a citizen's guide to redistricting

8/6/2019 A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting

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J U S T I N L E V I TForeword

er i k a w o o

2010 EDITIO

at New York University School of Law


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2010. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivs-

NonCommercial license (see http://creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its

entirety as long as the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link

to the Centers web page is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be

reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Centers permission.

Please let the Center know if you reprint.


3/139

ABOUT THEBRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

T B C J N Y U S L

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ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTERSREDISTRICTING PROJECT

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Justin Levitt, L L S L A,

B C J 2005 2008 2009 2010,

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; amicus curiae ; , , -

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. H B C , Teruth About Voter Fraud(2007) Making the List(2006), - , , U.S. S C.

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Erika L. Wood D D B C D

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C L E C J A C C C F I. M. W -

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I 2009, M. W E. R. N P I A

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DEDICATION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T B C J F -

A Citizens Guide; ,

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6/139

FOREWORD

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First,theprocessismarkedbysecrecy,self-dealingandbackroomlogroll-

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Second,webelievethattheredistrictingprocessmustbemoreresponsive

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9/139

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 2

I. WHAT IS REDISTRICTING? 6

II. WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER? 10Letting politicians choose their voters 10

Eliminating incumbents 11

Eliminating challengers 11

Packing partisans 12

Diluting minority votes 12

Splitting communities 13

Destorying civility 13

III. WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN? 16

IV. WHO REDRAWS THE LINES? 20

Role o the legislature 24

Role o individual legislators 25

Partisanship 26

Voting rule 27Size 27

Diversity 27

Role o the courts 28

V. HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN? 40

Starting point 40

Timing 40

Transparency 41

Discretion and constraint 42

VI. WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN? 44

Equal population 44

Minority representation 46

Contiguity 50

Compactness 51

Political and geographic boundaries 54

Communities o interest 56

Electoral outcomes 57

(Partisanship, incumbent protection, competition)

Other structural eatures 66

(Nesting, multi-member districts)

VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 74

Ideas worth considering, rom existing models 75

Ideas worth considering, not yet implemented statewide 80

The reorm process 82

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Recap o redistricting choices 86

Appendix B: Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 o the Voting Rights Act 94

Appendix C: Additional Resources 95Selected reorm proposals 99

ENDNOTES 104


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RedistRicting matteRs.


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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING2

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

D IFFE RE N T RE D IS TRICTIN G PLAN S

District lines group voters into districts, with each district

electing a dierent representative. District lines can be

drawn in many dierent ways.


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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 3

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RELATED TOPICS: Simulated Redistricting

Ater leang through this owners manual, eel

like an entertaining and inormative redistricting

test drive?

At www.redistrictinggame.org, The Redistricting

Game lets you draw and redraw the districts

o a hypothetical state under several dierent

scenarios, with instant eedback on the con-

sequences. Its a good way to see or yoursel how

some o the parts o the redistricting process

t together.

INTRODUCTION


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15/139

WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?


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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING6 WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?

I. WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?

W ,

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Apportionment

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Reapportionment is the process o using a

states population to decide how many repre-

sentatives it gets.

Redistricting is the process o redrawing

legislative district lines.

Gerrymandering is the process o redraw-

ing district lines to increase unduly a groups

political power.

EXPECTED SEATS IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, 2012

ALABAMA 7

ALASKA 1

ARIZONA 101ARKANSAS 4

CALIFORNIA 53

COLORADO 7

CONNECTICUT 5

DELAWARE 1

FLORIDA 271GEORGIA 141HAWAII 2

IDAHO 2

ILLINOIS 181INDIANA 9

IOWA 4 1KANSAS 4

KENTUCKY 6

LOUISIANA 6 1

MAINE 2

MARYLAND 8

MASSACHUSETTS 9 1MICHIGAN 141MINNESOTA 7 1MISSISSIPPI 4

MISSOURI 9

MONTANA 1

NEBRASKA 3

NEVADA 4 1NEW HAMPSHIRE 2

NEW JERSEY 121NEW MEXICO 3

NEW YORK 281NORTH CAROLINA 13

NORTH DAKOTA 1

OHIO 162OKLAHOMA 5

OREGON 5

PENNSYLVANIA 181RHODE ISLAND 2

SOUTH CAROLINA 7 1SOUTH DAKOTA 1

TENNESSEE 9

TEXAS 364

UTAH 4 1VERMONT 1

VIRGINIA 11

WASHINGTON 101WEST VIRGINIA 3

WISCONSIN 8

WYOMING 1

GAINEDSEATS

LOST SEATS

{ NO CHANGE


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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 7WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?

I N Y 29

C, 28 30, redistricting

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Gerrymandering

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malapportionment

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Partisan gerrymandering

. Incumbent protection gerrymandering, bipartisan sweetheart ,

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RELATED TOPICS: A Vote for DC

Washington, DC is apportioned one ederal

representative sort o. Rep. Eleanor Holmes

Norton, Washingtons at-large delegate in

the House o Representatives, may sit on

committees and participate in debate, but she

is not allowed to vote.

Many Americans have joined the citizens o

the District o Columbia almost 600,000

people in agitating or change, so that the

Districts residents will no longer suer

taxation without representation.

Despite what some believe to be constitutional

uncertainty, there is increasing support or a

ederal bill that would grant the District a vote.

One version o this bill would, in return, grant

an additional representative to the state next in

line or a seat.9

In 2009, that state was Utah. Utah also be-

lieved that it was denied adequate representa-

tion; the State claimed that many o its citizens

were not counted in the 2000 Census because

they were overseas at the time (or example,

on missions on behal o the Mormon church),

and that the States true population would have

merited an additional representative.10

IOWA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

5

14

2

3

1 9 9 2

1

2

5 3

4

2 0 0 2

SOURCE: IOWA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU


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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING8 WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?

A BRIEF HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING

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In the 1780s, Patrick Henrytried to drawcongressional district lines to keep James

Madison out o oce.

THE 1812 GERRYMANDER


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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?


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II. WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?

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LETTING POLITICIANS CHOOSE THEIR VOTERS

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ELIMINATING INCUMBENTS

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ELIMINATING CHALLENGERS

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ILLIN OIS CON GRE S S ION AL 1 , 2002

BARACKOBAMAS

RESIDENCE

BARACK OBAMAS

RESIDENCE


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PACKING PARTISANS

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DILUTING MINORITY VOTES

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TE XAS CON GRE S S ION AL 6


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SPLITTING COMMUNITIES

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DESTROYING CIVILITY

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24/139


25/139

WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?


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III. WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?

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Redistricting will ollow the 2010 Census. In

most states, the 2012 elections will be the

rst ones conducted using the newly drawn

districts.

RELATED TOPICS:

Re-redistricting Litigation & Legislation

In 2003, just two years ater a court redrew

Texas congressional district lines, the Texas

legislature redrew the lines again. A challenge

made its way to the Supreme Court, but the

Court reused to strike down the re-redistricting

as unconstitutional.42

In the wake o the Texas

re-drawing, three ederal bills were introduced

that would have prohibited states rom redraw-

ing congressional districts more than once per

decade.43

RELATED TOPICS: Census Count

The ocial Census count determines how

many ederal representatives each state gets,

and is usually essential or allocating state

representatives to dierent parts o the state.

There is evidence, however, that minorities,

children, low-income individuals, and renters

are systematically undercounted, resulting in

underrepresentation in the legislature.38

Moreover, incarcerated people who are

disproportionately minorities and poor are

generally counted where they are imprisoned,

infating representation o prison districts and

diluting the voting power o the prisoners home

communities.39

In 2010, Delaware, Maryland,

and New York passed legislation to count

people in prison at their prior home address

or redistricting purposes.40

Similar bills were

introduced in Congress, and in at least six other

states, during the 2009 or 2010 legislative

sessions.41


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REDRAWING STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

{ ONCE PER DECADE

{ AT ANY TIME

{ UNCLEAR

{ NO LAW

REDRAWING CONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS

{ ONCE PER DECADE

{ AT ANY TIME

{ UNCLEAR

{ NO LAW

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29/139

WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?


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IV. WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?

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NewYorksadvisorycommissionhassixmemberschosenbythemajor -

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Mainesadvisorycommissionhas15members,withthelegislative

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The legislature draws district lines in most

states. Some states have an advisory com-

mission to suggest lines to the legislature;

others use a backup commission in case thelegislature cant come to an agreement. Still

others give all power to a commission either

a politician commission that can include

legislators, or an independent commission

where legislators dont have a vote.

In the gures below, blue and red represent

partisan commissioners; orange represents

commissioners chosen by members o both

parties. Outline circles will not be current

legislators; solid circles may be anyone.

IOWA

MAIN E

NEW YORK


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F backup commission (C-

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InOregon,thebackupcommissionisreallyjustthestatesSecretaryof

S,

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TexassbackupcommissionismadeupoftheLieutenantGovernor,the

S H R, A G,

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InIllinois,thebackupcommissionhaseightmemberschosenbytheleg-

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commissions:

, .57 J

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InArkansas,thecommissionismadeupoftheGovernor,theSecretary

S, A G.58

InColorado,thecommissionhasfourmemberspickedbythelegisla-

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InNewJersey,eachmajorpartysstatechairselectsvecommissioners.

I 10 ,

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InMissouri,thelinesforeachhouseofthelegislaturearedrawnbya

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ILLIN OIS

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MISSOURI STATE HOUSE

N E W J E RS E Y

COLORADO

ARKAN S AS

ORE GON


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F, independent

commissions

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InAlaska,theGovernorchoosestwocommissioners,thestateSenate

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InArizona,thefourlegislativemajorityandminorityleaderseachchoose

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InCalifornia,stateauditorschoose20Democrats,20Republicans,and

20 ,

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InIdaho,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner,and

, .66

InMontana,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner,

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InWashington,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner;

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2% .68


ARIZON A

COMMISSIONS F OR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

{ INDEPENDENT

{ POLITICIAN

{ ADVISORY

{ BACKUP

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COMMISSIONS FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

{ INDEPENDENT

{ POLITICIAN

{ ADVISORY

{ BACKUP

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33/139


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34/139


CHOICES INFLUENCING WHODRAWS THE LINES

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ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

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It is useul to consider the ollowing actors in

deciding who draws the lines: Roleofthelegislature

Roleofindividuallegislators

Partisanship

Votingrule

Size

Diversity

Roleofthecourts


35/139


ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS

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36/139


PARTISANSHIP

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37/139


VOTING RULE

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jority: j .86 I M, 2/3

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DIVERSITY

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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING28 WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?

2000 CYCLE, COURT INVOLVEMENTIN STATE LEGISL ATIVE DISTRICTS

{ COURT DREW

LINES ITSELF

{ COURT OVER-

TURNED PLAN

2000 CYCLE, COURT INVOLVEMENTIN CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

{ COURT DREW

LINES ITSELF

ROLE OF THE COURTS

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COMMISSIONS USE D TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRI CTS1

WHO SELECTS COMMISSIONERS OTHER RESTRICTIONS ONCOMMISSIONERS

STRUCTURE

ak Independent

Commission

1998 5 Governor selects 2 :: Legislative majority leadersselect 1 each :: Chie Justice selects 1

1 commissioner rom each o 4 judicial districts

:: Cannot be public employee or ofcial ::Cannot use party afliation to select commissioner

ar Politician

Commission

1936 3 Governor, Secretary o State, Attorney General are the commissioners

az Independent

Commission

2000 5 Commission on appellate court appointments

nominates 25 (10 rom each major party, 5 rom

neither major party) :: Legislative majority andminority leaders select 1 each :: Those 4 commis-sioners select 1 tiebreaker not registered with party

o any o 4 commissioners

At most 2 commissioners rom the same party

:: At most 2 o frst 4 commissioners rom samecounty :: No public ofce or 3 years beoreappointment :: Cannot have switched party inlast 3 years

ca Independent

Commission

2008 14 State auditor panel nominates 3 pools o 20 (20

rom each major party, 20 rom neither) :: Legisla-tive majority and minority leaders each strike 2

rom each pool :: Randomly choose 8 (3 romeach major party, 2 rom neither) :: Those 8 com-

missioners choose 6 others (2 rom each majorparty, 2 rom neither)

5 commissioners rom each major party, 4 rom

neither; cannot have switched party in last 5 years

:: Must represent geographic, racial, ethnic diver-sity :: Must have voted in 2 o last 3 state elections:: Not ofcial/candidate, party ofcer, employee/

consultant to campaign/party/legislator, lobbyist,or campaign donor > $2,000 in last 10 years :: Notsta, consultants, contractors or state or ederal

government

co Politician

Commission

1974 11 Legislative majority and minority leaders select 1

each :: Governor selects 3 :: Chie Justice selects 4At most 6 commissioners rom the same party

:: At most 4 can be members o state assembly ::At least 1 /at most 4 rom each congressional district

ct Backup

Commission

1976 9 Legislative majority and minority leaders

select 2 each :: Those 8 commissioners select1 tiebreaker

Must be elector o state

hi Politician

Commission

1968 9 Legislative majority and minority leaders select

2 each :: 6 o those 8 commissioners agree on1 tiebreaker

None

ia Advisory

Commission

1980 Bureau Nonpartisan bureau draws lines or legislature to approve

id Independent

Commission

1994 6 Legislative majority and minority leaders select

1 each :: State party chairs o two major partiesselect 1 each

Must be registered voter in state :: Not lobbyistor 1 year beore appointment :: Not ofcial/candi-date or 2 years beore

il Backup

Commission

1980 8 (9 i tie) Legislative majority and minority leaders select

1 legislator and 1 non-legislator each :: Tiebreakerchosen i necessary by random draw rom 2 names

(1 o each party) submitted by Supreme Court

At most 4 commissioners rom the same party

me Advisory

Commission

1975 15 Senate majority and minority leaders select 2 each

:: House majority and minority leaders select3 each :: State chairs o two major parties select 1each :: Those 7 commissioners select 1 each romthe public :: Those 7 public commissioners select

1 tiebreaker

None

mo Politician

Commission

1966 House: 18

Senate: 10

House: each major party nominates 2 per

congressional district :: Governor chooses1 per party per district (or 9 districts)

Senate: each major party nominates 10 ::Governor chooses 5 per party

House: at most 1 nominee rom each state

legislative district within each congressional district

Senate: none

ms Backup

Commission

1977 5 Chie Justice, Attorney General, Secretary o State,

and the legislative majority leaders are the commissioners

1In the other states not represented in the chart, the legislature draws the district lines. In Maryland, if the legislature cannot agree on a plan, the Governor will draw

the lines; in Oregon, the Secretary of State will draw the lines; and the process elsewhere is left to the courts.



40/139


COMMISSIONS USED TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (cont d)1

WHO SELECTSCOMMISSIONERS

Legislative majority and minority leaders select 1

each :: Those 4 commissioners select 1 tiebreaker

Each major party chooses 5 :: Tiebreaker choseni necessary by Chie Justice

Legislative majority leaders select 1 legislator,

1 non-legislator each :: Legislative minorityleaders select 1 each

Legislative majority and minority leaders select

1 each :: Those 4 commissioners select 1 tiebreaker

Legislative majority leaders select 3 legislators,

3 non-legislators each :: Legislative minorityleaders select 2 legislators each

Chie Justice selects 1 :: Governor selects 1 romeach major party :: Each major party selects 1

Legislative majority and minority leaders select

1 each :: Those 4 commissioners select1 nonvoting chair

OTHER RESTRICTIONSON COMMISSIONERS

2 commissioners rom west counties, 2 rom

east :: Cannot be public ofcial at the time

Selectors must give due consideration to

representation o geographical areas o state

None

Tiebreaker cannot be current public ofcial

None

Gubernatorial and party appointees must be

resident o state or last 5 years

Must be registered voter :: Not lobbyist or1 year or ofcial/candidate or 2 years beore

appointment

STRUCTURE

mt Independent

Commission

nj Politician

Commission

ny Advisory

Commission

oh Politician

Commission

ok Backup

Commission

pa Politician

Commission

ri Advisory

Commission

tx Backup

Commission

vt Advisory

Commission

wa Independent

Commission

YEAR SIZE

1972 5

1966 10 (11 i tie)

1978 6

1967 5

1964 3

1968 5

2001 16

1948 5

1965 5

1982 5

Governor, State Auditor, Secretary o State are the commissioners ::Each major partys legislative leaders select 1 other commissioner

Attorney General, Superintendent o Public Instruction, State Treasurer are the commissioners

Lt. Governor, Attorney General, Comptroller o Public Accounts, Commissioner o the General Land

Ofce, and the House majority leader are the commissioners

1

In the other states not represented in the chart, the legislature draws the district lines. In Maryland, if the legislature cannot agree on a plan, the Governor will drawthe lines; in Oregon, the Secretary of State will draw the lines; and the process elsewhere is left to the courts.



41/139


STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTR ICTS: WHO DR AWS THE LINES

STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

ak Independent Commission

al Legislature

ar Politician Commission

az Independent Commission

ca Independent Commission

co Politician Commission

ct Backup Commission

de Legislature

fl Legislature

ga Legislature

hi Politician Commission

ia Advisory Commission

id Independent Commission

il Backup Commission

in Legislature

ks Legislature

ky Legislature

la Legislature

GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2001 CYCLEPARTISAN CONTROL

1

Democrat

Democrat

Democrat

Bipartisan

Democrat2

Democrat

Republican Governor,

Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement, bipartisan

backup commission drew lines*

Democratic Governor,

Democratic Senate,Republican House

Republican

Democrat

Bipartisan


Republican Legislature

Bipartisan


Republican Senate,

Democratic House ::

no legislative agreement,Democratic backup commission

drew lines*


Republican Senate,

Democratic House

Republican


Republican Senate,

Democratic House


Democratic Legislature

STATE SUPREMECOURT REVIEW

I citizen asks

I citizen asks

I registered voter asks

Automatic


Automatic


I qualifed elector asks

Automatic

1Control by one party or another does not guarantee a partisan result, and bipartisan control does not preclude a result biased in favor of one party or another. This

table lists only the inputs into the process.

2In 2000, the legislature was responsible for drawing Californias state legislative districts. The independent commission (with a partisan balance) was authorized in

2008, and will be active for the first time in the 2011 cycle.

* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.



42/139


STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)


ma Legislature

md Legislature

me Advisory Commission

mi Legislature

mn Legislature

mo Politician Commission

ms Backup Commission

mt Independent Commission

nc Legislature

nd Legislature

ne Legislature

nh Legislature

nj Politician Commission

nm Legislature

nv Legislature

ny Advisory Commission


Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes




Democrat

Independent Governor,

split Senate, Democratic House ::no legislative agreement on Senate

districts, court drew lines*

Republican

Independence Party Governor,

Democratic Senate,

Republican House ::no legislative agreement,

court drew lines*

Bipartisan :: no commissionagreement, backup judicialcommission drew lines*

Democrat

Bipartisan

Democrat

Republican


Nonpartisan Legislature


Republican Legislature ::

legislative plan vetoed,court drew lines*

Republican3


Democratic Legislature ::legislative plan or House districts

vetoed, court drew lines*


Republican Senate,

Democratic Assembly


Republican Senate,

Democratic Assembly



I citizen asks


I citizen asks

3Although the commissions tiebreaker, Professor Larry Bartels, was selected by the state supreme courts Republican Chief Justice, Professor Bartels was not

affiliated with either major party, and announced that he would vote based on criteria designed to foster part isan balance. Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels, 1

Election L.J. 7, 9-11 (2002).




43/139


STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)


oh Politician Commission

ok Backup Commission

or Legislature

pa Politician Commission

ri Advisory Commission4

sc Legislature

sd Legislature

tn Legislature

tx Backup Commission

ut Legislature

va

Legislature

vt Advisory Commission

wa Independent Commission

wi Legislature

wv Legislature

wy

Legislature


No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes


Republican




Republican Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,

Democratic Secretary o

State drew lines*

Bipartisan






Republican




Republican Senate,

Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,

Republican backup commission

drew lines*

Republican

Republican


Democratic Senate,

Republican House

Bipartisan


Democratic Senate,

Republican Assembly ::no legislative agreement,

court drew lines*

Democrat

Republican


On request



I aggrieved person asks

I 5 or more electors ask

Automatic i plan is late,

or i registered voter asks

4In 2001, Rhode Island created an advisory commission to assist with the particularly sensitive task of redistricting an assembly that had been downsized from

50 Senators and 100 Representatives to 38 Senators and 75 Representatives. It is not clear whether this advisory commission will be utilized again in the future.

See 2001 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.315; Parella v. Montalbano, 899A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2006).




44/139


CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES


ak

Independent Commission

al Legislature

ar Politician Commission

az Independent Commission

ca Independent Commission

co Politician Commission

ct

Backup Commission

de Legislature

fl Legislature

ga Legislature

hi Politician Commission

ia Advisory Commission

id


il Backup Commission

in Legislature

ks Legislature

STRUCTURE FORCONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS

1 congressional district

Legislature

Legislature



Legislature

Backup Commission


Legislature

Legislature

Politician Commission

Advisory Commission


Legislature

Backup Commission

Legislature


n/a

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

n/a

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

2001 CYCLE PARTISANCONTROL FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

n/a

Democrat



Bipartisan

Democrat5


Democratic Senate,


court drew lines*

Republican Governor,Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement,

bipartisan backup commission

drew lines*

n/a

Republican

Democrat

Bipartisan



Bipartisan


Republican Senate,

Democratic House


Republican Senate,


Democratic backup commission6

drew lines*

Republican

5In 2000, t he legislature was responsible for drawing Californias congressional districts. The independent commission (with a partisan balance) was introduced in

2010, and will be active for the first time in the 2011 cycle.

6In Indiana, when the legislature cannot agree, congressional lines are drawn by a five-person backup commission composed of the majority leader and the chair of

the apportionment committee in each legislative chamber, and a member of the assembly appointed by the Governor. In 2001, there were three Democrats and two

Republicans on the commission. See Ind. Code 3-3-2-2; Mary Beth Schneider, Panel Adopts New Congressional Maps, Indianapolis Star, May 11, 2001.

* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othecases, a court took over.



45/139


CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)


ky

Legislature

la Legislature

ma Legislature

md Legislature

me Advisory Commission

mi Legislature

mn Legislature

mo Politician Commission

ms Backup Commission

mt


nc Legislature

nd Legislature

ne Legislature

nh Legislature

nj Politician Commission

nm Legislature


Legislature

Legislature

Legislature

Legislature

Advisory Commission

Legislature

Legislature

Legislature

Legislature


Legislature


Legislature

Legislature

Politician Commission7

Legislature


Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

n/a

No

n/a

Yes

Yes

No

Yes


Democratic Governor,Republican Senate,

Democratic House





(veto overridden)

Democrat

Independent Governor,

split Senate, Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,

court drew lines*

Republican

Independence Party Governor,

Democratic Senate,


court drew lines*


Republican Senate,

Democratic House

Democrat ::no legislative agreement,

court drew lines*

n/a

Democrat

n/a


nonpartisan Legislature



Bipartisan


Democratic Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,

court drew lines*

7New Jersey uses a different politician commission for its congressional districts: the majority and minority leaders and the major state party chairs select 2

commissioners each (none of whom may be a member or employee of Congress), and those 12 commissioners select a tiebreaker by majority vote.

N.J. Const. art. II, 2, 1.




46/139


CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)


nv

Legislature

ny Advisory Commission

oh Politician Commission

ok Backup Commission

or Legislature

pa Politician Commission

ri Advisory Commission9

sc Legislature

sd Legislature

tn Legislature

tx Backup Commission

ut Legislature

va Legislature

vt Advisory Commission

wa Independent Commission

wi Legislature

wv Legislature

wy Legislature


Legislature

Advisory Commission

Advisory Commission

Legislature

Legislature

Legislature

Advisory Commission

Legislature


Legislature

Legislature

Legislature

Legislature



Legislature

Legislature



Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

n/a

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

n/a

No

Yes

Yes

n/a


Republican Governor,Republican Senate,

Democratic Assembly


Republican Senate,

Democratic Assembly

Republican8


Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement,

court drew lines*




Republican




Republican Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,

court drew lines*

n/a




Republican Senate,


court drew lines*

Republican

Republican

n/a

Bipartisan


Democratic Senate,

Republican Assembly

Democrat

n/a

8When Ohios congressional redistricting took longer than expected, the legislature had to pull together a 2/3 majority to pass the plan as an emergency bill,

which would take effect in time to avoid an expensive supplemental primary for congressional seats alone. See Lee Leonard, Redistricting Compromise Reached,

columbus dispatch, Jan. 18, 2002.

9This advisory commission was created to assist with redistricting given a reduction in the overall size of the legislature. It is not clear whether this advisory

commission will be utilized again in the future. See the description above in the table of state legislative redistricting structures.




47/139


48/139


49/139

HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?


50/139

A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING40 HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

V. HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

I ,

.

STARTING POINT

A

, , ,

. I ,

. S, ,

,

V R A ( ). O -

, j .101

TIMING

T . T C

A 1 :

1991, 2001, 2011, .102 I ,

; , ,

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: 1992, 2002, 2012, .103

T j

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: X, Y, Z, .

S , ,

A.104

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.

T

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, j

.


51/139

BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 41HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

RELATED TOPICS: The Role of Technology

Given more than a ew competing objectives, it

is dicult to program a computer to draw district

lines on its own but in the right hands, computers

are still extremely useul redistricting tools.

Geographic Inormation Systems (GIS) sot-

ware assigns political and demographic data

to points or regions o maps, and will allow

even less experienced users to draw district

lines on-screen with instant eedback aboutthe composition o the district.

Several packages are commercially available;

some states will make data or these packages

available over the Internet, so that private

parties can plan districts just as the states do.

Moreover, several individuals or organizations

have announced plans to make basic redistrict-

ing sotware reely available to the public in

the 2011 cycle; these packages are currently in

development.

TRANSPARENCY

I ,

. T ,

, .

D , , .

I 2010, .105

S . I

2002, 26 -

, 18 -

.106 M

.107 T .108 T

.

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.109

C ,

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.110

L , . I ,

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.


52/139


Because discretion can be abused, some

have suggested eliminating discretion. But

such tight constraints are rarely neutral,

and oten have predictable, and potentially

undesirable, eects.

HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

DISCRETION AND CONSTRAINT

F, . A ,

.

T , - ,

- .S

. S

,

j.111

T

. A, ,

. V .

M

.112 F ,

1969, H C B S M z ;

A-A

, , J.113

M,

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.

F, ,

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X

Y. A

who .


53/139

WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?


54/139


Except or rare cases, congressional districts

must have almost exactly the same popula-

tion. In contrast, the biggest and smallest

state legislative districts can generally havea population dierence o up to 10%.

VI. WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

T

. , C

. I , . A ,

,

. W

.

EQUAL POPULATION

F 18, 19, 20 ,

, .114 A

, ,

, . B

1960, , C (L A C) 422 .115

I ,

, . I

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,

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S. A , z

422 z L A C.

I 1962 one person, one vote ,

S C C. N, , .116

T

. I 1964, S C

,

. 117 I , -

,

j.118

F , S C .

T .119 T

S C

. O , ,

( total deviation) 10%

.120 T : ,


States consider some or all o the ollowing

criteria when deciding where the lines should

be drawn:

Equalpopulation Minorityrepresentation

Contiguity

Compactness

Politicalboundaries

Communitiesofinterest

Electoraloutcomes

RELATED TOPICS: Measure of Population

Each congressional districts population is

based on the total number o residents, including

children, noncitizens, and others not eligible

to vote.121

For state legislative districts, however, the

law is less settled: most states count the total

population, but some have proposed using

voting-age population (VAP) or citizen

voting-age population (CVAP).122

These latter measures tend to equalize the

voting power o each ballot, but leave many

taxpaying residents under-represented.


55/139

BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 45WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?

CALCULATING EQUAL POPULATION

DISTRICT # POPULATION DEVIATION

1 1,010 + 1.0 %

2 1,035 + 3.5 %

3 980 - 2.0 %

4 940 - 6.0 %

5 1,005 + 0.5 %

6 990 - 1.0 %

7 965 - 3.5 %

8 1,020 + 2.0 %

9 1,050 + 5.0 %

10 995 - 0.5 %

Total population:10,000

Average (ideal) population: 1,000

Average deviation: 2.5 %

Total deviation: 11.0 %

10%

,123 ,

j 10%.124 B 10%

.

A . S , : C,

, 5%

,125 M,

2%.126 I 5% and 1%,

.127

S .

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: 10%

10% , 20%

20% , .128

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56/139


MINORITY REPRESENTATION

T -

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C z -

.129 A C

V R A.130

T V R A C P L

J 1965. A , V R A

, j

.

T V R A

A A

. A . T A-A

, 99 A 650 .131 A

, 9,000 A-A ,

5,000 L H , A P

A N A . 132

S V R A ,

. V R A

: S 2 ( )

S 5 ( 2006).133

SECTION 2

S 2

, ,

.134 I 1982, C S 2 , ,

.135 A vote dilution.

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.136 (S ,

, 57-59).


RELATED TOPICS: Race and the Census

In 2000, the Census expanded the way in

which it accounted or identity, by allowing a

respondent to check multiple categories indi-

cating her race or ethnicity.

Beore 2000, redistricting data contained 9

racial and ethnic categories; now, there are 126

distinct categories to consider. In 2001, the

Department o Justice explained that it would

usually consider individuals with a multi-racial

identity as belonging to each indicated minority

group or Voting Rights Act purposes. Thus, a

voter checking both Black and White would be

tallied with the Black population when analyzing

minority voting opportunities; a voter check-

ing both Hispanic and Black would be tallied

with rst Hispanic and then Black populations

when analyzing minority voting opportunities.137

The Act also assesses whether minorities are

politically cohesive, including questions about

whether Hispanic Black voters tend to vote

dierently than other Hispanic or Black voters

in the area.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN LEGISLATORS

700

500

300

100

1965 1975 1985 1995 2005

SIGNING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

SOURCE: YOICHI R. OKAMOTO, LBJ LIBRARY COLL.


57/139


Section 2requiresstatestodrawdistricts

where minorities have the opportunity to elect

a candidate o their choice i there is:

1. Large, compact minority population

2.Politicallycohesiveminorityvoting

3. Politicallycohesivemajorityvoting

deeating minority candidates

+

Totality o the circumstances showing

diminished minority voting power

In majority-minoritydistricts,themajorityof

the voters are rom the same minority racial

or ethnic group. Some also include minority

coalition districts in which more than 50%

o the voters are rom two or more dierent

minority groups, particularly i the dierent

groups tend to vote in a similar pattern.

Inminority opportunitydistricts, minoritieshave the opportunity to elect a representative

oftheirchoice.Theseareusuallymajority-

minority districts, but inminority crossoverdistricts, minority voters might comprise less

than 50% o the district, and still elect their

chosen representatives with support rom

some crossover white voters.

In minority infuence districts, minorities

constituteasizableportionofthedistrict,

but cannot control the result o an election.

There is substantial debate about the extent

to which minority voters actually infuencepolicy in such districts.

S 2 . I

, ,

opportunity to elect its candidate o choice,

. W

S 2,

, :

aminoritypopulationissucientlygeographicallycompact(thatis,living

) ;138

theminoritypopulation(usually,thecitizenvoting-ageminoritypopulation)

-z ;139

theminoritypopulationispoliticallycohesivethatis,itwouldusually

;

themajoritypopulationwouldusuallyvoteasablocforadierentcan-

, -

,

.140

W j ,

racially polarized. T , -

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z.141

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.143 I , ,

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majority-minority districts, -

j . T - ,

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. 144



58/139


SECTION 5

S 5 V R A ,

.145 I covered j

A A

. I , S 5

1964, 1968, 1972.

F S 5, V R A

, D J

W, D.C., .

T

. I

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N (1)

, (2) ,

.146 U S 5,

j ,

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J S 5 . A 10

, j,

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S 5, bailout.148

BEYOND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

O S 2 S 5

V R A,

-

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,

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149

. T

.150 I, ,

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Section 5requiresareaswithhistorically

low registration or voting rates to clear new

districtlineswiththeDepartmentofJusticeor

theWashington,D.C.federalcourt.Thenew

lines must leave minority voters no worse o

than beore.

S E CTION 5 OF THEVOTING RIGHTS ACT

{ COVERED

{ PARTIALLY

COVERED

See Appendix B or more detail.

RELATED TOPICS: Beyond Bartlett

The Supreme Courts 2009 decision in Bartlett

v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009), limited

redistricting protection under Section 2 o the

Voting Rights Act, to minority communities that

are at least 50% o a district-sized population.

However, smaller minority communities may

still be protected under Section 5 o the Act;

also, redistricters may still choose to consider

lines that (among other eects) keep smaller

minority communities together, as long as race

and ethnicity are not the predominant rea-

sons or the districts boundaries. Some states

are considering explicit state protections or

smaller minority communities beyond Bartlett,

which would supplement the protection thatlarger communities get under ederal law.


59/139


RELATED TOPICS: Cumulative Voting

In the most amiliar American elections, voters

make an either/or choice or one representative

per district, and the candidate with the most

total votes (the plurality) is the exclusive winner.

An alternative to this system is cumulative

voting: several representatives are elected

rom the same district, and a voter has multiple

votes, which she may give all to one candidate,

or spread among several candidates.

Cumulative voting is now used in more than

50 local communities, like Peoria, Illinois and

Amarillo, Texas.151

In 2010, Port Chester, New

York, implemented cumulative voting ater a

Voting Rights Act lawsuit, and or the rst time

ever, Latino citizens candidate o choice was

eleced to the towns Board o Trustees.

STATE VOTING RIGHTS ACTS

S ,

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[ ]

.152

C state voting rights act

.153 A , C

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.


EFFECT OF VOTING RIGHTS ACTS,100 MINORITY / 200 MAJORITY VOTERS

AT-LARGE (1 VOTE PER SEAT)

SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3

Majority 200 200 200Minority 100 100 100

DISTRICTS (VRA) (1 VOTE TOTAL)


Majority 35 80 85

Minority 65 20 15

VOTING RULE (CVRA)(3 VOTES EACH)


Majority 200 200 200

Minority 300 0 0

CUMULATIVE BALLOT

YOU MAY OFFER UP TO 3 VOTES

1 2 3

R. Engstrom

L. Guinier { {

S. Mulroy

R. Richie {

RESULTS

2 votes or Guinier, 1 vote or Richie


60/139


CONTIGUITY

A C ,156 -

S C157

.158

A

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W . M

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N Y S 60, N J 13.

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WI ASSEMB LY 61

RACINE

WA CONGRESSIONAL 2

NY SENATE 60

N J CON GRE S S ION AL 1 3


61/139


COMPACTNESS

C z ,

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B I----I-- ,

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.161

O contorted boundaries:

,

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( R )165 . O

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COMPACT NOT COMPACT

POLSBY-POPPER MEASURE

S OME ME AS URE S OF D IS PE RS ION


62/139


S population

. S

(

).167 O

:

,

,

.168 I , -

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1992 F 3 . A

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.169 I C,

, .170 IAz, P-P ,

.171 I M,

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.172

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,

- .)173 C

,

.174


FLORIDA CONGRESSIONALD IS TRICT 3, 1 992

SOURCE: ELECTION DATA SERVICES, INC.

POPULATION CENTER OF GRAVITY

GEOGRAPHIC

CENTER

POPULATION

CENTER


63/139


O ,

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I z

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-

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Compactnessrequirementscaneither embrace

or carve up communities, depending on how

spread out the particular voters are.


64/139


POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES

I , S C

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TOWNSHIPS IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, OH


65/139


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66/139


COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

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67/139


ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

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480 R. T R 48%

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Everyset o district lines has a predictable

electoral impact.

CRACKIN G


68/139


Packing j

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acking

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TACKING

HYPOTHETICALSTATE

PACKING

District 1 14 D 6 R

District 2 14 D 6 R

District 3 12 D 8 R

District 4 0 D 20 R

DEMOCRATIC GERRYMANDER

RE PUBLICAN GE RRYMAN D E R

District 1 8 D 12 R

District 2 20 D 0 R

District 3 6 D 14 R

District 4 6 D 14 R

District 1 9 D 11 R

District 2 15 D 5 R

District 3 8 D 12 R

District 4 8 D 12 R

RE PUBLICAN GE RRYMAN D E R


69/139


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RELATED TOPICS:

Proportional Representation

In a system o winner take all districts, one

party or another will usually win more legislative

seats than its overall statewide support (or

example, winning 57% o the seats with 51%

o the vote).

Some other countries (and some local American

jurisdictions) orego districts, and instead use

a system o proportional representation

where 51% support translates as nearly as

possible to 51% o the legislative seats. Critics

express concern that such systems give undue

power to party insiders at the expense o voters,

and to ringe parties at the expense o main-

stream ones. Several variants o proportional

representation, with slightly dierent rules,

may mitigate these concerns.

Still other places mix the two systems, electing

some representatives rom districts and others

rom jurisdiction-wide lists, in a manner designed

to approach proportional representation in

the legislature as a whole. In America, the

Democratic Partys presidential primary system

is such a mix: some delegates allocated in the

primary process are elected proportionally

across an entire state, and some are elected

(also by proportional representation) within a

multi-member district (see the multi-member

discussion on p.65 below).


70/139


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.198 I

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W

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C,200 J

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Mostredistrictingprinciples,eveniftheyseem

unrelated to partisanship, have the potential

to lead to skewed partisan results.

MIN ORITY D IS TRICT

District 1 14 D 6 R

District 2 10 D 10 R

District 3 16 D 4 R

District 4 0 D 20 R

MAXIMUM COMPACTNESS

District 1 12 D 8 R

District 2 12 D 8 R

District 3 12 D 8 R

District 4 4 D 16 R


71/139


BIPARTISAN GERRYMANDERS AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION

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-. T bipartisan gerrymanders ,

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protection gerrymander

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90% R . M

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;

90% R , 70%

R

. A R

R .


When neither party dominates a state

legislature, the sitting politicians can create

a bipartisan gerrymanderby packing

districts with their own supporters.

D IFFE RE N T GE RRYMAND E RS

before redistricting

incumbent protection

safe partisan gerrymander

riskier gerrymander

30 - 70 45 - 55 55 - 45 62 - 38

10 - 90 10 - 90 85 - 15 87 - 13

30 - 70 30 - 70 40 - 60 92 - 8

48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52


72/139


COMPETITION

T

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are, .203

I 2006, , 38%

j ; , 38%

, D R .204

A , 86% H R

10% ,

.205 T j

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competition.

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general . U, 55% 45%, . A

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80%

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median voter theorem,

. A



73/139


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turnout

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opposing .212

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.214 F ,

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Because o campaign nance rules, term

limits, the natural advantages o incumbency,

andthequalityofaspeciccampaign,among

other actors, competitive districts may not

actually produce competitive elections.

MAXIMUM COMPE TITION






74/139


. I ,

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C.

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Rather than ostering competitive districts

directly, some proposals ocus on thwarting

deliberate attempts to make districts

uncompetitive.



75/139


POLITICIANS HOMES

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a citizen's guide to redistricting

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