Non-Aligned Africa and the Middle East CrisisAuthor(s): George ShepherdSource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, What Happened to The African Revolution? (Jun., 1967),p. 4Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184783 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 18:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.28 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 18:30:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Non-aligned Africa and the Middle East Crisis The United Nations has swung from the

depths of futility on the Middle East crisis to be- coming the center of the power struggle over the basis of the peace settlement. The Third World has been the decisive force in the decisions of the General Assembly on Middle Eastern crises in the past. The fear that this assembly will turn into an anti-Western binge may arise from the weakness of the West's position.

The Soviet Union, in pressing for handing the issue over to the General Assembly, has counted upon the support of the African states for its attack on the West and Israel. However, the African states, as a whole, are not likely to accede to the pressures of any of the great powers. Most of the black African states give every indi- cation of continuing their non-aligned policy. Nor have the Arabs or the Israelis been able to count on the support of the black African nations.

When it comes to an Arab-Israeli confronta- tion shot through with cold war connotations, Af- rica has lined up in three basic groups: the Islamic and Arab states of Northern Africa, and Black Africa, consisting of two groups-a revolutionary and a more pragmatic, pro-Western group. Very little difference is discernible between the French and English-speaking nations, now that France has herself become non-aligned on Middle Eastern matters.

During the height of the latest crisis the old unity of the Arab world was revived. All of the North African states, including Tunisia (which had long been alienated) joined in the hostilities against Israel. The Sudan, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, declared war and offered a contingent of troops, though previously at odds with Nasser.

In the peace settlement maneuvering, this Arab solidarity, though weakening in the case of the oil boycott, is solidly with Nasser and sup- ports the Soviet Union's condemnation of Israel.

Black Africa, however, follows a more inde- pendent line. The arduous and positive work the Israelis have done in extending technical assist- ance to the African states has gained them re- spect and recognition. In the Security Council de- bates revolutionary Mali sided with the Soviet Union, while pragmatic Nigeria took an independ- ent position.

The majority of the African states cannot be expected to support Israeli territorial expansion. Julius Nyerere recently remarked "Tanzania ac-

cepts Israel's claim to existence", but he expected reciprocal recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestine Arabs to return to their homeland, and warned Israel against joining in an "Imperial- ist adventure to topple President Nasser".

Tanzania stands between the two black African groups. Nyerere is not as doctrinaire and anti- American as Mali; but he suspects American in- tentions far more than Emperor Haile Selassie or President Jomo Kenyatta. Nevertheless his poli- cies are representative of the thinking of the great majority of black African states.

Guinea, Mali, and Congo Brazzaville represent a minority of African nations who are very sensi- tive to Communist charges that American and British policies are neo-colonialist. Unfortunately they have temporarily been persuaded by the Arabs that American and British planes partici- pated in the war because this fits their basic as- sumptions about the West. The credibility of the U.S. and the U.K. has been badly hurt by the disastrous Vietnam campaign and the moral pos- turing in Rhodesia. Thus many of the more revo- lutionary Africans are in a mood to believe al- most anything damaging to the reputations of Johnson and Wilson.

The weakest position the United States could take is to respond with a cold war reflex action against the Russians in support of Israel. This can, as in the past, alienate Afro-Asian leaders. If the United States resists the pressures to re- turn to the cold war fixation and insists on an equitable peace settlement, the Third World will respond favorably.

Most African leaders, as well as a large part of the Third World are in favor of securing the recognition of the State of Israel by the Arab world, and assuring international free passage in the Gulf of Aquaba. They are not interested in pinning the blame for the conflict on either side. And, most important, they resist territorial ex- pansion, especially where this dispossesses large populations, as on the West bank of the Jordan.

The United States has lost ground in the Arab world over the Middle East; but most of the rest of the African and Third World may find itself suddenly very close to the United States if we insist on no territorial expansion in return for recognition and co-existence.

George Shepherd

What Is Revolutionary Action in Africa Today? Since 1957, a clear split has developed be-

tween African political leaders. Some have called this a division between revolutionaries and moderates. This split was revealed in the strains between Guinea and the Ivory Coast, Ghana (pre- 1966) and Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya, Algeria and Morocco, Lumumba and Kasavubu in the Congo, the MPLA and the UPA in Angola, the

Casablanca Powers and the Monrovia Group. It is clear from the defeat of the Lumumbist forces in the Congo, the downfall of Kwame Nkrumah, the standstill of liberation movements in southern Africa, that the revolutionary forces have, since 1964, not done well.

The nature of the arguments between these two camps is well known. The arguments have

4 AFRICA TODAY

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.28 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 18:30:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions