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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | Dean Carlota | A2010 Digests (Updated by B2013) 270

I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION INC. v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

70 PHIL 221

LAUREL; June 26, 1940

NATURE

Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS

- For the past 20 years, Pangasinan Transport has been engaged in the business of transporting in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission).

- August 26, 1939 PTI applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. This was granted by the Public Service Commission with the following conditions (which are written in a beautiful language called Spanish so you may refer to the original text in the case if there is a lack of confidence in my translation ^_^):

- That the certificates of authorization issued to Pangasinan Transport would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation

- That the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition.

- October 9, 1939 PTI did not agree with the conditions set by PSC so it filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the latter.

- November 20, 1939 - The present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that:

- An order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in the case.

- After hearing, the Court should render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void

- If this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision should be rendered declaring that the provisions are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939.

- Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 states that no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission and that the Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.

ISSUE

WON the conditions set by the Public Service Commission were valid (as mandated by Commonwealth Act 146)

HELD

YES but a remand of the case was ordered

Reasoning

- The condition that the Commission can acquire PTI is a restatement of the constitutional provision that the State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.

- PTI assails the condition that the certificates will be valid only for a period of time. This should be construed with the mandate that the Public Service Commission should issue certifications with the public interest in mind. Thus the period for validity is established in relation to promoting and safeguarding public interest.

- Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years."

- When it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to this constitutional mandate.

- All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner."

- The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. The Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." This is in accordance with all other previous laws (such as the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill) on the matter.

- Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.

- Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.

- However the Court ordered a remand of the case.

- The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience.

- On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence.

Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs.MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY TRANSPO

57 PHIL 600

MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932

FACTS

-Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."

-Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

- Manila Electric now asks the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies

ISSUE/S

WON the members of the SC has legal right to act as board of arbitrators

HELD

NO

- Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.

-The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

-The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.

Disposition The members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE

23 SCRA 405

REYES JBL; April 29, 1968

NATURE:

Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction

FACTS:

Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."

On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE: WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.HELD:

NO

- section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.

- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.Disposition Writs denied, petition dismissedGARCIA v MACARAIG39 SCRA 106

BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971

NATURE

Administrative complaint

FACTS

-Respondent Judge Macaraig was appointed to one of the newly created CFI branches in Laguna, in 1970. At the time of appointment, he was Chief of the Technical Staff of the DOJ, receiving salary therefrom.

- After confirmation of his appointment by the COA, respondent judge took his oath of office on June 1970. However, due to several delays in securing the court sala (unavailability of funds for office equipment and supplies, trouble securing the space for the courtroom due to objections and disagreement over price), he never had the chance to actually perform the functions of a district judge. After realizing that it might take sometime before he could actually begin hearing cases in his court, he decided to apply for an extended leave of absence. The Sec. of Justice, however, asked him to forego his leave and, instead, requested him to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, which he accepted.

- Having taken his oath as District Judge and, drawing salary as judge but without performing his functions as such, respondent was charged by Paz Garcia for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge.. .gross incompetence, violation of RA 296, particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58 thereof.

ISSUE

WON respondent is guilty of the allegations

HELD

No.

Reasoning He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of these laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making.

***While the SC dismissed the complaint, it nevertheless expressed the opinion that it did not look with favor the long standing practice of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts, stressing the principle of separation of powers. The Court was of the opinion that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty or violation of his oath of office as district judge as it was not altogether his fault that he could not actually perform his functions as presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna. Under the circumstances he was placed in, he made himself available to the DOJ to assist the Secretary, using his experience as technical assistant in said office. Disposition Administrative complaint DISMISSED.IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

166 SCRA 106

PADILLA; October 5, 1988

NATURE

Request for the issuance of a SC Resolution on the appointment of Judge Manzano as a member of the Prov. Committee on Justice

FACTS

-On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

- An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are:

-- Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

-- Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

- It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

- Furthermore, it is provided that The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

HELD

- Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions

- Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

- in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

Disposition The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

GUTIERREZ, dissenting:

- The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

- Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.

- "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

- membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

-The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their work.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:

- What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.

- The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions.PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR.

113 SCRA 31

Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982

NATURE

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747

FACTS

On May 14,1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Some named on the left list of elected officials may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.

(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.

The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the ConstitutionHELD

1. NO.

Ratio

Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, reads: SEC. 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction.

before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,

or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,

or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Reasoning

Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

In brief, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

ARTICLE VII, 1987 Constitution

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER

MACALINTAL v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

405 SCRA 693

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., July 10, 2003

NATURE

Petition for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS

-Macalintal as taxpayer avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

-He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.

-It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. [RELATIVE NI JAT?-hehe] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

- The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making power, to wit:

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. -

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

. . . . . . . . .

is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.

-The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.

ISSUE

Whether or not Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD

NO.

RATIOOnce a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.-By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

REASONING Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.-However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.

-The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."

-Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that "[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.

-The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

-By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law - the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.

-The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

-Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.

-During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to ADOPT THE SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO AS PART OF THE PONENCIA ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 17.1, 19 AND 25 OF R.A. NO. 9189 INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO THE CREATION OF AND THE POWERS GIVEN TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE.

Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"

b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"

c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, concurring and dissenting::

The resolution of the issue entails a two-tiered discussion of the: (1) whether Congress has oversight functions over constitutional bodies like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its oversight functions.Separation of powers and checks and balances

The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of government. This principle dates back from the time of Aristotle but the "modern" concept owes its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings of political philosophers including Locke and Montesquieu. Their writings were mainly reactions to the ruinous struggle for power by the monarchs and the parliaments in Western Europe.

-The Constitution divided the powers of our government into three categories, legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically sealed" from one another, the powers of the three branches are functionally identifiable. In this respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the law; executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the absence of specific provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle of separation of powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the power of the other.

-Justce Puno locates the concept of congressional oversight in the grand scheme of checks and balances under the doctrine of separation of power.

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

-Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

-The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. Among the most quoted justifications for this power are the writings of John Stuart Mill and Woodrow Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative Government, Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers objectionable; and to censure them if found condemnable." Wilson went one step farther and opined that the legislatures informing function should be preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that "[E]ven more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion."

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.

-Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress. Under the Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to Congress. The President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before the appropriation committees of Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a program of administration for the succeeding fiscal year. During budget hearings, administrative officials defend their budget proposals.

-The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded. Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the usual means of reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous appropriation to ascertain whether they have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an appropriation act. The consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the lawmakers to express their confidence in the performance of a Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their disgust or disfavor of the continuance in office of a bureaucrat. Congress can even curtail the activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds.

-But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

-This provision originated from the Administrative Code and was later elevated to the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in the work of the legislature."

-Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the organization of a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system. Consent of the Commission on Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the following positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b) ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose appointments are vested with the President under the Constitution.

-Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the appointing power of the executive. Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political considerations in the appointment of officials in sensitive positions in the government. It also provides Congress an opportunity to find out whether the nominee possesses the necessary qualifications, integrity and probity required of all public servants.

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, viz: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.-But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution, congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

-American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of Congress to conduct investigation has been adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v. Nazareno, decided in 1950, when no provision yet existed granting Congress the power to conduct investigation. Upholding the power of the Senate to punish Arnault for contempt, the Court ruled as follows:

-Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not frequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . The fact that the Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.

-The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session.

-The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a witness can not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But the Court explained that "the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation." The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

-Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault invoked the right against self-incrimination "is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety." It noted that since Arnault himself said that the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, there is therefore no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person would incriminate him. It held that it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his liability, thus:

. . .[T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. . . The fact that the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.[

-As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights.

-In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, this Court held that the senate committee exceeded the permissible exercise of legislative investigation because there was nothing in Senator Enriles speech which indicate that it is in aid of legislation.

-The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each House. In the House of Representatives, an inquiry may be initiated or conducted by a committee motu proprio on any matter within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of all its Members or upon order of the House of Representatives through:

(1) the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a request or demand for the conduct of an inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon motion of the Majority Leader or his deputies; or

(2) the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an inquiry reported out by the Committee on Rules after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an inquiry by such committee: Provided, That all resolutions directing any committee to conduct an inquiry shall be referred to the Committee on Rules; or

(3) the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee, after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of inquiry by such committee, of a petition filed or information given by a Member of the House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker: Provided, That such petition or information shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon which it is based, and accompanied by supporting affidavits.

-The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or information requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint sub-committees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the committee as a whole is authorized to perform, except to punish for contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be conducted. The inquiries are to be held in public except when the committee or sub-committee deems that the examination of a witness in a public hearing may endanger national security. In which case, it shall conduct the hearing in an executive session.-The Rules further provide that "the filing or pendency of a case before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies shall not stop or abate any inquiry conducted to carry out a specific legislative purpose." In exercise of congressional inquiry, the committee has the power "to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker." Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish for contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant inquiry; (d) refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of the Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence of the committee; or (f) unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings.

-Nevertheless, any person called to be a witness may be represented by a counsel and is entitled to all rights including the right against self-incrimination.

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

-Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.

-The legislative veto was developed initially in response to the problems of reorganizing the U.S. Government structure during the Great Depression in early 20th century. When U.S. President Hoover requested authority to reorganize the government in 1929, he coupled his request with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint Committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its consideration." Congress followed President Hoovers suggestion and authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. Although the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has since been renewed several times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Various American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115 Reorganization Plans, 23 of which were disapproved pursuant to legislative veto provisions.

-Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:

It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.

-Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.] They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

-Given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight, the next level of inquiry is whether congress exceeded its permissible exercise in the case at bar. But before proceeding, a discussion of the nature and powers of the Commission on Elections as provided in the 1987 Constitution is decisive to the issue.

Congressional Oversight and COMELEC

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body exclusively charged with the enforcement and administration of "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," and is invested with the power to decide all questions affecting elections save those involving the right to vote.

-Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage, the COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Originally, the power to enforce our election laws was vested with the President and exercised through the Department of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco, however, the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.

-Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of the COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of government. While the President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the President in the discharge of their functions. They have a fixed tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To ensure that not all Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one time, a staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold office for seven years, three for five years, and the last three for three years. Reappointment and temporary designation or appointment is prohibited. In case of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. The COMELEC is likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure,] and to appoint its own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service laws.

-The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. This Court has no general power of supervision over the Commission on Elections except those specifically granted by the Constitution. As such, the Rules of Court are not applicable to the Commission on Elections. In addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion.

-The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can in case of other agencies under the executive branch. The reason is obvious. The COMELEC is not a mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from the Constitution.

-Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto power or congressional oversight power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional. The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our election laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.DOUBTLESS, IF ITS RULE-MAKING POWER IS MADE TO DEPEND ON STATUTES, CONGRESS MAY WITHDRAW THE SAME AT ANY TIME. INDEED, THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION ENVISIONS A TRULY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED TO ENSURE FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS, AND TO SERVE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PEOPLE'S SACRED RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE THE CITIZENRY'S VITAL WEAPON IN EFFECTING A PEACEFUL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AND IN ACHIEVING AND PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY. [ BSJ: This statement of Puno supports the notion that in the Philippines, there is such thing as a legislative veto albeit there is no express constitutional provision using the term LEGISLATIVE VETO. He limits the notion of legislative veto to powers conferred by statute or delegated powers. When a power is conferred by the Constitution itself such as the COMELECs rulemaking power, it is already beyond the ambit of legislative veto]The elevation of the COMELECs power to promulgate rules and regulations in the 1987 Constitution is suffused with significance. Heretofore, it was Congress that granted COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and hence, Congress can withdraw or restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review and approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred power because Congress can veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known as subordinate legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional.

Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered with.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING; SALVADOR T. CARLOTAAdministrative agencies have proliferated in recent years. Administrative agencies are endowed with significant rulemaking and adjudicative powers and make decisions that affect both public interest and private rights. To confer both rule making powers and adjudicatory powers seem to run counter the principle of separation of powers. But recent developments and the complexities of contemporary society has left us with no choice but to adopt a more hospitable interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers that can accommodate the existence of administrative agencies within our constitutional system.

-Their creation is directed towards the regulation of sensitive areas in social and economic relations but the exercise of the powers vested upon them is constantly attended by arbitrariness or abuse of discretion, thus the need and the development of mechanisms of control over these agencies.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Power of Creation, Appropriation, and Investigation

Creation

- (In theory) Congress can create, divide, merge modify and abolish agencies.

- (In reality) Congress creates rather than abolish (evidenced by the multiplication of regulatory agencies) as society becomes more complex.

-the state is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change.

Appropriation

-have potential for checking arbitrariness in the administrative process but in reality these have no appreciable effect in controlling administrative discretionary power.

-Congress has the power to withhold funds for these agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in wielding this power because it recognizes that if it does, it will affect public interest. So what happens is, during budget hearings, these agencies undergo strict scrutiny but receive their appropriations just the same.

Investigation

-has limited value as a tool to provide as effective regular control of the improper exercise of administrative power

-effective only as an aid in legislation

The non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards

-traditional legal thinking places considerable emphasis on the non-delegation doctrine and the prescription of legislative standards to control administrative agencies in the exercise of their powers

-the rule is for delegation of powers to an administrative agency to be valid, the legislature must not only declare the policy to be executed but it must likewise fix a standard to guide the agency in the exercise of its delegated power

-for this doctrine to be effective, the legislature must be able to provide sufficient or definite standards every time it decides to delegate powers to an administrative agency, the more specific the standards the greater the chances of confining administrative discretion within its proper limits

If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is allowed to exercise uncontrolled discretion

-Non-delegation cases shows that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable to provide for definite or specific standards because there are numerous areas of regulation which are of different nature, subject to variable conditions and policy considerations with varying degrees of susceptibility to definite standards. Stone stresses that in providing definite standards the following must be considered (a) the number, vagueness and degree of potential conflicts among policy indications which the legislature wants to be accommodated, and (b) the rate of change and movement in the facts concerning such policies

-this inability has not caused the Supreme Court to shy away from assuming a liberal posture I resolving challenges regarding the sufficiency of standards, the Court is generally unwilling to strike down the validity of the delegation for broadness or vagueness of the standards.

-Interest of law and order, public interest, justice and equity and substantial merits of the case have been considered as sufficient standards to sustain the constitutionality of the delegation of powers.

-the SC recognizes that delegation to administrative agencies is a compelling necessity on a modern complex society.

-this combination (inability of congress to provide sufficient standards and reluctance of SC to strike down the constitutionality of such delegation) undermines the efficacy of the non-delegation doctrine. Thus, the administrators discretion is virtually unconfined and the possibility of abuse in the exercise of such discretionary power becomes a real problem

-In the US this doctrine has long been regarded as unsatisfactory

-Davis suggests that the non-delegation doctrine should be altered to turn it into an effective and useful judicial tool. The focus should no longer be exclusively on standards; it should be on the totality of protections against arbitrariness, Including both safeguards and standards. The key should no longer be statutory words; it should be protections and the administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of judicial inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards to administrative safeguards and standards.

Administrative Procedure as a Mode of Control

-the legislature can, although indirectly exert control over the activities of administrative agencies through the prescription of rules or principles of administrative procedure

-these rules of procedure serve to maximize fairness in the administrative process

-in prescribing rules of procedure the following must be considered (a) administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts (b) administrative agencies are designed to act with dispatch and flexibility to enable them to speedily accomplish their objectives. This does not however exempt them from the fundamental requirements of procedural due process (see Ang Tibay v CIR).(c)Administrative agencies are created to deal with specific problems, with different objectives and under varying conditions, thus a uniform rule of procedure for all is out of the question. There is a need to grant them enough leeway to come up with rules particularly suited to their areas of concern. The ideal situation is to provide them with minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed in the performance of their rulemaking and adjudicative functions.

-for a long time there was no law that prescribed common procedural guidelines for all administrative agencies, thus they adopted their own rules of procedure which resulted in a bewildering variety of rules and regulations promulgated by the agencies which in turn caused confusion and was prejudicial to the persons affected especially when the rules were not made easily available to them.

-The Administrative Code of 1987 was a significant legislative measure that answered this problem; it contains provisions which are applicable to all agencies. It provides for the minimum procedural standards which in their totality strike a harmonious balance between the fundamental requirements of procedural due process and the demands of administrative flexibility.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING

-Judicial review of agency decisions is given special emphasis in administrative law.

-that there should be judicial review is not contested, the debate is on the purpose of such review.

-A radical view would subject not only the agency conclusion of law but its determinations of fact policy as well.

-the controlling principles frown upon a wide-ranging or freewheeling type of judicial review.

-The courts, traditionally, have been confined to the role of seeing to it that administrative agencies stay within the limits of their power as defined in their enabling statutes and protecting private rights by checking arbitrariness in the administrative process.

-Even if the enabling statutes of these agencies are silent with regard to judicial review, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this does not foreclose the possibility of such review. In one case it held that it is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on the question of law ad jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protects substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of a system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion (San Miguel v Sec of Labor).

-note that the Supreme Court made no mention of judicial review of agency determination of fact and policy.

-The judiciary recognizes that its traditional role is deeply rooted to the idea of judicial deference to administrative expertise and the now well entrenched substantial evidence rule in administrative law.

-Questions of law belong to the domain of the judiciary, questions of fact and policy on the other hand are better resolved by administrative agencies which posses expertise or experience in their respective areas of specialization.

-While deference to administrative expertise is the rule the courts nevertheless is not precluded from reviewing agency determination of fact and policy. When the substantiality of the evidence supporting the factual findings of the agency is challenged, the issue assumes a judicial character. And the lack of substantial evidence to support agency finding causes the overturning of such by the courts.

-The courts generally avoid intervention in cases involving policy considerations, however there are occasions when in the course of resolving questions of law which are intimately linked to policy matters, the courts are unable to exclude the consideration of such matters in the review.

CONCLUSION

The rise of administrative power has generated a host of problems regarding controls over the exercise of such power.

Legislative Controls

Appropriation Power of the purse; but is generally not wielded in consideration of public interest

Fixing of Standards- Has been proven to be of little value

Prescription of Rules-prescription of minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be commonly observed by agencies can help maximize fairness in the administrative process.

( Administrative Code of 1987 strikes a harmonious balance between the fundamental requirements of fairness and the need for administrative flexibility

Judicial Review important instrument to control agency behavior through the courts actual policing of agency behavior to ensure that it is confined within the limits set by law

THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY(not assigned)CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS v VASQUEZ, PLDPPMA

240 SCRA 502

VITUG; January 25, 1995

NATURE

Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction

FACTS

- MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water distribution system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the projects with the Office of the Ombudsman (Vasquez), charging an apparent plan on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes) through the technical specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: set aside the recommendation of an MWSS committee to award the contact to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes, and award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder

- the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with the SC, contending that the ombudsman acted beyond the competence of his office when he assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the same is clearly among the excepted cases enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS

ISSUE

1. WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the PLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders

HELD

1. NO

Ratio The

Reasoning On the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the Ombudsman, Solicitor-General insists that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted by the MWSS

- The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Consti and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

- the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement. This case concerns the investigatory power and Public Assistance Duties of the Ombudsman

- the Ombudsman, in resolving the complaint, considered 3 issues: (1) WON the technical specifications prescribed by MWSS in the projects have been so designed as to really favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/ Bidders; (2) WON the MWSS has the technical knowledge and expertise with fiberglass pipes; and (3) WON the contractors and local manufacturers of fiberglass pipes have the experience and qualification to undertake the projects. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which "xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It seems that the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the MWSS Committee to award the contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees.

We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law.

Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and set aside.

LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ

243 SCRA 497MENDOZA; April 6, 1995NATURE

Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings: complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt.

FACTS

- February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. After an investigation, the investigating officer found no prima facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman, Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. The case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

- Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for acts of las