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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001476

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-48420)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 180.0 MILLION

TO

ROMANIA

FOR A

TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT

June 28, 2010

Sustainable Development Department Central Europe and the Baltic Countries Unit Europe and Central Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 31, 2010) Currency Unit = New Romanian Lei (RON)

US$ 1.00 = RON 3.40

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADT Annual Average Daily Traffic Calatori Romania National Railway

Passenger Company CAS Country Assistance Strategy CESTRIN Central Laboratory for Transport

and Road Infrastructure CFR Romanian National Railway

(Infrastructure) Company CPS Country Partnership Strategy DPL Development Policy Loan EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development EC European Commission ECA Europe and Central Asia (World

Bank region) EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIB European Investment Bank EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP Environmental Management Plan EU European Union HDM Highway Development and

Management System ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and

Results Report IFI International Financial Institution IRI International Roughness Index IRIS Integrated Railway Information

System IT Information Technology

Marfa Romania National Railway Freight Operations Company

MOT Ministry of Transport MPF Ministry of Public Finance MTCT Ministry of Transport,

Construction and Tourism MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure

Framework MTR Midterm Review NCB National Competitive Bidding NPV Net Present Value PAD Project Appraisal Document PAL Programmatic Adjustment

Lending PDO Project Development Objective PHARE EU Fund for Assistance to Central

and Eastern European Countries PMU Project Management Unit RNCMNR Romania National Company for

Motorways and National Roads SIL Specific Investment Loan SNCFR National Railway Company of

Romania (former) SWAp Sector Wide Approach TRP Transport Restructuring Project TSSP Transport Sector Support Project VOC Vehicle Operating Cost

Vice President: Philippe H. Le Houerou Country Director: Peter C. Harrold Sector Manager: Henry G. R. Kerali

Project Team Leader: Mohammed Dalil Essakali ICR Team Leader: Mohammed Dalil Essakali

ROMANIA Transport Sector Support Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary

D. Sector and Theme Codes

E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...............................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes...............................................43. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................84. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.........................................................125. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance......................................................136. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................177. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...........18Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ..........................................................................19Annex 2. Outputs by Component..................................................................................20Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................21Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.............25Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...........................................................................27Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results...................................................28Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR .....................29Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders .......................32Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents.......................................................................33

MAP IBRD No. 37920

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A. Basic Information

Country: Romania Project Name: TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT

Project ID: P093812 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-48420

ICR Date: 06/28/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: MINISTRY OF PUBLIC FINANCE

Original Total Commitment:

USD 180.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 123.3M

Revised Amount: USD 123.3M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: National Railway Infrastructure Company (CFR) National Company for Motorways and National Roads

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 05/24/2005 Effectiveness: 07/25/2007 07/25/2007

Appraisal: 04/25/2006 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 11/02/2006 Mid-term Review: 09/30/2008 09/30/2008

Closing: 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately SatisfactoryImplementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:

Unsatisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 5

Railways 45 30

Roads and highways 50 70

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Injuries and non-communicable diseases 20

Regional integration 20 25

Rural services and infrastructure 20 35

Trade facilitation and market access 40 40 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Philippe H. Le Houerou Shigeo Katsu

Country Director: Peter C. Harrold Anand K. Seth

Sector Manager: Henry G. R. Kerali Motoo Konishi

Project Team Leader: Mohammed Dalil Essakali Henry G. R. Kerali

ICR Team Leader: Mohammed Dalil Essakali

ICR Primary Author: Hernan Levy F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the proposed project is to assist the Borrower to reduce transport costs through the improvement of the overall quality of its national roads and railways networks during the first years of EU accession.

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Reduction in road transport costs on sections financed through this project Value quantitative or Qualitative)

100% 60% Between 90% and 95%

Date achieved 11/02/2006 12/31/2008 12/31/2009

Comments (incl. % achievement)

The periodic maintenance works led to reduction in vehicle operating costs in the order of 5-10 percent for maintenance works using asphalt concrete overlay depending on the type of vehicles. This range is considered normal for this type of works.

Indicator 2 : Increase in train operating speeds on sections financed through this project Value quantitative or Qualitative)

100% 140% freight 130% passenger

See comment

Date achieved 11/02/2006 12/31/2008 12/31/2009

Comments (incl. % achievement)

The target was achieved on a smaller scale because of the reduced scope of the railways component. In addition, major floods at the start of the project further damaged the track, increasing the amount of hazard locations and speed restrictions.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Percentage of national roads in good and fair condition Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

61.5% 70% 77.6%

Date achieved 06/15/2005 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

The target was exceeded, as a result of a combination of the project-financed works, and similar works in other roads carried out with financing from state budget or other financiers.

Indicator 2 : Funding increase in current terms for periodic maintenance and current repair of national roadsand (ii) hazard locations (number)

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

RON 363 million (=100%)

Increased by 30% +38.6%

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The government during the project period met the target, by increasing the allocation from the State budget, since the highway agency's own revenues remained about constant during the period

Indicator 3 : Unit costs for Summer maintenance decrease in current terms Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

RON 11,836 / km Reduced by 9.5% -10.48%


Unit costs were reduced by more than originally expected.

Indicator 4 : Implementation and effective use of road management system by RNCMNR


No Yes

Implementation and effective use in RNCMNR's CESTRIN


The target was partially achieved, since a broader use of the road management system was hampered by lack of progress under the parallel Transport Restructuring Project (TRP) regarding the reclassification of the road system.

Indicator 5 : Capacity of road administrations (RNCMNR) to manage road maintenance


N/A One area-wide maintenance contract

Study completed and first pilot identified and prepared in 2008.


RNCMNR reported in early 2010 that the documentation is ready for launching the bid. This is expected to happen after loan closing.

Indicator 6 : Road user satisfaction surveys done and published Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

None One/year None


Indicator 7 : Length of rail track generating speed restrictions on the interoperable lines Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

630 km 585 km See comment


See comment for PDO Indicator 2.

Indicator 8 : Number of hazard locations on the interoperable lines Value 1,060 1,030 About 30% of

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(quantitative or Qualitative)

initially expected reduction


See comment for PDO Indicator 2.

Indicator 9 : Update of Business Plan for the periods 2007-2011 and 2008-2012 Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

No Yes Partially done


Initial Business Plan for 2004-2008 was updated to cover 2006-2010. New business plan 2008-2012 was prepared by CFR management, but never approved by CFR's board of directors

Indicator 10 : Effective development and use of a rolling medium-term (5-year) railway infrastructure maintenance planning system (to be prepared as part of the exercise to update CFR business Plan)


No Yes Not yet part of Business Plan


This target is interlinked with the Business Processes Redesign activity implemented in parallel under the Transport Restructuring Project. Such activity was not completed.

Indicator 11 : Effective use of an economic evaluation methodology for preparing the Annual maintenance program.


No Yes Not yet part of Business Plan


See comment for Indicator 9

Indicator 12 : Train operator satisfaction surveys done and published Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

None One/Year Surveys was undertaken in 2008


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 04/05/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00

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2 01/09/2008 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 18.00

3 05/05/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.61 4 11/07/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.19 5 04/08/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 43.29







H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal At the time of the appraisal of the Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP) in April 2006, Romania was expecting to join the European Union (EU) in 2007, and much of the government’s social and economic development policies were driven by this goal. EU accession would require wide ranging reforms of the Romanian economy in order to prepare for competition, and to improve physical infrastructure. Romania was pursuing a balanced modernization approach between roads and railways, the two dominant transport modes carrying more than 90 percent of goods and passengers. Thanks to a long process of railway reforms that started in the 1990s, and still continuing at the time, railways had managed to keep a relatively high transport market share. While the government had achieved significant progress in structural and institutional reform of the transport sector with support of the World Bank, the state of Romania’s transport infrastructure was a key challenge for convergence and integration with EU member states. The quality of road and rail infrastructure was deemed to be limited, the efficiency and safety of transport was below EU standards, and a large backlog in rehabilitation and maintenance had accumulated partly because Romania had underinvested in transport infrastructure. There was an urgent need to speed up the improvement of infrastructure quality and to rationalize transport institutions. These issues had been identified in the government’s transport sector strategy for the period 2003-2010 as well as in the National Development Plan. The Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) covering the period 2006-2009 notes that “the overarching long term objective of Romania is to achieve convergence with the EU”. The CPS also notes that the main issues facing the transport sector are the poor quality of infrastructure, the inadequate financing of maintenance and the need to complete the program of railway restructuring. The World Bank had actively supported Romania’s transport sector through three investment operations and advisory services since the mid-1980s. The most recent operation—prior to the TSSP—was the Transport Restructuring Project (TRP), approved two years before the TSSP. The TRP included financing for new road investments—the construction of city bypasses—and, for railways, the procurement of railway maintenance equipment to support CFR’s mission as the railway infrastructure manager. The TRP included a significant policy reform and institutional development component to be achieved through a series of technical assistance inputs as well as the provision of management information systems to improve the quality of decision making for the management of both railways and roads. At the time of preparation of the TSSP, the Bank was also implementing the first series of the Programmatic Adjustment Loan (PAL) for Romania. The expectation was that the PAL program would support the TRP reform objectives. The TSSP was implemented in parallel with the TRP. While the TRP loan was approved two years earlier than the TSSP, both projects were expected to be completed at about the same time, because the TSSP was conceived as a fast disbursing operation. A number of factors that affected performance under the TSSP also did so under the TRP. The ICR of the TRP complements and provides in some areas more details than this ICR.

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1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

As stated in the Loan Agreement, the objective of the Project is to assist the Borrower to reduce transport cost through improvement of the overall quality of its national roads and railways networks during the first years of EU accession.

The objective would be reached through:

(i) In the road sector: a. Increasing the percentage of national roads in good condition b. Providing sustainable funding for road maintenance, rehabilitation and road

safety, through a coherent multi-year rolling program c. Improving the capacity within the Romanian road administration (RNCMNR and

others) to operate efficiently and effectively in managing road maintenance and rehabilitation

Key PDO indicators: reduction in road transport costs, improvement of road condition, better funding for road maintenance, effective use of road management systems.

(ii) In the railways sector: a. Reducing the number of hazard locations and the proportion of sections on the

main lines subject to temporary speed restrictions, through repair and rehabilitation of track infrastructure and signaling and electrification

b. Providing sustainable funding for railway infrastructure maintenance, current and periodic repair and overhaul, through a coherent multi-year rolling program

c. Improving the capacity within the infrastructure railway company to operate efficiently and effectively in managing railway maintenance and rehabilitation

Key PDO indicators: increased train operating speeds, reduction in number of sections with speed restrictions, reduction in number of hazard locations, development of rolling 5-year infrastructure maintenance planning system 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The PDO and Key Indicators were not revised. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries The PAD does not specifically identify the project beneficiaries. The project objectives and components suggest the main beneficiaries would be the operators of the road and railway systems, and the users of these two transport systems. In the case of roads, the maintenance programs will allow the Romania National Company for Motorways and National Roads (RCNMNR) to address a significant backlog in the maintenance of the national road network, preventing further deterioration and therefore reducing future road maintenance costs. Road users will benefit from reduced vehicle operating costs and safer roads. In the case of the railways, CFR and the various railway operators will benefit from the elimination of speed restrictions, which will allow a more efficient use of railway equipment. Railway users will benefit from faster services, and probably increased frequency of some services that will be made possible by the elimination of speed restrictions and consequent increase in rail track capacity.

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1.5 Original Components Component A: Road Sector Support (US$112.5 million). Subcomponent A1: Periodic Maintenance and Current Repair Works on National Roads (US$109.5 million). This comprises financial support for the RNCMNR’s Infrastructure Maintenance Program planned for 2006-2007, which is part of a larger national roads program that covers the period up to 2013. This subcomponent ensures that there is an appropriate balance between expenditures on maintenance, reconstruction and development within the multi-year investment program. The program is expected to cover over the two years a total of 2,909 kilometers, with works divided between asphalt concrete overlay for heavily trafficked roads, and single and double surface treatment for medium traffic roads. Subcomponent A2: Technical Assistance for RNCMNR (US$3.0 million). This comprises studies and consulting services aimed at: (a) preparing and implementing a pilot of output-based area-wide, multiyear contracts, (b) hiring a Technical Adviser to improve management and technical capacity within RNCMNR, (c) conducting a first road user satisfaction survey, (d) training of RNCMNR staff on preparation, procurement and technical/financial management of maintenance activities, and (d) the design of periodic maintenance and current repair works. Component B: Railways Sector Support (US$112.5 million). Subcomponent B1: Maintenance, current and periodic repair, and overhaul works on interoperable lines, and supply of necessary goods (US$98.7 million). This comprises financial support for CFR’s Infrastructure Maintenance Program for interoperable lines, planned for 2006-2007. This program is part of CFR’s longer term infrastructure maintenance program spanning 2006-2010 whose main objective is to eliminate temporary speed restrictions and improve traffic safety. This subcomponent is designed to fund three types of maintenance works: (a) overhaul of public infrastructure (i.e. tracks, bridges, tunnels and embankments, in track sections requiring comprehensive repairs of various kinds), as well as interlocking and signaling electrification systems (45 percent of cost), (b) repair and maintenance of above public infrastructure, in sections requiring selective repairs (35 percent of cost) and (c) repair and maintenance of interlocking, signaling and electrification systems (20 percent of cost). Subcomponent B2: Technical Assistance for CFR (US$13.8 million). This comprises studies and consultants needed for the implementation of the maintenance program, including (a) the design and inspection of maintenance works, (b) training on procurement and financial management, and (c) support to improve railway management practices through the development of an updated Business Plan for the periods 2007-2011 and 2008-2012. The development of an immediate and medium-term (5 years) maintenance plan based on the effective use of the information technology (IT) system and the track geometry car will be carried out through the TRP Technical Assistance for CFR’s maintenance management program 1.6 Revised Components The project components were not revised. 1.7 Other significant changes (in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations)

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The loan closing date was extended by one year, to December 31, 2009, in three stages. The first 3-month extension was approved to give time to the government to provide views on the future of the TRP and the TSSP. The second, a one-month extension was meant to provide the government with additional time to confirm the availability of funding for the extension period. The third, an 8-month extension, was intended to allow completion of most of the road component, and a large part of the rail component.

An amount of US$35 million of the loan was canceled, since disbursing this amount would not have been possible under the (revised) closing date. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Preparation The project was prepared in conjunction with the supervision of the Transport Restructuring Project. Both projects covered railways and roads and dealt with the same agencies, which facilitated preparation of the TSSP project. Conditions for appraisal included an agreed policy framework and reforms before start of the project, a sustainable expenditure framework linked to the government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and agreements on institutional capacity building. The appraisal was further linked to progress on key institutional development activities under the TRP, notably (i) selection of consultants by RNCMNR to evaluate road management systems and organization, and (ii) preparation by CFR of terms of reference for business development and updated business plan.

The project, initially envisaged as Sector Wide Approach Project (SWAP), was structured as a fast-disbursing, specific investment loan to be implemented over a period of two and a half years, and was intended to be the first of a series of programmatic support for the transport sector in Romania.

Project design took into account lessons from previous transport projects. Because the ongoing (at the time) TRP and PAL projects had substantial institutional objectives, the TSSP, while complementing the institutional objectives, focused on ensuring the execution of maintenance and rehabilitation of roads and rail infrastructure and systems. Attention to road and railway infrastructure maintenance—although a clear necessary condition to improve the quality of the service in roads and rail—had not received adequate funding from the various transport projects supported by European funds or other international financial institutions (IFIs). Experience with past projects had shown that the Romanian implementing agencies were competent in procuring and implementing civil works. It had also shown that technical cooperation was needed in conceptualizing and implementing new management methods, training both management and staff, prioritizing projects within budget constraints and updating standards and regulations.

Quality at Entry (QAE) There was no assessment of the project’s QAE by the Bank’s Quality Assessment Group (QAG). Risks One risk to project development objective was considered substantial and four were considered modest. The overall risk was rated as modest. The risks and the mitigation measures were the following:

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• Turnover of leadership and staff in RNCMNR (Substantial): technical assistance and training of staff.

• Resistance to institutional change in RNCMNR (Modest): close monitoring of the technical assistance activities.

• Insufficient funding for road maintenance and rehabilitation (Modest): increase in Rovinieta1 revenues and careful and timely assessment of the 5-year road program and its supporting MTEF.

• Insufficient funding for repair and overhaul of railway infrastructure (Modest): provision of sufficient budget allocation in the MTEF for railway infrastructure.

• Lack of management support to continue railway restructuring (Modest): frequent and effective supervision and cooperation with the railway management.

The leadership and staff risk, rated as substantial, was likely the result of the experience with the TRP, which in its early implementation years was already suffering from significant turnover in the management and staff of the RNCMNR. 2.2 Implementation

The TSSP was implemented in parallel with the TRP, and some of the same problems that affected TRP also affected TSSP, especially budget ceilings imposed by the government and management and staff turnover. Implementation of the TSSP also was affected by the non-achievement of reforms under the TRP, such as the restructuring of RNCMNR or the implementation of Business Processes Redesign in CFR, which were essential to materialize some of the TSSP’s expected outputs. Altogether, implementation of the TSSP was simpler than TRP, since the physical components were the annual maintenance programs of the roads and railway sectors rather than new investments requiring detailed technical specifications or complicated negotiations between the road agencies and local city government and land acquisition (in the case of the city bypasses included in the TRP).

Initial Delays and Implications. The project was negotiated in May 2006, but, due to delay in submission of the audit reports for CFR and RNCMNR the loan was not approved until November 2006. Thereafter, effectiveness was also delayed—as it had happened with the TRP—and was only declared in July 2007. As a result, it became apparent very early during implementation that it would be unlikely that the project could be completed, in one and a half years, by the original closing date at the end of 2008. A number of other issues, listed below, led to delays during implementation.

Implementation organization and management. Contrary to what had happened in previous transport projects, the TSSP (as well as the TRP) did not have a unified PMU, but separate units responsible for the road and rail parts of the project, with diffused responsibilities for the technical assistance components. Frequent changes of senior management of RNCMNR and CFR led to recurrent changes in, and shortage of, the staff responsible for implementing the project. The changing investment priorities in the transport sector in Romania further contributed to instability in the management of project and implementation delays.

Budget ceilings. The budget approved by the government for 2008 provided for only about 60 percent of the CFR program for the year, and about one third of the funds necessary to cover the road contracts expected to be executed during the year. These were spending limits on IBRD-financed investments, which also occurred in 2007 and 2009, and they were an important factor

1 Time-based road user fee charged to users of national roads in Romania.

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contributing to implementation delays. These budget ceilings decision seemed to reflect the government’s goal at that time of graduating from the Bank and moving to raise debt in the international financial market.

Temporary Suspension of Procurement. In late 2008 and early 2009, the road and rail agencies suspended procurement procedures for contracts not yet awarded, pending a decision regarding restructuring of the project and its extension—as explained in more detail in the next sections of this report. This suspension was a contributing factor to the project’s further implementation delays.

Pilot for Outsourcing Road Maintenance. This component became complicated due to the fact that a similar study was underway under an EBRD-financed project. As a result, the Bank-financed study was not launched. However, the Bank supervision missions coordinated with EBRD and followed closely the progress and results of the study.

Floods. Major floods in 2007, when project implementation was starting, damaged roads and rail infrastructure, meaning that the condition of transport infrastructure at the start of the project was in a worse condition than estimated at appraisal.

Comparative Progress of the Roads and Rail Component. By the end of 2007, RNCMNR had managed to carry out the agreed Annual Maintenance Program for that year. In contrast, CFR at that time was still hesitant to prepare or launch any works for two main reasons: (i) drastic constrains on the state budget allocated to CFR and lack of own sources, which prevented CFR from awarding contracts for technical designs necessary to start the works under this component, and (ii) the effects of the 2007 floods on the scope of works that were envisaged under the railway Annual Maintenance Program. Therefore, CFR could not even prepare technical documentation and bidding documents that would have allowed it to launch the bids as soon as the budget situation was resolved. It took CFR a few months in 2008 to catch up and launch the first bids, thanks mainly to the appointment at the start of the year of a dedicated project team.

Final Project Cost and Loan Cancellations. Due to implementation delays, and the loan cancellation, the final project cost was substantially lower than originally estimated: US$175.1 million actual cost compared with US$225.0 million at appraisal. Most of the reduction of project cost was in the railway component. There was also a drastic cut in the amount of technical assistance for both road and rail, which was practically reduced to zero.

Project at Risk Status The project’s development objective (PDO) was rated moderately unsatisfactory in September 2009, and this rating remained until project closing. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Design The M&E framework included two project outcome indicators, one for roads, reduction in transport costs, and one for railways, increase in operating speeds. The railway indicator was a well selected, simple indicator and the target was realistic. The road indicator, however, posed a problem in that transport costs are influenced by many factors in addition to the condition of roads. Further, that target—a reduction of 40 percent in transport costs—appeared optimistic. A reduction in vehicle operating costs would have been a more sensible indicator, and the target value could have been determined through a modeling exercise considering the baseline road condition and the expected road condition at completion.

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The M&E also included six intermediate outcome indicators for roads, of which three could be measured in numerical terms and three were of the yes/no type, and another six intermediate outcome indicators for the railways, of which two numerical and four of the yes/no type.

Baselines were established for all indicators. However, major floods in 2007, at the start of implementation, damaged the rail track, further increasing the number of railway sections and kilometers with speed restrictions, effectively altering the baseline for this indicator. The source of the data for monitoring was expected, for roads, to come from the road data register being developed under the TRP project. The technical assistance component for that project also included the development of performance indicators for the road sector. For the railway sector, monitoring was provided by the Integrated Railway Information System (IRIS), and Oracle Financials systems, both of which were already in operation, and staffed with trained personnel, at start of the TSSP.

Implementation and Utilization Monitoring data was regularly reported in the PMU’s periodic reports to the Bank and discussed with the supervision missions. The data was utilized by RNCMNR and CFR for their own management control and monitoring purposes. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Environment The TSSP piloted the Use of Country Systems under the Bank’s Operational Policy OP/BP 4.00. Equivalency analysis of the Bank and Romania procedures carried out in 2006 concluded there are no gaps between the two procedures. Therefore, the project was carried out in conformity with the Romanian Environmental legislation. Bank supervision teams undertook several reviews and concluded that the approach agreed between the government and the Bank was followed. Given the relatively good practice with regards environmental assessment in Romania—which is compliant with EU practices—the piloting of the use of country systems was not expected to make any significant changes in an already existing capacity in the country. The use of country systems did however reduce Bank supervision efforts and more importantly removed any confusion or additional burden on the implementing entities since they were using their national systems with which they were already familiar. Financial Management The Loan Agreement required project audits as well as entity audits of RNCMNR and CFR. There were some delays in submitting the entity audit reports by the annual deadline of June 30, which delayed project approval by the Bank. The audits for 2004 were the first audits of RNCMNR in its new legal form as a joint stock company. Although RNCMNR’s annual audits have been received and they have been found satisfactory to the Bank, the entity audits were qualified because of the significance of valuation of RNCMNR’s concession rights, impairment of asset, and because of emphasis of matter on the going concern issue. The qualified auditors’ opinion raises the questions of the suitability of RNCMNR’s legal status as a joint-stock company and the broader issue of long term road sector funding. Social safeguards Works under the project were within the existing right-of-way, and there was no resettlement or land acquisition.

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Procurement During project preparation, it was envisaged that the project would be implemented using a SWAp approach relying on Romania’s public procurement law. However, the assessment done by the Bank found differences between Bank and Romanian procurement procedures, which did not permit the use of country systems for procurement. Using Romanian systems would have probably led to a much faster and streamlined implementation. Given the relatively small size of road maintenance contracts, a large number of works contracts fell under National Competitive Bidding (NCB), and RNCMNR and the Bank agreed to use the Bank’s ECA regional sample bidding document in Romanian language and to have procurement done at the level of RNCMNR’s regional directorates. This approach has proved to be very successful. In the case of CFR, the project consisted of more than 250 contracts, spread all over the country. CFR chose to develop its own sample bidding document for works and goods for NCBs—modified to meet Bank requirements as per the loan agreement. Arriving at a document acceptable to the Bank took valuable time and contributed to the delay in the railway component. On the positive side, the procurement of goods under this component turned out to be very smooth despite the complexity of several ICB packages. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The improved road and railway infrastructure was put in operation as the works were completed. The investments financed under the project are integral parts of annual maintenance programs for roads and railways. Thus, these investments, and their operations and management, are the responsibility of the RNCMNR and the CFR, with funding provided by their respective budgets. The institutional and managerial improvements supported by the TSSP are being adopted by the respective road and rail agencies, although their effective implementation is contingent on the completion of activities launched under the parallel TRP project. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Improving the road and railway infrastructure and management was and remains an important priority for Romania. Strong economic growth in Romania through 2008 continued to put pressure on the country’s transport system, confirming the importance of carrying out satisfactory maintenance of road and rail infrastructure. While the economy contracted in 2009 due to the global economic downturn, it is expected to recover in 2010/2011, bringing with it a resumption of transport demand growth and requiring the operation of infrastructure in good condition. The current CPS, issued in 2009 in the midst of the global economic and financial crisis, notes that the new Government faced the difficult task of reconciling short-term fiscal consolidation with the need to mitigate the social costs of the crisis and restore the sources of sustainable and equitable growth. The government had put in place a program aimed to address the situation. According to the CPS, the World Bank Group will complement and support this program by (i) helping the Government to implement structural reforms to help mitigate the crisis by reducing social and economic vulnerabilities and (ii) putting in place the basis for sustainable economic growth in the medium-term. The TSSP by helping improve critical transport infrastructure that was in poor condition following years of accumulated backlog maintenance, and, together with

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the TRP, by supporting improvement in the management of the road and rail sector, contributes to the government program and the CPS strategy. Project design—focused on supporting the annual maintenance program of roads and railways—was appropriate to meet the project objectives. The road and rail agencies were responsible for preparing and implementing their maintenance programs. This approach helped strengthen the agencies, as they had to deliver timely programs to be included for financing under the project. The TSSP’s limited institutional development goals were appropriate, because the parallel TRP had a strong focus on policies and institutions and the need to avoid duplication of efforts. At the same time, the project’s fast-disbursing concept, to be completed in a two-year period, was reasonable considering the focus of the project on physical components, that such components did not involve complex engineering or environmental analysis, and that the respective implementing agencies had the capacity to prepare their annual maintenance programs. Still, the rail component was considerably more difficult to implement than the road component, because it required procuring a substantial number of goods and equipment under international competitive bidding (such as transformers, related electrical equipment, rail sleepers) in addition to civil works. All in all, the design of the project as a fast-disbursing loan was relevant. Despite the delays in starting the project, the budget limits imposed by the government, the impact of the global financial crisis on ongoing Bank loans to Romania in 2009, the project had one of the highest disbursement performance of any Bank specific investment loan to Romania. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives A number of factors combined to prevent the project from fully achieving its objectives. First, initial delays between project negotiations and Bank approval, and further delays until the project became effective, meant that civil works that were planned to be carried out in 2006 and 2007 had to be postponed until the implementing entities were certain the loan would be approved and become effective. The delay between negotiations and Board approval of the loan was due to the Bank’s concerns over the auditor’s opinion—which became available after negotiations—regarding RNCMNR’s unusual legal status as a joint stock company. For a two-year fast-disbursing project, a delay of several months in starting implementation was very critical. A second, major factor affecting outcome, was the spending limits on IBRD-financed projects imposed by the government in 2007, 2008 and 2009. These spending limits or ceiling constraints in the last two years came at a time when the road and rail agencies had greatly improved their implementation capacity. A third factor, affecting some of the TSSP’s expected outputs, was the lack of progress in the institutional components under the TRP project. A fourth factor was major floods in 2007, before project implementation had actually started, that substantially worsened the condition of road and rail infrastructure, altering some of the project baselines, which would have required to formally amend them as well as performance indicators’ targets. A. Road Sector Overall the project outputs necessary to meet the project objectives and targets were mostly achieved. The proportion of national roads in good condition improved from 61.5 percent at start of the project to 77.6 percent at closing, exceeding the original target of 70.0 percent for 2008. The improvement in road condition reflects in part the maintenance and rehabilitation works carried out on 2,197 kilometers under the project through the end of 2009 (versus 2,909 kilometers

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estimated in the PAD).2 The improved road condition of the national roads is estimated to have reduced vehicle operating cost by about 5 percent on roads receiving asphalt concrete overlay—and that have not deteriorated to the point where they need reconstruction—and by a lower percentage on roads receiving single or double surface treatments. This level of reduction in vehicle operating costs is considered fairly standard. The project target expecting a reduction of 40 percent in road transport cost (as opposed to vehicle operating cost) as a result of the road maintenance and rehabilitation works was unrealistic, as noted in Section 2.3. Funding for periodic maintenance increased in current terms by 38.6 percent compared to 2006, exceeding the target of a 30 percent increase. Progress was made in the preparation for a pilot for performance-based maintenance, in which there was collaboration between the EBRD, who financed the initial study, and the Bank team that reviewed the study and the bid documentation. Delays, mainly due to the complexity of the initial bid and draft contract documents suggested by the consultants, prevented launching the pilot during 2009. The documents were revised, a road section in Dolj county (Craiova region) has been selected for the pilot, and a contract is expected to be awarded after loan closing. Lack of progress under the TRP on the road reclassification and related reorganization of the RNCMNR hampered further improvement in the utilization of the road management system that had been developed under previous road projects. B. Railway Sector

Overall, most of the project targets for railways were not met. Even with the one-year extension of the loan closing date, only about 44 percent of the railway component in value was implemented—30 percent of the works and 75 percent of the goods originally planned to be supplied under the project were effectively delivered. While some speed restrictions were eliminated, this had only limited influence on achieving the targets, which increased significantly because floods at the start of the project further increased the initial number of speed restrictions. In addition, an increase in deferred maintenance of the rail track since project appraisal until the start of implementation due to insufficient CFR allocations for track maintenance further raised the initial number of speed restrictions. The combination of the effects on the railway infrastructure of the floods and the increased deferred maintenance meant that at the start of project implementation the condition of the railway infrastructure was substantially worse than assessed at appraisal. To account for this situation, the baseline regarding the number of speed restrictions should have been amended, and corresponding adjustments should have been made in the respective target. However, since only 30 percent of the works were executed, a change in the baseline and targets would have had no substantive effect on the assessment of the outcome.

2 The link between the overall improvement in the condition of the road network and the number of kilometers improved under the project is complex. The condition of the roads improved in part because of the project-financed road improvements, but there were during the project period other road improvements financed by EU funds or other IFI projects, which also contributed to improving the road conditions. It is impossible in practice to isolate the effect on road condition of the Bank project only. On the other hand, the condition of the road is assessed on the basis of the road surface’s roughness, by measuring the IRI (international road index). Some road maintenance works, such as asphalt overlays, change the roughness and can greatly reduce the IRI. Other works, such as single or double bitumen treatment, mainly seal the roads, without altering the IRI, although the seal prevents the surface from deteriorating and extends the life of the road.

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CFR prepared a draft business plan identifying investment required in infrastructure, and expects to have it approved by its board of directors after loan closing. Studies for the rationalization of the railway network have been carried out under the TRP Business Processes Redesign component, and their recommendations are under review, although their actual implementation is uncertain. 3.3 Efficiency The ICR economic re-evaluation was conducted separately for the roads and railway components. The economic analysis shows that the efficiency of the periodic maintenance works undertaken under the road component was very strong. The economic analysis of the railway component—which was done for CFR’s overall maintenance program—shows that the program in itself remains an efficient solution compared to deferring the maintenance, but the efficiency of the program will depend on whether the program will effectively be completed by CFR after the loan is closed. Roads. For the economic analysis, five representative road sections were selected to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the maintenance strategy selected using the Highway Design and Management model (HDM-4). The analysis also made an estimation of the reduction in vehicle operating costs (VOC). The results of the economic analysis show high economic internal rate of return for asphalt overlay works—reflecting in part the relatively high level of traffic as well as the appropriateness of this maintenance strategy when funds are available. The economic rate of returns of the surface treatment are higher than the cut-off rate of 12 percent, and the analysis shows that this strategy is a much better and cost-effective maintenance solution to preserve and extend the life of roads that have not been severely damaged to the point where they need reconstruction. At the same time, the reduction in VOC—immediately after the implementation of the project—is estimated to be around 5 percent on average for road sections receiving asphalt concrete overlay. This level of VOC reduction is in line with experience elsewhere with this type of periodic maintenance (40 mm AC overlay) for roads that have not approached the collapse of their structural integrity and which have predominately private car traffic. The reduction in VOC is lower for the roads receiving surface treatment. This is also expected because the key objective of surface treatment is to prolong the lifecycle of the road by sealing the road surface against ingress of water, arresting deterioration of the road surface, and providing a skid resistant road surface with the resultant benefits of reduction in accidents. The roughness of the road—to which VOC is directly linked—is affected only marginally by surface treatment, although such treatment significantly slows down the deterioration of the road’s surface condition over time. The positive NPV and the good EIRR reflect these benefits. Railways. The project intended to support CFR’s infrastructure maintenance, current and periodic repair, and overhaul program for nine interoperable lines in order to eliminate temporary speed restrictions and improve the safety of traffic. The ICR economic analysis used a similar approach to the analysis carried out at project appraisal but using different assumptions due to project changes and to implementation delays—especially with regards the phasing out of the multi-annual investment program to account for the limited financial and physical capacity of CFR to implement such a program. The results show that the implementation of the program originally

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envisaged in the PAD over a longer horizon would yield an economic internal rate of return of 16 percent—lower than the one estimated in the PAD. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. While the achievement under the road component would have warranted a moderately satisfactory rating—provided the outcome target on transport costs is corrected—the limited performance of the railway component made the project’s overall performance in terms of achievement of outcome moderately unsatisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

In addition to the economic benefits of the project, the decision to extend the project by one year until the end of 2009—a severe recession year in Romania—had significant social impacts. It was estimated that the implementation of the project generated about 90,000 person-months—out of which about 50,000 person-months in 2009 alone corresponding to about 6,500 jobs. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The only significant institutional impact of the TSSP is the preparation of the pilot for a performance-based maintenance contract. While an actual contract was not awarded, the preparation of bid and contract documents required detailed discussions within the RNCMNR, providing the agency a good understanding of the benefits and the expertise required to operate a program of performance-based maintenance contracts. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) The implementation of the project in a time of a severe financial crisis in Romania in 2009 has had a positive impact on the construction industry—which is very sensitive to the predictability of financing through public works contracts. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops This is a Core ICR, and does not require beneficiary survey and/or stakeholder workshops. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial. The road and rail infrastructure improvements carried out under the project are subject to considerable risk due to the uncertainty of the funding that the respective agencies would be provided to maintain the road and rail infrastructure in good condition. In the case of the roads, while funding has improved in recent years, very limited funding has been allocated in the 2010 budget, and there is uncertainty about future allocations. Funding provided by the Rovinieta—a dedicated source of revenue for RNCMNR form road users meant to be used for road maintenance—covers only a small part of the RNCMNR’s needs. On the railway side, CFR

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revenues have been falling—and this has been exacerbated by the fall in railway traffic due to the global financial crisis—and its 2010 budget does not provide adequate funding for maintenance. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately satisfactory. The project design as originally conceived was correct. The linkages with the TRP, and division of functions between the two, with the TRP focusing on policy and institutional reforms and the TSSP focusing on the road and rail maintenance—a high priority area that had not received necessary level of support from other IFIs—were appropriate. A number of conditions were set by the Bank for appraisal to ensure a satisfactory quality at entry. The conditions included an agreed policy framework for the transport sector, a linkage between this sector framework and the government’s medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), and a government commitment to carry out the required reforms. After appraisal, and until effectiveness, the Bank made sure that the latest audit reports had been sent to the Bank, and that remedial actions regarding RNCMNR identified in the respective audit, had been addressed. The Bank team that was involved during the identification-approval process was experienced with the road and rail agencies as it was essentially the same team, with some minor changes, that appraised and supervised the TRP project. One weakness of the PAD, was the key PDO target for the road part of the project. This weakness, however, did not compromise the project objectives or components, and could have been easily corrected during implementation. The target reflected the expectation that as a result of the maintenance works financed under the project, transport costs could be reduced by 40 percent. This target was implausible, because transport cost depend on more factors than the condition of the roads, and because experience elsewhere shows that most road rehabilitation or maintenance works yield vehicle operating costs savings (not transport costs) in the range of 5-10 percent. The PAD properly identified the project’s major risks. One of the risks, which became serious during implementation, was the funding for repair and overhaul of railway infrastructure. Hypothetically, if this risk had been rated substantial instead of modest, this could have alerted to the need of having stronger mitigation measures than the one identified in the PAD, which proved ineffective. However, it is uncertain whether it would have been possible to identify mitigation measures that would have proven to be effective in practice, and prevent the funding problems that occurred during project implementation. (b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately satisfactory. The Bank carried out frequent supervision missions that provided detailed reports on the progress and issues with the project. The supervision effort was correct, with on average two supervision missions per year. There was good attention to fiduciary and procurement issues. Most of the

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supervision team members remained throughout project implementation, and had been involved with the project since preparation and appraisal. The supervision missions early on became concerned with implementation progress. The November 2007 mission, just four months after the project was declared effective, raised the possibility of restructuring the project, cancelling the railway component since there was no indication of progress on that component. Yet, while progress on the rail component was a serious issue, there were a number of other additional factors affecting implementation. These factors included the implausible target set for road outcome indicator, changes in the baseline stemming from major floods in 2007, the budget ceilings imposed by the government on IBRD-financed projects that constrained both the road and the rail components, the lack of progress on the institutional components on the TRP project, and the fact that with the delays in project effectiveness there was only 1.5 years to implement the project. These factors, combined with the slow progress on the railway component, strongly suggested that it would not be possible for the project, with the original objective and targets, to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Given the warnings and the consideration of a possible project restructuring presented by the 2007 supervision mission, it is surprising that no action was taken by the Bank to restructure the project. The decision not to restructure seems to be due to the fact that a restructuring would most probably have entailed a decision in late 2007 by the Bank to extend the loan closing date. Such an early decision would not have been possible given the poor performance of the parallel TRP and the status of the overall dialogue between the government and the Bank in 2007 and 2008. The missions often took a broad view of the performance of the transport sector, beyond the direct implementation of the project, with the intention to impress on the government the need to take remedial actions. The Aide-Memoire of one of the supervision reports stated that lack of clear and consistent government mandate for transport institutions was leading to poor transport sector performance, and identified four specific issues that needed to be addressed by the relevant government agencies: lack of clear transport financing framework, lack of agreement by finance and transport ministries on the medium term sector budgets, unclear division of responsibilities between MOT and modal entities, and the lack of stability in the management of companies. That Aide-Memoire listed seven detailed recommendations. The supervision missions provided a number of other useful suggestions and recommendations, both for the project and more broadly for the road and rail subsectors. One of the supervision mission provided a detailed program how performance-based contracts could be introduced in Romania, listing several practical suggestions, such as that contracts should have a mix of input and performance based features and the winning contractors be required to employ redundant RNCMNR staff and be allowed during the contract period to lease the highway agency’s land and buildings no longer needed for road maintenance. Damages caused by the floods during 2007 forced CFR to make changes in priorities in the project-financed works and to focus on urgent repairs to the rail track, since CFR had no other source of funds to carry out such repairs. The selected repairs were scattered through a number of different lines. The supervision mission during the Mid-Term Review (MTR, October 2008) recommended to reconsider the priorities so as to avoid so much dispersion of the repair efforts. Had this been done, the rail component would have resulted in a more significant outcome. In the last 2 years of the project, supervision missions increasingly focused on the effect of the implementation delays on the project’s potential for achieving its objectives, and on the options available for the project to be successful. Starting in 2008, implementation regained speed, especially the railway component that was the most delayed. The supervision missions warned

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that despite the improved implementation performance, it would be impossible to complete most of the project outputs within the original closing date. The Aide Memoire of the MTR mission concluded that the project would need an extension of 12-18 months and the removal of budget ceilings imposed by the government to make possible significant progress towards achieving the project objective. A review of the status of the project in the Aide Memoire of the March 2009 included a detailed analysis of options regarding extension of the closing date and amounts of loan cancellation. The option that provided the highest probability for the project to reach a satisfactory outcome required the smaller amount of loan cancellation. Following this course would have also required an additional extension of some 12 months, but would have had a high chance of leading to a good outcome, provided project baselines and targets were formally amended to reflect infrastructure damages at start of the project, because of the improved implementation performance since 2008, and the lack of difficult policy decisions that was marring implementation of the TRP. Further, continuing the implementation of the TSSP would have helped create jobs at a time of rising unemployment. However, Romania’s difficult fiscal situation with the onset of the global financial crisis led the government to discuss with the Bank a program to provide Romania significant budgetary support in the form the crisis-response DPL. This was done in parallel to the decision to cancel US$35 million of the TSSP loan in 2009 due to the project’s implementation underperformance. While the decision by the Bank to grant a first 3-month extension until the end of March 2009 was meant to give the new government (at that time) sufficient time to provide its views on the future of TSSP and TRP and to ensure the government’s commitments to the projects, the second extension until the end of April 2009 was somewhat counterproductive. The options were already laid out in March 2009, and for fast-disbursing maintenance projects such as TSSP—where actual construction contracts are normally tendered out in the winter and implemented during the construction season between April and October—prolonging uncertainty should have been avoided. The Bank may have wanted to receive formal endorsement from the government, but in the end this may have impacted negatively how much could be done in 2009 by RNCMNR and CFR—with significant negative impact on the railway program that was envisaged in 2009. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. Based on the detailed assessment above of the Bank’s performance at entry and during supervision, the overall Bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory. The government appeared to strongly support the project during preparation, and even requested advancing the date for approval of the project. Unfortunately, things changed drastically once the project was approved. Most serious were the annual budget limits or ceilings (loan and government contribution) imposed by the government on IBRD-financed projects, that constrained the amount to be spent on road and rail contracts. These budgetary decisions seemed to reflect the government’s goal at that time of graduating from the Bank and moving to raise debt in the international financial market. These ceilings were substantially below what would

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have been required to implement the project according to the implementation plan agreed during negotiations of the TSSP project. Without such ceilings, the road component could have been completed earlier than 2009. Equally serious were the multiple state budget revisions during the calendar year, which had a strong negative impact on the implementing agencies, especially the CFR, to plan procurement. Such revisions were even more critical when funds were made available at the end of the year, which were too late to launch and implement contracts during the construction season (March-October). The fact that budget ceilings occurred from the beginning of the project, before the onset of the economic crisis and of the deterioration in the country’s fiscal position, suggested that while the project may have had real, strong support by the roads and railway companies, it did not seem to have equivalent support by the Ministry of Transport or central economic authorities. This is probably because a maintenance project such as TSSP is less visible and less politically rewarding than a large investment project such as city by-passes or motorways. Yet, to the credit of the government, they did increase during the project period the funding allocated to road maintenance—although the latest information indicates that no such allocation has been made for the 2010. The preparation of the project identified road and railway sector funding as a risk and identified the development and agreement on a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) as a mitigating factor. It turned out that the government’s transition to multi-annual budgeting and to a MTEF—which was one of the areas supported by the Bank’s PAL—was not successful, and budgetary processes remain a major issue facing all sectors in Romania. The government delays in resolving the legal and financial situation of the RNCMNR—which ultimately centers around the issue of funding of the road sector in Romania—created additional constraints to the implementation of the road component of the project. The delays in moving forward with the railway reforms expected under the TRP also affected progress of the rail component under the TSSP. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The RNCMNR performed well, especially in the beginning and then in the last 12-18 months of the project. The Annual Maintenance Programs were timely prepared, and bidding started soon after the project became effective. The high turnover of transport authorities and senior managers and staff of RNCMNR during implementation affected the agency’s capacity, and was the main cause of the periods when implementation did not progress satisfactorily. The performance of CFR was less satisfactory, and this is reflected in the limited proportion of the rail component that had been implemented by the loan closing date. The 2007 floods had an impact on the scope of works that were envisaged under the railway Annual Maintenance Program, and it took CFR some time before it could finalize a revised and implementable program starting in 2008. The state budget provided to CFR for investment was so limited that CFR could not launch the preparatory technical studies and designs. CFR also put on hold the preparation of tendering documents pending clarification of the budget situation. CFR could not prioritize works in a way that at least some lines would have had all the activities completed early/during 2009, which would have increased the benefits of the project-financed

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investments. CFR reporting on progress focused on the status of rail track procurement, but with little linkage to the works and installation activities that will make the new track operational, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving the project objectives. It should be recognized that a significant improvement in the implementation capacity of CFR happened with the appointment in 2008 of a project management unit (PMU) comprising 43 (both at central and regional levels) experienced staff responsible for procurement and technical specifications. Until the PMU was established, the staff allocated by CFR to implement the project lacked the administrative authority to call on experts in the different fields to help prepare the procurement documents. The reluctance of the implementing agencies, whether by their own decision or under instructions from the government, to utilize the project’s technical assistance funds resulted in practically no such training or other institutional strengthening activities being undertaken under the project. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated unsatisfactory. The Borrower’s decision to set budgetary ceilings for the project—that were much lower than the agreed project implementation plan—was a key factor in the project’s failure to achieve its development objectives. 6. Lessons Learned The following lessons emerge from this project: Dependency of one project on progress in another project. Several outputs of the TSSP depended on progress of outputs to be produced by the TRP—and the TRP depended itself on the outcome of the Programmatic Adjustment Loan (PAL). For example, preparation of an immediate and medium term (5 years) maintenance plan for CFR that was to be carried out under the TRP was an essential input for the annual maintenance program of the railways to be financed under the TSSP. This lesson can be divided in three areas: (i) that an additional, important risk is introduced in a project when achieving its objectives depends on the completion of another project’s outputs, (ii) that because of such dependency, the Bank—supervision teams and relevant managers—should put especial attention, including raising the issue at higher government levels, on completing the outputs of the companion project—the TRP in this case—and, (iii) if such outputs are not likely to be generated, restructure and amend the project objectives, with a view to delink it from the progress on the companion project. Project funding, budget ceilings, risk and mitigation. Funding for project implementation, whether counterpart funding or loan disbursement ceilings, is one of the most common project implementation risks. The budget ceilings imposed by the government were one of the critical factors causing the project not to be completed in time. Except in countries that have a solid tradition of providing adequate funding during project implementation, inadequate funding should be presumed to be a substantial risk. Mitigation of this risk is extremely difficult and requires a broad Bank involvement, during preparation as well as during implementation, with the country central economic authorities as well as with the respective sectoral agencies. Designing and launching performance-based maintenance pilots. Both the EBRD and the World Bank underestimated the problems with preparing and launching a pilot for a performance-

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based maintenance contract. While there is substantial international experience with such kind of contracts, there is also a wide variation in the specifics of such contracts, notably to take into account factors such as the capacity of the local road agency, the capacity and experience of local contractors, the size of the area to be included in the pilot, the utilization of road agency facilities and laid-off personnel, the proportion of inputs and performance-based parts in the contract, local procurement rules and others. As important is the question of funding for such multi-annual contracts. Even though a contract was not awarded, the process of designing and eventually finalizing the bid documents represents a valuable learning for Romania. Making decisions on project restructuring. There were indications early during implementation that for the project to achieve a satisfactory outcome, substantial changes would need to be introduced that required restructuring the project. Aspects that needed to be revised in a restructured project included the target for the road outcome indicator, the expected rail outputs—affected by slow start of implementation and the rail infrastructure damages caused by the floods early during implementation—the budget ceilings, and the non-achievement of important TRP outputs which had an impact on the TSSP. Lessons need to be learned on how to make project restructuring decision in the case of a fast-disbursing project such as TSSP that was envisaged to be implemented in two years. Factors affecting the performance of the transport sector. The problems experienced during the implementation of the TSSP—and the companion TRP—happened in the context of, and reflected, a poor transport sector performance. The root cause is the lack of a clear and consistent government mandate for transport institutions. In turn, this gives rise to four fundamental issues, namely, the lack of: (i) a satisfactory transport financing framework, that ensures the provision of adequate funding for the operations, investments and maintenance of transport infrastructure and facilities, (ii) agreement between the ministries of finance and transport on the medium term sector budgets, (iii) a clear division of responsibilities between the MOT and the modal entities such as the RNCMNR and the CFR, and (iv) stability in the management of those entities. Resolution of these issues is essential to improve the performance of the transport sector, including the implementation of investment projects. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

Comments provided by the implementing agencies are summarized in Annex 7. The comments show similar views by the two implementing agencies regarding the key factors affecting implementation and outcome, and the lessons that can be derived from the project. In particular, the comments highlight the delayed start of the project due to the need for the Borrower to fulfill the conditions for achieving loan effectiveness, the negative effects on project implementation of the budgetary ceilings imposed by the Ministry of Public Finance and the importance of maintaining a stable staff responsible for implementing the project. (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD million)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Road Sector Support 112.5 125.4 112 Periodic maintenance works of national roads

109.5 125.4 115

Technical Assistance for RNCMNR 3.0 0.0 0

Railway Sector Support 112.5 49.7 44 Maintenance, repair and overhaul works, and supply of goods 98.7 49.3 50

Technical Assistance for CFR 13.8 0.4 3

Total Project Cost 225.0 175.1 78

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD million)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Road Sector Support

BorrowerBudget 22.5 38.6 172

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Loan 90.0 86.8 96

Total Roads 112.5 125.4 111

Railway Sector Support


International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Loan 90.0 36.5 41

Total Railways 112.5 49.7 44

Total Project


International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentLoan 180.0 123.3 69

Total 225.0 175.1 78

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Outputs by component are summarized in the table below

Component Output Comment ROADS

Physical Investments Periodic Maintenance

a) Asphalt concrete overlay b) Thin layer c) Bituminous surface

treatment Total

561.1 km 602.0 km 1,029.0 km 2,192.1 km

Including works to be completed in the first half of 2010. 568.6 km 614.2 km 1,059.1 km 2,241.9 km

Technical Assistance TA for RNCMNR None RNCMNR in view of cuts in

funding, allocated all TA project budget to road maintenance Study for multi-annual performance-based maintenance of roads was undertaken under parallel EBRD-supported project

RAILWAYS Physical Investments

Track and related infrastructure 8 hazardous locations (9.3 km) and 4 sections with restricted speed (1.8 km)

were eliminated

Output achieved through civil works contracts and installation of sleepers and related hardware. Overall, output less than expected due to implementation delays and partial loan cancellation.

Signaling and electrification systems

Better signaling and more efficient electric supply

Output achieved through the purchase and installation of equipment and supplies. Overall, output less than expected due to implementation delays and partial loan cancellation

Technical Assistance Design of maintenance works Achieved Were used in carrying out the track

and signaling repairs and upgrading. Training None Business Plan Draft Business Plan

prepared Expected to be approved by CFR Board of Directors after loan closing

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis This Annex presents the economic re-evaluation of the project. It comprises two main sections; (i) economic analysis of the roads component; and (ii) economic analysis of the railways component. (i) Economic analysis of the road component The economic re-evaluation of the roads component was done using the Highway Design and Management model (HDM-4), and focused on a representative set of road sections. HDM-4 was used to estimate the net benefits of periodic maintenance works on each road section in terms of reductions in vehicle operating costs, travel time, and road maintenance expenditures. The ICR economic analysis used the data provided by RNCMNR on road condition before the project, traffic, and unit costs. Annual traffic growth was estimated at 3 percent—a conservative rate compared to the growth rates registered in the period prior to the global economic crisis. The analysis period was 15 years to account fully with the lifecycle of certain type of period maintenance technologies. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sections that were analyzed. Table 2 provides information on the scenarios used for the sake of the economic analysis—“project scenario” being the maintenance strategy effectively implemented under the project.

Table 1: Representative road sections selected for the economic re-evaluation Road number

Section (km points) Work type Section Length

(km) Traffic (2005)

DN-1 45+150 - 49+650 Asphalt Concrete Overlay 9.64 34,237

DN-2 39+000 - 42+633 Asphalt Concrete Overlay 6.23 13,669 DN-13 36+000 47+000 Asphalt Concrete Overlay 11.79 4,319

DN-1F 16+000 - 36+000 Surface treatment 21.12 3,134

DN-2F 2+000 39+100 Surface treatment 35.08 2,069

Table 2: Analysis scenarios Type of works Category of roads Roads Base scenario Project scenario

High traffic DN-1, DN-2 40 mm AC overlay when IRI>5.5

40 mm AC overlay when IRI>4.5

Asphalt concrete overlay

Medium Traffic DN-13 40 mm AC overlay when IRI>6.0


Surface treatment N/A DN-1F, DN2-F


Surface treatment every 5 years

The AC overlay was used for roads with relatively high traffic and those that need additional strengthening for their structure to cope with increasing traffic. The base scenario corresponds to delaying the maintenance until the road condition reaches IRI=6.0 for medium trafficked roads, and IRI=5.5 for high traffic roads. The results of the economic analysis—Table 3—show high economic internal rate of return for AC overlay works—reflecting in part the relatively high level of traffic as well as the appropriateness of this maintenance strategy when funds are available. The comparison of the two alternatives also shows that deferring such maintenance works has significant economic costs.

22

The economic rate of returns of the surface treatment are higher than the cut-off rate of 12 percent (Table 3), and the analysis shows that this strategy is a much better and cost-effective maintenance solution to preserve and extend the life of roads that have not been severely damaged to the point where they need reconstruction.

Table 3: Economic analysis summary

Present Value of Total Agency Costs (US$ M)

Decrease in User Costs (US$ M)

NPV (US$ M) @ 12%

EIRR (percent)

DN-1 2.76 5.84 5.23 92

DN-2 1.06 1.38 1.23 96

DN-13 2.01 2.47 1.98 57

DN-1F 1.77 0.73 0.59 24

DN-2F 2.95 0.75 0.53 19

The HMD-4 model also provides vehicle operating costs (VOC) for the scenarios considered under the analysis. Table 4 shows the reduction in VOC—vehicle type weighted average reduction—achieved immediately after the implementation of the project. The average reduction in VOC is around 5 percent for roads receiving AC overlay. Overall the reduction in VOC is higher for heavy vehicles. This level of VOC reduction is in line with experience elsewhere with this type of periodic maintenance (40 mm AC overlay) for roads that have not approached the collapse of their structural integrity and which have predominately private car traffic. It should be noted that the difference between VOC in the years following the periodic maintenance and the VOC under the base scenario becomes even higher than the 5 percent achieved the first year after project completion because road deterioration under the base scenario accelerates until periodic maintenance is carried out. The reduction in VOC is lower for the roads receiving surface treatment. This is also expected because the key objective of surface treatment is to prolong the lifecycle of the road by sealing the road surface against ingress of water, arresting deterioration of the road surface, and providing a skid resistant road surface with the resultant benefits of reduction in accidents. The roughness of the road—to which VOC is directly linked—is affected only marginally by surface treatment, although such treatment significantly slows down the deterioration of the road’s roughness. The economic benefits expressed by the positive NPV and the good EIRR reflect these benefits.

Table 4: Reduction in Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC)

Reduction in VOC (percent)

DN-1 6.0 DN-2 5.4 DN-13 5.0 DN-1F 1.0 DN-2F 1.0

(ii) Economic analysis of the railways component The project was originally intended to support CFR’s infrastructure maintenance, current and periodic repair, and overhaul program for interoperable lines during the period 2006 – 2007. Due to delays in implementation, the railways component started in 2008 and in the end only 44

23

percent of the component—in value—was implemented. The main objective of the railway component was to eliminate temporary speed restrictions and improve the safety of traffic. At project appraisal the economic evaluation focused on the nine interoperable railway lines candidates for CFR’s maintenance program 2006-2010 program—that was envisaged to be covered by the project in 2006 and 2007, and by subsequent loans—as shown in Table 5. The methodology and assumptions for the cost-benefit analysis are described below.

Table 5: CFR’s nine interoperable railway lines

Line n. Itinerary 1 Arad- Timisoara- Craiova- Calafat 2 Ungheni- Iasi- Pascani 3 Halmeu –Oradea- Cluj- Coslariu 4 Buzau- Faurei- Galati- Reni 5 Craiova- Videle-Bucuresti 6 Videle- Giurgiu 7 Vintu de Jos -Rm.Valcea-Pitesti –Bucuresti 8 Oradea- Ep.Bihorului 9 Halmeu - Baia Mare- Dej – Cluj

General assumptions. The cost-benefit analysis in the PAD mad an assessment separately for each line. The following benefits were assessed: (i) direct savings on track maintenance; (ii) removal of speed restrictions leading to time savings for passengers, savings in freight costs due to better utilization of wagons and locomotives, and savings in both passenger and freight train crew costs (time). Time savings on high value and perishable cargo are not considered. The PAD cost-benefit analysis covered 20 years. In the “with project” scenario, investments were implemented over the period 2006-2010. The “without project” scenario corresponded to deferred project scenario whereby the same investments would be implemented, but with a five year delay and over a longer period of 10 years. The economic re-evaluation for the ICR was carried out following a similar methodology to the one in the PAD but using different assumptions due to the project changes and to the implementation delays occurred during implementation. General assumptions. The re-evaluation assessed the component by integrating the nine lines into a single program. This is because the program was implemented only partially, and some of the investments in the goods for example will be completed after loan closing, and it is not possible to identify at this stage on which line they will be installed. From the implementation experience of the project, the re-evaluation considered an even longer implementation period of 15 years for the original program to reflect CFR’s capacity—with reduced benefits and increased investment costs commensurate with the extended implementation period. In the alternative scenario, investments are delayed by five years and implemented over a 20-year period. While the cost-benefit analysis reflects the financial and institutional capacity limitations of CFR that appeared during the implementation of the project, it also shows the consequences of further delaying the much needed maintenance program.

24

Results. Investment cost (with and without project), time saving, operational cost saving and maintenance cost saving are evaluated in Table 6 for the PAD and ICR analysis.

Table 6: Costs and benefits comparison PAD/ICR

Net present value of PAD (US$ M) ICR (US$ M) Investment cost with project 415 337 Investment cost without project 250 190 Time saving 220 134 Operational cost saving 66 36 Maintenance cost saving 23 14

NPV @ 12% 145 36

EIRR (%) 22 16

The re-evaluation concludes that, the NPV for the railways component is US$ 36 million and EIRR is 16 percent for the base re-evaluation. These figures are lower than the ones calculated at appraisal stage, due to the delays and partial cancelation of the loan. The analysis assumes that the remaining part of the maintenance program that was originally envisaged in the PAD analysis would still be implemented—at a considerably reduced pace to reflect CFR’s capacity. The results of the cost-benefit analysis are therefore subject to this assumption.

25

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Henry Kerali Lead Transport Specialist ECSIE Task Team Leader Mohammed Dalil Essakali Infrastructure Economist ECSIE Transport specialist Antti Talvitie Consultant ECSIE Institutional Development Sunja Kim Consultant ECSIE Railway Financial Analysis

Allan Pozniak Consultant ECSIE Railway Institutional Development

Gaetan Tracz Financial Analyst ECSIE Financial Analysis Salim Benouniche Sr. Procurement Specialist ECSPE Procurement

Stan Peabody Lead Social Scientist ECSSD Social Development and Safeguards

Ruxandra Floroiu Consultant, Environment Specialist ECSSD Environment Doina Visa Project Officer ECSIE Project management Otilia Nutu Consultant ECSIE Project management Bogdan Constantinescu Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Financial Management Jean-Charles de Daruvar Senior Counsel LEGEC Lawyer Ruxandra Costache Counsel LEGEM Lawyer Nicholay Chistyakov Disbursement Officer LOAG1 Finance Officer Coral Bird Program Assistant ECSIE Administrative support Juderica Dias Team Assistan ECSIE Administrative support

Supervision/ICR

Henry Kerali Lead Transport Specialist ECSSD Program/Task Team Leader (until 10/01/2007)

Mohammed Dalil Essakali Senior Infrastructure Economist ECSSD Task Team Leader (from 10/01/2007)

Gerald Paul Ollivier Senior Infrastructure Specialist ECSSD Program Team Leader (from 10/1/2008)

Antti Talvitie Consultant ECSSD Institutional Development

Allan Pozniak Consultant, Railway Specialist ECSSD Railway Institutional Development

Sunja Kim Consultant ECSSD Railway Financial Analysis Gaetan Tracz Financial Analyst ECSSD Railway Financial Analysis Astrid Manroth Senior Financial Analyst ECSSD Railway Financial Analysis Nadia Badea Operations Analyst ECSSD Project management, ICR George Banjo Senior Transport Specialist ECSSD Engineering, road safety Hernan Levy Consultant ECSSD ICR Primary Author Alejandro Lopez Martinez Engineer, JPA ECSSD Engineering, ICR Doina Visa Project Officer ECSSD Project management Alexandra Stan Operations Officer ECSSD Project management Otilia Nutu Consultant ECSSD Project management Salim Benouniche Sr. Procurement Specialist ECSPS Procurement Vladislav Krasikov Sr. Procurement Specialist ECSPS Procurement

26

Stan Peabody Lead Social Scientist ECSSD Social Development and Safeguards

Lucian Pop Senior Social Scientist ECSSD Social Development and Safeguards

Ruxandra Floroiu Environmental Engineer ECSSD Environment Cesar Niculescu Environment Specialist ECSSD Environment

Bogdan Constantinescu Senior Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Financial Management

Anneliese Viorela Voinea Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Financial Management Ruxandra Costache Counsel LEGEM Lawyer Nicholay Chistyakov Disbursement Officer CTRFC Finance Officer Coral Bird Program Assistant ECSSD Administrative support Lorraine McCann Kosinski Program Assistant ECSSD Administrative support Cristina Zirimis Program Assistant ECSSD Administrative support Alexandra Livia Onofrei Program Assistant ECSSD Administrative support

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)Lending

FY05 19 89.4 FY06 64 262.2 FY07 25 67.0

Total: 108 418.7 Supervision/ICR

FY07 10 41.8 FY08 23 107.6 FY09 33 132.7 FY10 20 94.5

Total: 86 376.6

27

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results N/A.

28

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results N/A.

29

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Contributions by the implementing agencies RNCMNR (roads) and CFR (railways) are summarized below. Roads Component Key factors affecting implementation and outcome

Among the key-factors affecting the project implementation, there can be mentioned the following:

• In order to access the funds, the Borrower had to fulfill the conditions for achieving the loan effectiveness, as well as the ratification of the Loan Agreement, procedures that lasted about 6 months;

• Due to insufficient budgetary allowances, public procurement procedures could not start according to agreed schedule;

• Usage of IBRD’s procurement guidelines by Regional Directorates instead of Emergency Ordinance no. 34 for Public Acquisition.

Borrower performance RNCMNR implemented contracts for periodic maintenance and current repairs of national roads. TSSP was supervised by a project implementation unit (PIU) established within RNCMNR. The contracts were implemented by staff from Regional Directorates. The PIU responsible for TSSP implementation consists of staff involved both in implementation of contracts and financial management and disbursement. Lessons Efficiency of project implementation depends on:

a) Availability from the start of all necessary documents (bidding, technical, financial) according to specificity of included projects; b) Availability of necessary funds (both from Loan and Government contribution) during the whole period of implementation; c) Establishment of both Project Management Unit and Project Implementation Unit and stability of the involved staff (technical, procurement and financial).

Strong and continuous cooperation between the Government, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, RNCMNR and the Bank is essential for successful implementation of the project. Commitment from the Ministry of Public Finance regarding availability of necessary funds for implementation of the Project is necessary. The Bank staff was very helpful and provided technical assistance both for staff from RNCMNR and for staff from Regional Directorates during the whole implementation period of the Project.

30

Railways Component Key factors affecting implementation and outcome

Among the key factors affecting the project implementation, there can be mentioned the following:

In order to access the funds the Borrower had to fulfill the conditions for achieving the loan effectiveness, as well as the ratification of the Loan Agreement, process that took approximately 12 months; Both in the PAD (dated October 6, 2006) and the Loan Agreement (dated November 27, 2006) the Procurement Plan was designed at a general level. Its form was to be finalized subject to prioritization of activities according to CFR needs; In 2007 the Romanian territory was affected by severe and repeated floods that damaged the railway infrastructure. These impacted the Procurement Plan leading to frequent changes of priorities; in this context the Procurement Plan was finalized at the beginning of 2008; The postponing of some procurement processes, due to the budgetary ceiling imposed by the Ministry of Public Finance; The lack of progress in institutional outcomes under TRP; Continuous change in personnel and management in the railway company;

Assessment of outcomes By execution of works contracts, a number of 8 hazardous points in total length of 9,300 m and 4 speed limits in total length of 1,786 m were eliminated. Borrower performance CFR has managed to implement 120 contracts for works, goods and technical design services. The total value of these contracts is US$ 49.66 million equivalent, out of which US$ 49.25 million for goods and works and US$ 0.41 million for technical design services and works. Disbursements from the Loan up to February 20, 2010 were US$ 45.00 million, out of witch the Counterpart contribution being US$ 9.04 million. Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP) is implemented by a project management unit (PMU) established within CFR. The PMU in CFR is also carrying out the implementation of the Transport Restructuring Project (TRP). The PMU is having several financial experts in charge with projects’ financial management and disbursement. The staff has the appropriate skills and resources in managing the financial management and disbursement aspects of the projects, with most of the experts having worked previously on other World Bank financed projects. Lessons The speed of the implementation depends, among others, on:

31

Involvement, starting with the loan preparation phase, of both technical and economic staff. In this way the ownership and therefore the implication of the final beneficiary (mostly technical part) will become stronger. The possibility to keep the same project team (technical, procurement and economical experts) during both preparation and implementation phases. The stability of management team for all involved entities at medium and upper level. The budgetary constraints can be overrun through a very accurate and timely overview of the allocated ceiling corroborated with the specific needs of each project. This allows reallocating of funds from a project to another, in order to meet the specific situation requirements, without affecting the budgetary imposed ceiling. The tight cooperation between the Government, CFR and the Bank is a key factor that leads to the success of the project. The Bank is not only a monitoring entity but has a strong involvement in the development of strategies to insure the overall success of the Railway Reform The Bank staff was very supportive during all the Project stages.

32

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A.

33

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

The World Bank, Transport Sector Support Project: Project Appraisal Document (Report No.35702-RO), October 6, 2006

The World Bank, Transport Sector Support Project: Loan Agreement (Loan/Credit IBRD ) between Romania and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Aide-Memoires of Romania-Transport Restructuring Project, World Bank Supervision missions, 2004 to 2010.

Mid-Term Review, Transport Restructuring Project, World Bank Supervision Mission, 2008.

World Bank, 2001. Country Assistance Strategy for Romania

World Bank, 2006. Country Assistance Partnership, Romania.

World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, 2005. Country Assistance Evaluation

World Bank, 2008. Implementation Completion and Results Report, First Programmatic Adjustment Loan, Romania

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GheorgheGheorgheGheorghiu-DejGheorghiu-Dej

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BistritaBistrita

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IasiIasi

Piatra-Piatra-NeamtNeamt

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ConstantaConstanta

PitestiPitesti

TargovisteTargovistePloiestiPloiesti

BrasovBrasovFocsaniFocsani

BuzauBuzau

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BUCHARESTBUCHAREST

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Moravita

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22°E 24°E 26°E 28°E

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48°N

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44°N44°N

30°E

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Th is map was produced by the Map Des ign Uni t o f The Wor ld Bank. The boundar ies , co lo rs , denominat ions and any other in format ionshown on th is map do not imply, on the par t o f The Wor ld BankGroup, any judgment on the lega l s ta tus of any te r r i to r y, o r anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundar ies .

JUN

E 2010

IBRD 37920

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

EUROPEAN CORRIDORS – ROADS

RAILROADS EUROPEAN –CORRIDORS

MAIN CITIES AND TOWNS

COUNTY (JUDET) CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

0

0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

25 50 75 Miles

ROMANIATRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT

PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRWORKS ON NATIONAL ROADS

VARIOUS LOCATIONS

MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND OVERHAULWORKS ON INTEROPERABLE LINES

VARIOUS LOCATIONS

ROMANIA