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Transformations of Yugoslav Federalism: from Centralized to PeripheralizedFederation

Transformations of Yugoslav Federalism: from Centralized to PeripheralizedFederation

by Vojislav Kotunica

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1987, pages: 382-392, on www.ceeol.com.
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TRANSFORMATIONS OF YUGOSLAVFEDERALISM: FROM CENTRALIZED TOPERIPHERALIZED FEDERATION

Vojislav KostunicaI

In one of his major writings on federalism, William Riker points to adifference between centralized and peripheralized federal orders. l Althoughthis distinction to a certain extent resembles the traditional, legal distinctionbetween federations and confederations, it essentially replaces this kind ofstatic analysis with a developmental approach. Centralized federations,according to Riker, approximate to a greater or lesser degree something thatmay be denoted as a maximum of centralization within which "the rulers offederations can make decisions without consulting the rulers of the membergovernments in all but one narrowly restricted category of action."2 Incontrast, peripheralized federations approximate to a greater or lesser degree aminimum of centralization within which "the rulers of the federation canmake decisions in only one narrowly restricted category of action withoutobtaining the approval of the rulers of constituent units."3Since the rise of the modern democratic state a trend towards federalpolitical systems has been evident, i.e., a trend towards a proliferation of thisform of political organization: nearly half of humanity now lives in federalstates. But the proliferation of federalism in modern society is in fact theproliferation of only one of the above-mentioned forms, centralized federalism. That is why one can say of this form that only it represents a successfultype of political organization.As is well known, centralized federalism is the pragmatic invention of thePhiladelphia Convention of 1787. In this connection, Riker makes anobservation which becomes for him practically a law about the developmentof federalism: "Had this invention not occured, it is doubtful that federalismwould have been widely adopted. Almost none of the contemporary federations are or were originally conceived as peripheralized. It is the centralizedform of federalism that the world finds attractive; and, had the notion of thiskind of federalism not been available for copying, it is doubtful that manyconstitution writers would have found federalism itself worthwhile. Theinvention of centralized federalism is, then, a necessary condition of thecontemporary federalism."4If one wants to use Riker's classification to analyze Yugoslav federalism,one should recognize that Riker uses the term "centralized federalism" in abroad and not exclusively legal or administrative sense. One of the mainfeatures of this form of federalism consists in that, irrespective of the way in

Praxis International 7:3/4 Winter 1987/8 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 383which competence is distributed between federal authority and the federalunits, the authority to participate in its exercise cannot be taken away fromthem without their consent. According to Carl Friedrich, "we can properlyspeak of federalism only if a set ofpolitical communities coexist and interact asautonomous entities, united in a common order with an autonomy of itsown."s These characteristics, more or less developed, are normally found indifferent types of "centralized federations."On the other hand, the present day Yugoslav constitutional arrangementsand federal relationships clearly approximate the peripheralized form offederalism, or, if one prefers a more conventional term, the so-calledconfederal state. If there is an indisputable trend from peripheralized tocentralized federalism in the present world, as well as a clear prevalence of thelatter over the former form, Yugoslavia after the constitutional reforms in thelate 1960s and early 1970s is an exception to this rule. Yugoslavia hasdeveloped in an opposite direction from other federal governments.6That Yugoslavia is a peripheralized federation, that it differs from themajority of contemporary federations, is best seen if one analyzes theprovisions of the Yugoslav 1974 Constitution regulating the participation offederal units (six republics and two provinces) in the federal sphere of decision-making. These constitutional provisions require the unanimous consent of allfederal units for all constitutional changes and a large part of the moreimportant federal legislation. There are, of course, other constitutionalprovisions which illustrate the novelty of the Yugoslav federalism: for instance,the provision that federal statutes and other regulations shall be enforced by theagencies of federal units. This entails that there may be eight quite differentways of enforcing the same federal statute, and in fact there are interestingcases of this kind, but here we shall be primarily concerned with the problem offederal decision making by unanimous consent of all the federal units.Constitutional lawyers agree that all federal states regulate their behaviourin accordance with two principles.7 The first is the principle ofautonomy, whichguarantees that there exists a definite distribution of competence between thefederation and constituent governments; within their spheres of operationboth are independent and not subordinate to one another. According to theprinciple of participation, federal units participate in the making of certaindecisions on the federal level. It is precisely this second principle, a secondfeature of federal states, which confirms that they do not function inaccordance with the principle of subordination but rather in accordance withthe principle of collaboration or cooperation.The constituent units' participation in federal decision making can betwofold: direct and indirect. Indirect participation consists in the federal units'right to be represented in one of the chambers of the federal legislature andthus to participate in the passing of federal laws. On the basis of unwrittenpolitical rules rather than in accordance with explicit constitutional andlegislative provisions, federal units are also represented in the other branchesof government. The federal units' indirect participation in one chamber of thefederal legislative assembly is characteristic of all federations, whether theunits themselves are equally or unequally represented in it.

cessviaCEEOL NL Germany


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384 Praxis InternationalUnder the Yugoslav Constitution, all the federal units are equally represented in both chambers of the federal legislature irrespective of their size. To

put it more simply, since the 1974 Constitution there exist two chambers offederal units which differ from one another only in the mode of voting and inthe way in which competence is distributed among them. Such an absolutelyequal representation of the constituent units in the federal legislative assemblyis not characteristic of any other contemporary federation.Still greater differences between Yugoslavia and other federal governmentsappear in the sphere of direct participation by the component units in federaldecision making. This kind of participation can as a rule be reduced to thefederal units' right to decide about amendments to the federal constitution. 8In some federations, the consent of a certain number of federal units is neededin the amending process (United States, Mexico, Venezuela), in others thisconsent is needed only with respect to certain constitutional provisions aboutthe relationships between the federation and the federal units (India,Pakistan), while in a third group, constitutional amendments are confirmedby a referendum of the majority of voters and the majority of federal units(Switzerland, Australia). The Canadian Constitution of 1981 requires theconsent of both Parliament and all the provincial legislatures only in the case ofthe revision of specific, narrowly defined constitutional provisions (includingsome highest offices in federal government and provinces, the composition ofthe House of Commons and the Supreme Court, and some language rights).But apart from Yugoslavia, there is no federation where unanimous consent offederal units is required for amending any constitutional provision.The direct participation of federal units in the amending of the federalconstitution is in federal terms limited and in any case it can never amount tomore than the proviso that a qualified majority of the federal units agree withthe proposed changes. The Yugoslav Constitution, by contrast, demands theunanimous consent of all federal units for each and every constitutionalchange. No federal constitution is so rigid that it requires the agreement of allthe component units in the case of its revision. The demand for unanimity,moreover, has been extended to cover a large part of federal legislation andother regulations which give a contractual character to all the more importantfederal statutes in Yugoslavia. This, of course, is not true of any othercontemporary federation.

11The 1974 Constitution is certainly a watershed in Yugoslavia's politicaldevelopment as far as the structure of federal government is concerned. Allthe postwar Yugoslav constitutions (1946, 1953 and 1963) followed the model

of a federal political structure. The previous constitutions, however, did notprovide for the unanimous consent of the federal units' legislatures onconstitutional amendments and essential parts of federal legislation. In theamending procedure of the Constitution, the qualified majority in the federallegislative assembly was considered sufficient without any kind of consent ofthe federal units' legislatures. The 1974 Constitution requires not only the


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Praxis International 385consent of a certain number of federal units in amending procedure but of allof them. That is why one is right in posing the question: what caused such aradical change in the Yugoslav federation?Yugoslav political leaders have tacitly recognized the legitimacy of thisquestion and attempted to answer it in their own terms. Thus VladimirBakaric, explaining the constitutional amendments of 1971, which directlyaffected the content of the present Constitution, explicitly stated that theprevious 1963 Constitution has been centralist and went on to pose severalquestions without answering them: "One can pose the question why is this so?Why is the most progressive Constitution centralist? Or why it was adoptedthough it is centralist?"9 At the end of 1960s, Edvard Kardelj, the majorofficial interpreter and framer of all the Yugolsav constitutions, did not speakof Yugoslavia as a federation. Thus in 1969, after the well known "motorwaycrisis" in Slovenia, he spoke about Yugoslavia as a community "which bears,in a certain sense, an already obsolete name, 'federation,' because it is nolonger a classical federation."lo Later, in 1971, he dismissed the question ofwhether Yugoslavia "is still a federation, or is becoming a confederation,"explaining that Yugoslavia is not building its political institutions "accordingto certain static legal formulas. "I I In a booklet which represented his politicaltestament, Kardelj makes quite clear his opposition to all classical types ofgovernmental structure. Yugoslavia exists above all as an agreement among itsfederal units (republics and provinces): "It is not in fact any federation orconfederation we refer to, but a self-managed community of nations andnationalities of a new type which is not based exclusively upon a division ofstate functions but above all on the common interests determined byself-management, democratic agreement among the republics and provinces.In this way, the self-management system has given an entirely new democraticcontent to national relationships."12The genuine significance of this new federalism is very clearly shown byKardelj's last statement. It is generally accepted in contemporary political andconstitutional theory that the federal system, as a particular kind of constitutional order, has a distinct function. According to Carl Friedrich, "thefunction it is supposed to serve is to restrain the powers wielded by theinclusive community, as well as those of the communities included withinit."13 According to Kardelj, however, the point is not the mutual restraint oftwo powers: the power of the federal community is in fact eliminated andreplaced by the constant bargaining between the component communities.Hence Kardelj reaches the conclusion that the Yugoslav federation is acontractual federation. And as any contract is based upon the consent of theparties making it, it is indispensable to have the consent of all the contractualparties when changing the contract. That is why the procedure for amendingthe constitution is of such importance. And that is why certain participants inthe debates on constitutional reform in the early 1970s had made it clear thatthis kind of amending procedure carried the seeds of a "new", "thirdYugoslavia."14There are, however, opinions that this contract should be stipulated in away to make it even less obligatory for the contractual parties. This, of course,


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386 Praxis Internationalcould occur if the federal units' competencies were expanded in respect to thefederation's competences, but also if this distribution of competencies wouldbe m a d ~ ad hoc and not a priori. 15 Such a point of view, of course, is quiteconsistent with the dominant conception of federalism in Yugoslavia.

Such a radical change of Yugoslav federalism at least in part has beencaused by an altered conception of the place and significance of the nationalquestion in Yugoslav society. Initially, the classical concept of federalism inYugoslavia was chiefly based on the belief that in postwar society, the existinginstitutions sufficiently guaranteed national equality. The national questionwas treated as "solved," "finally solved," "liquidated" in the public speechesof Yugoslav politicians and, particularly, Josip Broz Tito. 16 Tito's statementin 1960 is very characteristic: "No one in Yugoslavia points out any longerwhether someone is a Serb, a Croat or a member of any other nationality . . . In our country today there are no troubles among republics thoughin some republics there are purely local troubles which are, however, positivebecause they push forward."17 Within a few years, things changed dramatically. If one is to believe a controversial but plausible explanation by thehistorian Dusan Bilandzic, the party leadership was set to move in thedirection of the 1974 Constitution as early as 1964, just a year after theprevious Constitution has been adopted. 18It is interesting that Bilandzic says quite openly that the "new federalism"was based on a purely political calculation: according to him, the Partyleadership realized that national antagonisms would be contained if the

republican leaderships made a unique agreement on the division of poweramong the federal units. Bilandzic's explanation, of course, need not beaccepted: but it is certainly a refreshing contrast when compared to the manystatements by Kardelj, Bakeric and other official spokesmen on Yugoslavia'sunique contribution to the theory of federalism.Whatever the truth of this, however, it is certain that for the YugoslavCommunist Party the solution of the national question has never been an endin itself. It has served more as a means to achieve the basic strategic aim of theParty, the seizure and retention of power. That is why the Party both in theprewar and the postwar period could have quite different positions on thenational question. That is also why the Yugoslav constitutions from 1946 to1963 could be envisioned as a model for resolving the national question,though they were later criticized precisely from this point of view. On theother hand, it should not be forgotten that the national question has its owncomplicated history, much longer than the history of Yugoslav communism.The various institutional and constitutional arrangements through which theParty has attempted to solve it and, at the same time, use it for its own ends,have never been completely successful: these arrangements can easily get outof the Party's control and develop in their own way.

IIIWe shall now consider certain elements of the popular conception ofYugoslav federalism mentioned above. An essential and possibly its most


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Praxis International 387important part is the thesis that there exist political institutions and constitutional arrangements which are "beyond comparison" and that the principlesof federalism, as defined in the present Yugoslav Constitution, are of such acharacter. This thesis of the exceptionalism of the Yugoslav federal system isonly one in a series of attempts to emphasize the unique character of almost allthe institutions of the Yugoslav political system.If the Yugoslav federation were built without clinging to static legalschemes and dogmas, as has often been repeated after Kardelj, then it is alsotrue that no contemporary federation has been built according to a schemegiven in advance. Between them all there exist considerable differences. All ofthem, and particularly those that do not rely on centralized parties and partysystems, correspond more or less to the needs of an essentially federal,heterogenous society. In view of this, it is not surprising that all federationshave a pragmatic constitution which, to use Madison's well-known phrase, is"neither a national nor a federal Constitution but a composition ofboth."19 Inshort, all federations are characterized by the effort to be united but notunitary. But becoming unitary is not the only threat: federations can alsobecome disunited. One of the best signs that this has happened is that theunanimous consent of all federal units is required in the broad sphere offederal decision making: constitutional and legislative activity.For many Yugoslav political scientists, however, the unanimous consent offederal units is one of the most basic values of the constitutional model ofYugoslav federalism. This mode of decisionmaking is called "consensus" inYugoslav political science. But this is wrong since it conflates quite distinctphenomena: the essential element of unanimous consent is the vote, while theessential element of consensus is unanimity reached without vote. In certaincases this terminological confusion is probably deliberate and motivated by aneffort to ascribe the positive characteristics of consensus essential to democracy, in the sense that both majorities and minorities must agree to accept thedemocratic "rules of the game," to decisionmaking by unanimous consentcharacteristic of present-day Yugoslavia.20In discussing decisionmaking by the unanimous consent of federal units,one must not forget questions about the relationship between this form ofdecisionmaking and the right to veto. Yugoslav political scientists are dividedon the question ofwhether the right to veto exists in the Yugoslav federationbecause it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution itself. But if theunanimous consent of all federal units is a constitutionally valid mode ofdecisionmaking, veto must be its integral part. As a matter of fact, veto is anobvious practical consequence of that mode of decisionmaking where eachfederal unit acquires the right to block a decision favoured by the other units.This, of cours, may lead to the replacement ofmajority rule by minority rule.It should be pointed out that no contemporary federation except the Yugoslavfederation accepts either the principle of unanimous consent or the right toveto because they are contrary to the very idea of a federation, which assumesthat what is in the general interest need not in every case be in the interest ofall, of every single member-state.By introducing the principle of the unanimous consent of all federal units,


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388 Praxis Internationalthe dominant conception of the Yugoslav Constitution as aflexible constitutionwas abandoned and the conception of a rigid constitution accepted. In thisrespect, it is interesting to quote a statement made by Kardelj in April 1973,less than a year before the present Constitution was adopted. In the course of aTV interview he said that "the main causes of frequent constitutional changesin Yugoslavia lie in the dynamism of the Yugoslav revolution and thecharacter of its Constitution."21 Yugoslav society as a self-managed, socialistsociety was very young, according to Kardelj, and like any other youngcreature grew very fast. That is why its suits quickly become very tight. Formany Yugoslav officials and social scientists, Kardelj is still the leadingauthority on these matters, but it is still unclear whether Yugoslav societycontinues to undergo development or if its suit is now cut so perfectly that itwill never again need to be changed.Be that as it may, decisionmaking by majority is nowadays the only realisticway ofmaking decisions in societies which remain divided, non-homogenous,and disturbed by various sorts of social and political conflict. As a mode ofdecisionmaking, unanimous consent belongs to the past. This, of course, ishardly surprising since it inavoidably leads to political paralysis, the causes ofwhich then are attributed not to the mode of decisionmaking but simply to therecalcitrance of human behaviour. One talks, for instance, about the misuse ofunanimous consent in federal decisionmaking in Yugoslavia,22 althoughdecisionmaking by the unanimous consent of federal units is itself a misuse ofthe very idea of federalism. Instead of recognizing that the causes ofinefficiency and political stalemate lie in the political institutions, manyofficial spokesmen and scholars ignore them. They seem to demand thatindividuals should behave in such a way that the system could function well. 23Their position almost inevitably reminds us how classic insights into humannature still have their relevance. It is, as the Federalist argued almost twocenturies ago, unrealistic to expect that human nature in politics should showonly its "bright side," and that is why it is necessary to create a form ofgovernment which could function well in both favourable and unfavourablecircumstances. As Benjamin Wright has said: "The central argument in theFederalist is that a government must be so constructed as to stand the strainsthat are inevitable. A government designed only for favourable circumstanceswould deserve to be rejected . . . The limitations of human nature must betaken into account, just as the breaking point of steel must be known toarchitect. As th architect must also know the strength of steel, or wood, orstone, so the designers of government must know ofman's capacities, as wellas their limitations. ,,24The Yugoslav Constitution endeavours to ensure at all costs that federalunits be equally represented in the two chambers of the federal legislativeassembly (to say nothing of the way in which they are represented in otherbranches of government). But this equality has its price: Yugoslav citizens asindividual voters no longer have the same weight for the simple reason thatthere no longer exists a single chamber of the federal legislative assemblywhose members are elected in numerically comparable, roughly identicalelectoral districts. One might say that the democratic principle of equal vote is


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Praxis International 389not combined with the equal representation of federal units, as in the case ofother federal states, but that the principle of "one person-one vote" has beenreplaced by the equal representation of federal units. An individual thus nolonger appears as a citizen with individual political rights but only as an atomof various interests. The functioning of the entire system is based on theopposition of general and particular interests, while the particular interestsare, of course, prefered. Within such a system an individual is of marginalinterest, and any form of agreement and association between the individualsthemselves is outside the existing institutions and for that reason condemnedto failure. The principle of the national state was thus put above democraticrights, constitutionally guaranteed to all citizens.But does such a system at least ensure the equality of Yugoslav nationswithin the existing federal units? Leaving aside the question of thecircumstances in which the Yugoslav federation was established and how theborders between the federal units were determined, one should not overlookthe fact that certain Yugoslav nations live in the territories of several federalunits. A great number of Serbs, the largest Yugoslav nation, live outside thearea of their federal unit. The number of Serbs living outside Serbia, theirown federal unit, is larger than the number of Slovenes, Macedonians,Montenegrin and Albanians, almost equal to the number of Moslems, andonly smaller than the number of Croats. This fact has complex historicalcauses, which cannot be treated here. Regardless of how it is explained, itssignificance is clear: at least one Yugoslav nation, and the largest at that, hasno federal unit which correspond to its traditional national aspirations. Unlikethe national minorities, Serbs who live in other republics have no recognizedright to the use of their own language (and its distinctive Cyrillic script) as wellas no right to develop their distinctive national culture and forms of politicalorganization.Moreover, departing further from the principle "To each nation its ownfederal unit," the postwar constitutional framers had been resolute in creatinga sort of asymmetric federal order by introducing two autonomous provinces(Vojvodina and Kosovo) into just one of the federal units (Serbia). Similarproposals for other federal units were treated at that time as "reactionary"because, it was supposed, they would lead to the "splitting" of other Yugoslavnations. That, at least, is what Milovan Dilas, at that time a deputy-ministerfor the Constitutent Assembly, said in reply to a proposal for the founding of aDalmation autonomous province in Croatia: "If we gave autonomy toDalmatia, we would be splitting the Croatian nation and preventing its freedevelopment."25 In that way the Communist Party of Yugoslavia remainedfaithful to its prewar Comintern-influenced policy of suppressing the alleged"greater Serbian hegemonism" and with the creation of two autonomousprovinces in Serbia tried to solve not the problem of national minorities(Hungarian and Albanian respectively), but rather the "Serbian question," inconformity with its old policy. One may rightly ask: if territorial and politicalautonomy was established for the Albanian minority, why has this been doneonly in the Serbian federal unit and not, for instance, in parts ofMacedonia orMontenegro, densely populated by the Albanian minority as well.26 In the


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390 Praxis Internationalcourse of the peripheralizing developments in Yugoslav federalism, with thefederal units (both republics and provinces) acquiring the basic features of thenational states and with the increasing persecution of the Kosovo Serbs, theSerbian people has been put in the paradoxical situation of being reduced tothe status of a national minority in its own federal unit (in Kosovo province)without at the same time enjoying genuine minority rights. 27All the above mentioned changes in Yugoslav federalism were inconceivablewithout a quite definite change in the structure of the ruling party. For thecharacter of the federal system is primarily explained by the character of theparty system in Yugoslavia; the federal structure at least partly reflects, and inturn reinforces, the structure of the party system. Changes in the Yugoslavfederalism in the 1970s parallel the changes in the ruling party, which becamedecentralized or, one might say, "confederalized." The observation that theruling party is in fact a coalition of eight national parties is today a well-knowncommonplace within official circles. In the words of a Yugoslav sociologist,"the structural contradiction of Yugoslavia is realized as a political system, ofparty particularism," i.e., it is a "decentralized variant of the one-party system"within which "Party domination is realized in the republics."28This specific form of "party pluralism" within the one-party system has to acertain extent contributed to the further liberalization of Yugoslav politics.Once pluralismwas recognized with regard to understanding and representingown's own national interest (i.e., one's own federal unit), it became moredifficult to avoid the legitimate expression of various views on some otherissues as well: for example, the relationship between political expediency andfactual truth, the possibility of different analyses of controversial events fromrecent history, the attitude toward political views and their proponents, therelationship between politics and culture, the limits of the freedom ofexpression, and particularly the persecution for so-called political offences andthe associated penal policy. But such a form of pluralism in Yugoslav societyhas led also to essential differences on the level of liberalization betweencertain federal units. 29 With all the advantages this federal and nationalpluralism involves, in certain parts of the country in particular, its limitationsare nevertheless obvious and arise from the absolutization and interpretationof national interests from above, as well as from the fact that the system is stillcharacterized by the domination of one party within each federal unit.

IVIn addition to the fact that the unitary, non-federal state proved to beinappropriate for the new Yugoslav state born after World War I, the federalidea itself represented an old ideal among the South Slavs and the Balkannations. This idea has had adherents among people professing differentpolitical beliefs and ideals and belonging to diverse political parties and social

movements. It gradually became clear, to both individuals and parties, thatfederalism had to be accepted if these nations were to live in a common state.The Yugoslav communists, however, were won over to federalism only withdifficulty: at its Fourth Congress in Dresden in 1928, the Communist Party


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Praxis International 391opted for the dissolution of Yugoslavia into the separate states of Croatia,Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia (Serbia was not even mentioned), whilethe Hungarian and Albanian minorities were supposed to break away, as theirlands had allegedly been annexed by the Serbian bourgeosie. The CommunistParty at that time sought the active cooperation of different separatistmovements (Croation and Albanian).30In the years immediately before World War 11, however, the federalsolution was adopted not only by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (afterthe turnabout in Comintern policy in 1935) but by some other left and centerparties as well. At that time federalism was a much discussed subject inYugoslavia. Out of the large body of writings on federalism, both scholarlyand political, we might, for instance refer to just one newspaper article. In theleftist weekly Napred , Jovan Dordevic, at that time a young universityprofessor and after the war one of the main advisors in the preparation ofseveral Yugoslav constitutions, wrote that the government "has partiallyabandoned the centralist order of the unitary state and finds itselfon the vergeof a new, essentially different organization," which is still not a federation but"according to the internal governmental logic must develop towards thefederal form of government without which a strong and progressive Yugoslavia is still unthinkable." In the same article Dordevic wrote: "Federation isnot a matter of accident, it is not an expression of one ideology or oneintellectual sympathy. It is the product of history, of objective necessity andpolitical wisdom."32It would be hard to add anything to this simple and concise statement. As a

form of political organization, particularly suitable for multinational states,federalism must in all cases reflect various characteristics of the social andethnic structure, and therefore, cannot be simply copied or adopted at will. Ifall writings and debates on federalism in Yugoslavia, from their verybeginning, can teach us anything, it is that what the South Slavs and othernations .living in this area have in common cannot overshadow the greatdifferences between them in terms of political and cultural traditions, levels ofeconomic development, and patterns of social organization, as well as sheersize. Those differencies cry out for essential modifications in the federalsystem, particularly when compared to classic, ethnically homogenous federations. Far-reachingmodifications in the Yugoslav federal system are requiredif it is to function efficiently and at the same time safeguard the interests of allYugoslav nations. But those modifications should ignore neither the experience of other federal regimes nor the political experience ofYugoslavia itself.And they cannot hope to succeed without taking into account the relevantfindings of political science and its methodological lessons.NOTES

* This paper has been delivered at the Wilson Center Conference on "Yugoslavia: Federal vs. RegionalRelationships" in Washington D.C., Sept. 4-6, 1986 and is due for publication in the conferenceproceedings.

1. William Riker, "Federalism," Handbook ofPolitical Science, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 5, pp. 93-172.


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392 Praxis International2. Ibid., p. 102.3. Loc. cit.4. Ibid., p. 107.5. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America(Waltham, Mass: Blaisdell Publishing Company), 1968, p. 195.6. In his article on federalism (published in 1975) Riker was obviously unable to take into account thelatest changes in the structure and functioning of Yugoslav federation and that is why he had wronglyassumed that Yugoslavia "possibly" belongs to the circle of fully centralized federations in which,according to him, "the vast majority of significant political decisions are made at the center and inwhich the notion of state or provincial right is quite meaningless". op.cit., p. 133.7. Cf. Marcel Prelot, Jean Boulois, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel(Paris: Dalloz, 1978), pp.

243-244.8. In several federations const ituent units do not part icipate in amending procedure because i t isconsidered that their equality is already ensured by the fact that they are represented in one of thefederal legislature's chambers. Thus constitutional amendments are adopted by a qualified majority ofthe federal legislature in Germany, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Brazil and Argentina.

9. Vladimir Bakaric, "Politicka osnova ustavne reforme SFR Jugoslavije," Ustavna reforma, Zagreb,Center za aktualni politicki studij, 1971, p. 6.10. Edvard Kardel j, "Raskrsca u razvi tku naseg socijalistickog drustva ," Problemi nase socijalistiekeizgradnje, Beograd, Komunist, 1974, vo!. 9, p. 27.

11. Kardelj, "Idejne i politicke polazne tacke za promenu Ustave," Problemi nase socijalistiekeizgradnje, vol. 9, pp. 195-196.

12. Edvard Kardelj, Pravci razvoja politiekog sistema socijalistiekog samoupravljanja (Beograd: Komunist,1977), pp. 120-121.13. Friedrich, Ope cit., p. 195.14. Jozo Ivecevic, "Revidirati postupak za reviziju saveznog ustava/' Ustavna reforms, p. 58.15. France Bucar, "Vprasanja in hipoteze 0 vzrokih jugoslovanske krize," Nova revija 4Cr-47/1986, p.

395.16. Cf. Kosta Cavoski, "Sporna boljsevicka zapusCina," Nova revija 4Cr-471l986, p. 395.17. Josip Broz Tito, "Iz razgovora sa predstavnicima Hrvatske bratske zajednice," Sabrana dela,

Beograd, Kultura, vo!. 13, p. 321.18. Dusan Bilandzic, "Geneza ideje 0 Ustavu iz 1974," Prijepori oko politiekog sistema, Zagreb, Centarza idejno-teorijski rad GK SKH Zagreb, 1985, pp. 68-72.19. Alexander Hamil ton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: The AmericanLibrary, 1961), No. 39, p. 246.

20. Cf. Zvonko Lerotic, Naeela federalizma visenacionalnih drzava (Zagreb: Globus, 1985), p. 201.21. Kardelj , "Osnovni uzroci i pravci ustavnih promena," Problemi nase socijalistieke izgradnje, vo!. 9, p .343.22. Najdan Pasic, Razgovori i rasprave 0 politiekom sistemu (Beograd: Partizanska knjiga, 1986), pp.162-168.

23. Cf. Lerotic, Ope cit., pp. 192, 197.24. Benjamin Wright, "Editor 's Introduction," The Federalist (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1961), p.83.

25. Zasedanje Ustavotvorne skupstine, 29. November 1945-1 February 1946, Beograd, PrezidijumNarodne skupstine FNRJ, s .a ., p . 187.26. Dimitri je Bogdanovic, Knjiga 0 Kosovu, (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1985), p.238.

27. As a result of constant persecution, the number of Serbs in Kosovo has been reduced almost by halfinthe past twenty years, so that this traditionally Serbian region-if this t rend is not reversed-willbecome an ethnically homogenous Albanian territory in the next 10-15 years.28. Vladimir Arzensek, Struktura i pokret (BEograd: Centar za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju Institutadrustvenih nauka, 1984), p. 136.29. Cf. Kosta Cavoski, "Sloboda i regionalne oligarhije," Knjizevna ree, 10 September 1986.30. Desanka Pesic, Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (Beograd: Rad, 1983), p. 235.31. Jovan Dordevic, "Deset pravila federacije," Napred, 3 January 1940.32. Loc. cit.

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