workshop lameta inequality and social welfare: preferences...

88
Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences, behavior and measurement Ranking Distributions of an Ordinal Attribute Nicolas Gravel (Aix-Marseille Université, AMSE, France) Brice Magdalou (Univ. de Montpellier, LAMETA, France) Patrick Moyes (Univ. de Bordeaux, GREThA, France) Montpellier, November 17-18, 2016

Upload: others

Post on 30-Apr-2020

4 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Workshop LAMETAInequality and social welfare:

preferences, behavior and measurement

Ranking Distributions ofan Ordinal Attribute

Nicolas Gravel (Aix-Marseille Université, AMSE, France)Brice Magdalou (Univ. de Montpellier, LAMETA, France)

Patrick Moyes (Univ. de Bordeaux, GREThA, France)

Montpellier, November 17-18, 2016

Page 2: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Introduction

Page 3: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

A real demand for new social welfare indicators• « for a better life index » initiative (OECD, 2011) ...

Most of the social welfare dimensions are ordinal attributes• examples: development (access to housing), health (health status, body

mass index, QALY), subjective well-being (life statisfaction, happiness), education (Pisa scores, years of schooling, IQ), ...

Our objective: To propose criteria to rank such distributions• with transparent ethical foundations : efficiency / equity• empirically implementable (ex: Lorenz dominance)• Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem (Kolm 1966, Atkinson 1970, ...)

Objective of the paper

Page 4: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Very bad Bad So so Good Very good Self-assessedHealth

A scale is a list of ordered categories

Numerical representations of the scale are allowed, but defined up s

Page 5: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Very bad Bad So so Good Very good

1 2 3 4 5

Self-assessedHealth

A scale is a list of ordered categories

Numerical representations of the scale are allowed, but defined up to a strictly increasing transformation

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Page 6: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Very bad Bad So so Good Very good

1 2 3 4 15

Self-assessedHealth

A scale is a list of ordered categories

Numerical representations of the scale are allowed, but defined up to a strictly increasing transformation

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Page 7: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Very bad Bad So so Good Very good

1 13 1412 15

Self-assessedHealth

A scale is a list of ordered categories

Numerical representations of the scale are allowed, but defined up to a strictly increasing transformation

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Page 8: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Very bad Bad So so Good Very good

1 13 1412 15

Self-assessedHealth

A scale is a list of ordered categories

Numerical representations of the scale are allowed, but defined up to a strictly increasing transformation

the distance between two categories has no meaning ...

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Page 9: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

How to define « the size of the cake » ?• the ranking of the means of two distributions can be reversed by a

transformation of the (numerical) scale• Mendelson (1987): only the quantiles (ex: median) are invariant to such

transformations• efficiency considerations: captured by the notion of increment

What is the meaning of « inequality reduction » ?• for a cardinal attribute : Pigou-Dalton transfer principle• questionable for an ordinal attribute ... no alternative in the literature

Specificities of ordinal measurement

Page 10: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Most of the literature : « cardinalization » of the scale

Only few papers recognize the specificities of ordinal measurement

Alison & Foster (J. Health Eco. 2004)• applies to distributions with the same median• single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Abul-Naga & Yalcin (J. Health Eco. 2008)• develop and apply indices consistent with inequality reduction in the

sense of Alison & Foster

Cowell & Flachaire (WP 2014)• definition of individual statuses, invariant to a transfo. of the scale• inequality as distance from a reference point (mean, median, ...)

Literature

Page 11: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Framework and Definitions

Page 12: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Notation

n

C = {1, 2, . . . , k}

(ns1, n

s2, . . . , n

sk) ns

j

�kj=1n

sj = n

We consider a population of individuals

A scale is a set of ordered categories

A society s is a list , where is the number of individuals in category j, with

Page 13: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

We consider a transfer principle, due to Peter J. Hammond (Econometrica 1976), for capturing our intuition about meaning of inequality reduction in an ordinal setting

Hammond’s (progressive) transfer : • a transfer from a richer to a poorer individual, without reversing their

positions on the ordinal scale, improves social welfare• contrary to a PD transfer, which is a mean-preserving contraction in

spread, nothing is preserved here

Hammond’s transfers

Page 14: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 15: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 16: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 17: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 18: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 19: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 20: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 21: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 22: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 23: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 24: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 25: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Hammond’s transfers

Page 26: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Only the first example is a PD transfer

Hammond’s transfers

Page 27: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare functions

We consider the following large class of social welfare functions :

Normative foundations :• (kind of) utilitarianism: weights interpreted as subjective utilities• non-welfarist justification (Gravel, Marchand, Sen 2011)

Page 28: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare functions

We consider the following large class of social welfare functions :

Normative foundations :• (kind of) utilitarianism: weights interpreted as subjective utilities• non-welfarist justification (Gravel, Marchand, Sen 2011)

number of individuals in category j, in society s

Page 29: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare functions

We consider the following large class of social welfare functions :

Normative foundations :• (kind of) utilitarianism: weights interpreted as subjective utilities• non-welfarist justification (Gravel, Marchand, Sen 2011)

number of individuals in category j, in society s

weight associated to category j

Page 30: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare functions

We consider the following large class of social welfare functions :

Normative foundations :• (kind of) utilitarianism: weights interpreted as subjective utilities• non-welfarist justification (Gravel, Marchand, Sen 2011)

Two particular subclasses will be of importance :

Page 31: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

The implementation criterion is based on the following curve :

This curve is really easy to compute. We have :

Dominance: a society s dominates a society s’ if the H-curve for society s lies nowhere above that of s’

and

The H-curve

Page 32: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

Page 33: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

Lowest category Highest category

Page 34: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H-curve

ns1

n

Page 35: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H-curve

Page 36: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H(2; s)

H-curve

ns2

n

Page 37: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H(2; s)

H-curve

Page 38: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H(2; s)

H-curve

Page 39: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H(2; s)

H-curve

ns3

nH(3; s)

Page 40: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2

1 2 3 Category i

ns1 ns

2 nsk

3

ns3

The H-curve

k

...

...

k

H(1; s)

H(2; s)

H-curve

H(3; s)

Page 41: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Results

Page 42: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

Page 43: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

transparent definition of efficiency and equity

Page 44: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

transparent definition of efficiency and equity

robust ethical foundation for the SWF

Page 45: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

transparent definition of efficiency and equity

robust ethical foundation for the SWF

implementation criterion

Page 46: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

Page 47: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

increasing and « strongly » concave

Page 48: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Social welfare: efficiency and equity

increasing and « strongly » concave

Page 49: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 50: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Illustration of « strong » concavity

1 2 3 4 5 6

Lowest category Highest category

Page 51: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 52: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

Arbitrary values

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 53: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Which minimum value of for consistency with Hammond’s

transfers ?

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 54: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 55: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 56: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 57: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Loss

Gain

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 58: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 59: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

Which minimum value of for consistency with Hammond’s

transfers ?�2

�3

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 60: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 61: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 62: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 63: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 64: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�3

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 65: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�3

�6 = �k

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 66: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�3

�6 = �k

�4

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 67: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�3

�6 = �k

�4

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 68: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�1

�2

�3

�6 = �k

�4

�5

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 69: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�6 = �k

�1

�2

�3

�4

�5

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 70: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 Category i

Weight �i

�6 = �k

�1

�2

�3

�4

�5

« normal » concavity

Minimal concavity to be considered

as « strong »

Illustration of « strong » concavity

Page 71: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Dual theorem: inefficiency and equity

Dual H-curve :

Simple computation from the survival function :

Dual theorem :

and

Page 72: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

The last, but not the least, objective

Can we isolate equity considerations ?• as compared to the cardinal framework, (in)efficiency cannot be

«neutralised» but letting the means fixed• stochastic dominance strategy : intersection of weak-super-majorization

and weak-sub-majorization

Page 73: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

The last, but not the least, objective

Can we isolate equity considerations ?• as compared to the cardinal framework, (in)efficiency cannot be

«neutralised» but letting the means fixed• stochastic dominance strategy : intersection of weak-super-majorization

and weak-sub-majorization

��

We already have :

Page 74: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

The last, but not the least, objective

Can we isolate equity considerations ?• as compared to the cardinal framework, (in)efficiency cannot be

«neutralised» but letting the means fixed• stochastic dominance strategy : intersection of weak-super-majorization

and weak-sub-majorization

(c) � (a)

��

It remains to show that :

We already have :

Page 75: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Empirical Illustration

Page 76: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Body mass index as health indicator : mass(kg)/square-of-height(m)• obesity and overweight are increasingly recognized as major problems

(both for health and for self-esteem)• so can be « underweight » (anorexia)• often used as a diagnostic tool to identify pathologic weights

Six levels usually defined :

Distributions of body mass index

> 40 : morbid obesity

[35-40] : severe obesity

[30-35[ : mild obesity

[25-30[ : over-weight

[18-25[ : norm

< 18 underweight

Page 77: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Body mass index as health indicator : mass(kg)/square-of-height(m)• obesity and overweight are increasingly recognized as major problems

(both for health and for self-esteem)• so can be « underweight » (anorexia)• often used as a diagnostic tool to identify pathologic weights

Six levels usually defined :

Distributions of body mass index

> 40 : morbid obesity

[35-40] : severe obesity

[30-35[ : mild obesity

[25-30[ : over-weight

[18-25[ : norm

< 18 underweight

> 40 : morbid obesity

[35-40] : severe obesity

[30-35[ : mild obesity

[25-30[ : over-weight

< 18 : underweight

[18-25[ : norm

From the lowestto the

highest category

Page 78: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

1 2 3 4 5 6

FH

Body mass index categories

H-Curves for french adult females

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Distributions of body mass index

Data source: survey ESPS (panel since 1998)

Page 79: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Conclusion

Page 80: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

We have provided a « foundational » theorem, and some extensions, for normative evaluation dealing with distributions of a discrete ordinal attribute

The approach is easily workable : implemention criteria

Need to do :• to develop ordinal inequality indices consistent with Hammond’s

transfers• to make empirical applications (with statistical inference)• multidimensional generalizations ?

Conclusion

Page 81: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Appendix

Page 82: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Elementary transformations

Page 83: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Elementary transformationsefficiency

Page 84: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Elementary transformationsefficiency

equity

Page 85: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Inequality of self-reported health status

Data are taken from Abul-Naga & Yalcin (J. Health Eco. 2008) • Swiss Health Survey (SHS), by Switzerland’s Fed. Stat. Office in 2002 • 19.706 observations from 7 satistical areas• 5 categories : very bad, bad, so so, good, very good

Page 86: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Inequality of self-reported health status

North west

Central

Zurich

East

Léman

Ticino

Middle-land

Middle-land

Central

Zurich

East

Léman

North west Ticino

First-order dominance H-Curve

Page 87: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

In classical social choice theory, Hammond equity principle is tightly connected to the so-called leximin ordering

• Def : a society dominates another society if the poorer individual is strictly better in the first one. If equal situations, comparison of the second poorer individuals, and so on and so forth ...

• Leximin is a complete quasi-ordering

Bosmans & Ooghe (2013): the ony continuous, anonymous, Pareto-sensitive and Hammond-sensitive quasi-ordering is the maximin criterion

The first part of the paper : fixed scale / grid.

We show that dominance according to the H-curve (not a complete quasi-ordering) converges to leximin (complete)

Extension: Refinement of the grid

Page 88: Workshop LAMETA Inequality and social welfare: preferences ...dse.univr.it/it/documents/it14/Magdalou_slides_Lameta.pdf · • single-crossing condition of the CDFs about the median

Initial scale / grid :

Refinement of the grid :

The H-criterion depends upon the grid. We obtain :

Extension: Refinement of the grid