wwii aerial counterflak tactics

8/9/2019 WWII Aerial Counterflak Tactics

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DeceptionDeception of one sort or another was as much

a stock in trade of flak batteries as was their ammunition, and the Hun became quite proficient indeceptive tactics.Frequent Changes of Positions

Accuracy of Alliedair reconnaissance compelled flak batteries tomake frequent changesof positions. Movementswere mostly at night,and often a two-hourfire silence in the newpositions was enforcedfor the purpose of "sucking in" unwary fighter-bomber pilots.Dummies

In the vacated positions dummy guns wereleft, and detection of thedumm ies was an extremely difficult and oftenimpossible task for photointerpreters, because ofthe height from which

from 1,000 feet.Traps for Fighter-bombers

In the German handbook of tricks there wasalways a chapter on luring fighter-bombers withineasy range of flak guns. Various types of bait were

used.In Western Germa

ny a section of highw ayhad foxholes dug everyfifty feet, and movingback and forth alongthe road were threetrucks. When fighter-bombers dived in for anattack, the truck driversdove into the foxholes,and light flak openedfire from positions onboth sides of the road.

Sometimes the baitwas a locomotive withsteam up, but unmanned.Planes which went infor an attack receivedstrong light flak fire.

Another trick wasto drive two trucks downpictures were taken. Sketch of 20mm flak on tower a highway. If they wereSince this German policy was well known to flak officers, it was no surprisewhen a ground inspection of overrun defensesrevealed a number of dummy positions which hadbeen plotted as "occupied" positions. Though notelaborate, the dummy guns and fire control equipment contained all the component parts of thesimulated materiel and were often realistic even

attacked, one truck, avan type, dropped its sides, exposing light flak guns.

Very seldom were heavy gun emplacementscamouflaged, probably because the expense anddifficulties involved were not w orth the results.Frequ ently l ight gun emplace ments were camouflagedfor the p urpos e of su rprising low level attacke rs.Guns aro und a flak trap were always concealed.

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Flak with the ArmyWhereas flak units in the rear areas were usually

static or semi-mobile and concerned only withdefense against Allied aircraft, flak with the armies,particularly those units well forward, were equippedas highly mobile and powerful striking forces. Theversati l ity of the 88mm and 20mm weapons wereexploited offensively and defensively.

During the African Campaign 88mm flak gunswere used to seek and destroy Allied tanks. Thoughsuch offensive action was infrequent during theEurop ean camp aigns, these weapons always reverted to anti- tank roles when Allied armies appro ach ed gun positions before they could be evacuated.Their use, and subsequent sacrifice, in road blocksand strong points were often planned rearguard,delaying actions to allow withdrawal of mainGerman forces from untenable positions. A primeexample of this was the enemy's retreat from theArdennes region in Ja nu ary and F ebruary 1945.

As major flak defenses were approached byAllied ground forces, a great lessening of fire wasnoted by flak officers studying pilots' reports of firereceived over the defenses. The principal reason forthis decrease was not that the guns had been withdrawn to positions farther beyond the battle lines,but, rather, that they had been redeployed in aground role. Arm y com mand ers studied such redeployment of flak guns and divined from it thekeynote of the Hun's defensive preparations.

German Panzer Army spearheads which drovedeep into the Ardennes in December 1944 fairlybristled with light flak guns which were to protectthe crack armored units from the much feared andrespected "Jabos". Close behind the advancingtroops came large numbers of heavy flak guns toprotect vital crossroads and communication centers.

Flak weapons were allotted top priority in thaoffensive, even thou gh it was plann ed to take advantage of weather prohibitive to flying.

The crisis created by the First Army's captureof Remagen bridge and establishment of a footholdon the east bank of the Rhine was met with a strongholding force of mobile 88mm and 20mm flak gunspulled from active defenses of Cologne and the Ruhrand redeployed in a half circle around the bridgehead area.

Mobility and high muzzle velocities of flak gunsmade for flexible adaptability to the many purposesnecessarily consigned them by the Germans. However, the vacillating policies of the higher commandin deploying their AA in air, ground, air-ground,ad infinitum roles so frustrated the flak field commanders that they were among the first Germans torealize the futility of their further resisting the Alliedhordes which were striking them mercilessly andunrelentingly from the air and the ground.

Arm y flak firing as field artillery

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OrganizationTo the German Air Force was delegated re

sponsibility for defense of the Reich and its militaryinstallations against Allied aerial attacks. Tools forthis task, in addition to aircraft, were the hugenu mb ers of flak weapons of all kinds. Four-fifthsof all flak was controlled by the GAF; 15%, bythe Army; and 5%, by the Navy.

For purposes of administration the GAF dividedGermany and occupied countries into areas knownas Luftgaue (similar to American Corps areas). Tothe headquarters of these Luftgaue was given controlof all flak within the areas. Units operating in Luftgaue were generally either static or semi-mobile.

ChannelsUnder Luftgaue headquarters the channel of

command ran down through divisions (or brigades),regiments, battalions, to batteries. In static defensesbrigades often took the place of divisions.

A parallel set-up for mobile flak was maintained by the GA F, parallel except that the comm andchannels were headed by Corps instead of Luftgaue.The GAF furnished the great majority of flak unitsrequired by the Army, retaining administrativecontrol while passing operational control to theArmy. In addit ion the Army had separate flakbattalions of its own; from these were often formedbattle de tachm ents which o pera ted offensively in aground role in conjunction with regular groundforces.

Flak organizational structure was very flexible,and its composition was governed by exigencies ofparticular circumstances.

PersonnelMore than 1,000,000 persons were involved

in German flak defenses, and this total was maintained even during the acute m anpo wer shortageoccasioned by the German reverses in the East andthe increased scale of air attacks in the West. Asflak units were called upon for trained personnel toset up new flak units and for replacements for otherbranches of the service, Goering scraped the bottomof the manpower barrel and dragged out personnelwho normally would not have been called upon formilitary service. Thus the regular ranks of GAF flakwere diluted with Hitler Youth, old men, prisonersof war, Italia n nationals, and wom en. Co nseque ntly,

in the areas where these people were used accuracyand volume of flak fire suffered.Military* Civilian Men, Women Used

Most of the flak personnel continued to bemilitary, but 30% were civilians and foreigners,who carried on their normal occupations and werecalled upon for service during air attacks and fortraining. Russian prisoners, under inducements ofbetter rations and l iving conditions, were employedto considerable extent in flak batteries.Five percent of the total flak personnel werewomen. Generally they were used in headquarters

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staffs, searchlight and balloon units, though some- suitable than men for operation of the director,times they were used to ope rate fire control equ ipmen t height finder, and radar; women showed keener per-for the heavy guns. Women were found to be more ception, though men possessed more technical skill.

TrainingNormal detachment for the range finder-director was a crew of six; for radar, six; for a single88mm gun, seven. Types of training fell into threeclasses: basic, specialist and practical.

Responsibility for basic army training and basicgunnery training belonged to the flak Ers Division.Period of training was from six to eight weeks.Specialist trainin g was carried out at the variousschools conducted by the flak school division. Rangefinders went through a six-week course. Director

crews had five weeks of training; radar operators,four to six weeks. Only the non-commissionedofficer in charge of an 88mm gun crew went to aspecialist school this for three weeks; othermembers of the gun crew were taught their jobsat the flak Ers Division and on the gun site.

Normal detachment for the single barrel 20mmgun was a crew of six. For the 20mm Vierling threemore loaders and three more ammunition men wererequired, making a crew of twelve.

SupplyUnrelenting pounding of German arsenals of

war and transportation systems by Allied bombersand fighter-bombers so plagued the enemy that hissupply prob lem was a major h eada che and contributing cause to his final collapse.

Shortages of ammunition, as well as of replacements for wo rn - out gun s, seriously affected flakfire during the last months of the war. Not only werefactories making parts of flak equipment hard hit,but assembly of parts into a finished pro duct was madedoubly difficult because of the blasted supply lines.

Even when there was sufficient ammunition forall batteries, distribution fell down. Batteries in somesections of Germany had plenty of shells, whileothers had scarcely enough for firing against acrippled bomber.

The supply and distribution situation becameso acute that high-level directives were issuedseverely curtailing flak fire against Allied aircraft.

Barrage fire was strictly forbidden. Firing at rangesgreater than 20 seconds time of flight was notallowed, nor was fire past the mid-point or afterbombs-away allowed. Instructions stated that gunswere not to be fired unless there was reasonableexpec tancy of scoring hits. Unseen targets, formations using ant i-rad ar measures, or planes takingeffective evasive action probably obviated thatrequisite "reasonab le expectancy" in many instances and caused batte ry com man ders to withho ldfire in compliance with the stern orders.

Sole exception to the restrictions were the vitaloil industries, which required continued protectionat all costs.

The Hun was never able to surmount his supplyand distribution problems, and that failure affordedmany an Allied flyer the unusual and pleasantexperience of flying within range of long knownstrong defenses without drawing a shot.

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Fighter-bombers of Ninth Air Force Thunderbolt, Mustang, and Lightning

Because personnel and equipment will always have certain capabilities andlimitations, no single person nor military weapon in this war ever proved infallibleor invincible. So it was that the threat of the German flak defenses was mastered bythe prudent and skillful use of countermeasures. The measures described in thefollowing paragraphs allow a brief insight into the major methods used in this AirForce an air force which met the full fury of German flak and came through awinner.

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FACTS

Poster Number 1


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Medium BombersIn the absence of enemy aircraft, the principal

routing problem was to avoid all known or suspectedflak defenses. This was usually possible, although attimes the bomber range did not allow the use of thebest circumferential routin g. In the Nin th Bombardment Division both flak officers and air crewswere so flak conscious that routes were sometimeschanged to avoid a spot where flak fire had beenreported but once previously.

Under blind bombing conditions the plannershad little latitude because the final 30 mile runcould be made on only two different headings at themost, and often on only one, depending on thelocation of the ground control stations with relationto the target. However, as was pointed out elsewhere,the unseen fire of enemy batteries could in no waycompare in accuracy to visual shooting. In routingthe ships the chief worry was that visual fire wouldbe encountered through breaks in the cloud, andthis actually happened on various occasions.

In routing over a visual target, many conflicting problems were considered and balanced against

Wing shot off, B-26 goes down

each other. The ideal conditions were to have thewind and sun at the tail of the formation and theflak deployed in such a way that on this headingthe bombers came in over the weakest sector. However, such a combination of conditions was seldomachieved . In the presence of very strong flakdefenses other considerations were occasionally madesecondary. However, it was very seldom that flakwas considered of sufficient import to send the planesin on a heading where bombing accuracy wouldhave been very low due to sun glare or poor visibility. In most cases a compromise was arran ged .Fighter-bombers

On armed reconnaissance missions fighter-bomber pilots were briefed on the major flak zonesin their area, but in general they depended onaircraft maneuverability and knowledge of enemyflak deployment tactics to keep themselves out oftrouble. Light flak was so mobile in the close uptactical area that it was not possible to brief fighterswith the same degree of accuracy as the bombers.Our experienced fighter pilots soon got to know

in flames over Pas de Calais, France


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where flak was and where it could be expected, andthe low damage and loss figures proved they usedthis knowledge to good advantage. On more specifictarget missions fighter-bombers of course tookadvantage of altitude and careful routing to reachtheir targets undamaged.

Troop CarrierIn operation of troop carrier transports and

gliders, flak was always one of the most importantconsiderations. As a result of the altitude of formations (5001500 feet) and the speed flown (110

Flak casualty

140 mph), troop carriers were very vulnerable toanti-aircraft fire of all categories. It was usuallynot possible to take the formations over absolutelyflak free routes, because this required a zig-zagcourse of detours around individual gun positionswhich was impossible for the unwieldy transportand glider teams. In addition, the tactical missionof troop carrier command required the element ofsurprise, and formations had to go in on as short andas direct a route as possible. Therefore the best routeas regarded flak was always a compromise withother important factors of navigation, nature of themission, and length of route over enemy territory.

over Munstereifel

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SUCCESSFULATTACK/

-NINTH AIR TORCr FLAK SECTIONPoster Number 2


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BOUGHE/ /TOUGHEST

EVASIVETACTICS/

Poster Number 3 NINTH AIR FORCE FLAK SECTION


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Medium BombersIn the early days of the war evasive action was

usually left up to the individual fancy of the formation leader. As studies were made and tactics developed, it was found that very carefully plannedevasive action would invariably lead to lower lossand damage and therefore better bombing.

It is now known that change of altitude hasvery little effect on evasive action unless it is violently made, and unless it is incorporated withevasive action in course. On the approach to thetarget this Air Force used altitude changes on butfew occasions.

Planned evasive action was usually begun 40seconds or more before coming within range of theheavy flak. S turns were attempted and later abandoned, because it was found that planes were oftenhit by predicted bursts when coming back overthe original straight course line. Instead of these, adefinite but irregular series of turns was used, theminimum ra te being abo ut 2/sec. The straightportion between turns became progressively smalleras the target was approached, varying from 20seconds down to 5 seconds. Because of operationalrequirements the turns themselves usually werebetween 150 and 45 0 . This action continued untilthe start of the bomb run. It was also found thatthe last turn into the bomb run should be as largeand sharp as possible.

When an 18-ship box arrived at the IP, theinside flight made the turn first. The lead flight andoutside flight continued on the same course for 10seconds, at which time the lead flight made thesame turn. The outside flight continued on for 10seconds and then it also made the same turn. From

there until the start of the bomb run, these flightsflew parallel courses and executed the same evasivemaneuvers. The bomb runs were therefore convergent, provided the three flights had the sameaiming point, thus also employing saturation tacticsagainst the flak gunners.

As the ships were most vulnerable while on thebomb run, shorter runs were attempted, but assessment of bombing damage proved that propersynchronization could not be made, and a run of45 to 60 seconds was highly advisable. A sharp turnaway and loss of as much as 1,000 feet altitude afterbombs away has long been a standard procedure.The evasive turns were then begun again until theships were out of range of the defenses.Fighter-bombers

Ninth Air Force fighters have developed somenovel and also extremely successful evasive tactics.In a low level strafing attack, for instance, the firstprinciple is surprise. This is mainly accomplishedby staying low and making use of terrain features.After passing over the target the pilots were taughtto stay low and head out of the area, as climbingwould expose a large surface to enemy gunners.Another ruse was to split up into elements of twoor three planes each, which came in on differentheadings from 300 to 1200 apart. This tactic confused and tended to saturate the defense in a similarmanner to bomber practices, as the gunners couldonly fire at a small percentage of the attackingplanes. Another bit of deception used was to sendone flight over the target area just out of light flakrange. This flight simulated a dive-bombing attackand drew fire, and while the flak gunners were thus

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engaged the other flights sneaked in on the deck in asurprise sweep.

Very little other planned evasive action wasnecessary, as the maneuverable fighters could perform what aerial acrobatics were necessary as theoccasion arose.Troop Carrier

Evasive action by troop carriers was oftendifficult or impossible. While tugging gliders andcarrying paratroopers tug planes could not "jink"all over the sky, as the very nature of the equipmentdid not permit it. The landing and drop zones weresmall areas which required very precise navigationto find. When coming in for para or glider drops therun resembled a bombing run, and evasive action

A medium over

at this critical stage was inconceivable.After the transports released their loads, more

evasive action was possible. Going into a slight dive,thus gaining speed to leave the area quickly, wasfound to be one good expedient, as loss or gain ofaltitude often confused flak gunners. Steep bankswere not advised as these exposed a large surfaceof the plane. Profitable use was made of cloud cover,as well as defilade caused by hills or trees. However,the maximum use of low altitude flight increasedthe hazard of small arms fire. In view of vulnerability und er all conditions, tro op carrie r missions whichdid not sustain some damage or loss were rare, yetthe complete success of such missions flown overthe battle grounds of Europe at extremely low lossis a tribute to the pilots and to flak intelligence.

Armentieres, France


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BEWARE 0 TRAPS/I N T H A I R F O R C E F L A K S E C T I O N


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DEFEND THAT MISSION/

Number 5


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Air power is not as powerless to hit back againstflak as was originally supposed. Various methods ofneutralizing flak from the air have been developedand used in this Air Force with excellent results.Medium Bombers

The mediums employed high explosive andfragmentation bombs with good success againstheavy flak batteries. Clusters of three 260 lb. fragbombs or six 90 lb. bom bs were used. Th e formercluster parted upon release, whereas the latter hadeither an instantaneous or a delayed release mechanism. Usually a box of twelve ships went outslightly ahead of the main bombing formations anddid this work. Of cou rse, direct hits p ut the flakout of business com pletely, but nea r misses oftendiscouraged the flak personnel or ruined the delicatedirectors. Crew experience proved that this anti-flak measure worked well, provided th at tim ing wascorrect, since fire received was often far below theunhindered capabilities of the defenses.Fighter-bombers

Concerning fighter operations, the standardprocedure was to assign several fighters the taskof strafing th e empla ceme nts ar oun d a target, whilethe remainder went about the business of strafingor bombing the target itself. Here again it was foundthat the average flak gunner took cover first andworried abo ut his jo b late r, so this system bec amestandard on all well-defended targets such as airfields or ordna nc e dep ots. Th e fighters also carried90 lb. frag bombs under the wings, and these wereused against flak positions in a manner similar tobomber tactics. Proxim ity fused anti-personne l bom bs

were used in the last months of the war, and showedgreat promise.Peeling of f


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FIRST COORDINATED AIR ATTACK

TAR0T5v. A A. Batteries

H ,,HflK

ilwbot3cnnbr \ launch/'thjitlLltb

aqaWdt'cffaJL

fighter Bombers ibombers to i.R

lighter 3ombersLeft mam jbrmationon signal, ID dii>ebomb an d strafeflak guns around)L Hie target

Medium Membersbegan run asjirstof the FighterJSomhers attackthe flak positions

8tf2_


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Calais Combined OperationOn the gth of May 1944 the first combined

air operation in this theatre simultaneously employing medium and fighter-bombers at the same targetwas successfully accomplished. The general planwas to achieve the best possible medium bombingaccuracy against a target strongly defended byheavy flak.

Obviously the major problem was to achievesuch timing that the short bombing periods of thefighter bombers would occur during the criticalperiod just before and d uring the medium s' bom bing run on the two main targets, Calais andSangatte. In the actual at tack the entire mediumand fighter-bomber force rendezvoused at NorthForeland, proceeded generally to a landfall fivemiles west of Dunkirk, thence to the B-26 initialpoint east of Calais where the mediums startedtheir bombing run. To obtain the t iming necessary,the medium bombers gave a radio signal on landfallindicating they would bomb six minutes later, andagain a signal at the IP meaning they would bombone minute and forty seconds later. Excellenttiming resulted.

The attack proceeded according to plan, themedium bom bers start ing their bom b runs just asthe first of the flak positions were being dive-bo mbe d.

Mediums cross

Immediately on the dive-bombing of flak positionsthe flak over the entire area went from "intenseaccurate" to "nil". Medium bombing results weregenerally excellent; there were no losses and flakdamage was received by only a few aircraft from aflak battery which was attacked slightly behindschedule. This reaction was quite different from aprevious attack when 3.5% of the mediums werelost and 57% damaged against the same target

- similarly protected. Bom ber and fighter crews wereall very enthusiastic, viz:

Bombers. "As our group approached targeton the bombing run moderate to intense flak wasseen coming from the Calais defenses apparentlydirected at the bomb group ahead. At that momentthe P-47S dive-bombed and the flak appeared tostop in the entire area."

Fighter-bombers. "It is my opinion thatthis is a very effective type of attack. The coordination with the bombers was perfect. The flak wasfiring at the fighter-bombers when they attackedthe gun positions. We smothered practically allground opposition. There was no flak to interferewith bomb run of medium bombers. Results, so faras attack by fighter-bombers and medium bombers,declared excellent."

the enemy coast


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THANKS TO GRO UN D SUPPORTNIN TH AIR FORCE FLAK SECTION


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Shortly after the beachhead was established in and fighter-bombers were in the area. In manyNormandy, Allied ground artillery fire was directed cases our artillery could not reach all of the flakagainst certain dense flak areas in the immediate batteries within range of the air targets, but evenbattle line in attempts to neutralize some of the partial neutralization often allowed the lay-on of aGerman AA positions. These early artillery missions mission which would otherwise have been beyondproved so beneficial to our air effort that, in the late the capabilities of our aircraft flying at very lowfall when the flak situation was again stabilized as and medium altitude against tremendous flak den-at Caen and Brest, counterflak artillery missions sities.were again employed and definite operating pro- The extract from a First Army operationscedures between air units and the ground artillery memo below is an example of SOP which all Alliedwere established. armies possessed to lay on these air-ground missions.During these operations every caliber of gun Th e flak intelligence section in each differed slightlyand howitzer from 90mm to 240mm was used to due to differences in photo interpretation sources.blast the enemy flak positions while our medium

ExtractHEADQUARTERSFIRST UNITED STATES ARMYAPO 230

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)18 December 1944NUMBER 46)

COUNTERFLAK FIRESI Counlcrf lak F ires .

1. Responsibilitya Counterflak artillery support can be made available for the majority of air missions flow n in support of First Arm y. Consistent with the availability of amm unition, all echelons are charged with furmshinq maximum protection to air support activities within their sectors. . .b. Respon sibility for arrangem ent of counterflak fires rests with the echelon (Army, Corps, or Division)imtlT%ipln7bUilityfor obtatningm d transmitting to corps certain information data required (targets,routes, altitude and es timated time over target) rests with G-3 Air section at IXTAC.d. Unit G-3 Air officers should coordinate plans w ith the appropriate artillery commande r prior tosubmitting requests through the air support officers to the IX TAC.

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2. Flak Intelligence


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In order that accurate data on enemy flak posilions will b e available the following procedure h as beeninaugurated.a. The Army Photo Interpretation Section (APIS) will publish weekly hostile flak lists ba sed onsecond phase interpretation of latest basic cover. Distribution will includ e divisions.b. Between publication o f hostile flak lists, as new photo coverage becom es available, APIS, throughthe Arm y Artillery Section (Army Artillery Officers' Radio Net, telephone, or messen ger), will disseminatechanges in enemy flak positions to the corps artillery, for further dissemination to the division artillery.c. F or large scale "carpet" bombing by heavy and medium bombers APIS will provide special counterflak maps and lists of coordinates .3. Type of Counterflak FiresBased on the present availability of ammunition, it is contemp lated that counterflak fires sho uld takethe following form :a. Fighter-bo mber support of divisions and corps : Neutralization of all enemy flak on and in theimmediate vicinity of selected bombe r targets just prior to and during attack.b. Medium bomber support of divisions and corps : Neutralization of target area as above, plusneutralization of heavy and medium flak along bomber routes when such are previously known.c. Large scale heavy and medium bomber "carpel" bombing : Neutralization and maximum destruction of all known and suspected enemy flak po sitions capable of interfering with the effort. F ires to becharacterized by 10 Jo minutes of intense concentrations preceding the attack and neutralization throughout the attack.d. Field Artillery Air OP patrols should be maintained in connection with all counterflak fires inorder to neutralize active flak unaffected by the planned fires.By command of Lieutenant General HOD GES :W. B. KEAN,Major General, G. S. C,Chief of Staff.OFFICIAL : Is I S. E. Senior/ / / S. E. SENIOR

Colonel, A. G. D.Asst. Adjutant General.

P-6i "Bl ack Widow" night fighter


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Medium BombersAs the Luftwaffe becam e neutralized , bom ber

formations were gradually altered to more successfully counter the potent flak hazard. Aircraftspacing in any formation has been the subject ofmany discussions and studies. If the ships fly tooclosely together, one shell burst may damage morethan one plane, or a shot aimed at one may missbut still hit another. The latter is called single shotprobability. If, however, the ships are spaced toowidely apart, the battery will be able to get in moreshots at a given number of planes because they willtake longer to cross over the effective area of fire.On the other hand bombing accuracy requires a

tight pattern which cannot be achieved in our typebombing if the ships are in a widely scattered formation.

An optimum solution had, therefore, to bedetermined. On the following page the top pictureshows the lead and low flights of a normal 18-shipbox enroute to a target. The bottom picture showsa flight of six. Distance between planes of eachflight was sufficient to provide protection againstone flak burst hitting more than one ship. However,since this spacing did not achieve a tight bombpattern, the two Vees of three contracted in breadthand trail while on the bomb run. Thus a satisfactorypattern was attained.

Hit the silk!


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Alediumbombersin flight


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CHAFF CAN TAKE IYOU C

CHAFF


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Radio countermeasures have played an important part in neutralization of enemy flak. Under"unseen" fire conditions the enemy was completelydependent on his radar for direction of his AA guns,and w ith effective use of R C M he was forced toresort to the inefficient barrage method of fire.When "seen" conditions prevailed the usual methodwas to use radar for range finding, but opticalsighting for elevation and azimuth. Here again withRCM in use the enemy's radar was denied him,and he had to use optical range finders alone instruments which required high type personnel forexact functioning and which decreased the lengthof effective engagement due to their limitations.

This Air Force used three "window" ships permedium bomber group. One ship flew in each of theflights of the lead box until the time approachedfor their dropping operation. Then they went outone mile ahead and 1,000 feet below the lead ship.The position of these "window" ships varied slightly

Clouds and "window"

depending on the wind direction with relation tothe direction of attack. The usual procedure wasfor the "window" ships to leave the formation atthe IP. They each dropped twelve bundles of"w ind ow " every six seconds, while all other ships inthe group dropped six bundles every thirty seconds."W ind ow " can well be credited with saving many aship, as well as allowing much better bombingthrough great reduction of the flak hazard. TheNinth Air Force has been credited by POW statements as employing "window" more successfully thanany other air force operating in this theater.

The jam min g, or "ca rpe t", technique used bythe Eighth Air Force was experimented with in thisAir Force, but it was found that our smaller bomberscould not carry the necessary equipment to make iteffective, nor did our A-26 aircraft, to which ourentire Bomber Division was slowly converting, havethe air crew necessary to operate the "jammer".

protect our mediums


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Flak was everywhere

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^'i-fp^t^^r'ilf^^.


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m*Prc-Invasion , Campaiqn

Shonqpi fioRobomb

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wwii aerial counterflak tactics

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