AROUND THE WORLD

JapanesePolitics in Flux:Mixing Idealism and Realism

After almostforty yearsof relativestasis,theJuly electionsin Japanhavebroughtaboutshiftsin thebalanceof political power which haveleft the Liberal DemocraticParty LDP not inthemajority for the first time since1955. Both Japaneseand foreign analystsare striving tounderstandtheprocessof changeand the pathwhich the politics of this world economicgiantwill take.

by Nicholas Breyfogle

A round the world, political analysts watched with batedbreathas Japanwent to the poils on July 18, 1993. For

the first time since 1955, the Japanesefaced the prospect ofagovernmentnot dominatedby the Liberal DemocraticPartyLDP. Certainly, the LDP reignhad never seemed whollysecure,but an LDP majority and a stable Japanesepoliticalsystemseemedto be establishedtruths.

The electionswere not the first signs toappearof thebreakdownof LDP hegemonyand of the political consensusthat hadbrought Japansuccessfully through the postwarperiod. In the 1970s andl980s, the Japanesepoliticalestablishmentwas challengedby chargesof corruption-illicit connectionsto large corporationsandorganizedcrime.They havealso sufferedunderpolicy criticisms of the relative slowdown in Japanesegrowth sincethe mid-1970s,as well as of the pricepaid bythe Japanesepeopleboth inenvironmentalterms and asconsumersin a producer-oriented society. Early thisspring, the LDP felt the shockwaves fromthe formation ofnew political parties by split-off LDP membersand theywere staggeringfrom theimpact of a resulting no confidence vote, that led to themostrecentelections.

As expected, Japanesevoters-apparentlytired ofLDP hegemony,corruption,and statusquo attitude-cast

Nicholas Breyfogle is a PhD

candidate in history at the

Universityof Pennsylvania.

their lot with the string of new parties. The LDP remainedthelargestparty in the Diet with 227 seatsbut failed to win thenecessary256 to constitutea majority in the 511-seathouse.The other postwarparty, the Social Democrats,also sufferedaseriouselectoral setbackas their representation droppedfrom134 to 70 seats. Afterthe haggling was doneand the dusthadsettled,a seven-partycoalition pushedthe LDP over into theoppositionand Morihiro Hosokawa, leader ofthe JapanNewParty which had won only 35 seats, assumedthe mantle ofPrimeMinister.

At stakein the whole proceedingswere some very fundamentalquestionsthat will directlyaffect Japanese";.iety. Thecoalition-composedof theJapanNew Party,JapanRenewalShinseito Party, and New PartyHarbingerall center-rightalongwith the leftist Social DemocratsandDemocraticSocialistsas wellas the Clean GovernmentKomeito Party and a few independents-hascome to a consensus for the momentthat, by allaccounts,will be difficult to prevent from fragmenting. Theyhave unitedin the desire toreform the existing politicalorder, but the vision of the futureoften differs from groupto group.

Overall, the coalition hasagreed to freer, more opendebate, toa greateropenness tothe outside world, tothe decentralization of the Japanesepolitical structure,and to the reform of‘JapanInc.’-that seamlessinterweavingof politicians, bureaucratsand businessinterestswhichhas been the trademark ofJapanesegovernancein the postwarera and the causenot only ofgreat economic success butalsoof much highly publicizedcorruption. They call for electoral

"JapaneseGothic:" Supportfor theLDP has beentraditionally highin rural areas. [Christopher Travel!]

SEPTEMBER1993 ORIGINS . 7

reform that would end the current structure-socrucial toLDP electionsuccessbecauseofthe weight it gives to ruralareas-inwhich multiple candidates are electedfrom the sameriding. Further, as Hosokawahas stated: "It is time to admitcandidly that Japanhas so farput its highestpriority on economic developmentand hasnotpaid sufficient attention toimproving the quality of life foreachand every person."

Political pundits are struggling to understandthe meaningof the recentelections. Fromone perspective,some arguethatthe changesare superficial.They point to the LDPoriginsof the reform movement’sleadership as well as the similarityof political ideology and arguethat it will be businessas usual,only undernew peopleand a new guise. Othersassertthat thepace of any change will be slow. No matter how much thepoliticians want reform, the power of the bureaucracyinJapanesepolitics makesovernightalterationsimprobable.

From the otherperspective, commentators,like Tomoakilwai, professorof political scienceat Tokiwa University,believe that "it is the startof realpolitics," and that these shiftsin the political spectrumare only the beginningof much morefundamentalchangesin the structure of Japanitself. For whatis perhapsthe first time in Japanese history,a group of politicianshaveopenly challengedthose foundationsof governmentthat haveservedJapanadmirably through its "economicmiracle" from the late nineteenthcentury to the present. Moreim’ ortantly, whereas politicalpartieshave traditionallyfoundtheir power source in the industrial conglomeratesand locallevel bureaucracy,the new coalition has looked to the will ofthe peoplefor supportand legitimacy.

The Meiji RestorationJapan’sfirst steps in the realm of democraticpolitics followedon thehealsof the Meiji Restorationof 1868. At that time, theexisting military-feudal systemof governmentthe TokugawaShogunatewas toppledand the Emperor‘restored’ to the topof the political order. Sincethe early 1 600s, the Shogunmilitary leader,rather than the Emperor, had beenthe nation’spolitical and administrativeleader. The Restorationstemmedfrom a combinationof internal and external factors.The internal forces-economicdecline of the landowning nobility, therising merchantclass and frustrationat the rigidity of the hierarchical administrativestructure-wereby far the most important. Theexternalfactorsactedonly as a catalyst.

From themid-1850s,internal loss ofconfidencein theTokugawaShogunatecoincided withthe arrival of the West.Foreign ships steamedinto Japaneseports, with theUnitedStates underCommodorePerry leadingthe way. Under thethreatof superiorforce, theJapanesesigneda seriesof unequaltrading treatiesgiving the Westernersaccessto Japanesemarkets and resourcesas well as extraterritoriality for their representatives. When the TokugawaShogunateproved unableto

"expel the barbarian",otherJapanese patriotsmoved toconfrontthe nation’s relativeweaknessthemselves.

The reversal of theseunequal tradingtreaties-andwesternacceptance of Japanasan equal world power-became the primarygoal of thenew Meiji leadershipand permeatedmost actionsof theMeiji governmentoutsideofpersonalinterestsof the variousleaders. In their strides toovercomethe weaknessesandfailures of Tokugawagovernment and in the searchfornational security,the newMeijileaders introducedan efficient,centralized, bureaucratized,and industry-focusedpoliticalstructure. Moreover, they fostereda national ideology thatwould speakto the masses,

capture theirallegiance,and bring them into the new politicaland social order as active,while controlled, participants.

The 1889 Constitution and the Birth ofDemocracyMost Western nations,especiallythe United States, wouldnotconsidera revision in the unequaltreatiesuntil Japancouldprove herself civilizedand moderni.e. democraticand capitalist. After a greatdeal of debate, the majority of Meijileadersbelievedthat to matchthe West, Japan mustbecomemore likethe West. Yet, the ‘West’ was by no meansa monolithic blockand therewas not one ‘West’ to copy. During the 1870sandl880s, Japaneseleaderswere dispatchedon international factfinding missions to determinewhat partsof the westernworldwere best to appropriate.

In 1889, the Meiji leadershipfixed upon a Prussian-styleconstitution and assembly structure:known in Japanas the"Emperor System". As is clear from the name, the Emperorheld thepre-eminent positionconstitutionally. However,despitehis theoreticalpowers, the Emperorwas not intendedtorule directly but, rather, tolegitimize the policies of the rulingelites and ministers. Thus, the political structurewas dominated by a small group of Meiji oligarchswho administeredandengineeredthe processof change. Theseelites chosethePrime Minister and the cabinet of ministerswho stood atopthe newly formed and highly efficient civil bureaucracyasdirect advisorsto the Emperor,often from within their ownranks. They also acted as the arbitersbetweenthe differentloci of political authority outlinedin the constitution-betweenthe parliament/politicalparties, the military establishment,thebureaucracy,the Emperorand the zaibatsulargemonopolisticindustrial-businesscombines.

As one historian hasnoted: "The Meiji constitutionenvisaged a politicalcommunitydirected by a small elite at the headof an extensivebureaucracy.In theory, the elite would consultpublic opinion as it was expressedin the Diet, but the elitewould be fundamentallyneutral, standing abovegroups andfactions representedin the legislature and acting in the interestsof the whole nation."

[Electromap, inc.]

8 ORIGINS . SEPTEMBER1993

The military-whose importancewas unparalleledinJapaneseprocessesof self-strengthening-helda special,autonomousposition, answerableonly to the Emperor. At thesametime, businessand industrial interestsalso came to takecentral stage.The success ofthe large conglomerates, whichhad begun todevelopin the Tokugawayears, was deemedimperativeand they were given extensivegovernmentprivilegeand support.

Popular governmentwas limited. The newly createdparliament-aconsultative electedassemblywith voting restrictions-waserectedby the Meiji elite for reasonsthat were notalways connectedtn estern democraticprinciples. On onehand, manyJapaneseleadersarguedthat theonly way inwhich they would ever competewith westernstrengthwouldbe to adoptwestern practices.On theotherhand,certainelitesbelievedthat if they were to haveany hope of reversingtheunequaltreatiesand andreconstructingJapan’simage abroad,they would have to appear‘civilized’ to the western world.Thus, whilethey maynot haveagreedin the inherentsuperiority of westernpolitical structures,they realizedthat the adoption of parliamentaryand democraticpracticeswas required,atleastin form, to placatewestern desires.

There was hardly unanimityover the imposition of theparliamentarysystem. Many of the Meiji eliteconsideredpolitical parties,and especiallyoppositiongroups,to be wrongto the point of immoral. Consensusratherthan confrontationwere thecharacteristicsthe Meiji stroveto enhance.

Thus,Japanesedemocracywas born from above,not frombelow. Participation in governmentwas not necessarilyconsideredan innateright. Ratherthan an institution that wouldreflect and representthe will of the people,the nationalassembly was to be an institution that would transmitthe wills andgoals of the Meiji oligarchsto the populace while explaininggovernmentpolicies and educatingthe public in the art of participatory government.

Moreover, the parliamentwould serve as a safetyvalve.In the course of their missions abroadthe Meiji leaders hadwitnessedthe social dislocationsthat rackednewly industrialized countries. The Meiji governmenthopedto avoid thesepitfalls through a national assemblythat would foster a senseof national unity and loyalty amongthe Japanese people and,in theory, overrideany divisive tendencies.

As the historian KennethPyle haswritten, the Meiji leaderswere "intent upon finding ways of spurring on the populace,ofachievingnational unity, and of preventingharshantagonismsthat would make impossible-orat leastmuch moredifficult-the taskof building an industrial society." As a result, the Meijileadersfostereda national ideology that would be strongenough toconfront the strains ofindustrial change butonewhich also had resonancebecauseof its deeproots in the culture of the Japanesepeople: socialharmony,selflessdedication,loyalty, obedience,deferenceto authority,and subordinationofindividual intereststo consensusand community.

Taisho DemocracyThe passingof the Meiji Emperorin 1912and the successionofthe EmperorTaisho 1912-26 servesas a benchmarkforchangesin the Japanese politicalspectrum. If the Meiji periodwas characterizedby consensusand a uniform dedicationtostrengthening Japan,the Taishoera saw thedemiseof this unity.

The political-economicstructureerectedby the Meiji ohgarchshad worked exceptionallywell in bringing about anunprecedentedlyrapid and successfulindustrialization of

Japan.Theirefforts appearedvindicatedin 1894 with the repealof the unequal treaties.However, the very speed ofthe economic changecombined withthe top-down approachto politicsconfrontedJapan’sleaderswith new problemsto solve.

Despite the oligarchs’ best efforts, industrialtransformation andeconomicdevelopmentbrought with them dislocations and socialtensions. The economicgrowth had beenstaggering, but it had notbenefittedthe populationequally.Divisions were especiallynoticeablein the rural-urbansplit,where the agriculturalsectorwas hurt becausethe Meiji government favored industryand imported less expensive foreignrice in order to feed the cities. Social unrest was on the rise,witnessedin the Rice Riots 1918, a rash vigilante attacksonKoreansliving in Japan,the growth of labor unions, women’sorganizationsand tenant farmerassociationsas well as in theinflux of radical political thought from abroadespeciallysocialistand communist. The establishedorder felt challengesfrom all sides. Economicupsand downs, and especially the 1929 world depression,servedto exacerbatethe alreadygrowing tensionsand unrest.

The political and administrative structures ofthe Taishoera reflectedthis turmoil in society. On the surface,the sturdyand successfulMeiji constitutional structurecarried over intothe Taisho period unchanged-withpower sharedbetweentheoligarchs, the civil and military bureaucracies,the Diet, thezaibatsuand thepolitical parties. However, underneath,Japanesegovernanceunderwentshifts in the respectiveroles.The power of the partiesand of popularly electedgovernment increasedsubstantiallywhile the iron grip on policy ofthe Meiji oligarchs began toloosen. Throughthe l920s and1930s, theoligarchsand the political partiescoexisted-sometimesoperatingin tandem, sometimesat loggerheads.

The Meiji Emperor1868-1912dressedin an adoptedwestern-styleuniform. [Metro TorontoReferenceLibrary]

SEPTEMBER1993 . ORIGINS . 9

ThroughtheMeiji era andmuchof Taisho, the Prime Minister waschosenby the ohigarchs.Beginningin1905, a representativeof the largestparty in the Diet alternatedas PrimeMinister with the individual appointed by the Meiji elites. From 1924 to1932, the British practiceof the headof the majority party in the DietbecomingPrime Minister becamethenorm. Moreover, morewidespreadpolitical participationwas on the risewith the introduction, in 1924,of universalmale suffragewomen wouldhaveto wait until afterWorld War II.Rule by a small group of elitesappearedon its wayout the door.

In the end, however,parliamentary politics was unable to constructa stablepolitical order. While thechanges initiallybodedwell for thegrowth of parliamentary partydemocracy-andtherewas a well-foundedbelief that democraticrepresentation had truly come toJapan-manypeople within thepower structurewere unreadyandunsympatheticto the vagariesof parliamentarypolitics.Throughoutthe 1920sand l930s,party politics was challengedby those-especiallythe oligarchs, militaryand zaibatsu-whofearedits instability and by those who worried that it mightresult in a left-leaning government.

At the same time,Japan’sTaisho political partieswere notfully mature democratic institutions,nor mass-based organizations.Theirpower derived notfrom the mandateof the peoplebut from the power ofthe political and industrial structureitself. KennethPyle has argued:"The rise of the parties did notinvolve them making a fundamentalchangein the political structure.Instead, they succeededin shrewdinfiltration and conciliation on institutional forces establishedby theMeiji constitution-theoligarchy,the bureaucracyand the military."

The principal Japanesepartyduring this period was Seiyukai. Itsleader,Hara Kei, "gained power[forhis party] not by championingpopular causesor by seekingreform of thepolitical system . . .but by accommodating to the needsof the bureaucracy, by trading party support ofgovernmentprogramsfor positionsin the bureaucracy,and by regionaldevelopment projectsthat built support at the local level." So long asthe local leaderswould provide theirvote support, the gravy train wouldcontinue.

In connected trends,the parties

became heavilytied to the interestsof both the large landlordsand thebusinessclasses,especiallythezaibatsu.The Meiji governmenthadplayed a significant role in the process ofindustrializationin order toadvancenational self-strengthening.Both the zaibatsuand the governingbodies hadbecomeaccustomedtoclose ties with theother.

At the same time,the partiestendednot to espousea particularideological view. Outside of theleft-leaning partiesoutlawed in1925, the two primary politicalgroupings held to similar, whatsomehave called‘pragmatic’, political philosophies-economicgrowthand national strengthwere the goals,and the necessarymeanswere takento achievethem.

The liberal useof thepork barreland the prevalencecorruption haveleft the political partiesopen tochargesby critics that theywereentirely undemocraticand that"Taisho democracy"reflects the

shifting of powerfrom one set of elites to anotherwithin theconfinesof the sameconstitutionaland institutional structures.With eachaccommodationand compromise,the partiesbecameless and less representativeof the will of the peopleand more apart of theconsensus-lovingelite.

By allying themselves symbioticallywith the other powergroups within the institutional structure the bureaucracy,ohigarchsandbusinessinterests,the political parties cut themselvesof from the support of the people. They restrictedthemselvesfrom instituting any serious overhaulof the existing socialand political orderalthough theydid not necessarilyhavea choicegiven the nature ofthe Meiji constitutional system-structuralreformsthat would have beento the long-term benefit of parliamentarygovernmentand of the political partiesthemselves.

Most importantly, however,thepartieswere neverable tolegitimizethemselves withinthe confinesofJapanesevalues. The nationalistideology and collectivist ethic, longa part ofJapaneseculture and purposely fosteredby Meiji oligarchssince 1868,had left their mark. Thefluidity of the Diet, the competitionbetweendifferent interests,rule bymajority rather than consensus,thechargesof bribery and interestpeddling ran counter tothe traditions ofthe Japanesecollective and thenatinnalistethos.

EmperorHirohito 1926-89--publiclyrenouncedhisdivinityandJapaneseracial superiority in 1946. [JapaneseConsulate]

A Westernview of Japanese expansionismin the1930s.[Metro TorontoReferenceLibrary]

10. ORIGINS SEPTEMBER1993

While the populacemight have been morewilling toacceptsuch changesand chaosin good economic times,thedownturnsof the 1 920smadesucha seeminglyunstablepolitical system appear even more unpalatable. The countrywasleft with a sensethat it had beenset adrift. Gone, manybelieved,was the ‘organic unity’ and consensus betweenthevariousgoverningbodiesoligarchs,bureaucracy, military,andthe Diet-the rock that hadanchoredthe political communityfrom the Meiji beginnings.

Militarism Ascendant: The Failure ofDemocracyMany groups in the Japaneseadministrationwere frustratedwith the breakdownof consensusand the instability of parliamentarygovernment. The military, for instance, disagreedwith the accommodationistforeign policy of the period thatcalledfor the statusquo andthe submissionof Japaneseterritorial desiresin favor of the will of the international community.

Two possible responsesexisted for Meiji leaders uncomfortable with the rising social problems,pressuresand instabilities of masssociety. Theycould accedeto the demandsforreform and adjust the social and political institutions that theyhad created. Or, they could increasetheir relianceon authoritarianism and bolster theirefforts to bring aboutnational self-sacrifice and mobilization through the further accentuation ofsuch traditional valuesas social harmonyand deferencetoauthority. More often than not, the elites turned tothe latterand strove to restrict the range of political debaterather thanexpandthe existing social andpolitical structures:to quashoppositionratherthan to work with it. The PeacePreservationLaw of 1925 served to contractthe possibletopics for discussion and,specifically, bannedleftist political groups whomight foment the kind of social revolution that the oligarchsdesperatelyfeared.

The party-dominatedDiet could solvethe spiralling socialproblemsno betterthan the oligarchs. Their close links to thebureaucracyand zaibatsuleft them little room to manoeuvre.When the Japanesemilitary forces in China took mattersintotheir own handsin incidents in 1931 Mukden and then decisively in 1937 Marco PoloBridge, the Diet could do little butstandby and give their tacit supportto a fait accompli. Therewas evenless they could do in the face of a rash ofassassinations of political figuresduring the l920sand 1930s. The parties and parliamentary governmentwere simply not powerfulenoughto challengethe military who desired conquestandempireand who were constitutionally responsible only totheEmperorcombinedwith the zaibatsuwho craved the marketsand resourcesthat colonies would provide. Nor, for that matter, could the politiciansrein in the forces of nationalismfosteredby the oligarchssincethe Meiji restoration.

Democracycollapsed fullyin 1937 and Japan,ruled by amilitary-fascist governmentset out on a path of war that ledeventuallyto Japan’scomplete defeat,a host of atrocities, thelossof millions of lives and a large-scale destructionof property.

The American Occupation 1945-1952The American Occupationof Japan1945-1952 set the stagefor the Japanesepolitical structure ofthe Cold War periodandcame in two definable parts. The first-a period of reform-challengedthe very foundationsupon which the Meiji restoration had beenbased. The secondsought to reversethe earlierreform and solidify the traditional political order.

In the first, the Occupationgovernment,underGeneral

Douglas MacArthur, implementeda seriesof ‘radical’ reformsthat were designed tobring abouta democratizationand demilitarization of Japan. The American occupiersbelievedthat atruly democraticpolitical systemasopposedto what theyconsideredthe undemocraticthe Meiji versionwould make Japanless likely to go to war in the future. Interestingly, thereforms the Americans introducedcoincideduncannily withthe policies of the banned Japanesecommunistsin the I 920sso fearedby theMeiji elite.

The first step towardsthis democratizationcame in 1947with the revisions to the 1889 constitution. The new constitution cast the emperorin the role of powerless figureheadandsymbol of national unity. The Diet was made thehighestsourceof political powerand the Prime Ministerwas requiredto come from the Diet as was the cabinet. An article wasinsertedin which Japan renounced warin perpetuityand whichdeniedJapanthe right to maintain any standingforce for warpotential. The political systemwas decentralized,shiftingauthority to local organs.

Combinedwith this political democratization,the Occupation administrationdisbandedthezaibatsu,breakingup the intertwined industrial and commercialunits. The occupierssaw thezaibatsuas villains whose monopolisticcontrol of industry andcommercecausedthe needfor a forcefulJapaneseexternalpolicy. At the same time,the Administrationencouragedthe formation of labor unions, and instituted land reform measures,inorder to offsetthe strengthof the industrial businesspowers.

The secondhalf of the occupation periodwas characterized by a swingto the otherextremeand a reversalof many ofthe original reform policies. As the specterof the Cold Warbecame increasinglyreal for the United States,the so-called"reversecourse"was designed tore-strengthen Japanas quickly as possibleas a bulwark againstcommunismin Asia. In it,the priorities of the occupation administrationchanged fromthe reform of a non-democraticcountry to economic recoveryand thereconstruction of Japan’s prewar powerbase.

Often, the occupiersrepealedreforms that were alreadyinstituted. The leftist forces that hadbeenpanderedto, especially concerningthe labor unions, were now consideredpariahs. The zaibatsuwere reconstitutedand given officialgovernmentalsupport. A small Self-DefenceForce was creat

Hiroshima: Japan paid the pricefor its militarism.[ChristopherTravel!]

SEPTEMBER 1993 . ORIGINS .11

ed. The police and educationalsystemswere replacedundercentral government control. Thebureaucracywas recentralized and many leaderswho had beenpurgeddue to theirwartime actionswere reinstated fortheir expertise.

The greatestbeneficiary of the OccupationamongJapanese politicalelites was the bureaucracy. While the military and zaibatsuestablishmentswere beingdeconstructed toreducetheir powerand the fledgling parties were learning thepolitical ropes,the bureaucracyremained relativelyuntouchedthrough both parts of the Occupation. As Japan enteredthepostwaryearsin 1951 with the SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty,thebureaucracyheld thebalance ofpower.

After the OccupationPost-warJapanis bestcharacterizedby the ‘economicmiracle’and political stability. In the first case,Japan grewfrom aneconomy devastatedby war into the third largesteconomyinthe world by the late l960s-arate ofgrowth only matchedbythe unprecedentedburst of the Meiji era. From 1950 to 1970Japanorchestratedannualratesof growth greaterthan ten percenton average. It was not until after the ‘oil shock’ the 1973Arab oil embargothat Japanesegrowth, while everpresent,becamemore uneven.

Following the ‘to and fro’ reversalsof the occupationyears,Japanese politicssettled down to a patternof stability inwhich parliamentarypolitics played the predominantrole.Gone werethe chaosand instability of the Taisho years,so toowere the Emperor, militaryand oligarchsas activeparticipantsin government. However, the bureaucracyremainedstrong andmany commentatorsarguethat it hasbeenthis group, and nottheparties, which held the realpowerin Japan’spolicymaking.

Post-warpolitics was divided betweenthe left-wingSocial Democratsand theconservativeparties,who combined to form the LDP in 1955. The latter ruled this periodwith pragmaticpolicies and deftguidanceof economic growth.The Social Democrats,on the other hand,were often too consumedby ideological stancesto haveany attraction to themajority of people,who fearedthat a Social Democratgovernmentwould meana shift to a Soviet leaning economicpolicy.

While initially therewas a certain amount of legitimateconfrontationbetweenthe forces of left and right, the conflictquickly took on a solely rhetorical form as the postwareconomic boomtook off. It was hard for the Social Democratstobe taken seriouslyin their oppositionto the existing structurewhen it was accomplishingeconomicmiracles. Many politicalanalystsargue that the Social Democratsquickly settled into

12* ORIGINS . SEPTEMBER1993

the role of honorableopposition withthe realizationthat theywould neverhold office. In many ways therelationshipbetweenthe theLDP and the Social Democratswas analogousto that betweenthe U.S. and the Soviet Union. A tacit understandingwas arrived at in which both sides agreednot todirectly attack the other,but in which the level of rhetoricremainedhighly antagonistic.

The truearenaof confrontation in postwar Japanesepolitics lay not within inter-party squabblingbut in intra-partyconfrontation. The LDP was not a unifiedparty but rather aconglomerate ofsome sevenor eight different factions. Factions were,in many respects, parties in theirown right. Theyexisted in order to championthe cause of the faction leader.Once in a highposition of power, that leaderwould rewardhisfollowers. Loyalty to the faction stood above loyaltyto theparty because itwas the faction that dispensedfunds and gaveoffice. Overallparty policy was decidedin backroom sessionswhere factioninfluencewas rankedand strictly hierarchical.

As the economysoared,the influenceof businessin political circles returnedto prewar levels. At the same time, thebureaucracycontinuedto dominatethe entire political structure. The result was a gigantic political-bureaucratic-industrialstructure‘Japan Inc.’ that has beenat the sourceof Japaneseeconomicgrowth and the cause of criticism that it is not thepoliticianswho rule Japan.

The Critics Take PowerIn many respects,the recent Japanese elections demonstrateadesireon thepart of bothpoliticiansand populaceto incorporatemore idealism into the highly pragmatic Japanesesocial-political-economicmachine. They desirea merging of the "realist"politics that havebrought-alongwith staggeringeconomicsuccess-corruption,back-roomdeals, producer orientedpoliciesand a Japan oftenclosedto the outside world,with certain idealistic principles: clean government,opendebate,more directpub-lie participationand a more evenshareof the economicspoils.

Not to misunderstand,they do not wish to give up theirextensive economicgrowth. Theyare less opposed to LDP"policies" than to the mannerin which "politics" was carriedout. Herein lies a clue to Japan’spolitical future. The call tothe new politiciansis to continuegrowth but to chosea pathwith a more "humanface"-a path that will benefit,both spiritually and physically,the"Japanese"as much as"Japan". *

TheJapanese Diet: today the seat of politicalchange.[JapaneseConsulate]

Suggestions for FurtherReadingHilary Conroy and Harry Wray. eds. Japan Examined:

Perspectivesin Modern JapaneseHistory. Universityof Hawaii Press,1983.

Kenichi Kohyama. The Limits of the PostwarPoliticalSystem." in Japan Echo ‘Vol. XIX. No. 3, Autumn1992,p. 8-13.

Michio Morishima. WhyHas Japan Succeeded’?Western TechnologyandtheJapaneseEthos. CambridgeUniversity Press,1982.

Tetsuo Najita The Intellectual FoundationsofModern.IapanesePolitics. Wniversity ofChicagoPress.1974.

Tetsuo Najitaand J. Victor Koschmann. Conflict inModern JapaneseHistory, the NeglectedTradition.PrincetonUniversityPress,1982.

KennethB. Pyle. The Making of Modem Japan D.C.Heathand Company.1978.

Edwin 0. Reischauer.TheJapanese.WarvardUniversity Press,1981.