a close encounter of the worst kind? the logic of situated actors and the statue crisis between...
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A Close Encounter of The WorstKind? The Logic of SituatedActors and the Statue CrisisBetween Estonia and RussiaHiski HaukkalaPublished online: 30 Sep 2010.
To cite this article: Hiski Haukkala (2009) A Close Encounter of The Worst Kind? TheLogic of Situated Actors and the Statue Crisis Between Estonia and Russia, Journal ofBaltic Studies, 40:2, 201-213, DOI: 10.1080/01629770902884250
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Journal of Baltic Studies
Vol. 40, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 201–213
A CLOSE ENCOUNTER OF THE WORST
KIND? THE LOGIC OF SITUATED ACTORS
AND THE STATUE CRISIS BETWEEN
ESTONIA AND RUSSIA
Hiski Haukkala
The article argues for the need to develop more multicausal accounts ofinternational relations. It uses the Estonian–Russian political crisis over therelocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in 2007 as a case in point, showinghow the ideational, material and institutional structures within the widerinternational society interact. As such, even cases with clear identity-politicalroot causes can benefit from other factors being inserted into the equation whenit comes to analysis. The article concludes by arguing that it is only by embracingmulticausality that our chances of arriving at fuller and consequently moretruthlike accounts of the events out there are improved.
Keywords: international relations; international relations theory; internationalinstitutionalization; Baltic studies; Estonia; Russia; EU–Russia relations
Introduction
In recent years identity-based approaches have become commonplace in the study ofinternational relations (IR). This is in line with the so-called linguistic turn in the
social sciences, where narratives and other discursive structures have increasingly beenseen as constituting the very bedrock of human social reality. In IR these ideas havebecome crystallized in the form of a constructivist research program that has gained inprominence especially during the post-Cold War era.1
It should be noted at the outset that there is nothing wrong with pursuing this lineof investigation per se. For example, it seems evident that the current complexities ofBaltic–Russian relations are a case in point concerning the strong power and hold that
Correspondence to: Hiski Haukkala, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Policy Planning and Research,
P.O. Box 412, FI-00023 Government, Finland. Email: [email protected]
ISSN 0162-9778 (print)/ISSN 1751-7877 (online) � 2009 Journal of Baltic Studies
DOI: 10.1080/01629770902884250
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memory, history and identities have on people and even on state-to-state interaction(see Smith 2008, Lehti et al. 2008 and the contributions in Berg & Ehin 2009). Thisarticle nevertheless argues that identities are not the be all and end all when it comesto the study of social interaction. What follows should not be construed as a scathingattack against identity-based explanations,2 for identities – or worldviews or belief-systems – obviously matter a great deal. At the same time, however, we mustacknowledge that the independent explanatory power of identity-based accounts hasits limits (see Legro 2005, p. 21).
In sum, while ideational factors are important in framing our perceptionsconcerning the world around us, people are not always free to act upon and enacttheir identities. In the classic words of Karl Marx (1852) ‘men make their own history,but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selectedcircumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted fromthe past’. These circumstances include not only what can be called the ideationalstructure of the international society, that is to say the identities of other actors andtheir interaction. In fact, all actors are caught in the middle of a multitude of socialstructures, of which identity is only one. In addition, the material and institutionalstructures of the international society should also be taken into consideration if wehope to arrive at richer and more truthlike accounts of international relations.
This article seeks to bring all these structures into play by arguing that we needto have a broader understanding of identities and the actors that harbor them byenvisaging them as situated actors at the crosshairs of ideational, material andinstitutional structures. In short, we need to seek more multifaceted, essentiallymulticausal understandings of the issues at stake. Admittedly, in recent years calls fortheoretical synthesis and bridge-building have multiplied (see, for example, Fearon &Wendt 2002). At the same time, empirical works that have sought to put theseprinciples to use have been relatively few and far between (one of the most interestingexceptions to this rule has been Legro 2005). It is this shortcoming in the presentliterature that the article at hand seeks for its part to ameliorate.
The article uses the statue crisis between Estonia and Russia in April–May 2007 asa case for discussion. The case can be seen as of high relevance in the present contextin two important respects. First, the course and the eventual outcome of eventsindicate that taken alone monocausal accounts do not give a full enough picture of theissues at stake. For example, although identity-related factors enable us to understandthe contentiousness of the Bronze Soldier to begin with, they do not help us to fathomthe actual conflict between Estonia and Russia over the issue. But neither will a cruderealist power analysis suffice, for – especially if conducted in isolation from widerinstitutional structures in contemporary Europe – it only leads to profound bafflementover Russia’s relative impotence in reaching its goals vis-a-vis Estonia. Indeed, it is onlyby focusing on the wider institutional dynamics at play that we can arrive at a fullerunderstanding of the events; during the crisis these dynamics acted as an interveningvariable, effectively balancing the odds between the two conflicting parties in Estonia’sfavor. Secondly, the crisis can be seen as having potential future ramifications,especially when it comes to the role of (Western) European institutionalizedstructures and the political solidarity upon which the Baltic and wider northernEuropean member states of the EU can currently draw. In essence, if the events are
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seen as a Russian attempt at eroding the essential solidarity of Western institutions,then the row over the Bronze soldier can be seen as a potential harbinger of futureclashes of a similar kind.
The argument will be developed in three parts. Before entering the empiricaldiscussion, a few words about the need for multicausality and the role of situatedactors in the study of IR are required. This is then followed by a multicausal analysis ofthe statue crisis between Estonia and Russia. The article ends with some conclusionsthat also try to sketch out the potential future relevance of the crisis for the widerBaltic region.
Truthlikeness and Multicausality in the Study of IR
The starting point for our discussion must be that not every theory, conceptualframework or explanatory narrative is equally valid. As Vasquez (1995, pp. 225�6)has noted, empirically we know enough about the world already to conclude that ‘notevery imaginative narrative’ can be imposed upon it. To him, ‘[T]he word ‘‘reality’’refers to this resistance of the world to conform to every imaginable conceptionshumans create [sic]’. Although the concepts we use do to a degree construct a worldaround us, we need not remain prisoners of this world but can ‘reject concepts onsome basis other than whim or personal taste’ (Vasquez 1995, pp. 225�6). Thisnotion seriously challenges the Kuhnian idea of incommensurability between rivalparadigms that has traditionally been seen almost as a formal proof against thepossibility of ranking theories in terms of their relation with a notion of truth (seeWight 1996; for a formal proof that Kuhn in fact got it wrong with his thesis, seeHintikka 1988). Although it is quite probable that at least in social sciences we willnever be able to arrive safely at the truth with a capital T, a somewhat more forgivingand hopeful way exists of embracing (critical) scientific realism by accepting thattheories do indeed differ in terms of how well they capture their referent object(reality, which actually exists), i.e. what is their degree of truthlikeness in light ofother theories and the reality they are all purportedly supposed to be examining (seeNiiniluoto 1999). The key here is to accept that although theories and their conceptualviews of the world may and often do radically vary, they are still essentially attempts atfathoming the same single world; hence allowing for that very world to resist ourattempts at forcing it into our pre-determined theoretical categories.
This is a difficult subject that we can hardly hope to settle in a short article, theessential gist of which lies elsewhere (for a more detailed discussion of the issues atstake, see Haukkala forthcoming). Instead, we may proceed by way of noting that wemay increase our chances of having more truthlike accounts of the phenomena we areinterested in by making our theoretical frameworks and empirical templates morerealistic, i.e. by helping them to capture larger slices of the causal forces at playbehind the events in question. One should, however, point out that we are not talkingabout overdetermination on this occasion: traditionally political scientists and IRscholars have preferred parsimony, urging scholars to use the minimum number ofvariables that is required to arrive at a satisfactory explanation. Although in principle
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the ideal of parsimony has a lot to commend it, it does come at the cost of leavingparts of some cases unexplained while others have to be forced to fit within thetheoretical categories (Jervis 2001, p. 391). It is obvious that an overly parsimoniousapproach is ill-suited to the building of multicausal models of international relations.At the same time, we must be clear about the essential difference betweenoverdetermination and multicausality. Quoting Levy (2001, p. 57, emphasis added):
It is important to note that overdetermined explanations are not equivalent tomulticausal explanations. In overdetermined explanations, there are severalfactors, or sets of factors, that are individually sufficient for an outcome. Inmulticausal explanations, a set of factors may be jointly sufficient for a particularoutcome. The two are not the same.
A useful way of arriving at multicausal understandings of the issues at stake is to viewthe very actors at play as situated actors. According to Hay (1995, p. 190), a situatedactor is an intentional agent that is located in a structured social context that definesthe range of the agent’s potential actions. For present purposes, we may note that theideas informing the intentions of any given actor stem from the identity of that actor.Having said this, it is important to bear in mind that these ideas do not operate ina vacuum. Instead they are conditioned by a wider social structure that can be calledthe constitution of the international society. Any constitution has two interlockingdimensions. First, it has a normative component that captures the rules and normsthat are crystallizing in certain institutionalized practices. Since the Peace ofWestphalia, the Grundnorm in this respect has been sovereignty, the precise content ofwhich has, however, significantly varied over time (Barkin 1998; Krasner 1995/96;Haukkala 2008). But there is also another material structure of the internationalsociety that we must take an interest in. Keohane (1984, p. 132) has argued thatalthough ideational phenomena are important, ‘a structural analysis of con-straints . . . [is] necessary to put the phenomenon of actor cognition into its properpolitical context’.
In the following, an attempt to show how the different structures relate to eachother in actual fact is made. This is done by turning to the actual empirical case to bestudied on this occasion: the intense political crisis between Estonia and Russia inApril–May 2007. In this article we will use process tracing to tease out the differentfactors at play, while casting nets that allow us to gauge the potential widersignificance of the events as well. Process tracing has been found to be useful inbringing together multiple types of evidence in the verification of a single inference(Gerring 2007, p. 173). For present purposes this means that by reconstructing theevents prior, during, and even after the relocation of the monument in Tallinn in lateApril 2007, we can use different levels of analysis and combine them into a singlemulticausal account of the case in question.
The Political Crisis over the Bronze Soldier in Spring 2007
At first sight the row over the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue in April 2007 isa classic case of identity politics.3 It can be seen as a struggle for who has the right to
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tell the legitimate and authoritative story concerning the events in Estonia during andafter the Second World War. Very briefly, at least three different narratives andidentity-markers can be discerned. For many native Estonians the Bronze Soldiererected by Stalin in 1947 to commemorate the Red Army soldiers killed in the‘liberation’ of Estonia was a symbol of Soviet repression; for many ethnic Russians inEstonia it has increasingly become a marker for their own unique identity incontemporary Estonia; and for the Russian state and Russians living in Russia it stillremains a potent symbol of the sacrifices made and hardships endured during the‘Great Patriotic War’ in the name of ridding not only Russia but the whole world ofthe scourge of fascism (Ehala 2009). Therefore, the role of history and identity cannotby any means be discounted in the events that took place in Tallinn. In fact, it was theinherent incompatibility of these narratives that resulted in a tense political situationthat erupted in violent street clashes in Tallinn and the consequent political crisisbetween Estonia and Russia over the relocation of the monument in April–May 2007.
Although the identity prism will definitely help us to fathom why the crisiserupted and why the Bronze Soldier proved to be such a potent object of contentionin this respect, it does not help us to understand why the events unfolded in the waythat they did. More importantly, it does not answer the question concerning perhapsone of the most striking aspects of the events: despite all its sound and fury, Moscowin effect failed to achieve any of its objectives concerning the crisis.
In this respect, Moscow’s aims can be divided into two groups: those precedingthe relocation of the monument and those following it. Prior to the relocation of thestatue, Moscow was seeking to prevent it from happening in the first place. Already inearly April Vice-Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov urged ordinary Russians to sanctionTallinn by boycotting Estonian goods in shops. In addition, Russia also issued anofficial diplomatic note protesting against the plans for relocating the monument.None of these moves proved to be particularly effective and the statue was dulyrelocated on the night of 27 April 2007 – an event that sparked off several nights ofviolent riots by ethnically Russian youngsters on the streets of Tallinn.4
After the event Russian objectives seemed to be two-fold. First, Russia clearlysought to put political pressure directly on the Estonian government. It is also possiblethat Russia used the occasion to aggravate further the ethnic tensions within Estoniansociety.5 This was manifested primarily by means of a toughening rhetoric that was attimes border-line hysterical.6 For example, Russian Foreign Ministry spokespersonMikhail Kamynin called the relocation of the statue ‘blasphemous and inhuman’(Blomfield 2007) while the representatives of the Russian Duma who had arrived inTallinn to assess the situation called for the immediate resignation of the Estoniangovernment. The highest echelons of power in Russia also reacted to the events. TheForeign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the Estonian government’s ‘blasphemousattitude towards the memory of those who struggled against fascism’ (Blomfield2007). Equally President Vladimir Putin voiced his grave concerns over the events inTallinn. Finally, the Federation Council joined the fray, voting to sever diplomatic tieswith Estonia – a resolution that did, however, go unheeded by the Russian presidentand government.7
In addition to rhetoric, Russia also started to apply a series of measures that canbe understood as sanctions, although officially Russia did not announce that it was
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applying sanctions against Estonia. For example, in early May Russia imposedtemporary restrictions on railroad transport as well as petroleum products and coaldeliveries to Estonia. Officially, only technical and commercial reasons for thesemeasures were cited. Yet, as Leonard and Popescu (2007, p. 15) have argued, using‘technical’ standards and problems as political weapons in bilateral relationsincreasingly seems to be a foreign policy instrument of choice for the Kremlin.Other less conventional forms of pressure were also applied. Of special significance inthis respect is the free rein given to the pro-Putin youth movement Nashi to harass theEstonian Embassy and its staff in Moscow through continued verbal and physicalintimidation and street protests. In addition, and perhaps more worryingly, theinternet servers of the Estonian government and other public actors (such as the mostinfluential daily, Postimees) were subjected to intensive, protracted and concentratedcyber attacks from Russia. Although the Russian government was never officiallyincriminated in the attacks, the consensus seems to be that the attack was at leastpartly orchestrated by Russia itself.8
Secondly, Russia also sought to internationalize the events, clearly seeking toisolate Estonia from its Western partners in the European Union and NATO (Socor2007).9 Here a case in point is the letter by Foreign Minister Lavrov that was sent toall of Estonia’s EU partners in early May. In the letter Lavrov expressed indignationover EU member states’ unconditional support and toleration for Estonia’s actions inrelocating the monument. For Russia, Tallinn’s antics amounted to no less than‘equaling the heroism of soldier-liberators and the crimes of Nazis and their henchmen. . . [and] attempting to rewrite history and reinterpret the role of the anti-Hitlercoalition in the victory over fascism in World War Two’. He also said that the eventsin Tallinn had been condemned by all levels of Russian society and warned that theymight have wider ramifications, influencing Russia’s relations in a serious way not onlywith Estonia but with the European Union and NATO as well.10
Despite these well-articulated aims and considerable effort Russia failed in itsendeavors – the aggravation of internal tensions being perhaps a partial exception here(for a discussion, see Bruggemann and Kasekamp 2009). Despite Moscow’s earlyprotestations, the statue was relocated and, despite political and economic pressure,the Estonian government refused to amend its domestic policies or resign, asdemanded by certain Russian officials. And despite attempts at internationalizing thesituation in the hope of isolating Estonia from its Western partners, the solidaritytowards Estonia only became more intense. Here one should note how the rather rashapplication of sanctions discussed above in fact managed to galvanize support forTallinn in the west (see below).
Russia’s relative impotence in the face of tiny Estonia requires explanation in itsown right. This is especially so if one examines the events in isolation from the widerinstitutionalized setting in Europe. If the bilateral identity dynamics briefly touchedupon above account for the negative dynamics between Estonia and Russia, thenbilateral power dynamics give us a priori grounds to expect that Russia should haveprevailed in the crisis. Although serious power analysis is always a rather delicatematter (for a discussion see, for example, Baldwin 2002), as our starting point we canprovide just a few illustrative figures that portray the drastic asymmetries betweenEstonia and Russia: the population of Russia is 140 million, the population of Estonia
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1.5 million (of which approximately 25% are ethnic Russians); economically Estonia isheavily dependent on Russia, with 100% of natural gas and almost all of its oil comingfrom the country; and finally, militarily Russia would have had no problems inoverwhelming Estonia: the Russian troops located in the immediate vicinity would inthemselves have been more than sufficient to paralyse the 20,000-strong Estonianarmed forces. (For more about these figures, see Gelb 2007 and International Institutefor Strategic Studies 2007, pp. 109–10 and 195–205.)
The fact that military power could have played a role in the crisis is not as fantasticas it might seem at first sight. First, at the official doctrinal level Russia had groundsfor applying military force against Estonia. In the Russian official debate the debacleand especially the handling of the riots by the Estonian authorities was represented as aserious infringement of the rights of ethnic Russians in Estonia. The current militarydoctrine from 2000 unambiguously states how the discrimination and the suppressionof the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of the citizens of the RussianFederation in foreign states is a legitimate external threat for Russia that can becountered with the use of armed force, if necessary (Voyennaya Doktrina RossiiskoiFederatsii 2000). Second, Russia’s track record in similar political crises with its otherneighbors has shown that Moscow does not shy away from threatening with, and attimes even applying, military power in order to beef up its position. For example, theconflicts with Georgia in 2006 and 2008 over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and withUkraine over territorial claims on the Sea of Azov in 2005 have shown as much.
But why did Russia fail to reach its objectives? In order to understand Russia’s lackof success in the crisis, we must turn our attention to the last of the causal dynamics atplay – that of institutional factors in Europe and indeed the wider West. Here we maynote that from the outset Russia was severely constrained by the fact that during thepost-Cold War era Estonia has, together with other Baltic states, been brought underthe umbrella of Western multilateral institutions. Of special significance in this respectare the memberships Estonia secured in NATO and the European Union in 2004.
Indeed, after some initial hesitation all of the main Western players unequivocallycame to Estonia’s side in the crisis. A triggering factor here was the ill-advisedpicketing of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow by Nashi and the clear breaches ofVienna Convention concerning diplomatic relations that ensued, already alluded toabove. For example, NATO issued a statement according to which the events inMoscow were deemed ‘unacceptable, and must be stopped immediately’ (NATO2007). In a similar vein, Germany as EU President, as well as the EuropeanCommission, urged Russia to heed its international obligations and to refrain fromescalating the crisis further (see Lobjakas 2007). The USA also voiced its concerns,clearly putting the onus on handling the crisis in a constructive way squarely on Russia(Department of State 2007).
It seems clear that at least on this occasion Estonia’s membership of NATO andthe EU helped to foster a degree of institutional solidarity that clearly affected Russia’sroom for maneuver in the crisis. This has always been the West’s intention, of course.In addition to fostering common values and reaping economic benefits, geopoliticalconsiderations have also played a role in the enlargement of the EU and NATO. Forexample, Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, p. 332) have argued that the United States inparticular has been keen to make sure that there is no power vacuum in Central and
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Eastern Europe that might entice Russia into geopolitical adventures there in thefuture (see also Simes 2007, pp. 39–40). The events during the statue crisis seem toindicate that this has been duly achieved. The fact that military pressure has been usedagainst non-NATO and -EU members Georgia and Ukraine but not against Estoniaindicates that this is indeed the case.
Having said this, one should note that this does not mean that the ‘gray zone’between Russia and the West has been eradicated; it has only been moved further tothe east, into the ‘common neighborhood’ currently shared by the EU and Russia:especially Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In this respect it seems noteworthythat most of the countries within this zone find their position uncomfortable to say theleast, clearly preferring strong institutionalized ties with, or even membership in, theEU and NATO. For example, the presidents of Ukraine and Georgia, VictorYuschenko and Mikhail Saakashvili respectively, have repeatedly voiced theirmembership aspirations. Perhaps the most outspoken person in this respect hasbeen Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who has made the case forincluding Ukraine in Western institutions in order to engage in a wider geopoliticalcontainment of Russian ambitions in the region (Tymoshenko 2007).
Some of the Russian actions during the crisis indicate that Russia was indeed wellaware of the existence of institutionalized solidarity in Europe. It can be argued thatone of the major aims behind the attempted internationalization of the crisis wasindeed to test and potentially reduce the solidarity with Estonia demonstrated by theWest (see also Socor 2007). However, on this occasion at least, solidarity appears tohave prevailed, thereby seriously denting Russia’s hopes of successfully puttingpressure on Estonia. Yet one may go further than this to argue that the attempts atdiluting the institutionalized solidarity in Europe have become one of the leitmotifs ofRussian European policy, especially under Putin. The Russian drive for cultivatingbilateral relationships at the expense of, for example, wider EU–Russia relations hasbeen a case in point (Haukkala 2006). Usually these have been seen as mere tacticalmaneuvers aimed at blunting the edge and the preponderant weight of the Union’sinstitutions (see Leonard & Popescu 2007). Yet it is possible to detect other and morepurposive strategic dimensions behind the Russian antics in the Bronze Soldier crisis:an attempt at diluting European solidarity in the hopes of isolating a single memberstate so that it can be pressured into submission (cf. Lucas 2008). As will be discussedin the conclusions, if this was indeed the case, then we are faced with a much moresevere challenge to European institutions than was the case previously.
Conclusions
The Estonian–Russian political crisis over the relocation of the Bronze Soldier diedaway inconclusively without a clear outcome or reconciliation. The end result of thecrisis has been the continuation of a rather uneasy political status quo between Estoniaand Russia. When it comes to identity politics, neither side was unequivocally able toenforce its reading of the significance of the monument or the events surrounding itsrelocation. Also Russia clearly failed in its attempts at internationalizing the situationto Estonia’s detriment.
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At the same time we can only account fully for these events by looking at othercausal factors at play. What is more, by introducing the material and institutionalfactors into the equation one is able to tease out potential outcomes and futureramifications from the debacle that were not perhaps immediately obvious at the timeof the crisis. In fact, the analytical narrative above shows us the increased explanatoryand analytical power of seeking multicausal accounts over monocausal ones. None ofthe three structures of the international society identified at the beginning of thisarticle – ideational, material or institutional – was in itself enough to give us asatisfactory account of the statue crisis between Estonia and Russia. Although theidentity prism is a powerful tool enabling us to grasp the background and indeedthe very essence of the conflict, it was not sufficient in capturing the dynamics of theactual political crisis between Estonia and Russia. A crude power analysis done inisolation from other institutional structures did not yield any clear conclusion, leadingus to question why Russia did not prevail with ease. It was only by also incorporatingthe institutional factors at play that we arrived at a fuller and, it is believed, also moretruthlike understanding of the events.
But the narrative above also suggests other conclusions that can be seen as havinghigh relevance, especially in the Baltic context. First of all, we should note that theinter-relationship between institutional and political solidarity is a complex one. Onthe one hand the statue crisis indicates that the existence of institutional structures,for example EU membership in the case of Estonia, can spur other member states toshow political solidarity even in cases where they initially might view the conflict as abilateral one. Having said this, one should be clear that in the long run the existenceof more active political solidarity is the primary component in this respect: over timethe credibility of institutional solidarity will hinge on the efficacy and reliability ofactual political solidarity manifested by the member states.
From this, two questions follow. First, is the West, mainly the EU member statesand the USA, willing to enlarge its sphere of institutionalized solidarity further to theeast, even if this has to take place in the face of growing Russian opposition andresistance? This is a question of importance for the three Baltic countries which havebeen working hard in recent years to promote the further enlargement of Westerninstitutions to include countries such as Georgia and Ukraine (see Jakniunaite 2009).It seems evident that the European Union in particular is currently battling with itsown ‘enlargement fatigue’; the expansion of NATO to include Georgia and Ukrainehas been seen as a more immediate prospect, although this may well have changedfollowing the Russian–Georgian hostilities in summer 2008. Against this background,the previous events during the statue crisis show that the enlargement of Westerninstitutions brings with it a political obligation to show solidarity to new membersshould they have serious bilateral problems with third parties. As such, enlargementmight also carry a foreign political price tag for the old members, something thatmight dampen their enthusiasm for further enlargements.
Second, and even more pertinently, do the EU member states and the USA havethe wherewithal and political will to cash the geopolitical check they have alreadysigned? This is an even more pressing, one could even say existential, question for theBaltic states. It is possible that the statue crisis was only an indication of Russia’s futureactivities in the region and that institutionalized and political solidarity will be needed
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in the future. The statue crisis indicates that at least thus far the existence ofinstitutionalized structures and solidarity is enough to activate the more activepolitical component of solidarity. Yet the question remains whether this will also bethe case in the future, especially if Western actors are faced with an increasinglypowerful and assertive Russia. If not, then we are quickly faced with a situation wherethe credibility of Western actors and institutions will start to unravel as Russia isallowed to pick and choose small member states for close encounters of the worstkind along its borders.
AcknowledgementsThis article is part of the FIIA project ‘Russia’s European Choice: With or Into theEU?’, which is in turn a part of the Finnish Academy’s larger ‘Russia in Flux’ ResearchProgramme, 2004–2007. I would like to thank the two anonymous referees as well asthe editor of Journal of Baltic Studies for constructive comments and criticism on anearlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
Disclaimer
Statements of fact and opinion are those of the author and do not imply endorsementby the Government of Finland.
Notes
1 Perhaps the most authoritative – but also contentious – theoretical statement ofthe program has been made in Wendt (1999). For a useful discussion and criticismof his ideas as well as Wendt’s reply, see Guzzini and Leander (2006).
2 For a contribution along these lines, see von Busekist 2004.3 For discussions along these lines, see most of the contributions in Berg & Ehin
(2009); Lehti (2007), Smith (2008) and Lehti et al. (2008).4 The spontaneity of the riots has been a matter of debate that cannot be settled on
this occasion. The Estonian government has claimed that Russia was involved ininciting the riots prior to the relocation of the Bronze Soldier. To be sure, thereseems to be evidence that members of the Russian youth group Nashi, which isknown to have close connections to the Kremlin, were operating in Estonia priorto the riots. And, yet, it seems equally clear that a good deal of the consternationon the part of young Estonian Russians was actually real.
5 I am thankful to the anonymous referee for pointing out this potential facet of thecrisis to me.
6 The rhetoric used by Russia has been usefully discussed in Berdy (2007, p. 8).7 The Russian reactions have been discussed in Yasmann (2007).8 See ‘A cyber-riot’, The Economist, 12 May 2007 (p. 30) and Traynor (2007).9 This is, however, nothing new. Throughout the 1990s Russia had applied the same
strategy in the context of monitoring the rights of the Russian-speaking minoritiesin Estonia and Latvia. I am thankful to the anonymous referee for pointing out thisfact to me.
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10 ‘Lavrov letter slams EU over Estonia’, Baltic Times, 11 May 2007, available at:http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/17865/, accessed 20 November2007.
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Hiski Haukkala is a Special Adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
Previously he has worked at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the
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Stirling (Scotland). ([email protected])
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