WHERE JUDICIAL REFORMS FITS THE BANK’S AGENDA

LCR PERSPECTIVE

David F. Varela, LCCVE

THE COUNTRY’S JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT CYCLE

Countries started working in judicial reform well before the Bank started

Identification

External criticism of the judicial authorities

- Questions about their honesty or competence

- Excessive formalism of the procedural rules

- Deficient quality of services delivered

- Excessive cost for the service users

Media interest in judicial affairs

Self-criticism of the judicial authorities

Preparation and Appraisal

Outside pressure for judicial reforms

Intervention of other State Powers

Leadership of the judicial authorities

Inspiration in foreign models

Adoption of a reform agenda

Implementation and Evaluation

Complexity of the implementation process

Disagreements among the authorities responsible of implementation

Unsatisfied expectations of service users

Unexpected and/or uncontrollable side effects

COSTS AND RISKS OF THE COUNTRY’S JUDICIAL REFORM CYCLE

Judicial reform is a long-term, time-consuming process

Costs

Political capital consumed in the consensus-building process

Scarce human resources allocated to the planning and execution of reforms instead of service delivery

Scarce budgetary resources allocated to reform financing

Risks

Weakening of judicial independence

Negative media coverage

Possible politicization

Growing confusion among court users and staff

Limited or temporary impact of certain reforms

A BANK-FINANCED JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT CYCLE

Where a Bank operation meets the Country’s needs and priorities

Economic DevelopmentPrivate sector development

Poverty reduction

Improved GovernanceTransparency and accountabilityPost-conflict countries: social peace, public safety

Rationale for Bank involvement

Recognized by judicial authoritiesPolitical interference

Low budgets

Antiquated legislation

Not recognized by judicial authoritiesLimited managerial capacities

Poorly prepared human capital

Access barriers –costs, jargon, distance-

Sector issues

Analytical Framework (Selectivity)

ESW: Diagnostic of sector issuesPolicy Notes

Sector assessment

IGR: Broad institutional and governance issues

Justice section

Transparency and accountability issues

Strategy Framework (Selectivity)

Country’s Development Plan/PRSPsGovernance section

Justice section

CAS: Inclusion in the Bank’s business planFull-fledged CAS

Interim Strategy Notes

CAS Progress Reports: Modification of the Bank’s business plan

Preparation Activities (Selectivity)

Identification of reform proposalsStakeholder consultation (Judiciary and other sector institutions, Executive, Congress)Multidisciplinary Focus (Legal, Economic, Financial, Managerial)

Developing sector strategiesConsistency with country’s development plan/PRSP

Consensus-buildingDonor coordination

Design of specific reform initiativesCost-benefit analysisBeneficiary selectionMonitoring and evaluation indicators

Bank internal processes

Task Budgets (Norms)PreparationSupervision

Task Teams (CMU and SMU dialogue)Legal expertise Non-legal expertise

Typical Objectives

Strengthen the institutional capacity of the Judiciary to coordinate the implementation of reform programs

Achieve concrete improvements in the quality and efficiency of justice services

Support independence, transparency and integrity of judicial authorities

Encourage the access to justice of marginal groups

Typical ComponentsProvision of justice services

Planning, management and evaluationCourt and case management

Professional development of judicial human resourcesHuman resources managementLegal and non-legal trainingCultural change

IntegrityAdministrative systemsDisciplinary systems

Access to justiceAccess to justice services for the poorInformation and communications

Project management, monitoring and evaluation

Project unitsStaffed by consultantsAttached to highest judicial authorities

Advisory panelsProminent individuals selected on the basis of their expertise on judicial reform issuesProvide advice on specific issues

Task forcesSmall teams within the Judiciary's structureCoordinate implementation activitiesMaintain regular communication with donors and stakeholders

Implementation Arrangements

Continuous consensus-building process

Preparation and implementation of legal and regulatory reform packages (project-related or not)

Communication activities Internal (Judiciary and other sector institutions)

External (Legal profession, users, citizenry)

Implementation Activities

Goods, works, training consultants services, and operating costs required for:

- Building construction- Office equipment (software, hardware); E-justice?- Diagnostic studies- Workshops, seminars and conferences- Training programs

Following Bank procurement and financial management guidelines

Country systemsHarmonization

Eligible Expenditures

Best practices

Ensure commitment of highest country authorities

Reorient resources towards small and med-sized operations

Develop multi-annual plans to achieve systemic changes

Prepared by independent experts

Coordinated with other donors

CONCLUSION

Judicial Reform: A Gordian Knot of a Trojan Horse?

The Gordian Knot: Complexity

Political economy of reform Authorities Stakeholders

Project design and implementation Partner institutions Targeted groups

Monitoring and evaluation Process and product indicators Perception and hard-core data

The Trojan Horse: Opportunities

Democracy-building Effective separation of powers

Checks and balances Barriers to abuse or misuse of power

Rule of law Recognition and enforcement of individual and group

rights Legitimacy of State institutions

Fight against corruption Enforcement of anti-corruption laws