Populist Leader Case Study: BoliviaVictor Paz Estenssoro

BackgroundThe fight for Bolivian independence from colonial Spain began in 1809, and

was completed in 1825, at the battle of Tumusla. President Sucre began a series of liberal reforms to remove the colonial barriers and caste system. They were too liberal for conservative elites, who wanted to maintain power and control over indigenous populations. Sucre attempted to unite Bolivia and Peru in 1836, which failed due to Chile’s intervention in 1839. In 1841, Peru attacked Bolivia, but were defeated at the battle of Ingavi on November 18th. Many consider this to be Bolivia's true date of independence. These initial wars ended Bolivia’s position as a power to be reckoned with in South America.1 Economic problems due to the decrease in mine revenues, also impacted Sucre’s reforms. This led to a coup, and initiated political instability for many years.

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Bolivia is a landlocked nation. They lost their port to Chile in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884. This war became complicated when the United States attempted to mediate it. The US intervention hurt Bolivia more than it helped, and initiated poor relations with the US. Bolivia also has the largest indigenous population. Ethnic differences ran deep, and the majority population didn’t speak Spanish, instead they used indigenous languages (Aymara & Quechua).2 These peasants mostly lived in the high altiplano (Andean Plateau) with little education and even less political power. Local judges were often related to the landlord and local governments had less power than the Latifundista.3 Peasants paid tribute to their landlords by providing labor in the fields, and working in their landlord’s personal home a few weeks out of the year. In the 1950’s, the average income was less than $100 a year.

1 Kenneth Lehman. Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership. (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 28. 2 Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 12.3 Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958) 18.

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Bolivia also suffered from poor infrastructure that left national politics concentrated mostly in La Paz (the capital). Regional and separatist feelings erupted in the 1921 Aymara Rebellion and the Chayanta Rebellion of 1927. Add to this maelstrom, miner/worker unrest and a struggling woman’s movement; Bolivia was in turmoil. Society, already divided by social class, was also internally fragmented into narrow interest groups.4 The military supported the landed oligarchs, mine owners and various foreign investors.

Three mining companies controlled the central government, and only 3% of the population was allowed to vote. These social disparities were brought to a head during the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-35). The government tried to use the war as a diversion from the economic problems of the Great Depression, as well as the increased influence of the mining companies on the government. It led to the beginnings of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), as disillusioned young middle-class lawyers, journalists and bureaucrats came together to support a nationalist agenda.5 They took advantage of a national consciousness of discontent. They set up small committees, called comandos, in provincial cities that attracted professionals and white-collar workers. MNR leaders, like Paz Estenssoro, also met with labor leaders to gain support. This working-class alliance was used to discredit the government by exposing labor issues against them.

Gen. Villarroel Paz Estenssoro

Juan Lechín Hernán Siles Zuazo

In 1942, unarmed miners went on strike at the Cataví mines and were massacred by the army. This led to the official formation of the MNR by the disaffected middle class. In 1943, there was a military coup led by the RADEPA (Razón de Patria), a socially conscious group within the military. This military junta attempted to form a legitimate government by teaming up with the MNR. RADEPA members took control of regiments while the MNR took over the telephone system to confuse the conservative government.6 General Villarroel took charge and Paz Estenssoro became his finance minister. Villarroel had difficulty getting US recognition for his government since his regime was a military junta and the fact that the MNR had past affiliations with fascism. To make the US happy, he expropriated property owned by Axis countries in Bolivia. Without diplomatic

4 Mitchell, 3.5 Joseph Holtey, Victor Paz Estenssoro: A Political Biography (Arizona: Victorpazestenssoro.com & House of Lit, 2012), 15.6 Mitchell, 22.

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recognition, the US would not buy Bolivian tin (the US accounted for over 50% of Bolivian revenues).7 US recognition was only granted after Villarroel announced elections in 1944, and removed the MNR from his cabinet (besides the fascist claim, the US had wrongly assumed the MNR were communist).

In November there were a series of executions by RADEPA leaders against a group of rebels who had attempted a coup (a sudden takeover of the government) against Villarroel. To improve his image, Villarroel let the MNR back into his cabinet. Paz created a flurry of reforms, including: a new minimum wage, increased union rights, voluntary retirement, and rent reductions. In 1944, miners united to form the FSTMB (a leftist miner’s union) headed by Juan Lechín. Without contribution from the mining industry, the national budget would diminish and leave nothing to support schools, courts or the army. It was imperative for Bolivia’s survival to get a good price on tin. Paz had been the delegate at the Chapultepec Conference8 in 1945, he knew the United States had pledged to purchase strategic raw materials at unreduced prices even after WWII. The United States and Bolivia, however, were unable to reach a decent agreement on the price of tin. This forced Paz to make a 20% cut in the 1946 budget and institute a wage freeze. As finance minister, Paz tried to diversify Bolivia’s economy to free them from dependence on mineral exports.9 Paz attempted to get loans for financing machinery to increase farm production, build roads to unite areas, and for surveying for oil drilling. The MNR also sought support from the peasants by addressing land redistribution. The miners and peasants were two large social groups that the traditional political parties ignored.

Downfall of Villarroel and Exile of Paz Conservative parties and the mine companies (and the newspapers they

owned) feared the “radicalism” of the RADEPA-MNR alliance. They combined efforts to break down Villarroel. Leftist parties like PIR (Socialist) and some unions worked against the Villarroel regime out of fear that the MNR would replace them. The opposition isolated Villarroel from public support and incited mob violence in La Paz. A teacher’s strike in 1946 led to the death of a University student and gave the opposition a martyr. They called for the resignation of the MNR from Villarroel’s cabinet. Paz suggested he resign ALL members of the cabinet so that the violence would not be blamed on the MNR, but Villarroel gave in to the opposition. He replaced the MNR with RADEPA members (who had been plotting against him).

On July 21st, 1946, anarchy ensued in La Paz as armed civilians roamed the streets and sought out government supporters. The police refused to arm the MNR or supporters of Villarroel. The General of Transit Police was lynched at the Plaza 7 Holtey, 29.8 At this conference, all countries agreed to respect each other’s social, political and economic sovereignty—the US was there and signed it9 Glenn J. Dorn. The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy. (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 42.

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San Pedro. The editor of a pro-government newspaper was shot to death and his body was hung from a lamp post under Villarroel’s office window. That afternoon, the mob stormed the Palace and shot anyone who got in their way. They shot the president’s aides, his private secretary and Villarroel, who was hiding behind a file cabinet in his office. They threw their corpses out of the second story window and then strung them up from lamp posts in front of the palace.10

Rebels broadcasted over the radio for the capture (dead or alive) of Paz and other MNR members. Paz and Germán Monroy narrowly escaped. Instead of going home, they found refuge in the house of an MNR supporter. They hid in the attic as they listened to the events unfold outside and over the radio. Twice, the house they hid in was searched by rebels. At 8:30 pm, Paz and Monroy made their escape to the Paraguayan Embassy. They pulled their hats down, their collars up, and walked as quickly as they could to the rear of the embassy, so as not to encounter any rebel mobs. They had to jump over an iron gate that led into a garden in the back, which was easy for Paz, however Monroy was a bit heavier...and got stuck with his legs dangled over the end. Two people in their balcony saw and laughed at them, which could have been bad had it brought attention before Paz was able to get over and help Monroy.11

They were trapped in the Paraguayan embassy for over 100 days. In September, a mob forced its way into the La Paz city jail and took the Majors who had been responsible for the November assassinations. They lynched them and dragged their bodies through the Plaza Murillo. This incited more violence, which led the mob to the Paraguayan embassy where they shouted for Paz and Monroy. Paraguayan officials informed them that if anyone violated their embassy, it would be an act of war. The local police dispersed the crowd by firing shots in the air. Paz and Monroy were able to secretly escape Bolivia in November 1946.12

The Sexenio & the Road Back to PowerAfter the coup, Bolivian politics returned to normal as conservative parties

(dominated by the Tin companies) took control. The social reforms that Paz had instituted under Villarroel were rolled back. The period between the 1946 coup and the 1952 Revolution is known as the Sexenio (six years of rule by the old guards).

In 1947, Enrique Hertzog was elected president. He created a coalition government that included the PURS (conservative political party), and the PIR (revolutionary Leftist political party). His coalition was not a united front. He tried to please conservatives by not increasing taxes, but they were upset over his use of the PIR to get support from miners.13 In turn, the miners did not trust the PIR for working so closely with the Hertzog government. They viewed the PIR as

10 Holtey, 44.11 Holtey, 45.12 Holtey, 45.13 Maria L. Wagner. “The Sexenio (1946-52)” in Bolivia: A Country Study. Ed. Rex A. Hudson and Dennis M. Hanratty, (Washington D.C.: Federal REsearch Division, 1991), 33.

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opportunists and dupes. After the 1946 coup, the MNR worked immediately toward creating a revolution, and sometimes collaborated with PIR to sabotage the government.14 The MNR showed some strength in the 1949 May election. Paz and other MNR exiled officials met in La Quiaca, near the border of Argentina and Bolivia, to prepare for a coup against Hertzog’s government. MNR rebels hoped to take the police station of Villazón, while others would throw dynamite at the local army garrison. This rebellion however never occurred. It was leaked to the authorities, and Paz and the other MNR officials had to go back to Buenos Aries. Argentina then kicked him out and Paz went to Montevideo, Uruguay, where he was not allowed to communicate with the MNR. This failure taught the MNR that they could not gain power alone, they would need a coalition of the people to support them.

Back in Bolivia, the MNR was gaining more support in the cities while Juan Lechín helped to organize miners. The government party (PURS) held a majority in both houses of congress, but they lacked leadership. The Government also had many scandals, as well as a poor reputation for mistreatment of political prisoners. The jails were overcrowded, unsanitary, and torture was common. The economy was poor, inflation rose while tin prices continued to stay low (due in part to US policies). The GDP was only $118.60, which was the second worst in the Americas (the worst was Haiti). Health services were scarce in the cities and nearly non- existent in the rural areas. Bolivia had the lowest life expectancy in Latin America.15 The rural peasants in Bolivia were tied to the land and had to give personal service, pongueaje, several times a year to the Latifundista. Indians who were not obligated to do this (only 18%) were still exploited through discriminatory taxes. In the cities, Indians were expected to stay out of sight and out of mind. They had to stay off the main streets and were not allowed to use certain conveniences, like elevators.16

For the 1951 elections, the MNR did not have much money. MNR supporters tore down opposition posters, wrote pro-MNR slogans on the back and put them back up. They slipped MNR propaganda into the pages of the daily newspapers. Some MNR supporters even infiltrated the opposition, took funds meant for that candidate, and then used them to buy materials for the MNR.17 During this time Paz was reunited with his family in Buenos Aires. He worked hard on his campaign for presidency. He tried going home in March, but the Panagra Airlines refused to fly him. The MNR platform emphasized nationalism. A handbill in 1950 stated, “The criminal Rosca (government) must be considered and combated as a foreign invader, because it is foreign!”18 In the end, Paz received the most votes in the 1951 election:19

Paz (MNR) 54,049

48%

14 Dorn, 97.15 Lehman, 100.16 Lehman, 101.17 Holtey, 66.18 Mitchell, 31.19 Holtey, 67.

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Gosálvez (PURS) 39,940

36%

Gutierrez (FSB) 6,559 6%Elío (Aramayo Mines)

6,441 6%

Arze (PIR) 5,170 4%

Since Paz did not technically win a majority, it was up to Congress to decide who would lead. Rather than give power to the MNR, the military took control. Ten days after the election General Ballivián took control, accused the MNR of communist alliances, and refused to let Paz take his position as president. MNR supporters who challenged the regime met brutal suppression. For the next 11 months, the junta met resistance. Inflation increased, the US stopped buying tin, and food became scarce. Days before the Revolution a “Bolivian Dilemma” document circulated the White House explaining Bolivia’s problems of massive wealth/land inequality, poor education and the plight of the peasants, which had created the current social and political chaos.20 In a flashback to the Chaco war, the military tried to divert the public’s attention by focusing on an old territorial dispute with Chile, but to no avail.21 The final blow came when some military leaders secretly began to align themselves with the MNR.

In April 1952, General Seleme (Paz’s ex-commander in the Chaco War) negotiated with MNR leader, Hernan Siles, to support an uprising in return for the presidency. He began the uprising on April 8th, and distributed arms to the workers and middle class The MNR and police forces took control over central La Paz, but the army retaliated and their efforts to retake the city were nearly successful. So much so, that General Seleme fled, took refuge in an embassy, and forfeited his right to the presidency. Siles and Lechín continued to fight with poorly armed workers. An uprising in Oruro kept southern troops from reinforcing the army at La Paz. Miners then attacked the army from behind, and eventually forced General Torres to sign a truce with Siles. Many officers fled to Peru. The 1952 Revolution lasted three days with 552 dead and 787 wounded.22 In Buenos Aires, Paz rejoiced

20 Lehman, 100. 21 Mitchell, 32.22 Mitchell, 33.

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at the news of the MNR victory and met with Juan and Evita Perón to discuss his return and leadership of Bolivia. Paz returned on April 15th, 1952.

Paz’s 1st Term and Problems within the MNRPaz credited the people with placing him in office, which established the

legitimacy of his presidency. He stated in a speech, “Common citizens took up arms against an oppressive government which had made a mockery of the legitimate electoral process. The masses have imposed their will.”23 When Ballivián was leaving the country, mobs tried to force his plane to return (to lynch him). Paz refused to allow his plane to be brought back, and ensured his safe exile.

Paz found it difficult to maintain party unity between the left and right-wing factions within the MNR. Signs of class conflict appeared immediately, which led many to align more with the middle class that stressed regime stability. After the Revolution, nearly every labor union was considered an affiliate of the MNR. Lechín led the leftist Central Obrero Boliviano (COB) that called for immediate nationalization of mines and railroads, radical land reform and economic diversity (which the MNR already promised). Peasant unions were called upon to work and feed the country. The CNTCB (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) was created from the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. The MNR’s initial policy was more to manage and neutralize the peasants rather than mobilize them.24

Opposition persisted. In May of 1952, an editorial in the paper, Rebelión, called for radical Marxist-style nationalization of the tin mines and land. This led Paz to shut down the paper. The MNR paper, En Marcha, responded that the MNR was against international communism, since the MNR was based on Christian and Nationalist principles.25 A system of patronage was created where only MNR members could get civil service jobs. Paz scored a victory in 1954, when POR (Revolutionary Workers Party) leaders defected to the MNR. These POR leaders represented the voice of labor. Paz succeeded in dividing and neutralizing powerful labor unions and peasant groups by carefully selecting the most powerful leaders from within them and appointed them to various important posts within his administration. From 1952-56, the MNR was shaped by powerful interest groups (Middle class, Miners, Workers, Peasants, etc.) who acted independently. Each of these groups were given power over ministries: The mine workers got the Ministry of Mines, factory workers got the Ministry of Labor, railroad workers got the Public Works Ministry and the peasants got the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. A special term, cogobierno, meaning co-government, was coined to describe this coalition of power.26 The heads of these four ministries had multiple duties as government 23 Robert J. Alexander. The Bolivian National Revolution. (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 23.24 Mitchell, 47.25 Holtey, 75.26 Mitchell, 49.

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leaders, party leaders, and union leaders. Paz fostered unity by putting leaders of the left and right in his cabinet. The National Political Committee (CPN) became a central executive group that met weekly to implement important decisions. In 1953, there were 9 members whose goal was to maintain party organization. They also included a women’s representative. During Paz’s first term, the CPN membership basically consisted of his cabinet. Christopher Mitchell claims that, “Paz was well suited to preside over this combination of rivalries and shared hopes...one is impressed by his ability to maximize his own influence by balancing or manipulating the interests of others.”27

The ArmyAfter the Revolution, the army became a serious concern. Juan Lechín was

against any reformation, stating, “What more army do we need than the people? To make massacres totally impossible, we must repeat...that we don’t want an army.”28 Paz supported a reformed army, but did not want to upset the miners. The army was reduced from 20,000 men to 5,000. They were also supposed to recruit from all social classes. In the end, Lechín supported Paz, stating, “We are sworn enemies of the army...but we believe that, like Revolutionary France in 1789, we have a need to create a Popular and Revolutionary Army.”29 Lechín would follow this pattern of standing up for his workers, but then eventually support the MNR decisions.

Paz Estenssoro dominated the military, relegating them to civic-action projects and colonization of the frontier areas in the lowlands (which were sparsely populated). The military budget fell from 22% in 1952, to 6.7% in 1957.30 Paz established the School of Military Engineering, reestablished the military academy in 1954, and began to send officers to the School of the Americas (SOA), run by the United States in Panama. In 1963, Bolivia had more graduates from the SOA than any other Latin American nation. The focus of their training was in counter-insurgency (how to handle communist guerrillas). Since the army decreased, there were worker and miner militias that numbered between 50 and 70,000.31 Paz also reorganized the police force and gave them more responsibility than the military.

Siles, who was more conservative, began to rebuild the military after 1956, when he questioned the reliability of the militias who were more supportive of the Leftist faction of the MNR. He continued to involve them in civic action projects. The United States also indirectly pressured the MNR when economic aid became mutually dependent upon an established army. The US began to send military instructors to Bolivia in 1956. To make the military more supportive of the MNR, officers were given preference in appointments and promotions, and began to gain

27 Mitchell, 5.28 Mitchell, 52. 29 Mitchell, 52.30 Bolivia: A Country Study, 225.31 Bolivia: A Country Study, 226.

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political influence. Paz continued this trend in the early 1960’s while he actively prevented militias from rearming. By 1964, the army had increased to 15,000 men. As a result, the government became dependent on the military to control increased social unrest, while the military became less dependent on the government.

PoliciesOne of the first things Paz initiated was the Universal Suffrage Decree on

July 21st 1952. It granted suffrage (the right to vote) to 90% of the voting age population (who had been denied due to literacy and property qualifications).32 This decree had universal support from the Left and the Right. This decree changed the political game. It forced politicians to pay attention to the poor and indigenous, for the first time. The Ministry of Peasant Affairs set up peasant unions to defend their interests. A Commission for Educational Reorganization was set up to extend education to the “rank and file” in rural areas.33

In May 1952, Paz initiated the Mine Nationalization Study Commission and gave them 120 days to finish a report. This commission consisted of various elements from the FSTMB, Central Bank, and representatives of the mines. Nationalization became a reality when Paz gave the Proclamation Decree 3223 at the Cataví mines. To appease the United States (25% of the mines were owned by American citizens), Paz offered compensation, minus any back taxes owed to the government.34 The US supported this and agreed to buy all the Bolivian tin that had not already been sold. The economy however, was in trouble. Inflation threatened the 30% salary increase Paz had initiated, while the prices for flour, rice, sugar and cooking oil rose. The government tried price controls and limited food staples from the government warehouses. This discouraged domestic agricultural production and led to illegal re-exporting of food. The mines contributed to inflation due to their company stores, pulperías. Miners bought their food at government reduced prices, and many resold them on the black market at higher prices. This crisis culminated in a coup attempt in January 1953. The right wing of the MNR went extreme and arrested Lechín and others. Paz received help from the army to squash the half-hearted attempt. This gave Paz the opportunity to crack down on other disruptive groups. Rather than use bloodshed however, he arrested other political opponents (about 100). The MNR also purged the military of those who had supported the coup. Paz’s tactics of compromise and power-balancing prevented an open clash between the left and right-wing sectors.

Paz stressed the need to diversify the economy and build an extensive road system to unite production areas with the urban markets. In 1953, Paz needed a long-term contract with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) which

32 Holtey, 77.33 Alexander, 48.34 This means if the company had not fully paid their taxes, the government would keep that amount and pay the remainder to the company

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was the organization that dealt with purchasing raw materials for the US government. Through much hassle and negotiations, prices were eventually agreed upon, though not as high as Paz had hopped. Paz tried to improve the economy through a fixed exchange rate at 190 bolivianos to the dollar, increased food prices and limited wage increases He also approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $10-million-dollar loan to stabilize the boliviano. When Eisenhower won the presidency in 1953, he sent his brother, Milton, to Bolivia on a fact-finding mission. His report called for US aid to sustain Paz’s regime. Milton stressed that if Paz fell, more radical, possibly communist elements could take control. Thus, the Cold War worked to Paz’s advantage. Meanwhile the cost of living in La Paz rose 59% within 3 months and the average wage increased 180%. The economy was in a downward spiral.

The MNR program had called for land redistribution. The radical factions of society, primarily the Trotskyist group (POR) incited peasants to violence, claiming they shouldn’t wait for government action. This especially affected the Cochabamba valley, where peasants began looting and attacking landowners. The MNR sent officials to investigate and they arrested the POR, communists and FSB (Right wing Fascists) as agitators. Paz removed the mayor, chief of police and MNR coordinator of Cochabamba’s peasant federation from power. The Agrarian Reform Decree 3464, on August 2, 1953, freed ¾ of the population from generations of servitude. The 1950 census showed that 70% of the rural land was owned by 5% of the population. Most landowners did not work or cultivate their land. The Agrarian Reform Decree freed peasants from inferior socio-economic status and provided an incentive to earn more by increasing food production.35 Nuflo Chávez claimed it was fashioned nearly word for word from the Chinese Agrarian Reform Law of 1950.36 It aimed to:

● distribute land to peasants● restore Indian community lands that had been taken ● free agricultural workers from serfdom ● increase production of agriculture and grazing ● conserve natural resources ● promote internal migration of the population.37

The vast majority of Bolivia’s indigenous population became de facto landowners. Violence began after the decree because it was implemented too slowly. By the 1970’s only about 40% of peasants actually received land. Paz’s government only wanted to distribute low performing land, those farms that were medium sized and productive were supposed to remain with the landowner. Peasants took land for themselves, often with violence against the landlords. This was a main reason why Paz created the Ministry of Peasant Affairs, to organize peasants into syndicalists (unions), in order to better control them. Paz took a lead role in selecting local leaders to oversee this process. He stated, in regards to a

35 Holtey, 91.36 Alexander, 64.37 Alexander, 64-65.

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person suggested for a remote part of Santa Cruz, “No, he wouldn’t live very long in that job. He’s not very fast with a gun.”38

In November 1953, a US congressional delegation came to visit, and there was another attempted coup to discredit Paz’s administration. It began in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz simultaneously under the leadership of the FSB (Right wing fascist party). They forced their way into the president’s residence with the intent to assassinate Paz, but he wasn’t there. In Cochabamba conspirators took over police headquarters and the radio station. In Santa Cruz they attempted to overrun the airport. It all failed. Lechín was held in Cochabamba, but within hours, miners freed him. Paz addressed the nation from the La Paz radio station in the early afternoon of the coup, and gave a fifteen-minute reassurance speech that the government was still in charge. The FSB and moneyed-oligarchy had failed. He said the government had popular support that would quickly crush any revolutionary movements instigated by traitorous and irresponsible elements. In closing, he stated those responsible for the coup would be given their full legal rights by properly authorized courts (rather than by self-appointed citizen’s tribunals).39 They were exiled to Uruguay.

The EconomyEastern Bolivia had massive untapped crude oil reserves that needed

exploration and production by the State Oil Corporation (YPFB). Paz invested into the YPFB, which led to the tripling of crude oil output from 1953-54. The YPFB was successful. The invested money was eventually recovered, leading to a profit of $38 million in 1953-56. In 1955, a Petroleum Code was created to attract foreign investors while protecting Bolivia’s sovereignty over oil riches. In August 1953, an all-weather highway connecting Cochabamba and Santa Cruz further supported trade. Roads would improve trade by getting goods from places of production to consumption, BUT it would also help to break down regionalism and promote nationalism.40

In 1954, inflation continued from the heavy government expenditures on long range projects. Salaries were adjusted 50%, but prices for goods continued to increase. The focus, again, went on tin, since it made up 90% of the state’s foreign exchange income. The US responded with an aid package which saved the urban population from food shortages. The food aid, however, contributed to poor agricultural production, which made Bolivia more dependent on the US. In 1955, Paz made an economic agreement with Chile that would make Bolivia an import oil exporter. The Mutual Economic Pact established guidelines for a coordinated cooperation exchange program to help improve both economies through an active interchange of products and a roadway. 41

38 Alexander, 65.39 Holtey, 95.40 Holtey, 96.41 Holtey, 114.

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Milton Eisenhower and John F.Dulles https://outlet.historicimages.com/search?page=1190&q=americana

JFK and Paz https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/pYoiN81Ku0mxhzqGQxvVTw.aspx

Inflation worsened by 1955-56. Paz used all foreign exchange to buy machinery and technology to build up its agriculture production, infrastructure and petroleum industry. This left the Central Bank without reserves to back the currency it issued to pay civil servants and the state run tin mines. The average annual increase in the cost of living in La Paz was 147%. Inflation was worse for food and clothing, but fuel and rent were not affected as much. Fuel only rose 50% and rents stayed the same due to a rent freeze. Inflation occurred partly from the increase in bolivianos, which went from 91 billion to 206 billion. Another cause of inflation was the continued decrease in tin revenues. The Central Bank lacked the ability to maintain a stable boliviano.

COMIBOL (the state-owned mines) faced serious limitations. After the mines were nationalized, many foreign technical and administrative personnel left. There was exhaustion of the rich ore sources, a scarcity of electricity for mineral processing, and an increase in costs due to higher wages and fringe benefits. COMIBOL employees also strained the economy due to the over inflated number of miners. There were too many workers and not enough work. Another problem was that the government still subsidized the pulperìas (company stores), where miners bought food and other essentials at a fraction of their actual value. These pulperìas were a tool in controlling the miners, since they could only get their food and supplies from these stores, which consumed nearly ¾ of their wages.42

Health and EducationThe mortality rate among newborns decreased by 50% between 1951 and

1956. However, health care was inadequate and focused mostly on the urban areas with rural areas relying more on traditional healing methods of the indigenous. Under Siles, the MNR set up the Social Security Code of 1956, that provided aid for sickness, maternity, occupational risks, disabilities, pensions and survivor

42 Sarah McCracken. “Women in the Bolivian Mines, 1961-1985.” Prospect Journal of International Affairs. October 12th (2011).www.projectjournal.org.

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benefits.43 Health issues due to the dangerous mine conditions led to premature deaths from silicosis, a disease of the lungs. The MNR did little to support preventative health measures for miners or workers. Paz’s regime spent 28% of their budget (before it was 16) on education. This led to a 15% increase in construction of rural school buildings, a 56% rise in the number of school-aged children attending classes, and a 22% increase in teachers. Prior to the Paz regime, 84% of the population was illiterate and 73% of school-aged children did not go to school.44 However, even with these advancements, teacher salaries remained very low, which eventually led to strikes, which then led to social chaos in 1964.

In 1956, the MNR set up the foundation for the education system. Students would attend six years of primary school, four years of middle school and two years of secondary school that would culminate in a baccalaureate degree. The University of Bolivia was the only post-secondary school that awarded degrees. Eventually technical, fine arts and teacher training schools would be set up.45

Although the MNR made efforts to increase education, significant problems remained. There was a large disparity between male and female enrollment. Many females dropped out due to economic pressures, since daughters were expected to help with the chores and childcare of younger brothers and sisters. Dropout rates were high across the board though. About one-third of first graders completed fifth grade, only 20% of students began secondary school, and only 1% of students finished with a university degree.46 One of the main reasons why the dropout rate was so high was the lack of a bilingual education system. The peasants spoke indigenous languages while the teachers taught in Spanish at every level.

Women and IndigenousThe intense patriarchy of Bolivia kept women’s issues in the background

during and after the Revolution; however, the Revolution created an atmosphere of change where “women could seize the opportunity to negotiate their own role.”47 Prior to the 1952 Revolution, some educated women joined Inter-American Women’s Commission (CIM) and fought for suffrage (voting rights), equality, indigenous rights and access to education. Women were vital in keeping up resistance to the Sexenio after Villarroel’s assassination. They staged street demonstrations, held hunger strikes to release political prisoners, were secret messengers and spies, nursed the sick, and sheltered political refugees. Lydia Gueiler Tejada was a commander of an MNR armed guerilla militia in La Paz. She was the only female to remain politically active after the revolution and became an MNR ambassador. She would also become Bolivia’s first female president from 1979 to 1980, when she was overthrown in a military coup.

43 Bolivia: A Country study, 97. 44 Alexander, 84.45 Bolivia: A Country Study, 93.46 Bolivia: A Country Study, 93.47 McCracken, 5.

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The MNR recognized the political usefulness of women by organizing “Female Commands”. These had control over traditional activities, such as the market place and selling drinks. They worked to politically organize women. The most visible women were the Barzolas (named after Maria Barzola, a female miner and women’s activist who died in the Cavati Massacre). The Barzolas were used to support the MNR, Paz Estenssoro even referred to them as “a women’s secret police.”48 Often they were used to silence opponents of the MNR. At a working-class demonstration in La Paz, Barzolas jumped in and attacked with razors, penknives and whips. In Parliament, Barzolas would throw tomatoes and shout down anyone who opposed the MNR.49

In 1956, the first-time women were allowed to vote, the MNR manipulated them by reminding them it was the MNR that gave them this right. After the revolution women were unable to facilitate an identity that would fight for their issues over subordination and discrimination.50 For instance, the Agrarian Reform may have given land to the peasants, but only to the male peasants. Women were not allowed to directly own land.51 While they voted in 1956, there weren’t any women on the ballot. Domitila Barrios de Chungara, a leader in the Mine Worker’s Committee of Housewives and who rejected the label of “feminist”, implied that the MNR’s patriarchal beliefs excluded women from leadership positions in the government. Lydia G. Tejada’s voice was limited after she was shipped off to be an ambassador in West Germany.52

Traditional values remained after the Revolution. Men continued to follow the roles of machismo and patronage. Therefore men “demonstrated heroism, forcefulness, a zest for action and sexual prowess,” while also giving favors to subordinates and expecting loyalty in return. With this in mind, women were expected to uphold the ideals of “womanhood” by being modest, self-sacrificing and focused on motherhood.53

The patriarchal system did not hamper women from political activism though. In 1961, miners’ wives formed the first Housewives Committee over grievances that their husbands were owed wages for three months, there was little food/supplies in the pulperìas and two labor leaders had been arrested. The communist union leaders Escóbar and Pimentel were arrested for promoting a strike against the Triangular Plan (A Western Aid package that was contingent on laying off miners and getting the left under control). The Housewives Committee went to La Paz and held a hunger strike for their release. Many had to bring their young children with them and they were attacked by Barzolas.

48 Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes. A History of Latin America. (Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 396.49 Francesca Miller. Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice (New England: University of New England Press, 1991), 85.50 Ed. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury. Women and Politics Worldwide. (CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 119.51 Nelson & Chowdhury,, 120.52 Keen & Haynes, 396.53 Bolivia: A Country Study, 77.

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Once the men were released (after Manuela de Cejas died from the hunger strike), they told the wives they could not return immediately to the mines...their wives did not accept no for an answer, and forced them on the bus to return. They chastised the leaders saying, “You have no idea how you are making these women feel right now...You ignore us, but you better pay attention to these women.”54

Many of these women, who were fighting for their families, not women’s rights, often met hostility from their husbands. Sarah McCracken states, “Their husbands, used to a patriarchal society in which women stayed home and did not participate in politics, evidently felt threatened by what they might achieve.”55

Indigenous rights were also not fully acknowledged. It has already been stated that the MNR sought to neutralize and control the peasant population. Laureano Machaka, an Aymara leader, organized the Independent Aymara Republic in 1956, but it did not last long. To keep strong ties to the United States, Paz agreed to support the powerful US trained National Army, and used them to go after peasant militias. The use of the army negatively impacted the MNR base of support by breaking up the worker and middle-class alliance.56

While the 1952 Revolution impacted the white elite’s power, and challenged their status, racism against the Indians persisted. The Revolution allowed for upward mobility of the indigenous and mestizo. For the first time, many had the opportunity previously denied them, to move to the cities. Before the Revolution the average peasant never ventured beyond the village. The upper classes, however, still judged them based on their physical features and Indian sounding names. Prejudice continued against Indians and Cholos.57 The belief in racial superiority and “purity of blood” continued in the psyche of the upper class.

Impact on ReligionLike other Latin American colonies, the Roman Catholic Church had a strong

influence and authority over Bolivia, but was subordinate to the state. After Independence, the Church maintained its status as the sole religion in Bolivia. In 1961, Paz relinquished the state’s right to mediate church affairs. This meant that the government could not have a voice in church decrees or play a role in selecting church officials.58 Thus, in the 1960’s the church made stronger gains in integrating itself more into Bolivian society. The Bolivian Bishops Conference was established (CEB) and they condemned the harsh living conditions of the peasants and miners.59 They created organizations and research centers to address these issues. Towards the late 1960’s some priests and nuns would be inspired by Liberation Theology and take a more radical, Marxist approach.

54 Thomas C. Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 36.55 McCracken, 5.56 Keen & Haynes, 397.57 Bolivia: A Country Study, 77, 88.58 Bolivia: A Country Study, 89.59 Bolivia: A Country Study, 90.

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Culture and the Revolution Prior to the 1930’s, Bolivian literature was an “accidental phenomenon” as

Bolivian writers were uninspired by their homeland and focused more on European themes.60 The Chaco War had a profound impact on Bolivian writing as it had on Bolivian intellectuals and middle class. It led to more of a focus on social protest and the formation of a national consciousness. A “Vernacular School” of writers erupted that examined the national conscience. Murdo explains that, “these young men want an intrinsically Bolivian Literature to be the first step in advancing the nation as a whole, a nation’s consciousness of its own self.”61

The MNR supported these exploratory novels that particularly looked into the plight of the indigenous, which had previously been ignored. Paz Estenssoro claimed they helped in creating a “national awareness” which played right along with MNR values and goals.62 After the 1952 Revolution, literature focused on agrarian reform, and the mines. The Mining novels tended to be repetitive in theme and monotonous, leaving the reader with a feeling of gloom and defeatism.63 While one might assume literature would be infused with inspiration after the Revolution, Murdo claims the opposite occurred. During the Sexenio, literature looked at social problems and attempted to give solutions. Murdo sums up literature after the revolution as “Post-revolutionary constipation” that lacked sophistication and imagination. He believes the fate of literature was tied up with the fate of the Revolution, both lacked new ideas to sustain themselves and move forward.64

By 1952, there were only 20 Radias Mineras (Mining radio) stations in Bolivia. They broadcast soccer games, popular music and local news, which often leaned to the left politically. In 1960, Radio Unión was established to reach ALL of Bolivia. It offered popular music, especially Bolero Trio music from groups like Los Panchos and Los Cinco Latinos.65 By the late 1960’s many of these radio stations closed down due to the tin mines decreasing productivity, and a lack of funding, as there was little to no advertising or corporate sponsors66. In 1963, the MNR government set up the Channel 7 network to offer public TV programming. Its intent was to push political propaganda. It was also meant to counter the influence of the Radias Mineras and their increasingly leftist/communist stance.67

In 1953, the MNR created the Instituto Cinematográfico Boliviano (ICB) to support Paz Estenssoro and the MNR agenda. The MNR had a monopoly on film at that time and created 136 newsreels from 1952-1956. The films that were created were meant to support the MNR nationalist agenda. They were made to define a national identity and ended up rejecting Hollywood standards by choosing NOT to 60 Macleod Murdo. “The Bolivian Novel, the Chaco War and the Revolution.” in Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952, ed. James Malloy and Richard Thorn. (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 341. 61 Murdo, 345. 62 Murdo, 348.63 Murdo, 358.64 Murdo, 361.65 Javier Galván. Culture and Customs of Bolivia. California: ABC-CLIO, LLC. 2011. 102. 66 Galvan, 101. 67 Galvin, 104.

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use professional actors and by filming at real locations rather than on movie sets. The directors often encountered government censorship and mainstream critics for being too leftist in manner and focusing predominantly on the indigenous populations. In 1953 the MNR attempted to block the film “Vuelve Sebastiana” from entering the Servicio Oficial de Difusión Radiotelevisión y Espectáculos film festival because, “a movie about Indians couldn’t possibly represent Bolivia in a film fest in a foreign country.”68 To their chagrin, it was smuggled in and won first place in the Ethnographic category.

The 1952 Revolution was supported by many political artists. Their social activism and the movement’s goals were at times intertwined. One such artist, Arturo Borda created a climate of political radicalism, though he died shortly after the revolution. He was a strong supporter of indigenous rights and

his work showed a “dark,

tortured strangeness of humanity.”69Many murals were commissioned to show the positive effects of the Revolution. After 1952, political art was institutionalized by the MNR. Funds were used to support culture (supportive of the MNR) and up and coming artists like Miguel Alandía Pantojas, Walter Solón Romero and Lorgio Vaca. 70 The murals became a way to link the public and private sphere and were a conduit for the people to comprehend the Revolution of 1952

Paz Leaves Presidency…and then comes back. By the end of his first term (1956), the economy needed restructuring to promote deflation. In order to get financial support, government expenditures needed to be cut, deficits eliminated, subsidies to pulperìas ended, and wages frozen. US pressure made this deflation process harsher than it should have been.71

68 José Sanchez H. The Art and Politics of Bolivian Cinema. (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1999), 39.69Sanchez, 41.70 Olivia Arigho-Stiles. “The Bolivian National Revolution of 1952: Art, Ideology and the Rise of the Social Artists” The Oxford Left Review, Issue 11, December 2013. www.oxfordleftreview.com. 71 Mitchell, 57.

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Figure Arturo Borda’s “Arriba Los Figure Miguel Alandía Pantoja’s “Education” in the

In 1957, Paz took an ambassadorship in Great Britain, since it was illegal for him to run for a consecutive term. Christopher Mitchell alludes to the idea that Paz probably preferred not to be in office during this time of strict economic restructuring (deflation).72 Hernan Siles assumed the leadership of the MNR and presidency, with Nuflo Chávez as vice-president. Siles was more right-wing and pushed for free-trade agreements, eliminated price controls, stopped borrowing from the central bank and stopped subsidizing the pulperías in the COMIBOL mines. There was quite a bit of opposition from the left-wing, which began to weaken as the right -wing gained strength. Siles wanted to reduce the influence of interest groups within the MNR, centralize power, and weaken the CPN. His strategy to accomplish this was:

● dominate the unions● divide the interest groups ● mobilize the peasants.

Siles immediately began placing people loyal to him in control of the comandos. The CPN had given him authority to do this to “prevent widespread indiscipline.”73 Siles then was given power to appoint members to the CPN. Chávez protested against this. In order to break the miners (Lechín) control, Siles gave other union leaders prominent positions in government, as well as bribes to support his economic deflation programs. Siles pushed the Bloque Restructurador de la COB (BR) which consisted of unions that supported his economic measures, since they had more to gain and resented the government subsidies given to miners. These unions took control of the COB (though they let Lechín remain executive secretary) and generally supported Siles’s programs. Lastly, Siles used direct confrontation among mobilized peasants to enforce obedience, as well as the army.74 Siles increased support for the military by opening the School of Higher Military Studies in 1960 just before leaving office.

Lechín asked Paz to return. In 1958, Siles’s policies had created unrest in Santa Cruz, and Paz came back to Bolivia once again to unite the MNR. Paz was able to publically get Lechín and Siles to shake hands, thus showing the country that the MNR was still a united front. This broke the uprising at Santa Cruz. The MNR however was split. The more radical left-wing formed the MNRA. There was also the creation of the Authentic MNR (Aténticos), the Sector Socialista, the Sector de Izquierda Lechinista as well as the Sector Pazestenssorista. In response, Siles created other groups to support himself, and some fake groups to discredit the unions.

In 1960, Paz and Lechín united for the upcoming election and won easily. Paz created order in COMIBOL by infusing massive amounts of foreign aid for national development projects. He centralized power in the executive branch. He also reorganized the military to enforce his policies and build public works programs in the rural areas. In 1961, Paz passed a constitutional amendment that permitted presidential reelection. Paz also suspended constitutional liberties for nearly a year

72 Mitchell, 57.73 Mitchell, 67.74 Mitchell, 70.

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to force support for the Triangular Plan. He appointed cabinet ministers on the basis of their loyalty to him and less on their qualification. These younger ministers (called técnicos) were often blunt and not personable in their administrative duties. Paz tried to seal up the factionalism by giving those leaders insignificant positions within the party and government, particularly representation in the CPN. He tried to isolate and neutralize them, making the CPN a council of factions. After 1961, the CPN rarely even met.

There was some economic prosperity during his second term, the GDP rose to over 5.7% (four times the amount under Siles). The Triangular Plan, deeply angered the miners and working class. They felt he was giving into foreign pressure and undermining Bolivian sovereignty. It forced him to reign in the excess freedom of the miners and peasants who took advantage of the 1952 Revolutionary reforms. Siles policies had increased regionalism to the point where even the president had to get permission from local bosses to travel in their areas. After his inauguration, he had to check inter-regional violence. Paz also cleaned up COMIBOL, firing over 5,000 workers (due to the Triangular Plan). There had been 10,760 union representatives for only 140,000 workers. This meant that there was one representative for every 13 workers, which was extremely inefficient and wasteful. US pressure forced Paz’s hand and caused miners to strike in retaliation. American hostages were taken, and the situation threatened military involvement, however Lechín intervened and helped keep the peace. The hostages were released…but many of them understood their captor’s point of view and sympathized with them.

Paz had a complicated relationship with communists. In 1961, seven communist leaders were arrested on charges of subversion. This was most likely to convince the US of the regime's anti-communist position, which had been in question. After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Bolivian students had protested, and the head of the US Southern Command was met in Bolivia with violent riots and burned US flags. In 1962, Bolivia refused US pressure to put sanctions against Cuba in the Organization of American States (OAS). Paz tolerated communist activity to appease the left-wing groups in Bolivia. In turn, Cuba viewed Paz as a revolutionary, but with differences, and had some sympathy for his government.75 Communist Cuba also used their La Paz embassy to organize revolutionary activity in South America, such as Operation Matraca, where Cuban sponsored guerillas were to infiltrate Peru and spread pro-Castro propaganda to Bolivian workers. Many Bolivian workers and students were very sympathetic to Cuba’s fight against American imperialism. Paz’s private secretary stated, “Paz looked the other way, hoping to maintain a nationalist image on the domestic scene.”76 During the Cold War, the US was preoccupied with preventing any further “Cubas” from happening in Latin America.

The Soviet Union had offered Bolivia $150 million in aid. Paz would not accept it, but this offer sparked the interest of the US to increase their aid to Bolivia (which led to the Triangular Plan). This consisted of a $37.75 million loan from the US, West Germany and Inter-American Development Bank with restrictive-labor-

75 Field, 70.76 Filed. 72.

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strings attached.77 Paz developed a strong relationship with President Kennedy. This led to millions of US dollars going to support education programs. In 1961, 400 schools were built, which increased enrollment by 28,531 students. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress was a Marshall Plan for Latin America. Paz went to the first meeting with a plan already in hand for AFP funds. The Alliance for Progress intensified the military changes and build up that had begun under Siles. The military was used to build infrastructure and public works projects in rural areas. In this way, the military was seen as helping rural peasants and would later receive their support in the coup against Paz.

In order for Paz to make his policies a success, he needed control. Subversive plots resulted in numerous “estados de sitio” (states of emergency in 1961-62). Paz suspended certain personal liberties so that the government could act forcefully in the face of disorder. There was a crackdown against the MNRA, PRA and communists who caused riots in La Paz. Things turned for the worse in 1964.78

Paz tries for a third termPaz pushed for a third term in 1963, partly due to Kennedy’s aversion to

Lechín as president, and partly because he felt the growing economy would only continue IF he remained in power.79 When JFK died, Johnson let the Pentagon assume a leading role in Latin American foreign policy. Without support from the US, Paz’s domestic problems got out of hand, and the MNR became even more divided. Different factions (like the MNRA, Autentícos, etc) wanted to run independently of the MNR, but Paz would not allow it. There was also an issue over who would be the vice-president. The original choice was Fortún, who was loyal to Paz. General Barrientos was head of the air force, and popular among the peasants, especially after he survived two assassination attempts. The third “attempt” on his life gave him even more public sympathy. He was wounded and flown to a US military hospital in Panama (this is suspicious…why not just get medical treatment in Bolivia…). There was speculation that this last attempt was faked to get him to Panama and work with the CIA. Under pressure, Paz dropped Fortún and chose Barrientos as his vice-president. Barrientos returned from Panama and campaigned as though he was running for president rather than vice-president. He threatened to step down unless Fortún gave him unconditional support. The opposition candidates boycotted the elections and Paz won easily. The press was censored, and supplies were removed from their offices days before the election.

In June 1964, Guevara (MNRA), Lechín and Siles united in a conspiracy with the military to depose Paz. In September, Siles was exiled to Paraguay on the suspicion he was plotting a coup. Social unrest erupted in students riots in Cochabamba; one died and 21 were injured. More student upheavals occurred, and miners began clashing with the authorities. Chaos erupted everywhere, and Paz could not stop it. General Barrientos sided with those who openly spoke against Paz. On November 3rd, Barrientos delivered a radio address from Cochabamba calling

77 Holtey, 133.78 Holtey, 139.79 Mitchell, 92.

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for Paz to step down and end the social unrest. Regiments across Bolivia declared themselves in open rebellion against Paz. General Ovando, head of the army, pretended to be detained and then released to act as a mediator between the rebels and Paz. Ovando held several emergency meetings with Paz, supposedly trying to get support rallied against the rebels. In reality, he was working against Paz, who was completely isolated without help from the MNR or peasants. Ovando convinced Paz to accept defeat and a safe flight in exile to Lima, Peru. Paz took the flight.

The military juntas that controlled Bolivia after 1964 were not a panacea for her ills. In 1975, the life expectancy was still only 45 years of age. Education graduation rates had not improved, nor had the economy. Economic growth was 4.5% from 1965 to 1980, which was lower than most Latin American economies. The economy was not diversified, as tin still accounted for 40% of all exports and 15% of government revenues.80 The economy was so poor, and Bolivia was in such debt in the 1980’s that Roberto Suarez Gomez, the “King of Cocaine,” offered to pay the multibillion dollar debt in order to avoid extradition.81 The military juntas repressed the miners and labor leaders even more violently than the MNR.

General Barrientos dancing with a peasant girl (Left). General Ovando and Barrientos after the coup (Right). ghttp://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-rene-barrientos-president-of-the-military-junta-news-photo/517824350#general-rene-barrientos-president-of-the-military-junta-that-governs-picture-id517824350

Paz in Review

80 Bolivia: A Country Study, 103.81 Bolivia: A Country Study, 154.

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Sergio Almaraz Paz, a onetime MNR supporter turned oppositionist, stated of the military coup that it was “a shot fired into a corpse.”82 By the time the coup occurred in 1964, Paz had alienated many within the MNR to the point where it was not a united organization. The many different factions within the MNR had wanted to run their own candidates and if they had won, would have led Bolivia as still part of the MNR. Paz refused to allow this, and then angered people further by running for president after it was understood that Lechín would be the next candidate. Therefore, Paz’s victory in 1964 was not an actual victory.

Historian Kenneth Lehman argues that one of the many reasons the MNR revolution failed was due to the US aid. The strings that were attached to US aid, many of which were degrading and unnecessary, did not induce Bolivian industry, and in fact made Bolivia more dependent on that aid. This fed into anti-Americanism and hindered the MNR’s nationalist image. He states that the US-Bolivian relationship is “the story of a powerful and self-interested nation (US) destroying a revolution in order to restore a docile satellite,” as well as, “ the story of an idealistic people (US) progressively disillusioned by their inability to reshape another (Bolivia) in their own image.”83 US policy was clouded by its perception of what democracy meant, and the ideological fears of the Cold War.

Christopher Mitchell concludes that Paz’s “stringent economic measures” in his first term, set the foundation for long-term development, but also forced sacrifices on his interest groups that the MNR (under Siles), had alienated. These divisions continued under Paz’s return in 1961, and further distanced themselves from him.84 Therefore, when Paz decided to run for a third term, this was the straw that broke the camel’s back, and it wasn’t difficult for General Barrientos to take power away from him. He had lost it through his own actions and this was evident by the massive upheavals of social unrest.

Thomas C. Field Jr. focuses on American Colonel Fox’s role in supporting General Barrientos’ ambitions. Fox is depicted as the figurehead that pushed Washington’s “anti-democratic policy of installing military governments that would carry out US dictates” throughout Latin America85 Field quotes people who claim the only person who understood everything that happened on November 4th was Colonel Fox. He also quotes CIA Station Chief Sternfield, who claimed that until Barrientos death, “nothing happened in Bolivia without our involvement.”86

Opinions on Paz’s leadership and the MNR Revolution are varied. It cannot be denied that the 1952 Revolution drastically changed Bolivia politically and socially in regards to Universal Suffrage, Agrarian reform, and the breakup of the three major tin mines control over the government. After nearly 20 years of mostly military rule, the economy continued to suffer, and social inequalities continued to divide the people. There was continued unrest that in the mid 1985 brought Victor Paz Estenssoro back to lead Bolivia once more. But that’s another story....

82 Lehman, 144. 83 Lehman, 144.84 Mitchell, 95.85 Field, 191.86 Field, 190.

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Works Cited

Alexander, Robert, J. The Bolivian National Revolution. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958.

Arigho-Stiles, Olivia. “The Bolivian National Revolution of 1952: Art, Ideology and the Rise of the Social Artists.” The Oxford Left Review, Issue 11, December 2013. www.oxfordleftreview.com

Ed. Chowdhury, Najama; Barbara J. Nelson. Women and Politics Worldwide. Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994.

Dorn, Glenn J. The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.

Field, Thomas C. From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era. New York: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Galván, Javier. Culture and Customs of Bolivia. California: ABC-CLIO, LLC. 2011.

Ed. Hanratty, Dennis M; Rex A. Hudson. Bolivia: A Country Study. Washintgon DC: Federal Research Division, 1991.

Holtey, Joseph. Victor Paz Estenssoro: A Political Biography. Arizona: House of Lit, 2012. Victorpazestenssoro.com

Keen, Benjamin; Keith Haynes. A History of Latin America. 3rd Edition. Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009.

Lehman, Kenneth. Bolivia and the United States: A limited Partnership. Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1999.

McCraken, Sarah. “Women in the Bolivian Mines, 1961-1985.” Prospect Journal of International Affairs. October 12th 2011. www.projectjournal.org

Miller, Francesca. Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice. New England: University of New England Press, 1991.

Mitchell, Christopher. The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977.

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Murdo, Macleod. “The Bolivian Novel, the Chaco War, and the Revolution.” In Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952. Ed. James Malloy and Richard Thorn. Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

Sanchez, José H. The Art and Politics of Bolivian Cinema. Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1999.

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