The Congo Crisis

US Leaders: Eisenhower & KennedyUSSR Leaders: KhrushchevCongo Leaders: Lumumba, Kasavubu, Tshombe and Mobutu

Background

By 1960 many of the European colonies in Africa had been granted independence. The end of colonial control created a political and economic vacuum, as the people who were left behind often didn’t have the education or training on how to run a government. The PRC, USSR and USA wanted to be the guides for these new African states.

The Belgian Congo was one of the most strategic and potentially wealthiest of the new states. Belgium had done very little to prepare a smooth transition from colony to statehood. In the late 1950’s people began to protest and call for independence, but the Congo did not have a professional or established elite that could unify and lead the entire country. The Congo consists of many (over 200) different ethnic groups. The strongest organizations were regional and were loyal to their ethnic groups. Only the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) led by Patrice Lumumba was able to mobilize a small amount of national support.

In the May 1960 elections, the MNC emerged as the largest party, and after independence was granted in June, Lumumba set up his government. The West ignored the Congo’s colonial history and Belgium’s contributions to economic burdens, which the new independent country would inherit. Belgium’s debts, the banking system and capital flight (money rushing out of the Congo and into Belgium accounts) pre-independence was never dealt with, nor investigated later on. Politically the new government was at a disadvantage as well. The system gave too much power to the legislators, who had no experience in government, and consequently had little sense of their responsibilities. They were given the task to run a country the size of the US, east of the Mississippi, with nearly 400 different languages and a population that lacked education, training, and spent 5 francs for every one franc it collected.

Lumumba was a former postal clerk who made a name for himself in the trade union movement. He was falsely imprisoned in 1956, on fake charges that he had stolen money from the post office. He

was released in 1957, and began moving politically closer to the Non-Aligned Movement. As Prime Minister in 1960, he was determined to make the Congo genuinely independent of Belgium, US and USSR dominance. In April 1959, Lumumba secretly contacted the Soviet ambassador in Brussels (Belgium). A Belgium communist leader believed that conditions for spreading Marxism were more favorable in the Congo than in other African countries.

Belgium and the US came to similar conclusions, even though the US diplomats from the Congo told the US government that Lumumba was not sympathetic to communism. The head of the Union Minière (UM - Belgium mining company that controlled the of minerals in the Congo) was convinced that Lumumba, once in office, would seek Soviet assistance. The US believed Lumumba seemed to be a dangerous left-wing politician who would give the USSR and PRC access to the Congo’s mineral wealth. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to bribe key Congolese politicians in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent Lumumba from coming to power. The CIA was convinced if Lumumba came to power, he would be more dangerous than Fidel Castro, because he would have done so legally. The CIA even attempted to assassinate Lumumba with poisoned toothpaste, but the operative (Larry Devlin) refused to complete the mission.

Even before independence was granted, the province of Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe, was talking of secession. Tshombe was a right-wing conservative, who had ties to the West, and did not like Lumumba. After independence the Congo immediately fell apart. The army was still under the influence of white Belgian officers. The Congolese army mutinied and threatened their white officers, as well as the white Belgian population. The Southern Kasai region broke away and established their own government, while the southern province of Katanga (which controlled more than half of the Congo’s mineral wealth) immediately seceded on July 11th 1960. Tshombe was assisted by the UM and the Belgian troops still stationed in the Congo, and became the puppet ruler of Katanga. His government was assisted by the

UM, which in reality ruled the region.Lumumba had a serious problem on his hands. The people were causing violence, which led to Belgian troops enforcing control. What this means is that a foreign country (Belgian) had sent its army to control the Congo. It appeared as though the Congo were a colony again. Lumumba went to the United States seeking help, but the US told him to go to the UN. On July 12th Lumumba appealed to the UN for assistance in putting down the mutinies within the Congo, as well as evicting the Belgian troops and the Katangan Separatists. UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, sent a peacekeeping force to keep order until the local forces were strong enough. The UN demanded the withdrawal of Belgian troops, but did not condemn Belgium for their actions. The troops did not leave, however, they moved

into Katanga. The UN did not authorize their force to take over Katanga or use force to evict the Belgian troops, which had been the main reason Lumumba asked for their assistance in the first place!

Since the US and UN were not helping Lumumba, he finally turned to the USSR, informing Khrushchev in a telegram that he would ask the USSR to intervene if the West did not stop their aggression against his country. The USSR sent some food and medical assistance, but in reality, there was little Khrushchev could do. The USSR was not yet equipped to intervene militarily in Africa. The USSR did not have warships that could move swiftly into the area and make an amphibious landing, nor

airlift capacity to bring in troops and supplies. Nor was the USSR willing to confront the US over the Congo.

On August 5th, 1960, the USSR demanded Belgium withdraw from Katanga and its reincorporation in the Republic of Congo. The UN Security Council (USA, France, Britain, USSR, and Taiwan as China) despite Soviet objections, declared the Katanga situation an internal affair, and thus stated the UN could NOT get involved. Hammarskjöld however, negotiated directly with Tshombe to secure the entry of UN troops into Katanga to replace the Belgian troops...but these UN troops were not to be employed there in support of Lumumba. Lumumba was getting the short end of the stick from everyone. By the end of August, US policy was to keep Katanga separate and away from the USSR influence, namely Lumumba.

The political and economic situation in the Congo deteriorated, the US considered the possibility of an armed intervention to pre-empt a Soviet one that would bolster Lumumba. On September 16th 1960,General Joseph Mobutu, who Lumumba had put in charge of the Congolese armed forces, forcibly took power over the Congo with the support of the US and Belgium. He ended aid and relations with the Soviet Union. Under US pressure the Soviet bloc and PRC embassies and advisors left the Congo. Lumumba was placed under house arrest, but his Deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga, managed to create a rival

government in Stanleyville. By October 1960 there were four different regimes in the Congo:

1. Mobutu in Kinshasa supported by the US and Western Power

2. Antoine Gizenga, in Stanleyville, supported by the Soviet bloc, Cuba, Egypt, and most of the new African independent nations

3. Albert Kalonji in South Kasai4. Tshombe in Katanga, supported by

Belgium and UM

Lumumba escaped house arrest (while he was under house arrest he was under UN protection)

and continued to enjoy the support of other African countries. Lumumba called for an uprising against Mobutu. The US, Belgium and Mobutu saw him as a threat that need to be “taken care of.” Lumumba was captured by Congolese troops in December 1960, and handed over to his enemies (Tshombe) in Katanga. Belgian and Katangese brutally beat him and murdered him. Lumumba and his associates, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, were taken to a forest, lined up against a tree and machine gunned to death. The Belgians wanted to get rid of the bodies, so they dissolved them in Sulfuric acid and

crushed/scattered their bones. His death wasn’t announced until three weeks later, though rumors of it had already spread. It was claimed Lumumba was murdered by enraged villagers after he had escaped the Kolatey prison farm. It caused an international uproar and protests. People in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) sacked the Belgian embassy. In London protesters marched through the street to the Belgian embassy where they gave them a letter of protest. In New York, a protest at the UN turned violent and spilled into the streets.

While the US was not directly involved in the murder of Lumumba, his removal was seen as a positive event for Congo security (or rather US interests). Antoine Gizenga became a leader of government in Stanleyville, while Cyrille Adoula was being prepped for leading a separate government in Leopoldville (The Capital). Gizenga was more socialist, and was recognized as the official government by the Soviet Union, Egypt and China. Thus, Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s support for Mobutu, but forced him to install a civilian government under Adoula. Kennedy was fearful of strongly supporting UN removal of Belgian troops, even though the threat of a communist Congo government died with Lumumba. To go against Belgium would be going against a NATO ally, and could cause disunity, something the Soviets could exploit.

August 28th, 196,1 the UN launched Operation Rumpunch. UN forces occupied the post office and radio station in Elizabethville (in Katanga). The UN searched for foreign military personnel and repatriated (sent back to their respective country) 185, while 321 went underground. The British were upset, feeling this exceeded UN authority, that the UN was not authorized to unify the Congo...however the August 1960 resolution did authorize them to evacuate all foreign military and mercenaries. The British were simply upset that the Congo would be unified in a way that would not benefit them (allow them to keep mineral profits from Katanga).

Belgium’s “tolerate Tshombe” attitude was at odds with Kennedy’s eagerness to produce a Congo that was more acceptable to African and international opinion. The US quickly realized Tshombe had no intention of returning Katanga to the Congo. The situation did not just impact the Congo, if the Belgians backed off, they would lose power in upcoming elections at home. White mercenaries that went underground began organizing resistance to the UN. Two companies of UN Indian troops were fired upon by the Belgian consulate in Elizabethville, and in a separate incident, two other UN troops were killed and 13 wounded. According to the UN, in no situation did the UN fire first.

By September 14th the American consul in Elisabethville referred to the fighting as the “Belgians seemed to have declared war on the UN” and the Belgian consulate remarked, “We are through with the UN.” The British remarked to the Americans that the UN action was a miscalculation which would end with the communists taking over Katanga and that the idea that resistance to the UN was led by Europeans was totally false. Kennedy was aware of the British exaggeration of the threat of communism (although to be fair, the US was also exaggerating the threat as well). Fear of widespread massacres was increased by the reports of atrocities on both sides--from the white mercenaries and from the UN (Indian troops in particular).

On September 16th, Kennedy was adamant that the US should not support any UN attempt to subdue Katanga, but was equally adamant that the UN should be assisted to hold onto what they had. Kennedy did not want the UN to “get licked.” Kennedy wanted a quick end, even if the UN failed to root out the white mercenaries and bring Katanga into a federated Congo. UN leader, Hammarskjöld, was desperately trying to create a ceasefire by arranging to meet Tshombe. The British were upset at the precedent being set by the UN, that “any group in the world” could now get a resolution through the Afro-Asian dominated UN and call on it for military force.

There were strong Pro-Tshombe sympathies among Rhodesian whites (south of the Congo). Washington worried about a possible “white supremacy” emerging. Kennedy’s administration believed support for Tshombe was being organized by a Rhodesian, named Loeb. The UN asked the US to airlift troops from Stanleyville to Elizabethville, but it was rejected. Hammarskjöld was flying to negotiate a ceasefire when he died in a plane crash near Ndola, Rhodesia. The Kennedy administration was informed he had been shot down, but there was no conclusive evidence to support it...however there is no evidence to refute it either. Göran Björkdahl claimed it was murder, committed to benefit the Union Minière. Former U.S. President Harry Truman commented that Hammarskjöld, "was on the point of

getting something done when they killed him. Notice that I said 'when they killed him'." A 2015 panel researched eyewitness reports and radio transmissions and noted that the plane was already on fire when it crashed and that other jet craft and intelligence agents were nearby.

After the crash UN forces were bolstered with an American fighter plane to defend US and UN transports, as well as Ethiopian and Swedish jets for protection of the UN. Kennedy was trying to convince Tshombe that he would not be able to maintain his military effectiveness. He should make an agreement with the Adoula government in Leopoldville. The British were encouraging Tshombe to hold out longer and made it known if any UN action was taken against Tshombe, the British would be angry. The new UN leader, U Thant, decided to act, and attacked a roadblock set up by the Katangese. Fighting began and the UN increased its reinforcements. European resistance to UN involvement was evident, and again they blamed the UN of serving communist interests. The Rhodesian leader began to complain the fighting was causing inter-racial bitterness, political chaos, economic instability and hardship, which were working to “hand over Africa to the communists.” Britain and Belgium finally agreed to a meeting between Tshombe and Adoula.

This meeting occurred in Kitona on December 19th 1961, and quickly faltered, as Tshombe said he couldn’t negotiate without the support of his government. It was agreed he would bring the declarations back for them to sign off on. It declared that secession would end, and the mercenaries and foreign military would go home. Whether or not Tshombe would uphold these agreements, was another thing...he would not.

Gizenga was another concern in the beginning of 1962. Gizenga was a supporter of Lumumba had had set up his own government in Stanleyville. His troops had effectively produced two different ANC (Congolese Army) troops. It was feared he would march into northern Katanga. He was also seen as a threat to Adoula’s leadership. However, in January he showed difficulty in maintaining authority, and was actually censured by his own parliament. Two months after Kitona, Tshombe still made no effort to stop secession or back off. African nationalists in other parts of the Congo were no help. There were vast amounts of corruption. Instead of trading goods within the Congo, they traded to other countries whose traders bribed officials for imports/exports. These issues were more of a problem than anything Moscow was doing.

Corruption was not an African initiative, but a continuation of the devalued moral practices of the Europeans, which were directly connected to their economic gains. A government bill (in the Congo) on the sale of diamonds was defeated in parliament. The votes were bought for 3 million Belgian francs. Belgium companies needed freedom to market their products abroad, without government interference. 1959 (when the Congo was a colony of Belgium) the Congo received $30 million from diamond exports. In 1961 (after independence), the Congo received $300,000 for the same production. That’s 1% of what was made 2 years earlier. You can make an educated guess where the other 99% of the profit went...and why Katanga was so important to the Europeans.

Tshombe was given an ultimatum, to accept a UN (US) Reconciliation Plan or face an economic boycott (one the US couldn’t necessarily enforce). He accepted the plan. However, two months went by with no progress. A ceasefire was agreed in Northern Katanga, and Adoula went public with a proposed new constitution. Progress was being made, slowly; therefore the US continued to support the UN Reconciliation Plan. Then on October 16th, 1962, U2 Spy planes over Cuba spotted Soviet missiles. (For the next 13 days President Kennedy would be more preoccupied with the Cuban Missiles Crisis than to be concerned over the Congo.) The next day Kennedy got a report that UN forces were not equipped to engage outside of Elizabethville. When US representative, McGhee left the Congo on October 18th, Adoula took back the ceasefire. Around this same time, China attacked India over border issues, and India recalled their UN troops from the Congo, which cut the forces by ⅓.

It was now clear that a solution could not be achieved by further negotiation, as Tshombe could not be trusted to keep his word. Kennedy was concerned with how the US public viewed the situation. He did not believe the public saw the confrontation in the Congo as sufficiently damaging to US interests to justify American military action. Kennedy wanted suggestions on how this could be changed. Kennedy was concerned about how to get more US troops under UN command, but U Thant didn’t want more US troops, he just wanted US equipment. On December 19th, the year anniversary of the Kitona meeting, Tshombe stated he would rather do a “scorched earth” policy than reintegrate into the Congo. Students stormed the US consul in Elizabethville shouting, “Down with Kennedy!” The US heavily supplied the UN with equipment, even against Soviet criticism. January 14th 1963, Tshombe wrote the US, Belgian, British and French governments that his ministers had decided to end secession and allow the UN to freely move throughout Katanga, and finally asked for a meeting with Adoula. This was a triumph for the UN and Kennedy.

Now that the Congo was on the road to stability, Soviet intervention was again seen as a possible threat. Communist strategy focused on politicians in parliament, military, youth groups and radio/newspaper personnel...almost exactly the same as what the US was doing. In parliament the radical Congo representatives would denounce communists, with the CIA coaching on the sidelines. The CIA found that money was more effective than propaganda. Monetary mismanagement was one of the Congo’s biggest problems. While the Congo appeared as a lost cause, the US couldn’t walk away due to the time and effort invested in it over the last three years. Cold War concerns were still prevalent.

Previously, the US had supported removing all foreign mercenaries, now they were installing exiled-Cuban mercenaries to fight the rebellions, and to make matters worse, these Cuban-exile-mercenaries shared facilities with the UN. Mobutu, who had been against retraining his ANC army, now accepted it from Israelis and had the Italians retrain his air force. Mobutu’s position as a key government figure was also getting stronger in America’s eyes. Mobutu’s troops captured South Kasai after four months of fighting. Under US pressure, Tshombe reluctantly agreed to reunite Katanga with the Congo, but this occurred only after UN troops actually intervened in Katanga in 1963 (which they refused to do for Lumumba in 1960). Tshombe was forced to flee to Rhodesia (a British colony that would eventually become Zimbabwe). Once the Congo was reunited and stable, UN security forces were withdrawn (June 1964).

Although the Congo was reunited, their problems did not go away. Pro-Lumumba leaders Soumialot and Mulele, who had undergone guerrilla training in eastern Europe, created rebellions in the north and east of the Congo. They got assistance from many African countries who were opposed to US and Belgian involvement in the Congo. The PRC sent equipment through Tanzania and Uganda. The Soviets sent equipment through the Sudan and Egypt trained 2000 guerrillas. Cuba also sent over 100 military instructors.

Johnson was reluctant to send in troops to the Congo, since the US was becoming more heavily entrenched in the Vietnam War. He tried to get Belgium to intervene, but when that didn’t work he sent in covert support. More mercenaries were recruited from South Africa, supplied by the CIA and transported in planes by anti-communist Cuban exiles. In November 1964, when rebels took over Stanleyville and seized several hundred European hostages, Johnson agreed to airlift 500 Belgian paratroopers to rescue them. By 1965 the rebellions had been defeated. On November 25th 1965, Mobutu overthrew the civilian government with the help of the CIA, and established a military dictatorship. Through brutal repression he stabilized the Congo and remained its dictator until 1997. The Congo remained weak however, which was made apparent when it needed help defending itself from an attack by Angola in 1977-78. Troops from Belgium and France had to rescue them.

The Congo: An Assessment

The European, Americans UN and to a small extent, the USSR bounced the Congo around from one contradiction to the next. The Congolese were not blameless either. It was difficult for them to see past that fact however due to all of the foreign pressures put upon them. The decolonization of the Congo can only be fully understood in the context of viewing the Cold War as an ideological conflict that shaped the perceptions of how the world should be, and had a tremendous impact on the way the Western powers behaved. For the Kennedy administration, Black Africa, and particularly the Congo, were the center of Global Cold War concerns: How could newly independent African states be incorporated into the Western World and kept out of the Soviet sphere?

It was the Cold War that propelled the Congo into the international world stage once the Belgian troops came back in. Had there been no threat of a “Soviet plot” it would have been very difficult and unnecessary for the US or the UN to appease Belgium, Britain and France. The Congo highlighted the decolonization dilemma: what was more important, winning over the African and Asians in the UN to Western perspectives OR maintaining relationships with allies (NATO) in Europe?

This Cold War lens impacted the policies of the US and UN as well as impacting the intelligence reports about the Congo from so-called intelligence agencies. Assessments within the State Department and the CIA often showed little evidence of a Soviet threat, which did not fit within the portrayals that were framed by Cold War pressures. There were many reports that showed Lumumba was not a communist, and yet the US policy makers behaved as though he was already flying the Red flag with a hammer and sickle.

Under Eisenhower and Kennedy the US saw the United Nations as the most effective means to pursue Cold War interests in the Congo. Unfortunately, the Americans did not expect the Belgians to ignore the UN resolutions. It was Brussels, not Moscow that had breached international law. In fact, the Soviets could have used the Congo more effectively in gaining greater prestige and status in Africa, but they dropped the ball. The influence of Soviet embassies was not significantly threatening in material or economic terms, considering the overwhelming presence of Western representatives, capital and agents. Their ideology was not dangerous because it was never translated into useful policies for the Congo. It was strictly rhetoric. The irony is the West’s perception of the Crisis: Lumumba’s susceptibility to the Soviets...however would have never been an issue if the UN had actually supported him and gotten the foreign Belgian army out of the Congo.