Gunmen who accompaniedLTTE delegates for talks withPremadasa assassinated TULFleader A. Amirthalingham andVettivelu Yogeswaran in July 1989.The list is too long to mention here.

Premadasa also facilitated ameeting between the LTTE andTamilNadu Chief MinisterKarunanidhi.

I covered a press conferencegiven by Balasingham onDecember 20, 1989, in Colombowhere he acknowledged an under-standing with the governmentregarding operations launchedagainst the TNA in the northernand eastern provinces. He was par-ticular about the operation con-ducted by Karuna in Batticaloaand its suburbs on December 13,1989 where over 100 TNA cadresdied in an orgy of violence underthe very nose of security forces.

The IPKF shot down a US builtBell 212 chopper as it was comingto in land at Cheddikulam onDecember 22m 1989. Premadasawas not worried. Then the LTTEdropped a bombshell. The LTTEdeclared that police and govern-ment security forces should not fillthe vacuum created by the IPKFpull out.

I met Mahattaya and Yogi atKoliyakulam, Vavuniya in thecompany of a group of Colombo-based Indian journalists.Mahattaya who led negotiationswith Premadasa ruled out compro-mise with rival groups. He reiter-ated their decision to wipe outtheir rivals. This was about threeweeks before they arrived inColombo for a three-hour meetingwith Premadasa. Premadasa madeavailable choppers for Mahattayaand Yogi to travel within the north-ern and eastern provinces. Theforces and police were placed in anembarrassing position. Batticaloapolice was ordered to meet LTTErepresentatives at the BatticaloaMulti Purpose CooperativeBuilding where the LTTE autho-rised the police to resume trafficduties. What a shame. This was inearly February. Mahattaya andBalasingham again metPremadasa on February 22, 1990.

Chief Minister of the NEprovince Perumal’s UnilateralDeclaration of Independence fol-lowed on March 1, 1990 shortlybefore the IPKF completed the pullout.

Minister Hameed met the LTTEat Kallady, Batticaloa followed by ameeting at the Trincomalee NavyBase on the instructions ofPremadasa who feared a break-down of his truce withPrabhakaran. Premadasa failed toidentify the danger signals evenafter the LTTE fired at a contin-gent of troops moving across whatthe LTTE claimed was their terri-tory.

Premadasa made a desperatebid to restore the truce after theLTTE shattered it by killing over400 policemen in the east and tak-ing hundreds of prisoners. Tigersfired mortars at the Palaly airbaseas the aircraft carrying Hameedwas taking off. Premadasa orderedHameed to negotiate a fresh dealwith the LTTE but his bid ended infailure.

The LTTE assassinatedPremadasa on May Day, 1993.Investigations revealed that thesuicide bomber (Babu) had beenknown to Premadasa’s valet forover two years.

D.B. Wijetunga’s bidThe release of five policemen

taken prisoner duringPremadasa’s administration, onJune 22, 1993 paved the way for arelationship between the LTTEand Wijetunga.

The LTTE offered to release 39government personnel in custodyto their families. The five person-nel released on June 22 wereamong the 39 member group heldby them. The LTTE requested adelegation of family members tovisit the peninsula. Wijetungaobliged. The LTTE responded bydemanding the lifting of all restric-tions on the movement of goods tothe Jaffna peninsula. This was fol-lowed by a request to send a gov-ernment representative to discussthe release of prisoners. BrigadierAnanda Weerasekera visited thepeninsula. The visit facilitated bythe ICRC helped the LTTE gain apropaganda victory although hefailed to secure the release of theprisoners.

The LTTE overran theJanakapura detachment in July

1993. The LTTE hit Pooneryn-Komar Point andNagathevanthurai bases in earlyNovember. Although Thondamansenior offered to mediate in Julyafter meeting the Europe-basedLTTE representatives includingLawrence Thilagar, the govern-ment ignored the offer.

CBK’s chief negotiatorKumaratunga picked her

Secretary KusumsiriBalapatabendi to head the peacedelegation. It comprised RajanAsiriwathan, Navin Gunaratne,Lionel Fernando, Brigadier SiriPeiris and Captain PrasannaRajaratne. The first round washeld in Jaffna on October 13, 1994with the LTTE turning the event toa major propaganda victory. Sheordered the resumption of officialcontacts in her capacity as thenewly elected Prime Minister fol-lowing the August 16 parliamen-tary polls.

This was after the AnglicanBishop of Colombo Rev.KennethFernando, Sarvodaya leader A. T.Ariyaratne accompanied by hiswife and a Catholic delega-tion led by the Bishop ofColombo Rt. Rev. NicholasMarcus Fernando visitedJaffna with the govern-ment’s blessings inFebruary 1994. Rt. Rev.Fernando secured therelease of two policemenand they were handed overto his representative Rev.Father Alfred Alexanderby Anton Balasingham.The religious leadersachieved nothing althoughtheir visits gave the LTTEplenty of publicity.

The LTTE blew-up anOffshore Patrol Vessel(SLNS Sagarwardene) offMannar late September.Prime MinisterKumaratunga did not takeit seriously and wentahead with the peacemoves. The first round onOctober 13, 1994 took placein Jaffna. The LTTE facili-tated Kumaratunga’s vic-tory at the presidentialpoll the following monthby assassinating her rivalGamini Dissanayake. Theveteran politician whoadvocated a joint Indo-Lanka effort to neutralisethe LTTE threat was assas-sinated along with severalother UNP MPs atThotalanga. TheThotalanga massacrecame just ten days afterthe first round of delibera-tions in Jaffna.

The second round tookplace in January 3, 1995.The notable absentee wasLionel Fernando, a formerGovernment Agent ofJaffna. He quit asSecretary to the Media,Tourism and AviationSecretary. He also gave upthe top job at the board ofdirectors of the nationalcareer.

The Norwegians weredeeply involved in theKumaratunga-led process.Under an agreementworked out in the firstweek of January 1995, fourteams headed by expatri-ates were to monitor thecessation of hostilities.The government and theLTTE were to assign twonominees each to the mon-itoring teams.

The teams were headedby Dutch LieutenantColonel Paul HenriHorsting, Canadian MajorGeneral C. Milner andNorwegians Audun Holm,Jihan Gabrielson. Theymet Balapatabendi aftermeeting Balasingham,Thamilselvan andPrabhakaran on February5, 1990. They also met theLTTE nominees. But theLTTE did not allow thenominees to sit.Subsequently the LTTEdemanded the setting up oftwo more monitoring com-mittees while making fur-ther demands. The LTTEwanted a SpecialDevelopment Bank inJaffna. The LTTE alsodemanded the setting up adecision making body.

The third round was

also held in Jaffna in February1995. The meeting failed to reachagreement on the re-opening ofSangupiddy-Kerathivu ferry serv-ices to facilitate civilian traffic.

A plethora of demandsincluding the shifting ofPooneryn-Komar bases under-mined the peace process. Thefourth round of talks took placein Jaffna on April 10, 1995. TheLTTE was led by Thamilselvanwhile the Balapatabendi led gov-ernment delegation includedBishop Kenneth Fernando,Charles Abeysekara and Dr.Jayadeva Uyangoda, Brigadier

Siri Peiris and CaptainPrasanna Rajaratne.

It was the last meeting beforethe LTTE blew up two navy ves-sels anchored at theTrincomalee harbour.

A visit by Colombo based rep-resentatives of 12 countriesincluding France, UK, Australia,US, Germany, the Netherlands,Sweden, Canada, Japan, Finlandand Norway in the second weekof March to Jaffna where theystrongly urged the LTTE toremain committed to the peaceprocess did not deter the LTTE.

The attacks were followed by

the shooting down of twoBritish built Avros over Palalyairbase. The shoulder-fired mis-siles claimed t7he lives of about100 officers and men and forcedthe Airforce to suspend flights toand from the airbase. The LTTEheld sway until forces launchedbefore combined security forcesoffensive Riviresa wrest controlof the peninsula and broughtJaffna under the Lion Flag.

Kumaratunga survived anassassination bid in December1999. It was to facilitate UNPcandidate RanilWickremesinghe’s victory.Although the assassinationfailed, Wickremesinghe contin-ued with the Oslo-led peace bidand finalised the infamousCease-Fire Agreement inFebruary 2002. I would not detailWickremesinghe’s handling ofthe peace process except that hecreated a new problem by allow-ing a member of his delegationRauff Hakeem to reach a privatepact with Prabhakaran. TheLTTE also politically assassinat-ed Wickremesinghe by forcing

the Tamils to boycott theNovember presidential polls.The rest is recent history.

Negotiating with the LTTE isnot an easy task. Contact Dr.Peter Nicolaus, the senior pro-tection officer with the UNHCRbased in Colombo in 1992-1993.He would be delighted to revealhis contacts with LTTE heavy-weights during his failed bid toestablish a safe passage for civil-ian movement to and from thepeninsula. The LTTE refused tocooperate unless the govern-ment vacated the Pooneryn-Komar point-Nagathevanthuraibases that prevented the LTTEeasy access to the peninsula.The LTTE resisted UNHCRefforts until it was ready to hitPooneryn-Komar point andNagathevanthurai bases inearly November, 1993. Suddenlythe UNHCR had no role to playas the Nagathevanthurai navalbase responsible for detectingand destroying traffic on theJaffna lagoon was taken out in amulti-pronged assault.

9Wednesday 15th February, 2006

Talks, negotiators... From page 6

Balasingham Thamilselvan Prabhakaran