turkey power struggle

8/8/2019 Turkey Power Struggle

1/18

1

STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

SPECIAL REPORT:Islam, Secularism and the Battle for Turkey s Future

A u g . 2 3 , 2 0 1 0

This analysis may not be forwarded or republished without express permission from STRATFOR.For permission, please submit a request to [email protected].
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/18

2

2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

Islam, Secularism and theBattle for Turkeys Future

A deep power struggle is under way in theRepublic of Turkey. Most outside observerssee this as the latest phase in the decades-long battle between Islamism and Kemalistsecularism. Others paint it as traditional

Anatolias struggle against modernIstanbul, egalitarianism versus economicelitism or democracys rise againstauthoritarianism. Ultimately, the struggleboils down to a fight over a single, universal concept: power.

The following special report recounts how an Islamist-oriented Anatolia has emerged to challenge thesecular foundation of the modern Turkish state. While those looking at Turkey from the outside areoften unaware of Turkeys internal tumult, a labyri nthine internal power struggle influences virtuallyevery move Turkey makes in its embassies, schools, courts, news agencies, military bases andboardrooms. Though the Turkish identity crisis will not be resolved by this power struggle, the battlelines drawn during the fight will define how the country operates for years to come.

A Power Struggle Rooted in Geopolitics

Turkey occupies a key geostrategic position. It sits at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and forms abridge between the Black and Mediterr anean seas. Turkeys core historically has centered on theisthmus that straddles the Sea of Marmara and Black Sea. Whether the map says Constantinople orIstanbul, whoever lays claim to the Bosporus and Dardanelles has control over one of the most activeand strategic commercial routes in the world, a key military vantage point against outside invaders,and a launchpad for expansion into Eurasia.


3/18

3


When Turkey is powerful, the country follows a Pan-Islamic model and can extend itself far and wide,from ruling over the Arabs and balancing the Persians in the Middle East to challenging the clout of Christian Europe in the Balkans to blocking Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. But when Turkeyis weak, its neighborhood transforms from a geopolitical playground into a prison.

Turkey, then the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, found itself in the latter position at the end of WorldWar I. With the aid of the victorious European powers, currents of ethnic nationalism surged throughthe empire, dissolving the bonds of Ottoman control. The final blow to the Ottoman core came via the1920 Treaty of Sevres, which dismembered the empire by ceding territory to the leading Allied powersand to the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds a period of history that continues to haunt Turks to thisday.

Times of crisis call for great leaders; for Turkey, that leader was Mustafa Kemal who earned thehonorific Ataturk, Turkish for Father of the Turks and whose face still graces statues, currency,paintings and emblems in every corner of the country. Ataturk sought to save the Turkish ethnic corefrom Sevres syndrome, as it is known in Turkey today, and to create a true nation-state. His tool of choice was nationalism, though his definition of Turkish nationalism rejected Pan-Islamism and insteadconcerned itself primarily with those Turkish citizens living in the Ottoman core that would become thenew and modern republic. Kemalist nationalism was also deeply steeped in secularism, with anuncompromising separation of mosque and state.

To preserve his vision of the Turkish republic, Ataturk bolstered a secular elite that would dominatethe banks and industry and maintain a firm grip over the countrys armed forces. Ataturk regarded theTurkish military as the guardian of the Kemalist state, a responsibility that Turkish generals havefrequently exploited to mount coups against the civilian political authority. For decades, this secularist-Kemalist model prevailed in Turkey while a more traditional, Islamist-minded Anatolian class watchedin frustration as it largely remained sidelined from the corridors of power.

The post-World War I era saw Turkish expansion into Europe effectively blocked, leading Turkey toturn its attention inward toward the Anatolian Peninsula, focusing on consolidating power from within.Though it would take several decades to manifest itself, the rise of Anatolian forces that wouldchallenge the supremacy of the Istanbul elite in many ways was inevitable.

Indeed, as the 21st century approached,a tremor began spreading throughTurkeys political landscape. By then,Turkey had gone through its fair share of political tumult. But with time, it hadconsolidated enough internally to startlooking abroad again through a Pan-Islamic lens. The Islamic vision wasrooted in the Milli Gorus, or NationalView, movement, which arose in the1970s as a religiously conservativechallenge to the left-wing seculartradition. The election of the Islamist-

rooted Refah Partisi, or Welfare Party(RP) in 1995 officially brought politicalIslam to the halls of power in modernTurkey, though the secular-dominatedNational Security Council banned theparty in less than two years. A moremoderate strand of the Milli Gorusmovement emerged with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001.

JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish President Abdullah Gul


4/18

4


Spearheaded by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, the partytook power in 2002 with a mandate to close the political and economic gap between the Kemalist eliteand the Anatolian masses. While more moderate than its predecessor, the AKP is largely considered anaffront by the secularists. Though the AKP was more cautious of exposing its Islamist-rooted politicalvision in its early days of power, it has become clear that the party represents those in Turkey whoembrace the countrys Islamic past. The AKPs vision of Turkey is a country that goes out of its way todefend its Turkic brothers abroad, that infuses religion with politics and that gives rise to what it seesas a long-neglected Anatolian class.

The Turkish Islamist Movement

The AKP is by no means pursuing the Islamist vision alone. A powerful force known as the Gulenmovement has quietly and effectively penetrated the armor of the Kemalist state over four decades.The charismatic imam Fethullah Gulen, who lives in Pennsylvania, leads the transnational organization,along with a small group of what the Gulenists term wise men. Inside Turkey, the Gulen movementfollows a determined agenda that aims to replace the Kemalist elite and transform Turkey into a morereligiously conservative society. Outside Turkey, Gulen presents itself as a multifaith globalorganization working to bring businesses, religious leaders, politicians, journalists and average citizenstogether. Whatever its public relations moves, the Gulen movement is at base just one more player

jockeying for power in Turkey.

The Kemalists have long viewed the Gulen movement as a critical threat to the secular nature of theTurkish republic. When Fethullah Gulen left Turkey for the United States in 1998, the court documentsthat had been issued against him included sermons in which he called on his followers to move in thearteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers. He also said that the time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete andconditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it.

More than a decade later, the Gulen movement has a presence in virtually all Turkeys power centers.In its earlier years, the movement moved much more discreetly, focusing on moving into the arteriesof the system without drawing attention to itself. Since 2007, however, when the AKP was electedwith 47 percent of the popular vote, conditions have ripened such that the Gulen movement can bemuch more open about its activities in the country. Gulenists now transmit a strong sense of

confidence and achievement in their discussions with outsiders, as the movement knows this is itsmoment and that decades of quiet work aimed at transforming Turkish society are paying off.

For its part, AKP does not walk in lockstep with the Gulen movement, nor does it want to becomeoverly dependent on the Gulenists. The party does not see eye to eye with the Gulenists on a numberof issues, and consciously attempts to keeps its distance from the group for fear of reinforcingsecularist allegations that the AKP is pursuing a purely Islamist agenda. Likewise, the Gulenistmovement will occasionally, albeit rarely, air its disagreements with the AKP. For instance, in the wakeof the Turkish-Israeli flotilla crisis, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed during a raid by Israelispecial operations forces on a flotilla full of pro-Palestinian activists, Fethullah Gulen said in aninterview that the Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) aid group that led the flotilla had defied authority forfailing to seek permission from Israel before attempting to deliver aid to Gaza. Gulens criticism of theaid organization came in stark contrast to the AKPs denunciations of Israel s actions and strong, publicsupport for the IHH. Gulen apparently used the flotilla crisis as an opportunity to alter outsideperceptions of his organization, showing that his pragmatism in responding to the situation has morein common with the West against critics who accuse the movement of being too strictly Islamist andextreme in its views. Yet Gulens comments also caused an outrage amongst much of the Turkishpublic (not to mention within the AKP), leading one o f the movements leaders to retract thestatements the next day. Clearly, tension exists between the AKP and Gulenists, but the two sides alsoneed each other and share a desire to replace the traditional secular elite. This objective, along withthe common threat they face from the secularist establishment, forms the basis of their symbiotic


5/18

5


relationship: The Gulen movement provides the AKP with a social base, while the AKP provides theGulenists with a political platform to push their agenda.

Turkeys wrenching struggle for national identity reaches every corner of society. In the educationrealm, the Gulen movement is a powerful force, creating schools across the globe to extend Turkishinfluence and intelligence capabilities as the number of Turkish embassy staffers educated in Gulenistschools continues to rise. The struggle is fiercest in the security arena, with generals regularly being

jailed over murky coup allegations. In the media arena, Turkeys media giants wage war via editorialsand lawsuits. In the world of business, the secularist Istanbul giants continue to dominate, though anemerging Anatolian merchant class is rapidly gaining prominence. Within the judiciary, the secularistsof the high courts are locked into a battle against AKP allies in the lower courts over a series of thornyconstitutional reforms that would go far to undermine Kemalist legal dominance. And on the street,Turkish citizens debate whether drinking raki (an anise- flavored liqueur) is offensive to the countrysIslamic culture a nd whether it is too Islamic to order halal meat when traveling outside of Turkey.

Education: Sowing Seeds in the Schools

Turkeys power struggle begins in the classroom. The most intense period of ideological cultivation formany Turks takes place between grades eight through 12, and the Gulen movement has spent thepast three decades working aggressively in the education sector to mold young minds in Turkishschools at home and abroad. The goal is to create a generation of well-educated Turks who ascribe tothe Gulen tradition and have the technical skills (and under the AKP, the political connections) toassume high positions in strategic sectors of the economy, government and armed forces.

The AKP-run government distributes free textbooks published by a firm close to the Gulen movementin primary and high schools. Gulen-funded schools are increasing in number, along with thousands of public Imam Hatip schools and state-run Quran schools for high school education.

Since the AKP mostly appeals to Turkeysreligious conservative and lower-incomefamilies, many of the partys potentialpolitical supporters attend publictechnical schools for working-class

laborers as well as religiously orientedImam Hatip schools, where girls arepermitted to don the Islamic headscarf,for their high school education instead of regular high schools. Under Turkeyscurrent educational system, graduatesfrom technical schools are only qualifiedto attend two-year colleges andgraduates from Imam Hatip schools areonly qualified to attend theologicalschools, even though many graduatesfrom Imam Hatip schools want to pursuecareers in law, medicine, engineering andother professions. Meanwhile, graduatesfrom regular public and private highschools where the headscarf is banned

by law are qualified to attend four-year accredited universities in seeking a higher education. Boththe technical and Imam Hatip schools fall under the labor school category, and since graduates fromlabor schools are not permitted to attend four-year unive rsities, much of the AKPs younger politicalbase is prevented from rising in economic stature when seeking a higher degree.

MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish girls in Istanbul wearing headscarves


6/18


7/18

7


institutions where they can gradually grow in number and position themselves to influence strategiccenters of Turkish society. For example, the university results of a Gulenist student may qualify him toattend the most elite university in Istanbul, but the movement will arrange for the student to attend amilitary academy instead, where the Gulenists are trying to increase their presence. While at themilitary academy, the student will quietly remain in touch with his Gulenist mentor, but will be carefulnot to reveal any religious tendencies that would flag him and deny him promotion. Once placed in astrategic institution, whether in the military, police, judiciary or major media outlet, the graduatecontinues to receive guidance from a Gulenist mentor, allowing the movement to quietly and directlyinfluence various organs of society. The Gulen movement is also known to influence its young

followers to attend universities in cities away from their families where the movement can providethem with free housing. This separation allows the Gulen to step in as a family replacement andstrengthen its bond with the student while he or she is away from home.

Gulenist Schools Expanding Global Influence

Over the past few decades the Gulen movement has spread to virtually every corner of the globethrough its expansive education network. The Gulenist international footprint comprises 1,000 privateschools (according to Gulen estimates) spanning 115 countries, including 35 African countries. TheseGulenist schools can be found in small towns everywhere from Ethiopia, Bosnia, Cambodia, India,Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Cote dIvoire, Azerbaijan and even the United States, where according tosome estimates, the movement runs more than 90 charter public schools in at least 20 states.

Like their counterparts in Turkey, the facilities and quality of instruction at these schools are excellent,making them attractive places for elite families of various ethnicities to send their children to receivean education. Gulenist businessmen provi de the majority of these schools funding. Such donors havegiven a portion of their incomes to schools in an assigned region in exchange for help finding businessdeals. The teachers of the schools are typically devout Gulenist followers willing to live far away fromhome in foreign lands for what they see as the greater mission of the Gulenist cause.

The curriculum at these schools includes math, science, and Turkish- and English-language instruction,but there is a deeper agenda involved than pedagogy. Graduates of these schools can usually speakTurkish fluently, have been exposed to Turkish culture and history, and are prepared for careers inhigh places. In regions like Africa and Central Asia in particular, where quality education is difficult tocome by, the children of the political elites who attend these schools usually have developed a deepaffinity for Turkish culture. As a result, the Gulenists are able to raise a generation of diplomats,security professionals, economists and engineers who are more likely to take Turkish national interestsinto account when they reach positions of influence.

The Gulenists have made a conscious attempt to avoid the perception that they are proselytizing tostudents through these schools, however. Lessons in Islam tend to be more prevalent in Gulenistschools where the religion already has a foothold. For example, Islam has a deep history in theCaucasus and Central Asia, though the religion was severely undermined by decades of Communistrule. Many Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other descendants of the Soviet Union do not identifywith Islam; the Gulenist schools in these regions aim to revive moderate Islam in the former Sovietterritories. This is not to say that the Gulenists are radicalizing these countries, however. In fact, theGulenists emphasize that the Turkish version of Islam that they teach is moderate in its approach and

distinct from the strict Islamic practices of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

As such, the Gulenists are not welcome everywhere they would like to set up. Iran and Saudi Arabia,neither of which wants a foreign strand of Islam influencing its people, have both shut the Gulenistschools out. In the Netherlands, where concerns over the growth of Islam run particularly high, thegovernment has tried to force out Gulenist institutions. For its part, Russia a natural competitor toTurkey is extremely wary of this channel of influence, and has reportedly shut down at least 16Gulenist schools so far. Russia is also heavily reasserting its influence in the former Soviet Union; tothis end; it wishes to block the Gulenist movement from expanding in places like Central Asia and the


8/18

8


Caucasus. Uzbekistan, with a government paranoid about external influences especially those tingedwith Islam, which they fear will inflame the various militant Islamist groups in the region banned anumber of Gulenist schools in 2000. The Gulenists have had greater success in setting up private highschools and universities in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani officialsregularly complain in private about the Gulenist encroachment in their country, claiming they do notneed Turks to instruct them on how be good Muslims. Even Iraqs Kurdistan Regional Governmentreportedly shut down four Gulenist institutions in December 2009.

Such resistance is likely to increase as the movements profile rises and as countries grow nervousover Turkeys expanding influence. In places like Africa, however, where countries are desperate fordevelopment, Muslims are in abundance, chaotic conditions prevail and foreign competition lacks theintensity it has in strategic battlegrounds like Central Asia, the Gulen movement has far more room toexpand its educational, business and political ties.

Security: Taking on the Military

Ataturk, a military man at heart, wanted to ensure his work and vision for Turkey would remain intactlong after his death. The Turkish armed forces seized responsibility for that legacy upon his death.Article 35 of the Army Internal Service Law of 1935 gives the military the constitutional right toprotect and defend the Turkish homeland and the republic. While the Turkish Constitution outlaws theremoval of democratically elected governments by force, according to the majority of the armed forcesand the Kemalist camp, a constitutional republic is defined as the liberal and secular republic foundedby Ataturk, not the religiously conservative republic growing under the rule of the Islamist-orientedAKP.

Turkish generals throughout much of Turkeys history interpreted these laws aspermitting the armed forces to intervenein civilian affairs whenever stability wasthreatened or the secular fabric of thecountry showed signs of unraveling.Consequently, Turkey has experiencedthree military coups -- in 1960, 1971 and

1980 -- and one soft coup in 1997,when the military worked through theNational Security Council to bring downthe government without dissolving theparliament or suspending theConstitution. When the military was notdirectly holding the political reins, it didso indirectly via the so-called DerinDevlet or Deep State, which worked inthe parliament, courts and media toensure that Turkeys Islamists remainedimpotent. The Deep State refers to amurky network of members from thearmed forces and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), some with links to organized criminalsyndicates and ultranationalist groups that view themselves as the guardians of the secular republic,and are willing to ignore the law to uphold that secular tradition.

Turkeys Islamists knew that if they had any chance of overturning the power balance of the state,they would have to take on the armed forces. The process would be slow, quiet and deliberate, butwould ultimately see the military stripped of its long-held untouchable status.

ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish soldiers at Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara


9/18


10/18

10


The military was backed against a wall. Though it still had enough influence over the courts to fightthe arrests, there was no question it was locked into an uphill battle against the Islamist forces. TheErgenekon probes that began in 2007 went after retired soldiers, but the arrests of active-dutygenerals in Sledgehammer completely broke with precedent. More recently, the AKP has taken it uponitself to exercise its constitutional right to make decisions on promotions for high-ranking members of the military something that no civilian government dared in the past. What was once consideredunthinkable for Turks across the country was now becoming a reality: The military, the self-proclaimedvanguard of the secular state, was becoming impotent as a political force.

While the AKP and Gulen movement already have de facto ownership of the countrys policeintelligence, they are also making significant inroads into MIT, the national intelligence service. Longdominated by the secularist establishment, MIT historically spent a good portion of its time keepingtabs on domestic political opponents like the AKP. The Turkish National Security Council in late Mayappointed 42-year-old bureaucrat Hakan Fidan as the new MIT chief. Though Fidan has both a civilianand military background, making him more palatable to the army and civilian government, hissympathies appear to lean heavily toward the AKP. This has not gone unnoticed by Israel, which haslaunched a campaign to defame Fidan in various media outlets, alleging that he would be more proneto sharing intelligence with countries like Iran. Notably, Fethullah Gulen publicly praised Fidan for hisprevious work as leader of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA),which works closely with the Gulen movement abroad. Fidan plans to increase MITs capabilities andfocus on foreign intelligence collection, allowing more room for the police intelligence (already underheavy AKP and Gulen influence) tooperate at home. By drawing a moredistinct line between foreign and domesticintelligence and shifting the MITs focusoutward, the AKP and Gulen movementare advancing their aims of usingintelligence as a foreign policy tool topromote Turkish expansion abroad whileslowly denying the secularists the abilityto use MIT for domestic espionagepurposes.

It has now become all the moreimperative for the military to maintain ahold on the security issues that still givethe armed forces some leverage againstthe AKP. The Kurdish question and thedispute with Greece over Cyprus top thislist, but even here the AKP is workingaggressively to take ownership of theseissues by recasting them as inherentlypolitical problems resolvable througheconomic development and diplomacy as opposed to military might. As long as Turkeys economyremains stable, the military simply does not have the popular dissatisfaction necessary to form acampaign against the AKP and Gulenist forces. The Turkish armed forces thus no longer have thepower exclusively to chart Turkeys political course, and whatever remaining power they have in thepolitical arena continues to slip by the day.

KAYHAN OZER/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan (L) with outgoing military chief Gen. Ilker Basbug and soldiers near the Turkey-Iraq border


11/18

11


Media and Business: Challenging the Secular Establishment

Controlling the Message

Turke ys media sits at the center of the countrys power struggle. Newspapers are the source of leaksthat have thrown generals in jails, courtrooms are filled with legal battles between media agencies andop-eds spar daily over which ideological direction the country should take.

The media is an especially potent tool in the Gulenist and AKP fight against the armed forces. The vastmajority of leaks in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer probes mysteriously emanated from a singlenewspaper, Taraf. Taraf was founded in 2007 as a paper for liberal democrats shortly before theErgenekon probe was launched. The Gulenists hail Taraf as Turkeys most courageous news outletfor its detailed coverage of Deep State. It printed everything from telephone transcripts of allegedcoup plotters to satellite imagery of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants crossing the Iraqi-Turkishborder to document alleged military negligence. While the Gulenists claim Tarafs success ininvestigative journalism is due to brave, disillusioned soldiers willing to leak information, others withinthe secularist camp suspect the transfers of sensitive information to Taraf have arisen due to years of successful infiltration of the armed forces by the Gulen movement.


12/18

12


Most of Turkeys predominantly sec ularist media, including the dailies Hurriyet, Milliyet andCumhurriyet, have been around as long as the republic itself. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however,Islamist forces began making their appearance in the media world through newspapers like Zaman,Star, and (since 2007) Sabah. Today, these newspapers have come to dominate the Turkish medialandscape, providing pro-AKP coverage. Even in the English-language arena, which is vital for theoutside world to monitor developments in Turkey, the Gulenist Tod ays Zaman is now outpacing thesecularist Hurriyet Daily News. The Gulenist-backed papers also have the benefit of a massive, well-organized social network to distribute newspapers for free, boosting their circulation. Meanwhile, thesecularist newspapers are increasingly finding themselves faced with a choice between pleading

political neutrality or fighting legal battles in the courtroom.

The most prominent media war in this power struggle is being played out between Dogan Media,owned by one of Turkey s leading business conglomerates, and Feza Yayincilik media group, withDogans Hurriyet and Fezas Zaman newspapers respectively at the epicenter of the battle. DoganMedia is extremely uncomfortable with the shift toward one-party rule under the AKP, and has publiclyproclaimed the need to balance against the rapid growth of pro-AKP/Gulenist news. After the Dogangroup devoted considerable coverage to a corruption scandal involving money laundering throughIslamist charities in Germany by senior members of the Erdogan government in 2008, the mediagroup soon found itself slapped with a $2.5 billion fine for alleged unpaid back taxes.

While tax fraud is relatively common in Turkeys media sector across the political spectrum, and Dogan

Media was no exception, suspicions run deep that Dogan was singled out as an example to othermedia of what can happen to a powerful business tycoon who challenges the AKP. Members within thepro-AKP/Gulenist media camp counter that Dogan got what it deserved, and cite the fining of thegroup as an example of a more democratic society that no longer shies away from punishing powerfuloffenders. At this point, Turkeys media battles intersect the corporate arena, where a quiet andbrooding competition is being played out between the old Istanbul elite and the rising Anatolian tigers.

Anatolia Takes on the Istanbul Business Elite

A handful of secular family conglomerates based in Istanbul have dominated Turkeys business sectorfor decades, serving as Turkeys economic outlet to the rest of the world. On the other side of thestruggle stand the millions of small- and medium-sized businesses with roots in more religiously andsocially conservative Anatolia. While the secular-nationalists still enjoy the upper hand in the businessworld, the Anatolian tigers are slowly gaining ground.

At present, the Turkish economy is dominated by names like Sabanci, Koc, Dogan, Dogus, Zorlu andCalik. Dogan Media occupies the staunchly secular niche of the business sector at odds with the AKPsIslamist-rooted vision, and has taken a public stand against the ruling party. Sabanci and Dogus alsobelong in the staunchly secular group, but tend to exhibit a more neutral stance in public toward theAKP for business reasons, such as avoiding the sort of legal battles Dogan has faced. Calik and Zorlugroups are far more opportunistic: They keep close political connections to the AKP to secure businesscontracts and tolerate the Gulen movement, though they are not considered true believers in theIslamist agenda. The last category consists of business conglomerates legitimately pro-AKP andGulenist, such as Ulker Group and Ihlas Holding.


13/18

13


The lines dividing Turkeys business, media andpolitics have become increasingly blurred overthe years. Sever al of Turkeys prominentbusiness conglomerates contain media outlets,and the AKP has worked to keep those mediaoutlets friendly, or at least neutral. Those thatoblige often obtain business deals with the state,while those that resist can find themselvesslapped with lawsuits or having to transforming

their newspapers into mostly apolitical tabloidsto avoid political pressure. Calik Group isperhaps the most obvious example of thecorporate benefits that can follow a healthyrelationship with the AKP. In April 2007, thestate-run Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF)seized Sabah news agency in a predawn raid onthe charge of fraud of its owner. Sabah isTurkeys second -largest media group; prior tothe raid, it was considered the strongest liberaland secular voice in the Turkish media. TheTMSF sold the group to Calik Holding in anauction in which Calik was the sole bidder, afterwhich Erdogans son -in-law became CEO of theagency. Loans from two state-owned banks(made allegedly at AKPs urging) and f rom amedia agency based in Qatar financed the deal.Today, Sabah is considered pro-AKP.

This intersection between politics and business can also be seen in the energy sector. The AKP has astrategy to boost four energy firms in the country that have aligned themselves with the ruling party.The firms are divided among Turkeys four main energy areas of interest: Ciners Park Teknik inRussia, SOM in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Inci in Iraq, and AKSA in Turkey. Park Teknik and AKSAare expected to work tog ether to pursue a deal with Russia to build Turkeys first nuclear power plant.

The AKP and Gulen movement lack theleverage the secularist-nationalists holdin the banking sector, but that has notstopped them from finding resources tofinance strategic projects, as the Sabahtakeover demonstrates. Banks such asTurkiye Is Bankasi -- created by Ataturkin the early days of the republic tomaintain a secular stronghold on thecountrys finances -- are difficult tocompete with, but state-owned ZiraatBankasi has increasingly become theAKPs go -to bank. Ziraat bank CEO CanAkin Caglar comes from a pro-AKP/Gulenist background. Prior tobecoming Ziraat CEO in 2003, he workedfor Turkiye Finans Bank, a knownconservative bank owned jointly by Ulkerand Boydak Groups. (Ulker is a staunchly pro-AKP/Gulenist business conglomerate.) Later, 60 percentof its shares were sold to Saudi Arabias National Commercial Bank in 2007. The Gulen movement alsodeposits much of the donations it receives with Turkiye Finans, now named Bank Asya.

ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan


14/18

14


The Gulenist Business Cycle

The AKP and Gulen movement recognize the lack of space for competition with the Western-orientedtrade markets ruled by Koc, Sabanci and the other secularist business elites. Instead, the Islamistforces have created their own business model, one that speaks for Anatolia and focuses on accessingmarkets in places like the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region.The drivers behind this business campaign are Turkeys Independent Industrialists and BusinessmensAssociation (MUSIAD) and Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), madeup of thousands of small- and medium-sized business owners. TUSKON has existed for just five years,but is slowly emerging as an alternative to the larger, and more well-established business associationslike Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association (TUSIAD), which represent big -name firmslike Sabanci, Koc and Dogan (and, which as expected, support the secularists).

As opposed to the Istanbul-entrenched secularist corporations, most businessmen who belong toTUSKON and MUSIAD hail from small, generally poorer and religiously conservative towns and citiesacross Anatolia. TUSKON is tightly linked into the Gulen movement and forms an integral part of theGulenist business, education, political and even foreign intelligence agenda. The business associationorganizes massive business conferences in various parts of the globe attended by high-level AKPofficials that aim to bring hundreds of Turkish businessmen into contact with their foreigncounterparts. While there are variations to how the Gulenist business cycle works, the following is abasic example:

A small-business owner from the eastern Anatolian city of Gaziantep makes a living manufacturing andselling shirt buttons. A Gulenist invites the buttonmaker to a TUSKON business conference in Africa,where he will be put into contact with a shirtmaker from Tanzania who will buy his buttons. TheTurkish buttonmaker and the Tanzanian shirtmaker are then incorporated into a broader supply chainthat provides both with business across continents, wherever the Gulenists operate. In short, theAnatolian buttonmaker can expand his business tenfold or more if he belongs to the Gulenist network.In return, the Gulen movement will ask the buttonmaker to provide financial support for thedevelopment of Gulenist programs and schools in Tanzania. The end result is a well-oiled and well-financed business and education network spanning 115 countries across the globe. Not only do thesebusiness links translate into votes when elections roll around, they also (along with the schools) formthe backbone of the AKPs soft power strategy in the foreign policy sphere.

Foreign Policy: Enabling the Rise

The Gulenist transnational network is a natural complement to the AKPs foreign policy agenda. Whilemany within the secularist and nationalist camp are highly uncomfortable with the notion of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism strategies that, in their eyes, brought about the collapse of the OttomanEmpire AKP followers embrace their Ottoman past and favor an expansionist agenda. As espousedby Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey is a unique geopolitical power, at the same timeEuropean and Asian, Middle Eastern and Central Asian, Balkan and Caucasian and straddling the Black,Caspian and Mediterranean seas. In the AKPs view, Turkeys potential is great, and though it shiesaway from the term neo - Ottomanism for fear of provoking an imperial image, it is di fficult to seeTurkeys current foreign policy as anything but a drive to return to its Ottoman sphere of influence.

Members of the secularist camp historically have dominated Turkeys Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Theycontinue to maintain a strong presence in Turkish embassies, since Turkish diplomats, as in manycountries, generally must serve an average of 20 years before they reach a position of influence. Butthis, too, is gradually shifting under AKP rule: Foreign Ministry sources report than an increasingnumber of graduates from Gulenist schools are being recruited into the diplomatic service. To helpspeed up the Islamist integration with the Foreign Ministry, the AKP-led government has passedlegislation to allow Turks to become ambassadors at younger ages lowered from 45 to 35. Turkeyhas also accelerated the opening of embassies in countries where the Gulen movement has a strong


15/18

15


presence. In 2009 alone, Turkey opened 10 new embassies, the majority of them in Africa. Thesecities included Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Accra (Ghana), Maputo (Mozambique), Antananarivo(Madagascar), Abidjan (Cote dIvoire), Yaounde (Cameroon), Luanda (Angola), Bamako (Mali), Niamey(Niger), NDjamena (Chad), Bogot a (Colombia) and Valetta (Malta). In addition, Turkey uses itsforeign policy arm to negotiate with countries across the Middle East, Eurasia and Africa to eliminatevisa restrictions and open up new markets for Anatolian businessmen.

The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) is also key to these foreign policy efforts. TheTurkish government created TIKA in the early 1990s to forge ties with former Soviet countries withwhich it enjoyed a shared Turkic heritage, though TIKA did not make much headway initially. The AKP,however, reinvigorated the TIKA in recent years for use as a public diplomacy tool, transforming it intoa highly active development agency. Davutoglu has even referred to TIKA as a second foreignm inistry. TIKAs development projects, particularly in Central Asia and Afr ica, overlap heavily with theGulen movement. As mentioned, Turkeys new national intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan who sharesthe AKPs vision for an expansionist foreign policy formerly headed TIKA.

Some Gulenists privately boast that their institutions abroad, whether schools, hospitals or other typesof developmental agencies, serve as useful intelligence satellites for the Foreign Ministry. If a problemerupts in a country in Central Asia, for example, where press freedoms are nonexistent andinformation is extremely difficult to come by, the Foreign Ministry can tap local Gulenist contacts forinformation and to facilitate government contacts. Gulenists abroad often learn local languages,

allowing them to act as Turkish translators. They have also developed close relationships with foreigngovernments through their work as well as their students, who often are sons and daughters of thelocal political elite.

Success in Image Control

AKP officials often deny Gulenist claims of serving as intelligence satellites for fear the AKP could beseen as pursuing a subversive global Islamist agenda. Indeed, some on the far left in Turkey havecharacterized the Gulen movement as a group of violent Islamist extremists ultimately aiming toimpose Shariah in Turkey. Though inaccurate, this view belongs to a fringe group within the secularistcamp that wants to reverse Turkeys trajectory.

For this reason, the AKP has made a considerable effort to pursue negotiations with the EuropeanUnion for full-fledged membership despite the high probability such talks are unlikely to leadanywhere. Poll numbers reveal how Turks increasingly are realizing that the chances of EUmembership have become a distant possibility. Yet the AKP cannot afford to allow that disillusionmentto seep into its foreign policy. Candidates for EU membership must have a modern economy, a militaryunder civilian control and an image of secularism. Privately, AKP officials agree that unanimous EUapproval for Turkish membership would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Butwere Turkey to drop its bid, turned its gaze solely toward Asia, and proceeded with a Pan-Islamicforeign policy, the party would have a much more difficult time arguing that it is not the threateningIslamist power the secularists have sought to paint it as being. Instead, the AKP and the Gulenistswant to portray themselves as having everything in common with the liberal, democratic values of theWest and that these very values have driven its efforts to bring the mili tary under civilian control.

Image control becomes especially important in Turkeys relationship with the United States.Conspiracy theories run rife in Turkey, and both sides of the power struggle will argue that the UnitedStates is backing on e faction against the other. For example, some secularists point to GulensPennsylvania residency and his political asylum in the United States as evidence the U.S.government supports the AKPs rise. At the same time, the Islamists will claim that the United Statesbacks the secularists, and provided covert support for the 2007 soft coup attempt by the secularist -dominated courts to ban the AKP. Despite these charges being contradictory, the AKP is veryconscious of the need to present itself as a nonthreatening, democratic power with an Islamistbackground capable of facilitating U.S. objectives in the Islamic world. This explains why, despite its


16/18

16


strong convictions that Israels actions against the Turkish aid flotilla were inexcusable, the AKP quiet lydispatched a delegation to Washington to mitigate some of the damage that was inflicted on the U.S.-Turkish relationship over the incident. Likewise, as the Gulen movement demonstrated in the wake of the flotilla crisis, the Gulenists will occasionally publicize their disagreements with the AKP on certainissues in an attempt to present their movement as a more compatible partner with the West.

Keeping Turkey s EU bid alive and relations with Washington on an even keel will thus help theIslamists undermine secularist efforts to portray the AKP in a negative light abroad. Though the AKPwill continue to keep a fair bit of distance from the Gulen in its dealings abroad to protect this image,the Gulenist transnational network undeniably gives the AKP economic reach, social influence andpolitical linkages vital to Ankaras foreign policy.

Judiciary: Neutralizing the High Courts

Whether the issue is headscarves worn in universities, media firms charged with tax evasion orsoldiers charged with coup-plotting, virtually every strand of Turkeys power struggle eventually findsits way to the courts.

The dividing line in the judiciary lies between the secularist-dominated high courts and the AKP-influenced low courts. This division results in a dizzying judicial system in which court rulings are oftenmired in political mayhem.

The high judiciary in Turkey is made up of the Constitutional Court (or Anayasa Mahkemesi inTurkish), the High Court of Appeals (Yargtay), the State Council (Danistay), and the High PanelSupreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The seven-member HSYK plays an instrumentalrole in the appointment of judges and prosecutors. In the current system, the HSYK is composed of the justice minister, the justice minister s undersecretary, three members appointed by Yargitay andtwo by Danistay. The secularists have long controlled the most powerful judicial institutions.

The headscarf controversy is perhaps the best illustration of the struggle between religious andsecularist forces in the judiciary. Turkeys secularist -dominated State Council has long barred Turkishwomen from wearing the headscarf in the public sector, making it difficult for religious females inTurkey to seek a university education or a career in the government, judiciary or state-run educationsystem. The AKP obtained sufficient votes for a proposed amendment in 2008 to lift the headscarf ban,but the secularist-controlled Constitutional Court annulled the proposed amendment four months laterin a non-appealable decision. Shortly thereafter, the two sides butted heads again when theConstitutional Court threatened to ban the AKP on the charge of being the focus of activities again stsecularism. The AKP escaped the ban, but at the cost of backing off from the headscarf ban for now.

Secularists continue to hold the upper hand against the Islamists in the judiciary. Through theirdominance of the high courts, the secularists hold the single most potent weapon in this struggle: Theability to ban political parties for violating the secular tradition of the state. The AKP is all too familiarwith this threat. The Constitutional Court has banned three AKP predecessors Milli Selamet Partisi(in 1980), Refah Partisi (in 1998) and Fazilet Partisi (in 2001) for becoming the focus of anti -secularist activities. Though the AKP is far more moderate in its approach than its predecessors, it

just barely escaped a ban in 2008 over the headscarf issue over the same charge. So far, each timethe court has struck the party, the AKP has come back even more resolute in its determination toundermine the secularists. Now, the AKP is ready to take on the judiciary with a package of constitutional amendments designed to strip the secularists of their judicial control.

With some modifications, this package of constitutional amendments calls for several critical changes.One is the restructuring of the Constitutional Court and HSYK, ending the secularis t monopoly andgiving the lower judiciary more clout. For example, the HYSK reforms call for increasing itsmembership from seven to 21, 10 of whom would be selected by 12,000 judges and prosecutors in


17/18

17


lower courts across the country where the AKP enjoys significant influence while five would beappointed by the president. Another calls for binding party dissolution cases to parliamentaryapproval, thereby neutering the highest courts ability to ban the party at will whenever the secularist -Islamist balance tilts toward the Islamists. This last resolution has not made it out of the parliament,though the AKP is sure to try again when the political climate is more conducive to success.

As expected, secularists in the high courts and the parliament with behind-the-scenes militarybacking strongly oppose these changes, charging that they will eliminate checks and balances in thegovernment. They also claim that the reforms are illegal, as Article 4 of Turkeys 1982 Constitutionstates that amendments to the first three articles of the Constitution articles which declare Turkey aTurkish-speaking, democratic and secular republic loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk cannot beproposed, much less implemented. Once again, both sides are seeking to seize the mantel of democracy, as the Islamists counter that an unelectable cabal runs the judiciary, and that theseconstitutional reforms are necessary to make Turkey more pluralistic and in line with Westernstandards of government.

The package of constitutional amendments got approval from the Constitutional Court and barelymade it through Turkeys parliament on May 7, with 336 votes in favor. While this passed the 330threshold needed for the government to put the proposals to a referendum, the parliamentary vote fellshort of the two-thirds majority needed to adopt the amendments without a referendum. The publicreferendum will be held Sept. 12, the anniversary of the 1980 military coup.

The battle lines are thus drawn, and thestruggle will be fierce in the monthsahead. AKP and Gulen leaders cannotclaim with confidence that thereferendum will pass, but if it does, theIslamists will establish the legalfoundation to accelerate their politicalrise. If the referendum collapses, thesecularists will retain the most criticalweapon in their arsenal to uphold theKemalist traditions of the republic. Even if the referendum fails, however, thestruggle will be far from over. The nextphase of the battle will be the 2011elections, which the AKP is counting on towin a supermajority in the parliament todraft an entirely new Constitution thatwould further cement its power. Followingthe flotilla crisis, the AKP is likely to havea more difficult time in trying to achievethis goal after seeing its response to theincident backfire both at home and abroad. The main opposition secularist parties, the PeoplesRepublican Party (CHP) and National Movement Party (MHP), were quick to seize the opportunity andblame the AKP for mismanaging the crisis and making Turkey appear reckless abroad. The post-flotilla

backlash, combined with a recent rise in PKK attacks, have even led the AKP to make concessions tothe secularist opposition, including a recent court decision to free some of those accused in theSledgehamme r probe. Still, even though the AKPs rivals have several opportunities at hand, they areno longer dealing with the AKP from an obvious position of strength. The struggle of the secularistsand the advent of the Anatolian masses is a factional feud that defies an easy resolution, but is anecessary component of Turkeys regional rise.

ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesA man holds a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in front of Ataturksmausoleum in Ankara


18/18

18

STRATFOR is the world leader in global intelligence. Our team of experts collects and analyzesintelligence from every part of the world -- offering unparalleled insights through our exclusivelypublished analyses and forecasts. Whether it is on political, economic or military developments,STRATFOR not only provides its members with a better understanding of current issues and events,but invaluable assessments of what lies ahead.

Renowned author George Friedman founded STRATFOR in 1996. Most recently, he authored theinternational bestseller, The Next 100 Years . Dr. Friedman is supported by a team of professionals withwidespread experience, many of whom are internationally recognized in their own right. Although itsheadquarters are in Austin, Texas, STRATFOR s staff is widely distributed throughout the world.

Barron s has consistently found STRATFOR s insights informative and largely on the money-as has thecompany s large client base, which ranges from corporations to media outlets and governmentagencies. -- Barron s

What We OfferOn a daily basis, STRATFOR members are made aware of what really matters on an internationalscale. At the heart of STRATFOR s service lies a series of analyses which are written without bias orpolitical preferences. We assume our readers not only want international news, but insight into thedevelopments behind it.

In addition to analyses, STRATFOR members also receive access to an endless supply of SITREPS(situational reports), our heavily vetted vehicle for providing breaking geopolitical news. To completethe STRATFOR service, we publish an ongoing series of geopolitical monographs and assessmentswhich offer rigorous forecasts of future world developments.

The STRATFOR DifferenceSTRATFOR members quickly come to realize the difference between intelligence and journalism. Weare not the purveyors of gossip or trivia. We never forget the need to explain why any event or issuehas significance and we use global intelligence not quotes.

STRATFOR also provides corporate and institutional memberships for multi-users. Our intelligenceprofessionals provide Executive Briefings for corporate events and board of directors meetings androutinely appear as speakers at conferences. For more information on corporate or institutionalservices please contact [email protected]
http://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.phphttp://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.phphttp://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.phpmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.php

turkey power struggle

Documents