2.2.2 group 2

Report

Regional Training Workshop on Practical application of designing risk-based disease surveillance in livestock value chains

15 - 20 April 2013, Chandigarh, India

Practical application of designing risk-based disease surveillance in livestock value chains

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Training facilitated by:

Dr Nick Taylor Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics Research Unit, University of Reading, UK


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CONTENTS

Acronyms and abbreviations .......................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5

2. Proceedings of the workshop practical sessions ........................................................... 5 2.1 Practical session on Day 2 ................................................................................................ 5

2.1.1 Group 1 ................................................................................................................................................ 6 2.1.2 Group 2 ................................................................................................................................................ 9 2.1.3 Other groups...................................................................................................................................... 11

2.2 Practical session on Day 3 .............................................................................................. 12 2.2.1 Group 1 .............................................................................................................................................. 13 2.2.2 Group 2: Risk of introduction of HPAI through live bird trading in to India ....................................... 18 2.2.3 Group 3 .............................................................................................................................................. 19 2.2.4 Group 4: Risk pathways for introduction of H5N1 virus to Bhutan/Nepal ........................................ 21 2.2.5 Points arising for discussion after group work .................................................................................. 24

2.3 Practical sessions on Days 4-5-6 ...................................................................................... 26 2.3.1 Group 1: PPR, its entry, propagation & transmission in reference to Jharkhand .............................. 27 2.3.2 Group 2: Value chain analysis of Meat and Milk in Nepal in relation to FMDV introduction and outbreaks.................................................................................................................................................... 37 2.3.3 Group 3: Preliminary risk assessment for AIV in Maharashtra .......................................................... 49 2.3.4 Group 4: CSF pigs ............................................................................................................................... 62

3. Discussion on outcome of practical work group sessions ............................................ 73 3.1 The first group task – practicing use of the risk pathway tool ............................................. 73 3.2 The second group task – analysing routes and risks of HPAI introduction ............................. 73 3.3 Practical sessions on Days 4-5-6 ...................................................................................... 74

4. Guidelines on the application of disease risk analysis for use in a risk based surveillance systems approach .................................................................................. 75

4.1 Summary: suggested guidelines on the application of disease risk analysis for use in a risk based surveillance systems approach in South Asia ................................................................ 82

Annex 1 Agenda of the training .................................................................................... 84

Annex 2 List of participants ......................................................................................... 88


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Acronyms and abbreviations

AIV Avian Influenza Virus

CAHWs Community Animal Health Workers

CSF Classical Swine Fever

CSFV Classical Swine Fever Virus

DADF Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries

DOC Day Old Chicks

ECTAD Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases

ELISA Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations

FMD Foot and Mouth Disease

FMDV Foot and Mouth Disease Virus

HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

IEC Information Education Communication

IVRI Indian Veterinary Research Institute

OIE World Organization for Animal Health (Office International

des Epizooties)

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction

PD_ADMAS Project Directorate for Animal Disease Monitoring and

Surveillance

PPR Peste des Petits Ruminants

PRRS Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SE South East


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1. Introduction

A training workshop on risk analysis with focus on important trans-boundary diseases in the South Asia region was carried out in Chandigarh, India, from 15th to 20th April 2013. The workshop was organised by the FAO South Asia (SAARC) ECTAD unit. Participants were drawn from three countries in South Asia.

The workshop was a mixture of presentations and practical exercises, drawing on the experience of participants. The conclusions section (section 3) of this report draws together some key points emerging from the workshop and the final section (section 4) presents draft guidelines on the application of the disease risk analysis for use in a risk based surveillance systems approach. The next section (section 2) presents the raw outputs of the practical group working sessions, with comments from the facilitator (Nick Taylor) as discussed during plenary discussions of the practical group working sessions in the workshop.

2. Proceedings of the workshop practical sessions

2.1 Practical session on Day 2

Task: You have been asked to comment on the risk of an outbreak of FMD or PPR occurring in your state/country as a result of long distance livestock movements…

1. Draw a risk pathway that shows how an outbreak of FMD (or PPR) could occur in a ‘home country’ as a result of livestock movements.

2. Annotate the risk pathway with any information that could be relevant to a risk assessment.

Information it would be good to have

Patterns/seasonality of animal movements during a year – any factors that influence probability of movement (rainfall)?

Behaviour of livestock graziers and transporters (probability and degree of contact between local and ‘moved’ animals)

o Any exchange or trading of animals or equipment?

Disease situation in neighbouring areas – seasonal changes?

Epidemiology of the disease in question – types of contact required for transmission of infection

Any control of borders? – are crossing animals checked or quarantined?

Risk pathway – important points

Risk pathway is a series of conditions that must be met, or events that have to occur, in order for the unwanted outcome to occur

At each step of the risk pathway we pose a question about the probability of the condition being met, or the event occurring

We consider the factors that influence probability and using data/information about those factors we make an estimation of likelihood (probability)

We make estimations of probability for each step of the pathway (based on available information)


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Then we make an overall assessment of risk based on: o the probabilities along the pathway; o the degree of exposure (e.g. volume of commodity flow per year, number of

times pathway active) o the impact/consequences of the unwanted event.

2.1.1 Group 1

Risk question: Risk of exotic strain of PPR virus being introduced into West Bengal and Jharkhand or NE India States due to livestock movements in festive season to/from Bangladesh.

Figure 1: Sketch of risk pathways

Animal

movement

Informal

trade

Formal

trade

Wild

animal

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Infection

High risk

Infection

Infected Movement restricted

High Risk

Low

Detection

High

Detection


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Table 1: Available information to inform a risk assessment

Risk Pathways (different possible routes)

Information Risk estimate

1. Animal movements through organized trade

- Country endemic, with >300 outbreaks reported in 2010 (Source: OIE, DADF, 2010)

- Disease acute, with an IP of 3-10 days (OIE)

- Clinical diagnosis and effective lab tests available

- carrier status not documented

- Vaccination program on-going (how effective?)

Very low risk of Introduction through this route as disease easily detectable with prominent clinical signs.

2. Cross-border informal movements

- Bordering states are endemic

- Expert opinion says that infected animals are sold at lower price making them attractive to middlemen

- Lower awareness regarding disease in stakeholders

- Surveillance in border areas can detect clinical/infected cases

- carrier status not documented

- Even though likelihood of introduction is high , the disease can be detected through effective surveillance

- Hence Medium risk

3. Introduction through wild animal movements

Known to be infected

No buffer vaccination around wildlife areas?

Animals graze within wildlife areas

No control over movement

High risk


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Facilitator comments

This group identified three types of live animal movements that are associated with risk of PPR transfer between areas/countries (formal trade, informal trade and wild animal movement).

The group identified some key information items on which to base their assessment of risk.

The group made some important assumptions in arriving at their overall risk assessments for each pathway:

Pathway Assessed overall risk Key assumptions

formal trade Very low Assumes that trade by this formal route is subject to effective health inspections.

Informal trade

Medium Assumed the disease will be detected by surveillance…

This needs to be supported by clear evidence of effective risk-based surveillance (based in good intelligence about informal trade patterns and trade routes)

Wild animals (?deer?)

High Assumed high level of infection in wild animals and high degree of contact…

BUT an important question would be the number of domestic herds/flocks kept regularly in wildlife areas – AND how much contact between these and other domestic herds/flocks (e.g. are the wildlife areas remote and isolated?)


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2.1.2 Group 2

Figure 2: Risk pathways for introducing PPR virus to Bhutan through imports of goats from Assam/West Bengal, India


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INFORMATION – related to each pathway step Probability estimation

High prevalence of PPR virus in goats in Assam and West Bengal

PPR outbreaks reported throughout the year in Assam/WB (Source: FAO, India, 2010)

Sheep/goat population in Assam 4.6 million

Disease control program in place (vaccination coverage??)

Probability that the virus present in animals selected for imports is “HIGH”

Visual examination of selected animals destined for exports to Bhutan

Probability that the health examination fails to detect infected animals “MEDIUM”

Certification of selected animals destined for exports to Bhutan

Probability that infected animals get certified for exports “HIGH”

Animals transported to the quarantine station in Bhutan

There may be mixing of animals with local animals en-route to quarantine station

Probability that the animals contract virus en-route to quarantine station “MEDIUM”

Animals kept at the quarantine station for 21 days and visual examination for appearance of clinical disease

The incubation period is 4–6 days, but may range from 3–10 days. For the purposes of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the incubation period for the PPR is 21 days.

Probability that health examination fails to detect infected animals is “MEDIUM”

ANIMALS IMPORTED TO BHUTAN OVERALL PROBABILITY THAT INFECTED ANIMALS ARE IMPORTED TO BHUTAN “HIGH”


This group chose to deal with only one type of live animal movement associated with risk of PPR transfer between areas/countries: formal trade. The background is that Bhutan is trying to increase local goat meat production and needs to import livestock to achieve this.

The group identified some key information items on which to base their assessment of risk. The table presented linked the information with each step of the risk pathway in a very logical and clear way.

The final conclusion of overall HIGH risk appears pessimistic given that animals formally traded must pass through 21 days quarantine, however, the group’s final assessment may be coloured by knowledge about the quality of the quarantine and of compliance with all the inspection requirements. If so, these issues should also be captured in the risk pathway and concerns stated transparently in the information column of the table.

The group accepted that there is also likely to be greater risk due to informal trade in goats close to the border, but this would need a separate analysis.


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2.1.3 Other groups

The two other groups discussed risk of FMD entry to India and Nepal. The work of these groups is not available in electronic form. Key issues that were discussed again included risk associated with informal trade in cattle: particularly a risk of ‘exotic’ FMD virus types entering Nepal across its northern border with China and FMD of various types entering India from South East Asia via Thailand and Myanmar.


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2.2 Practical session on Day 3

Task: We will split into at least 4 groups… We will work on HPAI. We will consider the risk of introduction of HPAI into countries/areas, identify the major routes and develop risk pathways.

Step 1: List all the ways in which the disease might move between States or Countries.

o Think about the ways in which the disease agent can be moved (epidemiology) and think about what practices or circumstances might encourage this (e.g. types of husbandry and marketing).

Step 2: Draw diagrams representing the chains of events that could lead to the disease agent being moved between states or countries (risk pathways).

o Think about whether each step in the chain is a very likely or unlikely event.

o Identify the factors influencing the likelihood that each step in the chain is passed.

o For each pathway make an assessment of overall probability

Step 3: Identify the points in the risk pathways that you could attempt to control – i.e. to reduce the risk of probability of entry – these are the ‘Risk Control Points’.

o Think about the measures that you will have to put in place at each control point. Are there any measures that are feasible and should be carried out?

Step 4: In case the disease agent does enter a state or country, what are the measures that you could have in place to reduce the risk of livestock being exposed to the agent and occurrence of an outbreak (or measures that might limit the severity of any outbreak. For e.g., biosecurity measures, key surveillance points).


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2.2.1 Group 1

Background

• Information on populations at risk?

• Information on bird movement in trade?

• National level outbreak surveillance?

• Influenza viruses in wild birds?

• Reservoir, Spill over and Aberrant Hosts?

Figure 3: General risk pathway for HPAI introduction, infection of resident flocks and further spread

RISK PATHWAYS / ROUTES OF ENTRY

1. Unsupervised movements of people, birds and equipment between porous borders.

2. Migratory Birds

IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING RISK (particularly probability of exposure and further spread)

1. Live Bird markets

2. Areas of high duck density

3. Mixed farming (Turkey/chicken: duck: pig)

4. Fighting cocks

5. Non-reporting by owners of birds Non-recognition of disease by owners of birds

6. Major cultural festivals with peak consumption

7. Dead bird disposal

8. Water bodies


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Figure 4: Infection transmission routes for HPAI between

arms


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Figure 5: Infection transmission routes for HPAI onto a broiler farm

Figure 6: Risk pathway for HPAI introduction to broiler farm via Day Old Chick supply


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Table 2: Summary risk assessment

Introduction routes and associated risk factors

RISK ESTIMATE

RISK CONTROL POINTS / INTERVENTION

RELEASE

‘Import’ of domestic poultry – live birds

1. Source of birds. MEDIUM Birds selected from known disease free areas.

2. Porous Borders: unrestricted movement of people, poultry and poultry products.

HIGH Increased vigilance at borders. Certification of poultry and poultry products??

Migratory Birds High UNCONTROLLED (not feasible)

EXPOSURE (of local poultry)

Live Bird markets Medium Increased Surveillance, Increased Biosecurity

CONSEQUENCE (further spread)

High duck density Medium Targeted surveillance

Mixed farming (Turkey/chicken: duck: pig)

Low Advocacy

Farm Waste Low-medium

Proper Disposal

SUMMARY

Critical control points were identified, for which actions to be taken to reduce the risks of introduction, subsequent exposure of poultry populations and transmission of HPAI.

Biosecurity Farmers should be introduced to biosecurity practices such as encouraging and enforcing visitors to use clean protective clothing and boots while handling birds, washing hands well before and after work, and not allowing any unauthorized visitors. Farmers should also make sure that there are footbaths, and that they provide adequate facilities to staff and visitors for cleaning and disinfection: sinks with soap/disinfectant, clean overalls and boots, etc.

Free range poultry and wild birds (contact)

Disease could be reduced by improving the construction of housing to further restrict access of free-range poultry, wild birds and farm bridge species to broilers.

Regulatory control

Compulsory reporting of contagious disease to veterinary authorities and by implementing containment measures such as bans on poultry sales and movements when disease is suspected


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Important information to gather:

• Develop and validate serological tests which can be used to monitor past exposure to avian influenza viruses in ducks, geese and pigs.

• Produce a rapid virus detection method for field use.

• Undertake additional investigations of the roles of wild birds in the overall infection process.

• Measure virus survival under Asian conditions, and assess the measures which are required to block transmission on various important types of fomites, such as bird cages.

• Undertake participatory epidemiological studies to clarify the role of marketing systems in high risk areas of the country on transmission of infection, and use this to adjust marketing arrangements.

• Validate the use of currently available vaccines in ducks.

• Investigate alternative vaccine delivery systems which could reduce the cost of vaccinating important populations of birds.


This group covered a lot of areas over the whole risk pathway from ‘risk release’ (entry of the virus to the country), through exposure of resident flocks to the scale of final consequences (proliferation of outbreaks).

The major conclusions are contained in Table 2. The highest risks of introduction are associated with wild birds (passage of migrating birds) and presumably informal trade in poultry and products across ‘porous’ borders (e.g. with Bangladesh). Of these two routes I would suggest that the wild bird risk would be lower in reality, as would be apparent if the risk pathway were analysed in more detail (e.g. what is the expected infection rate in migrating birds – probably quite low – and what is the probability of infectious contact with resident domestic poultry – not high).


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2.2.2 Group 2: Risk of introduction of HPAI through live bird trading in to India

Table 3: Summary risk assessment

INTRODUCTION ROUTES

FACTORS AFFECTING PROBABILITY

RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE FACTORS

PROBABILITY ESTIMATE

POSSIBLE RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

FORMAL TRADE

Import of DOC for breeding

DOC may be infected

AIV not known to vertically transmitted Hatchery contamination possible

Medium Import guidelines are in place Testing guidelines outlined Quarantine guidelines Risk based surveillance

Import of birds for recreation purposes (e.g. fighting cocks, cage birds)

Likely to be infected

Traceability Reservoir hosts for AIV

High Import guidelines-import from certified breeders Testing at landing and quarantine Risk based surveillance

Import of wild birds for meat and zoo breeding


Traceability Reservoir hosts Public health risk

High Certified zoo breeders Testing at landing Quarantine Risk based surveillance

INFORMAL TRADE

Informal Trade in live birds


Outbreaks are common Poor access to veterinary services Traceability of infected birds .

High Provide buffer area – poultry free zone. Put up the risk based surveillance. Increase the vigilance across the border. Increase to access to quality poultry birds with improved veterinary care/services.

Informal Trade of wild birds

Wild birds are reservoir likely to be infected.

Birds can be apparently healthy but can harbour the infection. Traceability Introduction of new virus

High Increase surveillance in border area. Alerting the quarantine stations.


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strains.

Exchange of live bird during festivity


Outbreaks are common Poor access to veterinary services Traceability of infected birds.

High Increase risk based surveillance in border area. Alerting the quarantine stations. Increase awareness amongst local people.


This group identified different types of live birds that could be moved either through formal (legal and controlled) channels and informal (illegal and uncontrolled) channels. The risk assessments (probability estimates) in Table 3 are focused on the risk release part of the overall pathway (i.e. the probability that HPAI virus enters a country by that route). All routes were judged HIGH probability except for the formal import of parent flock DOC (MEDIUM). I would suggest that that these estimates are on the high side and that there should be more difference between the different types of bird and route. All formal trade should, by definition, be lower risk provided the import regulations are properly formulated and enforced and complied with.

All informal trade could be higher risk. An important consideration regarding the probability of virus entry over any given time period, say a year, is the expected volume of trade. This is not mentioned in the analysis. For example, informal trade in domestic poultry is likely to be much higher volume, and therefore carry a higher overall annual probability of virus introduction, than informal trade in wild birds.

2.2.3 Group 3

possible ways of entry of virus

1. Movement of migratory/wild/captive birds from ??? to India.

2. Movement of infected poultry & poultry products / feeds (for marketing) / persons / fomites etc….

factors affecting risk

• Unorganised marketing system and porous border.

• Integrated farming (interspecies).

Table 4: Depicting the risk pathways and its probability

1. Movement of migratory/wild/captive birds from ??? to India.

RISK PATHWAY STEPS PROBABILITY ESTIMATE FACTORS

HPAI infection at source in birds

migratory birds- HIGH captive birds- MEDIUM

depending upon location source.

birds destined for imports/migratory are

HIGH depends upon disease prevalence at source


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infected

infected/carriers birds are not detected by vet. authorities.

MEDIUM/HIGH depends upon routine surveillance & tests.

infected/carriers birds are not detected at control check post at international border.by vet. authorities

MEDIUM- captive birds HIGH- migratory birds

depends upon facilities at control/check post.

Table 5: RISK MANAGEMENT/RISK CONTROL POINTS

1. Movement of migratory/wild/captive birds from ??? to India

CONTROL POINTS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO REDUCE RISKS

HPAI infection at source in birds

collection and gathering of information regarding HPAI prevalence.

birds destined for imports/migratory are infected

1. selection of birds from disease free points (captive birds) 2. close vigil upon migratory birds and their route of movements. 3 . routine sero surveillance of migratory birds in collaboration with forest department.

infected/carriers birds are not detected by vet. authorities.

to collect data regarding sero-surveillance of birds at source.

infected/carriers birds are not detected at control check post at international border by vet. authorities

1. to improve border check post inspection 2. round the clock manning with logistics. 3. administrative support .

Consequence assessment – spread of infection once introduced

MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF HPAI OUTBREAKS (spreading of infection flock to flock)

INTENSIVE SERO SURVEILLANCE OF MIGRATORY BIRDS & LOCAL RISK BASED

POPULATION FOR EARLY DETECTION OF DISEASE.

RAPID CONTROLLING RESPONSE TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF DISEASE OUTBREAK .

AVOID MIXING OF BIRDS WITH MIGRATORY /WILD BIRDS/DUCKS DURING THE

SEASON.

QUARANTINE PRACTICE SHOULD BE MANDATORY EVEN IN LOW SAMPLE

POPULATION BEFORE INTRODUCING IN NEW AREAS.(CAPTIVE BIRDS)

IMPOSITION OF REGULATORY MEASURES ( ON SELLING OF BIRDS) TO PREVENT

THE OUTBREAK

SENSITIZING THE PEOPLE REGARDING DISEASE, ITS EPIDEMIOLOGY, OUTBREAK

AND PREVENTING IT TOWARDS EPIDEMIC TO PANDEMIC.


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ENSURING NO RETURN OF BIRDS FROM MARKET PLACE.

TO ENSURE IMPROVED QUALITY OF HUSBANDRY PRACTICES ( MIXED FARMING

SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED)

BIOSECURITY MEASURES SHOULD BE STRENGTHEN

i.e. “ALL IN ALL OUT” STOCKINGS SYSTEM

CLEANING AND DISINFECTION OF FARM PREMISES AND MARKET AREAS.

PROPER DISPOSALS OF POULTRY WASTES AND OFFALS.


This group focused their analysis on the movement of wild and captive wild birds for the RISK RELEASE part of the pathway, although mentioned that movement of domestic poultry was another possible route of entry for the virus. The group again considered the risk associated with wild birds to be MEDIUM to HIGH.

The group considered separately the risk of spreading infection within the country (after entry) – i.e. the exposure and consequences and suggested many interventions to reduce the risk of infection spreading ‘out of control’. Many of these measures were hotly debated during the workshop, with some participants doubting their practical feasibility. However, the point was made that in the early stage of risk analysis all potential interventions (that have a good technical basis) should be proposed and feasibility assessment would come later. This feasibility assessment will include assessment of likely compliance by all affected stakeholders, taking into account the impacts of the different interventions on the different stakeholders.

2.2.4 Group 4: Risk pathways for introduction of H5N1 virus to Bhutan/Nepal

Bird Flu situation in the region

Source: EMPRESS (11 March-11 April 2013) and OIE

Basic information Bhutan:

Commercial farms exist in Bhutan (mainly layer farm) with low to medium biosecurity measures


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Backyard/free range farming with poor bio-security measures

Mixed farming system (chicken, duck, pigs, other livestock)

No live bird market

Open porous border and informal trade/illegal movement of birds

Migratory bird fly ways

DOC supplied by government breeding farms to the farmers

Some commercial farms supply DOC to farmers

Sporadic outbreaks of H5N1 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) along the border area Nepal:

Commercial farms exist in Nepal (broiler/layers) with low to medium bio-security measures

Backyard/free range farming with poor bio-security measures

Mixed farming system (chicken, duck, pigs, other livestock)

Live bird market

Open porous border and informal trade (weak regulatory system)

Migratory bird fly ways

H5N1 (frequent outbreaks since 2009 till - date 2013 and is increasing)

Possible routes of entry of virus

1. Infected live birds movement through border for breeding (formal/informal)

2. Movement of live birds through wet markets/live bird market

3. Infected live birds movement through border for slaughter/meat (informal)

4. Trading of infected meat (informal/formal)

5. Trading of infected eggs (informal/formal)

6. Trading of infected feeds (informal/formal)

7. Virus carried by fomites (vehicle, people, faeces)

8. Movement of wild birds/migratory birds In summary:

Illegal movement of infected live birds and its product for breeding /egg production/consumption

Movement of wild birds

Virus carried by fomites (vehicle, people, faeces)

Risk pathway for H5N1 entry to Bhutan/Nepal via movement of infected live poultry birds for breeding/egg production/consumption

1. Presence of H5N1 virus at source (in neighbouring countries) 2. Birds/products selected for illegal movement are infected 3. Infected birds/ products bypass the border regulatory inspection (not detected by

Regulatory system at the Control Check post) at the border 4. Virus enter the country


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Table 6: Risk pathway for H5N1 entry to Bhutan/Nepal via movement of infected live poultry birds for breeding/egg production/consumption

Steps Probability Factors

Presence of H5N1 virus at source (neighbouring countries)

High H5N1 is endemic in all neighbouring countries

Under reporting

Birds/products selected for illegal movement are infected

High Long open porous border

Many informal routes exists

No system of examination/certification

Price variation-cheap

Poor advocacy

Infected birds/ products bypass the border regulatory inspection at the border

High Long open porous border

Poor advocacy

Poor capacity of the Regulatory bodies

Table 7: Risk management

Steps Risk reduction measures

Presence of H5N1 virus at source (neighbouring countries)

Cross-border harmonization /cooperation/communication

Execute control program at the Regional level

Birds/products selected for illegal movement are infected

Create awareness to the public (all stakeholder in the value chain)

Strengthened border vigilance

Infected birds/ products bypass the border regulatory inspection at the border

Strengthened border vigilance

Improve surveillance

Create local community awareness

Measures to reduce the impact/exposure of virus

Reinforce the regular surveillance programs with targeted surveillance at the high risk areas

Public education

Improve reporting system

Reinforce bio-security measures at the farms.


This group identified different types of live birds (for slaughter, breeding etc.), products and inputs that could be moved either through formal (legal and controlled) channels and informal (illegal and uncontrolled) channels. They also identified possible routes of entry via fomite vehicles, for which risk pathways could also be developed.

The risk assessments (probability estimates) in Table 6 are focused on the individual steps of the risk release part of the overall pathway (i.e. the probability that HPAI virus enters a country by that route). All steps were judged HIGH probability. This reflects the general situation that poultry movements are hardly controlled in any way and there are reported


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outbreaks of HPAI in the neighbouring territories of Bangladesh, West Bengal and other NE Indian states (and more undetected infection is strongly suspected).

Of note among the risk reduction mentioned is “Cross-border harmonization /cooperation/communication; Execute control program at the Regional level”. This recognises that for HPAI the existing administrative borders between countries in this region present no obstacle and cannot ever be expected to.

2.2.5 Points arising for discussion after group work

It is important to consider the risk of exposure with each virus entry pathway in order to assess the overall risk to the country and to identify the most risky of the different entry points/routes.

Assessment of risk of entry and exposure require knowledge of production and marketing systems … links to the next topic (value chains).

Discuss the need for detail in the risk pathways and careful identification of all steps and factors affecting probability at each step.

o E.g. if wild birds are identified as a possible risk… consider: species; migration; season; contact or not with domestic birds (e.g. domestic waterfowl)…

Note that each step in a risk pathway is also a point where risk could be controlled

NOTE especially the importance of considering the VOLUMES of traffic through different possible entry points/routes…

o Higher volume means higher risk over time – e.g. compare wild birds with import of doc / fertile eggs

This is also linked with need to monitor economic situations that may influence trade flows in poultry – e.g. increase in local demand for poultry meat / cheaper imports available etc.

NOTE that some pathways may offer no practical risk reduction measures – cannot be controlled – e.g. wild bird migration.

In such cases we need to consider risk control further ‘downstream’ – e.g. in this case increased surveillance activities in areas and times of year when wild birds may pose particular risk to domestic birds. Or possibly consider localised vaccination of domestic species in areas where there is risk from wildlife – e.g. PPR vaccination of goats where there is risk of contact with wild ungulates.

We need to understand value chains (i.e. production and marketing processes) in order to identify risk issues (hotspots) and analyse risk

Although we can start with rapid overviews and rapid assessments, to properly assess risks requires attention to detail

Finally… remember that the overall objective is to arrive at a risk management strategy that is ‘transparently evidence based’ – tabulating risk pathways and evidence for controls is a useful technique to achieve this.


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2.3 Practical sessions on Days 4-5-6

Each group focused on the livestock sector(s) of the species affected by one ‘target’ disease (FMD, PPR, HPAI or CSF). Each group was asked to focus on a specific geographic area.

1. Describe (overview) the value chains involving the relevant species.

• Are livestock sectors and livestock commodities homogenous?

• Identify the main steps of production, processing, retailing and consumption…

• … and identify the groups of people involved.

• Organise the people or organisations you have identified into chains (or networks).

• Identify the points of convergence and dispersion of the animals and the livestock products.

Details to include:

• Commodity types produced (e.g. milk, meat, draught power… other e.g. ‘sport’).

• Production ‘formats’ (mixed, intensive, subsistence) …

• Relative amounts of different products. o who produces, who consumes? o where produced, where consumed? o seasonality or other time variations.

• Marketing system (traders, transport, retail / locations).

• Movement patterns (live animals, product, by-product).

• Supply of inputs.

2. Preliminary Risk Analysis.

Carry out a preliminary analysis of risks using the preliminary risk analysis tabular framework, to identify main risky areas (risk hotspots).

• Using the livestock value chain you have already worked on, think about your ‘target’ disease.

• Use the preliminary risk assessment tabular template to identify and describe risk hotspots.

3. Surveillance planning.

Still working on your ‘target’ disease…

Make an inventory of current surveillance activities and identify whether a risk-based surveillance approach could be used, based on the preliminary risk analysis.

• Surveillance inventory (what is already being done?).

• Identify gaps (dangerous areas where infection could go undetected).

• Prioritise gaps (based on risk).

• Are there surveillance activities that are less ‘productive’ and could be reduced? E.g. in low risk areas … but also ensure that (low) risks are still recognised and managed.


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• Identify other targets based on risk (to make surveillance more cost-effective).

• Can you identify any ‘trigger factors’ (such as market price changes) that could be monitored and used to direct surveillance efforts?

• Propose a surveillance strategy (supported by risk-based evidence).

4. Risk management interventions and stakeholder impact.

• Identify one or more risk reduction/mitigation interventions…

• … and carry out a stakeholder impact assessment for the intervention.

• Try to reach conclusions about feasibility for successful implementation.

2.3.1 Group 1: PPR, its entry, propagation & transmission in reference to Jharkhand

Figure 7: Map showing position of Jharkhand in East India

1. Value chain overview

Important facts associated with goat farming in Jharkhand


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• Meat purpose rearing of goat is predominant features among farmers in Jharkhand.

• Statistics 22 mill (approx) 140 mill. (India) 2007 census

• Stagnant growth, even downward trend in pig population

• Less production

• Less demand of milk and Meats likability among tribes is high (in addition to other communities)

• Govt. schemes

• Wide gap between demand and supply


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Figure 8: Overview of goat value chain in Jharkhand


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Figure 9: Schematic approach to risk management

2. Risk factors associated – Risky areas

1. Import

2. Import without quarantine

3. Import with quarantine but fails to produce desire immunity

4. Unvaccinated animals entry

5. At level of inter mediate stage complicated exchange occurring back to certain farmers for fattening purposes

6. Breeding and exchange of animals


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Table 8: Preliminary risk analysis tables

Part of the risk pathway and value chain

FACTORS AFFECTING RISK EVIDENCE BASED QUALITATIVE PARTIAL RISK ESTIMATE ??

DISEASE INTRODUCTION

LIVE ANIMALS Beef, Pig and broiler having their own limitations

Goat population stagnant trend because of risk associated with that and 50 % mortality trend in that species

High likability of black Bengal in the territorial areas of Jharkhand

Jharkhand is sharing 300 + k.m with West Bengal

Wide gap between demand and supply of meat in Jharkhand thus bound to import from other states.

In West Bengal the disease is endemic so high risk that imported goats might carry the infections.

ANIMALS PRODUCTS

FOMITES Vehicles of traders and animals transporting on foot might carry in form of aerosols infection

Virus can transmit through fomites may carry low to medium

AIRBORNE AEROSOLS INFECTION


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FACTORS AFFECTING RISK EVIDENCE BASED QUALITATIVE PARTIAL RISK ESTIMATE

??

EXPOSURE OF LOCAL GOATS TO PPR

LIVE ANIMALS MOST OF THE GOATS BROUGHT FROM W.BENGAL ARE FOR REARING/BREEDING.

SLAUGHTER/MEAT CONSUMPTION IS ULTIMATE GOAL .

GOATS OF UP/CG/MP HAVE NO LIKABILITY

EXPOSURE OF LOCAL GOATS WITH GOATS IMPORTED FOR BREEDING PURPOSE-high risks AND

EXPOSURE OF LOCAL GOATS WITH GOATS IMPORTED FOR SLAUGHTER –MORE LIKELY DURING TRANSPORT, MARKETS AND THROUGH FOMITES FROM SLAUGHTER HOUSES

ANIMALS PRODUCTS

FOMITES



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??

SPREAD OF DISEASE WITHIN AREAS

LIVE ANIMALS FREE GRAZING ROAMING HABITS.

GOATS ARE SMALL ANIMAL

EASY TO TRANSPORT TO DIFFERENT PARTS OF LOCALITY

SEASONAL DEMANDS CREATES GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND

ALLOWS INCREASED CHANCES FOR INFECTION

ANIMALS PRODUCTS

SLAUGHTERED IN VILLAGE , DISTT, LEVEL OF MARKET

NO ORGANISED SLAUGHTER HOUSES

PRICES ARE ALSO IMPORTANT FACTORS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF PROTEIN AT LOWER PRICES.

PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN SLAUGHTERING ACTIVITIES MAY TRANSMITS THE INFECTION TO THEIR RESIDENT PLACES GOATS after return

FOMITES NEARBY AREAS OF SLAUGHTERING PLACES MAY HAVE CHANCES OF INFECTIONS.



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??

SPREAD OF DISEASE TO ANOTHER AREA

LIVE ANIMALS BLACK BENGAL BREED OF GOAT IS IN HIGH DEMAND BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH MEAT QUALITY /LOW MORTALITY AT BIRTH/HIGH KIDDING AND SHORT INTERVALS PERIOD BETWEEN TWO KIDDING

EASY TRANSPORTATION FURTHER MAY INCREASE THE CHANCES OF INFECTION SO THEIR IS CHANCES (moderate) THAT NEARBY STATES MAY ALSO ACQUIRE INFECTION.

ANIMALS PRODUCTS

FOMITES

AIRBORNE AEROSOLS INFECTION S LIMITED TO CERTAIN INTERSTATE BOUNDARY


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3. Risk Based Surveillance in Value Chain of Goat farming (PPR) in reference to Jharkhand

SURVEILLANCE INVENTORY

• Virus is endemic.

• Throughout the years but most predominantly in season of summer April to June also happening in November December.

• Surveillance is a continuous process i.e. Passive surveillance based upon symptomatic reporting from end keepers.

• Symptomatic surveillance by state veterinary institution

• Subclinical form of infections (under-reporting of infection is a problem).

IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS

DISEASE SURVEILLANCE

For PPR control , there is no surveillance plan till developed by State Govt. Neither any C.S.S

• Need for disease investigation/epidemiological studies

• Need for intensive sero-surveillance for establishing comparative endemnicity of the disease. (‘One-off’ statistically designed random sample surveys.)

• Need for identification of risk hotspot based upon previous studies.

VACCINATION AND IMMUNITY MONITORING

• Inadequate infrastructure/ (manpower) and maintenance of cold chain

• Annual fixed calendar for vaccination prog.

• Require periodic detection of level of antibodies in stock (post-vaccination sero-monitoring).

DEFICIENCIES IN DISEASE CONTROL

• Biosecurity , quarantine practices not up to standard protocol.

• Importing of goats (inf. With ppr)from neighbouring states may carry the virus but no any health check/sero surveillance is conducted in border areas to detect the level of antibodies .

• Imposition of regulations particularly border areas.

• No difference of vaccinated and unvaccinated goats ( difficult to identify)

• Short lived animals supposed for consumption not kept for future uses for longer period.

PRIORITISING THE GAPS

• NEED FOR DISEASE INVESTIGATION/EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES

• NEED FOR INTENSIVE SERO-SURVEILLANCE FOR ESTABLISHING COMPARATIVE ENDEMNICITY OF THE DISEASE. (‘ONE-OFF’ STATISTICALLY DESIGNED RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEYS.)


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• NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION OF RISK HOTSPOT BASED UPON PREVIOUS STUDIES.

1. Development of surveillance & immunisation plan for whole state is urgently required

2. After identification vaccination programme can be ensued to minimise the disease incidence.

3. That further continued with strategic sound planning to maintained the antibodies level in stocks.

4. Annual vaccination plan must be mandatory

5. Imposition of regulations particularly border areas.

6. Identification of vaccinated stock (animal by special mark ( green ribbon) on neck collar.)

7. Biosecurity , quarantine practices should be followed

8. Multiplication of unit should be advocated to meet the high demand in state through promoting large scale farming/ production by masses.

4. Stakeholder impact analysis of a proposed risk management intervention

Control measure proposed: To select the Goats (for ‘import’) from disease free sources (or sources with absence of recorded outbreaks).

Table 9: Stakeholder impact analysis of a proposed risk management intervention

PEOPLES AFFECTED

EFFECT OF RISK CONTROL MEASURES ON STAKEHOLDERS

LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLIANCE

organised farms

low/neutral high (encourage to increase practices)

traders neutral to negative medium, IEC* practices

goat keepers neutral to positive go for IEC measures among farmers regarding multiplication of unit within localised areas.

vet . services neutral to positive to encourage incentivisation among personnel to increase the coverage

middle man neutral go with IEC measures regarding disease transmission

abattoir neutral public health significance , biosecurity measures

processing neutral public health significance , biosecurity


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industries measures

consumers positive to neutral will receive high quality end product

IEC adopted to discourage infected meats.

*IEC = Information Education Communication


The main origin of risk (of PPR infection) in Jharkhand is in the requirement (demand driven) to import goats from outside, specifically favoured are Black Bengal goats (best meat) from the East Bangladesh, via W. Bengal).

Key risky areas (risk hotspots) are therefore along the (unregulated / unofficial) live animal import supply chain, and further in the chain where goats are traded through markets and mixed with resident goats in farms.

Risk is amplified by poor vaccination coverage and lack of any risk management measures to prevent contact between susceptible and potentially infected goats.

Current surveillance is based on voluntary reporting of disease.

Currently the opportunity to learn more about the distribution of infection by following up reports with extensive outbreak investigations is not taken.

The group recommended an initial wide-scale sero-survey to establish the basic disease distribution pattern. Such a survey should be used to direct risk-based intensification of disease searching in future. With the current (erratic) use of vaccines, care will be needed in interpreting results of sero-surveys. It is recommended that any survey should also gather information about recalled disease occurrence and also include clinical examination at the time of the survey.

The risk management intervention proposed targets the main source of risk in the whole value chain (to select goats for import from disease or outbreak free areas). This implies formalisation (i.e. legalisation) of the trade and application of conditions, with provision for enforcement of regulations. Such a measure would require means to ensure that the veterinary service personnel properly enforce the regulations (the group indicated “incentivisation” – i.e. sufficient pay to avoid temptation to take bribes). Many other stakeholders would need to be convinced of the benefits of using a more regulated (likely more expensive) supply chain. The benefits would be that less incidence of PPR should increase productivity of the goat sector as a whole, therefore the extra cost of the live animal import supply chain should be more than offset by the increased productivity of a healthier overall population.

2.3.2 Group 2: Value chain analysis of Meat and Milk in Nepal in relation to FMDV introduction and outbreaks


Background Information on FMD

• Nepal is endemic for FMD


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• Outbreaks occurs frequently throughout the year with an average of > 500 O/b /yr

• FMDV serotypes O, A and Asia 1 responsible causing the outbreaks

• Serotype “O” of FMDV predominates

• Limited quantity of trivalent FMD vaccine imported from India

Commodities:

• Meat: Buffalo, Sheep, goat and pig

• Draught: Buffalo, bullocks.

• Hide: Cattle, Buffalo.

• Manure: Cattle, buffalo, pigs, sheep and goats.

Type of farming system: Subsistence to semi commercial and mixed farming.

Table 10: Animal population of Nepal

Species Population (million)

Cattle 7.5

Buffalo 4.8

Sheep 0.8

Goat 9.0

Pig 1.4

Table 11: Animal production of Nepal

commodity Producer Quantity (MT’000)

Seasonality

Milk Local Farmers 1497 All year round

Meat Local Farmers & Live Animal Imports

250 All year round, high during Oct-Dec (festival season)

Hide Farmers & slaughter place

NA All year round

Milk value chain


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Figure 10: Milk value chain

Movement of unproductive cows (after productive life)

• Sell to local traders or markets in Nepal

• Local traders sell to Bangladesh/India through Indian traders

• Some of the final product (meat) from Informal slaughter house located in the Indo-Bhutan border reach Bhutan (official slaughterhouses in Bhutan were closed due to religious sentiment of the people)

Meat value chain (Buffalo/Sheep/Goat)

• Live animal (buffalo) from India (30%), Nepal (70%)

• Sheep/goat from China (5%), India (40%), rest from Nepal (55%)


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Figure 11: Meat value chain

INPUT Supply

• Most of the cows that are kept for milk are sourced from Bara district within Nepal. This district is a transit point for movement of buffalo between Nepal and India.

• For meat the live animals are sourced from:

• Buffalo from India (30%), Nepal (70%).

• Sheep/goat from China (5%), India (40%), rest from Nepal (55%)

• Feed for semi-commercial farms manufactured within Nepal (with imported ingredients) - distributed by Agrovet

• Veterinary services (low coverage, 17%)

• Vaccination against FMD has limited coverage.

• Paraprofessional (Technicians and VAHWs) are mainly responsible to delivery the services at grass root level


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Figure 12: Mapping animal movement networks in Nepal


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2. Preliminary Risk Analysis of Foot and mouth disease in Nepal

Table 12: Preliminary Risk Assessment Tables – Nepal (Cattle, Buffalo, Sheep, goat, pig Value chains)

‘Vehicle’ Factors affecting risk Evidence based qualitative partial risk estimate

Questions unanswered

FMD introduction into area/country

Live animals

Movement animals

In southern part- from most of the districts (formal and informal) through India -frequent movement of Buffalo, goat. There is high demand of buffalo and goat meat in Nepal and Nepal is not self sufficient in meat

Buffalo are imported informally

Trans-border/common grazing system in North and southern borders

Frequent in country movement within Nepal from south to major cities of Nepal

Cattle are moved from India into Nepal and additional cattle from Nepal again enter into Bangladesh via India-(west Bengal and Bihar)

The is no national wide FMD control programme (pilot project in the east)

Movement of sheep and goats from Northern border (China) of Nepal is seasonal

Risk of FMDV introduction into country- HIGH

High demand of meat: There is 500,000 goats importing every year from India

High price of goat in Nepal

There is no/weak regulatory provision

Strong socio cultural linkages

Introduction of New strain of FMD virus Serotypes Asia 1 from China

No/Under reporting due to illegal movement of live animals Lack of reliable data on import/ consumption etc.

Meat Milk

There is occasional supply of goat meat into the southern part of Nepal as there the price of goat meat in India is cheaper than Nepal

Seasonal (during dry period) Supply of milk from India into eastern Nepal

MEDIUM No proper records


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Fomites Traders are involved both in India and Nepal in trading business. Vehicles are used are NOT in hygienic conditions Uncontrolled movement of technicians who are involved in FMD outbreaks

There are no proper transportation HIGH

Poor regulations

Exposure of local livestock to FMDV

Live animals

Buffalo, sheep and goats imported/entered into Nepal are mainly intended for slaughter

Some animals (cattle, buffalo and goat) are imported for breeding and they enter into the villages

MEDIUM to HIGH RISK Exposure of local animals are most likely via:

Contacts during transport and in live market

Mixing with local animals (in farm/villages)

Meat Milk

Goat meat procured from local meat shops is consumed by people Milk procured from producers/outside and consumed by people after boiling / pasteurization

MEDIUM risk

Kitchen waste used for feeding pigs

Kitchen waste may contaminate the surrounding grazing area (nearby house) leading to MEDIUM risk

Risk LOW

Milk boil/pasteurized for human consumption

Fomites Vehicles and human being involved in animals movement/transport MEDIUM risk

People and vehicles moving from infected areas to non infected areas come in contact with susceptible animal population


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Spread of FMDV within area/villages

Live animals

Cattle move on foot from west to east and from southern border into country mixing with local animals in grazing areas and watering points.

While moving from west to east there movement is interrupted in Janakpur and Sarlahi district of central Nepal where they entered into India (Near Madhubani, Bihar) and again enter from India into Sunsari and Morang district of Nepal. Collection point in Nepal is in “DAMAK” live animal market where unproductive cattle from Hills and Mountain districts of eastern Nepal are also being collected. Nepal from different routes in Sunsari and Morang both sides in certain places with Common grazing and watering points.

Some bullocks and bulls from DAMAK market are purchased by local farmers and mix with local animal in the village

Buffalo are mainly import for meat and move from southern border into Nepal, then they move to major cities largely in Kathmandu followed by Pokhara, Biratnagar and small number in other cities. Buffaloes for breeding are entered into villages and mix with other susceptible animals. Movement of cattle and pigs from DAMAK to further east entering to West Bengal and Bihar.

Sheep, goats and pigs are traded by trucks throughout the year but, high during Festival period (Dashain and Deepawali) (September to December)

There is no effective inspection system of animal in the country both in Nepal and India leading movement of clinical infected and carrier animals

Male cattle calves are roaming in cities.

Risk of FMD spread is HIGH among the local populations through direct live contact due to: - communal grazing and watering is common - Animal move long distance from west to east, from south to east, west and north and from north to south-east for slaughtering and breeding purpose.


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Spread of FMDV within area/villages

Meat Milk

Manure

Animals slaughtered in slaughter places in respective cities are consumed within the cities.

No inspection system practiced.

Animals slaughtered in the villages are consumed within the communities of the villages.

Milk supplied directly to the households is consumed after boiling.

Manure collected in Live market is disposed unsafely, It is used by local farmer with treatment

Manure produced in the farms and household livestock is sold to local farmers. Also used by farmers them selves

All animals are in the cities and villages are slaughtered by traditional butchers without any inspection. So, there is no restriction even slaughtering of FMD infected animal though they show the clinical signs. There is poor hygienic measures practised by the workers resulting to

Fomites Offal’s from slaughter places are used for feeding of pigs feeding without treatment where as wastage water is disposed unsafely.

Wastages/ offals of Animals slaughtered in household in festivals and in the communities are not disposed safely.

Technicians involved in providing veterinary services including AI are haphazardly visit house to house with disinfecting the instruments and gears (shoes, cloths etc,)

HIGH Risk of FMDV spread via

fomites and offals because most of the worker

keep animals in their houses

Spread of FMDV through tech, and VAHW in the villages is HIGH


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Overall/conclusion

There is high risk of introduction and spread of FMDV due to unrestricted movement of animals and products in the areas along the trading routes

Cattle and pigs trade from Nepal to Bangladesh and Bhutan via India leading to HIGH risk FMD spread to neighbouring countries

Awareness at all stakeholder level, regional control strategy, Biosecurity measures during transport and in live markets/ slaughter houses/places

Bilateral agreement to facilitate inspection and certification with neighbouring country (ies)

3. Foot and mouth disease surveillance in Nepal and Bhutan

Table 13: Foot and mouth disease surveillance in Nepal and Bhutan

Nepal Bhutan

Surveillance inventory

Passive surveillance (based on clinical signs reported by farmers to livestock officials)

Clinical surveillance

Outbreak reporting

Sero-typing of the virus

Targeted surveillance in eastern part of Nepal in the controlled areas (9 districts, sero-surveillance) – to verify freedom from infection

Passive surveillance (based on clinical signs reported by farmers to livestock officials)

Clinical surveillance

Disease reporting

Sero-typing of the virus (active)

Surveillance at quarantine station (clinical and serological)

Identify the gaps

Weak surveillance at the live animal market

No surveillance along the border areas

No surveillance of animals in the transit points/long distance movement route

No surveillance at the slaughter places

Weak surveillance along the border areas

Sharing common grazing points along the borders - no surveillance in these areas

Prioritise the gaps

Surveillance of animals

intended for long distance movement (routes)

Live market

Slaughter places

Surveillance of animals

Along the border areas

Less productive

Other cost-effective surveillance targets

Slaughter places

Live market

Border or animal movement check point

Migratory routes

Other trigger factors to be used to direct

Festival season during Sept-Nov

Migratory season (movement of animals) during winter


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targeted surveillance

Table 14: Proposed Surveillance strategy (Risk-based surveillance)

NEPAL BHUTAN

Type of surveillance Target Target

Passive

Village/farms of high risk areas

Village/farms of high risk areas

Risk-based active surveillance (clinical and laboratory)

sero-surveillance

Live market

In and around slaughter places

Trading routes

Trans-human migration along the southern border of central and eastern regions and northern border of central and western Nepal

Villages around the major cities

Migratory routes: Trans-human migration during winter season.

Along the borders

Quarantine station

Rumour verification (in addition to surv.)

Throughout the country

4. Stakeholder impact analysis of a proposed risk management interventions Control measure: Establish bio-security measures at live markets (cleaning /disinfection of the live markets)

Table 15: Stakeholder impacts of bio-security measures at live markets

People affected Describe the effects of the risk control measures on people/groups.

Comments on likelihood of compliance/means to improve compliance.

Municipality - Creation of employment opportunities.

- Added public expenses and burden

- Commit fund support from the government

- Collect small amount of fees/service charge from the traders

Traders - Have to bear additional expense.

- Net profit goes down.

compliance questionable - traders may avoid live market

- Strong regulatory provision should be in place

Farmers / Producers - Reduce spread of disease by fomites

-

Consumer - Ensure Food safety - advocacy


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- Bear cost of production

Control measure: Movement regulation based on vaccination status

Table 16: Stakeholder impacts of movement regulation based on vaccination status

People affected Describe the effects of the risk control measures on people/groups.

Comments on likelihood of compliance/means to improve compliance.

Traders Loss of income due to trade restriction Traders may resort to produce fake vaccination certificates

Farmers / Producers

Additional expenses for the farmers (farmers have to pay for the vaccination cost)

Provide vaccine subsidy

Veterinary service providers

Added responsibilities for certification (have to vaccinate large number of animals with limited man power)

- Added burden of sourcing sufficient vaccines

Employ para - vets/CAHW


The main origin of risk (of FMD infection) in Nepal is from live animal movements (and associated fomite-carriage) from outside the country (neighbours India and China).

Key risky areas (risk hotspots) are therefore along the (unregulated / unofficial) live animal import supply chain, and further in the chain where animals are traded through markets and mixed with resident livestock.

Risk is amplified by lack of any risk management measures to prevent contact between susceptible and potentially infected livestock.

Current surveillance in Nepal and in Bhutan is based on voluntary reporting of disease, supplemented by some targeted sero-surveillance (notably in 9 districts of Nepal where outbreaks have not been reported for some time and sero-surveillance has been organised to verify freedom from infection). However disease reporting is not actively promoted and the supplementary surveillance is limited in its scope.

The group recommended more risk-based targeting of surveillance activity. Such activity would be in addition to that already practiced and targeted on key gathering points in the live animal movement chain.

One risk management intervention proposed was targeted at the main source of risk in the whole value chain (to regulate movement based on vaccination status). This implies formalisation (i.e. legalisation) of live animal trade across international borders and application of conditions, with provision for enforcement of regulations. Such a measure would require support to encourage vaccination uptake and


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increased manpower resources in the veterinary services to deliver the vaccination and to properly enforce the movement regulations. Another risk management intervention proposed was targeted at a major risk hotspot for spread of infection within the country (biosecurity in live animal markets). Implementation of such measures should be carried out in stages, with first priority focus being on the highest risk markets (these would usually be the bigger markets where long-distance transported animals are gathered, rested and traded).

2.3.3 Group 3: Preliminary risk assessment for AIV in Maharashtra

1. Value chain overview Poultry Production System in Maharashtra

• Total 60 million poultry • All 3 Production systems(PS) present

– Commercial-60% • Layers- • Broilers • Fertile eggs

– Backyard-40% • Layers • Broilers

– Integrated System(National Level) • Include production(Contractual), processing, and marketing, including

supply of feed to retailers Poultry commodities produced in Maharashtra

• Meat – Processed meat

• Ready to cook • Ready to eat

– Dressed Meat • Eggs

– Fertile eggs for hatcheries – Table eggs

• DOC • Live adult birds • By-Products

– Emu oil – Feathers for shuttle cock production

• Manure from litter(composting of culled birds, offals)


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Marketing Systems-


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Figure 13: Poultry value chain – numbers of companies / individual producers / traders


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Figure 14: Poultry value chain – QUANTITY of product (eggs and meat)


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Figure 15: Poultry value chain – VALUE of product (eggs and meat)


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2. Preliminary risk assessment for AIV in Maharashtra:

Table 17: Preliminary risk assessment for AIV in Maharashtra

Risk from poultry

Factors affecting risk Evidence based Qualitative risk estimate

Questions remaining

Spread of HPAI in Maharashtra

Live Birds

In Maharashtra, the DOCs are mainly produced in the Pune and Nasik districts and some in Aurangabad district. From these National producers, the DOCs are distributed to the local producers in all the districts of Maharashtra and also many States of India and abroad. The local producers who in turn may raise the birds either through integration mode or in a normal mode by purchase of feed and vet care from various sources. The local producers sell the live birds through local market, traders, and to National producers and whole sale retailers. The spent hens are sold to traders and local markets for meat purposes and some spent birds are sold to backyard farmers. The birds are then sold to customers directly or through wholesale retailers/retailers. The role of middle man is prominent in local trade (include markets and traders/subdealers) and backyard sector The National producers have overall strong biosecurity Presence of virus in wild birds/peridomestic birds such as crows.

Biosecurity risk in movement of trucks carrying feed and during veterinary care – Risk is Medium Risk is high as the biosecurity in backyard, local markets and at dealer level is very low. Risk is high as the birds are collected from various sources and are also transported to a long distance. At retailer level also the risk is high as there is lack of biosecurity. Very low risk as the trade is organized and the firms observe strict biosecurity measures. Risk is high with peridomestic birds … … with wild birds risk is seasonal and Medium

Documentation, traceability and volume of trade is not available


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Risk from poultry

Factors affecting risk Evidence based Qualitative risk estimate

Questions remaining

Spread of HPAI in Maharashtra

Meat National producers market their processed meat through wholesale retailers and retailers to customers Dressed meat is mainly sold to the customers by the retailers including butchers who purchase the same from either traders or wholesale retailers.

Very low risk as the trade is organized Risk is high as the sale of dressed meat is unorganized to a large extent with lot of movement of the birds and traders.

Eggs The fertile eggs are transported to the hatcheries by the National producers. The trade in the table eggs between the local producers /traders and backyard is unorganized with lots of movements associated with collection and distribution

Risk is very low Risk is high due to opportunity for disease transmission.

Risk of introduction of HPAI from other States

Fomites Movements of trucks which return from the affected States

Risk is High since the trucks travel to HPAI affected States

Cleaning and disinfection of trucks and egg trays not documented.

Wild birds

Risk hotspots:

1. For the spent hen trade (from layer farms to small farmers for further production cycle

– via LBMs)

2. LBMs in general

3. Surveillance Plan for AIV in Maharashtra

Surveillance Inventory

• Point of Import:

– DOC-Grandparent stock- Testing on Day 1 and Day 21 for AIV and quarantine until results are available


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– Fertile eggs- Eggs are sampled for presence of yolk/maternal antibodies and surface contamination with AIV infected faeces

– Pet Birds for recreational and ornamental purposes- Testing done for AIV and birds quarantined until results.

• Surveillance within Maharashtra state

– Disease monitoring is being carried out by various DI labs and WRDDL.

– Sero-surveillance stopped recently as per recent guidelines under Action Plan

– Reports of unusual mortality are investigated.

– Report of surveillance sent to DADF monthly

Gaps

• Risk based surveillance of LBMs, bird holding places of wholesale retailers, traders/middlemen - not done.

• Border areas where the cross border trade occurs and is not under active surveillance. Disinfections of fomites not done.

• Wild bird surveillance is weak due to lack of infrastructure

• Species-wise surveillance not done

• Marketing of spent hens from commercial farms and backyards is unmonitored and not under active surveillance

Prioritising gaps

• High risk pathway of value chain at the level of LBMs, State borders, backyard and trader route need to be targeted.

• Wild birds surveillance to be planned as high risk area in migratory season.

• Area with presence of ducks such as Gadchiroli district need to be subjected to intensive surveillance.

Identified trigger points

• Very low risk areas such as highly biosecure establishments and certified national producer and wholesalers – low intensity surveillance

• Any reports of unusual mortality

• Presence of ducks.

• Presence of wild bird migration route.

• State Borders and trader routes

• Identify the areas where there is high poultry density with low biosecurity.

• Unusual sales of vaccines and drugs

• market price fluctuations

Proposed strategy

• Strengthen the active surveillance in border areas, live bird markets and trader holdings.

• Active surveillance of wild birds including ducks and poultry farms in and around the areas.


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• Strengthen passive surveillance through extension and involving poultry farmers/stake holders in decision making.

• Create awareness about the importance of biosecurity at the farmer and LBM and trader level.

• Participatory implementation of relevant animal health acts(including registration of poultry farmers)

Mode of surveillance:

• Border trade – clinical inspection and environmental sampling of trucks

• Live bird markets, trader holdings – Clinical inspection, bird samples and environmental samples.

• Ducks – bird samples including serum and environmental samples.

• Wild birds – Bird samples and environmental samples.

• Retailers– Clinical inspection, Tissue samples .

• Drug dealers (sales) and unusual market price fluctuations.


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4. Stakeholder impact assessment

Table 18: Stakeholder impact assessment (detail of influences and perceptions)

Proposed Risk control measure

Impact of the risk reduction measure on risk

Stakeholders involved Impact of risk on stakeholders

Impact of S’ Holder on risk (+/-)

Impact of the risk reduction measure on stakeholders

Improved biosecurity at producer level

Reduced risk of infection transmission along the value chain

Backyard / small scale Medium level holdings Large scale holdings Local traders (LBMs) Consumers

High High High Low Low

Medium Medium Medium Medium Low

High Low Low Low Low

Separate market space for spent hens

Regulated movement of spent hens for traceability, regulated marketing and surveillance

Backyard / small scale (Buyers) Medium level holdings (seller) Large scale holdings (Sellers) Local traders (LBMs) Consumers

High High High Low Low

Low High High Low Low

High High Low Positive Low


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Table 19: Stakeholder impact assessment (compliance)

People affected Describe the effect of risk control measure on this group or person

Comment about the likelihood of compliance and any means necessary to improve the compliance

Backyard / Small scale producers

The increased biosecurity will increase the cost of poultry production. However, the separate market for the spent hens may facilitate purchase of healthy hens complementing the efforts for increased biosecurity.

Since the cost of poultry production increases, encouragement in the form of schemes implemented through village panchayats for the periodical cleaning and disinfection will ensure compliance.

Medium level producers

The increased biosecurity may not affect the cost of production since it is already implemented to some extent. However, creation of separate spent hen market will increase cost of their selling.

Will be high as the biosecurity costs are part of the production. However, to encourage the compliance for selling the birds in the spent hen market, arrangement of transport at the block level by the Government and registration of farms will be helpful.

Large scale producers Biosecurity is already high and spent hens are marketed through their own retail outlets.

Likelihood of compliance is very high

Local traders Increased biosecurity may not add costs to the traders except in case of insistence on cleaning and disinfection of trucks leaving spent hen markets

Compliance can be improved if the trucks are cleaned and disinfected at the entry and exit points of the spent hen markets.

Consumers No effect on the consumer except a litter more cost

No role in compliance of risk reduction measures.


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The main origin of risk (of HPAI infection and other NAIVs) in Maharashtra is from outside the state (informally imported birds and wild birds). Overall the probability of introduction is probably low. However, the poultry value chain contains several high risk hotspots where risk of spread of infection, should it enter, is high. The scale and total value of the poultry in the state is high, meaning that any incursion of HPAI into the state could have huge negative economic impact (as occurred in the outbreaks previously).

Key risky areas (risk hotspots) were identified in the live bird marketing parts of the value chain, specifically the marketing of spent hens, which are often sold by large egg producers through markets to small scale farmers to be kept for further production. Being longer lived birds these are at higher risk of being infected (specifically with low pathogenic notifiable AI viruses).

Risk is amplified by lack of any risk management measures to regulate hygiene and biosecurity in live bird markets.

Current surveillance is based on investigation of reports of unusual mortality. Routine sero-surveillance has been stopped.

The group recommended more risk-based surveillance activity targeted on:

o LBMs, State borders, backyard and trader route.

o Wild birds surveillance to be planned as high risk area in migratory season.

o Area with presence of ducks such as Gadchiroli district need to be subjected to intensive surveillance.

Risk management interventions proposed were targeted on reducing the risk of infection spread within the value chain inside the state. Major focus would be on live bird marketing (improved biosecurity in markets and separation of the spent hen marketing chain). Implementation of such measures should be carried out in stages, with first priority focus being on the highest risk markets (these would usually be the bigger markets).


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2.3.4 Group 4: CSF pigs


Overview: PIG VALUE CHAIN

• COMMODITY TYPE: Meat & meat products, piglets, bristles, (biologicals: insulin)

• PIG PRODUCTION- a dynamic and rapid growing sector in the region (Assam, Jharkhand and in South India: Goa, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala)

• The present production of meat in India is estimated at 6.27 million tons in 2010 which is 2.21% of the world's meat production. The contribution of meat from buffalo is about 23.33%, while cattle contributes about 17.34%, sheep 4.61%, goat 9.36%, pig 5.31%, poultry 36.68% and other species 3.37% (FAO, 2012)

• Rising demand for pork and pork products, which increases in festival season

• Pig stats: 2007 (11.13 million) (4 million in Assam, >50%in NE REGION)

• Organized (government farms: both state and central)

• Large informal sub-sector

– Backyard pig production

• Few animals and free range

• Double Decker system along with ducks

Figure 16: Major transport routes and gathering markets for pigs in NE states


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Figure 17: Major transport routes and gathering markets for pigs in Karnataka

ACTORS IN PORK VALUE CHAIN

FARM LEVEL

• PIG FARMER

POST-FARM LEVEL

• LIVE PIG TRADERS

• TRANSPORTERS

INPUTS & SERVICES

• PIG BREEDING

• VETS/ANIMAL HEALTH WORKERS

• BIOLOGICALS

• ANIMAL ATTENDANTS (SCAVENGERS)

• FEED SHOP OWNERS (ONLY IN INTENSIVE SYSTEM)

• FEED MANUFACTURERS


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• FEED TRANSPORTERS

• SLAUGHTER HOUSE OWNERS

• PORK BUTCHERS

• SUPERMARTS

• CONSUMERS

Figure 18: Value chain overview (pigs)

CONSTRAINTS IN PIGGERY PRODUCTION SECTOR

• The health status of the pigs is poor as they are not necessarily grain-fed.

• India is not a large producer of pork products because of backyard operations, limited commercial farming.

• There is no national traceability program.

• Limited information on national investment on pig production.

• - Disease outbreaks often devastate local pig populations.

• - The major problem in pork is lack of its availability, followed by other problems like poor quality and high price.


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Different categories of information are needed in the preliminary value chain description.

Production process

Inputs

– source:

- where (geographical location in terms of access by producers)

- who (whether producer-supplier contract requires informal or formal contracts (transaction costs and compliance)

- how (cash, credit, credit on what terms)

– prices

– seasonality

- time/changes

Production

– products (with regard to demand, prices, quantities and seasonality, quality and preferences)

– cost structure

– productivity

– subsidies/support (government policy)

– veterinary inputs and services

Marketing routes

– mapping of markets

– data on traders and trader networks

– prices

Processing

– mapping of slaughter places

Consumption

– mapping of retail outlets

– prices

– destination (final market) for produce (may be outside province)

Governance, regulation, routine

Behaviours/routines (Who sets the rules? Who enforces them? What are the incentives/disincentives for doing them? Who governs?) – For example, how are things done? Particularly here we will be looking for “risky” behaviours and “biosecure” behaviours. Do visitors to farms come into direct or indirect contact with the livestock? Are animals from different sources mixed at markets? Do traders clean and disinfect their vehicles? Do feed suppliers visit farms in different production sectors?

Local field conditions


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What washing facilities are available at markets? Is the temperature suitable for virus survival (at different times of year)


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2. Preliminary Risk Analysis

Table 20: Preliminary Risk Analysis (CSF in pigs)

Factors affecting risk Evidence based qualitative partial risk assessment

Remarks

Disease introduction to country/area

Live animals • Demand for pork is high and hence there is pig movement from Myanmar

• CSF is endemic in Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram and Nagaland.

• Unrestricted animal movement b/w Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram and Nagaland.

• Direct purchase of piglets by local farmers from adjoining farms.

• Irrespective quality animals are bought.

• Inadequate vaccine coverage?

pig movement from Myanmar results in high risk of introduction of new sub-type of CSFV (2.2).

Predominant sub-type is 1.1

(GenBank database:2002)

UP and Bihar were showing sub-type 2.2 in isolated cases.

Present study shows regional distribution of sub-type 2.2

Animal products & waste

Meat,

Bristles,

Biologicals

Illegal import of vaccines from neighbouring countries


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Remarks

Fomites Within the area and adjoining areas supply of pigs for slaughter

Movement of men and material carrying infected pigs b/w the farms: regions: border

“Media reports”

Exposure of local livestock

Live animals • persistently infected piglets sold to the farmers.

• Farmers regularly introduce boars from outside without proper health records.

• Animals under incubation are sold to the farmers.

• Collection at animal shows, live-animal markets

Infected/persistently infected animal movements between endemic areas contributes to

High risk

Animal products & waste

• Open slaughter in the farm vicinity.

• Open sale

• No structured slaughter house in the entire NE region

• No certification

High Risk

Fomites Meat being transported within the high demand areas during festive seasons

No certification at the point of origin

Spread of disease to other areas/country


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Remarks

Live animals • Since consumption /demand is very high in the region; less likelihood of spread to Bhutan & Nepal.

Informal trading may spread CSFV to Bhutan and Nepal

Medium risk

Animal products

• Meat being transported to long distances during peak demand season


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3. Surveillance planning

Surveillance inventory (what is already being done)

• No systematic surveillance plan in place for CSF.

• In pockets of pig mortalities in susceptible population samples are collected for diagnosis of pig diseases (PRRS; CSF; Pasteurellosis).

• Screening tests (ELISA, PCR and VI) for CSF. Repository of serum/virus in (PD_ADMAS and IVRI)

Identify gaps (dangerous areas where infection could be undetected)

• Disease identification by visual inspection is missing: (Passive surveillance)

• Under-reporting and non-reporting (farmer)

• Clinical diagnosis of CSF possible (Vet)

• Inadequate Lab. Infrastructure for Diagnosis (LAB).

• Wild boar movement –uncontrolled pig trade

Prioritize gaps (based on risk)

Table 21: Gaps in surveillance for CSF

GAP IDENTIFICATION PRIORITIZE GAPS (risk-based)

• Unrestricted movement of pigs/wild boars

• Dynamic pig population

HIGH RISK

• Disease identification by visual inspection is missing: (farmer level)

• Under-reporting and non-reporting

HIGH RISK

• Unregulated slaughter High risk

• Clinical diagnosis of CSF possible (Vet) Medium

• Inadequate Lab. Infrastructure for Diagnosis (LAB). Low-medium

• Use of unscrupulous vaccines High

Identify other targets based on risk (to make surveillance more cost-effective)

• Live markets

• Slaughter houses

• Seasonality/festivity: Demand increased


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• Wild boars

Identify “trigger points” (market price changes) that could be monitored / used in direct surveillance.

• Low number of pigs turning up at the market for slaughter.

• Panic selling of diseased/dead pigs.

• Fluctuating market prices.

• Festival season with high demand of pork

• Biosecurity issues

Propose a surveillance strategy (supported by risk-based evidence)

• samples submitted on suspicion of CSF in pigs

• Farmers may consult their veterinarians where they see clinical signs or changes in behaviour or other health indicators and vets will consider whether they should consider CSF in their diagnosis.

• Biosecurity advice at pig premises is made available to pig keepers.

• Outdoor pigs are at greater risk of exposure to disease incursion from wildlife (including feral pigs in some areas), public access and other fomites making physical contact with outdoor pigs should be in place

• wild boar act as a large reservoir for classical swine fever virus (CSFV). As such, they present an ever-present risk of transmission of disease to farmed animals. To ensure the effectiveness for preventing the transmission of CSFV to domestic pigs, an effective vaccine is needed .

• Raising stakeholder awareness

• Develop cost-effective vaccine

• Tracing of meat from animals slaughtered in risk period :The CSF virus remains active for months in pig meat products and is a source of spread in pigs. Where pigs were moved from the IP to slaughter in a risk period (prior to disease restrictions being imposed)


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4. Control measures: stakeholder impact assessment

Table 22: Control measures: stakeholder impact assessment

Risk Mitigation measures People affected Describe the effects of the risk control measure on this person / group

Comments about the likelihood of compliance – and any means necessary to improve compliance

1 2 3

1. Selection of pig Breeding stock from disease free parent stock.

2. Application of Biosecurity measures.

3. Quality Meat Certification/inspection

Pig breeding farm HIGH HIGH LOW +/- (+ve in case of farms maintaining disease free stock; -ve in case of small farmers)

Pig farm labour MEDIUM HIGH LOW

Pig farmers HIGH HIGH LOW? (-) unless subsidy and price support for small farmers)

pig traders(Wholesalers/retailers)

HIGH MEDIUM HIGH (-) Cut in profit margins

Butchers MEDIUM HIGH HIGH (-) Have to pay for certification

Consumer HIGH HIGH HIGH (-)Increased cost of final product

Vaccine producers HIGH HIGH LOW

Vet agencies HIGH HIGH LOW

Feed manufactures MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW


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The main origin of risk (of CSF infection) is from both inside and outside the country (informally imported pigs via Myanmar).

Key risky areas (risk hotspots) were identified in the live pig marketing parts of the value chain, through which infected, incubating and pigs carrying the virus without clinical signs could be traded.

Risk is amplified by lack of any risk management measures to regulate hygiene and biosecurity in live animal markets.

Current surveillance is based on investigation of reports of unusual mortality.

The group recommended that initial focus needs to be on increasing awareness to generate more reports of disease in pigs, which should then be investigated thoroughly. This would build up a clearer picture of the distribution of infection and transmission patterns so that more active, risk-based surveillance activities could be added in future.

Risk management interventions proposed were targeted on reducing the risk of infection spread within the value chain. Major focus would be on sourcing of breeder pigs and on improved biosecurity in production, marketing and transport.

3. Discussion on outcome of practical work group sessions

3.1 The first group task – practicing use of the risk pathway tool

Task: You have been asked to comment on the risk of an outbreak of FMD or PPR occurring in your state/country as a result of long distance livestock movements…

The groups identified different types of live animal movements that are associated with risk of PPR or FMD transfer between areas/countries. Distinctions were clearly made between movements associated with formal trade, informal trade and wild animal movement, in terms of the level of risk, with informal trade singled out as the far highest risk. Formal trade movements were considered low risk because it was expected that effective health inspections would detect infected animals. This is perhaps optimistic, but an additional factor is that informal trade dominates animal movements so much that formally regulated movements anyway account for a small minority of movements, therefore contributing a small proportion of total risk.

The risk of PPR and FMD spread from and via wild animals was perhaps over-estimated. This is understandable given that the risk from these animals is perceived as uncontrollable. However the degree to which these animals contribute to total risk is probably small.

3.2 The second group task – analysing routes and risks of HPAI introduction

Task: We will work on HPAI. We will consider the risk of introduction of HPAI into countries/areas, identify the major routes and develop risk pathways.

The groups produced some logical and well considered analyses. This groups identified different types of live birds (for slaughter, breeding etc.), products and inputs that could be


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moved either through formal (legal and controlled) channels and informal (illegal and uncontrolled) channels. They also identified possible routes of entry via fomite vehicles, for which risk pathways could also be developed.

Depending on the area being dealt with, the highest risks of introduction are associated with wild birds (passage of migrating birds) and informal trade in poultry and products across ‘porous’ borders (e.g. with Bangladesh).

Similar to the PPR/FMD analysis, the wild bird risk tended to be over-stated and would be lower than assessed by the groups in reality. This would have become apparent if, given more time, the risk pathways were analysed in more detail (e.g. what is the expected infection rate in migrating birds – probably quite low – and what is the probability of infectious contact with resident domestic poultry – not high).

Some groups considered separately the risk of spreading infection within the country (after entry) – i.e. the exposure and consequences and suggested many interventions to reduce the risk of infection spreading ‘out of control’. Many of these measures were hotly debated during the workshop, with some participants doubting their practical feasibility. However, the point was made that in the early stage of risk analysis all potential interventions (that have a good technical basis) should be proposed and feasibility assessment would come later. This feasibility assessment will include assessment of likely compliance by all affected stakeholders, taking into account the impacts of the different interventions on the different stakeholders.

Of note among the risk reductions mentioned is “Cross-border harmonization /cooperation/communication; Execute control program at the Regional level”. This recognises that for HPAI the existing administrative borders between countries in this region present no obstacle and cannot ever be expected to.

3.3 Practical sessions on Days 4-5-6

Each group focused on the livestock sector(s) of the species affected by one ‘target’ disease (FMD, PPR, HPAI or CSF). Each group was asked to focus on a specific geographic area.

1. Describe (overview) the value chains involving the relevant species.

2. Preliminary Risk Analysis.

3. Surveillance planning.

4. Risk management interventions and stakeholder impact.

All the groups produced a logically arranged analysis, comprising the parts suggested in the groups work instructions. The outputs contained in the previous section of this report, read along with the facilitator summary comments, provide useful preliminary analyses of the situations for the four diseases targeted.

Value chains were described in outline. Risky areas (hotspots) within the value chains were identified (supported by logical arguments based on factual descriptions of value chain features). Technically sound risk management interventions were suggested and preliminary analysis of stakeholder impacts made leading to useful discussions about feasibility of implementation and compliance.


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Groups used the value chain description and preliminary risk analyses to make sensible suggestions about surveillance strategy.

These outputs show that the training goal of the workshop was well achieved. However, it could not be expected that the outputs themselves would represent comprehensive risk analyses and surveillance strategies.

To carry out the tasks set in the workshop properly in the field would require much more time, and most importantly the involvement of stakeholders, being engaged in a consultative process of mutual discussion, learning and analysis. The recommended processes for application of these techniques in the field are laid out in the two FAO guides which provide useful background to risk analysis and its application in value chains. These documents were supplied as hard copy during the training course.

FAO (2012). Designing and implementing livestock value chain studies. A practical aid for Highly Pathogenic and Emerging Disease (HPED) control. Animal Production and Health Guidelines. No. 10. Rome. ISBN 978-92-5-107139-7. http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2583e/i2583e00.pdf

FAO (2011). A value chain approach to animal diseases risk management – Technical foundations and practical framework for field application. Animal Production and Health Guidelines. No. 4. Rome. ISBN 978-92-5-106861-8. http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2198e/i2198e00.pdf

4. Guidelines on the application of disease risk analysis for use in a risk based surveillance systems approach

Why is the risk analysis in value chain approach useful?

Value chain and risk analysis in the field can be a means to engage stakeholders and develop locally specific initiatives. The practical approach is based on workshops and interviews with key informants:

1. Gather information from value chain actors (involve local veterinary authorities in information gathering)

2. Discuss risk pathways and risky practices in value chain with local veterinary authorities

3. Discuss risk mitigation measures with local veterinary authorities and other stakeholders

More detailed understanding of the value chain (and analysis of risk) can help us to answers questions such as:

Is stamping out appropriate in all (if any) situations?

Is stronger regulation justified for certain types of trader?

Should vaccination be subsidised / free for certain types of producer?

Which types of animal should be sampled in a surveillance programme?

Where should tracing be focused from outbreak investigations?

http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2583e/i2583e00.pdf



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How does the risk analysis in value chain approach contribute to surveillance strategy?

Surveillance combined with an effective response reduces spread of disease and therefore the impact and overall risk of disease is reduced. It is important to strengthen surveillance in parts of the value chain where risk cannot be reduced by other measures (RISK-BASED SURVEILLANCE).

The proposed definition of ‘risk-based surveillance’ that will be included in the OIE terrestrial code is:

“The application of qualitative or quantitative methods to increase surveillance efficiency by directing surveillance activities to…

1. the population of interest based on exposure to factors that may predispose it to disease or infection, or

2. subpopulations where, due to host factors, the disease or infection is most likely to be found, or

3. prioritizing populations where the consequences of disease or infection could be severe”.

Application of the risk-based surveillance approach follows naturally from the approach of analysing risk in value chains.

A combined value chain risk analysis can be used to tell us two things:

Where, when and in which sub-population is the probability of infection greatest?

Where, when and in which sub-populations would the consequences of infection be greatest (and it is most important to detect infection early)?

Risk analyses may also identify times of the year when likelihood of infection and/or consequences of infection are greater (seasonal risk factors). We might then increase surveillance activity at these high risk times.

Our risk analyses, linked to the value chain, may also identify value chain factors that increase the likelihood of infection and/or consequences of infection, e.g. supply and demand fluctuations in neighbouring countries might stimulate poorly regulated flows of livestock and products. We might plan to vary our surveillance activity according to market/price data from surrounding areas.

Other criteria for targeting surveillance activity that can be considered include:

It may be necessary to plan short-term surveillance activity or one-off surveys to fill in specific gaps in epidemiological knowledge and to improve the risk analysis.

o There may be uncertainty about the level of infection in different parts of the value chain…

o For example to rule out existence of long-term maintained cycles of infection / infection reservoirs.

Suggested guiding principles for surveillance strategies

Where resources are limited, surveillance actions should be proportionately allocated on a risk basis (i.e. more intensive in high risk areas, less intensive in low risk areas)


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Risk-based approaches require estimations of risk (qualitative and/or quantitative risk assessments)

A knowledge of the population at risk including descriptions of highly susceptible groups and potential reservoirs is critical for risk assessment and an effective surveillance approach

Surveillance approaches should achieve good coverage over both space and time.

Surveillance should be decision-orientated… identify in advance how information will be used

Surveillance approaches should result in data collection, data analysis, epidemiological interpretation and timely reporting back of results to decision makers and to inform risk communication

Surveillance must be practical and have sufficient resources (human, diagnostic and financial) to support and sustain implementation

Summary of Risk Analysis in Value Chains

collect data

value chain overview

identify risk issues

construct risk pathways

identify risk factors

preliminary risk assessment

detailed analysis of risk and identification of potential CCPs (risk pathway analysis)

Identify possible risk mitigation AND consider the need for (extra) surveillance as part of risk management (i.e. risk-based / targeted surveillance)

collect further required data

refine risk mitigation plan with value chain impact assessment (how are stakeholders affected?)

Carrying out the risk analysis in the field involves:

Value chain and risk ‘audit’ (processes, places, people).

Use available knowledge to begin with…

Approach is consultation with key informants and stakeholders… this will establish good RISK COMMUNICATION

o Gather detailed locally specific information (involve local veterinary authorities in information gathering)

o Discuss risk pathways and risky practices in poultry value with local veterinary authorities

o Discuss risk mitigation measures with local veterinary authorities and other stakeholders


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Identify risk control points and suggest interventions (and assist evaluation).

Important points to remember

the need for detail in the risk pathways and careful identification of all steps and factors affecting probability at each step.

o e.g. if wild birds are identified as a possible risk… consider: species; migration; season; contact or not with domestic birds (e.g. domestic waterfowl)…

NOTE especially the importance of considering the VOLUMES of traffic through different possible entry points/routes…

o Higher volume means higher risk over time – e.g. compare wild birds with import of doc / fertile eggs

This is also linked with need to monitor economic situations that may influence trade flows in poultry – e.g. increase in local demand for poultry meat / cheaper imports available etc.

NOTE that some pathways may offer no practical risk reduction measures – cannot be controlled – e.g. wild bird migration.

In such cases we need to consider risk control further ‘downstream’ – e.g. in this case increased surveillance activities in areas and times of year when wild birds may pose particular risk to domestic birds. Or possibly consider localised vaccination of domestic species in areas where there is risk from wildlife – e.g. PPR vaccination of goats where there is risk of contact with wild ungulates.

We need to understand value chains (i.e. production and marketing processes) in order to identify risk issues (hotspots) and analyse risk

Although we can start with rapid overviews and rapid assessments, to properly assess risks requires attention to detail

Finally… remember that the overall objective is to arrive at a risk management strategy that is ‘transparently evidence based’ – tabulating risk pathways and evidence for controls is a useful technique to achieve this.

The following table, Table 23, gives a very brief outline of the issues identified during the value chain and risk analysis process, leading to the consideration of risk-based surveillance, carried out in the workshop. It is important to note that this table is only intended as a quick reference to the issues discussed, and is far from a complete analysis. The table serves as a reminder of the issues that would require deeper exploration if proper risk-based surveillance plans are to be developed.


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Table 23: Outline of the issues identified during the workshop

HPAI FMD PPR CSF

Value Chains India has high-investment poultry value chains in particular areas (e.g. Maharashtra) There are also many subsistence and small commercialised (low-tech) value chains throughout the country.

A particular feature of large ruminant value chains in the region is that slaughter of cattle is prohibited in some countries. For this and other reasons there are large scale and largely unregulated livestock movements across the region.

Goat populations are particularly high in the NE of India and Bangladesh.

Demand for goat meat in NE India outstrips supply.

Bhutan is trying to increase goat production by importing breeding stock from India.

Pig value chains in India are locally concentrated in two parts of the country, the NE and the South. These areas are connected by pig movements at certain times of the year.

Demand for pigs can outstrip supply, and informal imports enter from Myanmar.

Risk Analysis The high-investment parts of the sector could face large economic damage in case of HPAI outbreaks. Some areas (e.g. West Bengal) are at risk from contacts with infected areas (e.g. Bangladesh).

Risk of disease spread is increased by unregulated live animal movements. These are linked into unofficial trade routes across South and South East Asia.

PPR is endemic in Bangladesh and infection is easily exchanged with neighbouring states in India through informal trade in live goats.

Risk of disease spread is increased by unregulated live animal movements. These are linked into unofficial trade routes across South and South East Asia.


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HPAI FMD PPR CSF

Risk Management

High-investment value chains must focus on sourcing inputs from healthy, assured sources, and maintaining high level of biosecurity.

Risk mitigation in other parts of the sector depends on two parallel issues: i) improved control of marketing to reduce potential spread of undetected infection; and ii) rapid detection of cases (surveillance).

Should focus on management of long distance trade in live animals.

Also risk mitigation depends on two parallel issues: i) improved control of marketing to reduce potential spread of undetected infection; and ii) rapid detection of cases (surveillance).

Should focus on management of informal trade in live animals.


Should focus on management of informal trade in live animals.


Surveillance:

Current activities

Depends on passive reporting of unusual mortality

Depends on passive reporting of clinical disease.



Surveillance:

Gaps and Priorities

There is no active surveillance targeted on high risk areas

There is no active surveillance targeted on high risk areas.

Nepal is carrying out enhanced sero-surveillance in some areas to verify absence of disease.




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HPAI FMD PPR CSF

Surveillance:

Risk-based

Active disease searching by various methods could be considered in areas where the risk of introduction is high.

Consider risk-based of wild birds at certain times of year.

Strengthen passive surveillance through extension and involving poultry farmers/stake holders in decision making.


Strengthen passive surveillance through extension and involving farmers/stake holders in decision making.


Surveys to better establish the distribution of infection, and associated risk factors, could be considered.

Disease reporting should be supported with diagnostic testing.

Surveys to better establish the distribution of infection, and associated risk factors, could be considered.


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4.1 Summary: suggested guidelines on the application of disease risk analysis for use in a risk based surveillance systems approach in South Asia

The essential steps to be taken towards development of risk based surveillance systems in South Asia can be summarised as follows:

1. Understand the value chains.

This requires planned consultation with stakeholders and other data gathering exercises (more details can be found in the two FAO guides listed below).

A particular feature in South Asia (not unique to the region) is the amount of informal / unofficial trade in live animals, driven by supply and demand in different areas, along with price differentials that encourage such activity.

2. Carry out risk analysis for the target disease(s) in the value chains.

This involves identifying areas where probability of diseases occurrence and spread are higher, and areas where consequences of disease could be high.

Risk analysis should include discussion of risks with the value chain stakeholders (risk communication).

3. Develop risk management plans.

Analysis of risk should focus on understanding the factors that increase or decrease risk – these factors can be the focus of risk management interventions.

Risks associated with animal diseases in South Asia (not unique to the region) are particularly linked to unregulated trade and lack of biosecurity in marketing chains, creating many opportunities for disease spread.

Risk management interventions should be subjected to stakeholder impact assessments in order to assess likely compliance and to identify specific needs for successful implementation.

4. Develop surveillance plans.

Risks management interventions are unlikely to entirely remove the risks linked to unregulated trade and lack of biosecurity in marketing chains, therefore surveillance is also needed to detect disease before there is chance to spread.

Such surveillance should be targeted on the same areas as the risk management interventions, plus any other high risk areas where risk management is impossible (i.e. risk-based surveillance).

Risk-based surveillance is targeted on areas where:

i. there is increased probability for infection to occur, and/or;

ii. the occurrence of infection could have severe impact.

5. Criteria for funding surveillance activities should be based on:


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The balance between the cost of the activity and the potential benefit in terms of disease losses avoided as a result of early detection.

The existence of a feasible plan for response activity linked to positive surveillance findings.

FAO guides

FAO (2012). Designing and implementing livestock value chain studies. A practical aid for Highly Pathogenic and Emerging Disease (HPED) control. Animal Production and Health Guidelines. No. 10. Rome. ISBN 978-92-5-107139-7. http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2583e/i2583e00.pdf

FAO (2011). A value chain approach to animal diseases risk management – Technical foundations and practical framework for field application. Animal Production and Health Guidelines. No. 4. Rome. ISBN 978-92-5-106861-8. http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2198e/i2198e00.pdf




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Annex 1

Agenda of the training

Day 1 – 15 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

0800 - 0830 Registration

Opening session

0830 - 0940 Welcome Remarks Remarks Remarks Opening Remarks

Dr Mohinder Oberoi, FAO-ECTAD, Nepal Dr Subhash Morzaria, FAO, Bangkok Dr H S Sandha, Director Animal Husbandry, Punjab Dr G Vajralingam, Financial Secretary, Ministry of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, Punjab Dr Amarjit Singh Nanda, Animal Husbandry Commissioner to Govt of India

0940 - 1000 Introduction to workshop Dr Nick Taylor, Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics Research Unit, University of Reading, UK

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 1

1030 - 1230 Introduction to the ‘philosophy’ of the course Nick Taylor

Overview of risk analysis Nick Taylor

1230 - 1400 Lunch break

Session 2

1400 - 1530 Qualitative risk assessment Nick Taylor

1530 - 1600 Tea break

Session 3

1600 - 1700 Practical exercises – the Parma Ham exercise Nick Taylor


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Day 2 – 16 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

Session 1

0800 - 1000 Practical – develop risk pathways for FMD risk associated with long distance cattle/buffalo movements

Nick Taylor

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 2

1030 - 1230 Presentation and plenary discussion of risk pathways

Overview of risk analysis Nick Taylor


Session 3

1400 - 1530 Quantitative risk assessment Nick Taylor

1530 - 1600 Tea break

Session 4

1600 - 1700 Practical exercises – Risk problems Nick Taylor

Day 3 – 17 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

Session 1

0800 - 1000 Review of basic probability calculations with particular reference to diagnostic test Sensitivity

Nick Taylor

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 2

1030 - 1230 Introducing a practical approach to management of risks – example of swine fever

Nick Taylor

Nick Taylor


Session 3

1400 - 1530 Practical – consideration of risk of introduction of HPAI into countries. Identification of major routes and development of risk pathways

Nick Taylor

1530 - 1600 Tea break

Session 4

1600 - 1700 Presentation and plenary discussion of risk pathways for introduction of HPAI into countries


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Day 4 – 18 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

Session 1

0800 - 1000 Risk assessment in value chains, introduction to value chains

Nick Taylor

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 2

1030 - 1230 Risk assessment in value chains – risk hotspots Nick Taylor

Nick Taylor


Session 3

1400 - 1530 Practical – describe poultry (or cattle) value chains in each country, identify key stakeholders, identify key risk issues and identify risk hotspots

Nick Taylor

1530 - 1600 Tea break

Session 4

1600 - 1700 Presentation and plenary discussion of poultry value chains

Day 5 – 19 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

Session 1

0800 - 1000 Risk mitigation in value chains - Including stakeholder analysis

Nick Taylor

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 2

1030 - 1230 Practical – describe risk mitigation measures in poultry value chains in each country and identify stakeholder impacts

Nick Taylor

Nick Taylor


Session 3

1400 - 1530 Risk-based surveillance in value chains - Identifying key points in value chains where surveillance should be directed as a response to high risk and/or as an opportunity to mitigate risk

Nick Taylor

1530 - 1600 Tea break

Session 4

1600 - 1700 Practical – design risk-based surveillance strategy for poultry value chains in each country

Nick Taylor


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Day 6 – 20 April 2013

Time Topic Speaker

Session 1

0800 - 1000 Practical – preliminary risk assessment of PPR introduction and spread in S. Asian countries using the value chain and risk hotspot approach

Nick Taylor

1000 - 1030 Tea break

Session 2

1030 - 1230 Presentation and plenary discussion of risk of introduction of PPR into countries

Nick Taylor

Summary of the training workshop Nick Taylor


Session 3

1400 - 1530 Final discussions, presentation of certificates and closing

Subhash Morzaria/ Mohinder Oberoi

.


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Annex 2

List of participants BHUTAN Dr Tenzin Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer National Centre for Animal Health Department of Livestock Ministry of Agriculture and Forests Serbithang, Thimphu Tel : +975- Fax : +975- Mobile : +975-17636260 Email : [email protected] Dr Bir Doj Rai Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Regional Livestock Development Centre Department of Livestock Ministry of Agriculture and Forests Wangdue Tel : +975- Fax : +975- Mobile : +975-17824518 Email : [email protected] INDIA Dr (Ms) M. Sobharani Deputy Director Southern Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (SRDDL) Institute of Animal Health and Veterinary Biologicals Hebbal, Bangalore Tel : +91-80-23411502 Fax : +91-80-23515882 Mobile : +91-9845953882 Email : [email protected] Dr S S Patil Senior Scientist Project Directorate on Animal Disease Monitoring and Surveillance (PD-ADMAS) Indian Council of Agricultural Research

IVRI Campus, Bellary Road, Hebbal Bangalore-560024, Karnataka Tel: +91-80-23412531/23419576 Fax: +91-80-23415329 Mobile: +91-9448759965 Email: [email protected] Dr Manjunatha Reddy G B Scientist Project Directorate on Animal Disease Monitoring and Surveillance (PD-ADMAS) Indian Council of Agricultural Research IVRI Campus, Bellary Road, Hebbal Bangalore-560024, Karnataka Tel: +91-80-23412531/23419576 Fax: +91-80-23415329 Mobile: +91-9738422146 Email: [email protected] Dr S.S. Rautmare Deputy Commissioner A.H. (Virology) Western Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory Aundh, Pune -411 007 Maharashtra Tel: +91-22-25691474 Fax: +91-22-25691474 Mobile: +91-9423012494 Email: [email protected] Dr Prabhat Pandey Block Animal Husbandry Officer and I/C Epidemiology and Monitoring Cell, AH Dept. Ranchi, Jharkhand Tel: +91-651-2490128 Fax: +91-651-2490128 Mobile: +91-9939555624 Email: [email protected] Dr Vijay Kumar Jha Junior Asstt. Research Officer, Epidemiology Section, Institute of Animal Health and Production, Patna, Bihar

mailto:[email protected]








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Tel: +91-612-2224343/65 Fax: +91-612-2224343 Mobile : +91-9031865299 Email: [email protected] Dr Jagadish Mohanty Specialist, Animal Disease Research Institute, Pulnakhra, Cuttack, Odisha Tel: +91-0671-2614629 Fax: +91-671-2614739 Mobile: +91-9438434570 Email: [email protected] Dr S.K Khokhar Veterinary Surgeon (Planning) Directorate of Animal Husbandry & Dairying, Panchkula, Haryana Tel: +91-172-2574662 Fax: +91-172-2704741/ 2563242 Mobile: +91-9417756604 Email: [email protected] Dr Vinay Mohan Scientist Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (North Zone) Department of Animal Husbandry Ladowali Road Jalandhar City-144 002 Punjab Tel: +91-181-2457337 Mobile: +91-9814709170 Fax: +91-181-2242335 Email: [email protected] Dr Bidhan Bandhyopadhyay Eastern regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (ERDDL) Kolkata West Bengal Tel: +91-33-25565021 Fax: +91-33-25565476 Mobile: +91-9748014394 Email: [email protected] Dr (Ms) Shiney George North Eastern Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (NERDDL) Khanapara, Guwahati, Assam Tel: +91-361-2912455

Fax: +91-361-2339965 Mobile: +91-9864421754 Email: [email protected] Dr Shanmuga Sundaram Nagarajan Senior Scientist High Security Animal Disease Laboratory (HSADL) Indian Veterinary Research Institute Anand Nagar, Bhopal-462022 Tel: + 91-755-2754673 Fax: 91- 755-2758842 Mobile: +919303110471 Email: [email protected] Dr Subhasis Chakroborty Veterinary officer Animal resources Development Department Agartala, Tripura Tel: Fax: Mobile: +91-9774145361 Email: [email protected] NEPAL Dr Kishan Chand Thakuri Senior Veterinary Officer Veterinary Epidemiology Centre GPO Box 20815, Tripureshwor, Kathmandu Tel: +977-1-4250717 Fax: +977-1-4250717 Mb: + 977-9841453272 Email: [email protected] Dr Prakash Raj Shrestha District Livestock Officer Department of Livestock Services Pokhara-5, Kaski Tel : +977-61-520082 Fax: +977- Mobile: +977-9846086922 Email: [email protected]











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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE RGANIZATION FAO-Regional Office for Asia and Pacific, Bangkok (Thaliland) Dr Subhash Morzaria Regional Manager FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 39 Phra Athit Road, Bangkok 10200, Thailand Tel: +66-2-697-4138 Fax: +66-2-697-4445 Mobile: +66-81827 5771 Email: [email protected] FAO- Regional Support Unit for SAARC Countries, Kathmandu, Nepal Dr Mohinder Oberoi Sub-regional Manager / RSU Coordinator Regional Support Unit/Sub Regional ECTAD Unit (SAARC), FAO Nepal, UN House Pulchowk, Kathmandu Tel : +977-1-5010209 Fax : +977-1-5010312 Mobile : +977-98511 04527 E-mail : [email protected] Dr Khadak Singh Bisht RSU Assistant Coordinator Regional Support Unit/Sub Regional ECTAD Unit (SAARC), FAO Nepal, UN House Pulchowk, Kathmandu Tel : +977-1-5010313/14/15; ext. 106 Fax : +977-1-5010312 Mobile : +977-9801020239 Email : [email protected] FAO ECTAD Unit, New Delhi, India Dr Ajender Bhagat Negi National Project Coordinator & Team Leader Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD)- India

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Animal Quarantine & Certification Service Station,Kapashera, New Delhi - 110037 Telefax : +91 11 25066292 Mobile : +91 88000 98572 Email : [email protected] Dr (Ms) Madhur S. Dhingra National Consultant (Epidemiologist) Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD)- India Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Animal Quarantine & Certification Service Station,Kapashera, New Delhi - 110037 Mobile : +91 8800098573 Email : [email protected] Dr Vikram Singh Vashist National Consultant (Epidemiology) Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD)- India Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Animal Quarantine & Certification Service Station,Kapashera, New Delhi - 110037 Telefax : +91-11-25066292 Mobile : +91-9560433774 Email : [email protected] Mr. Rajesh Dubey National Operations Officer Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD)- India Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Animal Quarantine & Certification Service Station,Kapashera, New Delhi - 110037 Telefax : +91-11-25066292 Mobile : +91-9910900591 Email : [email protected]









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VETERINARY EPIDEMIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH UNIT (VEERU) & PAN LIVESTOCK SERVICES LTD. Dr Nicolas M Taylor Veterinary Epidemiologist Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics Research Unit (VEERU) & PAN Livestock Services Ltd University of Reading School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, Earley Gate, PO Box 237 Reading RG6 6AR, UK Tel. :+44 (0)118 378 6633/+44 118 926 4888 Fax : +44 (0)118 926 2431 Email : [email protected]


2.2.2 group 2

Documents