women in arab countries: challenging the patriarchal...

Women in Arab Countries:

Challenging the Patriarchal System?

Philippe Fargues

Director, Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, Robert SchumanCentre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, and Institut national d’étudesdémographiques (INED), Paris, France. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: Progress in the empowerment of Arab women was found to be low in a 2002 report.Yet Arab women’s status is not reflected in continuing high fertility, which in 2000 had droppedsharply in one generation to 3.4. This paper discusses why fertility decline could neverthelesshave taken place in the Arab countries. Islam has not stood in the way of fertility decline, as Iranand Algeria show. From the mid-1970s to 1980s, subsidised consumption through oil wealthredistribution reduced the cost of children, and social conservatism kept married women out of thelabour force, both of which promoted higher fertility. The early stages of fertility decline were mainlydue to longer length of education of girls, rising female age at first marriage, e.g. 28 in urbanMorocco and 29 in Libya, and entry into the labour force of young, single women. There is also agrowing population sub-group of never-married young women. Collapsing oil prices and structuraladjustment reduced household resources and became an effective fertility regulation factor. Girlsborn since the 1950s have not only been educated longer than their mothers, but also their fathers,which increases their authority. These factors, and women’s activism and civil and political lobbyingfor the reform of personal status now underway in a number of Arab countries, could all challengethe patriarchal system. A 2003 Institut national d’études démographiques. All rights reserved.

Keywords: fertility, education, marital status, women’s status, Middle East and North Africa region

THE stark picture of human development inthe Arab world painted in a report writtenfor the United Nations by leading Arab

researchers became the subject of impassioneddebate in late summer 2002. They found thatit was being seriously undermined by failingson three fronts: civil and political freedom,knowledge production and dissemination, andempowerment of women.1 All – but especiallythe latter – are seen as the main factors of demo-graphic transition, especially fertility reduction.Women’s status, therefore, should be reflected incontinuing high fertility. But is that the case?

The average total fertility rate (TFR) for theArab world was 3.4 children per woman in 2000.Still high compared to the world average (2.7),it is low compared to the six to eight children

per woman which was the norm for the previousgeneration. So fertility has dropped sharply.Compared to Asian or Latin American countriesat the same level of economic development, thedecline onset later in the Arab world, but onceunder way progressed so fast that internationalstatistical yearbooks were taken unawares andalmost invariably overestimate the true TFRs(Table 1).

Arguably, then, the Arab countries wouldpresent a paradox of fertility decline withoutwomen’s empowerment. And yet the causes offertility decline are universal: in the Arab worldas elsewhere, it stems from the changing role ofwomen and the place of children in the familyand society, in the wake of the radical changesin today’s world, not least urbanization, the shift

A 2003 Institut national d’études démographiques.All rights reserved.

Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–480968-8080/05 $ – see front matterPII: S0968-8080 (05 )25161-3www.rhm-elsevier.com www.rhmjournal.org.uk

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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48

to service economies and the spread of education.Why have these causes been so late-acting in theArab world? Is it down to the Islamic religion andculture, or to economic and political factors?

Oil and fertilityLate-starting fertility decline in the Arab world –and in other parts of the Muslim world – is com-monly attributed to the influence of Islam4 insupposedly holding back the two agents of demo-graphic change – women’s autonomy and theemergence of civil society organizations that pro-mote community self-empowerment – by har-nessing the former to the yoke of male authorityand the latter to that of political authority. Andyet, whether as a State or grassroots religion,Islam has not stood in the way of radical demo-

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graphic changes. Cases in point are the IslamicRepublic of Iran – a country which, though ruledby the most fundamentalist of clergies, maywell have experienced one of the most rapidfertility declines in history5 – or Algeria, wherefertility collapsed in the 1990s at the very timewhen Islamic fundamentalism was gaining moststrength among the population.

Islam, however, is not all that Arab countrieshave in common; they also have a heavy eco-nomic dependence on oil revenues: either directlyin the case of major oil exporters (Saudi Arabia,Iraq and the Gulf States in the east, Libya andAlgeria in the west), or indirectly for the othercountries, where oil wealth has a major impactthrough development assistance, private invest-ment and migrant workers’ remittances. The oileconomy experienced an unprecedented boom


in the 10–12 years after the 1973 Arab–Israeliwar, one immediate consequence of which wasto send oil prices soaring. The sudden change inscale of oil revenues (crude oil rent) enabled Arabgovernments to establish welfare state systemsthrough financing development (health, educa-tion, etc.) and subsidising consumption.

While development activities were conduciveto fertility decline, subsidised consumption, byreducing the cost of children, could work to theopposite effect. This is what happened in a num-ber of Arab countries, especially the most oil-richones, whose governments, by keeping the popu-lation in check through generous oil wealthredistribution, were able to play the forces of con-servatism and change off against one another.Social conservatism was reflected in particularby a continuing very low labour force partici-pation rate among married women. So, byboth cutting the costs of fertility and keepingwomen in the home, oil revenues indirectly pro-moted high fertility. To some extent, oil revenues‘‘generated’’ population.

The onset of the oil crisis in the mid-1980sput an end to this. Collapsing oil prices slashedrevenues and all countries, apart from the GulfStates, were quick to bring in economic reformsfrom which families lost out. Age at marriagerose, a trend fuelled by the practice acquired inthe heady oil-rich days of amassing a substan-tial marriage dowry, which now took many yearsto scrape together. Married couples had smallerfamilies, as they continued to nurture the aspi-rations held for their children during the goodtimes, while life grew dearer. This succession ofeconomic cycles widened the generation gapbetween the children of the welfare state andthose of structural adjustment.6

Women’s Medical Faculty, Al-Azhar University,Cairo, 1994

ABBAS/MAGNUM

PHOTOS

An emerging group: young never-marriedwomenThe early stages of fertility decline in the Arabworld were mainly due to the rising female ageat first marriage.3,7 Three quarters of girls inthe 1950 birth cohort married under the age of20, compared to just one third in the 1970 birthcohort. Mean age at marriage had risen fromunder 20 to over 25 in barely a generation.

Why should women’s age at marriage haverisen so fast? A longer length of education isone reason. That explains the decline in early

marriages, but not the high incidence of verylate marriages: the vast majority of girls arenow educated up to the age of 15, but still onlya minority remain in education after age 20. Theproportion single among young women aged20–24 is therefore much higher than their enrol-ment ratio: 47% against 10% in Syria (1994 cen-sus), 84% against 17% in Tunisia (1994), 56%against 18% in Egypt (1996).

Employment is another reason for delayedmarriage. It is not yet wholly acceptable in Arabsocieties for a married woman to work outsidethe home. In the Arab countries covered by thefertility surveys of the 1990s, the average partici-pation rate was 31% among single 25–29 year-old females against 18% among married womenof the same age group with (18%) or without chil-dren (17%): clearly, marriage more than mother-hood is what prompts women to forsake workinglife. By putting a growing number of women onthe labour market, the economic changes under

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way – growth in women-dominated occupations(teaching, health, administration, etc.) and declin-ing living conditions from the end of the welfarestate – have therefore arguably contributed todelayed marriages.

Delayed marriage tends to be construed asevidence of the empowerment of Arab women.The two reasons cited above – rising educationallevels and entry into the labour force – argue infavour of that interpretation, in that for manyyoung women, their unattached years are a timefor acquiring skills or material assets, and for self-fulfilment. But empowerment is not absolute,as single women remain under the authority oftheir father or legal guardian. They live withtheir family until marriage, as do the overwhelm-ing majority of young people: in the working-class districts of a large metropolis like Cairo,male students and soldiers are the only singlepeople to live away from their family of origin.The lengthening premarital period, sometimesbeyond age 25 and even to almost 30 (28 in urbanMorocco, 29 in Libya), has created a populationsubgroup of never-married young women. Thisnew group has not yet carved out its own placein society, still less secured legal recognition.

Increasingly better educated, but lesseconomically active than menThe number of veiled women about the streetsof many Arab cities is growing. Is this a reflec-tion of resurgent religious devotion? Or simplythat more women are to be seen in the publicspace because the Islamic veil allows them tomove around freely? Education is what has reallyallowed girls, previously confined to domesticityfrom the age of puberty, into the public space.But has it gone as far as full gender equality ineducation? Egypt has witnessed a steady birthcohort-specific improvement in the deficit ofgirls in the school population (Figure 1). Egypt,which is averagely-placed in this respect, reflectsa reassuring picture of a steady advance towardsgender equality. The once chiefly male schoolpopulation (barely one girl to three boys in thecohorts born around 1930) has now becomenearly gender equal in primary and secondaryeducation (90 girls to 100 boys in the cohortsborn around 1980), and seems well-advanced inuniversity education (66 girls to 100 boys in the1970 birth cohort).

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Unlike school, many workplaces remain rela-tively closed off to women. Labour statistics(Table 1) show that Arab countries have theworld’s lowest female participation rates. How-ever, the evidence of a series of time-use surveysis that traditional statistical sources (censuses)underestimate Arab women’s real contribution tothe economy, because it partly comprises home-maker activities, and census takers’ questions areusually answered by men who are unwilling toacknowledge the economic nature of such activ-ities. Is it to take account of unrecorded femaleactivities that international publications havesignificantly revalued (albeit on an unknownbasis) the female participation rates reported inrecent censuses: revalued from 14% (1996 census)to 35% in Egypt, from 15% (1998) to 30% inAlgeria, from 21% (1994) to 41% in Morocco, from23% (1994) to 37% in Tunisia? The fact remainsthat, even revalued, these rates remain low com-pared to the world average (55%).

Might not women’s low participation rateshold the clue to one means by which Islam hashelped delay fertility decline? Lawyers argue thatby recognising women’s right to own personalproperty, but not an obligation to contribute tofamily finances out of their income, the Shari’ah(Islamic law) increases husbands’ reluctance toallow their wives to work. But we must be wary


of syllogism: legal provisions do not produceactual practices. The evidence of anthropologicalresearch is that economic realities outweigh legal-ism: in the crisis-hit urban classes, families notuncommonly rely on the wife’s income, prompt-ing husbands to forego standing on their legalrights to restrict the main breadwinner’s move-ments. In terms of family finances, women’s workis a response to the decline in men’s real wages.

Under the welfare state, women’s low partici-pation rates could partly explain their high fer-tility. Is the modest rise in female economicactivity recorded in times of economic hardshipsreason enough for the collapse in fertility?Probably not. A more likely explanation is lowhousehold incomes compounded by low femaleparticipation. The welfare state had raised parents’aspirations and the level of their financial invest-ment for their children, while structural adjust-ment now undermines their real resources. So,women’s partial empowerment reflected by theirlow contribution to household incomes becomesan effective fertility regulation factor.* This couldexplain the paradox stated above of a fertilitytransition unaccompanied by (total) empower-ment of women.

The end of the patriarchal systemWhat prospects might these trends foreshadow?Demographic change is undermining the patri-archal system which has governed the familysystem since time immemorial. That system restedon two pillars: younger brothers’ subordination tothe eldest brother in sibling relationships, andgirl–women subordination to males within thefamily or marriage unit. Fertility decline under-mines the first pillar. The modern trend towardstwo-child families – on average a boy and a girl –quite simply lessened the scope for a hierarchybetween brothers, for lack of brothers.

The second pillar can still be based on law, stillmodelled as regards personal status on theShari’ah. But the gap between law and actualpractices is widening. The rise in education levelshas not only affected gender, but also generation,

*Married women’s non-participation increases the rela-

tive cost of children, while participation increases their

opportunity cost (loss of earnings during spells out of

employment for child-rearing).

hierarchies. Measured by mean length of educa-tion, the educational attainment gap betweenchildren and their parents has grown steadily(Figure 2). From the 1950s’ birth cohorts, girlshave not only been educated longer than theirmothers, but also than their fathers. And sinceeducation is an element of authority, girls’ over-achievement compared to their fathers could wellchallenge the patriarchal system. On a cohort-for-cohort basis, women are now almost as well-educated as men, their labour force participationis bringing them in growing numbers into closecontact with non-relative males with whom theyare competing in the labourmarket.Women’s activ-ism and civil and political lobbying for the reformof personal status now under way in a number ofArab countries are likely to topple the patriarchalsystem from its increasingly shaky foundations.

Note

This is a reprint of Philippe Fargues. Womenin Arab countries: challenging the patriarchalsystem? Population & Societies No.387, INED,February 2003, available at bwww.ined.frN,reproduced in full with kind permission of theauthor and INED.

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http:www.ined.fr

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RésuméD’après un rapport de 2002, les femmes arabesprogressent lentement vers l’autonomisation.Pourtant, leur statut ne va pas de pair avecle maintien d’une fécondité élevée : en unegénération, celle-ci a été ramenée à 3,4 en 2000.L’Islam n’a pas fait obstacle au déclin de lafécondité, ainsi que le montrent l’Iran et l’Algérie.À partir de la moitié des années 70 et pendantles années 80, les subventions à la consommationprovenant de la redistribution des revenuspétroliers ont réduit le coût de l’éducation desenfants, et le conservatisme social a maintenules femmes mariées à la maison, deux mesuresqui ont stimulé la fécondité. La fécondité acommencé à diminuer principalement du faitde l’allongement des études des filles, ce qui aretardé l’âge du premier mariage, par exemple 28ans pour les Marocaines urbaines et 29 pour lesLibyennes, et l’entrée sur le marché de l’emploides célibataires. Les jeunes célibataires sont aussiplus nombreuses. La chute des prix pétroliers etl’ajustement structurel ont régulé efficacementla fécondité. Les filles nées depuis les années50 sont plus instruites que leur mère, mais aussique leur père, ce qui accroı̂t leur autorité. Cesfacteurs, ainsi que l’activisme des femmes et lespressions pour la réforme du statut personnelen cours dans plusieurs pays arabes pourraientsaper le système patriarcal.

ResumenEn un informe del 2002 se encontraronmuy pocosavances en la empoderación de las mujeres árabes.No obstante, el estatus de las mujeres árabes nose refleja en la continua fertilidad elevada, queen 2000 habı́a disminuido marcadamente a 3.4en una generación. En este artı́culo se examinanlas causas de esta disminución en los paı́sesárabes. Islam no ha obstaculizado el descenso dela fertilidad, como se observa en Irán y Argelia.Desde mediados de los años setenta hasta losochenta, el consumo subsidiado mediante laredistribución de la riqueza petrolera redujo elcosto de tener hijos, y el conservadurismo socialmantuvo a las mujeres casadas fuera de lafuerza de trabajo; ambos factores promovieronuna fertilidad elevada. Las etapas iniciales dela disminución de la fertilidad se debieronprincipalmente a una duración más larga de laeducación de las niñas, un ascenso en la edadde las mujeres al primer matrimonio, p. ej., 28 enMarruecos urbano y 29 en Libia, y la entrada delas mujeres jóvenes solteras en la fuerza detrabajo. Existe, además, un creciente subgrupodemográfico de mujeres jóvenes que nunca se hancasado. Los bajos precios del petróleo y el ajusteestructural disminuyeron los recursos hogareñosy constituyen un factor eficaz en la regulaciónde la fertilidad. Las niñas nacidas a partir delos años cincuenta han recibido una educaciónmás larga que ambos padres, lo cual aumentasu autoridad. Estos factores, y el activismo ycabildeo civil y polı́tico de las mujeres con el finde reformar su estatus personal, actualmenteen curso en varios paı́ses árabes, podrı́an retarel sistema patriarcal.

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Women in Arab Countries: Challenging the Patriarchal System?Oil and fertilityAn emerging group: young never-married womenIncreasingly better educated, but less economically active than menThe end of the patriarchal systemNoteReferences

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