jain (2003) local political leadership in japan a harbinger of systemic change in japanese politics

8/2/2019 Jain (2003) Local Political Leadership in Japan a Harbinger of Systemic Change in Japanese Politics

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Local Political Leadership in Japan: A

Harbinger of Systemic Change in Japanese

Politics?1

Purnendra Jain

Abstract

Observers of Japanese politics have generally assumed that because Japan is a unitarystate, local government and its political chief executives have very little political and policyautonomy. Yet the assumption that a high degree of centralization in the political structureprevents leadership at the local level is misguided. Three case studies demonstrate thatlocal chief executives from the peripheries are now more than ever demonstratingleadership at the local level. Local chief executives are increasingly challenging centralgovernment plans and policy priorities for local areas by setting policy agendas to followtheir own vision and local needs, rather than accepting the centers fiat. Using the typologyof transactional and transformational styles of leadership, this article argues that trendsobserved in some localities may be the harbinger of transformational leadership fromthe local level, as local government takes a more salient place in Japans political system.

Observers of Japanese politics have generally assumed that because

Japan is a unitary state, local government and its political chiefexecutives have very little political and policy autonomy. Thus,examination of Japans political leadership has looked for leadershipat the national level in Japan and in the nations actions in regional andinternational contexts (MacDougall 1982; Rix 1993; and Shinoda 2000).

Yet the assumption that a high degree of centralization in the politicalstructure prevents leadership at the local level is misguided. In the

1970s some heads of government at the local level exercisedunambiguous leadership, in a few cases even inspiring the centralgovernment to follow their local initiatives into national policy despitetight restrictions within the unitary structure (Aqua 1982; and Jain2000a, 4-7).

In this article I revisit the issue of political leadership at the local

level in Japan, turning to more recent times. While the centralgovernment had generally subsumed the local challenge in the 1970sby the end of the decade, we find some local leaders taking politicalground again from the early 1990s. I argue here through three casestudies that local chief executives from the peripheries are now more


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Local Political Leadership in Japan - 59

than ever demonstrating leadership at the local level. They areincreasingly challenging central government plans and policy prioritiesfor local areas by setting policy agendas to follow their own vision andlocal needs, rather than accepting the centres fiat. As in the 1970s,

some local chief executives have set new policy directions, some ofthem ahead of the national government (information disclosure, forexample) which has later incorporated those local ideas and policies

within the national policy framework.This article also considers some of the key reasons for the revival

of political leadership at the local level and how these changes now

under way may prefigure a deeper structural change in Japans unitarypolitical system. I argue that whereas in the 1970s the local challengeto the national government was basically a response to domesticpressures, this time local leaders are also responding to internationalpressures, particularly deriving from the consequences of globalizationinside Japan. This time the scale of the challenge is broader than before;

we already observe elements of strong leadership in more local

administrations across various levels of local government. It is alsodeeper, since this emerging leadership style involves more thaninnovative practical responses to local problems. This local push is

trying to instigate a profound philosophical shift in the way the politicsof the nation are conducted. It conflates demands from the people fordemocratic process and transparency with demands from localadministrations for greater independence in policy decisions and

responsibility, through liberalizing and decentralizing the unitary state.I argue that this may be the harbinger of transformational leadershipfrom the local level, as local government takes a more salient place in

Japans political system.

1. Leadership in Japan

Some of the earlier studies of the Japanese political system have claimedthere is a complete absence of leadership within it. For example, Karel

Van Wolferen (1989, 5) argued that Japans political system lacked apeak governing body and described it as a truncated pyramid withouta supreme institution that has ultimate policymaking jurisdiction. Heconcluded that in government decision making, the buck simply keptcirculating.


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Rix (1993) considered leadership in the context of Japans foreignaid policy, questioning Japans capacity as an international leader inofficial foreign aid. Rix identified a few indicators of emerging leadershipin this policy area, which he termed entrepreneurship (161), and

noted the tendency for leadership from behind, which he found to becharacteristic of the domestic political scene. Rix concluded that Japan

was unable to set for itself an identifiable global aid leadership, partlydue to domestic political and administrative obstacles (189).

Shinoda (2000) refuted the Van Wolferen thesis, arguing that therehas been a political centre, in the position of the prime minister.

Shinoda recognizes that institutional and political constraints make itdifficult for any prime minister to emerge as a strong leader, althoughin his view Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Miki, Nakasone,

Takeshita and Hosokawa all played leadership roles, even though they were different kinds of leaders. Shinoda classifies them under fourbroad categories: political insiders, grandstanders, kamikaze fightersand peace lovers. These categories may have some utility for explaining

leadership at the national level. But they are not helpful forunderstanding leadership at the local level, where the hierarchy ofpower relationships through the centralized national structure sets in

train different political dynamics through which local administratorscan assert their leadership capacity.

Although local chief executives in Japan are constrained by ahighly centralized political system, they are not completely prevented

from exercising leadership at the local level. Local chief executivesare elected directly by constituents, unlike national leaders. Directelection of local leaders removes the layer of party politics at work inchoosing the national leader and gives local leaders some scope forovercoming local political and bureaucratic resistance to push theirown policy preferences. Local leaders derive their power directly from

the people in their area, giving them opportunity to take a strongerleadership role than their counterpart at the national level.

2. Types of Leadership

The vast comparative literature on political leadership is rich withdefinitions of leadership and typologies of political leaders (Sweeting2002, 4). Here I take up the concept that Burns (1978) advanced,


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which distinguishes between transactional and transformationalleadership. For Burns (1978, 18), leadership is exercised when people

with certain motives and purposes, who are in competition or conflictwith others, mobilize institutional, political, psychological, and other

resources to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. Trueleaders induce followers to act in accordance with the values and themotivations of both the leader and the followers themselves. Burnsdistinguishes between transactional and transforming leadership, theformer involving an exchange of valued things, and the latter anengagement in which leaders and followers raise one another to higher

levels of motivation and morality (Hanson 1999). Transformingleadership has a clear moral dimension.

Gergen (1999) claims that the line of transactional leaders is, Ifyou vote for me, Ill build a bridge in your neighbourhood, simply atransaction between leader and follower. However the transformationalleader awakens within the followers a desire to live in a better society

one more open, decent and caring. Gergen advocates

transformational leadership on this basis, since politics and public lifehave become almost entirely transactional, creating cynicism, distrustand disengaged citizens. Robinson (2000) advocates a similar position,

recognizing that in the 21st century, the days of incrementalimprovement are over, and require a new form of leadership thatinspires innovation, pioneering and creativity. For Robinson, theseneeds compel transformational leadership since its context includes

a kind of visionary acumen that can articulate winning and success ina way that captures the imagination of others. Transactional leadersaddress the material needs of followers while transformational leadersaddress the self-concept and self-worth of followers (Moyer 1996).

Distinguishing between transactional and transformationalleadership is a useful approach to understanding leadership at the local

level in contemporary Japan and the new challenge it presents to thenational level. We see some local leaders trying to move local politicallife from a series of practical transactions meeting material needs inexchange for votes and power to a fuller engagement with the citizenrythat includes guiding public conscience through their actions. Theselocal leaders are responding to mounting public cynicism and distrustof politicians. Their moves are a bid to raise the standards of public


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life using visionary acumen to capture the popular imagination atgrassroots level. It is an ambitious move by some local leaders totransform the desire of people within their communities for a moreopen, decent and caring society into a socio-political reality at all

levels of government.The moves by local leaders come at a time when it appears there

is no choice but to change, whether or not this change becomestransformative. Other internal and external forces largely inspired bythe impacts of globalization are forcing economic and philosophicaldislocation across society, and rendering the highly centralized, opaque

system of government untenable to many. This forces local leaders toinspire innovation, pioneering and creativity. Hence, the moves by localleaders and the visionary acumen driving them are a challenge notsimply to the national government but to the Japanese unitary state inits present form. These moves have potential to be transformational.

And they are now growing apace as the actions of a small group oflocal leaders builds momentum.

3. Japans Local Government

Japans local government consists of two layers: prefectural (to,do,fu

and ken) and municipal (shi,cho and son). There are 47 prefectures fromHokkaido in the north to Okinawa in the south and some 3200municipal governments. The latter include 13 large cities (legally calleddesignated cities) such as Yokohama and Kobe, which are huge in

both population and financial capacity, and many small towns andvillages with tiny populations that depend heavily on prefectural andnational governments financially and administratively. Each localgovernment is led by a political chief executive (prefectural governors,city mayors, and town and village heads) who is directly elected by theresidents of the locality. Each local government has an assembly of

local councillors, again directly elected. Separation of powers operatesat the local level with checks and balances between the executive andlegislative branches. The 1947 constitution includes a separate chapteron Japans local self-government (Chapter VIII, articles 92-95) thatsets out the broad legal parameters of local governance. Other detailsare codified in a number of laws, principally the Local Autonomy Law.

There is surely great variation between local governments in terms


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of their population, financial capacity and functions. This article focuseson medium-sized prefectures in regional Japan, recognizing thatconclusions drawn from these sample prefectures are broadly applicableto many other local governments including municipal administrations

large and small. Some city and town mayors have been very active ininitiating and implementing new ideas and policies in transformational

ways, and although these mayors are not under the spotlight here wecan speculate that the mayoral initiatives may resemble those of theirgubernatorial counterparts in motivation and style. I acknowledge thatmy empirical work, discussion and conclusions are by no means

definitive. Yet it is not my purpose here to advance grand conclusionsapplicable to all types of local governments in Japan. I believe thatinstead my analysis opens the window on some new directions in localpolitical leadership, with profound consequences if and as present trendsgain transformative capacity within Japans political system.

4. Past Examples of Local Leadership

Most studies concerning Japans local government have not addressedthe issue of leadership at the local level. Aqua (1982) is one of a fewexceptions. The absence is conspicuous even in most recent studies(Muramatsu, Iqbal and Kume 2001), although Chiba (2003) discussedthe issue in a cursory manner. Yet the virtual absence of scholarlyattention does not imply the absence of local political leadership. It ismore likely to reflect misguided assumptions that Japans unitary

political structure impedes upon or disables political leadership fromlocal political heads. As discussed below, however, especially in the1960s and 1970s there were some conspicuous examples of strongleadership by local leaders and their administrations.

Historical antecedents and a political culture that promoted top-down bureaucratic governance from prewar Japan prevailed in the early

part of the postwar period, despite a new status for local governmentset down in the 1947 constitution.2 But rapid industrialization andurbanization produced some dire social consequences that conservativelocal leaders with transactional approaches to politics ignored. Citizensmovements began to spread across Japan in protest at the nationalgovernments failure to take remedial action, but conservative localleaders kept their attention fixed narrowly on the mantra of economic


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growth. Progressive political parties (mainly the Socialist andCommunist parties) were unsuccessful in mounting a comprehensivechallenge at the national level and began to challenge conservativepolitical leaders at the local level. These parties and their candidates

promised to protect the interests of their local communities ratherthan functioning simply as a conduit of the national government, asdid most conservative chief executives. In response, many progressive(kakushin ) leaders were elected in large urban industrial centres suchas Yokohama, and soon the huge metropolises of Tokyo and Osakasaw the ascendance of progressive governors. After the 1975 unified

local elections, it was estimated that one third of Japans populationlived under progressive rule at the local level (Jain 2000a, 4).

Many of the progressive local chief executives took bold policyinitiatives in social welfare, such as providing better medical servicesand more child-care centres. They also established strict controls tocombat industrial and other types of pollution. These policy reformsmade major improvements to the lives of urban residents and other

industrial workers and their families.Progressive local leaders not only pursued innovative policies,

they also mounted a serious challenge to the national government and

its unyielding authority over local administrations. The relationshipbetween local and central governments and the issue of local autonomy

were brought under the spotlight as newspaper headlines drew attentionto vigorous citizens movements and the striking new policy initiatives

of progressive local leaders. Case studies of local policymaking in thisperiod suggest that the Japanese state was less centralised than manyobservers had assumed. These studies demonstrated that localgovernments and their chief executives had significant leeway in somepolicy matters as demonstrated by their ability to introduce new policiesand other reform measures within their local administrations. These

progressive local administrations in the 1970s set domesticallyunprecedented examples of what public administration could achieve,and by doing so helped to force the national government to revisesome of its strategies to at least match the popular policy directionsset by local leaders (Steiner et al. 1980; Muramatsu 1988; and Jain1989).

The political space that the unaddressed public dissatisfaction of

the late 1960s and early 1970s presented to the local progressives was


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clearly dissipating by the end of the 1970s as the reform movementlost momentum. Most star progressive governors and mayors had retiredfrom office or chose not to seek re-election. The central governmentsmeasured response and a national economic boom enabled the centre

to rein in the pressure for reform and importantly, to retain its tighthold on the local administrations. The brief fling of some electorates

with progressive administrations at the local level provided a releasefor voter frustration and the opportunity for some local leaders todemonstrate their leadership capacity, especially vis--vis the centre.

During the bubble economy of the 1980s, the coffers of many

localities bubbled with cash. This was a new period of constructionin Japan gymnasiums, halls, sporting arenas, roads, bridges and golfcourses as the political pork barrel was in full swing at the nationallevel. The public had less reason for political grievance and the centralgovernment had less challenge to retaining the political status quo.Citizens movements against dams, nuclear power plants and otherpublic policies that many found unacceptable continued, but in an

attenuated form. Local referendums against public works projects andother hazardous industries were proposed and carried out throughoutthe 1990s (Jain 2000b). Voices calling for local reform continued too

in the 1980s and early 1990s. But now these came from quartersdifferent from those in the 1970s.

5. Demand for Reform and Strong Leadership

From the early 1990s another shift in the condition of the nationaleconomy, this time a downturn into prolonged recession, set the stagefor the new wave of local reform and political leadership at the locallevel. Public alarm at exposure of political corruption in both levelsof government added credence to the views of local reformers.Meanwhile, national economic downturn and the consequences of

national adjustment to globalization drove the push for cleaner, leanergovernment at all levels. Thus a mix of economic and politicalimperatives from both external and internal sources has revitalized thereform movement in local government. It has created circumstances

where again local leaders are motivated to challenge the centralgovernment, but this time their motivations and the scale of their unitedefforts appear to be closer to a transformational style of leadership.


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This time the activist local leaders are seeking reform and have a firmerpolitical philosophy to drive it.

The electorates ouster of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)from national rule in 1993, although brief, provided the political space

for a few strong advocates of local government to secure influentialpositions in the new central government.3 The end of the LDPs centralmonopoly also prompted some local leaders to push more vigorouslyfor reform. The lesson that some local leaders took from the LDPouster was that the nations people clearly wanted their electedrepresentatives to be more responsible, and more responsive to the

needs of the people. A national system of government in which thelocal level was forced to submit to venal central control was no longertenable.

Revelations of corruption at the local level during the 1990sintensified both public dissatisfaction with politicians and the will ofreformers to overhaul the political system to remove its inherentcompulsions toward corruption. Some local governments drew the

wrath of the electorate for expenses from the public purse that citizensfound unacceptable. Under economic recession, the central governmenthad reduced its budget allocations to local administrations as an act of

financial stringency, which exacerbated the financial difficulties thatmany of the local governments were already battling. The recessionhad already hit local finances by reducing income from local corporatetaxes that are a vital source of independent revenue for the

administrations of most prefectures and metropolitan cities. Tocompensate for lost revenue, many local governments undertooksupplementary borrowing that raised their debt ratios to very high levels(Abe and Shindo 1997, 72).4

In these times of relative economic hardship with a muchdiscussed need for real financial stringency, citizens were outraged to

hear reports of their local politicians paper tours (kara shutcho) andlocal officials involvement in political deals using taxpayers money(kan kan settai entertaining central bureaucrats to court subsidies andother favours from the centre). Construction of bridges, dams androads was no longer popular among local residents, who began to watchthe expenditures of their local governments with much more criticaleyes. Public demand for local government transparency strengthened

considerably. Corrupt local leaders were forced to resign from their


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position and were replaced by new local leaders who promised to governin the interest of the community.5

Political corruption was not confined to the local level. In the1990s media also exposed corruption in the central bureaucracy, which

was widely assumed until then to be a bastion of propriety at the centreof the political system. The expose forced members of the public toquestion not only the bona fides of the central bureaucrats, but alsothe ethical capacity of central bureaucrats to work on managing localmatters. It was now becoming clear how far this responsibility for localaffairs could present a conflict of interest for bureaucrats whose primary

loyalties are with the central government locus of power to whichthey are primarily responsible. At various times from the 1970s, mediaexposure of bribery and other scandals brought to public attention thehigh level of corruption among the nations politicians and helped tobring down governments. In the 1990s it fed directly into publiccynicism, distrust and disengagement the public response that hasmotivated some local leaders to pursue as never before a reform agenda

with a new philosophy of political decentralisation to transform thenations political life.

Corruption is not the only problem begging transformative change

to the political system. The forces of globalisation and major advancesin information technology, both with mostly external origins, have alsoexposed the shortcomings of the present political system by highlightinghow tight centralization slows or disables local governments in

responding effectively to rapid change. These forces have exposed localgovernments to global competition in trade and commerce but thelocal governments do not have the independence or flexibility torespond as effectively as they wish. Some commercial arrangementsmade at the national level such as financial and market deregulationhave consequences at the local level that require swift policy responses

consistent with specific local needs or preferences. Yet, hamstrung bythe centres tight grip upon them, local governments have very littlecontrol over what they can and cannot do without central direction(Nagata 1999).6

Inflexibility has bred inefficiency in local government operationsthrough lost opportunities and other economic costs. Being slow torespond because they lack independence, local governments lose

competitive advantage in fast changing, highly competitive situations,


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which are the ever more common results of globalization andinformation technology. The centralized political structure thus createsthe political irony that we see at work from the 1990s. On the onehand it restricts the space in which local leaders can act independently

from the centre and demonstrate political leadership. But on the otherhand it fuels the desire among reformist local leaders to push harder toreform this system. Reformist local leaders are developing strongerpolitical will to push the centre towards granting them greaterindependence and making the nations political life more responsiveand open to the public. They are also directing their stronger political

will to demonstrate to the centre what they are capable of and howseriously they are motivated to change an outmoded system from thebottom up.

The discussion above points to the genesis of a new wave oflocal reform. Unlike the earlier reform movements, this one is notdriven exclusively by internal forces. A mix of factors is at work here,including globalisation and technological development, stronger public

support for decentralisation and demand for transparency, andrekindling of the earlier forces pushing for administrative reform. Itcreates circumstances conducive to local leaders asserting their

leadership capacity to demonstrate to all in the nation the capacity oflocal governments as responsible, capable, independent political actorsin a less centralized political system.

6. New-Wave Governors

New political and economic challenges arising from globalisation,technological advancement and fiscal difficulties have helped toproduce a new breed of governors in Japan. As noted before, this isnot a brand new phenomenon in Japans local politics. In the 1960sand 1970s new types of governors emerged, supported by the opposition

socialist and communist parties. Scholars, people of letters (bunkajin)and prominent party leaders such as Asukata Ichio of the SocialistParty were elected to head local governments as progressive chiefexecutives. Most of these progressive governors and mayors werebrought to office in major urban centres and metropolises such as

Tokyo and Osaka. However the new breed of reform-minded governorsin the 1990s has some characteristics very different from those of its

predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s.


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First, many have been elected as ainori (literally, sharing a ride)candidates, supported by most of the major political parties except the

Japan Communist Party. More than 80 percent of governors in placeafter the April 1999 unified local elections had run as ainoricandidates

(Jain 2002, 14). There is now also a growing trend for independentcandidates with no party support to run successfully for gubernatorialpositions. Ishihara Shintaro in Tokyo, Tanaka Yasuo in Nagano, Domoto

Akiko in Chiba and Hashimoto Daijiro of Kochi are telling examples.Second, because of the growing phenomenon of ainoriand no-

party support, the earlier ideological cleavage between progressive and

conservative chief executives is no longer salient in Japanese localpolitics. Nor are the new local leaders hostage to the ideologies andplatforms of the parties supporting them. They promote themselvesas localleaders, working in the interest of the locality that they representand not as an agent of the national government or of a political party.

Third, the new breed of governors is often labelled reformers (kaikaku-ha) as opposed to progressives (kakushin). Their aim is to reform the

political system by securing greater autonomy for local administrations,making decision-making channels transparent and open, and providingbetter services to the people. Their political philosophy is driven by

ideas of efficiency, managerialism and cost effectiveness, and they areincreasingly becoming internationalist. They make major decisionsbased on their own assessment of local interests and their own policypreferences and vision, rather than following party affiliations and

national guidelines.Fourth, unlike in the 1970s when progressive governors came to

power mostly in urban centres and metropolises, many of the currentreformist governors have emerged in regional and rural Japan, includingareas such as Nagano and Chiba prefectures that have beenconservative strongholds for long periods in postwar Japan. Finally,

the number of governors who are ex-bureaucrats is not declining, andnot all of these ex-bureaucrats tow the national political line oremphasise their national connection (chuo chokketsu). Indeed some ofthem are very critical of national policies and central control. 7 Newgovernors now come from all sorts of different backgrounds, stretchingfrom the bureaucracy (Katayama of Tottori and Asano of Miyagi),media (Hashimoto of Kochi and Domoto of Chiba) to literature and

public life (Tanaka of Nagano).


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7. Networking for Policy Coordination

Formal national associations of governors and mayors in Japan(Zenkoku Chijikai and Zenkoku Shichokai) meet regularly to discussissues of mutual interest. However, some local chief executives forminformal smaller groups to realize some common purpose beyond the

terms of reference of the national association. Progressive governorsin the 1960s formed their own association called the Association forProgressive Chief Executives of Japan (Kakushin Shichokai). Someof the new wave governors have also organised themselves in informal

groups to exchange ideas and act as a pressure group to seek greaterautonomy for local government. Here we see local leadership in action.One such group is Chiiki kara kawaru Nihon(Japan changing from

the regions), formed in 1998 by Kochi Governor Hashimoto Daijiro,Mie Governor Kitagawa Masayasu, Gifu Governor Kajiwara Taku,Miyagi Governor Asano Shiro, Iwate Governor Masuda Hiroya and

Akita Governor Terata Sukeshiro. Their aim is to articulate innovativeideas from the regions and introduce them as policy initiatives. Theysee political space for their actions at a time when the centralgovernment has demonstrated its inability to manage local problems

effectively, despite its overall responsibility. These governors recognisethat they are well placed to take this action rather than leave mattersto central bureaucrats who have demonstrated repeatedly that they

will perpetuate the systems tight centralisation. This group of localchief executives seems to have followed their progressive predecessorsof the 1960s and 1970s who recognised mutual benefit from sharing

views on their common interests in managing local administrations,and established an association to serve as a think tank for policy directions.

With like-minded reformist governors from Iwate, Miyagi andother prefectures, Mie Governor Kitagawa founded a study group in

July 2002 to promote further decentralization and this group has already

made recommendations to the central government to review its publicworks projects. Group membership has since expanded significantly

and now includes governors of Tottori, Gifu, Kochi, Wakayama, andFukuoka. One of the key drivers behind this group is the former Ministryof Finance official, also known as Mr Yen, Sakakibara Eisuke, whois now a professor at Keio University, a highly prestigious privateuniversity in Tokyo. In November 2002, the group announced the items


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on its agenda, which include information disclosure and assessment,transparency, competition, and partnership with the private sector(Chiba 2003). To amplify their voices nationally, the governors ofMiyagi, Mie and Kochi authored a popular book (Asano, Kitagawa

and Hashimoto 2002) calling for the regions to show nationalgovernment the path to reform and change. These initiatives by localleaders seeking to carry with them both the moral dimensions theconscience and the practical dimensions the actual support oftheir electorates suggest the qualities of transformational leadershipdiscussed earlier in this article.

8. Policy and Ideas

Most of these reformist governors have revolted against the prevailingtop-down rule, a disposition similar to that of their progressivecolleagues in the 1960s and 1970s. They have also opposed wastageof taxpayers money on building unnecessary dams and other public

works projects. Tanaka of Nagano opposed a dam that the

Construction Ministry wanted built against the wishes of local residents;Fukuda Akio in Tochigi won election on a similar platform. Domotoin Chiba opposed a land-reclamation project that Tokyos bureaucratshave been pushing for nearly 30 years. These reformist governorsconcern for the environment, their respect for peoples voices and theirconviction that change in Japan must begin from the regions distinguishthem from fellow transactional types of governors.8

So impressive are the ideas and policies of the reformist governorsand so powerful is their stance in Japans political life that The Economist

in London paralleled the governors transformative potential with thatof the samurai from the remote domains of Satsuma and Choshu whorestored the Meiji emperor and brought to a sudden end two-and-a-half centuries of rule by the Tokugawa Shogunate.(The Economist, 14

June 2001, www.epiphanycorp.com/jetaa_usa9/library/governors.html, accessed 7 January 2003). The current leaders are fromthe regional Japan, as were their samurai antecedents. Whether or notthese reformist local leaders will be able to transform the nationspolitical system as the Satsuma and Choshu samurai did in the past isquestionable. They have presented their vision and policies for theirlocal areas, and are increasingly forcing the national government to


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devolve power to the peripheries and modernize its outdated structuresustaining central control. They have also become a role model for thenational government for some initiatives concerning political style,including greater transparency and accountability in the political system.

The reformist local leaders are not simply pushing politicalrhetoric. The cases presented below reveal how these leaders havetaken concrete action and achieved some of their policy goals, andhave plans in place for implementing others. Reformist governors havealso focused on improving their economies. Governor Kimura of

Wakayama, for example, has generated jobs through a program of local

revitalization combined with the protection of nature (Hagami 2002,208-210). Governor Katayama of Tottori has generated jobs in theface of the ongoing economic slump by slashing the salaries of allprefectural workers by 5 per cent over a three-year period, using thesavings to hire additional employees under a work-sharing program.

The salary levels of Tottori civil servants subsequently fell to the lowestamong Japans 47 prefectures, but this self-declared New Deal policy

enabled the prefecture to add 170 new workers to its payroll. GovernorTanaka of Nagano has taken a more drastic approach by slashingprefectural employees salary by 10 per cent annually from 2002 for

three years in order to reduce the burden of prefectural debtaccumulated over the years. These are policies with practical outcomesbut they also carry the moral weight required of transformativeleadership to carry the will of the people with the will of the leader.

9. Case Studies

The new reformist movement that began to appear in Japan in the1990s was largely in response to the bursting of Japans bubbleeconomy, the IT revolution, and the gathering forces of globalization.

These forces began to harm localities economically as never before

and highlighted the dysfunctionality of the present unitary system. Theelectorate was aggrieved and responded with their votes to empower anew breed of local leaders advocating bottom-up reform of the politicalsystem.9

To illustrate the types of leadership roles that the new breed ofgovernors in Japan is playing, I present three case studies of governorsin Gifu, Mie and Miyagi prefectures. My findings here are informed


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largely by extensive interviews that I conducted in these prefectureswith senior officials and with Governor Kitagawa of Mie and GovernorAsano of Miyagi. These cases are drawn from regional Japan ratherthan from metropolitan and large prefectures such as Tokyo and Osaka,

prefectures that are economically powerful and politically influential.10

The rural and regional prefectures in Japan have accumulatedvast debts through borrowings to finance blind spending on publicworks projects. Conservative governors had built a financial pipelineto the national government and became highly dependent on centralsubsidies and other central assistance including borrowings. These are

also the areas where local leaders mounted large-scale constructionprojects heavily subsidized by the national government. These localleaders were captive to special interest groups, such as the constructionindustry, that delivered both the money and votes that are essential forelectoral success.

The case studies presented here are to illustrate the types oftransformative leadership that some prefectural governors are

exercising. These cases cannot depict comprehensively what 47prefectural governors from a range of backgrounds are doing. The twomajor types of reformist governors are: 1) bureaucrats who take early

retirement and run for gubernatorial positions; and 2) politicians whorun for gubernatorial positions after serving in various capacitiesincluding in local assemblies and/or in the national parliament.11 Iinclude both types in my case studies below.

Gifu Prefecture: Governor Kajiwara

Kajiwara Taku has been Gifus governor since 1989. His profile istypical of many past and current prefectural governors in Japan

(Kataoka 1997, 218).12 A graduate of Kyoto Universitys law facultyand a former Ministry of Construction bureaucrat, he is a native ofGifu where he attended school and studied at Kyoto University (secondin prestige after Tokyo University). In his capacity as a centralgovernment bureaucrat he was transferred to Gifu prefecturalgovernment for some time and was then appointed Vice Governor ofGifu in 1985 under Governor Uematsu Yosuke, before being elected

as governor in 1989. He is currently serving his fourth term in office.He is a typical conservative governor, supported ainori-style by theLDP, Komeito and the Democratic Party of Japan.


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Since he was elected as governor at the time when Japans bubbleeconomy and construction industry were booming, he felt it was naturalthat he would seek a number of construction projects including roadsand bridges to his local area, especially given his strong political and

bureaucratic links with the centre. However, Kajiwara wanted todistinguish himself from fellow bureaucrats-turned-governors byintroducing his own vision for the prefecture. Gifu is home to smalland medium-sized industries such as textiles (apparel) and ceramicsthat were losing their competitiveness to foreign producers andrelocating their manufacturing units in China in order to cut costs and

remain competitive. Kajiwaras plan therefore included making Gifu acentre of the new economy led by IT and software. He wanted toachieve this not just through the conventional methods of appealingto the central government for subsidies and inviting local businessesto his prefecture. He also tried to forge links with companies andgovernments overseas. One of his innovative potentiallytransformative leadership initiatives is establishing links directly with

partners abroad without taking the central government route.

Policy Initiatives in Gifu

Governor Kajiwaras primary objective from the beginning of his termwas to prepare Gifu for the 21st century, harnessing judiciously thetwin forces of globalization and information technology. He understood

well that Gifus traditional industries would not withstand the forcesof globalization and could not compete against goods produced incheap-labour countries like China. His focus was therefore on makingGifu a centre of IT industry. Sweet Valley, around the three Kisorivers was his answer to the looming forces of the 21st century. The

valley is located around the Nobi plain in southern Gifu and now boastsa high density of R&D sites in information, communications androbotics, including Softopia Japan and Technoplaza. Kajiwaras dreamfor Gifu is to make it a regional hub of what he termsjojo (comprisingtwo Japanese characters to mean information industry) as opposed tonojo (agriculture) and kojo (industry) of the previous centuries. The ideais to attract IT companies from throughout Japan and from overseas to

transform Gifu into a major IT centre in Japan. The advancements ininformation technology and presence of knowledge-based companiesare also expected to enhance the lifestyle of Gifu residents (e.g. when


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applied to providing welfare services) and local administration (suchas advancement in e-local government). In 2003, the Softopia Japanbuilding accommodates some 160 companies, including 35 foreigncompanies some of which are Silicon Valley-based Indian companies.

Softopia Japan has become a model hub of IT for several other Asiannations such as the Philippines, China and Hong Kong, whose officialshave visited the facility in the hope of establishing similar hubs intheir own countries.

Governor Kajiwara also aims to achieve excellence at theinternational level by making some Gifu products world class. His

administration and the residents of Gifu already take pride in Gifusinternational achievements: producing a top class marathon runner(gold medallist at the Sydney Olympics), a world karate champion, aNobel prize winner and a world-class pianist, three of whom are women.Kajiwaras administration is committed to helping people, industry andbusinesses, especially those who have the potential to excel at theglobal level. One such initiative is to produce first class designer

products in Gifu, and international trade links have been establishedfor these. Under the Oribe project,13 Gifu invites artists from aroundthe world to work with local industries and design new products that

are sold in both the national and international markets. Gifu has alsoformed an alliance with the Domus Academy in Italy to help activateits local industries.

Gifu prefecture has established a direct overseas partnership

program to promote exchanges conducted in a mutually beneficialspirit. The Gifu prefectural administration regards the prefecture asone sovereign nation since its economy is at par with those ofSingapore and Malaysia.14 Its GNP of US$78 billion ranked 37th in the

world and its per capita GNP of $37,030 ranked fourth in the world,at the same level as Denmark and Switzerland in 1999. Governor

Kajiwaras emphasis on international linkages is manifest in the directpartnerships that Gifu has with 22 countries in one or more fields (US,Brazil, Argentina, UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Finland,Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Russia,Israel, the Republic of Korea, China, India, Malaysia and Australia).Between 1989 and early 2002, the governor led 25 missions overseasin 27 countries, searching for trade linkages, investment opportunities

and other kinds of exchanges in Asia, Europe, the Americas and


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Oceania. Gifu has established 12 offices overseas destinations in suchcountries as China, Hong Kong, US, France, Germany, Italy and Holland.

Sceptics have raised questions about these huge projects (Softopiaalone is a 54 billion yen facility), trade missions and overseas offices

and their direct role in improving the Gifu economy. There is someclear evidence of economic benefits flowing from these projects, 15 butofficials admit readily that these are still early days for some of theseprograms. One official claimed that the governor is betting his politicallife on Softopia (Kruger and Fuyuno 2002, 32). Governor Kajiwara iscertainly aware of the risks, but he sees that laying the blame for the

national economic recession on Tokyo is not the way out and theprefecture must work its own way out.

This governor is a regional advocate in his reformist position,claiming For Japan to change drastically, the regions must first changedrastically. We need the pioneer spirit (Kruger and Fuyuno 2002, 32).16

He is also an internationalist. His strategy to change Gifu is via buildingcloser alliances that extend beyond the limits of nationality, language,

race, culture and religion, as the projects discussed above indicate.Governor Kajiwaras ideals may be lofty, but as the data presentedhere indicate, he is certainly taking a broad range of practical initiatives

that appear designed to carry the people of Gifu forward with his ownpolitical vision. We could describe this as the type of visionary acumenthat can articulate winning and success in a way that captures theimagination of others, as Robinson (2000) casts the context of

transformative leadership.

Mie Prefecture: Governor Kitagawa

Kitagawa Masayasu is a native of Mie Prefecture and was elected its

governor in 1995. A graduate of Waseda Universitys commercedepartment, he entered prefectural politics and was elected to the localassembly in 1972, where he served close to three terms until 1983.

That year he was elected as an LDP member to the Lower House ofparliament where he served four terms until 1995. During hisparliamentary career, he also served as LDP deputy secretary-general.

A year before his retirement from the Lower House he left the LDP

and joined Shinshinto (New Frontier Party) in 1994. Kitagawa firstran for the governorship of Mie Prefecture in 1995 with support fromShinshinto, the predecessor of the Liberal Party.17 He defeated Ozaki


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Takeo, a former vice governor supported by the LDP. Kitagawa wonhis second term in 1999 as an ainoricandidate, supported by all politicalparties except the Japan Communist Party. While most people insideand outside the prefecture expected him to run for his third term in

April 2003, especially given his high popularity among voters, to thesurprise of many, in November 2002 Kitagawa announced his intentionnot to seek a third term and accordingly retired from this position in

April 2003.18

Kitagawas conservative political background suggested he wouldbecome a typical LDP policy-oriented governor favouring close ties

with the construction industry and relying on central subsidies andhandouts. Far from this typecast, however, Kitagawa returned to hisnative prefecture with new political agendas driven by a clear policyorientation at odds in many ways with the LDP party philosophy. LikeKajiwara above, Kitagawa recognized the need to tackle at theprefectural level the serious challenges facing Japan. He saw the erosionof peoples trust in public administration and politics as the result of

bad policies, corruption and putting the taxpayers interests last. Whathe saw in Japans body politic is precisely what Gergen (1999) claimedare the results of transactional leadership: cynicism, distrust and

disengaged citizens.Kitagawa therefore set as his first task restoring peoples

confidence in their prefectural administration, a task he felt was possibleonly by taking into account the views of taxpayers. This meant

reorienting policy focus away from the supply side and toward thedemand side through changes in administrative procedures and rules(interview with Governor Kitagawa, 31 January 2003).19 For Kitagawa,the practices of Japans centralized administration and nationwidestandardization were out of step with global trends that demandflexibility, efficiency and competitiveness. He saw the solution in locally

based policies that develop a sense of ownership among stakeholderswithin the locality the essential conditions for making Mie a prefecturein which its residents took pride. We see here direct parallels withGovernor Kajiwaras philosophy on Gifu residents identifyingthemselves as stakeholders in the prefecture.

Kitagawa pursued a number of dramatic policy initiatives tointroduce a new paradigm in prefectural management. One was to

make the prefectural administration as transparent as possible by


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opening up the administrations culture long characterized by secrecyand internal negotiations, through an information-disclosure policy inall areas of public administration. Mie is not the first local governmentin Japan with an information-disclosure ordinance,20 but Mie has the

most comprehensive plan, with more disclosure rules than most localadministrations allow. Another was introducing some basic principlesof private-sector management: least cost with best results. Resistanceto his new philosophy and practice was expected, especially from theprefectural civil service. Nevertheless, after more than 10,000 hoursof dialogue to induce what he calls change in attitude (ishi kaikaku)

of prefectural employees, Kitagawa secured prefectural employeescommitment to his principles. A third initiative was introducing a cost-performance assessment system for budget compilation to comply withthe principle of administrative accountability.

Other moves in administrative reform had an eye to environmentalprotection. Kitagawa was also the first governor to legislate an ordinanceto tax industrial waste, aiming to reduce production of industrial wastes

and encourage recycling. His prefectural office launched an ecofficecampaign; prefectural offices now do not have a rubbish bin and staffare encouraged to dress casually during summer to save energy by

lowering the demand for air conditioning. Mie has received severalprizes for its energy efficient and green-oriented office, proudly holdingan International Organization for Standardization certificate ofEnvironmental Management systems. Indeed, Mie prefectural office

serves as a national role model.Governor Kitagawa also took a number of bold steps that made

it clear he was taking into account the views of local people as residentsand taxpayers. In February 2000 he cancelled a nuclear power plantproject that created a feud among local residents for about 40 years.

The plan to construct two reactors in Ashihama, a scenic coastal area

in Mie prefecture, had remained the subject of a prolonged and bitterconfrontation since 1963 when a local utility company, Chubu ElectricPower, made a proposal to build this power plant. Governor Kitagawabroke the stalemate by cancelling the project, citing in front of localpoliticians a lack of consensus among local residents, especially in thelight of recent nuclear accidents in other parts of Japan (Watts 2000).

Yet Kitagawa was also very mindful of the critical economic

situation in the nation and in his own prefecture. Unlike many other


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regional prefectures, Mie is home to large industrial complexes; bestknown is Yokkaichi Petroleum. With the old industrial structurebecoming obsolete, the governor began to focus on new industriessuch as IT and communications to regenerate Mies economy. He

therefore cited with a great sense of achievement being successful inattracting Sharp Corporation to Mie to produce state-of-the-art products,after offering the corporation a substantial prefectural subsidy of 9billion yen to relocate in Mie.

We see here that Mies economic regeneration programs arefocused primarily on domestic industries, unlike Gifus that are focused

on domestic and international linkages.21 Currently, Mie has four majorplans for economic and technological advancement: medical, silicon,crystal and pearl valley programs, each focusing on new and emergingtechnologies of the 21st century. Toshiba is a part of the Crystal Valleyprogram and has generated more than 1200 jobs in the prefecture. Abetter employment environment is expected after most economicregeneration plans are implemented (Interview, 31 January 2003).

Through a broad range of moves such as these, many with a moralas well as an instrumental tow, Kitagawa has implanted a newparadigm in prefectural management and political philosophy at the

local level. He has also carved out a reputation as an eminent reformistgovernor. Most stakeholders in the prefecture have approved ofKitagawas paradigm shift to a managerial style of administrationand he has received national and international media acclaim. Here

too we see a governor with apparently visionary acumen, taking aproactive policy position to proceed with potentially transformativeleadership initiatives. Many other local leaders are apparently inspiredby the kinds of initiatives that Kitagawa took in Mie.22

Miyagi: Governor Asano

As with the two governors discussed above, Asano Shiro also servesas governor of his native prefecture and has been in this position since1993. He was born in Sendai where the prefectural headquarters arelocated.23 A graduate of Tokyo Universitys Faculty of Law, he enteredthe Ministry of Welfare in 1970. While he was serving as Director of

the Panning Division in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, a majorscandal broke in his native city Sendai and then in Miyagi prefectureitself. In early 1993 the mayor of Sendai was arrested on bribery charges.


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Three months later, then Governor Honma Shuntaro was also forcedto resign. He was later arrested on charges of accepting bribes fromgeneral contractors (zenekon ). This type of corruption through kankan settai (official to official entertainment practices) is typical of the

political culture in regional Japan. Local politicians forge strongconnections with the national government and its bureaucracy to securefunds for public works programs in the localities. At the local levelpoliticians establish close links with construction and other public-

works related companies that thrive on government constructionprograms and in turn offer huge amounts of money to local politicians

coffers, mostly illegally. Yet for both the mayor of a city where theprefectural headquarters is located and the governor to be arrested onbribery charges within a space of three months was exceptional. Asanosaw this as a sign that something was seriously wrong with Sendaispolitical culture and administration (Interview, 4 February 2003).

Just three days before the deadline for registration of candidatesin the local electoral office, Asano resigned his secure bureaucratic

position and decided to run for the gubernatorial position as anindependent candidate without the backing of any political parties. Insubsequent elections in 1997 and 2001, Asano refused any support

from political parties and launched a grassroots campaign withvolunteers collecting 100-yen donations from citizens (Asahi Shinbun[Miyagi edition] 2 and 19 November 2001).24

Given the circumstances under which Asano was elected in 1993,

one of his major aims was to clean up Miyagis administration andrestore peoples trust in politicians and administrators. 25 Thus one of

Asanos policy successes is his contribution to dealing with endemicstructural corruption. Asano recognized transparency as the key toremoving corruption and other unethical political practices, to restorepeoples trust in public administration. In a letter to all senior members

of the Miyagi civil service typical of Asanos hard line on corruptionAsano wrote:

We must choose one of two avenues. Either we will sincerely devoteourselves to explication of the real truth, or we will direct all of our effortsto protection of prefectural officials, even if it means concealing the truth.In all ways, we will seek to show the truth. This statement is not merely fordiscussion; this is an order. For those who cannot follow this guideline,resignation is the only course (published inAsahiNewspaper, reproducedin Repeta2001, 4).


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The road to stamping out what has been standard practice formost of the postwar period in a regional prefecture is, of course, noeasy task. Asano faced intense bureaucratic and political resistance tofully implement the freedom of information ordinance. For example,

the prefectural police department resisted the Governors pressure andfound a powerful ally in the local assembly, which sided with it tooppose the governors proposal to make police records available forpublic scrutiny.

Asanos aim to make his administration transparent and makepast cases of corrupt practices available for public scrutiny was

extenuated by an already a strong public movement in Sendai demandingthe administration submit all entertainment expenditures before a civilombudsman, formed by a group of local lawyers. But Miyagi officialscontinued to refuse disclosure of public expenditures. In 1995, thelocal lawyers filed suit in the Sendai District Court under the Miyagiinformation disclosure ordinance. This put Asano under the spotlightas he was elected on the promise of striving for clean politics and

transparent administration. As governor, he was named a defendant ina suit asking the government to open its files. Asano surprised many inthe prefecture by not taking the traditional transactional path of

governors who would have resisted public pressure. In fact, not onlydid he not appeal a district court ruling and complied with citizensdemands to reveal information about the prefectural governmententertainment expenses on central bureaucrats, he gave them morethan

they asked for. Miyagi prefecture delivered data on expenses for foodand drinks for the entire government rather than just the threedepartments targeted by the Ombudsman (Repeta 2001, 5). Accordingto newspaper reports, this disclosure of information case in Miyagieventually led the central government to ban its bureaucrats from thepractice of entertaining each other.26

We see here how Asanos bid to clean up political life from thelocal level up is driven by a strong vision to reform not just themechanics of political life but also the values that set thesearrangements in place and give life to the political system. As with theother two leaders discussed above, we see this leader exercising thekind of visionary acumen that captures the imagination of others.Instead of, indeed to end, the succession of transactional leaders who

by narrowly addressing the material needs of followers have helped to


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embed channels of corruption within the political system, Asano isshowing the signs of transformational leadership to restore faith ingovernment by bringing higher standards to public life.

10. Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn based on the preceding discussion.First, more and more prefectural political chief executives in Japan aredemonstrating their willingness to take strong leadership in a range ofpolicy areas. Many of their policies have been adopted and implemented

in the face of tough resistance coming from different quarters, bothlocally and nationally. Cancellation of dam projects and nuclear power

plants, and the introduction of industrial waste taxes have attractedboth supporters and critics. This is of course not the first time that thephenomenon of innovative and bold policy measures at local level hasappeared in Japan. Indeed, this can be regarded as the second wave ofpostwar local leadership in Japan first, it emerged in the 1960s whenmany urban centres of Japan were governed by progressive chief

executives. In recent years, local leaders of varying political persuasionshave revived the tradition of transformational type of local leadership,first established by progressive local chief executives. Reform,decentralization, transparency, information disclosure, responsibility,efficiency, and public participation have become part of the newpolitical lexicon in Japans local administrations, most clearly articulatedand implemented by the new breed of governors.

Second, the new wave governors may not be radical, but neitherare they purely traditional or incremental. Some of their actions havebeen path breaking, as we see in all three of the case studies. Theyhave certainly made significant advances in administration bychallenging some of the old ways of conducting public administrationand fundamentally altering them. They have championed the cause of

administrative transparency and public participation, as is amply evidentin the cases of Mie and Miyagi. They have also gone beyond the typicalincremental change process and are building a new political culture

within, but in some ways to replace existing frameworks. They havedistinguished themselves from their conservative predecessors and someof the currently serving governors by adopting policies that have earnedthem accolades in their own area, nationally and internationally.27


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Third, while it is indisputable that there is significant andqualitative improvement in local political leadership, one needs to keepin mind that they are localleaders. Some of the qualities expected fromtransformational leadership may be more relevant for national leaders.

It is not easy for local political leaders to make radical changes, as theyhave to operate within legal frameworks on which they have littlecontrol. That is why theirs is a bid to induce far-reaching systemicchange from the bottom up. Undoubtedly they are sending the rightkinds of signals about the need for transformative change to all in thispolitical system residents of the locality, local bureaucrats, local

industry, and to the national government. They have also organizedthemselves in various national networks of like-minded chiefexecutives and are in the process of presenting their ideas to the nationalgovernment to change its traditions and modernize publicadministration, appropriate for a powerful industrial nation in the 21st

century. Together they are likely to present a formidable force which isworth closer attention.

Finally, it is important to observe that local political leaders in Japan need to maintain a balance between transactional andtransformational types of leadership styles. There is no denying that

the era of a typically transactional type of leadership that broadlycharacterized postwar local administrations is slowly coming to an endin Japan. But this does not necessarily lead to the rise of idealtransformational types of leaders as local politicians in Japan, as in

most countries, have to constantly juggle and balance their new ideaswith old practices. Leach and Wilson have observed that if the leaderturns too much towards the forces of tradition, then he/she is in dangerof losing credibility in the eyes of the modernizers. On the other hand,if leaders push too strongly in the direction of reform and heterodoxy,their own position might become vulnerable (Leach and Wilson 2002,

685). However, given that ordinary people in Japan demand governmentto be responsive, it is more likely now than before that many localleaders in Japan will move further along the reformation path. Their

voices and actions, however, will be more effective if they form astrong network of reformist chief executives. They will then be betterable to build nationwide consensus on crucial system concerns:decentralization of functions and authority, policy change, participation,

transparency, and partnerships between government, private and non-


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government organizations. The new era, characterized by technologicalinnovations and globalization, certainly requires a moretransformational style of leadership as we are beginning to see in somelocal administrations, but considerable change of attitude on the part

of a range of policy actors will be required to bring real transformativechange in Japans political life and its system.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Leadership in Japan: Transactionaland Transformative International Workshop held in Brisbane, February 20-21, 2003.

The paper is part of my larger research project on Japans local government for whichfinancial support has been received from the Australian Research Council under its LargeGrants Scheme. Many colleagues and officials at various levels in Japan have helped me

with this research project over the past several years. The author is especially grateful to DrGreg Story, Senior Austrade Commissioner in Tokyo and his colleagues in regional

Japan for organizing interviews with governors and officials of a number of prefecturesduring my field research for this paper in late January and early February 2003. The author

would also like to thank Governor Kitagawa of Mie (retired in April from this position)and Governor Asano of Miyagi and high-ranking officials of Gifu Prefecture (especiallyas Governor Kajiwara had to cancel an interview appointment with this author due tosome other pressing matters) for their time and interviews.2. The prewar Meiji Constitution made no mention of local government.

3. Hosokawa Morihiro who headed a coalition government following LDPs defeat in1993 is the only former governor who has served as prime minister of Japan.4. For example, the component of local taxes fell from 42.6 per cent of the total in 1989to 37.8 per cent in 1992 and 33.9 per cent in 1994. Similarly the local allocation tax (ageneral equalization grant) fell from 18 per cent in 1989 to 17.1 per cent in 1992 and 16.2per cent in 1994. To cover these shortfalls, local governments increased their revenuethrough local bonds. The share of revenue from this source increased from 7.5 per centin 1989 to 11.2 per cent in 1992 and 14.9 per cent in 1994.5. The most recent example is Tokushima Prefecture where Governor Endo Toshio (aformer Transport Ministry official) who favoured construction of a local dam was involvedin a bribery scandal. He resigned from his position in March 2002. He was charged, finedand sentenced to three years in prison, but suspended for four years (this means he will

not have to serve prison unless he repeats the offence). Endo was replaced by OtaTadashi who is supported by broad sections of the local people, who favour both cleanpolitics and a no-dam policy.6. Nagata cites a number of examples of Japans central government committing localgovernments to international obligations without prior consultation.7. A former Ministry of Home Affairs official, Governor Katayama Yoshihiro of Tottoriis one such example. See his article (2002).8. For example, the disgraced and pro-dam governor of Tokushima Prefecture, Endo

Toshio.


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9. Hashimoto Daijiro, elected as governor of Kochi Prefecture in 1991, is one of the firstsuch reformist (kaikaku-ha) governors.10. One could probably argue that Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro is also a reformistgovernor (kaikaku-ha chiji), but because of his nationalistic fervour and because Tokyo isa relatively rich prefecture, I have not taken up Tokyo in my discussion here.11. According to Kataokas data, 43 of 47 prefectural governors in 1995 came either fromthe bureaucracy or through political career. Kataoka (1997), p. 218.12. In 1995, 34 of the 45 prefectural governors came from the central and local bureaucracies.13. A native of Gifu, Oribe Furuta was a tea master during the 16th century. Hedemonstrated his genius in his creations ranging from the inventive designs of teaceremony rooms to his bold artistic expressions in ceramics. Gifu prefecture has produceda manga book on Oribe Furuta, written by Machiko Satonaka and Moribi Murano. In

2001 Gifu Prefecture published the English edition, Oribe Furuta: Warrior and Tea Man.14. Local officials throughout Japan are fond of comparing their locality with a sovereignnation. A former Saitama official (on loan from the Ministry of Home Affairs) told methat he produced various statistics to Governor Tsuchiya to convince the governor thatSaitama Prefecture should regard itself as a medium-sized industrialised European nationand project itself accordingly.15. The governors office has produced many statistics that show economic benefitsflowing to the prefecture. Some of these statistics were made available to this authorduring the interview process.16. Gifu Shinbuncarried a series of articles (some 52 of them) over a period of sixmonths from June to December 2002 under the broad title of chiho ga Nihon o kaeru(The localities that will change Japan).

17. In August 2003, the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party of Japan, whichwas then led by Kan Naoto.18. There is an ongoing debate among reformist governors about the maximum numberof terms that governors should seek. Some have proposed two, others argue for three,

while still others think there should be no limit.19. Governor Katayama of Tottori takes a similar view. In an article published in Chihozeiin May 1998, Katayama, then a section chief in MOHA emphasized the importance oflocal residents as taxpayers whose views should matter very much, rather than localadministrations treating local residents simply as objects under their administration ashas been the case throughout postwar (quoted in Chiiki Seisaku, July 2002, 33).20. The first to establish such an ordinance was the small town of Kanayama in rural

Yamagata Prefecture in 1982, some 17 years before the national government passedlegislation on information disclosure. It is interesting to note that some small localitiesin regional Japan have been at the forefront of new initiatives like this. In Niseko inHokkaido Prefecture, a town with a population of about 4500, mayor Osaka Seiji madeall kinds of information available when he was elected in 1994, including access to allmeetings held at the section chief level. In 1999, around 20 per cent of local governmentsin Japan had arrangements in place to allow public access to information, although manydo not allow the public to access the deliberations of local assemblies and othergovernment services such as police (Jain 2000a, 12-13).21. However, a Mie official indicated that the prefecture rents some commercial space in


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Singapore, which is made available to Mies venture companies for a nominal amount(interview, 31 January 2003).22. In my many interviews with local officials throughout Japan in connection with mylarger project, references to Kitagawas administration were made several times.23. After I completed my interview with the governor, he very proudly pointed his fingerin the direction of a building which was his high school in Sendai, visible through theglass window of the site where the interview was conducted.24. According to the 2001 Zenkoku shucho meibo (directory of Japans local chief executives,2001) produced by Jichi Kenkyusho, Asano received indirect support from the SocialistParty.25. One of the most important policy initiatives of Governor Asano is in the field ofsocial welfare programs, with his vision to make Miyagi Prefecture Number One in

welfare. SeeMiyagi no fukushi yume puran: Nihon ichi no fukushi senshinkenzukuri(Visionplan of welfare in Miyagi: towards constructing a number one developed welfare prefecturein Japan). Heisei 9-nen 9-gatsu sakutei, heisei 14-nen 3-gatsu chukan minaoshi (March2002 mid-term review of September 1997 Welfare Plan), Miyagi Prefecture, July 2002.26.Asahi Shinbun, 18 May 1999.27. Many of the internationally renowned media outlets such as the EconomistandGuardianfrom England, Time Asia, Business Week and the International Herald Tribunehave covered stories on these new wave Japanese local chief executives.

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