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Malaga vs. Penachos Jr.

Facts: Iloilo State College of Fisheries through its Pre-qualifiecation, Bids and Awards Committee caused the publication in the Nov. 25, 26 and 28 1988 issues of the Western Disayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was December 2, 1988 at 3’o clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Maria Malaga and JosieeleenNajarro, respectively doing business under the name of B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their documents at two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occena submitted on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as they were considered late as having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 o clock in the morning of December 2, 1988

On December 12, 1988 petitioner filed a complaint claiming that they have submitted their documents on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. The plaintiffs argued the inapplicability of PD 1818 which state that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order xxx, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order stating that ISCOF was within the coverage of PD 1818

ISSUE: WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818

HELD: Yes, first, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development of the State; second, the Treasurer of the RP shall also be the ex-officio treasurer of the State College, third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the State College such apparatus, equipments etc. and lastly, an additional amount of P1.5 Million has been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. There are two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and awarding of the project. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and then changed these deadlines without prior notice; second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to bid 30 days before the date of the bidding if the estimated project cost was between P1M and 5M in order to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favouritism, collusion and fraud.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the restraining order as not covered by the Prohibition of PD 1818

De la Llana vs. Alba

[GR 57883, 12 March 1982]En Banc, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs with condition, 7 concur in separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion

Facts:: De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition (considered by this Court as an action for prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Ministerof Justice from taking any action implementing Batas PambansaBlg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

Issue: Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbentJustices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.

Held: The BatasangPambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardlydistinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court.

Removal is,of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, itwould be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judgesare concerned, the Supreme Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need beentertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisoryopinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its say prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where thematter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departuretherefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberalinterpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing theinferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. Thechallenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to thosepredisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that inthe choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to bepreferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act toavoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas PambansaBlg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from actingwithin the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutionalsystem we have adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is acardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which agovernment is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certainpowers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in thelanguage of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. Thelaw may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to

enable them to perform his functions and fulfillhisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution.

TIO VS.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential DecreeNo. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogramindustry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code providedthat:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject tosalestax.""Section 10.Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, theprovince shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale,lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shallaccrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be sharedequally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videogramsincluding,among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced theoperations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendanceby at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and othertaxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in

government revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180Million in taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. Itwas imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was alsoan objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 asunconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there isno question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant filmpiracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified andunreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments arevirtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage inbusiness."WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

US.vs. ANG TANG HO

Delegation of Power – Admin Bodies

On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A which prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

Held: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official

arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.

EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

Marcos v. Manglapus

FACTS: It is a case of a dictator President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return to the Philippines to die.

But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Issue: 1 .Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines has international precedents?

2. Whether or not the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the Marcoses?

HELD: NO, The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it

is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]

On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."

[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]

It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

2.NO.The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Petition is Dismissed

CARINO vs. CHR

Adjudicatory Power of the CHR

On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Carino vs. CHR

• Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the LiwasangBonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they

suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers

constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

LLDA vs. CA

Facts: On March 8, 1981, the Task Force CamarinDumsite of our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a complaint with the Laaguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in tala Estate due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate (liquid that has percolated through soil or other medium). The LLDA found that the city government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, as required under PD 1586 and clearance from LLDA.

On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER. However, sometime in Aug. 1992, the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting among the city government of Caloocan and LLDA failed to settle the problem.

ISSUE: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a “cease and desist” order under RA No. 4850

HELD: Yes, the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of RA no. 4850 and other relevant environmental laws cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of its injunctive powers. As an administrative agency, it has powers that are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.

The issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by the LLDA is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amending law. The charter of LLDA as stated in RA 4850 Section 4(d) is the power to institute “ necessary legal proceedings against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program with the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/ OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners ,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICOL.RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.

G.R. No. 73140May 29, 1987

Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner sappeal on a technicality.

Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG

Ostrand, J

Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)

FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by

the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action

HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.

The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

Araneta vs. Gatmaitan

GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957

Felix, J.

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and CamarinesNorte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.

Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80

2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President

HELD:

1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.

YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under egislative

authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS: The respondents were charged withzh violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power

People vs. Maceren

G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977

Aquino J.

Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlitodel Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.

Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

BAUTISTA vs. JUINIO

Police Power

The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 — the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 — is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from ”[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday.” 2 Motor vehicles of the following classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (c) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars

This Court gave due course to the petition requiring respondent to answer. There was admission of the facts as substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that the ban starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and as to the mention of a Willy’s Kaiser jeep being registered in the name of a certain TeresitaUrbina, about which respondents had no knowledge. There was a denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy (H) and

extra heavy (EH) on the other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of equal protection and the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of due process. The answer likewise denied that there was an undue delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. There was also a procedural objection raised, namely, that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an adjudication of a case or controversy.

It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear. Thus: “[Whereas], developments in the international petroleum supply situation continue to follow a trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies within the foreseeable future; [Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability of the country’s economy and sustain its developmental growth; [Whereas], to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative to adopt a program directed towards the judicious use of our energy resources complemented with intensified conservation efforts and efficient utilization thereof; . . ..” What is undeniable is that the action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed.

In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one’s property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: “To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.’”

Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al

“Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others

Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.

HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990

Sarmiento, J.

The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.

ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS

Gancayco, J.

Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines

Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.

Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees

HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

CIR vs. CA

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation

GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power

HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health…,safety and general welfare of the people.

US VS. PANLILIO

The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaous to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR;

GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006

FACTS:

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National

Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be

known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former

President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the

number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.

Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in

the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.

Sec. 3.Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby

amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable,

Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic,

charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already

operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this

Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall

be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations,

the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act.

ISSUE:Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by Courts

HELD:Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and

the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies

before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial

function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks

to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its

quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative

power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the

Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such

concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and

importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are

special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering

said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are

accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20][21]

Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of

prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition

is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling

matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in

the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an

ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation

that “respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined by the trial

court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

Blas Oplevs Ruben Torres et al

Executive Power – Administrative Orders &The Administrative Code

On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System". The late Senator Ople averred that the said AO is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the people’s privacy and that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislature’s power to legislate laws. Blas opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of the nature of a law hence it is beyond the president’s power to issue such. He filed a petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al countered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office; confers no right; affords no protection and imposes no duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the president is an encroachment of the functions of the Legislature.

HELD: As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Upon these precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

Sec. 3.Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. An AO is not a law. In here, AO 308 partakes the nature of a law hence it is beyond executive power. Only the legislative can enact such a law of general effect.-

PSDSA vs. De Jesus

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks

FACTS: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.

In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD: Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against

petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC¶s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.

ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon

petitioner

HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission¶s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to

Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.

ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner

HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Philippine Lawyer¶s Association vs. Agrava

Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.

On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training.

ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included

in the practice of law

HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles.

Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi- judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.

GUEVARA vs. COMELEC

Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct

contempt proceedings

HELD: NO.Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

AngTibayvs Court of Industrial Relations

Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates AngTibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in AngTibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

CASE DIGEST ON SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]

November 10, 2010

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC

Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.

The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.

3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

Issues:

1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply

lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:

a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).

b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action,& the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint& levy of

the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)

c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty

No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.

Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.

Abejo v dela Cruz.

F: Case involves a dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc. (Pocket Bell), a "tone and voice paging corporation," namely, the spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo vs. De la Cruz Abejo (hereinafter

referred to as the Abejos) and the purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Telectronics) of their 133,000 minority shareholdings (for P6 million) and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her (for P1,674,450.00), and the spouses Agapito Braga and Virginia Braga (hereinafter referred to as the Bragas), erstwhile majority stockholders. With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of the outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell. Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and those of its nominees. Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas, refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia Byaga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. This triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the protagonists, all centered on the question of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the Securities and Exchange Commission, while the Abejos and Telectronics, as new majority shareholders, claim the contrary. Respondent Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the order which dismissed the complaint of the Bragas in the RTC, thus holding that the RTC and not the SEC had jurisdiction. Respondent judge also revived the temporary restraining order previously issued restraining Telectronics' agents or representatives from enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions.

The Abejos filed a MR, which motion was duly opposed by the Bragas, which was denied by respondent Judge.

I: W/N the RTC, as claimed by the Bragas, has jurisdiction over the case or the SEC, as claimed by the Abejos

H: The Court ruled that the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell, namely, the Abejos and Telectronics, the purchasers of the 56% majority stock on the one hand, and the Bragas, erstwhile majority stockholders, on the other, and that the SEC, through its en banc Resolution of May 15, 1984 correctly ruled in dismissing the Bragas' petition questioning its jurisdiction, that "the issue is not the ownership of shares but rather the nonperformance by the Corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording transfers of shares of stock of the Corporation of which he is secretary." The SEC ruling upholding its primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute is correctly premised on, and fully supported by, the applicable provisions of P.D. No. 902-A

which reorganized the SEC with additional powers "in line with the government's policy of encouraging investments, both domestic and foreign, and more active public participation in the affairs of private corporations and enterprises through which desirable activities may be pursued for the promotion of economic development and, to promote a wider and more meaningful equitable distribution of wealth.” The dispute at bar, as held by the SEC, is an intracorporate dispute that has arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate secretary, backed up by his parents as erstwhile majority shareholders, to perform his "ministerial duty" to record the transfers of the corporation's controlling (56%) shares of stock, covered by duly endorsed certificates of stock, in favor of Telectronics as the purchaser thereof. Mandamus in the SEC to compel the corporate secretary to register the transfers and issue new certificates in favor of Telectronics and its nominees was properly resorted to therefore.

The very complaint of the Bragas for annulment of the sales and transfers as filed by them in the regular court questions the validity of the transfer and endorsement of the certificates of stock, claiming alleged preemptive rights in the case of the Abejos' shares and alleged loss of the certificates and lack of consent and consideration in the case of Virginia Braga's shares. Such dispute clearly involves controversies "between and among stockholders," as to the Abejos' right to sell and dispose of their shares to Telectronics, the validity of the latter's acquisition of Virginia Braga's shares, who between the Bragas and the Abejos' transferee should be recognized as the controlling shareholders of the corporation, with the right to elect the corporate officers and the management and control of its operations. Such a dispute and case clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC to decide, under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A.

Insofar as the Bragas and their corporate secretary's refusal on behalf of the corporation Pocket Bell to record the transfer of the 56% majority shares to Telectronics may be deemed a device or scheme amounting to fraud and misrepresentation employed by them to keep themselves in control of the corporation to the detriment of Telectronics (as buyer and substantial investor in the corporate stock) and the Abejos (as substantial stockholders-sellers), the case falls under paragraph (a). The dispute is likewise an intra-corporate controversy between and among the majority and minority stockholders as to the transfer and disposition of the controlling shares of the corporation, falling under paragraph (b) of Sec 5 PD 902-A. As pointed out by the Abejos, Pocketbell is not a close corporation, and no restriction over the free transferability of the shares appears in the Articles of Incorporation, as well as in the bylaws 10 and the certificates of stock themselves, as required by law for the enforcement of such restriction. As the SEC maintains, "There is no requirement that a stockholder of a corporation must be a registered one in order that the Securities and Exchange Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to enforce his rights as such stockholder." This is because the SEC by

express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations" and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the Corporation Code, among which is the stock purchaser's right to secure the corresponding certificate in his name under the provisions of Section 63 of the Code.

An intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.

Bernardo v. Abalos

GR No. 137266

FACTS: Antonio Bernardo, et al filed a criminal complaint against Benjamin Abalos, Sr. and Jr., and others for vote buying in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. They alleged that the Abaloses sponsored an outing for the public school teachers who were also registered voters and members of the Board of Election Inspectors in Mandaluyong City, several weeks before the elections were to take place. Abalos Sr. also allegedly delivered a speech promising the said teachers hazard pay and an increase in their allowances of a total of P3,000.00.

The COMELEC issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC for the nullification of the COMELEC’s Resolution, citing that it was issued with apparent grave abuse of discretion. The petition was filed without first submitting a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ failure to file the required motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC is fatal to their cause.

HELD: YES. Petitioners’ failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. A petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners’ instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court.

RATIO: A petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally

cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.

GSIS vs. CSC

According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the CSCS, she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide.

Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.

Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC.

In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988.the Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit Systems Board has the function to “Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system.”

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409

clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:

SECTION 9.Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:

j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.

Paat vs. CA

FACTS: The truck of private respondent De Guzman was seized by DENR personnel because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed on the truck. Petitioner Layugan( Community Environment and Natural Resouces Officer) issued an anoder of confiscation of the truck and gave de Guzman 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. De Guman failed to submit the required explanation. Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained Petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. De Guzman filed a suit of Replevin with RTC. Petitioner filed an MD. RTC dismissed the MD and MR, which the CA affirmed. Petitioner assailed the Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies while the Respondent states that the doctrine does not apply because 1. Due process was violated and seizure and forfeiture was unlawful because (a) DENR Sec. and his representatives had no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utitlized in transporting illegal forest products. And 9b) trucks were not used in the commission of the crime

ISSUE: 1. WON without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an action for replevin may prosper?

2. WON the DENR Sec. and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favour of the govt.

HELD: 1. No, the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction tat such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The exception to the general rule is that 1. When there is a violation of due process; 2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question; 3.When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 4. When there is estoppels on the part of the admin agency concerned; 5. When there is irreparable injury. 6. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the the president bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9.When the subject matter is a private land case proceeding; 10 when the rule does not produce a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and 11.When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial proceedings.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by the for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A if the PD 705, as amended

2 Yes, Section 68 and 68-A of PD 70, as amended by EO 277. The secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the code or other forest laws, ruled and regulations.

Petition is granted.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte

[GR 74930, 13 February 1989]

En Banc, Cortez (J): 13 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion

Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro

replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, OswaldoCarbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the BatasangPambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to BatasangPambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct BatasangPambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were

therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

MANGUBAT vs. OSMENA

PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Regional Chairman, Special Task Force on Environment and Natural Resources (STF-ENR) of Region 8, Tacloban City, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Leyte, Branch 34, and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tacloban City, Respondents.

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C. Tabao, Assistant City Prosecutor of Tacloban, in his capacity as Regional Chairman of the Region 8 Special Task Force on Environment and Natural Resources, against (1) Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the Leyte Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of

judicial authority, and willful disobedience to settled jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar of the Leyte RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in the performance of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private individual, violation of Section 1(b) and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The records of this case reveal the following facts.

On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the name M/L Hadija, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of around 100 tons of tanbark. Due to previous irregular and illegal shipments of tanbark from Bongao, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the shipments accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain Robert Hernandez.

The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and consequently they ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. The tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. No. 705, [1 the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines (as amended), against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadija, Robert Hernandez, TandicoChion, Alejandro K. Bautista, and Marcial A. Dalimot. Bautista was a forester while Dalimot was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Tacloban City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, [2 along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutors Office of Tacloban City.

In an order dated March 6, 1998, [3 complainant directed the seizure by the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the three trucks pending preliminary investigation of the case. DENR thus took possession of the aforesaid items on March 10, 1998, with notice to the consignee Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR. The case was raffled off to Branch 34 of said court and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296. On March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. [4 Respondent sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal logging. He points out that this is a well-settled issue and cites several decisions [5 of this Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter. He argues that respondent judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this issue, particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Complainant submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them. But he avers that it is respondent judges duty to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.

Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the following reasons: (1) the defendants in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should have alerted respondent judge to the possibility that the items sought to be recovered were being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and (2) the complaint for replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting documents, which should have made respondent judge suspect that the same were being held by authority of law.

As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar, complainant states that it was incumbent upon Aguilar to safeguard the M/L Hadija and prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. However, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriffs gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties, according to complainant. As of the time of the filing of the complaint, according to complainant, the whereabouts of the vessel and its crew were unknown.

Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez on March 20 and 21, 1998, or within the five-day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ. Complainant argues that the tanbark formed part of the peoples evidence in the criminal complaint against Hernandez and the others. By his act, respondent sheriff effectively altered, suppressed, concealed, or destroyed the integrity of said evidence. For this act,

complainant contends that respondent sheriff may be held liable under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders. [6 Respondent sheriffs acts also constitute gross irregularity in the performance of his duty as a court employee.

Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998. This period included the dates he was supposed to have released the tanbark to Hernandez. Complainant contends that respondent sheriff not only unlawfully released the tanbark, he also made it appear that he was not physically present when such act was done.

In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred this administrative matter to both respondents for comment.

In his comment dated October 12, 1998, [7 respondent judge calls the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator to a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case that effectively prevented him from commenting on the issue. The discussions that would have to be included in the comment, he says, would also resolve the pending motion to dismiss. Respondent judge contends that complainant should have been prudent enough to wait for the resolution of the motion to dismiss before filing the instant administrative case.

Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296. He only learned of the criminal case from an urgent manifestation dated March 20, 1998, filed by complainant. He argues that he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the urgent manifestation.

Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court. He also points out that said writ was issued provisionally and was not intended to be the final disposition of the replevin case.

Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross ignorance of the law is premature since he has not made a ruling yet on the motion to dismiss filed in the replevin case. He contends that it was too much to ask from him to take note of the fact that the defendants in said case were officials of DENR and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover, respondent judge submits that while the complaint alleged that the cargo of tanbark was intercepted by the NBI, it also alleged that the consignee thereof produced documents to prove that the shipment was legal.

In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment. Neither did the DENR issue a seizure report. Respondent judge contends that the validity of the seizure of

the subject items by the DENR is a matter that will have to be resolved in relation to the motion to dismiss.

For his part, respondent sheriff submits [8 that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard precisely to prevent the departure of the subject vessel, since he does not have the means to physically prevent said vessel from sailing. The Coast Guard commander should have examined the vessel and its crew after being served the writ, to determine whether or not they were engaged in any illegal activity.

Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board the vessel when he served the writ on the Coast Guard. He verified the cargos status with DENR, which furnished him a copy of a fax transmission stating that the tanbark came from legitimate sources except that the shipment documents were not in order. [9

Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary. He argues further that since the items subject of the writ are in the custody of the court and could be disposed of only through court order, there could not be any unwarranted benefit to a private individual as claimed by complainant.

Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not covered by either an NBI apprehension report or a DENR seizure report, respondent sheriff contends that complainant should have taken steps to protect the integrity of the shipment instead of heaping blame upon others for his own negligence. Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his intention to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, contrary to complainants claim.

Respondent sheriff refutes complainants claim that he was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998, and alleges that it was complainant who was absent from court hearings on several occasions, in violation of his duty as a prosecutor.

Respondent submitted two supplemental comments dated October 30, 1998, [10 and May 3, 1999, [11 (1) reiterating his contention that the tanbark seized by the DENR and subject of the replevin case had been found to come from a legitimate source, per an order signed by the Regional Director (Region 8) of the DENR, [12 and (2) informing the OCA that the main replevin case was dismissed per an order of respondent judge dated November 27, 1998. [13

As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24, 2001, the parties herein separately manifested that they are willing to have the present case resolved based on the record on hand.

We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA, after reviewing the case, recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the

law. At the same time, the OCA recommended that the charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for the amount of the fine to be imposed on said respondent judge.

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. [14 It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and appropriate action. [15 A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the complaint as Annex D. [16 To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. [17 Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. [18 The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in the commission of the offense.

In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:

the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. xxx[19

Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. [20 Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands

constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

We find, however, that respondent judge had already vacated the Writ of Seizure he issued on March 19, 1998, in a subsequent Order dated November 27, 1998, dismissing the Civil Complaint for replevin filed by Robert Hernandez against the Regional Director of the DENR and other officers. He also directed in said order the sheriff to return to CENRO, Tacloban City, all the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ of Seizure. [22

Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of the Writ, dated December 15, 1998, had already delivered to CENRO the 102 tons and 120 kilos of tanbark duly receipted by CENRO representative Marcial A. Dalimot on the same date. [23

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00. Under the circumstances, considering that this is the first complaint against him, we deem a fine of P10,000.00 to be sufficient.

Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his ministerial duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with its mandates. [24

WHEREFORE , respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is hereby found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.00, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation

GR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975

Fernando, J.

FACTS:

Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to MactanInterantional Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line applied for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination

HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.

KBMBPM vs. Dominguez

GR No. 91927, January 13,1992

Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos’ successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas PambansaBlg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental, directsdcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccced the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.

On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid

2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available

HELD:

1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. HERVILLA

G.R. No. 75501 September 15, 1987

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs Hon. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary, and ASTERIO BUQUERON, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the decision rendered by public respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President, reinstating and confirming the decision dated April 17, 1978 of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences, and setting aside the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources.

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973, private respondent AsterioBuqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder.

Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post.

During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on

the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.

After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17, 1978, the dispositive portion of which reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondent (Buqueron) is hereby given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims, except the area covered thereby which is in conflict with adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII Fr." Adverse claimant (Atlas) on the other hand, is given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the area covered by its "Master VII Fr." case.

Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a decision dated November 10, 1978, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the derision of the Director of Mines dated April 17, 1978, should be, as hereby it is, set aside. In lieu thereof, it is hereby decision that the "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims of AsterioBuqueron are null and void, that the "Carmen I Fr. " to "Carmen V. Fr. " mining claims of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation are valid, and that it be given the preferential right to possesses, explore, exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby. (Decision, Office of the President; Rollo, pp. 52-57; Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, Rollo, pp. 47-51; Comment of Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 88-90; Decision, Director of Mines, Rollo, pp. 157-160).

As aforestated, on further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.

Hence, this petition.

Briefly stated, petitioner's assignment of errors may be combined into the following issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of the President was time-barred;

(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims.

The Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment in the resolution of October 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 76). Both private respondent and public respondent filed their respective comments on November 17, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 81-86; pp. 88-95).

On December 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 104) this Court required the respondents to file a rejoinder to the consolidated reply filed by counsel for petitioner dated November 4, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 97-102). Said rejoinder was filed on February 6, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 108-111), by the Solicitor General for public respondent, after which petitioner filed a sur-rejoinder thereto on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 113-116). Thereafter the Court in the resolution of March 30, 1987 gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their respective memoranda.

Counsel for public respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion praying to be allowed to adopt its comment dated November 2, 1986 and Rejoinder dated February 4, 1987 as the memorandum for public respondent. Petitioner filed its memorandum on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 136).

The petition is devoid of merit.

I.

It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources dated November 10, 1978 on November 27, 1978 and that under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision of the Minister is appealable to the Office of the President within five (5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the 5-day period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private respondent filed his appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.

Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time and therefore, the Office of the President did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and should have dismissed the same outright (Rollo, pp. 20-21).

This contention is untenable.

Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that at the time of the filing of the questioned appeal, Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Section 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended.

The same law provides:

Section 31.Pretermission of holiday. — Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this Court in accordance therewith has invariably held that in case the last day for doing an act is a legal holiday, it does not have the effect of making the preceding day, the last day for doing the same; the act may be done on the next succeeding business day (Gonzaga vs. Ce David, 110 Phil. 463-464 [1960]; Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247

[1952]; Austria, et al. vs. The Solicitor General, et al., 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).

Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after December 2,1978 was December 4, 1978 — a Monday, it is evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on time.

II.

It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (AngTibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]).

In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioner claimed that it is a registered surface land owner and locator of six (6) lode claims duly registered with the Office of the Mining Recorder as above stated and that in derogation of its permission, caused the "table" location and survey and applied for the lease of his alleged mining claims known as "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr. " lode claims.

In his answer, private respondent denied the material allegations of the adverse claim and by way of affirmative defense alleged that all of petitioner's claims including a portion of Master VII Fr. are null and void for having been located in areas which were closed to mining location in open and gross violation of paragraph 1 (d) of Section 28 and of Section 60 of the Mining Act as amended.

The main thrust of petitioner's claim is that all of the mining claims of both petitioner and private respondent are located inside the premises or properties of the former, so that it is hardly possible for private respondent to have conducted the requisite location and survey without having been seen or noticed by petitioner and its personnel.

The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of mining claims of petitioner and private respondent and that as a matter of record petitioner's mining claims were registered subsequent to those of private respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which was registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to the registration of the mining claims of private respondent.

In ruling as to who, between the parties shall be given preferential right to lease the area in question, the Director of Mines' findings are as follows:

Adverse claimant in its attempt to impugn the validity of the mining claims of respondent alleged that said mining claims were the result of table locations and survey and in support thereof submitted the sworn statements of its Chief Geologist and Chief Security.

On the other hand, respondent asserted that he, through his authorized representative actually and validly performed all the acts of discovery and location required by law and the field survey of his mining claims was actually conducted by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen from December 16 to 18, 1974. In support of this assertion, respondent submitted in evidence affidavit of the authorized agent (Annex "D" of the answer) and another affidavit of Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen (Annex "F" of the answer). Respondent also submitted in evidence Bureau of Forestry map and Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey map of the total area (Exhs. "9" to "10") which embraces the area in question. These maps tend to prove that the Atlas main gate is not the only point of ingress and egress such that one can enter the area in question for the purpose of mining location and survey without being noticed by any of the personnel of Atlas.

After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and cognizance as we are of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to nullify the prior claims of respondent. Stated differently, the evidence submitted are not sufficient to destroy the prima facie character of the sworn declarations of location of respondent's mining claims which were duly registered on the date herein before stated. Thus "A location notice certificate or statement when re-examine accorded is prima facie evidence of all the facts the statute requires it to contain and which were sufficiently set forth" (40 C.J. pp. 811-812) and constitute notice to all persons and to the whole world of the contents of the same (Sec. 56 of the Mining Act, as amended).

It is, therefore, pertinent to quote hereunder Sections 28(d) and 60 of the Mining Act, as amended, as well as Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 99-A:

SEC. 28 — No Prospecting shall be allowed:

(d)-In lands which have been located for mining leases by other prospectors under the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 60. — No valid mining claim or any part thereof, may be located by others until the original locator or his successors in interest abandons the claim or forfeits his rights on the same under the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 1 — Whenever there is any conflict between claim owners over any mining claims whether mineral or non-mineral, the locator of the claim who first registered his claim with the proper mining registrar, notwithstanding any defect in form or technicality, shall have the exclusive right to possess, exploit, explore, develop and operate such mining claims. ...

In the light of the aforequoted provisions of law applicable on the matter, and in view of our findings, earlier discussed, the subsequent mining claims of adverse claimant insofar as they conflict the prior claims of respondent are hereby declared nun and void.

On the other hand, it is also our view that respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the prior claim of adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null and void. Considering that this mining claim is prior in point of location and registration, it follows that this claim will have to prevail over that of respondent. For the same reason, therefore, that the subsequent claims of adverse claimant were declared null and void insofar as they conflict with the prior claims of respondent, the mining claims of respondent insofar as they conflict with "Master VII Fr." claim of adverse claimant are likewise declared null and void. (Decision, Director of Mines; rollo pp. 157-160).

As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by the Office of the President.

However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings because of the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review (Rollo, p. 18).

This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding (L-21588-Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. vs. Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [1967]), where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 [1986]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines vs. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).

A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify

the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 (1992)

• power of administrative control

• power of executive control

FACTS:Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO. RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

ISSUEs: Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

• Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD: Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed

upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”

Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas

INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES vs. SINSUAT

National Development Co. Vs. Collector of Customs

Facts: The collector of customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp and Company informing it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it carried on unmanifested cargo of one RCA Victor TV set 21” in violation of Sec 2521 of the Tarriff and Customs Code

C. F. Sharp and Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A.V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who answered the notice stating that the TV set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further, “if this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing. The collector of customs replied to Rocha stating that the TV set in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explaanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 2521of the Tarriff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5000 on the vessel and ordeered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the CFI, which was granted.

ISSUE: WON the requirements of administrative due process have already bee complied with

HELD: No, Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the TV set complained is not a cargo that needs ti be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tarriff and Customs Code. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed the vessel the huge fine of P5000. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process.

True is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tarriff and Customs Code, are not judicial in nature, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregared but should be observed. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated by this court in the AngTibay case.

The decision appealed from is affirmed.