A Casualty of Political Transformation?:

The Politics of Japanese Energy Efficiency

Phillip Y. Lipscy

Department of Political Science &Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research

Center,Stanford University

Politics of Energy Efficiency: The General Puzzles

• Cross-National Variation in Energy Efficiency Policies and Outcomes–What Explains Cross-national Variation

in Outcomes?–Why are Different Policies Adopted?–What Political Factors Affect the

Effectiveness of Policies?

Why Japan?• Strong Energy Efficiency Record• Important component of foreign

policy and foreign aid • Not Clear Why Japan has Done So

Well• Role of Politics?

Cultural Explanations?• Energy Policy Experts Often Claim: “Japan

is Different”• Unique Culture of Frugality?

The Political Context of Japanese Efficiency Policies

• Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy• Interest Group Politics• Efficiency Clientelism

Bureaucratic Initiative & Independence

• Stable Government Policy– Encourages private sector investment in

efficiency– vs. US: Carter Reagan; Clinton Bush

• Public-Private Communication• Depoliticized Policymaking– Top Runner Program– Explicitly designed to prevent perversion

of policy through lobbying

0.00%

0.01%

0.02%

0.03%

0.04%

0.05%

0.06%

0.07%

0.08%

0.09%

Budgets of National Energy Efficiency Agencies and Ministries, Share of GDP

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Number of Employees in NationalEnergy Efficiency Agencies / Ministries

Interest Group Politics• Interest Group Politics– Absence of Strong Anti-Efficiency

Interest Groups– Early establishment of industry

leadership in efficient products– Virtuous Cycle: • Specialization in efficient products Political

support for efficiency Policy to support efficiency

– e.g. Automobile Sector & Fuel Economy Standards• Toyota; Honda strong lobby for stringent

standards

Efficiency Clientelism• Efficiency Clientelism: policies that served dual

purpose:– Provision of Pork to LDP (Old Ruling Party) Constituencies– Energy Efficiency through Diffuse Costs Imposed on

General Public • Efficiency Clientelism matched up well with

Japan’s post-World War II political arrangements– MMD-SNTV Electoral System; Rural Overrepresentation– LDP One-Party Dominance– Bureaucratic Initiative

• Contributed to Japan’s abnormal transport profile of high costs, low total distance traveled, high rail-share, and low automobile-share

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5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

Total Distance Traveled (All Modes), Annual Passenger KM per Capita

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10000

15000

20000

25000

Passenger KM per Capita by Travel Mode

Car

Bus

Rail, Tram, Metro

Air

Water

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Rail and Bus Share of Total Distance Traveled

Japan

Denmark

Italy

Sweden

Germany

France

Finland

Norway

Great Britain

US

Example: Kei-Cars (軽自動車 )• Subsidization of light-weight

automobiles through tax incentives and relaxed requirements

• Began as part of motorization policy in 1950s

• In 1970s, coopted to serve dual purpose:– Energy Efficiency fuel efficient vehicles

for rural areas with limited public transportation

– Subsidization of rural residents, small business

Subsidies for Kei-CarsKei-Cars Regular

AutomobilesAutomobile Acquisition Tax (Time of Purchase)

3% 5%

Automobile Weight Tax(Every 3 Years)

13,200 (~$160) 56,700 (~$690)(Compact Car)

Automobile Tax (Yearly)

7,200 (~$90) 29,500 (~$360)

Highway Discount(Per Use; Rural Areas Only)

20% Discount n/a

Registration of Parking Space

Not Necessary(Rural Areas Only)

Required

Kei-Car Ownership by PrefecturePrefecture Kei-Cars as

% of TotalPopulation Density (people/km2)

Kochi 50.0% 108Nagasaki 49.6% 349Okinawa 49.0% 609Shimane 48.8% 107Tottori 48.3% 169… … …Osaka 28.0% 4,657Aichi 27.2% 1,436Chiba 26.4% 1,199Saitama 26.0% 1,888Hokkaido 25.9% 70Kanagawa 20.0% 3,728Tokyo 16.2% 5,937

Rural Transportation in US vs. Japan

Other Examples• Highway Tolls• Gasoline Tax• Shinkansen Bullet Train Network• Electricity Prices

The End of Efficiency Clientelism• Political Changes Since the 1990s

Undermine Efficiency Clientelism– Electoral Reform – Delegitimization of Bureaucracy– End of LDP Dominance

• Peculiar Position of DPJ (New Ruling Party)– Public Endorsement of Significant CO2

Reductions • Hatoyama 25% Reduction Target from 1990 Levels

– Policy Commitments that Run Counter to CO2 Reduction

Conclusion• Political Sources of Japan’s Efficiency

Policies – Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy – Interest Group Politics– Efficiency Clientelism

• New Approach? – Distribution of revenues to efficiency-

enhancing activities & R&D rather than pork

– Challenge: difficult to implement pro-efficiency policies with diffuse costs without public backlash

–Where will political support come from?