WERNHER VON BRAUN AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA ________________________

A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University _____________________

In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History ____________________ by Robert Anthony Carver May 2001

1

APPROVAL This is to certify that the Graduate Committee of Robert A. Carver Met on the 5th day of December 2000. The committee read and examined his thesis, supervised his defense of it in an oral examination, and decided to recommend that his study be submitted to the Graduate Council, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts in History.

_________________________ Chair, Graduate Committee _________________________ _________________________

Signed on behalf of The Graduate Council

________________________ Dean, School of Graduate Studies

ii

ABSTRACT WERNHER VON BRAUN AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA by Robert A. Carver This study is an examination of the career of the von Braun team in America, encompassing their time working for the American Army and NASA and the ongoing controversy surrounding von Brauns work at Peenemnde and the Mittelwerk. The purpose of this study is to examine the career of von Braun specifically, along with the various experiences of tema members in order to provide a balanced, multi-faceted view of this complex individual and to put in perspective von Braun and the teams place in history. The approach to the study is historiographical, analyzing the historical record while comparing specific points of the two main views of von Braun and the team. Both primary and secondary sources are used to examine the teams career in America while attempting to provide an accurate account of the supporters and critics of von Braun and the team. Conclusions of this study suggest that von Braun and the team made a major and critical contribution to the American space program as well as to the socioeconomic progress of Huntsville, even though their legacy has been intertwined with the unresolved controversy surrounding von Brauns work at Peenemnde and the Mittelwerk.

3

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Stephen Fritz who served as committee chairperson for this project. I also wish to thank those who were of invaluable assistance to me during my research. They include but are not limited to Konrad Dannenberg, Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Gene Cataldo, Bob Ward and the Huntsville Times, Mike Wright and the History Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center and the staff at the National Archives in Atlanta.

iv CONTENTS Page

5 APPROVAL ii ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.. iv INTRODUCTION.. viii Chapter 1. CONTROVERSY... 1 Revisionism 2 Personal Correspondence.. 12 Neufelds Huntsville Lecture 17 French Professor Debate. 19 Forced Labor at the Mittelwerk 21 Objectivity.. 22 Media Attention... 25 2. PRELUDE TO AMERICA... 30 American Choices... 31 Wars End..

36 Paperclip.. 37 Cold War.. 40

vChapter Page A Proven Leader 43 Collective Guilt... 45 3. EARLY YEARS IN AMERICA. 48 Fort Bliss.. 48 The Search.. 53 The Difference. 55 Local Reaction. 56 Space Prophet. 61 Assimilation.. 62 Rocket City USA.. 65 4. THE MARSHALL YEARS. 68 NASA.

69 Race Relations.. 72 Huntsville Difference. 75 Alabama Responds.. 77 Personal Vision. 82 Politics. 84 Science and Religion. 86 Children Reply. 90 5. THE AMBIVALENT HERO... 93 Changes.. 93

7

vi

Chapter Page The End of the Huntsville Odyssey.. 94 Life at NASA Headquarters. 96 Retirement and Death. 98 Alabama Pays Tribute. 100

A Legacy Questioned.. 101 6. CONCLUSION.... 106 WORKS CITED..... 110 VITA. 119

vii

INTRODUCTION

Most Americans were not aware of the existence of Wernher von Braun and his team of rocket engineers in Huntsville, Alabama until von Braun had his articles published in Colliers, a popular magazine of that era. The Colliers series was made into a well received Disney TV show in which von Braun was a featured commentator. Von Braun became the personal icon of the manned space effort for Americans. While many contributed vitally to the space program, no one was more identifiable with space than von Braun. He was seen as a genuine American hero, even if he did have that noticeable German accent. So how does the modern scholar judge von Braun and the team? My intention was to look at the historical record of von Braun and the team while in the United States, especially the time in Huntsville. The current discussion about von Braun centers on the time in Germany during World War II. Critics have attacked his actions and alleged inactions regarding the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk. This focus seemed to me to be an attempt to find retribution for those who suffered and died at the Mittelwerk. Critics have quite an attachment to these people that, in my opinion, clouds their judgment as historians.

9

As a historian, I sit today, in the year 2000 and look back at the life and actions of these men. I am quite removed from the daily reality they experienced as citizens of the Third Reich during the 1930s and 40s. How can I, a person who was born and raised in an open democratic society, be able to comprehend what it is like to live under a totalitarian regime? Then, if this is difficult, how can I also judge these people for what I believe ethically they should have done regarding the inmates? It is a difficult dilemma for a historian when dealing with history outside ones experience. My goal is not to judge, which I cannot do, but rather to consider their

experience in such a milieu. I examined the arguments made on behalf of those who have attacked von Braun and the team and by those who have defended the actions of these men. I present both sides during my thesis for the reader to examine. I do not stop at these arguments like so many of this debate now do. I wanted to examine the total record, giving importance to the teams time and work in the United States. Any examination of these men would be incomplete without such an assessment. Important considerations were given to von Brauns interaction with the community and his views on ethics and religion. Given that he faced charges as an opportunist, I also examine his actions regarding a very controversial issue in Alabama during the early 1960s, civil rights. The sources all agree that von Braun was a great engineer who built and

managed a team of brilliant engineers. The sources do conflict when it comes to deciding on von Braun and the teams place in history. The controversy surrounding the Mittelwerk will continue for as long as people wish to take sides. There is no definitive proof from either side that would end the debate in their favor. What I hope to communicate to the reader is that a man must be judged on the full record. There are circumstances that we can never fully know from the historical record. We must recognize the inherent biases we bring to the subject of Wernher von Braun and work through them to view the man and the team in context. This debate cannot denigrate the numerous accomplishments of von Braun and the team for the American space program. He will remain a founding father of

the space age and his team will continue to be canonized by the citizens of Huntsville as men of honor. Though the controversy will not end soon, we can be assured of von Braun and the teams rightful place in the pantheon of space pioneers.

11

CHAPTER 1 CONTROVERSY

After his death in 1977, a revisionist movement emerged that sought to change the image of Wernher von Braun from national hero to Nazi war criminal. His activities for the American space program were not suspect. It was his time at Peenemnde during World War II that fell under scrutiny. Von Braun has been called an opportunist who swore no allegiance to any dogma except that which assured his own well-being. If working for the German Army advanced his cause, then he would make weapons of war for them. If

the SS wanted him to make the V-2 work, then he would do so. If slave labor was used to build his dream, then he would use that type of worker. If switching allegiance to the United States would gain him access to working on rockets after the war, then he would sell out his native country. These accusations and doubts have existed since the von Braun team came to the United States in 1945. A Time article in 1958 about the upcoming Explorer II launch looked at the background of von Braun: To some, von Brauns transfer of loyalty from Nazi Germany to the U.S. seemed to come too fast, too easy. Von Brauns critics say he is more salesman than scientist; actually, he learned through bittersweet experience that his space dreams had to be sold (I have to be a two-headed monster, scientist and public relations man.)1

Revisionism The April 16, 1995 edition of the Huntsville Times had this front page headline, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? The Brett Davis column went into the recent controversy that had arisen around von Brauns time at Peenemnde: Some recent historians have recast von Braun, a hero in Huntsville and widely recognized as the father of American space flight, as a high-tech Faust who compromised his principles with an evil government to continue his pioneering work. That portrayal contrasts sharply with the traditional view of von Braun as a space flight enthusiast whose benign efforts were hijacked by the Nazi government This von Braun revisionism centers on the murderous conditions forced upon the slave laborers who built the V-2 at an underground factory known as the Mittelwerk or Middle Works.2 There were many opposed to von Braun and his team being in America1 Reach for the Stars, Time, 17 February 1958, 21-24, 28. 2 Brett Davis, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, pgs. A1, A12.

after the war. These critics, who often did not know the full situation, pronounced them all as Nazis who should be sent home. These protests died once it was seen these men were valuable contributors to the Army missile effort. More recent critics have revived the charge of Nazism, this time with a harder edge. Most of the opponents, on the other hand, gave no credence to the human dilemma of those who lived under the Nazi dictatorship. They established resistance to Hitler and possible martyrdom as the standard of judgment, and denounced those who had failed to meet its requirements as unworthy of American citizenship.3 Because those at Peenemnde failed to speak out openly against Hitler or Himmler, they must be guilty of war crimes, runs the logic of this line of reasoning. The more recent Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations inquiry into Arthur Rudolph, an associate of von Brauns, Tom Bowers Paperclip Conspiracy and Linda Hunts Secret Agenda, all condemn the Paperclip scientists and engineers as ardent Nazis. These were politically motivated attacks on von Braun and his team. Anyone who stepped up to defend von Braun or the others was labeled [as] an anti-Semite. It became politically correct to denounce anyone associated with the Nazi era, no matter how little control they had over their situation. No new or hard evidence was ever given to support the contention that these men were guilty of atrocities at the Mittelwerk complex, where slave labor was used to build V-2 rockets. It was merely guilt by association for knowing of its existence.

13

3 Marsha Freeman, How We Got to the Moon: The Story of the German Space Pioneers, (Washington DC: 21st Science Associates, 1993) 169-70.

The harshest critic of von Braun has been Dennis Piszkiewicz, author of The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War and Wernher von Braun: The Man Who Sold the Moon. In Nazi Rocketeers, Piszkiewicz comments on what he imagines to be von Brauns thinking after visiting the Mittelwerk, where the V-2 was being assembled and seeing the use of slave labor from the Dora camp. This is an interesting passage, since it is obvious that Piszkiewicz projects his own thoughts and feelings onto von Braun: One can only speculate (italics mine) on von Brauns internal reaction. After joining the Nazi party and the SS, after accepting honors and perks from the Nazi regime, after conspiring to subvert his own dream of space exploration to the building of a weapon of mass destruction and terror, after accepting the forced labor of foreign slaves at Peenemnde from the Trassenheide camp, he now faced the atrocities of the Mittelwerk. Granted, if he made too big a fuss about the brutal treatment of the workers, he would run the risk of being sent to join in building the rocket he had designed. Nevertheless, von Braun chose the course of discretion, silence and complicity.4 both counts but did manage to kill numerous foreign workers. This was the final event that placed Himmler and the SS in complete control of V-2 production. The irony here is that it was a British action that made it possible for the SS to gain control of V-2 production. Von Braun described how the SS achieved this end: After we had made some progress with our research and development, and having achieved a number of successful flights with the new V-2, the decision was made by Speers Ministry for Armaments and Munitions in Berlin to begin mass production of the V-2 After that Hitler himself gave the order to place the final assembly of the V-2 underground. The installations and equipment in the three of four factories were transported to an underground oil depot in the vicinity of Nordhausen, south of the Hartz Mountains. SS-General Kammler was assigned by Hitler and Himmler to get as many educated and uneducated forced laborers as were necessary in order to fulfill the production goals of the ministry. The prisoners were chosen from various concentration4 Dennis Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 139.

camps and transported to Dora, a camp surrounded by barbed wire in the vicinity of one of the entrances of the former underground depot.5 Piszkiewicz seems to disregard totally von Brauns situation and expected him to sacrifice himself in a useless but moral gesture for the slave laborers. He also disregarded the reports von Braun did try to file with the SS over Mittelwerk conditions. Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, a member of the Peenemnde team, who came to the United States with von Braun, gave his account of the Mittelwerk controversy: After Himmler had assumed responsibility to mass-produce the A-4 in an underground factory in 1943, he established production facilities in a former gypsum mine in the Harz Mountains, later called Mittelwerk. Production of other weapon systems was also carried out there, among them the Buzz Bomb V-1 and parts of fighter planes and submarines. Himmler, who was in charge of all concentration camps in Germany, proposed the use of inmates as workers in the Mittelwerk, against Speers recommendations. New camps were built near the factory, among them, Dora, Harzungen and Ellrich, and inmates were transferred there from other camps, such as Buchenwald. As Speer later wrote, conditions in the camps were scandalous. Von Braun, who had to visit the Mittelwerk occasionally to help solve technical problems and one of his chief engineers, Arthur Rudolph, who was assigned to the Mittelwerk as technical director of A-4 production, were horrified when they saw under what subhuman conditions the inmates had to work and to live. They tried to persuade the SS guards to treat the inmates more humanely and to give them better living conditions in the camps, only to be told to shut up or wear the same striped uniform of the inmates. A large number of inmates died in the camps from diseases, from mistreatment or simply from total exhaustion.6 Dr. Stuhlingers account provides greater insight into what occurred at the Mittelwerk. Unfortunately, critics like Piszkiewicz downplay any accounts by the Peenemnde team as simply them being apologetics for von Braun. They5 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 128-29. 6 Konrad Dannenberg and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Rocket Center Peenemnde - Personal Memories (paper presented at the 44th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Graz, Austria, 16-22 October 1993)

15

have criticized the Huntsville school of history as only being positive about von Braun and the teams activities at Peenemnde while totally ignoring the issue of slave labor. Piszkiewicz in fact, only grudgingly acknowledged this incident by stating rather petulantly that von Braun might have to work on his own rockets if he complained. Von Braun was at the Mittelwerk due to the high failure rates for the V-2. His job was to find ways to improve the quality of the V-2s being produced there. Yet Walter Dornberger, von Brauns commander, soon sent him back to Peenemnde to work on the quality issue. According to Piszkiewicz, in an important admission of von Brauns impotence, There was little they could do about getting the slaves at the Mittelwerk to produce better quality rockets. Their motivation and fate were under the control of the SS.7 In a further demonstration of von Brauns real position within the power establishment, on March 14,1944: Wernher von Braun was awakened at three oclock in the morning by three men who introduced themselves as agents of Himmlers Gestapo If Gestapo justice took its usual clandestine course, von Brauns destination would be a concentration camp, possibly Dora, where slaves were building the A-4 missiles Buhle told Dornberger that Wernher von Braun, Klaus Riedel and Helmut Groettrup had been arrested for sabotage of the A-4 project Keitel went on to tell Dornberger that his engineers had been overheard to say when they were in Zinnowitz, just south of Peenemnde, that they had no intention of making their rockets into weapons of war. They were working for the army only because it supported the development of rockets, which they wanted as vehicles for space travel.8 Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments in Nazi Germany, also discussed the role of Himmler and the SS in the use of slave labor for armaments

7 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 141. 8 Ibid., 145-46.

production: After Hitler had become excited over the V-2 project, Himmler entered the picture. Six weeks later he came to Hitler to propose the simplest way to guarantee secrecy for this vital program. If the entire workforce were concentration camp prisoners, all contact with the outside world would be eliminated. Such prisoners did not even have any mail, Himmler said. Along with this, he offered to provide all the necessary technicians from the ranks of the prisoners. All industry would have to furnish would be the management and engineers. Hitler agreed to this plan. And Saur and I had no choice, especially since we could not offer a more persuasive argument. The result was we had to work out guidelines for a joint undertaking with the SS leadership-what was to be called the Central Works. My assistants went into it reluctantly and their fears were soon confirmed. Formally speaking, we remained in charge of the manufacturing; but in cases of doubt we had to yield to the superior power of the SS leadership. Thus, Himmler had put a foot in our door and we ourselves had helped him do it.9 That passage makes it abundantly clear who wielded the power in Nazi Germany. Himmler made sure that the SS had its hand in any operation he believed would increase its power. Once Hitler decided that the V-2 was important for the war effort, Himmler decided it was important to him and the SS. Speer also talked about how Himmler would confer honorary SS ranks upon people he wanted to influence. Speer claimed to have turned down offers from Himmler to be a SS general on several occasions. He also battled Himmler for control of V-2 production. As a testimony to the power of the SS, Speer gave his description of what happened to von Braun: On March 14, 1944, he had Wernher von Braun and two of his assistants arrested. The official reason, as given to the chief of the Central Office, was that these men had violated one of my regulations by giving peacetime precedence over their war-production tasksWhen Hitler visited me at my sickbed in Klessheim and treated me with such surprising benevolence, I took this occasion to intercede for the arrested specialists and had Hitler promise that he would get them releasedActually, Himmler had achieved one of his ends. From now on even the top men of the rocket staff no longer felt safe9 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 369.

17

from his arbitrary hand. It was conceivable, after all, that I might not always be in a position to free them if they were arrested again.10 Is it little wonder that von Braun was careful to avoid any confrontations with the Gestapo after this incident? He was arrested simply for stating he wanted to explore space with the A-4 and not use it as a weapon of war. This incident has been downplayed or reinterpreted by critics of von Braun, who do not want to admit that he might have been intimidated into inaction for fear of Gestapo reprisals. Certainly, if one were arrested for idle talk, then what would happen to someone who voiced opposition to the SS use of slave labor? Logically, one reaches the conclusion that either being sent to a concentration camp or being executed were the likely outcomes of such opposition. If von Braun was an opportunist in this regard, it is very difficult to blame him for wanting to stay alive or out prison. Michael Neufeld, curator of World War II history at the National Space and Air Museum, Smithsonian Institution, is also a von Braun critic. His book, The Rocket and the Reich, does not directly accuse von Braun of being a Nazi war criminal, but he does say von Braun was morally responsible for the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk. Dr. Walter Haeussermann and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, both von Braun team members, have been highly critical of this conclusion by Neufeld. Haeussermann said that Neufeld interviewed surviving team members, but twisted their words in his book. As far as I know, everybody is shocked about the book, Haeussermann said. We didnt expect anything like this after the interview.11 Neufeld, like Piszkiewicz and10 Ibid., 371-72. 11 Brett Davis, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, p.

Speer, explored von Brauns arrest: The chief of OKW allegedly told him (Dornberger): The charges were so serious that arrest was bound to follow. The men are likely to lose their lives. How people in their position can indulge in such talk passes my understanding. von Braun, meanwhile, languished in jail for nearly two weeks without the slightest indication of the charges against him and with no contact with the others Dornberger was able to free von Braun for a preliminary period of three months. After Speers return from Italy, Hitler grumbled about the trouble he had gone to in this case but promised the Minister in mid-May that, As long as [von Braun] is indispensable to me [Speer], he will be exempted from any punishment, however serious the resulting consequences might be.12 After this narrow escape for von Braun, Neufeld still criticized him as being lucky and an opportunist. He said the arrest gave the false impression that von Braun was an anti-Nazi who was used by the Nazis for their own ends. But he has no moral qualms about building missiles for the Third Reich, even when slave labor became involved; the same goes for almost everyone else at Peenemnde, insofar as they had any choice in the matter, which most of them did not. [Italics mine]13 Neufeld intentionally stated that von Braun and the team members were morally responsible for the use of slave labor and yet in the same paragraph he admits they had no choice in the Nazi system. Neufeld admited the dangers of going against the SS at Dora in an introduction he wrote for another book on this subject. He wrote about the peril of trying to help the inmates, A few civilians did surreptitiously pass prisoners food or do other small favors, but those who were inclined to be more humane were intimidated by the threat of denunciation by others and

19

A12. 12 Michael Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemnde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1996), 218-9. 13 Ibid., 219.

the possibility of sharing the prisoners fate.14 It is as if he believes that everybody was afraid of the SS and unable to act except for von Braun and some of his team. How von Braun became so powerful in Neufelds mind is unknown. It is clear from his criticism that he expected that von Braun not only could have, but should have interceded to help the Mittelwerk inmates. Von Braun would have had to be very devious to fool the SS. Neufeld admited, surveillance by the Gestapo/SD counterintelligence apparatus was all-pervasive and threatening.15 Neufeld does not seem to comprehend the fear for von Braun and his team working under such oppressive conditions. Von Braun described his own feelings about the futility of trying to help the inmates of the Mittelwerk: Its hellish, he said. My first reaction was to speak with one of the SS posts. He responded with unmistakable gruffness that I should mind my own business or I would end up in the same prison attire. I would never have believed that men would have been able to sink so low. But I knew that any attempts to persuade them with arguments about humane considerations would have been totally senseless. These individuals had become so distant from the most fundamental principles of human morality that they were completely unmoved by this showplace of indescribable suffering.16 Neufeld contradicted himself consistently in his own writing. He used a meeting that von Braun attended where the participants discussed the need to bring in more skilled French workers. This was intended to damn von Braun for collaboration but then Neufeld stated, Von Braun was now in a difficult position because he had been arrested by the Gestapo in March and14 Yves Bon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age, ed. Michael J. Neufeld, trans. Yves Bon and Richard L. Fague (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), XVII. 15 Ibid., XVII. 16 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 131-32.

held for two weeks, presumably for refusing to go along with a Himmler plan to take over Peenemnde.17 Again, the gap between totalitarian reality and present day moral condemnation appears. Personal Correspondence Neufelds fascination with von Brauns motivation and thinking are apparent. The focus of his research led him away from testimony from those who actually knew, lived and worked with von Braun from Peenemnde on. It makes it easier to consider the differences if we cast Neufeld as the (selfproclaimed) Apostle Paul, who never met Jesus to Stuhlingers Apostle Peter, who lived through the trials and tribulations of Jesus. Neufelds von Braun was not the man who got us to the moon. Von Braun was the apolitical opportunist who somehow shouldered the responsibility of not sacrificing his life to help the inmates at the Mittelwerk. Neufeld and Stuhlinger corresponded over their differences of interpretation regarding von Brauns motives. In a letter to Stuhlinger, Neufeld wanted to meet to discuss the behavior of von Braun and the team in Nazi Germany. He asked for some documentation that Stuhlinger might have and ended the letter with the following comment: Contrary to what you may believe, I do not have a predetermined agenda to attack the Peenemnde group, but I do have a strong point of view which is nevertheless open to modification in the face of new evidence.18 It does not seem that Stuhlinger,

21

17 Ibid., XIX. 18 Dr. Michael J. Neufeld to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, 26 August 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger.

or the other team members were assuaged by such claims on the part of Neufeld. Stuhlingers replies to Neufeld were filled with irritation and regret that Neufeld disregarded the stories of the team to revise the interpretation of von Brauns life and work. Stuhlinger took Neufeld to task on many points: Your book shows again how extremely difficult, or even impossible it is for a non-technical person to write a reliable and correct history about a primarily technical project in which he had no part. This is even more so when the events to be described took place under a ruthless dictatorship that did not allow any dissenting thought or voice to enter into a document that was to be stored in the archives, a fact of which you obviously are not aware. Unfortunately, most of my former colleagues are no longer alive, so it is too late now for such a joint book. Soon after your book was published, a number of my (American-born!) colleagues who knew von Braun well, and who were very familiar with all the phases of the Peenemnde Project, urged me to write a detailed review of your book, pointing out where you had relied on unreliable sources, or where you misunderstood, misinterpreted, omitted, or overlooked historical facts well known to those closely familiar with the history of the Peenemnde project.19 Neufeld responded to Stuhlingers letter by discounting Stuhlingers point of view. After all, Neufeld suggested, Stuhlinger may have lived through these events with von Braun but he was no historian. The first part of his letter disparaged Dr. Stuhlingers book about von Braun as being poorly written. Then he followed with a claim as to which of them could more rationally and objectively judge the von Braun experience. His tone was quite condescending towards Stuhlinger: I wont go on about your comments about my book, as they betray incomprehension of what professional historians do. Let me just say that participants virtually always make poor historians of their own experiences (memoir is another form of writing altogether), and almost all scientists and engineers who have tried to be historians of science and technology have failed at it although there have been brilliant exceptions, of course. History takes a measure of training and distance from the topic, plus a distinctly19 Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger to Michael J. Neufeld, 1 September 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger.

different cast of mind than is the case in science and engineering; in some cases, however, only those with dual training in the technical subject and in history can write deeply technical histories.20 The tone of this letter was similar to that of an adult to a particularly slow thinking child. Because he disagreed with Dr. Stuhlinger, it was obvious that Stuhlinger just didnt understand the correct history of events that he experienced. Only historians like Neufeld had the depth of insight an intelligence to glean the truth from the volumes of sources. In case Stuhlinger wasnt sufficiently impressed, moreover, then Neufeld was going to make sure he knew with whom he was dealing: However, my receipt in 1997 of the coveted Dexter Prize of the Society for History of Technology for an outstanding book in the history of technology would indicate that others do not agree with your assessment of the engineering aspects of the book.21 Now that he had put Stuhlinger in his place, Neufeld did admit that history was about the interpretation of the past, based on the information the historian had available. He also admitted that two historians who had the same exact source material might reach different conclusions. But given his opening to this letter, he nonetheless knew his interpretation was correct. Neufeld did state he was willing to examine new evidence that might place von Braun in a better light regarding Dora and the Mittelwerk. He admitted that his friends who wrote about this topic were closed minded in regards to favorable evidence for von Braun. He ended this letter with a postscript that suggested that Stuhlinger might have inquired if Neufeld had Jewish roots.20 Dr. Michael J. Neufeld to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, 4 November 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger. 21 Ibid.

23

Neufeld then went on a tirade about anti-Semitism and how this attitude retarded the truth about the Dora camp. Stuhlinger responded to this letter from Neufeld, in which it was obvious that their correspondence had not helped to bridge the gap between them. Our world views and training are separated by a gulf that makes effective communication difficult.22 Neufeld had made the accusation that Stuhlinger was an anti-Semite. Stuhlinger denied this charge and then went into a discussion of more errors that had been made by Neufeld. After a discussion of these errors, Stuhlinger made a final point to Neufeld regarding writing the history of von Braun and his team: It should not be surprising, therefore, that a historian relying only on the scarce and brief documents that he can still find 45 years later of a complex and protracted project involving a number of different personalities, working groups and agencies will not be able to put together a true history of the event. That situation is even aggravated if the historian systematically denies the correctness of the knowledge, insight, and memories of eyewitnesses who were active participants in the project and the events the historian wants to describe.23 Von Brauns critics never resolved their contradictions in this regard, preferring simply to blame von Braun, as if that would validate the suffering of the Dora inmates. Piszkiewicz and Neufeld both cited the Dora workers and the others who died because of the V-2 in their dedications. They both seemed determined to find a way to blame von Braun and his team for the atrocities of Dora, evidence of their lack of complicity be damned.22 Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger to Michael J. Neufeld, 4 December 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger. 23 Ibid

Neufeld and Piszkiewicz were not the first to raise questions about the Mittelwerk. The West German government investigated allegations of wrongdoing and came to the conclusion that there was a lack of credible evidence to link von Braun with having any control regarding the use of slave labor. Brett Davis elucidated upon this subject in his Huntsville Times story: Criticism of von Brauns alleged involvement in the work camps is not entirely new. In 1987, the then West German government completed an investigation of Arthur Rudolph, a former von Braun deputy both in Germany during the war and in Huntsville who left the United States in 1984 under charges of being a war criminal for his work at the underground V-2 factory. Four of the 26 former forced laborers interviewed by the Germans linked von Braun to the persecution of the workers, according to a translation of the German document obtained by The Huntsville Times. In one case, a prisoner said von Braun witnessed a hanging. But the government concluded in each case that the testimony probably was not credible. Von Braun, who rarely visited the underground plant, was aware that slave laborers were used but said he never saw a death in the factory.24 The critics of these men want to hold them accountable for the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk, based not on any hard evidence but rather it seems upon the fact that von Braun and his team came to the United States and were prominent, invaluable contributors to the American space effort. Being successful and respected by their American peers makes the alleged sins of the Mittelwerk even worse to these critics. Even as they engage in moral condemnation, his critics admit that von Braun and the others were powerless to act and that von Braun was arrested for simply discussing using the V-2 for space travel instead of as a weapon. They use innuendo, association and the blatant abuse of facts to mislead the reader into thinking that von Braun had the power and ability to intervene on24 Brett Davis, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, p. A12.

25

behalf of the Mittelwerk inmates. Any contradictory evidence is ignored or labeled unimportant to their thesis. While von Braun certainly was no saint, neither was the Nazi war criminal they wish to present. These critics have been unable to prove that von Braun was a willing participant in exploiting the Mittelwerk inmates. Neufelds Huntsville Lecture Neufeld came to Huntsville in November 1998 to give a lecture about von Braun at the local university. In his speech, Neufeld stated categorically, Von Braun was involved in using slave labor and therefore had a moral responsibility for this action. He went along when he had to with the Nazis.25 Still, Neufelds summation revealed the extreme complexity of assigning blame, even for one so critical of von Braun. He had the moral responsibility, Neufeld concluded. Whether he had legal responsibility is a different question. Indeed, I cant see him being convicted. Other people were far more guilty. He is not perfectly innocent. He is not the worst.26 During a question and answer session following his lecture, I asked Mr. Neufeld about the political realities of opposing Himmler and the SS. During his lecture, he said that there were examples of people who openly opposed the SS. His example regarded soldiers who no longer could shoot Jews and refused to do so anymore. They were normally not punished but were transferred to other areas. What consequences would von Braun have faced25 Michael Neufeld, Wernher von Braun and the Third Reich (lecture presented at the University of Alabama Huntsville, 17 November 1998) 26 Martin Burkey, Historian: Von Braun Indifferent to Nazi Hate, Huntsville Times, 18 November 1998, B8.

if he had pushed the Mittelwerk issue? He never directly answered my question but instead told me that I was making excuses for von Braun. What Neufeld didnt consider was that Himmler felt a great concern for the men under his command who had to shoot all of these people personally. He allowed them to refuse to shoot and made sure they received help if any emotional problems arose. Von Brauns situation vis--vis the SS and Himmler was very different. Therefore, Neufelds use of this example, soldiers successfully refusing to shoot, is not valid. Like Piszkiewicz, Neufeld would not elaborate on what he felt von Braun should have done to render legitimate aid to the Mittelwerk inmates. Neufeld also stated in his lecture that von Braun was an opportunist, looking out for his own benefit. This was a constant theme of his book and throughout the lecture. An incident with French laborers was raised to illustrate his point. Rudolph, Dornberger and von Braun were at a meeting on May 6, 1944, where the topic of adding more prisoners was discussed. Georg Rickhey was director of the Mittelwerk at this time. He was going to ask the SS for more workers to be brought in, specifically 1,800 French prisoners. In his book, Neufeld wrote about von Brauns reaction, Objecting would have been risky, of course and because von Braun had been conditionally released from a Gestapo jail just a month before, he was clearly in no position to object.27 Instead of accepting, as he had just admitted, that von Braun was not in a realistic position to act, Neufeld then added, Von Brauns post-arrest27 Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 228.

27

situation makes the evaluation of his responsibility more complex, but there is no doubt he remained deeply involved with the concentration camps.28 Neufeld does not see the ironic double meaning in his statement. Von Braun would have been an inmate if he had acted to help the French, which would have truly made him deeply involved. French Professor Debate On August 15, 1944, after a visit to Buchenwald, von Braun attempted to get a French prisoner, who was a physics professor, granted special privileges. In response to this action, Neufeld contended, Humanitarianism may or may not have entered into that appeal, but it is clear that von Brauns visit to Buchenwald and its commandant further implicated him in the system of slave labor.29 Piszkiewicz also commented on this request: Von Braun became an active partner with those who would use slave labor by personally selecting top quality technical people to work as slaves on his project. This activity, had it been known at the time, could have made von Braun subject to charges of having committed war crimes, similar to those faced by Albert Speer at Nuremberg.30 Ironically Oskar Schindler specifically selected people to work in his factory and today is hailed as a hero. The matter seems to be based on ones perception of the person involved. Neufeld discussed von Brauns request regarding the French physics professor during his lecture and in the following Q&A session, where von

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 167.

Braun team member Gerhard Reisig refuted Neufelds interpretation of von Brauns interest in the prisoner. Reisig said, I was present when von Braun was talking about the physics professor and he said he wanted to help him. He was a humanitarian and was upset over the plight of the laborers but knew he could do nothing to help them. I was also present when von Braun was told Himmler had given him membership in the SS. Von Braun did not want to accept it and asked Dornberger for his advice. Dornberger told him he had better take it to stay out of trouble and so von Braun reluctantly did so.31 Neufeld responded, I never said von Braun wasnt a humanitarian and I do not question that von Braun was disinterested in becoming a member of the SS.32 The discussion ended with Neufeld not answering the question of how von Braun could have aided the slave laborers. Forced Labor at the Mittelwerk Brett Davis pointed out that Neufeld does fault Rudolph and von Braun for sometimes showing what he said was a callous disregard for the fact that thousands of forced laborers died while putting the V-2 together.33 In writing about their memories of Peenemnde, Dannenberg and Stuhlinger also discussed the Mittelwerk inmates: Von Brauns and Rudolphs efforts to ease the plight of the Mittelwerk inmates led to some improvements in the harsh treatment they received from the SS, but, as von Braun remarked much later, the vision of those luckless prisoners has haunted me ever since. The most depressing thought is the fact that I31 Gerhard Reisig, oral comments to Neufeld during lecture at University of Alabama Huntsville, 17 November 1998 32 Michael Neufeld, response to Reisig after lecture at University of Alabama Huntsville, 17 November 1998 33 Brett Davis, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, p. A12.

29

was absolutely without power to do anything substantial. Even if I had left the place and my work and gone to jail, Himmler would have given orders to continue, but only under harsher and more stupid conditions. The inmates would have undoubtedly have suffered even more.34 Von Braun team member Gerhard Reisig wrote to the Huntsville Times about the Neufeld lecture. For reasons unknown the editorial section decided not to print the letter. Reisig gave an intense defense of von Braun against the view presented by Neufeld at the lecture: Mr. Neufeld lives in a too distant time period from the Third Reich to have the slightest feeling and proper appreciation of the meaning of living under a cruel dictatorship. Any individual living in those times knows only the merciless alternative Do (and think!) as ordered or risk your life. As to W.v. Brauns alleged approval of the use of forced labor: Mr. Neufeld again seems to miss the historical fact that W.v. Braun was the technical director of rocketry developments at Peenemnde. In his position in the organizational order, he had no authority of deciding on the employment of forced labor. He had to report his pertinent objections to the Executive Director of Peenemnde, General Dornberger. But even this General had to report about such fundamental matters to A. Speer, Minister for Armaments Production. But here surfaces the critical point about A. Speers authority: He was the archenemy of Himmler, the High Commander of the SS, who hated Speer just as much as Speer hated him. Himmler managed to obtain Hitlers approval for the employment of concentration camp prisoners in the Mittelwerks production. How could W.v. Braun act directly against Himmler in the matter of forced labor? In spite of being appointed an Honorary SS Officer by Himmler, W.v. Braun ended up in prison, having been seized at night by Himmlers justice negating Gestapo. This craven act was Himmlers revenge for W.v. Brauns unshakable loyalty to General Dornberger. This steadfastness of W.v. Braun to his immediate superior, in itself, proves W.v. Brauns moral integrity.The only activity required of W.v. Braun at the Mittelwerk was the inspection of the quality of the end product, the complete A-4 rocket (Goebbels: V2). His staff personnel for these control functions were members of his Peenemnde development team who were, of course, independent of the permanent technical staff of the Mittelwerk.3534 Konrad Dannenberg and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Rocket Center Peenemnde - Personal Memories (paper presented at the 44th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Graz, Austria, 16-22 October 1993) 35 Gerhard Reisig, unpublished letter to the Huntsville Times, 4 December 1998, letter in possession of the Huntsville Times.

Objectivity At the time of Neufelds scheduled appearance in Huntsville, University of Alabama, Huntsville, President Frank Franz received a letter from Dr. Friedwardt Winterberg, physics professor at the University of Nevada, Reno. This letter concerned erroneous stories about von Braun that Neufeld might have received from Communist officials on a visit to the former East German republic. Dr. Winterberg also raised issues about the National Air and Space Museum, where Neufeld was employed. The museum had made an error in an exhibit in which they failed to credit Dr. Winterberg. He wrote to them to correct this error. His request was refused and he stateed, I did not pursue this matter any further, but it serves as an example for the intellectual dishonesty of the National Air and Space Museum, in not accurately reporting the historical truth.36 The fallout from Neufelds lecture continued with Martin Burkey of the Huntsville Times writing about the difficulty of judging von Braun. He gave numerous examples of moral ambiguity in American history, from the treatment of the Native Americans to the present day controversy over gun violence. He continued: Its arrogant for most people to say with certainty what they would do in von Brauns situation. Separated by different societies, sensibilities and 50 years of history, we cant comprehend the luxury of sitting on the couch of moral certitude and toasting our toes before the fires of hindsight If von Braun had his faults, it doesnt mean people should have to repudiate the mans entire life and the contributions he made. Some people wont be happy till they indict every German living in Germany between 1932 and 1945.3736 Dr. Friedwardt Winterberg to Dr. Frank Franz, 6 November 1998, copy in Huntsville Times archive. 37 Martin Burkey, Von Braun: Still No Easy Answers, Huntsville Times, 22 November 1998, D1.

31

On another front, a Professor Rainer Eisfeld had come across a letter from von Braun written to the Director of the Mittelwerk. Eisfeld claimed this letter alone was enough to prove von Braun guilty of war crimes. Eisfeld claimed the letter was a new discovery but Dr. Stuhlinger countered it had been in the public domain for years and that he had a copy of it in his personal files. The topic was a discussion about the French professor that Neufeld had mentioned previously. Dr. Stuhlinger commented on this situation: I heard about these events the first time in Peenemnde in 1944, although very briefly longer discussions on such subjects were extremely dangerous. I learned that there was a French professor of physics in the KZ camp Dora, and that von Braun will try to first have him on some special tasks, and also have him put under less harsh living conditions than other Camp Dora inmates, and later have him transferred to Peenemnde where he could work in close contact with Peenemnde scientists, and under more decent conditions than possible at the Mittelwerk. I really dont know whether his specialty in physics would be of any use to us, von Braun was quoted, but a situation like this is about the only one where I personally can do something to ease the lot of at least one, and possibly some more individuals like him, by helping them get out of this absolutely hellish environment of a concentration camp.38 This letter is also the centerpiece of an exhibit in Berlin entitled I Only Worked for Technology, the point of the exhibit being that slave labor was used in the construction of the V-2. Excerpts from von Brauns letter are used to show he sought to use the French physicist to work on the rocket. It also included the conclusion of the letter where von Braun asked for better conditions for this physicist. Dr. Stuhlinger also received a letter from a British Lt. Colonel who had read that Stuhlinger was writing a biography about von Braun. This man had38 Personal reply to charges made by Professor Rainer Eisfeld, Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, July 1996.

visited America and came to see the space center at Huntsville in 1991. He was shocked to see that the space center had positive prominent displays about von Braun and his work. He stated his feelings about von Braun quite clearly. There is no doubt, of course, that von Braun was, with others, responsible for the mass slavery and murder of thousands of slave laborers forcibly gathered throughout Europe It is to the undying shame of humanity that we have to use such men, as the Americans had to do in a time of great danger.39 The revisionist history bias had obviously affected England. This man obviously was greatly consternated about having von Braun regarded as anything but a war criminal. Media Attention When the revisionist view garnered media attention, articles appeared in magazines to discuss this change in the view of von Braun. The headlines they used were quite sensational. Telegraph Magazine had a cover emblazoned with the words Inside Hitlers Tunnels of Death. The magazine

33

claimed to have an exclusive that would break the silence on the scientists who came to America to work on the rocket program. The report opened describing the miserable conditions suffered by the Mittelwerk slave laborers. Then it gave a detailed narrative about what the Allies found when they

39 Lt. Col. Robert Wythe, Suffolk England to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Huntsville Alabama, 22 May 1993, personal letters of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger.

arrived in the small town of Nordhausen and then the area camps. It also pointed out that the camp, Dora, was not different from other camps used by the Nazis. This camp was just never termed a death camp. The irony is that this camp was not filled with Jews, Gypsies or others that were to be exterminated by the Nazi regime. But the article did make a good point about how the harsh conditions mandated by the SS retarded the inmates ability to produce V-2s: They were of 21 nationalities, mainly deportees from German-occupied territory and prisoners of war; a few were British, a disproportionately high number were French or Belgian, suspected members of the Resistance and Russian. It was in the Germans interests that they be productive; given better conditions and a little more food, who knows what they might have been forced to achieve As the camp commandant, Otto Foerschner, reported to his SS superiors, Normal output is demanded of the prisoners without giving them even the most primitive sustenance or care.40 The magazine stated that Dora was kept quiet after the war to protect the Germans brought over to the United States to work for the military. They interviewed author and Dora camp survivor Jean Michel about his experiences at the Mittelwerk and his crusade after the war for justice: The purpose was to suppress the embarrassing truth that some of the German scientists who went to the United States immediately after the war to pioneer the American space programme had played important roles in the administration of Dora Eventually it became too much to bear. For Michel the final straw was watching television pictures from America of the celebrating after the Apollo astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin buzz Aldrin had taken mans first steps on the moon; Wernher von Braun, who had visited Doras tunnels on at least 20 occasions, carried shoulder high by cheering crowds; Arthur Rudolph, whose knowledge of the conditions at Dora was even more intimate, accepting congratulations and awards. There was no mention of the fact that, in Michels words, that triumphant walk was made possible by our initiation to inconceivable horror. He became determined to set the record straight.4140 Paul Eddy, Inside Hitlers Death Tunnels, Telegraph Magazine, 5 June 1993, 28. 41Ibid., pgs. 28, 30, 32.

Another Dora survivor, Yves Bon, wrote his memoir, Planet Dora, as a personal account of his time at the Mittelwerk. In his preface, Bon thanked Neufeld for his friendship and help getting this book published in America. Neufeld wrote the introduction to this book, again being highly critical of von Braun and the Germans. It was a rehash of what he wrote in his own book, but it gave him another opportunity to attack von Braun. Neufeld wrote: Under Sawatzki was Arthur Rudolph, who had been assigned from Peenemnde to be production manager of the Mittelwerk. Rudolph was a close friend of Wernher von Brauns and had worked under him as a rocket engineer since 1934. He had been a Nazi party member since mid-1931 two years before it became expedient to become one. Von Braun himself became a party member in 1937 and an SS officer in 1940 but was basically an apolitical opportunist. As the technical director of the army side of Peenemnde, he visited the Mittelwerk more than a dozen times during its short existence. Von Braun admitted in a TV interview not long before his death in 1977 that the working conditions there were absolutely horrible and that he had once seen the mining operations close up it was a pretty hellish environment, he said.42 You can see how Neufeld used association and loaded words to slant the readers opinion against von Braun. He started with the camp commandant, Sawatzki, then connected him to Rudolph, who was a friend of von Braun. Then he commented on their Nazi party membership. He interjected his unfounded opinion about why Rudolph joined the party in 1931. He then cast aspersions on von Brauns motives. It is true he joined the Nazi party, but it was because he felt he had to do so. It is true he was made an officer in the SS, but Neufeld neglected to point out that this was an honorary post conferred by Himmler to gain control and influence over von Braun and the42 Bon, Planet Dora, XV, XVI.

35

Peenemnde operation. In all of his research, Neufeld could only find one picture of von Braun in his SS uniform, which does not indicate that he was enthused about being a part of the SS. Piszkiewicz did not care about von Brauns situation. The following showed his inability to grasp the reality of life under a totalitarian regime. He also failed to explain how they acted like Nazis or where they were ever directly responsible for any deaths: In the final analysis, any debate of whether von Braun and his partners in developing modern rocketry were dedicated Nazis is semantic. They belonged to the Nazi party, the SS and other Nazi organizations. They were honored by the Nazis generally and by Hitler specifically. They dressed in Nazi uniforms and most damning of all, they behaved like Nazis. They were indirectly, some cases directly, responsible for the deaths of thousands of concentration camp slave laborers. The damage and deaths caused by their creation, the V-2 rocket, was slight in comparison.43 One of the best descriptions of Dora and the Mittelwerk came from the British military magazine, After the Battle. Issue 101, from 1998, is devoted to Nordhausen, Dora and the Mittelwerk. It covered all of the war material production that emanated from the Mittelwerk. It gave the history of how V-2 and other war production was organized and carried out at the Mittelwerk. It did so in a rather balanced fashion, unlike the work done by Piszkiewicz and Neufeld. We have seen how critics have called the teams actions at Peenemnde and the Mittelwerk into question. Still, the accusation that von Braun was morally, if not legally, responsible for the use of slave labor has not been proven. The debate over this issue continues to fall into two categories; the43Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, x.

Huntsville School that defends von Braun and the team and the Revisionist School that accuses von Braun of immoral acts while dismissing the personal testimony of the team. Each school seems to be unwilling to compromise its position and the two remain in direct opposition.

37

CHAPTER 2 Prelude to America

Critics have pointed out how easily von Braun went from being a German working for the military during the war to signing up with the United States Army to come to America and continue to work on the V-2. They used this as evidence that von Braun was only out for his own best interest. Piszkiewicz discussed what was going on as the Russians advanced deeper into Germany. He stated that von Braun made the decision to surrender to the Americans while avoiding the Russians and trying not to be killed by the SS. During the evacuation to Bleicherode, von Braun made use of his SS rank of Major. That, along with forged documents, allowed the rocket team to move across Germany and away from the oncoming Russians. Instead of writing that von Braun simply wanted to avoid the Red Army, Piszkiewicz placed his own spin on the story, without any valid evidence to support his opinion. Von Braun wanted to move to meet the Americans, claimed Piszkiewicz, because there was an awkward possibility of having to explain to the Soviets what they were doing in the proximity of the concentration camp that was building rockets they had designed. A safe surrender to the Americans could only be helped by distancing themselves

from the Mittelwerk.44 He went on to imply that von Braun was glad for the confusion of the final days, as this allowed him to get away from the Mittelwerk and surrender himself at an innocent distance from Dora and the Mittelwerk.45 If von Braun had wanted to escape any connection to the Mittelwerk, he would have surrendered to the Soviets. It was the Americans who were the most determined to pursue Germans for war crimes. Nowhere did Piszkiewicz or Neufeld present any evidence that von Braun and his team made the move to surrender to the Americans as a means of escaping responsibility. Both do not hesitate to speculate that this was what von Braun was thinking. They failed to mention that it was not unusual for Germans to prefer surrendering to the Americans, as many Germans feared the Russians reprisals. American Choices The criticism, past and present, has focused on von Braun and the teams desire to come to the United States. This would not have been possible unless the United States desired the services of these engineers. Before American troops even entered into Germany, teams of scientists had been drafted by the armed forces to scour each nation liberated from the Nazis. Their mission was to locate prominent scientists, examine their facilities, and interrogate them for critical information, such as the progress of the German atomic bomb project. A new concept of intellectual reparations emerged.46

39

44 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, x. 45 Ibid. 46 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 147.

Neufeld, in his work for the Smithsonian, interviewed several of von Brauns team and asked them about their motives for coming to America after the war. In his discussion with Karl Heimburg, Neufeld asked about going to the United States: Neufeld: Did you question much the idea of going to the United States, or did it seem pretty natural? Heimburg: It seemed to me natural, in this way. Here is a lost war. This takes quite some time until everything is reorganized. So you are better off when you are not in Germany but you are outside of Germany, because I knew the company in which I was in, they would have a slow start until they could work again. So I figured you are better off if you are for one year outside, and we figured, well, probably one, two years we will be outside and then we will come back, because the idea was mainly not to start a rocket business, but the United States was interested what were the rockets like, how far can you use them, what can you do with them. And we even started our second stage for the V-2 at Fort Bliss. But it never came to bear, because after two years, you know, then, or three years, it finally was decided, no, the United States will go into the rocket business too, and we would stay there.47 Neufeld also talked to Konrad Dannenberg about the same topic. Neufeld was very interested in the motivation behind the Germans desire to come to America: Neufeld: And you didnt think at that time, its hard, you have to think back, negatively about the United States as such? Dannenberg: Well, in a way, when, in the last days in Peenemnde, we already philosophized quite often, well, what is going to happen after the war? And one of our favorite subjects in the discussion was to eventually come to the United States and to keep on building bigger and bigger rockets here in the United States. So we really, we were certainly not antagonistic, and I think in a way our early dreams even really finally got being fulfilled. And also von Braun, I think von Braun had very well planned the whole thing through Now, again von Braun was a pretty good negotiator. He finally got completely out from under the reach of the SS, so we made the contact with the Americans directly. Neufeld: As far as your discussions then about possibly going to the United States are concerned, when you were in the last phases of Peenemnde, was that a discussion that had to be kept in a fairly tight group? Dannenberg: Oh yes. You only talk to your closest friends about that. Neufeld: Thats the47 Karl Heimburg, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemnde Oral History Project, 9 November, 1989, Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 77-78.

kind of talk that lands you in a concentration camp. Dannenberg: Right. Definitely. So you didnt talk to strangers about it all, and even among our closest friends we were very careful about talking about these things.48 I find it very interesting that in this exchange with Dannenberg, Neufeld made an explicit reference to the kind of talk that lands you in a concentration camp. In his interviews it is obvious he sought some kind of self-serving plan by these men. What he found was an interest about the United States coupled with a visceral fear of the SS. So Neufeld contradicted his own thesis about von Brauns being able to act to help the slave laborers. Neufeld kept this thread running in his talk with Walter Wiesman. Neufeld talked to Wiesman about the attitudes at the end of the war. Wiesman discussed his view of what was occurring and then he went into his decision to come to America: my wife and I, made a decision even in 44, at least early 45, if we ever had a chance to get to America, that would be it. Because see, with nothing left in the Ruhr district where we lived, when the war ended, my parents had just moved to their eighth habitat, see. So all this is a sobering effect on a young man who had heard nothing but Nazi philosophy, see, and you begin to just put it all together, and too late says too, lets think about this.49 As the interview continued, Neufeld did not appear to be satisfied over what Wiesman had described. He probed further into his motives, despite being raised to think of the Nazi philosophy as the only way, Neufeld still asked a question about Nazi party involvement at Peenemnde. Neufeld then commented to Wiesman, You know, because there are a lot of people48 Konrad Dannenberg, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemnde Oral History Project, 7 November, 1989, Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 64. 49 Walter Wiesman, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemnde Oral History Project, 24 January, 1990, Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 19.

41

at the top levels who were members of the party, mostly because they had to be and didnt have much choice about it.50 Wiesman responded saying in trying to exert authority, the SS used honorary titles to bring important people into their sphere of influence. But it is once again clear that Neufeld had no illusions about the power of the SS and the Nazi party in controlling its people. He saw that these men did not have a choice in the matter. Just like von Braun had no choice when it came to making changes at the Mittelwerk. So somewhere in between these interviews and the writing of his book, Neufeld either forgot this situation or blatantly chose to ignore it since it was inconvenient for his books premise. In regards to the von Braun team coming to America and working for the United States, Dr. Stuhlinger addressed that issue during a 1995 lecture at the University of Alabama, Huntsville. After being offered the chance to go to the United States, Stuhlinger spent a week pondering this move: Could we hope that our move to America, and our willingness to live and work with our former enemies, may help build a bridge, however tenuous at first, from people to people, and convince our American colleagues that not every German was an ardent Nazi? Could we hope that Americans would accept us as co-workers and take us at our face value, in spite of all the war propaganda that had painted a very different picture of the Germans To go to America did not simply mean a change of country or a switch in loyalty The powerful flow of German emigrants to America during the past 300 years has certainly contributed its share to the development of freedom and democracy in America. Emigration of young German engineers and scientists to America after World War II would not be merely a move to another country; it would be a step in the natural demographic evolution, an expansion from one nation into another one to which that nation had been related for 300 years by strong ties of kinship in body and mind.51

50 Ibid., 20. 51Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, "German Rocketeers Find a New Home in Huntsville" (lecture presented at University of Alabama Huntsville, 21 September 1995).

This explanation certainly contains a good measure of selfjustification but there is also within it a sense of hoping to earn a redemption of sorts, not only personally but also collectively for other Germans who served the Third Reich but felt powerless to oppose it. Critics will not agree with this conclusion, but it is a matter once again of your perspective on this group. The United States Army obviously felt that these Germans were not pushovers when it came to having them come to the U.S. to work for our government. In a War Department report, members of the German group had experienced some difficulties and had filed a complaint. This report detailed these issues and noted, It took considerable effort to persuade many of the German group to come to the United States. One of the influencing reasons was that they believed they could rely on the honesty of this country more than that of any other country in the world.52 Wars End When von Braun and the team surrendered to the Americans, Piszkiewicz felt that any illegal or immoral activities were glossed over due to their value as V-2 engineers. According to Piszkiewicz, an American Lieutenant was told by the Seventh Army command to see if these Germans were Nazis. His reply was, Screen them for being Nazis! What the hell for? Look, if they were Hitlers brothers, its beside the point. Their knowledge is valuable for52 Report on jet-propelled guided missile field, Major R. B. Staver, Ordnance Department, Memo to Office Chief of Ordnance, Chief, Research and Development Service, 14 December, 1945, enclosure A, p2.

43

military and possibly national reasons.53 Piszkiewicz took this one mans statement as official Army and U.S. policy, before long, the American authorities would accept Lt. Stewarts point of view. The bombardment of London and Antwerp would be forgiven. The Mittelwerk and the tens of thousands who slaved and died there would be forgotten. Nothing but the rockets and their creators would matter.54 After the war ended, various American personnel interrogated the German rocket team. The Germans were quizzed often and by people with varying degrees of technical skill. When the Germans became frustrated and wanted to move on Piszkiewicz stated they had a hidden reason to want this. Perhaps they were apprehensive that they might be asked embarrassing questions about the Mittelwerk. Apparently the subject did not come up. In any case, they were rocket scientists; the Mittelwerk was the business of the SS.55 If the United States had believed these men were not useful to be exploited, they would have been left to their own fate in Germany. The opportunism went both ways, von Braun and the team were able to come to the United States and the Army automatically upgraded its rocket capabilities exponentially. In the chaos following the war, the team must have wondered just how competent the Allies really were. A state of confusion reigned: At Garmisch, the process of interrogation was chaotic. Dr. Zwicky reported after his three-month stay in Germany that There were too many technical53 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 223. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., 235.

teams, both British and American, the members of which conducted 45 interviews helter-skelter without any coordination with others and little regard to what had been previously done. General Dornberger, a very energetic and astute man, and his collaborators on the V-2 watched the unexpected and disorderly procedures of the British and American teams with discerning eyes and it became apparent that they considered our missions pretty much of a farce.56 Paperclip Operation Overcast was the project to locate and then exploit the knowledge and talents of German scientists, engineers and technicians as an aid in the continuing war against Japan. Operation Overcast was the precursor to Operation Paperclip, which operated under much the same premise but on a much more limited scale. Operation Overcast was headed by Colonel Holger Toftoy, who came to Germany on a mission to find as many V2 scientists and technical experts as possible for exploitation by the United States. It was Toftoy who paved the way for the Germans to sign contracts to work for the Army and to come to Fort Bliss in Texas when Project Overcast became Project Paperclip. Neufeld stated that the Army had to bend the rules to bring in and keep these German scientists and engineers. The use and exploitation of former enemy workers was established under Operation Paperclip, which started in March 1946. That did not mean things were to go smoothly, according to Neufeld, as many questions were raised about the Germans at Ft. Bliss. As Neufeld tried to prove a cover-up, however, the flaw in his premise was that neither von Braun nor other members of his team ever refused to answer any56 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 150-51.

questions. Still, Neufeld persisted: But security reports for a number of individuals, including von Braun, had to be revised or fudged to circumvent the restrictions that still existed. Some writers have seen those actions as evidence of a conspiracy in the Pentagon to violate a policy signed by President Harry Truman, but it reflected a conscious choice by the U.S. government, approved up to the level of cabinet at least, to put expediency above principle. The Cold War provided ample opportunity after 1947 to rationalize that policy on anti-Communist grounds, but the circumstances of restrictions on Nazis and war criminals would have gone ahead at some level anyway, because the Germans technical expertise was seen as indispensable. Thus when the Armys own investigators came looking for witnesses and evidence for the Mittelbrau-Dora war crimes trial, which was held at Dachau in 1947, it is no surprise that Ordinance was none too cooperative in granting access to the Ft. Bliss Germans. The whole story of the Mittelwerk and its prisoners was to be obscured as much as possible, because it would besmirch Army rocket development. Indeed, from the very end of the war, if not before, the Peenemnders had divorced themselves from any responsibility for slave labor; the SS provided a convenient scapegoat for all the crimes associated with the program. It was a position American authorities found easy to accept.57 Neufeld claimed that after the initial questioning was avoided by unknown government agencies, the team was left alone until much later: For the German rocket engineers in Huntsville and elsewhere, the issue essentially vanished after 1947. For obvious reasons, they spoke little about it, and there is not much evidence that it weighed on their consciences. For most but not all of them, events in Germany had indeed been beyond their control; in any case, the SS provided a convenient scapegoat for all crimes committed in the V-2 program. Because of the Cold War and space race, the U. S. Army and other government bodies had a strong interest in whitewashing the Nazi issue, and the press was only too ready to cooperate.58 Neufeld claimed in that passage to have known what each of these men felt in their conscience. He did not know how they felt but he biases the way he reported this to lead you to think none of the Germans cared about what occurred at the Mittelwerk. He again admitted they did not have control57 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 235. 58 Yves Bon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age, ed. Michael J. Neufeld, trans. Yves Bon and Richard L. Fague (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), XXV.

over events in Germany but then said the SS was a scapegoat even though in his own writing he has stated how dangerous and oppressive they were at the Mittelwerk. In both of the previous quoted passages, Neufeld passed off the SS as a scapegoat, which might lead the reader to think that, like the proverbial animal, the SS were innocent of wrongdoing. I am certain this was not his intent, but rather he wrote in a manner to downplay the SS role in the use of slave labor to try to incriminate von Braun. He wanted the evidence to support only his thesis and he ignored anything that would contradict this, even his own material. Cold War Another point raised was the emergence of hostilities with the Soviet Union. By the end of the war in Europe, American officials knew, or at least suspected, that the communists would be our next adversary. So there was an urgency to find all of the important scientists and engineers for use by America. American officials did not want these valuable men to fall into the hands of the Soviets to be used to further their programs against the United States. For example, at the Mittelwerk Major Staver had found a treasure trove of V-2 parts in the underground factory at Nordhausen. Colonel Holger Toftoy, who was in Paris as the Chief of the Ordinance Department of Intelligence Services, agreed with Staver that the components should be moved and as many as 100 of [the specialists] be evacuated within 30 days.5959 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 153.

47

This haste would get them out before the Soviets took over Nordhausen and it had the added bonus of securing them for the Army. Not only was there a competition with the Soviets but also the U. S. Army wanted these men for their exclusive use. This, Staver said, must be done before such time as the U. S. Navy or the British decide to do the same.60 The British did sign up some of the Peenemnders to come to England under the aegis of Operation Backfire which test launched V-2s from Cuxhaven. The Americans were angry over the British attempt to take away some of the Peenemnders, but the Army was successful in getting the vast majority of the team to come to the United States. One reason why these critics seem to be driven to assign blame to von Braun is due to his success and popularity. If von Braun had suffered setbacks, failures and had never become such a prominent figure with the popular public profile, would we be hearing about these charges against him today? During his UAH lecture, Neufeld got to the heart of the matter of why he was so critical of von Braun and the team. He specifically pointed out how he was disturbed by the lack of contrition on the part of the Peenemnders for the use of slave labor, over which they had, as he also admitted elsewhere, no control. Neufeld was upset that von Braun did not speak publicly on the subject until the 1960s: Another case was Wernher von Braun, who essentially made a pact with the devil in order to build large rockets. Although he became disillusioned toward the end of the regime, that did not alter his basic motivations; after the war he bore proudly the nominal reasons for his arrest - putting space flight before military missile work - but there is no evidence that he ever stuck his neck out60 Ibid., 153-54.

for the concentration camp prisoners before his arrest, nor did he show any obvious pangs of conscience about their fate until the 1960s and 1970s, when protests by French prisoner survivors forced him to confront the issue more directly.61 After my interview with Konrad Dannenberg and after reading the comments of Dr. Stuhlinger, it seems obvious that von Braun was concerned and did think about the plight of the Dora-Mittelwerk inmates. But as one can see from the previous citation, Neufeld discounted every example of von Brauns efforts to help ameliorate the lot of the workers as simply personal opportunism, while simultaneously damning him for not showing any contrition until the 1960s. He wanted it both ways, to portray von Braun as an immoral opportunist while he dismissed the record when it contradicted this thesis. Piszkiewicz and Neufeld damn von Braun because he did not come out and hold a press conference where he broke down publicly and cried about how miserable the conditions were for the inmates. The postWatergate era has seen the advent of this confrontational style of historical writing. A look back over the 1990s highlights the need we now have for public figures to humiliate themselves and beg forgiveness for alleged sins. This is now considered a sign of personal contrition by the mass media. Evidently, Piszkiewicz, Neufeld and other critics are angry that von Braun never made such a public confession and they have taken it upon themselves to punish him by attacking his legacy. Dr. Stuhlinger has the reputation of being the keeper of von Brauns memory. When I talked to him about this revisionist history, he became quite61 Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 270-71.

49

disconcerted. He obviously takes this criticism of von Braun very personally. He and Dr. Haeussermann have been critical of Neufelds conclusions: But Haeussermann cataloged a list of technical and historical errors he said Neufeld made, and said he is among those outside observers who have no idea what happens in a dictatorship. Stuhlinger said Neufeld obviously did a lot of work in archives, but he said the documents there are the records of the SS, the hated security forces, and arent necessarily accurate. He goes through mountains of documents and believed the SS ones, Stuhlinger said, but while he is doing that he neglects to really take a good look at those documents and those books that were written by our Peenemnde people the real player in the play. He pushes them aside and calls them inaccurate and untrue.62 A Proven Leader What is justice for von Braun? It will be for him to be remembered for what he did do and not by what his critics say he should have done during a war they did not experience. Von Braun will be remembered for his work in launching the first American satellite and for his work on the Saturn booster that got America to the moon. In interview after interview, members of the von Braun team that came with him from Peenemnde praise him as their inspirational and irreplaceable leader. They say without his genius and leadership, the booster program and the moon landing would have been impossible. Nor is this simply a case of Germans covering for one of their own. Interviews with those Americans who worked with von Braun and the Germans, from Ft. Bliss, Huntsville and elsewhere, all indicate the same high regard for von Braun and his team. In an interview, Gene Cataldo discussed

62 Brett Davis, Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist? Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, p. A12.

his work at Redstone Arsenal, which he joined in July 1951. He was hired as a chemist and then went into metallurgy. He worked under Dr. Wolfgang Steurer and then Rudolph Schlidt, both part of the Peenemnde group. According to Mr. Caltaldo: I never heard anything bad said about the Germans. We were in awe of them and their experience. They were great to work for. Most of them had American deputies to help them interact with the workers. I was able to socialize with them quite often. There was a tremendous spirit of excitement, cooperation and good communications among the personnel, and we were steadily increasing in manpower There were 130 Germans in the original von Braun group that signed short-term contracts with the government. At the end of the Ft. Bliss period, several returned to Germany and others took jobs in the U.S About 115 of them came as a team to Huntsville, as a consequence. The Germans and those of us that were employed in Huntsville dived into the new projects with lots of enthusiasm. We found that the Germans were easy to get along with and we worked well together, even though they had many years of experience in the rocket field. We seldom heard any disparaging remarks about our own lack of experience. I worked closely with a large number of them, since the Materials and Processes field was so closely allied with the rocket development work.63 Mr. Cataldo was involved in working on the Jupiter-C, which were Redstones modified to fly developmental ablative nose cones. He had to work with new materials sent to him by industry representatives. In 1956, he heard about a new aluminum alloy that had better salt water resistance and better weldability than the aluminum currently in use. He obtained a small sample and did tests on the new alloy. He described what happened next: Within a few days, Dr. von Braun called me into his office and began asking questions about this new alloy. I read your report, he said. How good is this new alloy? I went over with him the tests that I had made and the information I had received from Alcoa Good, he said, I think we will use this alloy for the next vehicles. You must investigate further, as quickly as possible and tell me if I must stop. Because I will proceed from now to plan on using this material. Von Braun was knowledgeable enough to be this63 Gene Cataldo, Wernher von Braun interview by author, Huntsville, AL., 16 November 1998.

51

involved in all phases of rocket production and yet always treated everyone as partners and not as subordinates.64 Collective Guilt Piszkiewicz, Neufeld and other critics of von Braun are guilty of having the simplistic notion of collective guilt. Simplistic because it disregards the factor of personal fear and the intimidation of living and working in a totalitarian system. Collectively, they viewed all of the Germans involved with the V-2 as being, to a greater or lesser extent, guilty of the atrocities committed at the Mittelwerk. They also have judged von Braun by todays standards, dismissing the situation in which von Braun found himself working in Nazi Germany. They exhibited the need to see von Braun and his team make a satisfactory, to them, act of contrition for absolution in the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk. They have been judge, jury and, especially in Piszkiewiczs case, a willing executioner of von Brauns reputation. Von Brauns critics never detail what he could have done to help the inmates at the Mittelwerk. They are left saying von Braun should have done a nebulous something. This leads you to believe that something reasonably could have been done. Things like sabotaging their work, joining a partisan resistance cell, or maybe even trying to assassinate the SS command staff at the Mittelwerk. Naturally, that any of these things, when discovered, would have led to the execution of von Braun is irrelevant to the critics. So what difference would it have made for von Braun to sacrifice himself for the Mittelwerk inmates? None, the conditions would not have changed, even without the V-2, the64 Ibid.

Mittelwerk had plenty of military work to do. At wars end, Germany had used 8 million forced laborers. To say that von Braun could have made a lasting, positive difference for those who worked at the Mittelwerk is ludicrous. He did turn himself and the team over to the Americans for their own self-interest. It didnt take a rocket scientist to figure out the difference between internment by the Americans versus the Russians. Von Brauns dreams were to continue his work on rockets for space exploration. In surrendering to the Americans, he could best pursue this vision. But in no uncertain terms should we think this is just von Braun exploiting the Americans for his own ends. The Americans were glad to have him and the team to use in our own exploitation in building missiles. This team was the nucleus of the Armys ABMA group that later became the Marshall Space Flight Center of NASA. This was the team that was vital in getting the United States to the moon. This does not matter to von Brauns critics, who are still stuck at the Mittelwerk, looking for someone to blame. It is a question we face today. Why do we want to explore space? The dream of exploring the heavens has fired the imaginations of many throughout history. Von Braun was a man who was able to make his dream come true. It comes down to choices. When the Nazis took over Germany, they were a new party and gave Germany the promise of better days to come. Neither Von Braun, nor anyone else at that time, knew what was coming over the next 12 years. So when the GermanArmy was willing to fund his work in rocketry, it seemed like a godsend at that time. The moral

53

dimensions were not apparent to him. I was still a youngster in my early 20s and frankly didnt realize the significance of the changes in political leadership, von Braun wrote years later. I was too wrapped up in rockets.65 The teams desire to come to the United States after the war has not been seen by critics as a positive aspect of their character. There has been no evidence to prove the accusation that agents of the United States performed a cover-up of alleged war crimes by the team. The von Braun team was an important weapons technology coup for the United States Army in its coming competition with the Soviets in the Cold War, so the claim of opportunism of necessity ran both ways. Still, an enormous gulf, both moral and actual, separate claims of professional opportunism after a lost war and allegations of collusion in war crimes. Neufeld and other critics seem unable or unwilling to credit this distinction.

65 Robert Zimmerman, Brave New World: American Colonial History as a Guide to Building Space Societies, Ad Astra, July/August 2000, 35.

CHAPTER 3 Early Years in America At the end of World War II, consideration had been given to how to exploit German technology and make use of experienced personnel. Colonel Holger N. Toftoy was chief of the Army Ordinance Technical Intelligence in Europe. He set up a program to find and ship 100 V-2 rockets back to the United States for testing. The Germans responsible for the V-2 were also to be rounded up and shipped to America under Operation Overcast. Overcast was used to pick the best minds of Germany for tasks in the United States. It allowed for up to 350 people to be allowed to come to the United States to assist in the war against Japan. Known war criminals would not be allowed to participate and the use of the men would be a temporary measure. This project was later incorporated into Operation Paperclip. This brought 642 German and Austrian specialists to America through 1952. Toftoy had to decide which specialists to hire for the nascent Army missile program. Using recommendations f