SUGGESTED READING LIST FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMPREHENSIVE EXAMS

This list is not exclusive; it is only a baseline guide. You should also make use of the citations contained in these works to develop a full understanding of the field.

Current Literature: Students are expected to be up to date on the current literature, by reading through the articles published in the last five years in the main international relations journals (such as IO, ISQ, JCR, WP, and EJIR) and the IR articles published in the general purpose journals (APSR and AJPS). This holds true for all subfields.

IR Theory

Classical Realism

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations

Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War

E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V, The Melian Dialogue.

Randall Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security; Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004).

Neorealism: the structure of anarchy

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics

Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances

Liberalism: preferences and progress

Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Perpetual Peace and other Essays on Politics, History and Morals.

Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review (December 1986).

G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order" International Security (Winter 1998/99).

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Patrick McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine and International Relations Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Selections to be determined.

Neoliberalism: International Cooperation and Institutions

Robert Keohane, After Hegemony

Stephen Krasner, International Regimes

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978).

Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. (1998).

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security (Winter 1994/95).

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, (2001) “The Rational Design of International Institutions” International Organization 55/4 Autumn, 761-799.

Constructivism

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," International Organization (Spring 1992), pp. 391-426.

John G. Ruggie, (1982) “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order” International Organization 36, 2 (Spring), 379-416.

Peter J. Katzenstein, ed, (1996) The Culture of National Security

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990) “Socialization and Hegemonic Power” International Organization 44/3 (Summer), 283-315.

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999) "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization 53/4 (Autumn): 699-732.

Vincent Pouliot, (2008), "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security

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Communities" International Organization 62(2): 257-288.

Lisa Wedeen, (2002) “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science” American Political Science Review. Vol. 96, No. 4 December, 713-28.

Ted Hopf (2010) “The Logic of Habit in International Relations” European Journal of International Relations June.

Strategic Interaction

Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict

James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization. 49 (1995): 379-414.

Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, Introduction and Conclusion, skim case studies.

Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics (April 1991), pp. 336-66.

Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).

Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4, (Autumn 1992), pp. 765-792

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, chs. I, II, & IV.

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation

Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988).

Hegemony

Robert Gilpin, War and Change, (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics (April 1976).

William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security (Summer 1999) pp. 5-41.

Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression.

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Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations.

Domestic Structures and Domestic Actors

Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization (Summer 1988).

Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire.

Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions.

Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 689-718.

Andrew MacIntyre, “Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia,” International Organization 55, 1 (Winter) 2001, pp. 81-122.

Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," International Organization (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-912.

Michael Hiscox, “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” International Organization 55 (Winter 2001), pp. 1-46.

Ideas and Perception

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations.

Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas (Cornell UP 1998).

John Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War.

Elizabeth Saunders, (2009). “Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy.” International Security 34(2), pp.119-161.

Julia Gray, The Company States Keep: International Economic Organization and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets.

International Order

Monteiro, Nuno. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful.” International Security (Winter 2011/2012): 9-40.

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Lake, David. “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics.” International Security (Summer 2007): 47-79.

Nexon, Daniel and Thomas Wright. “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate?” American Political Science Review (May 2007): 253-271.

Branch, Jordan. “Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systematic Change.” International Organization (January 2011): 1-36.

Ikenberry, John G., Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics (January 2009): 1-27.

Causes of War and Peace

Fearon, James. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization (Summer 1995): 379-414.

Reiter, Dan. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” Perspectives on Politics (March 2003): 27-43.

Gartzke, Erik. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science (January 2007): 166-191.

Dafoe, Allan. “Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor.” American Journal of Political Science (April 2011): 247-262.

Lieber, Keir. “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security (Fall 2007): 155-191.

Powell, Robert. “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization (January 2006): 169-203.

Slantchev, Branislav. “Borrowed Power: Debt Refinancing and the Resort to Arms.” American Political Science Review (November 2012): 787-809.

Goemens, Hein and Giacomo Chiozza. “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex-Post Inefficient?” American Journal of Political Science (July 2004): 604-619.

Weeks, Jessica. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review (May 2012): 326-347.

Gartzke, Erik and Yonatan Lupu. “Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence.” International Security (Spring 2012): 115-150.

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Crisis Behavior

Fearon, James. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution (February 1997): 68-90.

Kroenig, Matthew. “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes.” International Organization (January 2012): 141-171. Weeks, Jessica. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization (January 2008): 35-64.

Snyder, Jack and Erica D. Borghard. “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound.” American Political Science Review (August 2011): 437-456.

Slantchev, Branislav. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises.” American Political Science Review (November 2005): 533-547.

Trager, Robert. “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy.” American Political Science Review (May: 2010): 347-368.

Press, Daryl. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the Appeasement Crisis of the 1930s.” International Security (Winter 2004/2005): 136-169.

Sechser, Todd. “Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.International Organization (Fall 2010): 627-60.

War Conduct and Outcomes

Reiter, Dan and Allan Stam. “Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter.” International Security (Summer 2003): 168-179.

Downes, Alexander B. “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War.” International Security (Spring 2009): 9-51.

Reiter, Dan, Allan Stam, and Alexander B. Downes. “Correspondence: Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War.” International Security (Fall 2009): 194.

Kahl, Colin. “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq.” International Security (Summer 2007): 7-46.

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Downes, Alex. “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War.” International Security (Spring 2006): 152-195.

The Rise of China    

Friedberg, Aaron.  “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security (Fall 2005): 7-45.

           Beckley, Michael. “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security (Winter 2011/2012): 41-78.

Johnston, Alastair, I. “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security (Spring 2003): 5-56.

Drezner, Daniel. “Bad Debts: China's Inflated Financial Power in Great Power Politics.” International Security (Fall 2009): 7-45.

Jervis, Robert. “Thinking Systemically About China.” International Security (Fall 2006): 206-208. Christensen, Thomas. “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia.” International Security (Summer 2006): 81-126.

Nuclear Proliferation

Kroenig, Matthew. “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (April 2009): 161-180.

Kroenig, Matthew. “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” American Political Science Review (February 2009): 113-133.

Press, Daryl, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino. “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons.” American Political Science Review (February 2013): 188-206.

Hymans, Jacques. “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security (Fall 2011): 154-189.

Fuhrmann, Matthew. “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security (Summer 2009): 7-41.

Bluth, Christopher, et al. “Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security (Summer 2010): 184-200. (Read Kroenig’s critique and Fuhrmann’s response only).

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Terrorism and Insurgency

Pape, Robert. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science Review (August 2003): 343-361. Frankie

Lyall, Jason and Isaiah Wilson II. “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Victory in Counterinsurgency Wars.” International Organization (January 2009): 67-107.

Blair, Graeme, Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob Shapiro. “Poverty and Support for Militant Politics in Pakistan.” American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, available at online first. Abrahms, Max. “Why Terrorism Doesn’t Work.” International Security (Fall 2006): 42-78.

Lyall, Jason. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechnyan War.” American Political Science Review (February 2010): 1-20.

Chenoweth, Erica. “Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity.” Journal of Politics (January 2010): 16-30.

Compliance with International Agreements

Fearon, James. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” International Organization (Spring 1998), 269-306.

Vreeland, James Raymond. “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” International Organization (January 2008): 65-101 .

Simmons, Beth and Allison Danner. “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court.” International Organization (April 2010): 225-256.

Xinyuan, Dai. “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism.” International Organization (April 2005): 363-398.

Von Stein, Jana. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” American Political Science Review (November 2005): 611-622.

International Trade

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Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein, and Douglas Rivers. “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? Comment.” American Economic Review (December 2007): 2005-2018.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Miller, and Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” International Organization (June 2002): 477-513.

Kono, Daniel. “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.” American Political Science Review (August 2006): 369-384.

Busch, Marc L. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” International Organization (Fall 2007): 735-761.

Milner, Helen V. and Dustin Tingley. “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy.” International Organization (Winter 2011): 37-68.

International Finance

Schultz, Kenneth and Barry Wingast. “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” International Organization (Winter 2003): 1-40.

Archer, Candace, Glen Biglaiser, and Karl DeRouen Jr. “Sovereign Bonds and the ‘Democratic Advantage’: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World?” International Organization (Spring 2007): 341-365.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. “Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets.” International Organization (Spring 2007): 443-463.

Bach, David and Abraham Newman. “Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation.” International Organization (July 2010): 505-528.

Sub-field A: International Law, Norms, and Institutions

International Legal Philosophy

Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend & Robert D. Vander Lugt, eds, International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (1996).

Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (1999).

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Theoretical Approaches to International Law

The Natural Law Approach

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Natural Law," pp. 34-37

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Questions 90-94

Francisco Vitoria, De Indis, Excerpts

Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 38-53

The Legal Positivist Approach

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Legal Positivism," pp. 56-59

John Austin, "Lectures on Jurisprudence"

Hans Kelsen, "The Nature of International Law," from Law and Peace in InternationalRelations, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 60-74.

H.L.A. Hart, “Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules,” and "International Law," from The Concept of Law, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 75-92

Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, Chapters One, Two & Three

The Realist Approach

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Classical Realism," pp. 94-98

George Kennan, "Diplomacy in the Modern World," from American Diplomacy, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 99-106

Dean Acheson, Remarks before the American Society of International Law, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 107-108

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Structural Realism," pp. 144-146

John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions"

The New Haven School

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Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "The New Haven School," pp. 110-112

John Norton Moore, "Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell"

Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 113-141

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Institutionalist Approaches," pp. 165-166

Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt,pp. 187-205Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime- Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 167-186

Constructivism

Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”

Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, Chapter Four

The New Stream:

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "The New Stream," pp. 227-229

David Kennedy, "A New Stream of International Law Scholarship," Lectures I & III, in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 230-250

Nigel Purvis, "Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law"

Feminist Approaches

Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, "Feminist Voices," pp. 253-255

Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelly Wright, "Feminist Approaches toInternational Law," in Beck, Arend & Vander Lugt, pp. 256-286

Hilary Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods in International Law”

Sub-field B: International Security

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Introduction to International Security

Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 211-239.

Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October1997), pp. 7-33.

Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000),pp. 5-50.

David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-EraOrigins of Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 107-141.

What is Security Studies?

David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression Era Origins of Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), 107-141.

David Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), 117-141.

Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), 7-33.

Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), 129-53.

Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), 87-102.

Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), 5-50.

U.S. Grand Strategy

Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home,America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3(Winter/2012/13), pp. 7-51.

Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.

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92, No. 1 (January/February 2013), pp. 116-128.

Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), chaps. 1-2.

H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable, Vol. IV, No. 6 (November 5, 2012) on Richard K. Betts.American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (2012), pp. 1-20.

Balancing

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 39-52.

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001),chaps. 1-2, 5-9.

Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory ofUnderbalancing,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201.

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Allyagainst the Leading Global Power?” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp.7-43.

Galen Jackson, “The Offshore Balancing Reconsidered: Realism, the Balance of Power inEurope, and America’s Decision for War in 1917,” Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 2012),pp. 455-489.

Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics,”International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 126-154.

Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma

Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,”International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.

Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and CanWe Measure It?” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-87.

Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1(Summer 2000), pp. 71–104.

Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for InternationalRelations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 155–191.

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“Debating Charles L. Glaser’s Rational Theory of International Politics,” Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July-September 2011), pp. 416-489. [Short articles by Jervis, Mearsheimer, Fearon,Copeland, Lieber, Schweller, and Glaser.]

Unipolarity

William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), 5-41.

Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” WP 61/1 (January 2009), 58-85.

Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), 41-72.

Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41-78.

Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), 5-48.

Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), 7-51.

G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, StateBehavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 1-27.

William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” WorldPolitics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 28-57.

Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January2009), pp. 188-213.

Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 203-213.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a ‘Post-American’ World,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 215-217.

William C. Wohlforth, “How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.

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56, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 219-222.

Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security,Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9-40.

H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review (October 31, 2012), William C. Wohlforth on NunoMonteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful,” pp. 1-5.

Bargaining

James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No.3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.

David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations ofthe Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 7-52.

Jonathan D. Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?” Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1(Autumn 2000), pp. 143-150.

Jeffrey A. Friedman, “How Cumulative Dynamics Affect Military Decision Making,”unpublished manuscript, January 2013, pp. 1-30.

Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 12 (2009), pp. 243-261.

Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of TerritorialDisputes,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 107-138.

Audience Costs

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592.

Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An ExperimentalApproach,” International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 821-540.

Kenneth Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1(February 2001), pp. 32-60.

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (August 2011), pp. 437-456.

Marc Trachtenberg, “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1

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(January-March 2012), pp. 3-42.

Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,”International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 457-489.

Regime Type

Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 585-602.

David Kinsella, “No Rest for the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 453-457.

Branislav L. Slantchev, Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke, “Probabilistic Causality,Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 459-462.

Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 463-466.

Sebastian Rosato, “Explaining the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 467-472.

Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force, andGlobalization,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1999), pp.403-34.

Civil-Military Relations

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957),pp. 7-79, 464-466.

Eliot A. Cohen, “Civil-Military Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 177-187.

Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq SurgeDecision,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 87-125.

Richard K. Betts, Michael C. Desch, Peter D. Feaver, “Civilians, Soldiers, and the Iraq SurgeDecision,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 179-199.

Suzanne C. Nielsen, “American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance ofSamuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State,” International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2 (2012),pp. 369-376.

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Economics and Security

Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), 5-41.

Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, “Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), 115-150.

Peter Liberman, “The Spoils of Conquest” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), 125-53.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much as You Think),” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013), 52-79.

Stephen G. Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits ofConquest,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October, 1999), pp. 646-670.

Christina L. Davis, “Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–23,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 143-179.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great PowerPolitics,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 7-45.

Rise of China

John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April2006), pp. 160-162.

Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China andU.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 81-126.

Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,”International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009).

Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of InternationalOrder in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 41-72.

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Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security,Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41-78.

Managing Power in International Security

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), Chapters 1-2.

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), 7-43.

Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” IS 29/4 (Fall 2004), 159-201.

Stacie E. Goddard, “When Might Makes Right: How Prussia’s Rhetoric Overturned the Balance of Power,” IS 33/3 (Winter 2008/09), 110-42.

Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” IS 35/4 (Spring 2011), 7-44.

Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 155-189.

David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), 57-85

The Origins of Instability and War

Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 167-214.

Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), 58-107.

Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 71–104.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), 615-628.

Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), 591-613.

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Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), 82-107.

Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 2006), 169-204.

The Bargaining Model of War

James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 1995), 379-414.

Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspective on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), 27-43.

David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/11), 7-52.

Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 12 (2009), 243-261.

Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), 107-138.

Jonathan D. Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?” Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), 143-50.

Coercion, Credibility, and Reputation

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976).

Daryl G. Press, “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the Appeasement Crises of the 1930’s,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004), 136-69.

Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Spring 2013), 221-252.

Barbara F. Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April 2006), 313-330.

James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), 68-90.

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Dustin H. Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, “Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No. 6 (December 2011), 996-1020.

Robert Trager, “Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy: European Relations after Austrian Crimean War Threats,” Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 2012), 232-265.

Domestic Politics and International Security

John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), 267-294.

Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), 585-602.

Replies to Rosato by Kinsella, Slantchev, et al., and Doyle (and Rosato’s rejoinder) in American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August 2005), 453-472.

Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), 235-269.

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), 577-592.

Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Fall 2007), 821-840.

Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter 2008), 35-64.

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,” American Political Science Review, 105/3 (August 2011), 437-456.

Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,” International Organization, 66/3 (July 2012), 457-489.

International Institutions and Security

Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), 357-378.

David A. Lake, “Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 129-60.

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G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), 43-78.

Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 527-557.

Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 2008), 257-88.

Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2001), 487-515.

Brian C. Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 2011), 243-273.

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” IS 19/3 (1994), 5-49.

Sebastian Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the EuropeanProject,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 45-86.

Norms, Culture, and Rhetoric in International Security

Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153-185.

Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), 31-63.

Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999), 433-468.

Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2007), 35-66.

Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (December 2003), 511-531.

Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War,” International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), 7-45.

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Nuclear Weapons

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), 54-86.

Jacques Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), 154-189.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), 731-45.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), 7-44.

Francis Gavin, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), 7-37.

Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), 141-171.

Todd S. Sechser, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), 173-195.

Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” InternationalSecurity, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49.

John Mueller, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy, No. 177 (January/February2010), pp. 38-44.

Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?”International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 133-166.

Military Effectiveness

Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol, 42, No. 3 (June 1998), 259-277.

Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

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Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,” International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter 2010), 167-92.

Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Vol., 63, No. 1 (Winter 2009), 67-106.

Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), 7-40.

Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 87-125.

Richard K. Betts, Michael C. Desch, Peter D. Feaver, “Civilians, Soldiers, and the Iraq Surge Decision,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), 179-199.

Intervention, Occupation, and Conquest

Tanisha Fazal, “State Death in the International System,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Winter 2004), 311-344.

David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), 49-91.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2006), 627-649.

Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to be Free: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 90-131.

Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 2008), 49-80.

Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2 (June 2004), 269-292.

Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (December 2000), 779-801.

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Sub-field C: International Political Economy

Introduction to Political Economy

Przeworski, Adam. 2003. States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Adam. 1895. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: T. Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row.

Johansson, Per-Olov. 1991. An Introduction to Modern Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stigler, George J. 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1):3-21.

Peltzman, Sam. 1976. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2):211-240.

Meltzer, Allan H. and Scott F. Richard. 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy89:914-927.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. 1988. Structural Dependence of the State on Capital. American Political Science Review 82:11-29.

Barr, Nicholas. 1992. Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation. Journal of Economic Literature30:741-804.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1980(1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. pp. 3-70.

Introduction to International Political Economy

Frankel, Jeffrey. 2000. Globalization of the Economy. In Governance in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, pp. 45-71 (Brookings Institution Press).

Grieco, Joseph M. and John Ikenberry. 2003. The Economics of International Trade. In Grieco and Ikenberry, State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. pp19-56.

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Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84 (4):833-850.

Gawande, Kishore and Bandyopadhyay Usree. 2000. Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection. The Review of Economics and Statistics 82(1):139-152.

Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. Power Politics and International Trade. American Political Science Review 87 (2):408-20.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2):131-65.

Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?International Studies Quarterly 37 (4):459-489.

Bordo, Michael D., Barry Eichengreen, and Douglas A. Irwin. 1999. Is Globalization Today Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? NBER Working Paper No. 7195.

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Trade Policy- factors & sectors, voters & politicians

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4):1121-1137.

Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions. Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2):165-192.

Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? Journal of International Economics 54 (2):267-292.

Mayda, Anna and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others? European Economic Review 49 (6):1393-1430.

Ray, Edward John. 1981. The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States. Journal of Political Economy89 (1):105-121.

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Mansfield, Edward D. and Marc L. Busch. 1995. The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. International Organization 49 (4):723-749.

Trefler, Daniel. 1993. Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy.Journal of Political Economy 101 (1):138-160.

Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. World Politics 49 (3):309-338.

Lohmann, Susanne and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.International Organization 48 (4):595-632.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 1998. Parties and Interests in the "Marriage of Iron and Rye.” British Journal of Political Science 28 (2):291-330.

Gilligan, Michael J. 1997. Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade. International Studies Quarterly 41 (3):455-74.

Gereffi, Gary. 1999. International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. Journal of International Economics 48 (1):37-70.

Bhagwati, Jagdish and V. K. Ramaswami. 1963. Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy. The Journal of Political Economy 71 (1):44-50.

Trade Policy- international institutions and their interaction with domestic institutions

Ruggie, John Gerard . 1982. International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.International Organization 36 (2):379-415.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglas C. North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics 2, no. 1 (1990): 1-23.

Staiger, Robert W. 1994. International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy. NBER Working Paper No. 4962. (Published in G.M. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, 1995. The Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, North Holland, 1995.)

Staiger, Robert W. and Guido Tabellini. 1999. Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? Economics and Politics 11 (2):109-44.

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Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 2002. Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. In Daniel Kennedy (ed.) The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Hudec. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56 (3):477–513.

Hollyer, James and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2011. PTAs and Leader Survival. Paper prepared for presentation at the 4th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Zurich, January 27-29.

Davis, Christina. 2011. The WTO. Paper prepared for presentation at the 4th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Zurich, January 27-29.

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization. International Organization 53 (4):669-698.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (3):427-460.

Goldstein, Judith and Lisa Martin. 2000. Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. International Organization 54 (3):603-632.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade. American Economic Review 94 (1):98-114.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp5-135.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. The World in Depression 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp288-305.

Allee, Todd. 2004. Legal Incentives and Domestic Rewards: The Selection of Trade Disputes for GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution. Ms. Department of Political Science, University of Illinois.

Schnietz, Karen E. The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. International Organization57 (1):213–33.

Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. International Organization57 (1):137–74.

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International Capital Mobility

Neely, Christopher J. 1999. An Introduction to Capital Controls. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 81 (6):13-30.

Singer, David Andrew. 2007. Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial System. New York: Cornell University Press.

Goodman, John B. and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. World Politics 46 (1):50-82.

Alesina, Alberto F., Grilli, Vittorio and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. 1993. The Political Economy of Capital Controls. NBER Working Paper No. W4353. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=227033

Haggard, Stephan and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World.International Organization 50 (1):35-68.

Edwards, Sebastian. 1999. How Effective Are Capital Controls? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (4):65-84.

McNamara, Kathleen. 1999. Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in European Monetary Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (3):455-476.

Quinn, Dennis and Carla Inclan. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization.American Journal of Political Science 41 (3):771-813.

Simmons, Beth A. and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy.American Political Science Review 98 (1):171-189.

Quinn, Dennis P. 2003. Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Globalization, 1890-1999: A Synoptic View. International Journal of Finance and Economics 8 (3): 189-204.

Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.International Organization 55 (2):391-438.

Way, Christopher R. 2005. Political Insecurity and the Diffusion of Financial Market Regulation. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598 (1):125-144.

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Capital Mobility, Exchange Rates, & Macroeconomic Policy

Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization 45 (4):425-451.

Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M Taylor. 1998. The Great Depression as a Watershed: International Capital Mobility over the Long Run. NBER Working Paper No. 5960 (Also Reprint No. r2212). Published: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century. Bordo, Michael D., Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White, eds., pp. 353-402 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

Simmons, Beth. 1994. Who Adjusts: Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. chap. 4.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1995. Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy. International Organization 49 (4):657-687.

Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. American Journal of Political Science 43 (4):1003-1027.

Clark, William Roberts and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. American Political Science Review 94 (2):323-46.

Bernhard, William, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. International Organization 56 (4):693-723.

Edwards, Sebastian. 1996. Exchange Rates and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Discipline. American Economic Review 86 (2):159-163.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1997. Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America: An Open Economy Interpretation. Journal of Economic History 57 (2):367-95.

International Monetary Systems & Exchange Rate Regimes

Eichengreen, Barry. 1996. Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.

Dooley, Michael P., David Folkerts-Landau, Peter Garber. 2003. An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System. NBER Working Paper No. 9971. Published: Dooley, Michael P., David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber. The Revised Bretton Woods System,International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2004, v9(4,Oct), 307-313.

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Mundell, R. A. 1963. Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique 29 (4):475-485.

Bernhard, William and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments. International Organization 53 (1):71-97.

Frankel, Jeffrey and Andrew Rose. 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2):437-466.

Frankel, Jeffrey A. 1999. No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or at all Times. Essays in International Finance No. 215, Princeton University (August):1-45.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization 56 (4):863-889.

Scheve, Kenneth. 2004. Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking. International Organization 58 (1):1-34.

RecommendedMeissner, Christopher. 2005. A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold Standard, 1870-1913.Journal of International Economics 66 (2):385-406.

Leblang, David and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. International Organization 60 (Winter):245-262 .

Foreign Direct Investment

Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries. International Organization 57 (1):175-211.

Jensen, Nathan M. 2006. Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 4-6.

Borensztein, E., J. De Gregoriob and J-W. Leec. 1998. How does foreign direct investment affect economic growth? Journal of International Economics 45 (1):115-135.

Görg, Holger and David Greenaway. 2004. Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? The World Bank Research Observer 19 (2):171-197.

Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production. American Journal of Political Science 48(4):662-674.

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Henisz, WJ. 2000. The institutional environment for multinational investment. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16 (2):334-364.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1994. International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation. International Organization 48 (4):559-593.

Stasavage, David. 2002. Private Investment and Political Institutions. Economics and Politics 14, 1: 41-63.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. International Organization 60 (4): 811-846.

Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines, Jr. 2004. Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes. Journal of Public Economics 88 (12):2727-2744.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sovereign Debt

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. International Organization 57 (1):3-42.

Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2005. Do Countries Have a ‘Democratic Advantage?’ Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies and Sovereign Borrowing. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4):366-387.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Foreign Aid

Kosack, Stephen and Jennifer Tobin. 2006. Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and Government in Economic Success. International Organization 60 (1):205-243.

Boone, Peter. 1996. Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. European Economic Review 40 (2):289-329.

Svensson, J. 1999. Aid, Growth and Democracy. Economics & Politics 11 (3):275–297.

Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1):33-63.

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Bearce, David H. and Daniel C. Tirone. 2007. Foreign Aid, Recipient Growth, and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments. Paper presented at the International Political Economy Seminar (IPES), Stanford, November 9-10.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2006. IMF Program Compliance: Aggregate Index versus Policy Specific Research Strategies. The Review of International Organizations 1 (4): 359-378.

The Political Economy of International Organizations

Broz, J. Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund.International Organization 60 (2):367-399.

Thacker, Strom. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics 52 (38-75): 38-75.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. American Political Science Review 98 (4):577-591.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2007. Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Ms.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge. Chapter 2.

Hacche, Graham. A Non-Definitive Guide to the IMF. World Economics 8 (2):97-118.

Dreher, Axel, Silvia Marchesi, James Raymond Vreeland. 2008. The Politics of IMF Forecasts. Ms.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2007. The Politics of IMF Conditional Lending. World Economics 8(3):185-93.

Milner, Helen. 2005. Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives. Perspectives on Politics 3 (4):833-54.

Copelovitch, Mark. 2006. Master Or Servant? Agency Slack And The Politics Of IMF Lending. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Bulir, Ales and Soojin Moon. 2004. Fiscal adjustment when IMF is involved. Comparative Economic Studies 36 (3):373-399

Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. International Institutions and National Policies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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IPE and Political Regime

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Global Markets and National Politics. International Organization 52 (4):787-824.

Mosley, Layna. 2000. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. International Organization 54 (4):737-773.

Brooks, Sarah M. 2002. Social Protection and Economic Integration: The Politics of Pension Reform in an Era of Capital Mobility.Comparative Political Studies 35 (5):491-523.

Rudra, Nita. 2002. Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. International Organization 56 (2):411-445.

Swank, Duane and Sven Steinmo. 2002. The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 46 (3):642-655.

Li, Quan and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis. British Journal of Political Science 33 (1):29-54.

Nooruddin, Irfan and Joel W. Simmons. 2006. The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending. International Organization 60 (4):1001-1033.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization 62 (1):35-64.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2007. Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2):251-284.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships. Economics & Politics 18 (1):1–26.

International Migration

Mayda, Anna Marie. 2006. Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants. The Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (3):510-530.

Olofsgård, Anders. 2003. Incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups. Journal of Public Economics 87 (9-10):2105-2128.

Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy.Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (1):133-45.

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Hanson, Gordon H., Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies. Economics and Politics 19 (1):1-33.

Timmer, Ashley S. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1996. Racism, Xenophobia or Markets?: The Political Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties. NBER Working Paper No. 5867.

Sub-field D: American Foreign Policy

Brooks, Stephen G & William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), ISBN: 978-0-691-13784-1 (paper)

Friedberg, Aaron L., A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (NY: Norton, 2012), ISBN: 978-0393343892 (paper)

Gaddis, John Lewis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), ISBN-13: 978-0674018365 (paper) Ikenberry, G. John, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), ISBN: 978-0691156170 (paper)

Kupchan, Charles A., No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), ISBN: 978-0199325221 (paper)Lieber, Robert J., Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the U.S. Is Not Destined to Decline (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ISBN: 978-0521281270 (paper)

Mandelbaum, Michael, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), ISBN: 978-1610390545 (paper)

Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (NY: Routledge, 2002), ISBN: 978-0415935364 (paper). NB: 2001 hardcover is acceptable too)

Nau, Henry, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), ISBN: 978-0691159317 (hardcover)

Nye, Joseph S., Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), ISBN: 978-0691158365 (hardcover)

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The Historical Legacy and American Exceptionalism

Seymour Martin Lipset, “Still the Exceptional Nation,” The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2000): 31-45, www.jstor.org/stable/40259998

Mead, Special Providence, Chapter 1, “The American Foreign Policy Tradition,” 3-29; Chapter 2, “The Kaleidoscope of American Foreign Policy,” 30-55

Gaddis, Chapter 2, “The 19th Century,” 17-34

Stephen Peter Rosen, “Blood Brothers: The Dual Origins of American Bellicosity,” American Interest, July 2009: 20-28

Walter S. McDougall, “The Unlikely History of American Exceptionalism,” American Interest, March/April 2013

The American Era and its Foundations

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Presidential Leadership, Chapter 1, “The Role of Leadership,”1-20; Chapter 2, “The Creation of the American Era from Theodore Roosevelt to GeorgeH.W. Bush,” 21-74

Kupchan, Chapter 1, “The Turn,” 1-12; Chapter 3, “The Last Turn: The West Beats the Rest,” 46-73

Mead, Special Providence, Chapter 8, “The Rise & Retreat of the New World Order,” 264-309

The Bush Doctrine and Responses to 9/11

Gaddis, Chapters 1, 3, 4 (pp. 1-5, 35-113) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 20, 2002,www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf

R. Lieber, American Era, Chapter 2, “New (and Old) Grand Strategy”

Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," The National Interest, Fall 2004

President Bush Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,October 6, 2005

Ikenberry, “Rise & Fall of the Bush Revolution,” Liberal Leviathan, 254-275

Frank Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” NY Times Magazine, Feb 19, 2006

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Liberal Internationalism, Multilateralism & Liberal Order

Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011

Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, Chapters 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, (read selectively)

Richard K. Betts, “Institutional Imperialism,” (review of Ikenberry, LiberalLeviathan) The National Interest, May/June 2011: 85-96

Peter Berkowitz, “Liberal Internationalism and Freedom,” Policy Review, June 2011, No 167

Brooks & Wohlforth, Chapter 5, “Institutionalism & the Constraints of Reputation,”148-170

Realist Critiques: Retrenchment and Disengagement

Barry Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” ForeignAffairs, Jan/Feb 2013

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the Pax Americana,” Cambridge Reviewof International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, June 2011

Sebastian Rosato & John Schuessler, “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States,” Perspectives on Politics, December 2011, 803-819

John Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” National Interest, January/February, 2014, 9 -30

Campbell Craig et al., Correspondence: Debating American Engagement & the Future of Grand Strategy,” International Security, Fall 2013, (see especially the rejoinder by Brooks, Ikenberry, & Wohlforth, 191-199)

Keir Lieber & Daryl Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,”International Security, Summer 2013

Conservative Internationalism and Neoconservatism

Henry Nau, Conservative Internationalism, Introduction & Chapters 1-3, (1-80), Conclusion, (201-245)

Elliott Abrams, “Neoconservatism: A Good Idea That Won’t Go Away,” Standpoint Magazine (London), June 2013

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Balancers and Peer Competitors: America and China; “Soft Balancing”

Brooks & Wohlforth, Chapter 2, “Realism, Balance-of-Power Theory, and the Counterbalancing Constraint,” and Chapter 3, “Realism, Balance-of-Threat Theory, and the ‘Soft Balancing’ Constraint,” pp. 22-59, 60-97.

Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, Introduction, Chapters 1,2,7,8,9,10,11

Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78

Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007): 59-69

Azar Gat vs. John Ikenberry et al., “Which Way is History Marching? Debating the Authoritarian Revival,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009: 150-159

Domestic Foundations and Constraints

Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower, Introduction, Chapters 1,2,4,5 (1-63, 101-180)

Robert J. Samuelson, “A country in denial about its fiscal future,” Washington Post, December 25, 2011

Tyler Cowan, “What Export-Oriented America Means,” American Interest, May/June, 2012 (5-11)

Brooks & Wohlforth, Chapter 4, “Liberalism, Globalization, and Constraints Derived from Economic Interdependence,” 98-147

R. Lieber, Power & Willpower, Chapters 2, 3 (30-79)

Pew Research Center, “Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips,” December 3, 2013, www.people-press.org/2013/12/03/public-sees- us-power-declining-as-support-for-global-engagement-slips/

The U.S. and the Rise of the Rest

Kupchan, Chapter 4, “The Next Turn: The Rise of the Rest,”

Brooks & Wohlforth, Chapter 6, “Constructivism & the Restraints of Legitimacy,” 171-207

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Jorge G. Castaneda, “Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance,” Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2010: 109-122 http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-2-4.pdf

R. Lieber, “Multipolar or Multilateral? Diffusion of Power, the BRICS and the United States,” forthcoming in International Politics (London), spring 2014 (page proofs will be available)

Daniel Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think,” International Security, Summer 2013 (especially pages on “The Public Goods Benefits of Military Primacy,” 67-79)

An Obama Doctrine?

Owen Harries & Tom Switzer, “Leading From Behind: Third Time A Charm,”American Interest, May/June 2013

Eliot Cohen, “American Withdrawal and World Disorder,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952.html

Economist, “The man who used to walk on water,” November 23, 2013, www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590476-how-barack-obama-can-get-least-some-his-credibility-back-man-who-used-walk-water/print

Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, “Scoring Obama's Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012

Bob Woodward, “Robert Gates, former defense secretary, offers harsh critique of Obama’s leadership in ‘Duty’,” Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/robert-gates-former-defense-secretary-offers-harsh-critique-of-obamas-leadership-in-duty/2014/01/07/6a6915b2-77cb-11e3-b1c5-739e63e9c9a7_story.html?wpisrc=al_comboPN_p

Is American Primacy Sustainable?

Mandelbaum, Conclusion & Epilogue, 181-213

Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the‘Pax Americana,’ ” International Studies Quarterly (Feb 2012): 11pps

William C. Wohlforth, “How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (Feb 2012): 4pps

R. Lieber, Power & Willpower Chapter 6

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Joseph S. Nye, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not be a ‘Post-American World,” International Studies Quarterly, (Feb 2012), 3pps

Nye, Presidential Leadership, Chapter 4, Twenty-First Century Leadership, 136-159

Kupchan, Chapter 7, “Managing No One’s World,” 182-205

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