what can we mean by “cognition,” and does it make any sense?

Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy Volume 7, Number 2, Summer 1989

WHAT CAN WE MEAN BY "COGNITION," AND DOES IT

MAKE ANY SENSE?

Harold B. Robb III

A B S T R A C T : Practitioners of Rational-Emotive Therapy easily identify themselves with the broad camp of cognitive behavior therapy. However, the meaning of the term "cognition" is often unclear. Six possible meanings are outlined: (1) mental event, (2) symbolic overt behavior, (3) symbolic covert behavior, (4) pragmatic convention, (5) unreportable behavior and (6) hypothetical construct. This paper aims to: (1) clarify what we can mean when we talk about cognition, and (2) identify which meanings keep us in the tradition of empirical science and which take us to the realm of spooks and nonsense.

Pract i t ioners of Rat ional -Emotive Therapy (RET) are associated wi th the broad camp of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). However, the m e a n i n g of the t e rm "cognition" is often unclear when used by adheren ts of both RET and CBT. This paper has two aims: (1) clari- fying wha t we can m e a n when we ta lk about cognition, and (2) identifying which mean ings keep us in the t radi t ion of empirical science and which take us to the rea lm of spooks and nonsense. Six possible meanings for cognition are described and examined in this paper: (1) men ta l event, (2) symbolic overt behavior, (3) symbolic covert behavior, (4) p ragmat ic convention, (5) unrepor table behavior and (6) hypothet ical construct.

Cogni t ion as a Menta l E v e n t

Historically, the t e rm "cognition" has presumed the metaphysical doctrine of dual ism. Dual i sm claims the existence of two worlds, one

Hank Robb works as a private practitioner. He is an Associate Fellow and approved Supervisor of the Institute of Rational-Emotive Therapy, New York, as well as a Diplomate in Counseling Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology.

Address correspondence and reprint requests to Hank Robb, Ph.D., 4550 S. W. Kruse Way, Suite 325, Lake Oswego, Oregon 97035.

67 �9 1989 Human Sciences Press

68 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

composed of "empirical stuff ' and another composed of "mental stuff," or, for my money, "spook stuff." Begun by the Neoplatonists, if not by Plato himself, dualism was further developed by Christian philoso- phers and brought to completion by Descartes and his followers (Rus- sell, 1984). Historically, cognition has been understood to be a func- tion of "mental stuff."

Dualistic approaches describe mental or "spook stuff' as having attributes exactly opposite of "non-spook," empirical stuff. Therefore, "spook stuff ' is said to be timeless, spaceless and weightless. "Mental measurement" is, in truth, an oxymoron. Infinite things are not measurable. By definition, "mental stuff ' either endures for an infinitely long or an infinitely short time. Thus, it is timeless. It either occupies an infinitely large or an infinitely small space. Thus, it is spaceless. It either has an infinitely large or an infinitely small weight. Thus, it is weightless.

This is why psychology in its attempt to assert itself as an empirical science has always had a love affair with measurement. Measuring phenomena shows the phenomena cannot be part of the "spook" world, because that world is not measurable.

"Spooks" are the reason science and religion inevitably conflict. Science proceeds only by removing reference to "spooks." Religion proceeds only by insisting on reference to them.

If cognitive behavior therapy is to stay within the tradition of empirical science, it cannot stick with this first and oldest meaning of cognition. "Cognitive phenomena" cannot mean "mental phenomena." Our cardinal rule had better remain: No "spooks!"

Leaving aside the more outlandish claims of religion, there have been two historically important supports for the concept of "spook stuff." First is the inability of physio-chemical concepts to deal with problems of symbolic behavior, especially complex linguistic behavior such as theorizing about theorizing. Second is the well known fact that humans have "private" or covert experiences. Such experiences are reportable only by the experiencing person, e.g. visualizing a sunset or "hearing" the national anthem when it is not "actually" being played. These historical supports are addressed below.

Cognition as Symbolic Overt Behavior

Practitioners of behavioral treatments were once criticized by Locke (1971) for seeming to omit from acconts of their procedures two obvi-

Harold B. Robb III 69

ous facts: (1) they and their service recipients talked to one another; and (2) what was said played a central role in the procedures. The term "cognition" might be used to denote that physio-chemical speci- fication of events like talk, sign language, or mathematics will not sufficiently characterize the controlling role of these events in human behavior.

"Noise" is not necessarily differentiated from "speech" by simply identifying the physical patterns of the sound waves. The sounds produced by someone speaking Chinese are verbal stimuli to someone who "knows the language," but "noise" to someone who lacks the proper background. The work on self-instructions, self-control, disputing and reattribution are often "cognitive" using this second meaning of cognition, and I, for one, wholeheartedly endorse this use of "cognition."

Cognition as Symbolic Covert Behavior

A third way the term "cognition" may be used is in making reference to private or covert events, especially symbolic covert events. This use of cognition designates events reportable by one person but by no one else. In this sense, systematic desensitization is a cognitive strategy as are thought stopping, covert sensitization and covert self- instructions.

Private or covert events were traditionally ruled out of psychology by methodological behaviorism because they do not conform to the doctrine of public verifiability (Skinner, 1974). On the doctrine of methodological behaviorism, science only proceeds if two or more per- sons can simultaneously make reports on the subject of investigation. Obviously, private events can never meet this requirement because only one person is ever in position to report on private events. Indeed, that is why they are labeled "private." The only way we can ever af- firm that a set of neuronal firings, which are publicly observable in theory at least, produces the vision of a sunset, which is inherently private, is by asking the person if they are experiencing such a vision and then relying solely on their answer. No amount of information about neuronal firings can prove a person is visualizing a sunset when they insist they are not.

Methodological behaviorists found themselves in the troublesome position of agreeing to study the publicly verifiable reports about


private events, but unable to admit for study the private events which are the subject of these publicly verifiable reports. Radical behaviorism (Skinner, 1974) does allow these events to be admitted for study, though Skinner, for one, often speculates that investigating them will not add much to understanding human behavior. Radical behaviorism simply asserts that the privacy of an event does not move it from the empirical world to the "spook" world. In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Rile (1949) quite clearly makes the case that private events need not imply the world of "spooks." In psychology, methodological behaviorism first pushed the "No Spooks" Doctrine into the area of public symbolic behavior, but stopped there. Radical behaviorism pushed the "No Spooks" Doctrine into the area of private events.

There has been a long controversy over whether symbolic events and physio-chemical events are of the same logical type. If they are not, the science-language developed in the study of symbolic events will not be reducible to the science-language developed in the study of physio-chemical events. Saying there is a logical gulf between these two language systems does not imply the existence of "spooks." Con- sider. Because we understand the every day language rules associated with concepts of color and sound, we know it is nut ty to ask, "What sound does orange make?", or "How green is loud?" Our troubles in re- sponding to such questions arise because the concepts used in formu- lating the questions have been used improperly. In ordinary language, we cannot relate these two concepts in the way implied by the sentences. That we admittedly have this sort of trouble is hardly a ground for believing in spooks.

If the assertion that a logical gulf exists between the science-language developed in the study of symbolic events and the science- language developed in the study of physio-chemical events is correct, then one system may not be reduced and perhaps not even translated to the other. But as before, the fact that we have this trouble is hardly a ground for believing in "spooks."

The problem of reduction is as eminent for public symbolic behavior as for private symbolic behavior. There is no reason to argue the "scientific superiority" of public symbolic behavior over private symbolic behavior on reductionistic grounds. The privacy or publicity of symbolic events is irrelevant. Our problem is a logical problem involving all symbolic events. Neither type of symbolic behavior implies the existence of "spooks." Whether one type of behavior proves superior to the other is a matter for empirical demonstration under specific condi- tions. Since private events are all but an indisputable fact of human


existence, and since our attention to them need in no way tie us to the concept of "spooks," I, for one, wholeheartedly endorse this use of "cognition."

Cognition as a Pragmatic Convention

A fourth possibility is using the term "cognition" to refer to purely pragmatic conventions. Pragmatic conventions are terms which need not have empirical referents, but neither do they refer to "spooks" (Turner, 1967). The value of such terms is procedural or directive. By establishing a pragmatic convention, one is led to undertake activity which might not otherwise be undertaken. The utility of the pragmatic convention is determined by the results of the procedures in- spired by the convention. The fact that a pragmatic convention in- spires effective procedures does not prove a "spook" lurks unseen and is the "real reason" for the results we see.

Rational-emotive approaches to behavior change (Ellis & Grieger, 1977) may be construed as relying, at least in part, on this forth meaning of cognition. When practitioners use a rational-emotive approach, they often make reference to certain "suppressed premises" which are leading the service recipients to behave as they do, e.g. "You are an- gry because you think your spouse must do as you want."

If clients could actually report such private events, the third meaning of cognition would apply. However, it is clear that clients fre- quently have no private or covert events to report. Rather, these suppressed premises can be construed as purely pragmatic conventions. Practitioners make reference to them in order to get clients to engage in behavior which is expected to be more effective, e.g. increased use of certain types of self-talk. The value of a pragmatic convention lies in its ability to direct us to effective actions. In this case, raising the is- sue of a "suppressed premise" is judged effective based on whether clients produce the self-talk encouraged by the practitioner, and whether this self-talk decreases the problems experienced by the clients.

By insisting the value of a pragmatic convention be empirically demonstrated, we remain in the empirical tradition even when theorizing with terms which may have no empirical referents. Of course, the empirically demonstrable utility of this or that pragmatic convention is always open to question. Researchers can well examine the ef- fectiveness of introducing a "suppressed premise" as a gambit for inducing new forms of behavior. Since using pragmatic conventions can prove quite helpful in treating psychological dysfunction and since


they need in no way tie us to the concept of "spooks," I, for one, wholeheartedly endorse this use of "cognition."

Cognition as an Unreportable Behavior

A fifth possibility is the term "cognition" refers to symbolic behavior which "exists," but which is inherently unreportable. Closely inspect- ing the concept of irrational ideas as used by Ellis, and the concepts of schemas and automatic thoughts as used by Beck (1979) shows both Ellis and Beck seeming to assert the existence of symbolic behavior which occurs "outside of awareness." No one can make reports about the occurence of such presumed behavior. Ellis and Beck both seem to take as evidence for the existence of "out of awareness" symbolic behavior the fact that (1) people will either "spontaneously" voice a suppressed premise when directly confronted with it, and (2) people change emotionally and behaviorally when they act against these "suppressed premises."

If these are the cognitions to which cognitive behavior modifiers wish to refer, they are asserting a strange type of empiricism. This approach requires events which are inherently unreportable to be called "empirical." In my view, such events are exactly the kind of events which are not meant by the term "empirical," and nothing is gained by so designating them.

Consider the first "proof" for the existence of events about which no one can make reports, that people will either "spontaneously" voice a suppressed premise when engaged in Socratic dialogue or will agree they hold such a premise when directly confronted with it. Socrates himself thought humans were born with all knowledge already inside them because under "proper questioning" he could "get out" what was already "in there." The next intellectual step was the assertion that all knowledge could be obtained by applying correct deductive pro- cesses to indisputable premises. The last four hundred years of empiricism shows these ideas are mistaken (Russell, 1984).

Once people get the hang of logical behavior, they can often "fill in the blank" or agree that "logically speaking" they must be adhering to certain suppressed premises. These facts only show they have developed some appreciation of how to play a logic game. As any practitioner can attest, many clients have developed little or no appreciation for logic, let alone the ability to play the game with any facility. Ap- preciation of logic is often the first thing the practitioner has to culti- vate. Much of what Beck calls "collaborative empiricism" are exercises


designed to develop depressed people's appreciation for logic and its potential application to their problems. These tactics are demonstrably effective, as are the tactics developed by Ellis. That hardly proves events about which no one can make reports are lurking about "causing the problem."

There is no doubt that people overtly and covertly produce nonsense and attempt to conduct their lives by this nonsense with resulting unpleasantness. But, these events are reportable by somebody, if only a single person. In the present instance, we are talking about events about which no one can make a report, events which are inherently unreportable.

People may consult a theory about falling rocks if they wish to predict the behavior of falling rocks. The theory is not "in" the rock "causing" it to fall. People may also consult a theory about human behavior to predict human behavior. That doesn't prove the theory is "in" the people "causing" them to behave as they do. Since people are not rocks, though sometimes they can be fairly rock-headed, people can learn about theories and use theories to affect their own behavior. Perhaps we might then say the theory is "in" their head "causing" them to behave in a certain way. But, at that point, these theories will hardly be events about which no one can make reports. The answer to this problem is to return to the concept of pragmatic convention, and make a distinction between rule-governed and rule-consistent behavior.

There are many cases when humans control their behavior by following rules. For example, most of us found it useful to memorize a rule for calculating the area of a triangle, base multiplied by height divided by two. We then covertly produced the rule, or actually wrote it down, plugged in the appropriate values and solved the problem. Let this behavior be called "rule-governed behavior."

Rule-governed behavior may be distinguished from behavior which can be described by a rule, but which is not produced by a rule. A baseball player with a "natural swing" may swing level, meet the ball, etc., without resorting to rules. However, this behavior is consistent with the rules swing level, meet the ball, etc., and may be described by these rules. Let this behavior be called "rule-consistent behavior."

Schemas, irrational philosophies, suppressed premises, or any event about which no one can make a report may be conceptualized as rule- consistent behavior. When practitioners introduce statements about schemas, or suppressed premises into a session they can be seen as using a pragmatic convention. The convention states a rule which


is consistent with the behavior. The point of the technique is to facili- tate the introduction of alternative rules which clients use to change their behavior, e.g. disputing the correctness of the rule with which their behavior is consistent, or engaging in an "experiment" to test the "truth" of this rule. The client is attempting to estabish rule-governed behavior using sane and sensible rules provided or induced by the practitioner. This conceptualization retains the demonstrably effective procedures without asserting the existence of events which are inherently unreportable. For these reasons I wish to discourage the use of "cognition" as an unreportable behavior, and encourage the kind of pragmatic conventions described above.

Cognition as a Hypothetical Construct

A sixth possibility is that "cognition" is being used as a hypothetical construct or holding term. As indicated above, it is possible to conceive the terms used in a discussion of cognitive processing as purely pragmatic conventions which need have no empirical referents, and whose use will rise or fall on their empirically demonstrated utility. On the other hand, in the traditional stimulus-organism-response paradigm, some terms are needed to describe what takes place "in" the organism, where "cognitive processing" is said to occur. These cognitive terms are first approximation physio-chemical accounts describing what is literally happening in the organism. In such cases, these cognitive terms can be said to be holding a place in the account of behavior which will eventually be cashed in for a more complete physio-chemical account. This eventual addition to the account is part of the "sur- plus meaning" described by MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) in their now classic paper, "On a Distinction Between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables."

If the term "cognition" is used as a holding term, the doctrine of physio-chemical reductionism is assumed because it is the physio- chemical account for which a place is being held by the cognitive terms. Reductionism is not about explaining "big phenomena" in terms of "little phenomena." It is about being able to do all the work of one explanatory system by substituting another explanatory system which either: (1) has fewer terms or concepts, (2) explains a wider array of phenomena than the first or (3) both. No one is seriously trying to explain the "Big Bang," an admittedly large phenomena, in terms of the actions of hundreds of zillions of atoms, or just that many more quarks. Reductionism is not about that sort of thing.


Historically, there has been considerable controversy among methodological and radical behaviorists over the acceptability of hypothetical constructs in psychological theorizing. In part, the controversy arose because radical behaviorists questioned the value of the particu- lar hypothetical constructs proposed by Hull (Skinner, 1950). This does not necessarily mean the concept of the hypothetical construct is unacceptable, though Skinner and Tolman opposed them (Turner, 1967). It has also been argued that since holding terms must eventually be cashed in for physio-chemicat accounts, cognitive terms cannot be formulated in ways that conflict with physio-chemical accounts. Others have argued this places too great a restriction on theorizing about behavior.

Would brain physiologists accept the assertion that their concep- tualizing must be carried out so as not to conflict in any way with the current concepts of physics? Certainly not. A unified science based on the concepts of physics means that all living phenomena can be ex- plained with concepts equally appropriate for nonliving phenomena. Getting such a system has been a fairly tough nut to crack. Nonethe- less, the problem hardly proves brain physiologists are against eventually producing a unified science in which a single set of concepts explains all phenomena. Neither does it mean that brain physiologists support the existence of "spooks"! Cognitive behavioral practitioners and researchers who are determined to treat cognitive terms as first approximations of physio-chemical accounts of what is literally happening inside an organism would be wise to adopt the same sort of position.

However, I would discourage using of the term "cognition" as a hypothetical construct on two counts. First, using hypothetical constructs presumes reductionism which requires that symbolic events and physio-chemical events are of the same logical type. As we have already seen, this presumption is quite controversial. If the science- language developed in the study of symbolic events is not of the same logical type as the science-language developed in the study of physio- chemical events, then one will not be reducible to the other. Thus, our supposed hypothetical constructs will never perform as advertised. The logical gulf will forever prevent these "cognitive" terms from being be cashed in for a physio-chemical account of what is literally happening in the organism. While such an outcome would not require us to believe in "spooks" and would be unfortunate for all those hoping for the eventual unification of all science, that's all it would be, unfortunate. The scientific standing of psychological work does not rise or


fall on the even tua l r educ t ion of t h a t work to the concepts used by o the r workers .

Second, I sugges t we let t he b ra in physiologis ts concern themse lves wi th the i r own problems. If our p r agma t i c convent ions prove helpful to psychological researchers as well as the providers and rec ipients of psychological services bu t do not prove he lpfu l to b ra in physiologis ts or o ther scient is ts work ing wi th phys io-chemical problems, t h a t is good e n o u g h for me. If t he b ra in physiologis ts have a p rob lem dea l ing wi th the symbolic behav io r of h u m a n s w i th in the i r conceptual frame- work, let them work on it. We are wiser to occupy ourselves wi th our own problems, which are considerable.

A LITTLE A P P L I C A T I O N

Grieger (1985), in an o therwise h igh ly lucid ar t icle states:

In the Active-Active Process, then, the concept of a Declaration is crucial. In the spirit of the Contextual ABC Model, a declaration is an act of creation that has nothing to do with t ruth or empirical validity; by declaration something becomes what it is declared to be simply because a person says so, or declares it. Examples of declarations include the following: a judge declares a defendant guilty; a baseball umpire calls a strike; a parent names a child "Todd", a priest pronounces someone married; a person forgives himself for a wrongdoing; a person says "I love you" to someone else. All of the outcomes these declarations imply, happen or be- come real simply because someone with authority pronounces them so.

The importance of the Declaration Process is that people, by endorsing the position of Living Philosophically, have the power to create out of their own self-initiated declarations how they will act, feel, and think without any immediate or prior stimulating event or condition needed . . . .

These few sentences provide a r ich source of mys te r ies and confu- sions. Fo r tuna te ly , m a n y of t h e m can be quickly removed by rewi r ing the sentences in E-pr ime, e.g. " . . . by dec lara t ion some th ing becomes w h a t it is declared to be s imply because a person says so, or declares it." t r ans l a t e s to: " . . . by dec lara t ion people s ta r t t r ea t ing someth ing in a way dif ferent f rom the way they former ly t r ea t ed it." However , let us focus here on the the not ion t h a t some th ing is seemingly being crea ted out of no th ing , a g rea t "spook" fo rmula if I ever hea rd one.

Harold B. Robb HI 77

One of the main things Grieger is correctly calling to our attention is the existence of what I previously labeled "pragmatic conventions," terms used for their procedural effect. He and I agree there may be nothing literal to which these terms point. The important thing to glean from Grieger's "declarations" is people can and do learn to use symbolic behavior to invent rules and then conform their behavior to those rules. Grieger is on the r ight track in seeing that the "truth" of certain rules is not "in the rules." Rather, Grieger directs our attention to behavioral changes, and whether the effect of this changed behavior rates as desirable. When we call, "Todd! Come to dinner[," is it our child who arrives at the table, or our neighbor's child?

If the rule produces the desired results, we usually call the rule "good" even thought, strictly speaking, we may not be entitled to call it "true." We might say the rule is "truly good," but this mainly means we find the rule good for the long run rather than only occasionally. In any event, we can readily admit pragmatic conventions have some very useful applications without invoking the notion of magically creating something from nothing. We can also readily admit the importance of both overt and covert symbolic behavior without introducing the notions of either "spook stuff ' or unreportable behaviors which are the "true causes" of what we observe. Neither must we claim that our cognitive terms will eventually be cashed in for a physio-chemical account in order to make headway with our problems.

Summa~

Six different meanings for the term "cognition" have been outlined: (1) mental event, (2) symbolic overt behavior, (3) symbolic covert behavior, (4) pragmatic convention, (5) unreportable behavior and (6) hypothetical construct. Using the term "cognition" to denote symbolic overt behavoir, symbolic covert behavior and pragmatic conventions is specifically encouraged because these meanings keep us within the empirical tradition while expanding the horizons for both psychological researchers and practitioners. Using the term "cognition" to denote mental events, unreportable behavior and hypothetical constructs is specifically discouraged. Mental events and unreportable behavior take us into the realm of spooks and nonsense, while hypothetical constructs entrance us with problems which may prove insoluble and which are not our own.


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what can we mean by “cognition,” and does it make any sense?

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