacy, and to achieve further and enduring steps towards the protection of human life and towards building resilience into political economies. To do so requires the compilation of cutting-edge science, indices and maps on the hazards that affect ACP sub-regions and, therefore, their legitimate development prospects.

DRR must be seen as essential to policy development planning and decision-making. The effort should serve to highlight harmonised approaches, build common understanding of disaster risk management (DRM), and gather political support, dialogue and engagement at the ACP level (communication, awareness raising and advocacy purposes). Although the quality and scientific basis is sound, this study was not designed as a fully-fledged scientific tool for technical and operational DRM purposes.

1.2 INTENDED AuDIENCE

The ACP Risk Compendium is designed to be accessible and readily understood by a wide audience especially those not intimately familiar with risk management and disaster risk reduction (DRR) jargon. It was prepared for a decision-making audienceone that may not have the time to absorb excessive technical detail but who is in a position to make DRR a priority in ACP communities, countries or regions, and may need compelling and user-friendly evidence at his/her fingertips to help them do so.

The study targets ACP countries and key constituencies, including the ACP Secretariat, ACP organisations and the ACP-Eu Joint Institutions. ultimately, this also includes ministries of planning, finance, and environment/climate change, and disaster risk management agencies among other sector social policy ministries, such as education, health, and agriculture. Although deliberately non-technical, the compilation provides concise descriptions of risk concepts and topics in ACP countries that may be useful to technicians.

The idea for this compendium is to help create a bridge between science and society throughout ACP member-states, making hard evidence as compelling and accessible as possible. It is anchored in the latest scientific understanding and exchanges with the technicians who manage the databases and build the models for example, the European Commissions Joint Research Centre (JRC), the united Nations International Secretariat for Disaster Reduction (uNISDR) and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (gFDRR). It is validated through discussions with ACP stakeholders, in particular ACP sub-regional organisations with responsibilities in DRM to ground the science in the local realities; they include the Southern Africa Development Commission (SADC), Disaster Risk Reduction unit (DRRu); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IgAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC); the Secretariat for Pacific Countries (SPC), Disaster Reduction Programme (DRP); the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Association (CDEMA), Coordination unit (Cu); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change programme (DRRCC); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECoWAS), and the Disaster Risk Reduction Division (DRRD). The result is a compilation of the most salient and meaningful trends in ACP. The goal is that these messages lead to greater awareness of the intricate nature of disaster risk, as well as to ways of building greater risk resilience.

1.3 METhoDoLogY

The ACP Risk Compendium is grounded in an in-depth literature review of state-of-the-art risk assessment, as well as in efforts to improve understanding and to build resilience across the regions. It was accompanied by a parallel and thorough compilation and analysis of all available global datasets that reflect the notion of disaster risk.

With this initial understanding, the authors spent three days in each of seven sites to gain perspective, to verify the trend from the datasets, and to assess the fruits of the on-going ACP-wide efforts invested in reducing risk. While priority was given to efforts funded mainly through the Intra-ACP Cooperation modality, efforts funded by other donors, and even unfunded initiatives or innovations, were also studied.

More than half of the trends, maps and figures portrayed in this study are derived directly from data produced by the Joint Research Centres Index for Risk Management (InfoRM), a


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collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience and the European Commission, through its Joint Research Centre (JRC). The indicators and indices were systematically triangulated with other data sources, many of which are also outlined separately in the pages such as CREDs EMDAT data, or uNISDRs Average Annual Loss (AAL) data. Where discrepancies or concerns about the results were identified, they are discussed openly in the text. No dataset or risk index is perfect, so the healthiest method is to capitalise on the most useful elements from each source. When no source is cited for any figure or quantitative slice of information, it comes from InfoRM. When another dataset is used, the source is cited.

All of the global datasets report at country level; no source reports on indicators per ACP region. All data sets were aggregated for each region by the authors. Averaging indicator values across 15 to 47 countries in an ACP region inevitably results in a wealth of lost data, including rich detail describing real differences between countries and islands. Furthermore, it is crucial that the reader understands the indices and averages as relative trends. They help compare one country and region with another, but are not absolute levels of risk. After all, the concepts explored in this compendium are social constructs: risk, disasters, vulnerability and capacity. hazards, as physical phenomena in their own right, are not for mankind to construct, but the disasters they trigger are inarguably of our doing.

During the site visits, the authors compiled a list of case studies that appeared to have salience in the sub-regions. They classified these case studies by region/country, hazard, and phase of risk management. A sub-set of them was then chosen to add live examples from each region. The selection was intended to be a balanced sample from the regions, phases of risk management, and different hazards. See Figure 1 below.

1.4 oRgANISATIoN: hoW To uSE ThIS CoMPENDIuM

Chapter 2, understanding Risk, features the most theoretical findings from the study and can be considered an abridged version of an introductory course in risk management for natural hazards. Therefore, we encourage decision-makers to read it before studying the series of infographics (four sets for each level of analysis). Subsequently, decision-makers may want to study the geographic chapters most important for his/her work (ACP- if working at the global level, or the respective Africa, Caribbean or Pacific Chapters, if mandated or interested in at the regional or national level).

both within and after Chapter 2, the Compendium is systematically divided into a series of four concepts (Left side of Figure 1), across four levels (right side, Figure 1). While the first concept is overall Risk, it is broken down into its three component parts: Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity. These four concepts are addressed at each level: for ACP, as a whole, then repeated to provide greater detail in each of the three ACP regions Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. This precise pattern of layers also applies to the organisation of the publication, to the InfoRM, and also to the series of infographics.

For each of the layers, the status of that component and level is described (this represents What we know), followed by a brief summary of efforts underway to address that element (What ACP countries are doing). For example, in the subchapter on Vulnerability in the Pacific, the level of vulnerability is described as depicted by global datasets this is what we know. It is then followed by a description of the legislation and efforts designed to reduce that vulnerability What ACP countries are doing. In the description, case

Figure 1: ORGANISATION OF THE COMPENDIUM-

RISk

Sub-SAhARAN AFRICA

PACIFIC

CARIbbEAN

hAZARD

CAPACITY

VuLNERAbILITY

ACP


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studies are featured in text boxes to provide greater detail on a few examples. It is important to understand that the Compendium is not an inventory of all efforts, but a brief summary portraying a few examples (space does not allow full treatment of every element in every region).

A technician working in an ACP region or country, you may want to study the geographic chapters in greater depth. Technical hints are provided throughout the document to provide more depth on indices or concepts. Another way to use this compendium is by topic. For example a technician focusing on:

Risk knowledge and identification, will want to direct attention to the hazard infographics (all four) and to each sub-chapter on hazard knowledge, profiles and actions to strengthen that knowledge base (3.2, 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2).

Policy / legislation or resilience efforts, may want to spend more time reviewing sub-chapters on vulnerability and the actions under way to reduce it (3.3, 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3);

Capacity building and/or preparedness, may want to focus on the series of sub-chapters and sub-infographics on capacity and the action underway to develop it (3.4, 4.4, 5.4, 6.4.).

Furthermore, some readers may have a particular interest in a specific component of risk management. The case studies highlighted in the Compendium were selected to show a balance of successful approaches across the regions. A case study in a particular region may also have an equivalent in another region that is not discussed with the same level of detail (in this case it is not featured in the chart below). Many additional examples are, however, provided in the text. See Figure 3.

Figure 2: POSITION OF SIDE BARS AND SELECTED CASE STUDIES -

SUB SAHARANAFRICA

Chapter 4 Chapter 5

ACP

Chapter 3RISK

MANAGEMENT

THEPACIFIC

Chapter 6

General

Prevention

Preparedness

Response Recovery/

Reconstruction

ACP Observatory SADC DRR Info. System DEWETRA Portal Pacific Disaster Net Portal GO TO: Side-Bar 2 on Knowledge Portals

AU and REC Strategies Comp. DM Strategy Strategy for Dis. and Climate Resilient Dev. (SDRP) GO TO: Side-Bar 3 on Policy and Legislation

ICPAC, SADCs DRRU CDEMA SPC/SOPAC GO TO: Side-Bar 4 on DRR Entities

IOC (and SWIO/RAFI)

IGAD Hazard Atlas GO TO: Case-Study 2

Earth Observation GO TO: Case-Study 3

CEWS GO TO: Case-Study 6

IDDRSI Resilience GO TO: Case-Study 4

DIMSUR Urban Risk GO TO: Case-Study 5

PDNA GO TO: Case-Study 7

CDEMA Roving Team GO TO: Case-Study 9

CARIFORUM DRM GO TO: Case-Study 10

Risk Knowledge GO TO: Side-Bar 1

BSRP: Resilience GO TO: Case-Study 12

Private Sector Plans GO TO: Case-Study 13

CCRIF PCRAFI GO TO: Case-Study 1 Case-Study 1 1 Case-Study 8 and Side-Bar 5

on Risk Financing

CARIBBEAN


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2. Understanding RiskRisk is everywhere, from crossing a street to negotiating a relationship. It can never be entirely removed, and everyone has a different level of acceptable risk. The term risk management is used more and more in contexts ranging from corporate business to family life. This chapter looks at the concept of risk, and shows how it is most often understood with regard to disasters. It was inspired by discussions and insights directly expressed by ACP stakeholders. It can be considered your pocket primer on how to navigate the international and very overlapping often-complementary humanitarian, disaster risk reduction (DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA) and resilience communities.

2.1 gENERAL kNoWLEDgE PRIMER: RISk 101

1. Extreme events such as storms, droughts, flooding and earthquakes are not disasters; they are hazards.

2. Disasters are not natural. Rather than the will of god, they are socially constructed, based on the places people live, and the way governments and individuals conduct their work and lives. because they are socially constructed, disasters are also preventable. Disasters are not in themselves damaging events, but rather the consequence of such events. They are characterised by a change from normal functioning and the need for external assistance.

3. Risk is a function of three factors: Hazard1: a phenomenon, substance, activity or condition that may cause harm (loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. It is also known as a threat. Vulnerability: the characteristics of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard. The opposite of vulnerability is resilience. Capacity: the combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available and accessible within a household, community, society, organisation or country to rebound from the effects of a hazard.

1 Definitions are adapted from uNISDR 2009. http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_uNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf, available in many languages.

Preventing Risk in new investment:

Hardware: mitigation e.g., flood-resistant infrastructure,

Software: Policies, strategies and legislation (building

codes, etc.)

Humanitarian relief, saving lives

Recovery (between response and reconstruction)

Building Back Better(NB: also contributes to prevention)

Risk Analysis: identification (e.g., disaster loss dbases), modelling (e.g., AAL/PML,

PCRAFI) and monitoring (e.g. InfoRM)

Reducing Risk in existing investment: Early warning, support to hydromet services

and NDMAs, emergency and contingency mgmt. systems, stockpiling, evacuation

drills / simulations, etc.

EVENT

RISK REDUCTION

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Figure 3: RISK MANAGEMENT

PREVENTIoN RESPoNSE

PREPAREDNESS RECoNSTRuCTIoN


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Table 1: RISK ANALYSIS -

GENERAL AWARENESS AND POLICY DIALOGUE

(MULTIPLE LEVELS)

NATIONAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS

DYNAMIC FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND INSURANCE

What are the relative risk profiles of different countries?

What is the portfolio of disaster risk within a country?

Which hazards contribute most to the annual cost of disasters?

What are the factors that make societies susceptible to the hazards?

What is the initial estimate of annual average loss (AAL) and probable maximum loss (PML) in the most common disasters?

Questions to answer

how many public buildings (e.g. schools, hospitals) and roads will be closed or potentially damaged by a hazard in a specific area?

What is the current level of public investment in disaster management, and how has it changed over past years?

What are the relative costs and benefits of risk-optimised interventions (e.g. flood control, building codes, retrofitting infrastructure)?

What are the losses (AAL/PML) that might be incurred?

In terms of meeting industry standards, what is the refined annual average loss and probable maximum loss from disasters?

historical event databases (CRED EM-DAT and DESINVENTAR).

historic damage and loss assessments (DaLA).

Asset databases, building inventories, population density.

Standardised collection of hydro-meteorological data in Sub-Saharan Africa linked to the monitoring of cyclone, flood and drought, fire hazards (MESA and the Intra-ACP Programme building Disaster Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa).

Tools required/ technology available (examples only)

Probabilistic risk modelling.

Risk Sensitive budget Review (RSbR), using DRM Marker and RM categorisation.

Macro: Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA)/Catastrophe Simulation (CATSIM).

Micro: Cost benefit Analysis (CbA).

Requires higher resolution data and sub-national probabilistic risk modelling the best possible results of the A and b analysis stages.

A comparison across countries for international policy discussions.

An evidence base within a country for national policy discussions.

End results (Nb: additivethose in Type C will likely be achieved first under Type b)

Risk-optimised public investment (in prevention, preparedness and recovery/reconstruction) that demonstrates transparency and accountability.

greater fiscal resilience in the face of imminent risk.

An input required for private sector product underwriting (to stimulate domestic insurance markets such as gIIF, CCRIF, PCRAFI, etc.).

Dynamic financial analysis models (based on actuarial principles) financing strategies.

TYPE A. Risk Profiling

TYPE b.Risk-Optimised

Assessment

TYPE C. Risk Modelling for

Financial Applications


13

The most successful reduction of risk occurs when all three factors are addressed simultaneously.

4. Risk Management, in its most simple form, combines what should occur before a hazard strikes (risk reduction) with what happens after a destructive event (disaster management). given that they are inter-related, they are often portrayed as a cycle. Although these concepts are the topic of on-going debates in high-level international circles, Figure 3 is where the debate currently stands. While prevention generally focuses on new risks, preparedness targets existing risks. understanding those risks (risk analysis) entails using many steps and tools in between the two. See Figure 3.

5. Risk Assessment (often called risk profiling) or, more generally, risk analysis (see Table 1) is as varied as the use of the term; it means different things to many different groups of people. Table 1 outlines some of those differences. While all assessment is evidence-based and aims for better understanding of risk in order to manage it more effectively, each type of analysis has a very specific end-use. The types, which are not interchangeable, build on each other (e.g. outputs of Analysis A may be required to conduct b). Type C requires inputs with the greatest precision and resolution. 1 outlines some of those differences.

2.2 hAZARDS 101

6. The two main types of hazards are natural (originating in the natural environment) and human (such as violence and conflict). While the hyogo Framework for Action (hFA) has generally focused only on natural hazards, there are many places even in ACP countries where human hazards are a more pressing concern than natural hazards because of their impact both in economic and human terms.

7. Climate change is not a new hazard. however, it exacerbates most natural hazards (excepting geological, which like human hazards - are not considered to have a direct link to climate). Climate variability and change are known to influence the behaviour of hazards possibly altering their frequency, intensity, predictability and/or geographical distribution. A relatively new hazard is sea level rise, a hotly debated phenomenon with direct links to global warming or climate change. Because climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are intertwined, it is inefficient and a lost opportunity to separate them in policies, funding streams and practice.

8. Hazards know no boundaries. Flooding is the most visible example of a trans boundary hazard because many major rivers span dozens of countries. National governments and communities, upstream and downstream, must join together to address the key underlying causes, and must collaborate to effectively manage flood risk across the full hazardscape. however, the need to consider the fluid nature of hazards is not restricted to continents; in Indian ocean, Caribbean, and Pacific island states, storms and tsunamis are also considered trans boundary, and require similar levels of communication and co-operation.

9. Hazards interact with each other. Large groups of displaced people after a major earthquake create a perfect breeding ground for cholera and other vectors. When a natural hazard triggers a technological disaster, it is called a natech (e.g. the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan that followed the 2011 earthquake). Although there are no known natechs in ACP countries, rapid growth and urbanisation mean that these may occur in the not too distant future. Complex emergencies are situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, such as in the horn of Africa (as in 2011). Natural hazards can be the cause or the consequence of these complex emergencies.

10. Pandemics and epidemics qualify as natural hazards. These health-related phenomena originate in the natural biological environment, and ACP countries have a long history of dealing with biological hazards. Epidemics are among the four most frequent types of disasters since 1980 for all three ACP regions (see Infographic: Hazards in ACP). As of late 2014, the estimated cumulative number of confirmed Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases reported by the World health organisation (Who) in guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone was 13,241 including at least 4,950 deaths. other pervasive biological hazards are malaria and pest infestation (e.g. locust). If not addressed, the consequences of such outbreaks could lead to long-lasting impacts on farmers livelihoods and household economies, resulting in major food security crises.

2 For more information on Natechs, see: http://www.unisdr.org/files/2631_FinalNatechStateofthe20Artcorrected.pdf


14

11. Urban hazards are gaining importance. Although no known hazards are exclusive to urban environments, population density, poor living conditions and the sub-standard built environments in some urban settings may, like climate change, exacerbate hazards for example, by accelerating the transmission of pathogens or by exposing inhabitants to chemical emissions from nearby factories. growing in step with human development and the industrialisation of ACP countries, urban risk is already a major issue for risk management. urban planners also have the benefit of economies of scale because the proximity of vulnerable people to response teams makes it more cost-effective to reach them after a disaster (as compared, for example, to people in remote rural African communities or distant Pacific islands or atolls).

12. There is no direct relationship between the speed, size and scale of hazards and their impact. A modern coastal urban environment with buildings built to industry standards may escape unscathed from a level-5 cyclone. The cumulative impact of a pervasive small-scale, slow-onset extensive disaster (e.g. drought or sea level rise) can overshadow the loss and damage incurred by a large-scale, rapid-onset intensive disaster (e.g. flash floods). In the excitement and adrenalin of an enormous event, extensive disasters are often sidelined. because extensive hazards take place more frequently, communities face a difficult challenge to recover and cope with the impacts.

13. Measuring hazards and their impacts is a tricky business3. Although it is relatively straightforward to account for the frequency, duration and intensity of some hazards, others (i.e. drought) are much more challenging. Measuring impact often intangible is even harder. Although most global datasets provide an inventory of lives lost and an estimate of economic damage, they do not propose a measure to address the cost of those lives lost. how do we compare a tsunami in the Pacific that killed 0.05% of an islands population to a flood in a populous country in Africa with 1,005 lives lost, or to a Caribbean storm that destroys 1% of the national gDP?

14. Static versus probabilistic hazard profiles: most disasters that could occur havent yet happened. hazards have long been analysed from data registered in historic global event-based datasets. In these datasets, the number of cases for the most extreme events is still too few and the impact data (economic damage) is less reliable than data on fatalities. Furthermore, climate change has taught us that the past is no longer the best measure of the future. For these reasons, many risk analysts now opt for probabilistic risk profiles, enabled by rapidly advancing technology and understanding of relationships between variables. A probabilistic approach to risk modelling, estimates the probability of events of varying severity, occuring in a given location - including extreme and infrequent events that have not yet occurred. While the economic impact of past disasters (such as agricultural loss or physical capital damage) is regularly woven into economic forecasts, the probability of future disaster risk has rarely been considered to date.

15. While early warning systems track hazards, global datasets track disasters. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CREDs) Emergency Database (EM-DAT) defines and registers disasters4 when there are at least 10 deaths, 1,000 or more individuals affected, or a declaration or call for international assistance. For the uNISDR, in support of the ever-growing database named DESINVENTAR (for inventory of disasters, in Spanish), an extensive disaster may register only one death; however, when a minimum of 30 lives or 600 homes is destroyed, it qualifies as an intensive disaster.

16. Linking science and society. Scientific information on hazards should be translated into messages with meaning in ordinary peoples everyday life, providing directly interpretable statements. That is, it is important to translate one meter of water rising to a more close-to-home estimate of potential damage. Early warnings, policies and projects focusing on DRR/CCA are only as good as the data that guide them; despite years of investment, high-resolution data are still lacking. Specialised agencies should also provide assistance to at-risk communities to cultivate, archive and capitalise on local knowledge.

2.3 VuLNERAbILITY 101

17. Vulnerability, like disaster, is a construct. It can be measured in countless different ways. one way is to use socio-economic variables (such as development, inequality and aid dependency) and to count groups of people with an accepted vulnerability profile (e.g. uprooted people, malnourished individuals, those living with chronic illnesses or in regions or places known to face extensive recurrent disasters)5.

22. one step in measuring vulnerability is to establish which elements are exposed to hazards and may be destroyed or damaged. This generally entails developing high-resolution datasets on three elements: populations (their distribution, density and profiles); public and private assets (e.g. buildings, transportation infrastructure, factories); and natural capital (ecosystems and highly bio-diverse environments).

23. Risks to natural capital compromise future wealth, and these are regularly omitted from global datasets and current international efforts. The loss and erosion of natural capital has serious consequences for businesses, households and a countrys wealth. Wild-land fires now affect all continents, with global annual losses to tropical ecosystems alone potentially reaching uSD190 billion per year. Land degradation increases agricultural drought risk; in Africa, the total area with high degradation and high drought hazard is almost 260,000 square km.

3 Direct disaster losses are much higher than reported in global datasets. Total direct losses in 40 low-income and middle-income countries amount to uSD305 billion over the last 30 years; of these, more than 30% were not reported (uNISDR, gAR2013).

4 http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition5 This is the way that the Index for Risk Management (InfoRM) is constructed by JRC. INFoRM is a collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing

Committee Task TEAM for Preparedness and Resilience and the European Commission.


15

18. Two sides of the same coin: vulnerability is the opposite of resilience. If a project succeeds in reducing vulnerability, it will inevitably build resilience. Resilience, as defined by uNISDR, is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard.

19. Poverty is not a perfect synonym for vulnerability: poorer populations are not systematically the most vulnerable. one example comes from Madagascar, where Toliara is typically the poorest province, but does not exhibit the highest signs of malnutrition. Populations there have traditional dietary practices that contribute positively to nutrition levels elements that escape capture by conventional datasets. Toliarans also consolidate or hide their wealth in ways that escape conventional measures.

20. Vulnerability doesnt just happen. Populations are vulnerable when they are exposed to hazards and do not have the resources (e.g. economic, social capital) to choose a different, less risky livelihood or home. It is a direct outcome of sustained exposure: living or working in places at risk, such as flood plains, camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and sub-standard buildings. They are also considered vulnerable when they live with chronic illness and malnourishment.

21. Hazards affect vulnerable groups differently. This differentiation may be related to such things as ethnic origins, religious beliefs, gender (women and men are exposed and affected differently), age (children and the elderly), social status, revenue, and the location of their home or work (rural versus urban). A fisherman on the sea may be more exposed to storms due to his place of work. A woman with children who will not participate in a timely evacuation without her husbands physical presence is made vulnerable because of her religion and gendered role in the family.

22. Exposure to earthquake, wind, storm surge and tsunami results in an all-ACP average annual loss (AAL) of USD 6.9 billion, or 2.3% of the all-ACP GDP6. These figures do not reflect intangible or hard-to-measure costs such as loss of lives, business interruption, or simply lower yields in agricultural production. In Mozambique, for example, a one-in-10 year drought would lower maize yields and gDP by 6% and 0.3% respectively.

23. Globalised supply chains create new vulnerabilities. global trade, financial markets and supply chains have become increasingly interconnected. When disasters occur in globally integrated economies, the impacts ripple through regional and global supply chains, causing indirect losses to businesses in other parts of the world. As supply chains become globalised, so does the vulnerability of businesses to supply chain disruptions for example, when disasters affect critical production points or distribution links. The interruption of one critical point or link in any ACP region produces regional and global ripples throughout the supply chain.

24. A new wave of urbanisation is unfolding in hazard-exposed countries and, with it, new risks and new opportunities for resilient investment emerge. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by some of the fastest growing countries in the world. The urban population of Africa almost quintupled between 1970 and 2011, from 87 million to 414 million and is expected to reach 744 million by 2030. The Caribbean has a far slower urban growth rate than other regions, but this is only because a very high proportion of its population already lives in urban areas.

2.4 CAPACITY 101

24. The resources available to manage risk and bounce back from a disaster determine capacity. The resources may be manifest, for example, in the institutional (general level of governance and progress of entities mandated to reduce risk) and infrastructural (reliability of communication, healthcare and sanitation/water/road networks to manage an emergency) set-ups in a country7.

25. governance conveys aspects such as transparency and accountability. Public institutions have the mandate to protect and serve communities, and should be held accountable for this. Likewise, when they invest in public activities that prevent or reduce risk of disasters, they should be credited, even when the disasters do not occur. In the Indian ocean region, agents from the Ministries of Finance use a DRM marker to conduct systematic risk-sensitive budget reviews to determine the proportion of investment to be made in DRM thereby producing a baseline that can easily be monitored to demonstrate increasing DRR governance. Similar efforts have been undertaken in the Caribbean and Pacific regions.

26. Capacity to bounce back from a disaster must be built where the impacts are felt most directly at the local level. Local authorities need to be sensitised and empowered and held accountable to protect and guide populations for which they are responsible. It is these people who will be the first to respond when a disaster hits.

27. Coping capacity is not adaptive capacity. Coping is a reflex a survival instinct. It is rarely sustainable or beneficial in the long-term (e.g. diversifying income sources to include more primary forest products, or a farmer selling agricultural land). greater effort is required to identify, encourage and enable strategies at institutional and community levels that build up healthy defences without sacrificing resources for future generations.

28. The ability to bounce back is intricately linked to development. In fact, given the constantly rising levels of economic damage due to disaster in ACP countries (see infographics on hazards), DRR can be recast as reducing

6 uNISDR gAR2015. 7 This is the way the Index for Risk Management (InfoRM) measures capacity.


16

risk to development. Efficient and risk-optimised public investment is crucial as ACP countries accelerate their development.

29. The new paradigm for disaster risk governance includes the private sector. Only half the countries assessing progress in line with the hyogo Framework for Action (hFA) report on active engagement with business on disaster risk management (DRM). Private investment largely determines disaster risk, also in ACP. In low and middle-income economies (such as the Pacific Island Countries of Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New guinea, kiribati, Samoa, Timor-Leste, Tonga and Vanuatu), 70% of overall investment is made by the private sector and is on the rise since 1996 in the lower middle economies8. Recent major disasters, however, highlight the growing impact of disasters on the private sector. Many large global businesses are now strengthening their risk management capacities. Disasters directly affect business performance and undermine longer-term competitiveness and sustainability; when a business closes down following a disaster, it may never reopen. businesses lose their lifelines when critical infrastructure is hit. Most of the 1,300 businesses surveyed in disaster-prone cities in the Caribbean noted disruptions in power, water supply and telecommunication as top concerns. over 90% of damage to these lifelines occurs in local disasters.

30. Tourism investment in small island developing states comes with high levels of disaster risk but also with large potential benefits from investment in disaster risk management (DRM). Attracting investment in tourism development is one of the few areas where island ACP countries are competitive. Six of the top ten countries with the greatest proportion of assets at risk of cyclone wind damage are small islands. The competitiveness of these countries, and the businesses invested in them, will depend on effective disaster risk management through, for example, certification programmes and voluntary rating systems.

31. Evidence abounds that investing in prospective DRR is more cost-effective than responding to emergencies. Although imperfect and necessitating continued support, there is sufficient evidence (with linked strategies and plans) to justify investment in legislation/policy (such as building codes or disaster impact assessments) and, above all, their enforcement (action). Inaction can no longer be blamed on lack of evidence.

32. The ultimate challenge is to make prevention and DRR attractive to investors. In the meantime, many countries are exploring the implementation of a modest levy on risky behaviours or extractive industries linked to natural resources (e.g.. smoking, poaching, mining). Such a levy could provide a useful on-going revenue if directed strictly to DRR, thereby contributing to prevention while relieving aid dependency. If DRR cannot be made attractive, it must at least be made a condition. Public investment decisions should include risk (not just environmental impact) assessment as a requirement for accessing loans and building permits. All investment projects should be required to have a disaster risk assessment as is currently done for environmental assessments. Also, Risk financing efforts such as the global Index Insurance Facility (gIIF9), the Caribbean CCRIF, the Pacific PCRAFI and fledgling efforts in the IoC, should be supported to share the burden of risk.

33. Although scientific/technical and political entities have equally important mandates, science cannot flourish or contribute to risk reduction without political will. bridging this gap means that scientists need support to translate technical information into concise messages (i.e. in clear economic terms), and political actors (as well as legislators and the media) need to be carefully sensitised and regularly reminded of the need to prioritise risk management before disaster management.

8 Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database, http://ppi.worldbank.org/ 9 http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/57e3fd0040b5f934b396b34dfc4fc2d0/Insurance-gIIF-Factsheet-Sept2014.pdf?MoD=AJPERES


17

3.1 oVERALL RISk

Disaster risk in ACP countries is substantially higher than in non-ACP countries. Among the top 20 most at-risk countries in the world (according to the InfoRM, v303 2015), 13 are ACP countries 12 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa and one is in the Caribbean (the highest Pacific island country was ranked 35th out of 191 countries studied10).

high levels of vulnerability and lack of capacity, however, are key features of risk in ACP countries more so than the actual incidence of hazards. Nonetheless, hazards have the greatest impact on vulnerable populations that are ill-prepared to manage risk. Lack of coping capacity in ACP countries is the factor that drives risk highest.

Risk has a very different profile in each region, and cannot be generalised across the ACP countries. overall, Sub-Saharan Africa faces the greatest levels of risk, followed by the Pacific and the Caribbean regions. Risk profiles for all three regions are featured in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The status of the three dimensions of risk (hazard, vulnerability and capacity) is described below, with brief explanations of the various actions underway or completed, to reduce risk in ACP countries. At international level. level, efforts have been set up to make progress towards achieving the five priorities set out in the hyogo Framework for Action (hFA, 2005-2015, see Text box) priorities that are being actively revisited in an intensive series of Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) leading up to the uN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, March 2015, Sendai, Japan.

10 While the InfoRM dataset does not register any data for Cook Islands and Niue, the CRED EM-DAT registers 10 and three disasters for these countries, respectively.

HFA Priority Action 1: Ensure that DRR is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis.

Priority Action 2:Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

Priority Action 3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience.

Priority Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.

Priority Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

hyogo Framework for Action Priorities (2005-15)

3. Risk in ACP regions

MAURITANIA

MALICAPE VERDE

SENEGAL

GAMBIA

GUINEA BISSAU GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

LIBERIA

CTEDIVOIRE

BURKINA FASO

GHANA

TOGO

BENIN

NIGER

NIGERIA

CHAD SUDAN

SOUTH SUDANCENTRALAFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SAO TOME& PRINCIPE GABON

REP. OFTHE

CONGO

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

UGANDA

RWANDA

BURUNDITANZANIA

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

MALAWI

KENYA

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

DJIBOUTI

SEYCHELLES

UNION DES COMORES

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR

ZIMBABWE

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

SOUTH AFRICA

LESOTHO

SWAZILAND

MAURITIUS

ERITREA

LEVEL OF DISASTER RISK -

Risk is higher among ACP countries.See maps for country-level risk index.

hazards are less dominant in ACP countries, but vulnerability is nearly twice as high.

Lack of capacity, however, is the most dominant dimension of risk for all.

InfoRM estimates relative risk using indices, simplifications of reality.

Indices are not absolute values of risk; they are only useful in comparison.

In InfoRM, larger numbers = higher risk. Source: JRC/InfoRM-2015, v303

4.8

4.3

2.9

4.4

5.4

4.3

2.8

8.2

3.4

4.54.9

7.0

4.5

2.4

6.84.6

6.4

3.2

3.2

3.0

4.8

4.8

6.2

3.8

3.6

4.8

4.1

6.75.2

2.95.7

3.7

6.0

6.5

4.1

4.7

2.8

4.38.8

4.2

7.8

7.2

3.9

4.36.4

5.3

4.1

5.1

0.4

oVERALL RISk IN ACP

n hazardsn vulnerabilityn lack of capacity

4.11ACP 2.82 4.63

6.28

3.16Rest of

the World3.45 2.65 4.02

BELIZE

THEBAHAMAS

CUBA

JAMAICA

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

ST. KITTSAND NEVIS

ST. VINCENTAND GRENADINES

TRINIDADAND TOBAGO

HAITI ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

DOMINICA

ST. LUCIA

BARBADOSGRENADA

SURINAME

GUYANA

Belmopan

Havana

Nassau

KingstonPort auPrince

SantoDomingo

Georgetown

Paramaribo

19


3.0

2.2

1.9

2.7

2.4

2.2

3.8

2.5

2.9

6.13.1

2.9

2.91.8

1.9

1.9

NIUE

SAMOA

COOK ISLANDS

NAURU

KIRIBATI

4.7

2.5

2.9

4.8

2.3

2.3

3.13.8

3.1

2.8

--

4.9

4.4

1.5

--

COMPONENTS OF RISK -

Pacific countries are the least exposed to hazards; Caribbean countries are the least vulnerable; and Sub-Saharan Africa ranks riskiest on all three components.

The shape of risk is very different in each sub-region, and averages should be used with caution.

Regional averages mask wide variation.

n hazardsn vulnerabilityn lack of capacity

1.70

4.44

6.33

PACIFICAVERAGE

2.41 2.25

4.30

CARIBBEANAVERAGE

3.25

5.45

6.92

AFRICANAVERAGE


20

in ACP

3.2.1What we knowACP confronts a panorama of hazards. Eleven different hazard types are registered as disaster events in CREDs Emergency Database (EM-DAT, see right.). While Sub-Saharan Africa faces all 11 types, the Caribbean countries have not registered any tsunamis since 198011, the Pacific countries do not register extreme temperatures, and neither region registers insect infestations as a disaster event.

Since 1980, ACP countries have confronted 2,566 disaster events (see Infographic: hazards in ACP). The hazards that have resulted in disasters most frequently in ACP countries, as a whole, are hydrological (N=870 floods, all types combined), biological (N=764 epidemics) and atmospheric (N=455 storms12). See Figure 4.

one measure of the intensity of a disaster event is the number of lives lost13. Nearly one million lives have been lost in these events in ACP countries since 1980. The disasters that have claimed the most lives in ACP countries as a whole are drought (N= 576,141 mainly during the 1980s horn of Africa crisis), earthquake (N= 223,136 the vast majority linked to the 2010 haiti event) and epidemics (N= 150,905). This ranking of proportional frequency has not evolved over the decades.

11 Although earthquakes drive them, tsunamis are separated from earthquakes in this study. EM-DAT, InfoRM, uNISDR and others uphold this separation. Tsunamis in the Caribbean occur but have not been registered in EM-DAT. The last recorded has been in haiti, provoked by the 2010 earthquake. The most important in terms of damage and lost lives was in 1946 in Samana, Domincan Republic, killing approximately 2000 people.

12 Storms here refers to the set of atmospheric phenomena from depressions to storms to tropical cyclones also known under the names of hurricanes and typhoons. The focus in this study is on their impact, rather than on their maximum sustained speeds.

13 The number of lives lost is often considered an unfair measure for multiple reasons. In small countries and small islands developing states (all but two recognised SIDS, Maldives and Singapore, are ACP member states; 45% of ACP member states are SIDS), the proportion of lives lost (deaths divided by total population) better reflects the volume of impact. Also, use of lives lost tends to magnify intensive disasters, rather than the increasingly worrying phenomenon of extensive disasters. Finally, although a growing number of people believe the contrary, it is considered unethical to put a value on lives lost - thereby making this measure hard to convert to the true value of loss (beyond damage to tangible assets).

3.2 hAZARDS

hazards confronted in ACP countries (no order):

Drought Earthquake

Tsunami Epidemic

Extreme temperature

Flood

Insect infestation

Mass movement landslide

Storm Volcano

Strong winds

Wildfire

Storm surge


21

Figure 5 portrays temporal trends from 1980 to 2013 for the ACP countries, all hazards included. While the number of events is charted in the shaded areas, fatalities are portrayed as bars in the foreground. Although the number of annual events appears to be decreasing since 2006, each decade since 1980 registers a rising number of events for each region (see Infographic).

In addition to lives lost, another measure of hazard intensity is impact in terms of economic damage. Although known to be underestimated14, a minimum of uSD 449.13 billion has been lost in registered damage due to these events the equivalent of uSD 13.6 billion each year. Furthermore, there is a clear trend of increasing economic loss over the decades. Even when normalised to compensate for rising wealth, this trend is sustained that is, the increasing exposure of people (affected) and economic assets (lost or damaged) is the major cause of increasing trends in disaster impacts15.

14 The gAR 2013 estimates that up to 50% of the value of damage to assets goes unreported to global datasets.15 hans Visser, h. Petersen, A.C. and Ligtvoet, W. 2014. on the relation between weather-related disaster impacts, vulnerability and climate change.

Climate Change. 125:461477.

Figure 4: MOST FREQUENT DISASTER EVENTS IN ACP (1980-2013)-

Flood

34%Epidemic

30%Storm

18%Drought

10%Earthquake

2%

Insect infestation

2%Wildfire

1.5%Volcano

1.5%Tsunami

0.75%

others

0.25%

Figure 5: TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND FATALITIES IN ACP (1980-2013)-

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

15.000 300

250

200

150

100

50

0

229.812

12.000

9.000

6.000

3.000

0

FATALITIES EVENTS

n Total ACPn Sub-Saharan African Caribbeann Pacific

MAURITANIA

MALICAPE VERDE

SENEGAL

GAMBIA

GUINEA BISSAU GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

LIBERIA

CTEDIVOIRE

BURKINA FASO

GHANA

TOGO

BENIN

NIGER

NIGERIA

CHAD SUDAN

SOUTH SUDANCENTRALAFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SAO TOME& PRINCIPE GABON

REP. OFTHE

CONGO

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

UGANDA

RWANDA

BURUNDITANZANIA

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

MALAWI

KENYA

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

DJIBOUTI

SEYCHELLES

UNION DES COMORES

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR

ZIMBABWE

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

SOUTH AFRICA

LESOTHO

SWAZILAND

MAURITIUS

ERITREA

1.4

1.1

1.0

5.4

4.5

0.5

2.12.8

5.3

1.5

2.2

3.9

2.3

2.3

0.9

1.4

3.4

2.7

3.1

2.6

2.14.6

1.5

0.9

1.6

1.9

6.0

3.44.4

1.9

3.52.0

3.4

3.6

1.9

6.8

1.6

2.2

8.6

4.3

7.0

7.3

7.8

2.1

6.2

4.0

5.8

0.0

3.7 TEMPORAL TRENDS-

While the number of events and cost of damage has risen each decade, the number of fatalities decreased regularly -until the 2010 haiti earthquake.

Because it is very delicate to put a value on a life lost, comparing fatality with damage is a DRR challenge

HAZARD PROFILES -

ACP countries do not have more disasters, they are just less prepared to confront them.

overall, natural hazards are more prominent than human hazards. See maps for overall hazard index.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, human hazards are currently more important than natural hazards.

Hazards can be natural (earthquakes, drought, flooding, etc.) or human (conflict and violence),

To provide a just comparison, the hazard index applies an arithmetic average of absolute (favoring populated countries and relative (favoring small islands) numbers of people exposed to each hazard. Sources: JRC/InfoRM-2015, v303 and EM-DAT: International Disaster Database www.emdat.be Universit Catholique de Louvain Brussels Belgium. D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, Ph. Hoyois.

NATURALHAZARDS

HUMANHAZARDS

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2.70 3.08

CARIBBEAN 3.95 2.97

PACIFIC 2.89 2.48

Rest of the World3.90

Rest of the World2.63

2.99ACP

2.23ACP

TIMELINE OF TOP-10 DISASTERS ACROSS ACP-

- 1980-1990-585.404 Fatalities

- 1990-1999-75.412 Fatalities

- 2000-2009-66.077 Fatalities

- 2010-2013-261.761 Fatalities

386 Disaster Events

17.5 billion USD damage

593 Disaster Events

1.212 Disaster Events

376 Disaster Events11.1 billion USD damage

10.3 billion USD damage

1983SUDAN

Drought 150.000 killed

2010HAITI

Earthquake 222.570 killed

1988ST LUCIA

Cyclone Gilbert uSD 1 billion in damage

SAMOAForest Fire uSD 32 m in damage

1986CAMEROON

Volcano 1.746 killed

1996BURKINA

FASOEpidemic

4.071 killed

1998ST KITTS

AND NEVIS Cyclone Georges

uSD 400m in damage

2005GUYANA

Flood uSD 465 m in damage

1997SOMALIA

Flood 2.311 killed

2009SAMOATsunami

uSD 150m in damage

6 billion USD damage

hAZARDS IN ACP

NIUE

SAMOA

COOK ISLANDS

NAURU

KIRIBATI

BELIZE

THEBAHAMAS

CUBA

JAMAICA

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

ST. KITTSAND NEVIS

ST. VINCENTAND GRENADINES

TRINIDADAND TOBAGO

HAITI ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

DOMINICA

ST. LUCIA

BARBADOSGRENADA

SURINAME

GUYANA

Belmopan

Havana

Nassau

KingstonPort auPrince

SantoDomingo

Georgetown

Paramaribo

1.20.3

0.6

0.1

0.7

0.8

1.2

1.5

3.0

2.8

2.6

3.1 --4.2

--

23


MOST FREQUENT HAZARDS

2,566 events 1. Flooding 2. Epidemic 3. Storm

1. Storm 2. Earthquake 3. Flooding

MOST COSTLY HAZARDS

USD 44.9 billion

1. Drought 2. Earthquake 3. Epidemic

MOST DEADLY HAZARDS

988,654 killed

HAZARD IMPACTS -

Storms have been the most costly, but drought the most deadly and flooding the most frequent disasters (see figure).

Storm includes tropical cyclones; they can cause disasters even before they become cyclones (at maximum sustained wind speeds of 119 km/h).

2.5

1.9

1.6

3.4

2.8

1.2

1.8

1.4

5.03.4

3.0

2.70.9

0.6

1.3

5.0


24

3.2.2What ACP countries are doingMany efforts have been made to confront hazards and prevent them from becoming disasters. Two categories of effort deal directly with hazards (not to be confused with actions that reduce vulnerability or exposure, discussed further below16). While the first aims to understand and monitor the hazards, the second type of effort tries to physically limit their paths.

The first category involves understanding the hazards and their behaviour, past and present. This type of action responds to the hFA Priority Action 2: identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. It is considered a starting point for reducing disaster risk because the knowledge of the hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities across ACP countries (and the ways they may be evolving) should point the way to appropriate action (See Sidebar on Risk Identification). This type of effort has been the main feature of DRR since the hFA was articulated, and our knowledge of hazard behaviour in the ACP region has increased by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Several types of Risk Assessments have been supported by the Intra-ACP cooperation, among others, through the ACP-Eu Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Programme (ACP-Eu NDRR), for example, in the Caribbean region, Lesotho, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and the Indian ocean.

The second category of effort dealing directly with hazards is typically classified as disaster prevention: efforts that aim to keep natural phenomena physically at a distance from communities - in other words, altering, or at least controlling, the path of a hazard. The most well known example is watershed and river management for the flood hazard. Few other hazards lend themselves to this type of action; we cannot push a cyclone onto another course, or displace a volcano. After the 2010 earthquake in haiti, for example, the physical environment was an entry point for investment in DRR. In the Dpartement du Sud, eco-DRR efforts targeted reforestation upstream and the physical reinforcement (retro-fitting retaining walls to new standards) of riverbanks downstream to contain waters, thereby lessening the likelihood that floodwaters would reach communities. Another example is in Mozambique, where the rehabilitation and protection of coastal areas is intended to reduce beach erosion, and hence improve the capacity of these ecosystems to act as buffers against tropical cyclones. In barbados, the boardwalk built in bridgetown South Coast is a major engineering feat that helps to stabilise the beaches and protect urban areas. In the Pacific, discussions abound about using traditional plants to help defend against rising seas.

An accompaniment to risk identification is more general risk knowledge management. Technology has made the sharing of knowledge increasingly easy, and ACP countries are standing up to the challenge to share their knowledge, make data available to their publics and use technology to the advantage of risk management. The Risk knowledge Management Side bar highlights some of the positive achievements made across ACP regions.

16 An intervention that strengthens buildings resistance to storms, for example, would be described under the category of vulnerability, because that resistance reduces exposure to the storms. In this section, only actions that directly target the hazards path or help to better understand its behaviour are discussed here.


25

17 Dilley, M, 2005.Natural Disaster hotspots: A global Risk Analysis. Disaster Risk Management Series Number 5. World bank. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1100_hotspots.pdf

Risk identification comprises all efforts to understand the science behind hazard behaviour, vulnerability and the capacity of a unit. Starting with data, it may entail simple mapping, indices and complex modelling before producing profiles and engaging in on-going monitoring. Each of these elements is described below:

Event data: global datasets have existed since at least 1988 to archive and monitor disaster events; the most well known of these are CREDs EM-DAT1 (http://www.emdat.be/database/) and DESINVENTAR2 (http://www.desinventar.org/).

Exposure data: To be able to assess the impact of disasters, it is crucial to have an inventory of what was in place before a disaster occurred people, and the quantities and qualities of buildings/infrastructure and ecosystems that are exposed to the hazard. Exposure databases across the world are being refined using, for example, high-resolution satellite imagery.

Risk Mapping: on the basis of these and various modelling, indexing and analysis tools, and merging disaster events with socio-economic and impact data, the global understanding of disaster risk has increased exponentially. one of the first global map products on risk, named Natural Disaster hotspots17 was produced in 2005 ; dozens have been proposed since by many different actors with many different perspectives, geographic Information System (gIS) techniques and sets of hazards.

Risk Indices: Decision makers need regularly updated risk information at country level, for example, to plan and strategise. A compelling way to package a wealth of information is to produce an index, combining many indicators. In 2007, a global Focus Model (gFM)1 emerged from oChAs Asia-Pacific region a risk model to track hazards, vulnerabilities and response capacity at the country-level using a range of quantitative indicators. In November 2014 the Index for Risk Management (InfoRM) was launched as an offshoot of the gFM. Most of the risk concepts and profiles described in this ACP Compendium are grounded in data from InfoRM.

Risk Modelling: During the same period, uNEP/gRID (global Risk Data Platform, International Centre for geohazards), global Seismic hazard Assessment Programme (gShAP, and LandScan), IPCC and others were exploring and compiling data on physical characteristics on land, sea and air that combine to produce, trigger or exacerbate hazards. Rather than archiving the events after they have happened, they aim to estimate risk in advance (these are also inputs for both the InfoRM and the uNISDR probabilistic models).

Meanwhile, uNISDR has joined in the quest for the best risk indicators by mainstreaming probabilistic modelling. using this latest generation of risk analysis first featured in the global Assessment of Risk (gAR) 2011 uNISDR estimates average annual loss probable maximum loss (PML) for four hazards worldwide (earthquakes, cyclonic wind, storm surge and tsunami). Work is on-going to improve the resolution of both disaster event (adding more extensive disasters) and asset (exposure) databases, at national and sub-national levels (see Case Study, IoC Disaster Financing). better data will make the probabilistic estimates more precise, reliable and insightful. As one example, this is the focus of the Intra-ACP Cooperation under the building Disaster Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa Programme.

Risk assessment: Many of the above elements are combined to produce risk profiles. State of the art risk assessments are being designed and used for very different purposes, ranging from awareness raising to indexed insurance (see Table 1 in Chapter 2.1).

Risk monitoring: once hazards are better understood with baseline data, such as those described above, they need to be monitored. The role of early warning systems is described in Chapter 4 on Africa (see Disaster Preparedness and Earth observation and CEWS Case Studies). The role that Needs Assessment plays in helping to further track risk after an event is described in a PDNA Case Study.

1 Since 1988 the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium) has been managing the Emergency Events Database EM-DAT. It is an initiative aimed at rationalising humanitarian action and decision making for disaster preparedness, as well as providing an objective base for priority setting. EM-DAT contains essential core data on over 18,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to present, compiled from a variety of sources.

2 From 1994, the creation of a methodological framework started at the Network of Social Studies in the Prevention of Disasters in Latin America (LA RED). They conceptualised a system to track disasters of various impacts based on pre-existing data, newspaper sources and institutional reports in nine countries in Latin America (with many additional countries since). The developed software tool is known as DESINVENTAR (disaster inventory).

Side bar 1:

RISk IDENTIFICATIoN


26

Portals exist and are improving at every level and every region to manage the mass of risk knowledge produced daily in ACP regions. A few are described below.

ACP: The Land Resource Management unit of the European Commissions Joint Research Centre (JRC) has set up an online ACP observatory (http://acpobservatory.jrc.European Commission.europa.eu/). The interface is a single interactive web-portal giving access to all the information available in the JRC in different thematic areas. Although many themes are covered (soil, forest, dry lands, agriculture, biodiversity, rangelands), this central repository of expertise, experience and effort holds promise to positively enhance ACP management of knowledge for disasters across the ACP territory. Information includes reference maps, indicators, and specific analyses linked to DRR, and can be enhanced to add specific foci and efforts from each region.

Sub-Saharan Africa: An Information Management System is being constructed by the SADC to give member states access to information, including: for each country, the national institutions for DRR will be listed; disaster risk/hazard profiles will be made available, including the identification of the main hazards for each country and the areas that are mainly affected; the data dissemination service will be in two parts, one to provide gIS baseline datasets and map layers, and another for data used for monitoring and prediction; the information exchange service for current hazards and risks will consist of a web platform, which allows documentation of current hazards and risks that will enhance awareness of DRR information and participation of various stakeholders in assessments of hazards and risks; the mapping and discovery service for DRR activities and projects in the region would show previous and on-going projects or activities that are being carried out in the region, basically answering the question who is doing what where? or who did what where?; the disaster statistics service will offer the capacity to record, analyse, summarise and disseminate statistical information on disaster occurrence, impacts and losses; finally, the knowledge management service is aimed at knowledge sharing, education and training.

Caribbean: the DEWETRA platform promotes Information technology for assessment and prediction, and will enhance on-going efforts to improve early warning systems, enhance DRR/CCA measures and provides Caribbean National Disaster Management Associations (NDMAs) with technical support to strengthen their planning and operations.

Pacific: The Pacific Disaster Net (http://www.pacificdisaster.net /) is the Virtual Centre of Excellence for DRM in the Pacific Region. In-country training missions in the use of the portal have been organised to Samoa, Solomon Islands and Fiji. The Web Portal and Database System is the largest and most comprehensive information resource, a living and growing collection of DRM information for actors and stakeholders engaging in research, assessment, proposal writing and collaboration. It also supports national action planning, decision making and provides in-country information for distribution within the region. It hosts material from various sources: countries, bodies, organisations and agencies at regional, national and international level.

Side bar 2:

DRR kNoWLEDgE PoRTALS


27

in ACP

3.3.1What we knowACP countries are considered highly vulnerable. The InfoRM vulnerability index scores the ensemble of ACP countries nearly twice as high as non-ACP countries (4.63 compared to 2.65). Vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa is more than twice as high as in the Caribbean ACP states. The Pacific falls between the two, but has considerably lower vulnerability than Sub-Saharan Africa.

Socio-economic factors strongly influence ACP vulnerability the most noteworthy factor overall being inequality, such as between genders and economic classes. This is the element that contributes most to Caribbean vulnerability. Caribbean inequality can be explained partially by wide differences within the sub-region18 (haiti, has an inequality index of 8.3, guyana trails close behind at 7.0, compared to Trinidad with 4.3 and bahamas with 4.2). In addition, there is a major societal trend in the sub-region towards a high number of families headed by females, who tend to be more vulnerable due to such factors as disparities in income, access to the labour market, and property ownership.

The second most important influence on ACP vulnerability is development and deprivation. Sub-Saharan Africa is still the least economically developed of the regions, and has the greatest prevalence of poverty. The presence of vulnerable grou

acp compendium of risk knowledge

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