ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation BoardSeptember 30, 1963

Barrera, J.

Dave Anastacio

SUMMARY: Aliens were charged with violating the prohibition on purchasing dollars without proper license from the Central Bank of the Phils. Warrants for their arrest were issued. They sought to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that the Deportation Board did not have jurisdiction to try the case. Lower court ruled that the Deportation Board had the authority to issue warrants and deport aliens. SC held that the Deportation Board has authority to deport, but not issue warrants of arrest.DOCTRINE: Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge.

FACTS: Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, of remitting them to Hongkong, and attempting to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments to evade prosecution. Following the deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing bond, Chee Gan et al. were provisionally set free.

Chee Gan et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board based on the grounds that the charge does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This was denied and so Chee Gan et al. filed with the court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. The court also issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against them until after the petition of habeas corpus was resolved.

After trial, the court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations to determine the aliens presence in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, since the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Chee Gan et al. appealed.ISSUES:

I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES

II. WON the President has the power to deport- YES

III. WON the President can delegate this power to the Deportation Board- YES

IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue warrants of arrest- NO

RATIO:

I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES

The charges constitute an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.

II. WON the Deportation Board has the power to deport- YES

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). This law, however, did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) reads:.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."

While this did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, the fact that a procedure was provided for the Presidents deportation of an alien-which was expressly exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the legislatures recognition of the Executives power to deport. Many court decisions sanction this executive power as well.

The deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

III. WON the President can delegate this power to the Deportation Board- YES

There is no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." Executive Order No. 33 of President Quezon created the Deportation Board to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation, and make the corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President.

IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue warrants of arrest- NO

Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613, does not provide the President with specific power issue warrants of arrest. It must be why President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, requiring the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent. It was only on when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation.

Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the President's power to deport relies, does not provide for the power to arrest, but the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation.

In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation.

The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution.

RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.Commissioner Vivo v. Hon. MontesaJuly 29, 1968

JBL Reyes

alycatSUMMARY: The Calacday boys came to the Philippines from Hong Kong, seeking Filipino citizenship. It was found that they were the sons of one Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. However, Isaac Calacday confessed that the boys were not his sons (although such confession was later retracted). Commissioner Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, for them to be brought before the Commissioner so they may show cause why they should not be deported. The Calacday boys filed a civil case before the CFI (with Hon. Montesa as judge) to prohibit their deportation. The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday boys without giving them a chance to be heard. The SC held that the CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys. Nevertheless, the issuance of warrants of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights.DOCTRINE: The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. The Commissioner of Immigration has no power to authorize the arrest of the subjects of a deportation proceeding whose illegal entry or offense has not yet been established.

FACTS:

Private respondents, seven males surnamed Calacday (Lets call them the Calacday boys haha) arrived in the Philippines from Hong Kong in 1959. Upon their arrival, they sought admission as Filipino citizens.

A board of special inquiry found them to be the legitimate sons of Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. The Calacday boys were thus admitted into the country, the Bureau of Immigration issuing each an identification certification as a Filipino citizen.

Isaac Calacday confessed that the Calacday boys were not his sons. However, he later retracted his confession, claiming that he was only angry at them for not giving him money.

Commissioner of Immigration Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, stating in their warrants their deportability under the Philippine Immigration Act. The warrants directed any immigration office/ officer to bring the Calacday boys before the Commissioner, for them to show cause why they should not be deported. One was arrested (Manuel), the others remained at large.

The Calacday boys filed a civil case before the Court of First Instance (with Hon. Montesa as judge) a civil case praying for three principal reliefs: (1) to restrain the arrest of those who have not been arrested; (2) to release Manuel; (3) and to prohibit the deportation of the Calacday boys, as they are Filipinos.

The Commissioner questioned the propriety of the remedy of prohibition, insisting that habeas corpus is the proper one.

The CFI invoked its general jurisdiction, which includes prohibition, on the ground that habeas corpus would be proper only as to Manuel, who had only been arrested, but not the others.

The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday boys without giving them a chance to be heard.

ISSUE:

1. Does the CFI have jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys? NO

2. May the Commissioner of Immigration issue warrants of arrest? NO

RATIO:

The CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the immigration authorities, due to the Philippine Immigration Act.

Porta Perez v. Board of Special Inquiry This case was not one where Philippine citizenship was admitted or conclusively appeared, to respondents were allowed to continue proceedings that had already begun by them until they have determined whether or not petitioners were aliens.

Miranda v. Deportation Board A mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case.

When the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, deportation proceedings had already been started but not yet completed. The Board of Commissioners had not yet rendered any decision. The Calacday boys were then, not yet being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision as to deportation, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the Calacday boys. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review.

The CFI misapprehended the import of the warrants issued. The warrants required that the Calacday boys be brought to the immigration authorities to show cause why they should not be deported, and not to be deported per se. There was no case of summarily arresting and deporting.

The Calacday boys have submitted to the Court documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship, but the proper procedure would be for them to submit these documents as evidence to show cause why they should not be deported.

Nevertheless, the issuance of warrants conflicts of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights. The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively.

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board The EO prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens only required the filing of a bond by an alien, but did not authorize his arrest.

Morano v. Vivo The Bill of Rights does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation.

There is no reason why the cautionary bond requirement of the EO should not apply to deportation proceedings. Such notice and bonds suffice to ensure the subjects appearance at the hearings. But as long as illegal entry or offense of the Calacday boys has not yet been established, their arrest upon administrative warrant violates the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: The writ prayed for is granted, and the order of the CFI set aside.

Santos v. Commissioner Bureau of Immigration

November 29, 1976

Fernando, J.

saiSUMMARY: Lucio Santos filed petition for habeas corpus because he was detained by virtue of the order of Commissioner. Lower Court granted his release. Commissioner appealed stating that lower court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is the deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportationDOCTRINE: As in the case of Qua Chee Gan, Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. . Commissioner could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation."

FACTS:

(Application for habeas corpus was filed by Lucio Santos, who was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally.

(Lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. Commissioner asked the lower Court for 3 days within which to submit his written return which was granted and the hearing was set anew for January 25, 1966

(January 21, 1966, Commissioner filed his return to the write of habeas corpus which stated that Santos is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King; that petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration; that deportation proceedings against him were pending hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry; that he had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country; that based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that he is a Chinese because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship.

(Commissioner also claimed that the lower Court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is the deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation; and that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

( Lower Court however ordered the release Santos upon posting of P5000 bond without passing on the issue of citizenship. The deportation proceeding was still pending at the time of this order and release was provisional.

( Commissioner appealed

ISSUE: Whether the power of the President to conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest.In the Qua Chee Gan whose ponente was Justice Barrera this was answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested." ( It should not escape attention that under the present Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of "probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan. Commissioner could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation." Such was not the case here.

DISPOSITIVE: LC affirmedHarvey v. Defensor-Santiago

June 28, 1988

Melencio-Herrera

Paolo Q. Bernardo

SUMMARY: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adrian Van Elshout were foreign naitonals who were apprehended from their respective residences in Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of orders issued by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.

In a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and detain the three petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.

2) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.

3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

DOCTRINE: "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

FACTS:

Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman (both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna), and Adrian Van Elshout, (Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna) were apprehended from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of

orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.

Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were three among 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two days after apprehension, the other 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for self-deportation, leaving the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa.

Seized were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown ing salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the

sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.

Warrants of Arrest were issued by Defensor-Santiago against the three for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against the latter.

The three petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that

their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, Defensor-Santiago ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that the three petitioners were healthy. A Petition for Bail filed by the three was denied by respondent considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy.

Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special Inquiry allowed provisional release of five days under certain conditions.

However, it appears that on the same date that the Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In the petition, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

4) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and detain the three petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.

5) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.

6) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

ISSUES: WON the arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were valid.

RATIO:

1. Yes. The arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were valid.

a. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not.

i. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.

Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof."

ii. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedur further provides that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5)

b. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.

i. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.

ii. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that prior formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens. Warrants of arrest were issued against them thereafter. A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal.

That the three petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. They were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners. had committed "pedophilia."

iii. At any rate, the filing by the three petitioners of a petition to be released on bail is considered a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.

c. The Court noted that the specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.

d. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the [1935] Constitution" is not invocable herein.

e. Commissioner Defensor-Santiago's Warrant of Arrest did not order the three petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, prior deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

f. "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

g. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

h. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

RULING: The Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. The warrants of arrest ordered by CID Commissioner Defensor-Santiago are valid.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs. HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CIDJuly 13, 1989

Fernan, C.J.

Borile

SUMMARY:

Lucien Tran Van Nghia, a French immigrant, was arrested because of a complaint filed by his landlord accusing him of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress." Commissioner Liwag ordered his arrest without a warrant of arrest. Nghia filed the case for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and his arrest. SC ruled that his arrest was legal. Even if arrest was illegal subsequent events cured the illegality of his arrest such as his release and initiation of formal deportation proceedings.

DOCTRINE:

- The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

- What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

FACTS: - Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national who came to the Philippines as a temporary visitor, but his status was later changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.

- On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly Nghia's landlord, accusing Nghia of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress."

- Liwag issued a mission order to a team of 7 CID agents for them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report."

- CID agents went to Nghia's residence in Sta. Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but Nghia and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents.

- The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the WPD. Once again Nghia adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. Finally, Nghia was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office.

- A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on the same day but there is nothing in the records to convince the SC that said warrant was served on Nghia prior to his apprehension.

- Nghia's counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of Nghias detention by respondent CommissionerISSUES:

1. WON the arrest and detention of Nghia by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation proceedings legal. YES RATIO: 1. The SC held the arrest to be valid saying that the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. Argument of Nghia: Liwag has no power, authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce ... ."

SC Answer: (Note: Im directly quoting the SC decision since the SC only quoted from another SC decision and Im doubting the ratio of this case because its inconsistent with other cases. Compare Qua Chee, Vivo and Salazar case vs Harvey and this case.)

The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago,G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988, where the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:

The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.R. No. 10280, September 30,1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that 'under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution)), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation.

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. ... .

The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. BUT even assuming that the arrest of Nghia was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest.

Firstly, Nghia was no longer under confinement because he was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court.

The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule.

This case is different from the case of Moncupa vs. Enrile, supra, where the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister because it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews to members of the mass media without official permission. He was also ordered to report regularly to the military authorities. There was still restraint although not physically.

Nghia was not similarly restrained.

Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against Nghia before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if any) against Nghia's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO

March 14, 1990

Sarmiento, J

Denn

SUMMARY: Tesoro, charged her manager Salazar with illegal recruitment. When the POEA found out the Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment agency, its Administrator Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order. The team tasked to implement said Order went to Salazars residence and confiscated assorted costumes. Through a letter, Salazar was asking for the return of the confiscated items, alleging that the seizure was contrary to law for being a violation of her right to privacy, and for being done without giving her prior notice and hearing. Before the POEA could answer, Salazar filed a petition for prohibition. The SC held that the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) may not validly issue search or arrest warrants.

DOCTRINE: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar with illegalrecruitment (Salazar was Tesoros manager. When she returned to the Phil. from Japan, Salazar allegedly failed to give her back her PECC Card.). Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent Salazar a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after finding out that Salazar had no license to operate arecruitmentagency, public respondent Administrator TomasAchacosoissued him the challenged Closure and Seizure Order. The Order informed Salazar of the closure of his recruitment agency and of the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means ofcommittingillegalrecruitment, it having verified that Salazar has (1) No valid license or authority from the DOLE torecruitand deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/arecommittingacts prohibited under Article 34 LC in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to Salazars residence (in Mandaluyong). They found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering, they served the order to a certain Mrs. FloraSalazar, who voluntarily let them in. Flora informed them that Hannalie was accredited with Moreman Development. However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes, which were duly receipted for. Salazar filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of theseized properties, on the ground that the seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner. She alleged that: (a) she was not given prior notice and hearing, (b) seizure violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and (c) the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.Before POEA could answer, Salazar filed the instant petition (while the POEA filed a criminal complaint against her).PRESENT CASE: for prohibition; concerns the validity of the power of the Sec. of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Art. 38 LC (prohibiting illegal recruitment). Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, the SC considered the petition as one forcertiorariin view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? - NO

RATIO:

Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. (Art. III, Sec.2)

Ponsica v. Ignalaga: mayors may not exercise this power. This power which was previously given to mayors was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution.

The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA: neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. Art. 38(c) LC, as now written, was entered as an amendment by PD Nos. 1920 and 2018 of Marcos, to PD 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers.

PD 1693: the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers (to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment). PD 1920 (May 1, 1984): with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment, it gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers (to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in illegal recruitment). PD 2018 (Jan. 26, 1986): gave the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well (to order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in illegal recruitment).SC RULING: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, SC declared Article 38(c) LC unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

On SolGen's reliance on the case ofMorano v.Vivo

SC: Reliance not well taken. Vivoinvolved a deportation case, governed by the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by the Immigration Law. SC has ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid.It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs.

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."

Justice Johnson: when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them".

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified.

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

On the nature of the seizure order

SC: The search and seizure order in question, assuming that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. A warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, SC reaffirmed the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

RULING: Petition granted. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. DELA ROSAMay 31, 1991

Bidin, J

DiwataSUMMARY:

William Gatchalians grandfather was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. A year after, William Gatchalian arrived in the Philippines. Upon his entry, there was an issue as to his exclusion as a Filipino Citizen and an order of exclusion and a warrant of arrest were issued. But not long after, his exclusion was reversed and he was reaffirmed as a Filipino citizen.

But 17 years after being readmitted, the NBI charged him with violations of the Immigration Act. Pursuant to this, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. What is relevant in the SCs decision is the propriety of the Commissioners issuance of the warrant of arrest. The SC declared the issuance of the warrant of arrest as unconstitutional and Gatchalian was declared a Filipino citizen.

DOCTRINE:

A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional

The constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

FACTS:

Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian.

A year after, William, then twelve years old, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

A month after, the Board of Special Inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen. Such included the case of William.

The Board of Commissioners then reversed and ordered the exclusion of William. A warrant of exclusion was issued and thereafter, a warrant of arrest. The case reached the Acting Commissioner who affirmed William as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrants of arrest.

Seventeen years after, upon request by the NBI, the Secretary of Justice charged William with violations of the Immigration Act of 1940. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. William posted a cash bond for his release.

William filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with the RTC to enjoin the deportation proceedings. The TRO was granted.

ISSUES: 1. W/N RTC and not the CA has jurisdiction

2. W/N the arrest of Gatchalian follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion

HELD: 1. YES, RTC has jurisdiction because Bureau of Immigration is not a quasi-judicial agency2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order

RATIO: (There are several issues in the case which made it reach 68 pages on iPad. But I will skip the ratio on the irrelevant issue)

1. SKIPPED

2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order

a. Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940

i. The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alienb. Hence, in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutionalc. Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board: "The constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

d. A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of William Gatchalian. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to: xxx xxx xxx

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code; xxx xxx xxx

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .

e. Argument of Commissioner: Arrest was based on the warrant of exclusion

f. SC: The argument has no leg to stand on. The exclusion order wasnt mentioned in the warrant of arrest

g. In fact, the Board of Special Inquiry, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner recommending the reconsideration of the decision excluding Gatchalian as Filipino citizen. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of xxx reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."

h. Eventually, then Acting Commissioner admitted Gatchalian as Filipino citizens; recalled the warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The above order admitting Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of William Gatchalian.

i. Dissenting opinion of Davide and Feliciano proposed the re-opening of the question of citizenship.

j. Majority: The records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Williams grandfather had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. The Commissioner do not even question the grandfathers Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this case.

k. Furthermore, the Commissioners position is not enhanced by the fact that Gatchalians arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.

i. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act: deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."

l. In this case, the cause of action and deportation against Gatchalian arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner only 28 long years after. It is clear that the cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced against William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

DISPOSITIVE:

Gatchalian is declared a Filipino Citizen. Commissioner is enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings.

DAVIDES CONCURRING-DISSENTING OPINION

This is quite long but the relevant portion about arrest is here.

Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503).

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not apply.

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;

Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry.

Hence, Davide disagrees with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription

FELICIANOS DISSENTING OPINIONThis is also long but the relevant portions on arrest are the same points that Davide raises. The other importants points made are here.

What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the Government, what was at stake was the right to

exclude from the country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation. Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of origin. This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had already physically gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained physical entry.

Camara v. Municipal CourtJune 5, 1967

White, J.

Jadd Dealino

SUMMARY: Inspectors of the San Francisco Dept. of Public Healths Division of Housing Inspection sought to examine Camaras premises due to it being used for residential purposes despite the buildings occupancy permit not allowing such use. The inspectors were never armed with a search warrant. Eventually, Camara was charged with refusal to permit a lawful inspection in violation of the Citys Housing Code. Camara filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. The California Superior Court denied the petition. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Courts denial. The Supreme Court of California denied Camaras petition. The US SC vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of California.

DOCTRINE:

1) Generally, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.)

a. Exception: Frank v. Maryland (The Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.)2) Warrantless administrative searches are significant intrusions upon interests protected by the 4th Amendment, and will be subjected to scrutiny by the Court, particularly as to reasonableness and whether there is an emergency or not.

FACTS:

November 6, 1963: An inspector of the San Francisco Dept. of Public Healths Division of Housing Inspection entered an apartment to make a routine annual inspection (for possible violations of the Citys Housing Code.)

The buildings manager informed the inspector about Camaras residential use of a portion of the building.

The inspector sought to make an examination of Camaras premises on the ground that the buildings occupancy permit did not allow residential use. Camara refused on the ground that the inspector did not have a search warrant.

November 8, 1963: The inspector returned (again, with no search warrant.) Camara refused to allow an inspection.

Subsequently, a citation was mailed ordering Camara to appear at the District Attorneys Office. Camara failed to appear.

November 22, 1963: 2 inspectors returned to Camaras apartment, informing him that he was required by law (Sec. 503 of the Housing Code) to permit an inspection. Again, Camara refused to allow them to conduct an inspection as they did not have a search warrant with them.

Subsequently, a complaint was filed against Camara, charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of Sec. 507

Camara was arrested and eventually released on bail. He sought to interpose a demurrer, but this was denied. He filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.

ISSUES:

1) WON the arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendment

2) WON inspections should only be conducted when the inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a violation.

ARGUMENTS OF CAMARA: Sec. 503 is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendments.

1) It authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists.

2) Therefore, Camara may not be prosecuted under Sec. 507 for refusing an inspection that is unconstitutionally-authorized by Sec. 503.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS: Used the cases of Frank v. Maryland and Eaton v. Price:

1) Sec. 503 does not violate the 4th Amendment as it is part of a regulatory scheme that is essentially civil, not criminal in nature.

2) It creates a right of inspection that is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.

RATIO: 1) Yes. The arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendmenta. The Court discussed the 4th Amendments.

i. It safeguards the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.

ii. It expresses a right which is basic to a free society (Wolf v. Colorado).

iii. The 4th Amendment is enforceable against the States through the 14th Amendment (Ker v. California)

iv. The general rule is that a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.)

v. Generally, the right to privacy and when it must yield is to be determined by a judicial officer (Johnson v. US)

b. The Court discussed the case of Frank v. Maryland which was relied upon by the District Court of Appeals.

i. Frank v. Maryland: The Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.

ii. The majority in that case upheld the conviction as, in its view, municipal fire/health/housing inspections, at most, touch upon the periphery of interests safeguarded by the 14th Amendments protection against official intrusion.

1. Such inspections merely determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with the minimum standards in local ordinances.

2. The inspector does not ask the property owner to allow a search for evidence of criminal action, so what is only involved is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy (i.e., less hostile.)

3. Such inspections are designed to be as non-demanding as possible, and that the standard of reasonableness will always guide the inspector. These relate to policy, so those granting warrants should act as rubber stamps at most.

4. Finally, public interest demands that such inspections are allowed.

iii. The Court agrees that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than a policemans search for evidence, but the 4th Amendment interests at stake in such cases are not merely peripheral.

1. Even the most law-abiding citizen could have their security threatened by criminal entry masquerading as an officially-sanctioned search.

2. These inspections jeopardize self-protection interests of property owners.

a. Criminal processes are used to enforce most regulatory laws, both with regard to refusal to comply and refusal to permit inspections.

iv. The Court states that the arguments of inspections being non-demanding and being guided by the standard of reasonableness unduly discount the purpose of the warrants.

1. Presently, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing thing such as the necessity of the inspection, the lawful limits, and the authorization. The only way to contest these is by refusing entry.

2. Practically, the occupant is left to the discretion of the person conducting the inspection.

v. The argument of public interest begs the question of whether such inspections may be made without a warrant. The threshold question is whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search (Schmerber v. California). There has been no showing that fire/health/housing code inspections cannot be made without a warrant.

2) No. Inspections do not have to be conducted only when the inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a violation.a. The standard of reasonableness is what is tested against the standard of probable cause in issuing a warrant under the 4th Amendment.b. Therefore, it is important to look at the government interest being advanced.c. In this case, city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards is the objective, to prevent the unintentional development of conditions detrimental to public health and safety.i. There is strong opinion that the best way to achieve universal compliance is through periodic inspections. This is where the probable cause aspect might appear, since the agencys decision to inspect is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole.d. Several factors support the reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections.i. Judicial and public acceptanceii. Public interest demands that dangerous conditions be dealt with, yet the effectiveness of other area canvassing procedures is doubtful. Some conditions cannot be seen from outside, necessitating an inspection.iii. There is a limited invasion of privacy since the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovering evidence of a crime.e. When public health and safety are involved, the nature of probable cause is different from that in criminal cases.f. Area inspections are reasonable searches of private property within the 4th Amendment. Probable cause takes the form of legislative/administrative standards.3) Despite what has been said, there are exceptions to the need for warrants as to searches, such as unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccination, summary destruction of tubercular cattle, etc. Routine area inspections do not fall within this exception of emergency.RULING: Judgment VACATED.

SEE v. SEATTLEJune 5, 1967

Mr. Justice White

Krissy

SUMMARY: See refused to allow access to his commercial warehouse without a warrant a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department for inspection pursuant to Seattles Fire Code. He then was charged and convicted under 8.01.050 of said Code. The US SC reversed his conviction and held as violative of the 4th Amendment said entry without a warrant.

DOCTRINE: The 4th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. This rule applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. When an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the 4th Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. The agencys particular demand for access will be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

FACTS: An inspection of appellant Sees locked commercial warehouse was conducted by a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattles Fire Code. Appellant refused the inspector access thereto, hence he was arrested and charged with violating 8.01.050 of the Code:

INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards."

Appellant: 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize warrantless inspection of his warehouse, would violate his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON: Convicted Appellant for refusing to permit the representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed therein.

ISSUES: WON the inspection of appellants warehouse without a warrant is violative of his 4th Amendment Rights. ( YES

RATIO: Camara v. Municipal Court (applicable): The 4th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. This rule applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences.

SC of Washington: The US Supreme Court has applied different standards of reasonableness to searches of dwellings than to places of business. 8.01.050, which includes the interiors of dwellings, establishes a reasonable scheme for the warrantless inspection of commercial premises pursuant to the Seattle Fire Code.

SC: There is no justification for relaxing 4th Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises.

A search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. Such right is placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.

Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to enforce a variety of regulatory laws; thus, entry may permit inspection of the structure in which a business is housed, of business products, or a perusal of financial books and records.

Another common investigative technique is the administrative subpoena of corporate books and records, wherein warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises.

When an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the 4th Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to conduct all reasonable inspections of such documents which are contemplated by the statute, but it must delimit the confines of a search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena. In addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.

Minimal limitations on administrative action are constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial establishment. The agencys particular demand for access will be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. The basic component of a reasonable search under the 4th Amendment that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure is applicable to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellants locked warehouse.

RULING: Supreme Court of Washington reversed.

Mr. Justice Clark, Dissenting:

Frank v. Maryland: the power to inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few.

The Majority set up a new test for the long-recognized and enforced 4th Amendments probable-cause requirement for the issuance of warrants. They would permit the issuance of paper warrants in area inspection programs with probable cause based on area inspection standards as set out in municipal codes and with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing magistrate this degrades the 4th Amendment.

Reasonable inspections are constitutionally permissible and in fact imperative for the protection of health, safety and welfare of the millions who inhabit the cities and towns. The inspection in this case meets the 4th Amendments test of reasonableness and is consistent with its commands. Nothing suggests that the inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper purpose, or designed as a basis for criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of any discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action affecting the appellant in either case.

The Majority says that under the present system, the occupant has no way of knowing the necessity for the inspection, the limits of the inspectors power, or whether the inspector is authorized to perform the search.

All of the doubts raised by the court could be resolved very quickly. Inspectors all have identification cards which they show the occupant and the latter could easily resolve the remaining questions by a call to the inspectors superior or, upon demand, receive a written answer thereto. These cases were based on the 4th Amendment, not on any of the circumstances surrounding the attempted inspection. Inspections of this type may be made without a warrant. This has been done so for over a century and a half and it is a little late to impose a death sentence on such procedures now. In most instances, the officer could not secure a warrant such as in Sees case thereby insulating large and important segments of our cities form inspection for health and safety conditions.

In entry-to-inspect situations where consent is necessary, inspections are most likely going to be denied and would place an intolerable burden on the inspection service. The economics of the situation (immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct possible defects) will force this result.

Majority: As to the propriety of warrantless area inspections, the basis for the probable cause for area inspection warrants begins with the 4th Amendments reasonableness requirement; in determining whether an inspection is reasonable, the need for the inpsection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement. There are a number of persuasive factors: long acceptance historically, great public interest in health and safety, and the impersonal nature of the inspections not for evidence of crime but for the public welfare. Probable cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. These standards will vary according to the code program and the condition of the area with reference thereto rather than the condition of a particular dwelling. Warrants may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry.

Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the search warrant? This will not only destroy its integrity but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. It will be very costly to the city in paperwork incident to the issuance of the paper warrants, in loss of time of inspectors and waste of the time of magistrates and will result in more annoyance to the public. It will also be more burdensome to the occupant of the premises to be inspected. Under a search warrant the inspector can enter any time he chooses. Under the existing procedures he can enter only at reasonable times and invariably the convenience of the occupant is considered. It destroys the health and safety codes as they apply to individual inspections of specific problems as contrasted to area ones. While the latter are important, the individual inspection is often more so.

Ocean Steam Navigation Company v. StranahanJune 1, 1909

White, J.

Francis

SUMMARY: Ocean Steam paid the collector of customs the fine established in Section 9 of the Alien Immigration Act. Ocean Steam challenged the constitutionality of such provision arguing that it defines a crime and gives executive officials the power decide whether it has been committed and inflict punishment without judicial trial against due process of law.

DOCTRINE: When Congress sees fit to further promote the U.S. policy to forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused. When the section is enlightened by an analysis of the context of the act and by a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, its various sections accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the act should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. By a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, it no doubt that the sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided. Congress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide the enforcement of laws in regard thereto to administrative officers. It is within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.

FACTS: Ocean Steam Navigation Company sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The money was paid under protest, and involuntarily because if it did not pay, the collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships which would have caused not only grave public inconvenience from the non-fulfilment of mail contracts and entailed serious pecuniary loss consequent on its failure to carry out many other contracts. Both the Secretary and the collector were expressly authorized by Section 9 of the Act entitled An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States. The act excludes from admission into the United States those afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease.

Section 9 provides: 'That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company other than railway lines entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or the owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease; and, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury( now Secretary of Commerce and Labor) that any alien so brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time, such person or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars for each and every violation of the provisions of this section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be remitted.

Ocean Steam Navigation Company argues that Section 9 of the immigration act of 1903 violates the Constitution relating to the judiciary and violates the Constitutional provision relating to the taking of property without due process of law because it authorizes the taking of property without judicial trial. It is also argued that such Act is repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment.

ISSUES: Whether or not the power conferred upon Secretary and the collector was consistent with the Constitution.

RATIO: Yes. Resting, as the statute does, upon the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control the coming in of aliens into the United States, and to regulate that subject in the fullest degree, it may not be doubted that it is not open to discussion that the statute, was within the power of Congress to enact

Repeated decisions of the U.S. SC have determined that Congress has the power to exclude aliens from the United States; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come in; to establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers; that the deportation of an alien who is found to be here in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and that the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury have no application.

We regard it as settled by our previous decisions that the United States can, as a matter of public policy, by congressional enactment, forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory, and can, in order to make effectual such decree of exclusion or expulsion, devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting the persons included in such decree, and causing their deportation, upon executive or subordinate officials.

When Congress sees fit to further promote the U.S. policy to forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.

But, in so far as the case of Wong Wing held that the trial and punishment for an infamous offense was not an administrative, but a judicial, function, it is wholly irrelevant to this case, since, on the face of the section which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose the exaction, it is appa