Graphics:Turkey and its neighborhood map – taken care of by PeterPolitical gradient for Turkish media – submitted to graphicsText chart of Turkish banks – finalizing numbersText chart of business conglomerates – finalizing numbersTurkish embassy map – need to submit

Display themes:Military v. civilian government (pic of army chief Basburg and PM Erdogan)Headscarves and universitiesGulenist schoolsTurkish newspapers – Zaman v. HurriyetCourt battles** Emre may be able to provide some photographs for use in this piece

SPECIAL REPORT: Turkey’s Power Struggle

A deep power struggle is gripping the Republic of Turkey. Most people watching Turkey from the outside see this as the latest phase of Turkey’s decades-long battle between Islamism and Kemalist secularism. Others paint it as traditional Anatolia’s struggle against modern Istanbul, egalitarianism versus economic elitism or democracy’s rise against authoritarianism. Whatever shade of paint is applied, this is a struggle that purely and simply boils down to a single, universal concept: power.

In the following special report, STRATFOR will tell the story of how an Islamist-oriented Anatolia has risen to challenge the secular foundation of the Turkish state. While those looking at Turkey from the outside are often unaware of the internal tumult brewing in the state, this is a labyrinthine power struggle that influences virtually every move Turkey makes in its embassies, schools, courts, news agencies, military bases and boardrooms. Turkey’s identity crisis will not be resolved by this power struggle, but the battle lines that have been drawn stand to redefine the country for decades to come.

A Power Struggle Rooted in Geopolitics

The Republic of Turkey occupies a highly geostrategic position in the world. The country sits at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and forms a bridge between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The core of the country has historically centered around the isthmus that straddles the Sea of Marmara and Black Sea. Whether the map says Constantinople or Istanbul, whoever lays claim to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits has control over one of the most active and strategic commercial

routes in the world, a key military vantage point against outside invaders, and a launch pad for expansion into Eurasia.

When Turkey is powerful, the country follows a pan-Islamic model and can extend itself far and wide, from ruling over the Arabs and balancing the Persians in the Middle East to challenging the clout of Christian Europe in the Balkans to blocking Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. When Turkey is weak, its neighborhood transforms from geopolitical playground to prison.

This was the feeling in Turkey, then the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, at the end of World War I. With the aid of the victorious European powers, currents of ethnic nationalism surged through the empire and dissolved the bonds of Ottoman control. The real blow to the Ottoman core came in the form of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which dismembered the Empire by ceding territory to the leading Allied powers, as well as the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds – a period of history that continues to haunt Turks to this day.

Times of crisis call for great leaders. That leader for Turkey was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a man who earned the name “Father of the Turks” and whose face is enshrined in statues, currency, paintings and emblems in every corner of the country. Ataturk’s mission was to save the Turkish ethnic core from Sevres syndrome, as it is called in Turkey today, and create a true nation-state. His tool of choice was nationalism, only his definition of Turkish nationalism dispelled the idea of pan-Islamism and instead concerned itself primarily with those Turkish citizens living in Ottoman core which would become the new and modern republic. Kemalist nationalism was also deeply steeped in secularism, with an uncompromising separation of mosque and state.

To preserve his vision of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk bolstered a secular elite that would dominate the banks and industry and keep a firm grip over the country’s armed forces. Ataturk regarded the Turkish military as the guardian of the Kemalist state, a responsibility that Turkish generals have frequently exploited to mount coups against the civilian political authority. For decades, this secularist-Kemalist model prevailed in Turkey while a more traditional, Islamist-minded Anatolian class watched in frustration as they were sidelined from the corridors of power.

The post World War I era effectively blocked Turkish expansion into the European continent, causing Turkey to turn its attention inward, toward the peninsula, in consolidating power from within. Though it would take several decades to manifest itself, the rise of Anatolian forces to challenge the supremacy of the Istanbul elite was in many ways inevitable.

Indeed, as the 20th century started to close in, a tremor began spreading through Turkey’s political landscape. Turkey by then had gone through its fair share of political tumult, but with time, had consolidated internally enough to start looking abroad again through a pan-Islamic lens. The Islamic vision was rooted in the Milli

Gorus, or National View, movement, which arose in the 1970s as a religiously conservative challenge to the left-wing secular tradition.The election of the Islamist-rooted Refah Partisi, or Welfare Party (RP) in 1995 officially brought political Islam to the halls of power in modern Turkey, but it took less than two years for the party to be snuffed out by a ban imposed by the military-dominated National Security Council. A more moderate strand of the Milli Gorus movement then came about in the form of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001. Spearheaded by Turkey’s current Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, the party came to power in 2002 with a mandate to close the political and economic gap between the Kemalist elite and the Anatolian masses. The AKP, while more moderate than its predecessor, is largely considered an affront to the secularist tradition. Though the AKP was more cautious of exposing its Islamist-rooted political vision in its early days of power, it is clear today that the party represents those in Turkey who embrace the country’s Islamic past. The AKP’s vision of Turkey is a country that goes out of its way to defend its Turkic brothers abroad, that infuses religion with politics and gives rise to what it sees as a long neglected Anatolian class.

The Battle Lines

The AK Party is by no means alone in implementing its vision. There is a powerful force in the shadows that over the course of four decades has quietly and effectively penetrated the armor of the Kemalist state. That force is known as the Gulen movement, a transnational organization led by a highly respected and charismatic imam, Fethullah Gulen, who lives under de-facto political asylum status in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. Inside Turkey, the Gulen movement follows a determined agenda to replace the Kemalist elite with its own and transform Turkey into a more religiously conservative society. Outside Turkey, the Gulen presents itself as a multi-faith global organization working to bring businesses, religious leaders, politicians, journalists and everyday citizens together in peace and harmony. Irrespective of the public relations label, the Gulen movement is simply another key player competing in Turkey for power.

The Kemalists have long viewed the Gulen movement as a critical threat to the secular nature of Turkish republic. When Gulen was expelled from the country in 1997, the court documents against him included sermons in which he called on his followers to "move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers.” He also said that “the time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it.”

More than a decade later, the Gulen movement’s presence is seen in virtually all power centers of Turkey. In its earlier years, the movement moved much more discreetly and acted more as a secret society as it focused on weaving through the “arteries of the system” without drawing attention to itself. Since 2007, however, it

appears that the conditions have ripened enough for the Gulen to become much more open with its activities in the country. Gulenists emit a strong sense of confidence and achievement in their discussions with outsiders. The movement knows that this is their moment and that their decades of quiet work in transforming Turkish society are paying off.

The AK Party, meanwhile, is not in lockstep with the Gulen movement, nor does it want to become overly dependent on the Gulenists for its stay in power. The party does not see eye to eye with the Gulenists on a number of issues and consciously attempts to keeps its distance from the group for fear of reinforcing allegations by the secularists that the AKP is pursuing a purely Islamist agenda. But the two sides also need each other and have a mutual desire to replace the traditional secular elite, an objective which forms the basis of their symbiotic relationship: The Gulen movement provides the AK Party with a social base to hold power, while the AK party provides the Gulen with a political platform to push its agenda.

Turkey’s wrenching search for national identity spans every corner of society. In the education realm, the Gulen movement is a preponderant force, creating schools across the globe to extend Turkish influence and intelligence capabilities. The battle is fiercest in the security arena, where generals are now being thrown in jail over murky coup allegations on a regular basis. In Turkish embassies around the world, the number of bureaucrats educated in Gulenist schools is steadily rising. The battle lines in Turkey’s media realm are cut with precision, as the country’s media giants duke it out in lawsuits and editorials. In the world of business, the secularist Istanbul giants continue to dominate while an emerging Anatolian merchant class is rapidly gaining prominence. Within the judiciary, the secularists of the high courts are locked into a battle against the AK Party allies in the lower courts over a series of thorny constitutional reforms that would go a long way in undermining Kemalist legal prowess. And in the streets of Turkey, citizens debate whether it’s “too Islamic” to order halal meat or “too un-Islamic” to order raki (alcoholic drink) in the streets.

EDUCATION: Sowing Seeds in Schools

Turkey’s power struggle begins in the classroom. The Gulen movement has spent the past three decades working aggressively in the education sector to mold young minds in Turkish schools both at home and abroad. The goal is to create a well-educated generation of Turks who ascribe to the Gulen tradition and have the technical skills (and under the AKP, the political connections) to assume high positions in strategic sectors of the economy, government and armed forces.

The AKP-run government distributes for free textbooks published by a firm close to the Gulen movement in primary and high schools. Gulen-funded schools are increasing in number, along with thousands of public Imam-Hatip schools and state-run Quran schools for high school education.

Since the AKP mostly appeals to Turkey’s religious conservative and lower-income families, many of the party’s potential political supporters attend public technical schools for blue collar laborers as well as religiously-oriented Imam-Hatip schools, where girls are permitted to don the Islamic headscarf, for their high school education. Under Turkey’s current educational system, graduates from technical schools are only qualified to attend two-year colleges and graduates from Imam-Hatip schools are only qualified to attend theological schools, even though many graduates from Imam-Hatip schools want to pursue professions in law, medicine, engineering and other professions. Meanwhile graduates from regular public and private high schools, where the headscarf is banned by law, are qualified to attend four-year accredited universities in seeking a higher education. Both the technical and Imam-Hatip schools fall under the labor school category. Since graduates from labor schools are not permitted to attend four-year universities, much of the AKP’s younger political base is prevented from rising in economic stature when seeking a higher degree.

In an effort to change this system, the AKP government has been engaged in an intense struggle with the secularist-dominated State Council to revise the strict grade point average calculations in such a way that would allow graduates from all labor schools (including Imam-Hatips) to enter four-year universities where they can rise to more prominent positions and remain loyal to the AKP and Gulenists. So far, the AKP has been unsuccessful in forcing this change, but it has not given up on this crucial point in its educational agenda.

The most intense period of indoctrination for many Turks takes place between grades eight through the twelve, when the adolescent mind is at its most raw and malleable stage. The Gulen movement claims to have the majority of Turkish students enrolled in its private and public schools. The Gulenist schools are not madrassas. In fact, they focus heavily on the sciences and math. That said, religious classes and customs can make their way into the curriculum and daily activities, especially in countries with existing Islamic links.

The Gulenist educational institutions are the easiest to spot because they typically have the newest facilities, best equipment and offer the most intensive preparation courses for university entrance exams. These exams will make or break a Turkish student’s career and are remembered by most Turkish youth as the most dreaded and stressful experience of their academic lives. Many Turkish parents will pay a great deal of money to ensure that their children receive the preparation they need to pass the exam and get into a good university. Consequently, the Gulen movement has strategically developed Isik Evleri, or Light Houses, which are tuition centers that arguably offer the best preparation for university exams for students, as well as the best recruiting grounds for the Gulenists.

Students who taken these courses describe how the “elder brothers” that run these Light Houses have their students follow an intense curriculum that keeps the students at the schools late at night and studying on the weekends instead of out

socializing and engaging in behavior that might be looked down upon by the religious conservatives. Students may start going to the Light Houses two to three times a week, but eventually could find themselves attending nearly every day of the week by the time they reach the end of the course. Based on their participation, attendance and performance in the courses, the Gulenist brothers are able to pick out the brightest and most loyal students as potential recruits. To test their loyalty, a student may be called late in the evening or early on a weekend morning and asked by his or her mentor to attend a function or perform a community task. These essentially serve as loyalty tests for the Gulenists to evaluate whether the student will respond to orders from his or her Gulenist mentors.

The Gulen movement and AKP have carried their presence to the university level as well. The pivot of the university battle is an institution called the Higher Education Council (YOK). YOK was created by the 1982 Constitution to keep a lid on political dissent in the universities since prior to the 1980 military coup, universities were the driving forces behind the political violence between right and left-wing activists that marred the 1970s in Turkey. Up until 2007, YOK was a bastion for hardcore secularists in Turkey to ensure their dominance over the universities.

When the last secular president of YOK retired in 2007, the AKP had its chance to appoint one of its own, professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, an AKP loyalist and sympathizer of the Gulen movement. Since then, YOK has been at the forefront of the highly polarizing headscarf issue in Turkey and has used its powers to appoint religious conservatives to university presidencies. Under the AKP’s watch, and particularly since 2007, 37 public universities and 22 new private universities have been built, many of them in Anatolian cities such as Konya, Kayseri and Gaziantep where the Anatolian business class is concentrated or in less populated and impoverished cities where young Turks have traditionally lacked access to higher education. The private universities are mostly funded by Gulenist businessmen.

Strategic Placement

But the Gulen movement and AKP do not only want loyal students to attend Gulen-run universities. Indeed, a core part of their strategy is to ensure the placement of their students in a variety of secular institutions where they can gradually grow in number and position themselves to influence strategic organs of Turkish society. For example, the university results of a Gulenist student may qualify him to attend the most elite Istanbul university, but the movement will arrange for the student to attend a military academy instead, where the Gulenists are trying to increase their presence. While at the military academy, the student will quietly remain in touch with his Gulenist mentor, but will be careful not to reveal any religious tendencies that would flag him and deny him promotion. Once placed in a strategic institution, whether in the military, police, judiciary or major media outlet, the graduate continues to receive guidance from a Gulenist mentor, allowing the movement to quietly and directly influence various organs of society. The Gulen movement is also known to influence its young followers to attend universities in cities away from

their families where the movement can provide them with free housing. This separation allows the Gulen to step in as a family replacement and strengthen its bond with the student while he or she is away from home.

Studying Abroad with Gulen

Over the course of the past couple decades, the Gulen movement has spread itself to virtually every corner of the globe through its pervasive education network. The Gulenist international footprint is made up of 1,000 private schools (according to Gulen estimates), which span 115 countries, 35 of which are in Africa. These Gulenist schools can be found in small towns in Ethiopia, Bosnia, Cambodia, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Ivory Coast and Azerbaijan and can even be found across the United States, with some estimates claiming that the movement runs more than 90 charter public schools in at least 20 states in the US.

Again, the facilities and quality of instruction at these schools are top-notch, which make them attractive places for elite families of various ethnic descents to send their children for their education. The primary funding for these schools comes from Gulenist businessmen, who donate a portion of their revenues toward schools in an assigned region in return for the help that they receive from the movement in finding business deals. The curriculum at these schools covers math, sciences, as well as Turkish and English language instruction. While the schools themselves are innocuous, there is also a deeper political agenda in play. The students who emerge from these schools can usually speak Turkish fluently, have been exposed to Turkish culture and history and are highly qualified for careers in high places. In regions like Africa and Central Asia, in particular, where quality education is difficult to come by, the children of the political elite who attend these schools are fostered by the Gulenists and have usually developed a deep affinity to Turkish culture. As a result, the Gulenists are able to raise a generation of diplomats, security professionals, economists and engineers whose work, they hope, will complement Turkish national interests when they are in positions of influence.

The Gulenists have made a conscious attempt to avoid the perception that they are proselytizing students through these schools. Lessons in Islam tend to be more prevalent in Gulenist schools where the religion already has a base. For example, Islam has a deep history in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but the religion has also been severely undermined by decades of communist rule. Many Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other descendants of the Soviet Union simply have trouble identifying with Islam as their religion, much less a way of life. The Gulenist schools in these regions have an agenda to revive moderate Islam in the former Soviet space. This is not to say that the Gulenists are radicalizing these countries. In fact, the Gulenists emphasize that the Turkish version of Islam that they teach is moderate in its approach and distinct from the strict Islamic practices of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

But the Gulenists are not welcome in every country in which they attempt to set up shop. Iran and Saudi Arabia have no interest in having their population come under the influence of a foreign strand of Islam, and have both kept the door firmly shut to Gulenist schools. In the Netherlands, where Islamophobia runs particularly high in Western Europe, the government has cut funding to Gulenist institutions. Russia, a natural competitor to Turkey, is extremely wary of this Gulenist channel of influence and has reportedly shut down at least 16 schools so far. Russia is also heavily reasserting its influence in the former Soviet Union and has an interest in preventing the Gulenist movement from spreading further in places like Central Asia and the Caucasus. Uzbekistan, whose government is highly paranoid of any type of external influence is more prone to strangling Islamic tendencies in the region than have them enflame various militant groups milling about the region, banned a number of Gulenist schools in 2000. The Gulenists have had greater success in setting up private high schools and universities in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, however. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani officials regularly complain in private about the Gulenist “encroachment” in their country, claiming that they don’t need Turks to instruct them on how be “good Muslims.” Even Iraq reportedly shut down four Gulenist institutions in Iraq in Dec. 2009.

The Gulenist educational crusade has met its fair share of resistance, and this resistance is only likely to increase as the movement’s profile rises and as countries grow nervous over Turkey’s expanding influence. Regions like Africa, however, where countries are already desperate for development, Muslims are in abundance, chaotic conditions prevail and foreign competition lacks the intensity of more strategic battlegrounds like Central Asia, the Gulen movement has far more room to maneuver in expanding its educational, business and political ties.

SECURITY: Taking on the Military

As the father of the modern Turkish republic, Ataturk, a military man, wanted to ensure his work and vision for Turkey would remain intact long after his death. That job was seized by the Turkish armed forces.

Article 148 of the Military Penal Code proclaims the military to act as the “vanguard of the revolution” with the right to “intervene in the political sphere if the survival of the state would otherwise be left in grave jeopardy.” Article 34 of the Army Internal Service Law of 1935 also gives the military the constitutional right to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the republic. While the Constitution outlaws the forceful ousting of democratically elected governments, a constitutional republic, according to the majority of the armed forces and the Kemalist camp, is the liberal and secular republic founded by Ataturk, not the religiously conservative republic growing under the rule of the Islamist-oriented AKP.

Turkish generals throughout much of Turkey’s history interpreted these constitutional rights to intervene in the civilian affairs of the state whenever stability was threatened or the secular fabric of the country showed signs of

unraveling. Consequently, Turkey has experienced three military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and one “soft coup” in 1997, when the military worked through the National Security Council to bring down the government without dissolving the parliament or suspending the constitution. When the military wasn’t directly holding the political reins, the workings of the so-called Derin Devlet or “Deep State” could be seen in the parliament, courts and media in ensuring that Turkey’s Islamists remained impotent. The Deep State refers to a murky network of members from the armed forces and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), some with links to organized crime syndicates and ultra-nationalist groups, who view themselves as the guardians of the ultra-secularist republic and are willing to work around the law to uphold that secular tradition.

Turkey’s Islamists knew that if they had any chance of overturning the power balance of the state, they would have to take on the armed forces. The process would be slow, quiet and deliberate, but would ultimately strip the military of its long-held untouchable status.

From Deep State to Ergenekon

The Gulen movement strategically began with the police intelligence services. The Turkish police force had long been the weakest institution within the security apparatus. This was largely a reflection of the country’s rural-urban divide through much of the 20th Century. In the early part of the century, the rural population comprised two-thirds of the country, giving the gendarmerie, the branch of the armed services that is responsible for the security of the countryside, far more influence than the police, who patrolled the urban areas. As more Turks began moving to the cities in the latter half of the century and eventually outnumbered the rural population, however, the police steadily gain in clout, providing the Gulen movement with a rare opportunity. Since the police were not a powerful force to be reckoned with at the time, they were not scrutinized as heavily by the secularists within the security establishment. As a result, background checks for Islamist traits in police officers were more lax, allowing religious conservatives to gradually increase their presence in the institution under the Gulen movement’s guidance. Within three decades, the police, and particularly the police intelligence, came under the umbrella of the AKP and Gulen movement.

The Islamists now had a powerful tool to undercut their secularist rivals. Not only did they have the pervasiveness of a security network that patrols the vast majority of Turkey’s population and the wiretapping capabilities to investigate the bowels of the security establishment, but they also had a powerful machine in the form of the AKP to uproot the deep state and neutralize the military’s grip over the government. From 2002 to 2007, the AKP spent its first five years in power trying to establish a working relationship with the Turkish General Staff as it made inroads into the National Security Council and started playing a role in the appointments of senior military leaders. In the summer of 2007, as the party prepared itself for a landslide

election victory, the AKP’s moves against the military took a bold turn in the form of the now infamous Ergenekon probe.

Ergenekon is an investigation that was first launched in June 2007 upon the discovery of a few grenades in the Istanbul slums. As word of the investigation hit the newsstands, allegations began flying about how the Deep State was at work again to overthrow the AKP government. Alleged anti-AKP conspirators had their phones tapped and purported transcripts of their conversations were published in the (mostly Gulenist-backed) media while hundreds of suspects, including journalists, retired soldiers, academics and everyday criminals, were arrested in predawn raids for allegedly taking part in this deep conspiracy.

Though there is little doubt that there were elements of the Deep State who were legitimately rolled up in this Ergenekon probe, there is also reason to believe that this probe took on a life of its own and was increasingly used by the state as a tool to quash political dissent. The AKP defended the probe to the outside world as a sign of Turkey’s democratization, arguing that Turkey was finally evolving to a point where the military could be brought under civilian control. But as the Ergenekon probe continued to grow, the legitimacy of the indictments began to be questioned with greater frequency. By late 2009, the investigations began to slow down. Then, in Jan. 2010, the other shoe dropped.

Breaking Precedent With Jailed Generals

A new and even more politically explosive coup plot was revealed in January by Taraf newspaper, a media outlet that is regularly praised by Gulenists. The plot, called Balyoz, or Sledgehammer, allegedly involved 162 members of the armed forces, including 29 generals, who composed a 5,000 page document in 2003, shortly after the AKP came to power, that detailed plans to sow violence in the country and create the conditions for a military takeover in order to “get rid of every single threat to the secular order of the state.” The plot allegedly included crashing a Turkish jet over the Aegean Sea in a dogfight with Greece to create a diplomatic crisis with Athens and bombing the Fatih and Bezayit mosques in Istanbul. By late February, more than 40 military officers were arrested, including four admirals, a general, two colonels and former commanders of the Turkish navy and air force.

The military was backed against a wall. Though it still had enough influence over the courts to fight the arrests, there was no question that it was locked into an uphill battle against the Islamist forces. The Ergenekon probes that began in 2007 went after retired soldiers, but the arrests of active-duty generals in Sledgehammer completely broke with precedent. What was once considered unthinkable for Turks across the country was now becoming a reality: the military, the self-proclaimed vanguard of the secular state, was transforming into an impotent political force.

While the AKP and Gulen movement already have de-facto ownership of the country’s police intelligence, they are also making significant inroads into MIT, the

national intelligence service that has long been dominated by the secularist establishment and has historically spent a good portion of its time keeping tabs on domestic political opponents, like the AKP. The Turkish National Security Council in late April appointed 42-year-old bureaucrat Hakan Fidan, as the new MIT chief. Fidan has both a civilian and military background, making him more of an acceptable candidate to both the army and civilian government, but he appears to lean heavily toward the AKP camp. Notably, Fidan was publicly praised by Fethullah Gulen for his previous work as leader of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), an organization that works closely with the Gulen movement abroad. Fidan is likely to increase MIT’s capabilities and focus in foreign intelligence collection, allowing more room for the police intelligence (already under heavy AKP and Gulen influence) to operate at home. By drawing a more distinct line between foreign and national intelligence and focusing the MIT more outward, the AKP and Gulen movement are not only advancing their aims of using intelligence as a foreign policy tool to promote Turkish expansion abroad, but are also slowly working to deny the secularists the ability to use MIT for domestic espionage purposes.

It has now become all the more imperative for the military to hold onto the security issues that still give the armed forces some leverage against the AKP. The Kurdish issue and the Cyprus dispute with Greece top this list, but even in these arenas the AKP is working aggressively to take ownership of these issues by recasting them to the public as inherently political problems that can be resolved through economic development and diplomacy, as opposed to military might. And as long as Turkey’s economic health remains stable, the military simply doesn’t have the popular dissatisfaction to seize and exploit in a campaign against the AKP and Gulenist forces. The Turkish armed forces no longer possess the power to chart Turkey’s political course, and whatever remnant power they have in the political arena continues to slip by the day.

MEDIA AND BUSINESS: Anatolian Tigers Challenge the Istanbul Elite

Turkey’s media sits at the center of the country’s power struggle: Newspapers are the source of leaks that have thrown generals in jails, courtrooms are filled with legal battles between media agencies while op-eds spar daily over which ideological direction the country should be heading.

The media is an especially potent tool in the Gulenist and AKP fight against the armed forces. The vast majority of leaks in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer probes have mysteriously emanated from a single newspaper: Taraf. Taraf was founded in 2007 as a paper for liberal democrats shortly before the Ergenekon probe was launched. The paper is hailed by the Gulenists as Turkey’s “most courageous” news outlet for exposing Deep State plots in heavy detail. Taraf coverage has included everything from telephone transcripts of alleged coup plotters to satellite imagery of PKK militants crossing the Turkey-Iraq border in a portrayal of alleged military negligence. While the Gulenists claim Taraf’s success in

investigative journalism is due to the brave, disillusioned soldiers in the armed forces who are willing to leak information and betray their military comrades, others within the secularist camp suspect that the transfer of sensitive information to Taraf’s publishers has been made possible by years of successful infiltration of the armed forces by the Gulen movement.

Most of Turkey’s predominantly secularist media, including the dailies Hurriyet, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, have been around as long as the republic itself, and have consequently dominated the media’s point of view for most of Turkey’s history. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the Islamist forces began making their appearance in the media world through newspapers like Zaman, Sabah and Star. Today, these newspapers are dominating the Turkish media scene with pro-AKP coverage. Even in the English-language arena, which is vital for the outside world to monitor developments in Turkey, the Gulenist Today’s Zaman is now outpacing the secularist Hurriyet Daily News. The Gulenist-backed papers also have the benefit of a massive, well-organized social network to distribute newspapers for free, which helps inflate their circulation numbers and increase readership for the movement. Meanwhile, the secularist newspapers are increasingly finding themselves faced with a choice between pleading political neutrality or fighting legal battles in the courtrooms.

INSERT POLITICAL GRADIENT GRAPHIC FOR TURKISH MEDIA(Includes most prominent media outlets, ownership, political orientation and circulation)

The most prominent media war in this power struggle is being played out between Dogan media group, owned by one of Turkey’s leading business conglomerates, and Feza Yayincilik media group, with Dogan’s Hurriyet and Feza’s Zaman newspapers at the epicenter of the battle. Dogan Media is extremely uncomfortable with the shift toward one-party rule under the AKP, and has publicly proclaimed the need to balance against the rapid growth of pro-AKP/Gulenist news. However, after the Dogan group spent considerable news coverage on a corruption scandal involving money laundering through Islamist charities by senior members of the Erdogan government in 2008, the media group soon found itself slapped with a $2.5 billion fine (check) for alleged unpaid back taxes.

While tax fraud is relatively common practice in Turkey’s media sector across the political spectrum, and Dogan Media was no exception to this practice, there is deep suspicion that Dogan in many ways was singled out to serve as an example to other media of what can happen to a powerful business tycoon that refuses to toe the AKP line. Members with the pro-AKP/Gulenist media camp meanwhile charge that Dogan got what it deserved and cite the fining of the group as an example of a more democratic society that no longer shies away from punishing powerful offenders. This is where Turkey’s media battles enter the corporate arena, where a quiet and brooding competition is being played out between the old Istanbul elite and the rising Anatolian tigers.

The Corporate Struggle

Turkey’s business sector is dominated by a handful of secular family conglomerates based in Istanbul who for decades have served as Turkey’s business outlet to the rest of the world. On the other side of the struggle are the millions of small and medium-sized businesses who have their roots in more religiously/socially conservative Anatolia. While the secular-nationalists still have the upper hand in the business world, the Anatolian tigers are slowly but surely finding their strength in numbers.

The following names dominate the Turkish economy: Sabanci, Koc, Dogan, Dogus, Zorlu and Calik. Dogan Group occupies the staunchly secular niche of the business sector that sits at odds with the AKP’s Islamist-rooted vision, and has taken a public stand against the ruling party. Sabanci and Dogus also belong in the staunchly secular group, but tend to exhibit a more neutral stance in public toward the AKP in the interest of maintaining business and avoiding the kinds of legal battles that Dogan has faced. Calik and Zorlu groups are far more opportunist-minded: they keep close political connections to the AKP to secure business contracts and tolerate the Gulen movement, but are not considered true believers in the Islamist agenda. Finally, the last category consists of business conglomerates that are both legitimately pro-AKP and Gulenist, such as Ulker Group and Ihlas Holding.

INCLUDE TEXT CHART OF BUSINESS CONGLOMERATES AND NET WORTH OF EACH

The lines dividing Turkey’s business, media and politics are blurry in Turkey. Several of Turkey’s prominent business conglomerates contain media outlets, and the AKP has worked to ensure those media outlets remain friendly - or at least neutral - to the party. Those that oblige are often awarded business contracts by the state, while those that resist, such as Dogan, can find themselves buried in lawsuits or end up transforming their newspapers into mostly apolitical tabloids to avoid political pressure altogether. Calik Group is perhaps the most obvious example of the corporate benefits that can be derived from a healthy relationship with the AKP. In April 2007, the state-run Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) seized Sabah-ATV news agency in a predawn raid. Sabah is Turkey’s second-largest media group and prior to the raid, was considered the strongest liberal and secular voice in the Turkish media. The TMSF sold the group to Calik Holding in an auction in which Calik was the sole bidder and Erdogan’s son in law was made CEO of the agency. The entire deal was financed (with the AKP’s urging) with loans from two-state-owned banks and from a media agency based in Qatar. Today, Sabah is considered a pro-AKP media outlet.

This intersection between politics and business can also be seen in the energy sector. The AKP has a strategy to boost four energy firms in the country who have politically aligned themselves with the ruling party. The firms are divided among

Turkey’s four main energy areas of interest: Ciner’s Park Teknik in Russia, SOM in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Inci in Iraq and AKSA in Turkey. Park Teknik and AKSA are expected to work together in pursuing a tender with Russia to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, a project that has been fought by the secularist-dominated State Council.

The AKP and Gulen movement lack the leverage that the secularist-nationalists hold in the banking sector, but that hasn’t stopped them from finding resources to finance strategic projects, as the Sabah takeover demonstrates. Banks such as IsBankasi which were created by Ataturk in the early days of the republic to maintain a secular stronghold on the country’s finances are difficult to compete with, but state-owned Ziraat bank has increasingly become the AKP’s go-to bank for its projects. The CEO of the bank, Can Akin Caglar comes from a pro-AKP/Gulenist background. Prior to becoming CEO of Ziraat Bank in 2003, he worked for Turkiye Finans Bank, a known conservative bank that was equally owned by Ulker and Boydak Groups (Ulker is staunchly pro-AKP/Gulenist business conglomerate) before 60 percent of its shares were sold to Saudi Arabia’s National Commercial Bank in 2007. Turkiye Finans, now named Bank Asya, is also one of the main banks the Gulen movement uses to deposit its donations.

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The Gulenist Business Cycle

The AKP and Gulen movement understand well that there isn’t much space for them to compete in the Western-oriented trade markets ruled by Koc, Sabanci and the other secularist business elites. Instead, the Islamist forces have created their own business model, one that speaks for Anatolia and focuses on accessing markets in places like the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific. The driver behind this business campaign is Turkey Industry and Businessmen Confederation (TUSKON), made up of nearly 15,000 small and medium-sized business owners. TUSKON has been in existence for only five years, but is a slowly growing competitor to the larger and more well-established business associations like MUSIAD and TUSIAD that represent big-name firms like Sabanci, Koc and Dogan, and, as expected, roots for the secularists.

As opposed to the Istanbul-entrenched secularist corporations, most businessmen who belong to TUSKON hail from small, generally poorer and religiously conservative towns and cities across Anatolia. TUSKON is tightly linked into the Gulen movement and forms an integral part of the Gulenist business, education, political and even foreign intelligence agenda. The business association organizes massive business conferences in various parts of the globe that are attended by high-level AKP officials and aim to bring into contact hundreds of Turkish businessmen with their foreign counterparts. While there are variations to how the Gulenist business cycle works, the following is a basic example:

A small Turkish businessman from the eastern Anatolian city of Gaziantep makes a living manufacturing and selling shirt buttons. A Gulenist will invite the button-maker to a TUSKON business conference in Africa, where he will be put into contact with a shirt-maker from Tanzania who will buy his buttons. The Turkish button-maker and the Tanzanian shirt-maker are then incorporated into a broader supply chain that provides both with business across continents, wherever the Gulen operates. In short, an Anatolian button-maker can expand his business ten-fold or more if he belongs to the Gulenist network. To return the favor of facilitating these business links, the Gulen movement will ask that the button-maker financially support the development of Gulenist programs and schools in Tanzania. The end result is a well-oiled and well financed business and education network that spans 115 countries across the globe. Not only do these business links translate into votes when elections roll around, but they also (along with the schools) form the backbone of the AKP’s soft power strategy in the foreign policy sphere.

The Foreign Policy Enabler

The Gulenist transnational network is a natural complement to the AKP’s foreign policy agenda. While many within the secularist and nationalist camp are highly uncomfortable with the notion of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism – strategies that, in their eyes, brought about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire – AKP followers embrace their Ottoman past and favor an expansionist agenda. As espoused by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey is a unique geopolitical power, at the same time a European, Asian, Middle Eastern, Balkan and Caucasian country straddling the Black, Caspian and Mediterranean seas. In the AKP’s view, Turkey’s potential reaches far, and though it shies away from the term “neo-Ottomanism” for fear of provoking a colonial image, it is difficult to see Turkey’s current foreign policy as anything but a return to its Ottoman stomping grounds.

Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has historically been dominated by members of the secularist camp. They continue to maintain a strong presence in Turkish embassies since Turkish diplomats, as in many countries, generally have to be in the business for an average of 20 years before they reach a position of influence. But this too is a reality that is also gradually shifting under AKP rule. Members within the foreign ministry describe how an increasing number of graduates from Gulenist schools are being recruited into the diplomatic service. To help speed up the Islamist integration with the foreign ministry, Davutoglu has also spoken of implementing reforms that would allow Turks to become ambassadors at younger ages. Turkey has also accelerated the opening of embassies in countries where the Gulen movement has a strong presence. In 2009 alone, Turkey opened 10 new embassies, the majority of them in Africa: Dar es-Salam (Tanzania), Akra (Ghana), Maputo (Mozambique), Antananarivo (Madagascar), Adibdjan (Ivory Coast), Yaounde (Cameroon), Luanda (Angola), Bamako (Mali), Niamet (Niger), N’djamena (Chad), Bogota (Colombia) and Valetta (Malta.) In addition, Turkey uses its foreign policy arm to negotiate with countries across the Mideast, Eurasia and Africa to eliminate visa restrictions and open up new markets for Anatolian businessmen to

thrive. (include countries that AKP has removed visa restrictions with in recent years)

INCLUDE TURKISH EMBASSY MAP

The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) is also key to these foreign policy efforts. TIKA was created by the Turkish government in the early 1990s to forge ties with former Soviet Union countries with Turkic links, but did not make much headway at the time. The AKP, however, reinvigorated the TIKA in recent years for use as a public diplomacy tool, transforming into a highly active development agency. Davutoglu has even referred to TIKA as a second foreign ministry for Turkey. TIKA’s development projects, particularly in Central Asia and Africa, overlap heavily with the Gulen movement and as mentioned earlier, Turkey’s new national intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, is the former chief of TIKA and shares the AKP’s vision for an expansionist foreign policy.

Gulenists privately boast that their institutions abroad, whether schools, hospitals or other types of developmental agencies, serve as useful intelligence satellites for the foreign ministry. If a problem erupts in a country in Central Asia, for example, where press freedoms are nonexistent and information is extremely difficult to come by, the foreign ministry can call on their local Gulenist contacts to provide information and help facilitate government contacts. The Gulenists who are living abroad, after all, often learn the local languages of these countries and can translate to and from Turkish and the local language. They have also developed close relationships with the local government through their work as well as their students, who are often sons and daughters of the political elite in the countries in which they are operating.

Image Control

AKP officials, often deny in private these Gulenist claims of intelligence satellites, not wanting to be viewed as too tightly linked to the Gulen abroad for fear that they might be viewed as pursuing a subversive Islamist agenda. Indeed some within the extreme left in Turkey have gone so far as to cast the Gulen movement as a group of violent Islamist extremists with an ultimate aim to impose Shariah law in Turkey. This characterization is grossly inaccurate, and belongs to a fringe group within the secularist camp that wants to reverse Turkey’s trajectory, but it is an image that the AKP continues to fight.

This is why the AKP has spent a considerable amount of effort in pursuing negotiations with the European Union for full-fledged membership, in spite of the extremely low likelihood that these talks will actually go anywhere. Poll numbers reveal how Turks across the country are increasingly coming to the realization that EU membership has dwindled to a very distant possibility. Yet the AKP cannot afford to allow that disillusionment translate into its foreign policy. For a state to be considered for the EU, it must claim a modern economy, a military brought under

civilian control and an image of secularism. Privately, AKP officials will agree that achieving unanimous EU approval for Turkey’s membership will be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. But if Turkey dropped the EU bid altogether, turned back to the Asian continent and continued its pan-Islamic foreign policy, the party would have a much more difficult time arguing that it is not the threatening Islamist power that the secularists have made them out to be. Instead, the AKP and the Gulenists want to portray themselves as having everything in common with the liberal, democratic values of the West, and that these are the very values that are driving their push to bring the military under civilian control.

This notion of image control becomes especially important in Turkey’s relationship with the United States. Turkey lives in a whirlwind of conspiracies, and both sides of the power struggle will make the argument that the United States is backing one faction against the other. For example, the secularists point to the fact that Fethullah Gulen lives in Pennsylvania and was granted political asylum in the United States as “evidence” that the US government is supporting the AKP’s rise. At the same time, the Islamists will claim that the United States backs the secularists, and provided covert support for the 2007 “soft coup” attempt by the secularist-dominated courts to ban the AKP. Despite the inherent contradictions in these arguments, the AKP is very conscious of the need to present itself as a nonthreatening, democratic power with an Islamist background that can actually facilitate U.S. objectives in the Islamic world.

By keeping the EU bid alive, relations with Washington on an even keel and one foot firmly planted in the West, the Islamists can better undermine secularist efforts to defame the AKP’s international image. The AKP will continue to keep a fair bit of distance from the Gulen in its dealings abroad to protect this image, but the Gulenist transnational network undeniably equips the AKP with the economic reach, social influence and political linkages that are vital to the government’s foreign policy.

JUDICIARY: Neutralizing the High Courts

Whether the issue is headscarves worn in universities, media firms charged with tax evasion or soldiers charged with coup-plotting, virtually every strand of Turkey’s power struggle finds itself in the courts.

The dividing political line in the judiciary is between the secularist-dominated high courts and the AKP-influenced low courts. This division results in a dizzying judicial system in which court rulings are often mired in political mayhem and are consequently tossed back and forth between the feuding factions.

The higher judiciary in Turkey is made up of the Constitutional Court ("Anayasa Mahkemesi" in Turkish), the High Court of Appeals ("Yargıtay"), the State Council ("Danistay"), and the High Panel of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The seven-member HSYK plays an instrumental role in the appointments of judges and prosecutors across the country. In the current system, the HSYK is made up of the

Justice Minister, his undersecretary, three members appointed by Yargitay and two appointed by Danistay. Within this coterie of judicial elite, the secularists have long held their grip on the most powerful judicial institutions in the country.

The headscarf controversy is perhaps the best illustration of the struggle between religious and secularist forces in the judiciary. Turkey’s secularist-dominated State Council has long barred Turkish women from wearing the headscarf in the public sector, making it difficult for religious females in Turkey to seek a university education or a career in the government, judiciary or state-run education system. The AKP succeeded in getting enough votes for a proposed amendment in 2008 to lift the headscarf ban, but the Constitutional Court, which is also packed with secularists, annulled the parliament’s proposed amendment four months later in a non-appealable decision. Shortly thereafter, the two sides came head to head again when the Constitutional Court threatened to ban the AKP. The AKP escaped the ban, but at the cost of backing off from the headscarf ban.

This is a battle arena in which the secularists continue to hold the upper hand against the Islamists. Through their dominance of the high courts, the secularists hold the single most potent weapon in this struggle: the ability to ban political parties for violating the secular tradition of the state. The AKP is all too familiar with this threat. The Constitutional Court has banned three AKP predecessors — Milli Selamet Partisi (in 1980), Refah Partisi (in 1998) and Fazilet Partisi (in 2001) — for violating the state’s secularist principals, and though the AKP is far more moderate in its approach than its predecessor parties, it just barely slipped the noose in 2008 over the headscarf issue. Yet each time the court brought the hammer down on the party, the AKP came back more resolute in its agenda to undermine the secularists. Now, the AKP is ready to take on the judiciary full force with a package of constitutional amendments designed to strip the secularists of their judicial prowess.

The AKP’s package of constitutional amendments calls for several critical changes. One is the restructuring of the Constitutional Court and HSYK that would end the secularist monopoly and give the lower judiciary more clout. For example, the HYSK reforms call for increasing the number of members from seven to 21. Out of this group, 10 would be elected by 12,000 judges and prosecutors in lower courts across the country, where the AKP has influence, while five would be appointed by the President. Another calls for binding party dissolution cases to parliamentary approval, thereby neutering the high courts’ ability to ban the party at will whenever the secularist v. Islamist balance comes into question. This last resolution did not make it past the parliament vote, but is sure to be raised again by the AKP down the road when the political climate turns more conducive.

As expected, the secularists in the high courts and parliament, backed by the military behind the scenes, are hotly opposed to these changes, and charge that these reforms will eliminate the checks and balances of the state. They also claim

that the reforms are illegal: clause four of Turkey's 1982 Constitution, states that amendments to the first three clauses of the Constitution - clauses which declare Turkey a Turkish speaking, democratic and secular republic loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk - cannot be proposed, much less implemented. But the veil of democracy is again being exploited by both sides: the Islamists argue that the current judiciary is run by a closed and unelectable segment of society and that these constitutional reforms are necessary to make Turkey a more pluralistic and democratic country in line with the views of the West.

The package of constitutional amendments barely made it through the Turkey’s Grand National Assembly May 7, when 336 deputies gave their vote of approval to the reforms. While this passed the 330 threshold for the government to put the reforms to a public referendum, the parliamentary vote was short of the two-thirds majority needed to formally adopt the amendments.

The battleground is laid, and the struggle will be fierce in the months ahead. AKP and Gulen leaders cannot claim with confidence that the referendum will pass, but they know that the stakes are high: if the amendments pass, the Islamists will establish the legal foundation to accelerate their political rise. If the referendum collapses, the secularists will retain the most critical weapon in their arsenal to uphold the Kemalist traditions of the republic. Yet even in the event of the referendum’s failure, this struggle will be far from over. The next phase of the battle will be the 2011 elections, which the AKP is counting on to win a super majority in parliament to push these constitutional changes through. If the AKP succeeds, the rise of the Anatolian masses will be heard far beyond Turkey’s borders.