17491086 morgenthaus classical realism and the problem of justice 2007
DESCRIPTION
Ian Mcmurtrie Towards Just International Relations Theory HansTRANSCRIPT
-
Towards Just International Relations Theory
Hans Morgenthaus Classical Realism
and the Problem of Justice
Ian McMurtrie
1110338
Honours Thesis
May 7, 2007
-
Acknowledgements
I would like to offer my sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people for their
assistance with this project and throughout my undergraduate career.
My advisor and the members of the review board:
Professor James Muir
Professor Sandra Tomsons
Professor Samantha Arnold
My friends, family and colleagues:
Maria Cristina Laureano
John-Paul Knox
Melissa Dzwonek
Professor Jane Forsey
Professor Brian Keenan
Melanie Zurba
James, Adele and Heather McMurtrie
Len McMurtrie
-
Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would
admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a
response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dim suspicion of there
being a meaning in it which you -- you so remote from the night of first
ages -- could comprehend. And why not? The mind of man is capable of
anything -- because everything is in it, all the past as well as all the
future. What was there after all? Joy, fear, sorrow, devotion, valour,
rage -- who can tell? -- but truth -- truth stripped of its cloak of time.
Let the fool gape and shudder -- the man knows, and can look on
without a winkHe must meet that truth with his own true stuff --
with his own in-born strength. Principles won't do. Acquisitions,
clothes, pretty rags -- rags that would fly off at the first good shake. No;
you want a deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish row -- is
there? Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for good or
evil mine is the speech that cannot be silenced.
It is a difficult case. What do you think I ought to do -- resist? Eh?
I want no more than justice. . . . He wanted no more than justice -- no
more than justice.
- Joseph Conrad
Heart of Darkness
For the social world being but a projection of human nature onto the
collective plane, being but man writ large, man can understand and
maintain control of society no more than he can of himself. Thus the
very intimacy of his involvement impedes both understanding and
control.
- Hans Morgenthau
-
1
Introduction
Can there be justice in international affairs? This larger question cannot be
addressed here, so we turn to a question that is necessarily prior: can there be just
international relations theory? This thesis will seek to show that an understanding of
justice is necessary for a theory of international relations to be credible and effective. To
do this will require establishing criteria for a just theory, and subsequently to study the
major schools of international relations with respect to these criteria. The dominant
school of international relations today, realism, began anew in the twentieth century
with Hans Morgenthau. Due to the importance of realism, his theory will be the major
focus of this work.
Hans Morgenthaus theory of classical realism argues against shoehorning the
anarchic international condition into moral or legal theories; attempting to do this is
ultimately impossible and impractical. Realists claim that politics must be evaluated
solely in terms of interest defined as power; importing normative principles from
philosophy will only confuse political understanding and prevent peaceful coexistence.
This has become known as the realist challenge. 1 This challenge has been a potent foil to
international law, international morality, international relations, and the philosophical
search for justice.
1 AM Slaughter Burley has defined the realist challenge as: the defiant skepticism of political realists such
as George Kennan, [and] Hans Morgenthau....that international law could ever play more than an
epiphenomenal role in the ordering of international life. Much of the theoretical scholarship in both
international law and international relations can be understood as either a response to or a refinement of
this challenge. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
Dual Agenda American Journal of International Law Vol. 87, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 206.
-
2
Hans Morgenthau argues that there is an analogous relationship between human
nature and the characteristics of the nation state. He claims that each individual is
driven by the desire for power, but because individuals are subject to an overawing
sovereign, their desires can be effectively channelled into support for national foreign
policy. In contrast, he claims that the state exists in a chaotic international environment
without any one entity maintaining a monopoly of coercive force; therefore each state
must pursue its national interests with all available power. According to Morgenthaus
political realism, the permanent dynamic of power and the necessity of self-interest are
the sole universals in international affairs. In this reductive account, concepts such as
justice and morality are extirpated because they are not binding in political
circumstance.2
In contrast, the idealist school posits values such as equality, liberty, and justice
that are necessarily vague and without effect in actual international affairs. Idealists
erected international institutions, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations,
based upon these ineffable principles in order to steer states towards harmonious
interaction guided by norms. Idealists believe that reason was the dominant aspect of
human nature, and thus human political interact could be shaped according to reasons
determined a priori. They operated deductively, positing desirable premises as ideals
towards which politics ought to conform. But, Morgenthau argues, that each case of
disarmament, collective security, international government, international law, and any
2 Morgenthau and classical political realism is not strictly mechanistic or fatalistic. He argues strenuously for
a moral dimension to realism which will be discussed in Chapter One. Morgenthau believes, as the subtitle
for his book suggests, that both power and peace are fundamental aspects of international relations; but that
the former ought to be wisely manipulated through realist theory for the sake of the latter.
-
3
instance of normative desire are all attempts to impose vague notions that paper-over
the real dispute for power. The idealist tradition continues, and although shaken by the
realist challenge, is represented here by the two versions of liberalism.
The persistent realist challenge has significant implications for international
relations and philosophical theory. It serves as a vital crucible for testing prospective
theories and their conformity to political reality. The realist challenge tests prospective
theories by requiring that they account for the material requirements of interest defined
in terms of power. If a theory fails to do this, then they cannot claim purchase in the real
world of international affairs. If, as Hans Morgenthau and the realists claim, any attempt
to appeal to international justice to make evaluative claims is at best moot (since justice
cannot have meaning in the course of actual political affairs) and at worst dangerous (as
national concepts of justice are incorrectly universalized and then conflicting
interpretations are resolved with force), then the nations and their populations cannot
but be at the whim of national interest. Without justice, those who command the greatest
power in international affairs are therefore morally unaccountable, except perhaps to
their own national interest of survival.
What is Necessary for a Just International Theory?
Given the pessimistic tone of Morgenthaus realism, and continuing international
strife, the question at issue here is: can justice play an effective role in international
relations? This larger question requires much greater depth than is available here; as
such, the scope will be limited to answering a question necessary in order to begin
-
4
confronting the larger problem. Specifically, can there be just international relations
theory? This project will examine realism and liberalism, two prominent theories of
international relations, and compare them in terms of the following criteria for justice. If
the theories that guide international statesmen cannot articulate a rational notion of
justice, then there is little hope that their prescribed actions can in turn be just. The final
question then is: if realism and liberalism are left wanting, are there any competing
international relations theories that can be offered in their place? But first it must be
established what criteria can be used to asses the merits of an international relations
theory with regard to justice. I will posit three conditions that must be met for a theory
to be effective in international relations, while remaining just in its evaluations and
recommendations. These criteria have been selected to confront and meet the demands
of the realist challenge. The criteria, when met, would mandate that a theory be
efficacious in application, accurate in evaluation, but also neutral with respect to
available power all of which are necessary precursors for just evaluation and action.
First, for an international relations theory to be just it must maintain
prescriptions for principled judgment. That is, it cannot only state that an action on the
international stage is efficient, expedient, prudential or advantageous. It may be all of
those things, but the theory must be able to make a statement that, for the sake of justice,
an action was right or wrong in a significant moral sense. Any mechanistic theory can
describe outcomes as efficient or prudent, but the goal for justice is to provide firm
ground for judgment that entails a normative ought statement. That said, morality
demands the consideration of pragmatic sensibilities be respected to ensure the basic
-
5
material requirements of survival and sustenance are met. But, a theory must be able to
moderate pragmatic necessity and normative demands. Neglecting prudence or
normative goals does not make for a theory that is just or sound. Realism attempts to
collapse morality and prudence, and justice into interest. This is perhaps necessary for
realist methodology, but it may not be sufficient for the purposes of international justice.
Nor is realism sufficient for the next criterion, that of equality of application. This
is similar to, but not identical with, justice as fairness as articulated by John Rawls.3
Equality of application is similar to justice as fairness in the sense of equal application of
principle regardless of the power wielded by the actor, but it is divergent in that equal
application is not necessarily concerned with the redistribution of resources. Equality of
application seeks the transparency of power or privilege in making judgments on the
international scene. In other words, if a powerful international actor feels it prudential to
conduct a certain act, and a theory condones it as prudential but says nothing more, this
theory is not just it must recognize the concept of isonomia.4 Liberal international
relations theory seeks to meet this criterion by neutralizing considerations of power in
regards to judgment and action. In the sense that it demands that liberal polities behave
consistent with liberal principles regardless of relative strength between the participants.
3 Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 14, No.
3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 223 251. 4 Isonomia is the Greek term roughly translated as equal political rights. I use this term to distinguish this
claim from any legal notions, but to retain the concept of equality of application which is a precursor for
justice. Isonomia is a political concept that is prior to law, chosen here in distinction from the later English
word isonomy. Cf. Gregory Vlastos, Isonomia, The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 74, No. 4. (1953),
pp. 337-366. Where he states: Because equal distribution says too much, as equality before the law says
too little. For what is conceived as equally distributed in Isonomia is restricted to Nomos, i.e. to the political
domain. (p. 352)
-
6
The third criterion for a just theory is its ability to guide action by providing
accurate descriptive and predictive stipulations. Theories that purport to establish a
particular theory of justice, but cannot extend their influence to the international sphere,
are mute in their ability to prevail in the world of political action. For a theory to be just
it must not diverge from actions and evaluations in particular circumstance, as the
realists charged against the idealist school. The theory must remain attuned to reality
while attempting to guide it towards just actions. A caveat to this notion is that a just
theory must not be strictly materially contingent. For example, the condition known as
the liberal peace the tendency for liberal states to coexist peacefully and operate
external to the competition for power although successful, remains inordinately
dependent upon material circumstance. Although the liberal peace may allow justice to
exist within its frontiers, it cannot hold for describing actions as just or unjust
throughout the entire scope of international relations (i.e. the whole of the world).
None of these three strictures, principled moral judgment, equality of
application, and concrete behavior guidance, are sufficient on their own to promulgate a
just international theory. However, each aspect remains necessary for a theory to be
considered just. To a greater or lesser degree, all theories under consideration here have
aspects of some of these qualities but none adheres to all of them. Accordingly, we
begin the investigation of international relations theory in the next chapter by examining
Hans Morgenthaus realism in detail.
-
7
Chapter One
What is Realism?
Defining a school of thought, its influence and
why it ought to be studied philosophically
This section will describe political realism as articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau
(1904 1980) in his Politics Among Nations, originally published in 1948. The advent of
this new theory of international relations codified an intellectual movement opposed to
the traditional idealism common to the study of global politics, law, diplomacy and
philosophy. While the publication of Politics Among Nations spurred rapid growth in
international relations, debate grew within other disciplines as its implications
fundamentally challenged their intellectual assumptions. Although attributed most
prominently to Morgenthau, what is now known as classical realism was also articulated
in the twentieth century by thinkers such as E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George
Kennan. In their view, political behaviour was increasingly divergent from theory, and
sought to reclaim the tradition informed by historical figures such as Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.5 These modern realists proposed a methodology
with the goal of reuniting political theory with political practice. Idealisms carefully
constructed theoretical and legal edifices, twice destroyed and rebuilt within
Morgenthaus lifetime, were left wanting for new methods to try to prevent or mitigate
the effects of future global conflicts. The intellectual challenge presented by Morgenthau
5 Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton,
1997), p. 9.
-
8
and his contemporaries, coupled with the material exigencies of global conflict,
encouraged future thinkers to develop the realist tradition eventually establishing it as
the dominant school of thought for international relations scholars and political actors
alike.
Realisms influence is such that most international relations scholars are either
self-identified or readily identifiable realists.6 For example, in one exhaustive study of
the development of the realist paradigm since World War II, almost three quarters of
all the phenomena noted, and over 90 percent of the hypotheses tested, were identifiably
realist in inspiration.7 Despite academic institutional supremacy, realism remains vital
with many different views participating in a lively internal and external debate. Realist
thinking in general encompasses a family of related arguments sharing certain common
assumptions and premises. Realist theories seek to explain politics as it really is, as
opposed to normative theories that offer prescriptions for how politics ought to be.8
The main criticisms against the realist school have been its inability to predict
and account for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and explain the existence of a pervasive
peace between liberal nations. Despite this criticism, as Stephen Walt argues,
there is still a place for a realist approach to[international
relations]highlighting the dominant role of major powers, their
ability to evade legal constraints when they feel it necessary, and
the tendency for customary law to reflect the interests of states
rather than any exogenous set of normative standards.9
6 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. 7 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. 8 Stephen Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition. In Political Science: State of the
Discipline III. Ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (Norton, 2002), p. 199. 9 Walt, Enduring, 228.
-
9
If one is concerned about the attainment of justice in international relations, then they
ought to take the legacy of liberal scholarship seriously.
Realism, in any of its variant forms, makes philosophical assumptions and
assertions while simultaneously challenging philosophical theory from having effect in
reality. Realists deny to philosophers the ability to make judgments that are efficacious
in international relations, or even to question the validity of realism. If the realist school
of thought determines the academic and political agenda, philosophers must ask if this
school is philosophically sound and in accordance with particular theories of justice.
Turning to classical realism, I will examine the core tenets in detail, including a
discussion of the concepts power and interest, the moral status of realism, and the
delimited political sphere. The chapter concludes with an argument for why realism
must be studied philosophically.
The Core Tenets of Classical Realism
Reacting to two successive world wars, and the failure of legal and political
theories to prevent them, Hans Morgenthau infused a new vitality into the scholarship
of international relations. These material and intellectual motivations impelled him to
formulate a theoretical model to help preserve the post-World War II peace and prevent
the next great war. Thus, political realism for Morgenthau is a descriptive and predictive
apparatus with real moral underpinnings. The book that sparked this uproar, and the
central subject of investigation here, is Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace. First published in 1948, it has been reprinted and revised through six editions.
-
10
With its publication, Morgenthau generated academic upheaval, and achieved his
purpose of presenting an entirely new theory of international politics.10
His choice for a name, realism, attempts to capture the subject matter the real
world of political relations but also the standards against which realisms merits are to
be gauged.11 As such, political realism claims it must be judged not on a priori principles
imported from other academic domains, but by the accuracy of its predictions with
respect to the actions and reactions found in actual political conduct. Abstract principles
such as justice are deemed practically unrelated to reality and are thus inadmissible in
regards to the validity of realism as a methodology. Realism must be judged by its
purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would
remain disconnected and unintelligible.12 This is not to say that Morgenthau believes
that theories of justice, morality, theology, and the like are pedantic or unimportant; it is
simply that they are antithetical to good politics. They distract the statesman from his
true domain of power and interest towards external spheres that are not able to affect
the ongoing dynamic of power politics, thus jeopardizing his states fortunes.
Morgenthau argues adamantly against the normative, idealist thinkers and
philosophers who have encroached and denatured politics. The idealist school of
thought is characterized by Morgenthau as one that,
10 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace Sixth Edition, revised by
Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1948 1985), p. 3. 11 Morgenthaus fellow realist, and Christian critic, Reinhold Niebuhr states the core of realism to be: the
disposition to take all factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to established norms,
into account, particularly the factors of self-interest and power. Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustines Political
Realism In Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner, 1953), p. 119. 12 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.
-
11
believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from
universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now.
It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of
human nature, and blames the failure of the social orderon lack
of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or
the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in
education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these
defects.13
Idealism seeks to rationalize political interaction, not to improve its predictive or
descriptive capacity, but to institute reasoned rules as fundamental to political
behaviour.
In opposition to the idealist school of thought, Morgenthau begins to construct
the new vision of realism in the twentieth century. The tradition from which
Morgenthau speaks, and which he desires to resuscitate, looks first to the world and
understanding that as
imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, [it] is the result
of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must
work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a
world of opposing interests and conflict among them, moral
principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be
approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests
and the ever precarious settlements of conflicts. This school, then,
sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all
pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to
abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil
rather than the absolute good.14
Accordingly, throughout Politics Among Nations he cites widely from history, invoking
wise statesmen and prudential theorists who have embraced the notions of power,
13 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3. 14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.
-
12
interest, and the balancing of each as the proper theoretical model for an uncertain
world.
From these two motivations, to argue against idealism and to launch a new
theory of politics, Morgenthau describes the six tenets of political realism. These tenets
provide the intellectual framework which ought to be used to understand political
action, evaluate political options, and guide political decisions in the real world. The
tenets will be listed and then elaborated in the discussion following. They are the
distilled laws and principles against which all events, evaluations, and decisions will be
measured and from which all future derivations of realism take as their touchstone:
1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through
the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined
in terms of power.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an
objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow
that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
-
13
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of
thought is real, and it is profound...the political realist maintains the
autonomy of the political sphere.15
The following will discuss these six tenets with particular attention to the notions of
interest and its relation to power, the moral status of political realism, and describe the
critical notion of the political sphere.
The First Tenet Objective Laws and Human Nature
Morgenthaus realism is firmly founded on a specific account of immutable
human nature. This provides the foundation for a theory that can, in a fashion similar to
but not identical with the scientific method, manipulate the forces present in politics and
mold them towards desired ends. These ends are determined by our capacity to
understand the regularity of human nature and the laws of politics. With a careful
understanding of these features realists will seek to shape policy in a technological
manner to balance the system like an engineer would an ongoing, unstable, chemical
reaction.
Morgenthau charges that idealist political theories place reason as the primary
aspect of human nature. Therefore, through education, legal innovations, and
institutional fine-tuning they can mould humans and their nature towards desired
normative ends. The realist will invert this, and say that reason can only be used as a
15 Principles one to six can be found in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 13. Emphasis added.
-
14
guide towards the ends that are delimited by the remainder of the tenets of realism.
Thus, human nature is permanent, and reason is strictly instrumental. A thoroughgoing
realist will take the laws of human nature into consideration not a priori, but only in
context of specific acts that demonstrate the nature of a particular foreign policy for a
nation. By combining the contingent and the universal the arbitrary historical facts
coupled with the laws of human nature the realist is able to project consequences of
foreign policy into the future and thereby synthesize objective criteria for a rational
theory from the constantly unique events of history.
The Second and Third Tenets A Discussion of Power and Interest
Those laws that determine the possible ends of political action are the second
principle: the notion of interest defined in terms of power. This for realism is what
provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the
facts to be understood.16 Interest and power are the theoretical devices that link the
permanent with the contingent. These are not merely normative stipulations, but the
essential ingredients for a political theory per se the twin pillars of interest and power
give direction and regularity to a chaotic world.
Although interest defined as power is stipulated as eternal and necessary for any
theory, these concepts are imposed as a theoretical stricture, and therefore a realist will
assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and the
16 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5.
-
15
evidence of history bears that assumption out.17 This theoretical rigour is the
methodological prerequisite on the observer who evaluates, judges and plans policy.
These strictures prevent theorists from straying into the unknowable regions that
prevent testability, reliability or objectivity. In short, they prevent against two popular
fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences18 and
return politics to reality.
By restricting political action to interests attainable given available power in a
particular circumstance, conceptual thought is strictly delimited between what is
desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete
circumstances of time and place.19 For the practitioner, realism asserts that neglect or
ignorance of the realities of power and interest have created an international scenario in
which the very structure of international relations as reflected in political institutions,
diplomatic procedures, and legal arrangements has tended to become at variance with,
and in large measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics.20 Any system in
politics or engineering that attempts to proceed contrary to natural law will ultimately
end in catastrophe. Therefore, the realist is persuaded thattransformation can be
achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have
shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can
bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws
17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. 18 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. 19 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7. 20 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 8.
-
16
with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.21 For classical
realists, understanding or controlling international order by existing concepts,
institutions, or norms is catastrophically flawed. This is the sharpest point in the realist
challenge to all disciplines that have contact with the political world.
Realists charge that applying universal principles, such as justice or morality, is
not amenable in concrete to specific political situations as they contribute nothing but
confusion and error. However, the third pillar of the realist framework holds that
although interest and power are objective and eternal, they do not maintain any
particular definition that is fixed. As such, interest is whatever the actor decides it to be,
and power spans a broad spectrum of influential tactics. In an evaluative role, interest is
also whatever an external observer deems it appropriate to be for a particular actor.22
While Morgenthau gives interest and power wide range being whatever the actor or
evaluator could possibly attribute to them they do not contravene the immaterial
strictures that it is claimed justice does. As power and interest are widely drawn, politics
for Morgenthau is very tightly constricted and this is how the realist avoids the
contradiction between interest and power as immutable, ineffable, yet applicable to
objective evaluation. While justice and morality are in some senses the same as power
and interest (ineffable, undetermined) they remain proscribed from material evaluation.
This is because justice and morality do not have material interests as their goal; they are
21 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 22 For example, if the United States desires to evaluate Chinese behaviour, it attributes interests to the
Chinese government to the best of their knowledge on the assumption that they will behave in accordance
with them.
-
17
directed at other ends such as fairness, equality or notions otherwise indefinable for a
realist.
Interest, essentially whatever a nation chooses to be its desires, does however
impose some rigour upon the person proposing it. Because interest is contextual, it
cannot be a stipulated end based upon particular features. In other words, not all
interests will have the common feature of x but rather, each instance of interest is
disclosed by the usage of the term in specific contexts, satisfying certain criteriaThis
conceptual distinction implies that particular attention has to be paid to the reasons
supplied in the descriptive meaning; criteria will have to be specified that the reasons
must satisfy.23 This imposes rigor upon the observer, and places the burden of proof on
those who declare a goal to be in the national interest. Those making a claim of interest
are thus compelled to provide evidence. Without evidence, their claims are not
amenable to evaluation or concrete action. Without supporting reasons, claims to
interest are capricious and dismissed as such. If those who claim to speak for the
national interest, or those who interpret the interests of others, can be held to account
then this is nothing other than the legitimacy of the public authority, and its resultant
ability to make binding decisions, [which] depends crucially upon perceptions that its
decisions are in the public interest.24
As all politics for Morgenthau is power politics, the objective of this power is the
fulfillment of its own interests. And power is anything that establishes and maintains
23 F. Kratochwil, On the Notion of "Interest" in International Relations. International Organization Vol. 36,
no. 1 (1982), p. 13. 24 Kratochwil, On the Notion of Interest, 9.
-
18
the control of man over man,25 while political power is the mutual relations of control
among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.26
Given the different interests that can be deemed relevant, power can encompass any
form of coercion from subtle negotiations to brute force any and all things that shape
the thinking of another political actor in the name of self-motivated interest. For this
reason, realism ignores motivations, ideologies and the internal organization of a nation
state.27 Liberals criticize this billiard ball approach to the nation state enshrined in the
realist model.28 However, based on the definition of power that covers the domination
of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by
constitutional safeguards...and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds
its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement29
it is neutral between internal organization. Morgenthau holds that the conduits along
which power travels constitutional, monarchical, or otherwise are of no moment
when evaluated in terms of objectively adjudicated actions. All power exercised is the
25 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11. 26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 32. 27 Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 388. The second answer holds, that regardless of their domestic
politics or the character of their governments, nations try to pursue their interests in a rational
mannerHence, a democratic countryhas to deal with all kinds of governments, even those whose
character and policies it morally condemns, and must take as the yardstick for its policies the interests and
power of the of the nations concerned. It cannot afford to jeopardize its own interests by indulging its
domestic political preferences and moral judgments of other nationsNations have in fact consistently
taken this position, since a rational foreign policy is otherwise impossible. 28 First, they [realists] believe that States are the primary actors in the international system, rational unitary
actors who are functionally identical. Second, they assume that State preferences, ranging from survival to
aggrandizement, are exogeneous and fixed. Third, they assume that the anarchic structure of the
international system creates such a degree of either actual conflict or perceived uncertainty that states must
constantly assume and prepare for the possibility of war. In this context, outcomes of State interactions are
typically zero-sum and thus are determined by relative power. For Realists, power is the currency of the
international system. States interact with one another within that system like billiard balls: hard, opaque,
unitary actors colliding with one another." AM Slaughter Burley, International Law in a World of Liberal
States European Journal of International Law Vol. 6, No. 4 (1995), p. 5. 29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11.
-
19
same, and the constitutional arrangements of the actors wielding power have little effect
upon the final evaluation or action.
The importance of interest defined as power is not merely an evaluative
technique. Morgenthau maintains a concept of justice, not articulated in Politics Among
Nations, that is entirely dependent on the centrality of power and interest. His definition
of justice is not normative, but dependent upon subjective, self-interested appraisal:
For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities
pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we
are able to do justice to all of themWe are able to judge other
nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this
fashion, we are then capable pursuing, policies that respect the
interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of
our own.30
Through the notions of power and interest realism attempts to resolve the contradictions
of justice and self interest, transient and eternal, theory and practice, necessity and
principle: the necessity is that of protecting the interests of the group for which one
serves as trustee and the principle is that of undifferentiated loyalty to values such as
justice and equality.31
The Fourth Tenet The Moral Status of Political Realism
Morgenthau, and realists in general, assert that theirs is not a positivist theory.
They recognize and follow moral dispositions, and normative principles in their
30 As quoted in Thomas L. Pangle, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 231. 31 RC Good, The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's Debate with Morgenthau and
Kennan, The Journal of Politics Vol. 22, No. 4 (1960), p. 597.
-
20
calculations outside the political sphere. These motivations can inform action within the
political sphere, but for correct realist analysis they must be omitted and substituted
with power and interest. Rational foreign policy based on the understanding of
particular interest and available power constitutes the sole normative metric for judging
political decision. This, however, is a normativity of calculation; good policy is one that
minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral
precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.32 Thus good and moral
are collapsed to what is successful or prudent.
Although Morgenthau attempted to draw a strict line between morality and
politics, the realist is called upon to recognize that political decisions have a necessary
moral impact. The corollary is that moral choices and political success make for an
ineluctable tension.33 The tension exists between the moral command and the
requirements of successful political action.34 But Morgenthau formulates it such that the
prudent is nothing but the correct moral action. As such, the rational choice, the moral
choice, and the successful choice are not necessarily the same, and may often be in
conflict. Although realism is aware of the moral significance, one may need to choose
success over morality. Realists do not wish to ignore morality, or have morality
dominate politics; rather they embrace the tension and embrace it as unavoidable. This
point further disambiguates the differences between interest and justice in realism. The
notion of interest, unchanging but contextually determined, is deduced for each
32 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10. 33 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 34 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12.
-
21
situation. However, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of
states in the abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the
concrete circumstances of time and place.35
The individual and the state may both value freedom (or justice, or equality) and
in so doing, the individual has every right to sacrifice their own interests (their life, their
possessions) for the sake of any particular principle or ends. In contrast, the state has
no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of
successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.36
The overarching principle of state action is survival, which relies on the collapse of
morality into prudent action. Without prudence, there can be no political morality
which, in turn would seem to equally eliminate justice, principle, law or any other item
that (1) cannot be filtered to a particular time and place (2) or that require a sacrifice of
the nations interest in survival. The difference being that ethics in the abstract judges
action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political
consequences.37 Although the moral foundations of realism are centrally important to
Morgenthau, ironically, they are most often articulated by its critics rather than
subsequent realist scholars.38
35 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 36 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 37 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 38 Cf. Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 19; Michael C Williams, Why Ideas Matter in International
Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,
International Organization Vol. 58, No. 04 (2004); or AJH Murray, The Moral Politics of Hans
Morgenthau, The Review of Politics Vol. 58, no. 1 (1996), p. 83 who states: First, it becomes obvious that
Morgenthau was in no way a positivist. His theory does not assert a necessity in international politics which
excludes the possibility of freedom or moral responsibility. Second, it becomes clear that, far from ignoring
-
22
The Fifth Tenet National Morality is not Universal Morality
The fifth tenet of political realism is the opposite border to the boundary laid by
the fourth. The fifth tenet states that the moral convictions of a nation are not to be held
as the universal morals laws to be imposed universally. Thus, if the fourth eliminates
importing universal principles, the fifth eliminates particulars from becoming universal.
Therefore, political realism seeks to tread between nihilism and absolutism, and it is
exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that
moral excess and that political folly.39
The Sixth Tenet The Foundations of a Theory and the Constrained Political Sphere
Realists claim that for politics to proceed in a prudent and rational manner it
must operate unencumbered. Politics, formulated as an autonomous discipline, prevents
judgments external to the political realm from impinging on the realist demand for
prudence. Any judgments outside the political sphere may be acknowledged, but
ultimately subordinated to power and interest. Morgenthau offers a brief example of the
necessity of the autonomous political sphere that illustrates the importance of the sixth
tenet. He looks to the French and British responses regarding the growing belligerence
of Germany in the 1930s. France and United Kingdom in this period allowed the
answer to the legal question, legitimate within its sphere, to determine their political
the moral questions that this raises, Morgenthau regarded them as central to his theory, and made a serious
effort to address the problems that they generate. 39 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13.
-
23
actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only
the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue
that their very existence might have depended upon.40 This relates to the central
question here as to why it is the case that appeals to justice (in this case to the justice of
international law) are simply invalid in the face of political power.
While Morgenthau expanded the realm of interest and power in the second and
third tenet, he contracts politics in the sixth with the purpose of making politics
rationally coherent and power and interest dominant. Although power is primary for
Morgenthau, the autonomous political sphere provides the ability to discriminating
between what forms of power will be admitted as legitimate. The autonomous political
sphere will allow legitimate political authority and seek to reject raw power. In fact, a
limited conception of politics is part of a sophisticated intellectual strategy seeking to
address the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to an
undifferentiated sphere of violence, to distinguish legitimate forms of political power, to
insulate the political sphere from physical violence, and to discern the social structures
that such a strategy requires to be successful.41
Morgenthaus project, although intended to bring power to the fore in political
understanding, is not to glorify or legitimize a situation in which the capacity to wield
any form of power particularly physical violence is the ultimate arbiter of authority
and legitimacy.42 He makes four distinctions among the varieties of power available,
40 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 14. 41 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 637. 42 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 634.
-
24
between power and influence, between power and force, between usable and unusable
power, between legitimate and illegitimate power.43 The main point of contention is the
difference between legitimate power the exercise of which is sanctioned by moral or
legal justification rather than naked power which is simply at the whim of its wielder.
Morgenthaus reason for favoring legitimate power is only that it is likely to be more
effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be so justified. That is to say,
legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent
illegitimate power.44 It is for this reason that, despite the moral dimension of realism, it
is a valid claim to attest that there is no resourceto prevent the development of a
cynical awareness that I may expand at your expense if I have the power to get away
with it.45
Although there exists this limited argument against naked power, and there
remains the possibility to profit from illegitimate force, it is incorrect to view Politics
Among Nations as a re-write of Machiavellis Prince. Morgenthau states his purpose as
twofold: The first is to detect and understand the forces that determine political
relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon
each other and upon international political relations and institutions.46 Michael
Williams argues that Morgenthaus delimited political sphere is the correct means to
guide realist policy towards more hopeful outcomes. Williams argues that moving the
focus towards interest defined as power implies an ethical dimension; a specific outline
43 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 33. 44 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 34. 45 Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 615. 46 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 18.
-
25
for legitimate authority and proper political action. By decrying both vague notions of
justice and concrete forms of brutality the narrow conceptual definition of politics is
here part of an attempt to distinguish the exercise of legitimate political power and
domination, and particularly to insulate this sphere from the intrusion of physical
violence and domination.47
With its new limited range, politics becomes the rational realm of legitimate
action and authority. Realism imposes a proper procedure on international decision
making which includes accepting a right course, but not a proper end. Any theory
sanctioning violent, or illegitimate, political authority would corrupt the political sphere
and return it to a contest of might. If realism were to sanction power tout court, that
would then subordinate the autonomy of the political sphere to interference by irrational
actors who can wield the greatest force. This would undermine realism and its goal of
bringing reason to politics as arbitrary violence and naked power are antithetical to
rational evaluation.
Delimiting the political realm is a strategic and prudential move. It invokes the
favoured mode of control for a realist the balance of power. By giving politics firm
borders, it becomes possible to balance distinct social spheres and interests against one
another to limit the reach of politics while also limiting the influence of other spheres on
the political.48 This prevents political overreach while simultaneously maintaining
political autonomy. The political realm stresses practise, but it is balanced in turn by
external principles. When operating within their assigned spheres, normative principles
47 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 649. 48 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.
-
26
can act as a counterweight to prevent practise from operating in a moral vacuum. This
method of balancing constrains politics, and provides a mechanistic approach to locating
the mean between extremes without imposing arbitrary normative restraints. Also, this
method preserves political autonomy, and the realist account of human nature.
Returning to the example above, when France and England in the 1930s imprudently
neglected the political sphere to act wholly on legal grounds, they neglected the
exigencies of the balance of power (both intellectually and materially). They chose
principle over practise in a realm where this is strictly prevented by human nature and
the laws of politics. The inevitable result was the invasion of France, and the near
collapse of Britain in the face of German aggression.
This realist conception of the political sphere poses the problem that, distinct
social spheres (economic, legal, moral, aesthetic) operating within their specific logics
and forms of power49 each have a demarcation that is decided a priori with a backdrop
of ends towards which each pursues distinct from any other. To say that these spheres
exist and that one of them, politics, is uniquely autonomous along the variable of power
and interest is to say that there are areas of influence demarcated metaphysically or by
realist fiat. If these disciplinary boundaries are not present in the same way that human
nature or the laws of politics are, but are only prudentially asserted, then realist
assumptions ought to be open to philosophical criticism. If politics is an autonomous
realm by nature, then that is a claim beyond which politics can address. If it is not, and
the political sphere is merely a methodological shortcut, then is the argument presented
49 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.
-
27
for the political realm sufficient for it to be immune from principled or philosophical
judgment? This question is briefly addressed in the next section, and will recur as the
investigation proceeds to see if realism can provide sufficient evidence for its claims.
Why Study Realism philosophically?
As we have seen, realism maintains many philosophical presuppositions. The
political sphere was posited to secure politics as an autonomous discipline, and this
zone is designed with the purpose of preventing imprudent action. But is this political
sphere philosophically sound in itself? Can politics truly be said to be autonomous? By
eschewing philosophical notions, scoping power and interest broadly, and shrinking the
political realm, politics is removed from external oversight. These unanswered questions
provide an indication why political realism requires philosophical evaluation.
Although Morgenthau attempts to be conscientious of justice and morality, they
remain secondary. Despite his best intentions, there remains no stricture against the
illegitimate domination of the powerful within accurate realist analysis. Thus, realism is
at best in an ambiguous position with respect to justice. To examine an alternative, we
turn in the next chapter to the idealist response: that of liberal theory.
-
28
Chapter Two
Two Variants of Liberal Justice and
Their Incompatibility with Realism
Domestic Liberalism
Liberalism has had several decades to respond to the realist challenge and
continues to be the strongest non-realist theory of international relations. Two variants
of liberalism will be discussed domestic and international. The domestic variant is the
one most often discussed by philosophers. Developed by John Rawls, it was originally
articulated in the Kantian tradition, but has subsequently been amended into a strictly
political notion. Rawlsian theories will be named domestic here because, although they
are not attached to any specific nation or group, they do depend upon a well organized
society adhering to the rule of law.
Domestic liberalism does not extend beyond national barriers, and of itself, does
not take account of international relations. But, if one is to take the domestic theories of
justice seriously, they must do so with an awareness of international affairs. As realism
remains the dominant theory in international relations, one cannot entertain a domestic
theory if it can be violated by actors in the international sphere who do not respect the
notion of domestic justice. Furthermore, Rawls seeks justice as fairness, while realism
denies fairness as an action-guiding principle. Nor does realism recognize well-ordered
societies as privileged within international politics. As such, there is a direct conflict
between philosophical theory and political practice if one wishes to pursue philosophic
justice with any notion that it is related to a world under the influence of power and
-
29
interest. Some scholars have made fledgling attempts to extend Rawls theory into the
international arena; but these attempts remain immature and unable to rival either the
international liberalism or the dominant realist school.50
Rawlsian domestic justice extends from particular procedural principles. They
are the principles of equal access to basic rights and liberties, and that any inequality in
society is justified only if it assists those least well off.51 If the two principles of justice are
followed, then society can be said to be organized in a just manner. This image of social
organization proceeds from individuals as bearers of rights,52 proceeding to mutual
advantage within an accepted plurality of beliefs. These principles provide a schema for
a political community that will function by eliminating fundamental beliefs such as
religion or morality from public debate. The community will retain only discourse that
embraces public reason53 and only endorse political action that observes the two
principles of justice. This will allow each person to pursue their desires within the
community without the interference of irreconcilable comprehensive views that
proclaim fundamental truths or ends. This pluralitistic notion of a just community
requires the existence of a well-ordered society amenable to the rule of law that has
50 Molly Cochran describes the attempts of authors such as Thomas Pogge and Charles R. Beitz to extend
Rawls internationally in: Cosmopolitanism: Rawlsian approaches to international distributive justice, in
Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 51 Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 227. 52 Liberalism has been identified with an essential principle the importance of freedom of the individual.
Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat
others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), p. 206. 53 I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the
politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizensThe basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine
accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), p. 766.
-
30
already emerged from a constitutional consensus. In short, justice for Rawls is equality
before the form of law which is constructed upon a fair procedure that represents
ideals we already intuitively accept.54
However, the world at large is not a well organized society able to recognize
persons as rights bearing individuals capable of equal participation. Nor is there a need
for global consensus within Rawls theory. The only requirement for justice is an
agreement among individuals to form a polity by assenting to a pluralist constitution
along principles they already intuitively accept.55 Rawls would have it that these rules
can be justified retrospectively with the aid of the original position. In the original
position, individual rational choosers are sequestered from any knowledge of position,
advantage, or social ends and they must posit procedures that will create the fairest
institutions. This may provide a means for justifying decisions made within a society,
but extending it beyond borders yields no more than international norms familiar to us
all: the equality of nations, self-determination, a right to non-interference, and that
treaties are to be kept.56
Rawls political idea of procedural justice that depends on an overlapping
consensus of differing views is similar to Morgenthaus political sphere which accepts a
plurality of interests among nations. Both postulate a decision procedure based upon a
54 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 30. 55 A well-ordered society amenable to Rawlsian justice must meet four criteria: it must maintain a public
conception of justice based on generally accepted beliefs (frequently articulated in the rule of law following
a constitution), the members of the community recognize themselves and their fellows as free and equal
moral agents, the third being a lack of a super-abundance of material goods (scarcity) with a plurality of
opinion held by its members, and held within the limits of justice that remains stable in the community is
the fourth. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 31. 56 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 26.
-
31
notion of human nature. For Morgenthau the individual a self-interested, power-hungry
person; for Rawls, however, the person is a person because of their status as citizen.
They remain self-interested, rights holding, agents who can becitizens, that isfully
cooperating member[s] of society over a complete life.57 The domestic liberal notion of a
person-as-citizen is fundamental for a just society, but limits their rights-as-persons to
rights-as-citizens. While Rawls maintains persons are the primary unit of political
consideration, Morgenthau admits only state actions that are internationally relevant to
the balance of power in his political sphere. Rawls argues that if one is to have a concept
of justice within constitutional democracies, it cannot through philosophy, but instead
must be secured in both political procedure and the acceptance of reasonable pluralism.
In this sense, Rawls shifts his notion of justice into a position analogous to Morgenthaus
autonomous political sphere and to a form that corresponds to Morgenthaus first and
fifth tenets of realism. Because Rawls shifts from a philosophical to a political conception
of justice, he attempts to confine it to the bounds outlined by the realist challenge, but
without the ability to extend his justice beyond national boundaries.
If a domestically liberal state cannot reach beyond its borders and carry with it a
concept of justice, then it must adopt a power-oriented foreign policy. Neglecting the
strictures of power and interest means risking the well-ordered society necessary for
justice to emerge. However, Thomas Pogge a Rawlsian international relations scholar,
states that nations are prevented from extending Rawlsian justice due to a lack of a moral
57 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 233.
-
32
reasons. 58 Whereas the classical realist will contend that because of international
disorder, and the strictures of power and interest, there can never be moral reasons
sufficiently compelling for international organization. Although international
institutions exist, and have some influence, for a realist they do not fail because they lack
the values of a well-ordered society, but because there cannot be effective values shared
internationally. International politics must rely upon material exigencies of interest
defined as power to provide guidelines for action. The same characteristic of the state
system that gives rise to well-ordered societies, the concept of national sovereignty, is
the same one that undermines attempts to institutionalize any shared international
values. This is borne out by the consequences of the original position which generates
the witnessed norms in international relations that of sovereign equality which in turn
breeds power politics. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the desires for
international relations coherent with domestic justice, and the demands of the original
position when used in interstate relations.
In the end, adherents of domestic liberalism must engage in the power politics
advocated by realism. Given the moral politics of Morgenthaus realism, liberal states
ought to abandon normative principle in international relations to protect their own well-
ordered societies that are the necessary conditions for Rawlsian justice. They have a
moral obligation to behave prudentially when engaging in foreign policy. This is the
only judgment of ought that extends from a Rawlsian perspective on the international
58 Pogges two hypotheses are that the present world order is a modus Vivendi, and that international
institutions are largely unsuccessful because they lack shared values integral to well-ordered national
societies. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 42.
-
33
scene. It is the ought of prudential action that betrays the primacy of persons, the
necessity of just distribution, and decisions blind to power and advantage. This collapse
of morality into prudence is the very nature of realist political morality: the primacy of
self-preservation to maintain the necessary conditions for liberal justice. The irony of this
position is that the just society must be prepared to behave unjustly to preserve its
justice-as-fairness against other powers who accept incompatible political goals. If
domestic liberals do not adopt a realist foreign policy, they risk losing their own well-
ordered societies to those who will engage in power politics to the liberals detriment.
Although realism eliminates moral judgments from potential decisions in favour of
qualifying actions as good or prudent, for a nation to behave morally it ought to behave
prudentially or risk its own existence. The only moral judgment that realism offers is to
take domestic liberal justice and impose realist international behaviour.
Pogge, in an attempt to transcend the realist challenge and the prevailing
disunity of sovereign equality, provides a values-based approach to minimize the
tumult of power politics. This moral outlook demands that nations accede to the
pluralistic acceptance advocated by Rawls political liberalism, only writ large to
encompass the community of nations. This would require that societies should accept
morally rather than prudentially the continued existence of one another and the values
central to their domestic social contracts.59 This is followed by the demand that there
ought to be a fair distribution of burdens and resources, and that countries be convinced
of, and ascribe to, this moral obligation as action guiding. Pogge maintains that with
59 Pogge as quoted in Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43.
-
34
the experience of trust and cooperation, commitment to a just scheme based on shared
values would deepen and widen.60 However, it is convincingly argued by the realists
that nations would not abandon their vital interests to implement obscure moral
principles in the way Pogge wishes. By trying to promote an international order based
on broad, undefined values he invites their breach by negligent parties with sufficient
power. Recalcitrant or negligent actors will exploit the principles that bind all other
nations to their own advantage without a mechanism to counter their aspirations. In
short, he is not able to overcome the realist challenge.
Although domestic liberalism attempts to reintroduce the ought of principled
judgment into politics by establishing a theory of justice, when it is extended to
international relations it (a) differs very little from the classical realist model of
international behaviour due to the original position, and (b) Pogges values-based
attempt to extend Rawls internationally fails in the face of realist criticism. Because
domestic liberalism is dependent on the well-ordered society, it cannot extend its
principles of justice to international relations without relapsing to realism or risk
destruction. Therefore it cannot be said to be just based on three criteria outlined above.
If the preferred philosophical theory of justice cannot overcome the realist
challenge, can we turn to international relations theory in the liberal tradition to provide
a just theory? The next section will look to international liberalism and its response to
realism.
60 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43. Emphasis in original.
-
35
International Liberalism
The second variant to be examined is international liberalism represented here
by Michael W. Doyle. Writing from the Kantian tradition, his scholarship is aware of the
historical development of realist international relations. Despite this, he asserts that
Kantian liberal principles have provided a firm anchor of the most successful zone of
international peace yet established.61 The expanding liberal peace envisioned by Kant is
now claimed by liberal scholars to be a historical fact. This zone is maintained by liberal
principles that promote commercial relations, transparency in judicial processes, and a
view of humans as rights-bearing individuals; all of which provide points of contact
between countries. These interactions undercut power politics among similarly
constituted states. For the international liberal, however, the competition of power
politics and illiberal behaviour generally predominates between the liberal and non-
liberal world.
Doyle argues that there are specific values understood in the liberal tradition
which have generated rights and institutions.62 The unique principle that underlies these
is that humans are moral ends in themselves with associated rights and reciprocal
duties. From this comes freedom from arbitrary restraint (embodied in equality before
the law), the promotion of capacities and opportunities (or positive freedom), and a
third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee
61 Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), p. 343. 62 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 206.
-
36
the other two.63 For international liberals, the individual is prior to the state, and the
state is justified only with the informed consent of its constituents. States behaving in
foreign affairs are subject to the same considerations as their component individuals; the
concept of national sovereignty is therefore akin to the sovereign equality of persons. In
other words, the
basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have
the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally
autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that
democratically represent them have the right to exercise political
independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the
touchstone of international liberal theory.64
International liberals do not deny that states exist in a realist security dilemma;
that they must contend against other states with the mutual desire for power in an
anarchic world. However, Doyle claims that the characteristics of liberal political
communities have formed a separate peace, and through economic and legal ties, have
annexed themselves from the competition of power politics. Unlike domestic liberal
theorists who wish a direct moral solution to international problems, Doyle argues that
through the continued growth of liberal democracies the political bond of liberal rights
and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A
separate peace exists among liberal states.65 Therefore it is not merely a moral desire
that solidifies peaceful coexistence, but a principled stand extending from the concept of
the individual. This notion of persons leads to the construction of institutions and states
63 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 207. 64 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 213. 65 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.
-
37
that respect individual rights, and through relations with other similarly constituted
polities, a zone of peace and understanding has emerged. This conceptualization of
relations contravenes the realist unitary (billiard ball) concept of the state.66 The relations
between sub-national components, particularly economic ties, entangle liberal nations at
an extra-national level that can prove to be superior to the power relations between
states.67
International liberals assert that these multifaceted intra-state relations are the
causal factors for the liberal peace. Through these interactions, trust between countries
with similar internal structure breeds transparency of intent, an increase of
communication, and therefore confidence in the decision mechanisms of foreign states.
The chance of misunderstanding therefore decreases, the risk of insecurity minimizes,
and relationships between nation states grow friendlier. The realist model fails to
appreciate these types of relations, and consequently states in a competitive scenario
suffer the chance that an inoffensive exchange may escalate into animosity and taint the
remainder their interactions. The liberal democracies are insulated from this due to the
extent and variety of commercial exchanges [which] guarantee that a single conflict of
interest will not shape an entire relationship. But between liberal and nonliberal
societiesa single conflict of interest will define an entire relationship.68 Similarly to
realist desires for checks and balances of forces, the interdependence of economic
66 Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 5 and Note 28 above. 67 Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 39. The world of liberal statesis a world of individual self-
regulation facilitated by states; of transnational regulation enacted and implemented by disaggregated
political institutions - courts, legislatures, executives and administrative agencies - enmeshed in
transnational society and interacting in multiple configurations across borders; of double-edged diplomacy
and inter-governmental agreements vertically enforced through domestic courts." 68 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 326.
-
38
relations, for example, will provide a counter-weight for security tensions and
international desires for power. So a beneficial economic relation will balance a stressful
security relation amongst liberal states.
In contrast to domestic liberals, international liberals do not fully accept
pluralism as a touchstone of peaceful coexistence. In fact, liberal internationalism
among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under
changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal
character of its constituent states.69 Doyle cites the United States as paradigm example
of how liberal states must reinforce each other and their shared principles in order to
affirm the international liberal order. It is claimed that acting with foresight and
coherent intentions, after World War II the United States following was prepared and
able to take measures70 to maintain liberal society internationally with economic and
political aid. However, this is simply another way of saying that the United States had
an interest in maintaining a particular form of government in Europe, and had sufficient
power to achieve it. Thus the principled liberal stand may be nothing more than prudent
realist necessity.
If the goal of this investigation is to seek a notion of justice that is pervasive, the
liberal peace is circumstantial at best. The international liberal peace is a coalition of
prudence dependent on certain material conditions, and not a principled victory. It
achieves a unique historical advantage, but not in a way that is fundamentally different
than an effective balance of power. For example:
69 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232. 70 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.
-
39
If domestic economic collapse on the pattern of the global
propagation of depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the
domestic political foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if
international economic rivalry were to continue to increase, then
consequent attempts to weaken economic interdependence
(establishing closed trade and currency blocs) would break an
important source of liberal accommodation.71
The liberal peace is only a form of muted competition due to material circumstance, and
not different-in-kind from realist alliances of coherent interests and their associated
reduction in security competition. When circumstances emerge to skew interest or
power sufficiently to compel states to diverge from the liberal alliance, realism remerges.
Therefore, any international justice present in the liberal peace is not founded upon
liberal principles, but the pragmatic circumstances that make cooperation more efficient
than competition. The liberal peace is not a negative outcome to be so easily derided, but
without recourse to justice beyond material circumstance, we risk falling back into
realist power struggles even between liberal states. One can assert principles, and
invest in their economic manifestation, but the fact remains that power and the interests
towards which it is directed are the underlying mechanisms that sustain liberalism and
its peace.
If the liberal peace provides a form of just relations within the boundaries of
liberal regimes, what are the features of the relations between the liberal and the non-
liberal world? Those not party to the liberal peace are not afforded the rights of being
ends in themselves; in
71 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 233.
-
40
liberal practice, some nonliberal statesdo not acquire the right to
be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect
the political independence and territorial integrity of other states.72
The notion of extending the liberal peace is a necessary factor for justice, and one that is
desired in order to entrench liberal principles globally. If the United States invokes its
power, as it did after World War II to maintain liberal nations, Doyle claims that this
ought to be the mandate of all liberal states. They should work to strengthen liberal
policies in other countries, and amend the gap that existences in behaviour between
liberal and non liberal states. To do this, liberal states should encourage nonliberal states
to secure basic human needs, civil rights, and democracy, and to expand the scope and
effectiveness of the world market economy.73 These are the liberal principles that, it is
claimed, give rise to the material conditions for peace. And this, then, leads to Doyles
statement that most distances international liberalism from domestic liberal and from
realist theories. He states that unlike the realist approach to foreign policy: powerful
and weak, hostile and friendly nonliberal states must be treated according to the same
standards. There are no special geopolitical clients, no geopolitical enemies other than
those judged to be such by liberal principles.74 This example denotes that liberal
policies must apply equally in the sense of isonomia regardless of material power,
external relations, and internal composition. It demands that nations have equal
treatment from the liberal world; it provides a metric against which good and bad
behaviour can be judged morally; it takes a stance that is disinterested with respect to
72 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 325. 73 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344. 74 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344.
-
41
power or interest. That is to say, a nation is not a client, in that its friendship or just
treatment is not dependent on what it can deliver to its powerful master, and animosity
does not spring from opportunity or geography. Animosity is reserved for those that
oppose the individual liberty, autonomous existence of other states and the civil rights,
human needs and others that flow from the person, to the state to the international
scene. However, this equal treatment does not extend to those other nations who deny
liberal principles. The international liberal must then choose between the principled
stand to respect the sovereign equality of nations, or confront the illiberal states using
coercive means and potentially abridge the populations individual rights.
To follow this principled stance
requires abandoning the national interest and the balance of
power as guidelines to policy. The interests of the United States
must be consistent with its principles. We must have no liberal
enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.75
But simply stating or desiring it does not make it so. If principles do not align with
interest or power, then they fail to affect policy and diminish the project that one wishes
to follow. Instances such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956 where the United States
contributed much liberal rhetorical support, but no material assistance, the result was
the suppression of the population and a loss of face for American officials. Because most
liberal states were not willing to risk their own interests or test their power against the
Soviet Union for the sake of principle, this only weakened the liberal world and their
normative desires because they were not coherent with the interest of refraining from
75 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 345.
-
42
war, and they presented insufficient power to restrain soviet interference.76 Thus,
principled politics must be subordinate to power politics in a direct confrontation.
Moreover, principled politics tend to weaken themselves in this respect when they are
not backed with sufficient material power.
76 Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 166. Which discusses the combination of bellicose rhetoric and
political inaction which will only guarantee failure. Also: As the London Economist observed on 30 august
1952: Unhappily liberation applied to eastern Europe...means either the risk of war or it means nothing...
Liberation entails no risk of war only when it means nothing. As quote by Norman A. Graebner, The
United States and NATO, 1953 1969, in NATO After Thirty Years eds. Kaplan and Clawson (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, 1981), p. 37
-
43
Chapter Three
Reinhold Niebuhrs Reformed Realism
Having seen the merits and difficulties with prevailing international relations
and philosophical theories, is there an alternative that is accurate in evaluation, effective
in practice, while also meeting the requirements for justice? Reinhold Niebuhr begins to
addresses this question through an understanding of St. Augustines The City of God
Against the Pagans. Niebuhr describes a reformed realism that acknowledges
Morgenthaus material requirements, but also demands effective non-material goals. For
Niebuhr, aspects of human nature that transcend power and interest are necessary to
temper the self-destructive qualities of classical realism. This reformed realism will
challenge the wisdom of Morgenthaus constrained political sphere, while seeking to
extend justice beyond the material contingency of the liberal peace. If he is successful,
then there is an avenue for philosophy to inform the material necessity of the political
realm without sacrificing realisms precision. By investigating this alternative,
philosophers can begin to work from a Niebuhrian standpoint and integrate themselves
into debates of international affairs and recommend just action.
The realist aspect of Niebuhrs theory begins in his agreement with
Morgenthaus derivation of realism from a particular theory of human nature. For
Niebuhr the origins of communities are coincidental and prudential, not planned or
principled, as people are driven together by common material interest or familial
-
44
relation. The beginnings of a community are not under the influence of justice; the
interests and relations come first, and their cohesion is achieved by using power to
subdue internal conflicts of interest. But acknowledging power and interest does not
exclude principles of justice for Niebuhr. He recognizes Morgenthaus stress on material
constraints, but contends that doing so is not fatal to the establishment of justice.77
Because of Niebuhrs Augustinian influence, the two drives of human nature the
material drive recognized by realism, and the transcendent interest of morality and
justice are reflected in Augustines two cities: the city of man and the city of God.
These also represent the two loves, the love of God and the love of self.78 One love, or
one drive, cannot be ignored to the expense of the other. Morgenthau seeks to engage
and mitigate the love of self through a refined understanding of human nature and
political relations, but he fails to understand that two drives cannot be separated. These
two drives are not two types of people [who] dwell together but[that] the conflict
between love and self-love is in every soul.79 Following Niebuhr, then, we must
undertake the study of international relations in a manner that is able to study the whole
of human desires, and to take account of the totality of human nature in the political
sphere.
Following the model of the two cities, philosophers and international relations
scholars can work to amend Morgenthaus account of human nature. This change in the
77 Rein