war, the state and international law in seventeenth-century europe

War, the State and International Law in

Seventeenth-Century Europe

Edited byOlaf Asbach and Peter Schröder

War, the State and InternatIonal laW In Seventeenth-Century europe

This page has been left blank intentionally

War, the State and International law in

Seventeenth-Century europe

edited by

olaf aSbaChUniversity of Hamburg, Germany

andpeter SChröder

University College London, UK

© the editors and contributors 2010

all rights reserved. no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

olaf asbach and peter Schröder have asserted their right under the Copyright, designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work.

published by ashgate publishing limited ashgate publishing CompanyWey Court east Suite 420union road 101 Cherry Streetfarnham burlingtonSurrey, Gu9 7pt vt 05401-4405england uSa

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data War, the state and international law in seventeenth-century europe. 1. International relations—history—17th century. 2. europe—foreign relations—law and legislation—history—17th century. 3. State governments and international relations—europe—history—17th century. I. asbach, olaf, 1960– II. Schröder, peter. 327.4’009032—dc22

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataWar, the state, and international law in seventeenth-century europe / edited by olaf asbach and peter Schröder. p. cm. ISBN 978-0-7546-6811-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. International relations—History—17th century. 2. International law—history—17th century. 3. europe—politics and government—17th century. I. asbach, olaf, 1960– II. Schröder, peter. JZ1330.W37 2009 327.4009’032—dc22

2009018786

ISBN 9780754668114 (hbk)ISBN 9780754694175 (ebk.II)

Contents

List of Figures viiList of Contributors ixAcknowledgements xiii

Part I IntroDuCtIon

1 War, the State and International law in Seventeenth-Century europe 3 Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder

Part II MoDern State anD War – an InternaL nexuS?

2 Wars of States or Wars of State-formation? 17 Johannes Burkhardt

3 Revisiting the “War-Makes-States” Thesis: War, taxation and Social property relations in early Modern europe 35

Benno Teschke

Part III MoDern LaW of natIonS – froM SPanISh SChoLaStICS to GrotIuS

4 the law of nations and the doctrine of Terra Nullius 63 David Boucher

5 taming the fox and the lion – Some aspects of the Sixteenth- Century’s debate on Inter-State relations 83

Peter Schröder

6 War, diplomacy and the ethics of Self-Constraint in the age of Grotius 103

Harald Kleinschmidt

7 Liquefied Sanctity: Grotius and the Promise of Global Law 131 Bertram Keller

Part IV State anD InternatIonaL reLatIonS – froM MaChIaVeLLI to hoBBeS

8 the anatomy of power in International relations: the doctrine of Reason of State as a “Realistic” Impact 155

Peter Nitschke

War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europevi

9 Security as a norm in hobbes’s theory of War: a Critique of Schmitt’s Interpretation of hobbes’s approach to International relations 163

Luc Foisneau

10 hobbes on the Concepts of the State and political Sovereignty 181 Christine Chwaszcza

Part V War anD State In the exPanDInG euroPean State SySteM

11 peace Impossible?: the holy roman empire and the european State System in the Seventeenth Century 197

Christoph Kampmann

12 hegemon history: pufendorf ’s Shifting perspectives on france and french power 211

David Saunders

13 Colonial design in european International law of the Seventeenth Century 231

Andrea Weindl

Part VI ConCLuSIonS anD PerSPeCtIVeS

14 Dynamics of Conflict and Illusions of Law: Making War and Thinking Peace in the Modern International System 249

Olaf Asbach

Index 267

2.1a “Europa Regina” 192.1b “Europa Regina” 202.2 “Gustav adolf auf dem Siegeswagen ausschnitt aus der dreiteiligen

Flugblattserie Schwedischer Beruf ” 212.3a “Neuer Auß Münster ... abgefertigter ... Postreuter” 232.3b “Danck-Gebet, für den ... nunmehr geschlossenen Frieden” 242.4 “AUGURIUM PACIS” (= Augsburger Friedenswagen) 252.5a “Böhmische Krone” 282.5b “Niederländischer Löwe” 29

ListofFigures

ListofContributors

Olaf Asbach,Dr.phil.,ProfessorforPoliticalScience,Heisenberg-Chair“EuropeandModernity”,UniversityofHamburg,Germany.Researchareas:HistoryofPoliticalIdeas;ModernConceptsofState,Democracyand(Inter-)NationalLaw.His publications include: Die Zähmung der Leviathane. Die Begründung einer internationalen Rechts- und Friedensordnung bei Abbé de Saint-Pierre und Rousseau (2002), Staat und Politik zwischen Absolutismus und Aufklärung (2005), Vom Nutzen des Staates. Staatsverständnisse des Utilitarismus: Hume – Bentham – J. St. Mill(2009).

David Boucher, Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S. Head of the School of European Studies,Professor of Political Philosophy and International Relations, Director of theCollingwoodandBritishIdealismCentre,CardiffUniversity.AdjunctProfessorofInternationalRelations,UniversityoftheSunshineCoast,Australia.Researchareas:ModernPoliticalTheory,TheoryofInternationalRelations,HumanRights,PopularCulture.Recentpublications:Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present(1998),“TheRuleofLawandtheModernEuropeanState:MichaelOakeshottandEuropeanEnlargement”, in: European Journal of Political Theory (2005), The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition(2009).

Johannes Burkhardt, Dr. phil., Professor Emeritus of Early Modern History,UniversityofAugsburg,Germany.HiscontinuingresearchexploresWar,Peaceand German Federalism in Early Modern Europe. His publications include:Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit. Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas, in: Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung (1997), The Thirty Years’ War: Central Europe,in:A Companion to the Reformation World (2004),Vollendungund Neuorientierung des frühmodernen Reiches 1648–1763(2006).

Christine Chwaszcza, Dr. phil., Professor of Social and Political Philosophy,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy.Researchareas:PoliticalPhilosophy(contemporary, early modern), Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of SocialSciences.Recentpublications:Moral Responsibility and Global Justice. A Human Rights Approach(2007),“BeyondCosmopolitanism:TowardsaNon-idealAccountofTransnationalJustice”,inEthics and Global Politics 1/3(2008),“TheUnityofthePeople,andMigrationinLiberalTheory”,inCitizenship Studies 13/5(2009),“StaatundpolitischePhilosophieinDavidHumesEssays”,in:OlafAsbach(ed.):Vom Nutzen des Staates (2009).

War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europex

Luc Foisneau,Dr.,DirectorofresearchattheCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique/EcoledesHautesEtudesenSciencesSociales,Paris,France.Researchareas:HistoryofModernPoliticalThought,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy.Recentpublications:(co-editor)Leviathan after 350 Years (2004),(ed.)Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century French Philosophers,2vols(2008),Governo e Soberania. O Pensamento politico moderno da Maquiavel a Rousseau(2009).

Christoph Kampmann,Dr.phil.,ProfessorofEarlyModernHistory,Universityof Marburg, Germany. Research Areas: International Relations in EarlyModern Europe; Comparative Constitutional History; Political Concepts,Historical Thought and “Memoria” in Early Modern Europe; Religion andPolitics in Early Modern Europe. Recent publications: Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Geschichte eines europäischen Konflikts (2008), “IusGentiumandInternationalPeaceOrder.TheTreatyofLondon(1518)andTheQuestionofContinuityinInternationalLaw”,in:Marauhn,Steiger,Universality and Continuity in International Law (2009), (co-editor)Bourbon – Habsburg – Oranien: Konkurrierende Modelle im dynastischen Europa um 1700.(2008).

Bertram KellerstudiedlawandphilosophyinHeidelberg,Cambridge,UK,ParisandVienna.Since2006hehasbeentheeditorresponsibleforpolar,abiannualjournal for politics, theory and art. Recent Publications: Rechtsphilosophische Kontroversen der Gegenwart (1999), Im Taumel der Freiheit. Demokratie und Repräsentation bei Jürgen Habermas, in: Der Staat (2000), “StreitumKonsens.AlternativeKonfliktlösungimdiskursivenSystemdesRechts”,in:G.Kreuzbaueretal.(ed.):Der Juristische Streit(2004).

Harald Kleinschmidt,Dr.phil.,ProfessorattheUniversityofTsukuba,Japan,GraduateSchoolofHumanitiesandSocialSciences.Researchareas:HistoryofInternational Relations, specifically, History of International Theories, HistoryofMigration,HistoryofHumanSecurity.Recentlypublications:Charles V. The World Emperor (2004),Ruling the Waves. Emperor Maximilian I, the Search for Islands and the Transformation of the European World Picture c. 1500 (2007),Migration und Identität. Studien zu den Beziehungen zwischen dem Kontinent und Britannien zwischen dem 5. und dem 8. Jahrhundert (2009).

Peter Nitschke,Dr.phil.,Professor forPoliticalScience,UniversityofVechta,Germany. Research areas: Political Theory and the History of Political Ideas,European Integration and New Terrorism. Major publications: Politische Philosophie (2002), (ed.) Globaler Terrorismus und Europa. Stellungnahmen zur Internationalisierung des Terrors (2008),(ed.)Politeia. Politische Verfasstheit bei Platon (2008).

List of Contributors xi

Benno Teschke,Dr.phil.,SeniorLecturer,DepartmentofInternationalRelations,University of Sussex, UK. Research interests: International Relations Theory,International History and Historical Sociology, Social Theory and Marxism;Recent Publications: The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (2003), “MarxismandInternationalRelations”,in: Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations(2008),“TheManyLogicsofCapitalistCompetition”,in:Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20(2007).

David Saunders, Professor Emeritus in the Socio-Legal Research Centre atGriffith University, Australia. His continuing research explores consequencesof historical religious settlements for modern European political-legal orders.Hispublicationsinclude:Anti-lawyers: Religion and the Critics of Law and State (1997); Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought(co-editor)(2002),Samuel Pufendorf: The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature (co-editor)(2003).

Peter Schröder, Dr., Senior Lecturer in Early Modern History, UniversityCollegeLondon.Research interests:HistoryofPoliticalThought, esp.NaturalLaw, international relations and concepts of sovereignty and civil liberty. Hispublicationsinclude:Christian Thomasius zur Einführung(1999),Naturrecht und absolutistisches Staatsrecht(2001),Niccolò Machiavelli(2004).

Andrea Weindl, Dr. phil., Member of the research group on European peacetreaties, Institute of European History, Mainz, Germany. Research interests:HistoryoftheAtlanticsystem,GlobalizationinEarlyModernTimes,InternationalLawinEarlyModernTimes.Recentpublications:Wer kleidet die Welt? Globale Märkte und merkantile Kräfte in der europäischen Politik der Frühen Neuzeit(2007),“TheasientodenegrosandtheInternationalLaw”,in: Journal of the History of International Law(2008).

Acknowledgements

ThisvolumeemergedasaproductoftheconferenceWar, the State and International Law in Early Modern Europe held at the German Historical Institute, London,in June 2008. We should therefore like to begin by thanking all the speakers,discussantsandparticipants for theircontributions.Asoftenwithsuchprojects,notallcontributionstotheconferencemadeitintothevolume,forverydifferentreasons.Therangeof themesandmaterialcoveredat theconference is thusnotfullyreflectedhere.Inparticular,someofthecontributionsontheinternationalandglobaldimensionsthatbroachedastimulatingdebatebeyond“Eurocentric”discussionsofearlymoderninter-staterelationscouldnotbecompletedintimeforpublication.However,giventhattheearlymodernworldsystemoftheJus Publicum EuropeaumwasitselfaresultofEuropeandominationandorder,webelievethatthefocusofthevolumerightlyreflectsandexploresthisEurocentricbias.

We are glad to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft(GermanResearchFoundation)andtheunfailingsupportwell beyond financial help of the German Historical Institute, London. ItsdirectorProfessorAndreasGestrichandhisstaffensuredthattheconferencewasnotonlyanintellectuallystimulatingbutalsoaverypleasantevent.Inpreparingthe chapters for publicationwe are grateful for the assistance ofDr. JonathanUhlaner.Finally,wewould like to thankall the contributors forworking toapressingschedulethatmadepossiblethepublishingoftheproceedingssoshortlyaftertheconference.

TheEditors

PARTIIntroduction

Chapter1 War,theStateandInternationalLawin

Seventeenth-CenturyEurope1

OlafAsbachandPeterSchröder

From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century – and Back

Theseventeenthcenturyisofparticularimportanceforthestudyofthetheoryandpracticeof themodern state,of the systemof international relationsandof thequestionofwarandpeace.Thepivotalsignificanceofthedevelopmentsofthistimemaybeseen,forexample,fromthelargenumberofstudiesanddebatesinpoliticaland cultural science, international law, philosophy, and social, economic andculturalhistorythathavetakenitastheirsubject.2Itisstrikingthattheyoftendrawanopenorimplicitrelationbetweendevelopmentsandproblemsthenandnow.Thisbecameespeciallyclearafewyearsagointhecommemorationofthe350thanniversaryoftheTreatiesofMünsterandOsnabrück,whichbroughttheThirtyYearsWartoanendin1648.3Thepeacesettlementsignalledtheendofaneraofstate-buildingandconfessionalwarsinthatthefollowingperiodsawtheestablishmentofnewstructuresandinstitutionsthatre-orderedsocialandinternationalrelationsbymeansofmodernstatepower.4 Oftheresearchanddebatesoccasionedbythisanniversarythesamemaybesaidasofthosebroughtforthbytheanniversaryafewyearsbefore,celebratingthepublicationofImmanuelKant’sZum ewigen Frieden in1795.Bothobservancesinitiatedawaveofwritings,conferencesandprojectson

1 TranslatedfromtheGermanbyJonathanUhlaner.2 Thispivotalsignificancemayalsobeseeninthefactthatmostcomprehensivehistorical

interpretationstake1648asacaesuraandthusbothreflectandreproducetheprevalent“mentalmap”.IndistinctivecontrasttothisisHeinzSchilling’streatmentoftheperiodbetween1250and1750in Die neue Zeit. Vom Christenheitseuropa zum Europa der Staaten(Berlin,1999).

3 Cf. Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte (Munich,1998);MeinhardSchröder(ed.),350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede. Verfassungsgeschichte, Staatskirchenrecht, Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Berlin,1999);OlavMoormanvanKappen,DieterWyduckel(eds),Der Westfälische Frieden in rechts- und staatstheoretischer Perspektive(Berlin,1999);HeinzDuchhardt(ed.),La Paix de Westphalie: de l’événement euopéen au lieu européen de mémoire? (Sigmaringen, 1999);JamesA.Caporaso(ed.),Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order(Oxford,2000).

4 HeinzSchilling,“DerWestfälischeFriedeunddasneuzeitlicheProfilEuropas”,inHeinzDuchhardt(ed.),Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte(München,1998),pp.3–32.

War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe4

questionsoftheinstitutionalandnormativere-thinkingofinternationallawandpeacethatcontinuestohaveaneffecttodayininterdisciplinaryeffortsandattheinternationallevel.5Inspiteoftheiroftenhistorico-politicalcontentandfrequentinstrumentalisationoftheirsubjects,orpreciselybecauseofthis,boththesefocalpointsofpolitical,historicalandphilosophicaldebateareextraordinarilyinstructive.Forafterall,theyareapplicableandcapableofbeingupdatedinahistorico-politicaland ideological respect only because we can discuss through them fundamentalproblemsofthepresent,whetherinordertoconceivetheseproblemsrationallyortotransformthemideologically.

Theformsandconfigurationsofpolitical,social,culturalandlegalinstitutionsandstructures,especiallyastheydevelopedandwereconsolidatedintheEuropeoftheseventeenthcenturyandwereglobalisedinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury, make up the common factual reference point of these scholarly andpoliticaldebates.6Anglophoneresearchinparticularsumsupthesedevelopmentsand transformations under the term “Westphalian order”. Here the Peace ofWestphaliaisasymbolforaspecificsetofnewsocialandpoliticalactors,institutionsanddynamics,andforthepolitical,legalandphilosophicalformsinwhichtheyaretobeconceivedandframed.Anditispreciselythesestructuralandfunctionalconnectionsthathavecometostandincreasinglyatthecentreofcurrentdebates.It is thisconstellation,sothegeneraltenorofarticlesonthisdebateshow,thathasbeenfundamentaltomodernandglobalrelationsintothesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,butthatinrecentdecadeshasfallenintoacrisisoftrulyepochalcharacter.Forwhenbasicallynewactors,structuresanddynamicsshapepolitical,socio-economicandculturalaction,alltheforms,institutionsandcriteriausedtoorganise,analyseandevaluatethemmustalsobecompletelyreconceived.

These connections among the structures and dynamics of the state,internationalrelationsandwarintheseventeenthcentury,whichareconstitutive

5 OnthedebatesoverKant,cf.ReinhardMerkel,RolandWittmann(eds),“Zum ewigen Frieden” – Grundlagen, Aktualität und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant(FrankfurtamMain,1996);MatthiasLutz-Bachmann,JamesBohman(eds),Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal(Cambridge,Mass.,1997);KlausDicke,Klaus-MichaelKodalle(eds),Republik und Weltbürgerrecht. Kantische Anregungen zur Theorie politischer Ordnung nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts (Weimar;Köln,Wien, 1998);GerdWehner (ed.),Von der ewigen Suche nach dem Frieden. Neue und alte Bedingungen für die Friedenssicherung(München, 2000); Eric S. Easley, The War over Perpetual Peace: An Exploration into the History of a Foundational International Relations Text(Houndmills,Basingstoke,2004).

6 Cf. Heinz Duchhardt, “‘Westphalian System’. Zur Problematik einer Denkfigur”,Historische Zeitschrift 269 (1999): 305–15; Olaf Asbach, “Die Globalisierung EuropasunddieKonfliktederModerne.DynamikenundWidersprücheinderTheorieundPraxisder internationalen Beziehungen in der frühen Neuzeit”, in Sven Externbrink (ed.), Der Siebenjährige Krieg (1756–1763): Ein europäischer Weltkrieg im Zeitalter der Aufklärung(Berlin,2008).

War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe 5

for an understanding of the relations and developments of the future as wellas the present, may be exemplified by three, frequently interwoven strands ofcontemporary debate and research. Focused on these strands, the seventeenthcentury,andtheturnofthetwentiethcentury,appeartobeboththebeginningandtheendofaspecifichistoricalepoch.

From the Birth of the “Leviathan” to the End of the Nation-State

Manycurrentdebatesrevolveroundthequestionofthechangeordeclineofthestateandstatesovereigntybroughtaboutbytheprocessofglobalisation.Fromtheperspectiveofthesestudiesanddiagnoses(sometimesincombinationwithamoreorlessclearpractical-politicalorientation),theseventeenthcenturyingeneralandthesymbolicyear“1648”inparticularstandfortheestablishmentofthe“modernstate”.Thecrisisthatfolloweduponthedissolutionofthefeudal-corporativeorder,overarchedbyimperialruleandchristianitas,andthenumerousresultantpolitical,economic, socio-cultural and religious conflicts and wars, led to implementingthestateasanew,centralisedinstitution.Thestatenowlayclaimtoanexclusivemonopolyonlegislationandtheuseofforce,andjustifieditsinternalandexternalsovereigntywiththecompetencetoguaranteegeneralconditionsoflaw,freedom,peaceandorder;thiswasthefoundationuponwhichsocialstabilityandthesecurepursuitofindividualandcollectiveinterestswastobemadepossible.7

Intheeyesofmanyobservers,thisorganisationalformofsocialcoherence,whichhasdecisivelydeterminedpoliticalstructuresforcenturies,hastodayfallenintoacrisisorevencometoanend.8Underthecatchwordof“globalisation”9,

7 Cf., for example, Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors. An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton, 1994), p. 27; Heinz Schilling, “Formung undGestaltdesinternationalenSystemsinderwerdendenNeuzeit–PhasenundbewegendeKräfte”,inPeterKrüger(ed.),Kontinuität und Wandel in der Staatenordnung der Neuzeit. Beiträge zur Geschichte des internationalen Systems(Marburg,1991),p.37.

8 Representativeof thisview,butwithclearlydifferingreasonsanddiagnoses,areJoseph A. Camilleri, Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World(Aldershot,1994);JohnHofman,Beyond the State(Cambridge,1995);MartinAlbrow,The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity(Cambridge,1996);PeterEvans,“TheEclipseoftheState?ReflectionsonStatenessinanEraofGlobalization”,inWorld Politics50(1997),pp.62–87;MartinL.vanCreveld,The Rise and Decline of the State(Cambridge,1999);StephanLeibfried,MichaelZürn(eds),Transformations of the State?(Cambridge,2005);DavidJ.Eaton(ed.),The End of Sovereignty? – A Transatlantic Perspective (Münster,2006).Acomparsionof relevant contributions to thisdebatehasbeenundertakenbyStefanLange,“DiagnosenderEntstaatlichung.EineOrtsbestimmungderaktuellenpolitischenZeitdiagnostik”,Leviathan30(2002),pp.454–81.

9 Ontheboomintheuseoftheterm“globalisation”sincethe1990s,cf.AndreasBusch,“DieEntwicklungderDebatte.IntellektuelleVorläuferundausgewählteThemen”,


theyhavediscussedallthosedevelopmentsandprocessesthatseemseriouslytounderminetheorganisational,regulatoryanddirectiveinstitutionsofthenationalstate,fromtheglobalisationofproductionandfinancecapital,thedevelopmentofnewsubandtransnationalactorsandinstitutions,toecologicalproblemsthatarenolongeramenabletotheregulatorypowerofnation-states.

From the Westphalian Order to the New World (Dis)Order

Fromthemid-seventeenthcenturyon,theestablishmentofthesovereignstategeneratedanewsystemofinternationalrelations.10Itscentralfiguresarestatesthatconfrontoneanotherwiththeclaimtosovereigntyandnolongeracknowledgeanoverarchinglegalandnormativeinstancesuchasemperorandpope.Thisradicallytransforms,andinaspecificsenserationalisesandsecularises,thetheoryandthepracticeoftheinternationalsystem:bothbecometheobjectofapurelyrationalcalculus of interests that seeks to secure the policies and wealth, position andgoalsofeachindividualstatebytheuseofpolitical,military,economic,financialandothersourcesofpower.Ontheonehand,asacorrelateofreasonsofstatein foreignpolicy so to speak, the concepts andpolitical strategiesof abalance of powerandofapoliticsofinterestsgaintheascendancy;ontheotherhand,anewkindofinternational lawemergesthatisprimarilyunderstoodasthelaw of states.Together, these tendenciescometo formthe fundamentofpoliticalandinternational thought and action in the new system, first in Europe and thenacrosstheglobe.11Fromthisresultsthesecularcharacterofthepresentcrisisoftheinternationalsystem.

inStefanA.Schirm(ed.),Globalisierung. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven(Baden-Baden,2006),pp.35–53.

10 Benno Teschke summarily sketches the relevant assumptions of what heunderstandstobe“aconstitutingfoundingmythwithinInternationalRelations”inThe Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations(London,2003;Germantransl.Münster,2007),pp.1–4.Foracriticaldiscussionofvariousvariantsofthisposition,cf.ibid.,chap.1,andMatthiasZimmer,Moderne, Staat und Internationale Politik(Wiesbaden,2008),pp.37–53.

11 Cf.RolandAxtmann,“TheStateoftheState:TheModeloftheModernNationStateanditsContemporaryTransformation”,inInternational Political Science Review25(2004),pp.264–81.Ofthevastliteratureonthetheoryandpracticeofpoliticalandlegaloperationsinthemodernstatesystem,cf.forexampleHeinzDuchhardt,Gleichgewicht der Kräfte, Convenance, Europäisches Konzert. Friedenskongresse und Friedensschlüsse vom Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. bis zum Wiener Kongreß (Darmstadt,1976);WilhelmG.Grewe,The Epochs of International Law(BerlinandNewYork,2000);ArnoStrohmeyer,Theorie der Interaktion. Das europäische Gleichgewicht der Kräfte in der frühen Neuzeit(Wien,KölnandWeimar,1994);MichaelSheehan,The Balance of Power. History and Theory(LondonandNewYork,1996);LucienBély (ed.),L’Europe des traités de Westphalie. Esprit de la


Whentoday,undercatchwordslikethe“endoftheWestphalianstatesystem”,12scholarsdetectanupheavalininternationalrelations,theyarenotingtheendoffundamentalstructuresofanorderthathasbeenineffect formorethanthreecenturies and that dominates contemporary institutions and outlooks.13 Thisis a matter not merely of a quantitative increase in new international actorsalongsidestates,oragrowingcomplexityofpowerrelationsandproblem-solvingstrategies,butratheroftheperceptionthatwearelivingthroughthecollapseofthe entire political and socio-cultural, institutional and conceptual frameworkthathasemergedsincetheseventeenthcentury.14Themanifoldeffortstocreatetransnationalformsofintegrationandcooperationaswellasnewregionalandglobal institutionsandmechanisms,andtherebytoachieveare-determinationof international private and public law, represent attempts to reformulateinternational relations and international law. Opinions differ widely, however,astowhetherthisisasupplementtoorasurrogateforthehithertostate-centredworldandlegalorder.

From the Nationalisation of War to the Unleashing of New Wars

The upheavals within the classical “Westphalian order” come to the fore withparticular clarity in the current discussions of (the at least supposedly) “newwars”.Inearlymodernity,theestablishmentofthenewstatesystem,forwhoseterritorially defined organisation of rule the claim to external sovereignty wasconstitutive,wenthand inhandwithnationalisationofwar.TheWestphalian

diplomatie et diplomatie de l’esprit(Paris,2000);ArnaudBlin,1648 – La Paix de Westphalie ou la naissance de l’Europe moderne(Paris2006).

12 JoachimHirsch,“DieInternationalisierungdesStaates.AnmerkungenzueinigenFragenderStaatstheorie”,Das Argument236(2000),p.329.

13 Cf.JohnDarwin,After Tamerlane. The Global History of Empire since 1405(London,2007),p.8:“theinternationalstatessystem,withitslawsandnorms,reflectstheconceptsandpracticeofEuropeanstatecraft,andterritorialformattingontheEuropeanmodel”.

14 Cf., for example, the following diverse assessments: M. Gene Lyons, MichaelMastandundo(eds),Beyond Westphalia?(BaltimoreandLondon,1995);SusanStrange,The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy(Cambridge,1996);MichaelZürn,Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance(FrankfurtamMain,1998);UlrichMenzel,“DiepostwestfälischeKonstellation,dasElendderNationenunddasKreuzvonGlobalisierungundFragmentierung”,inibid.(ed.),Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom Wohlstand der Nationen(FrankfurtamMain,2000),pp.158–87;andUlrichBeck,EdgarGrande,Das kosmopolitische Europa (FrankfurtamMain,2004).Huntington’sthesisofa“clashofcivilizations”alsorestsonthediagnosisofatransitiontoanewepochshapedbycultureswiththeirowntraditions,valuesandreligions;cf.SamuelHuntington,Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of World Order (NewYork,1996).


Peacewas,asitwere,asymbolforanewinternationalsystemthatmadestatesalonethelegitimateactorsinthedeclaration,conductandendingofwars.15Wemightspeakofadownrightsymbiosisbetweenthestateandwarinmoderntimes,although theviews thatunderlie the interpretationsof the foundationsof andrelationsbetweenthesetwophenomenaarebasedonveryheterogeneousevidence,bothempiricalandtheoretical.Warandtherulesofwarbecameexclusivelyanaffairofthestate.Theupshotofthis“nationalisationprocess”,however,wasquiteambivalent: historically and systematically it harboured the opportunity for a“civilising”,“managing”and“juridification”oftheius ad bellumandius in belloaswellasthepotentialforanextraordinaryincreaseandintensificationoftheuseoforganisedviolence.16

Theincreasinglyoftenuseddesignationof“newwars”indicatesthediagnosisof a basic breach of this “Westphalian order”.17 On this view, the previouslymentionedprocessesofthe“de-nationalisation”,pluralisationandglobalisationofactors,resourcesandstructuresofconflictleadtoshelvingthewell-rehearsedformsinwhichwarshavehithertobeenthoughtof,explainedandpoliticallyandlegallylegitimated.Theyarenowbeingreplacedbycompletelynew–orperhapsbetter,completelyold–organisationalforms,modesofthoughtandstrategiesoflegitimation,suchaswereknownbeforetheformingoftheWestphalianorderandwhicharemarkedbyabasicpluralisingand“privatising”oftheuseofviolence.18

15 Cf., for instance, Otto Kimminich, “Die Entstehung des neuzeitlichenVölkerrechts”,inIringFetscher,HerfriedMünkler(eds),Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen, Bd. 3: Neuzeit: Von den Konfessionskriegen bis zur Aufklärung (Munich,1985),p.93;Carl Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth in the international Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,translatedbyG.L.Ulmen(NewYork,2004),pp.140–51;WilhelmJanssen,“Krieg”,inGeschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, vol. 3,Stuttgart1982,pp.576–83;Grewe,The Epochs of International Law,pp.203–21.

16 Cf. Ekkehard Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft(FrankfurtamMain,1985),pp.277–82.

17 Cf.MaryKaldór,New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era(Stanford,1999;2nd2007);MarkDuffield,Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London, 2001); Bernhard Zangl, Michael Zürn, Frieden und Krieg. Sicherheit in der nationalen und post-nationalen Konstellation (Frankfurt amMain,2003);BernhardZangl,MonikaHeupel,“Von‘alten’und‘neuen’Kriegen–ZumGestaltwandelkriegerischerGewalt”,Politische Vierteljahresschrift 45 (2004):pp.346–69;Martin Kahl, UlrichTeusch, “Sind die ‘neuen Kriege’ wirklich neu?”, Leviathan 32/3(2004):382–401;HerfriedMünkler,The New Wars (Cambridge,2005);Ibid.,Der Wandel des Krieges. Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie(Weilerswist,2006);SiegfriedFrech,PeterI.Trummer(eds),Neue Kriege. Akteure, Gewaltmärkte, Ökonomie(Schwalbach,T.,2005).

18 Cf. Mark Duffield, “Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment StatesandPrivateProtection”,Civil Wars1/1:65–102;MichaelRiekenberg,“Warlords.Eine


Thus the emergence of the modern state system in the seventeenth centurythrowsupthefundamentalquestionsofwarandpeace,ofinternationalrelations,internationallawandtherulesofwar,witharadicalitycomparabletoourownday.September11,2001wasnotnecessaryinordertoprovethatthesequestionshavebecomesignificantlymoreurgentinviewofthepresentdegreeoftheglobalinterlinkingofpolitical,economicandecologicalproblems,andthemanifoldlyincreasedpotentialfordestruction.

Thedisciplinaryandmethodologicalperspectives,conceptions,diagnosesandassessmentsthatappearinthepreviouslymentionedstudiesanddebatesexhibitabroadspectrumofthemesineachofthethreeindicatedfields.Thequestionwhetherthetheoreticalandempiricalassumptions,methodsandconsequencesofthevariouspositionsareobjectivelyappropriatehasarousedintensecontroversies.Preciselythisheterogeneityofpositionsandthevehemenceoftherelateddebatesattests to theneedandtheurgencyofcomingtogripswith thehistoricalandsystematicfoundationsofthestate,warandinternationalrelationsastheycametobeformedandconsolidatedintheseventeenthcentury,andhavetodaybecomethequintessenceofthatwhichisunderstoodunderthelabelofthe“Westphalianorder”.Quiteapartfromwhetherwerefertotheideaofthe“Westphalianorder”positivelyor critically, thisorderhas constituted the central referencepointofdebatesthatareofextraordinaryrelevancenotonlyforthescholarly,butalsoforthepoliticalprocessofagreementaboutthebasicstructuresofpastandpresentinternationalrelationsandconflicts,andofourknowledgeofthem.

Towards a New Approach to the Seventeenth-Century International System

Theaimofthisvolumeistopresentnewstudiesandapproachesintheinvestigationof the historical, systematic and contemporary meaning of the structures anddevelopmentsofthestate,warandinternationallawinandsincetheseventeenthcentury,andtoaffordnewaccessestothesesubjects.Thepreviousreflectionsonthecomplexityoftherelatedfactualandmethodologicalthemesanddimensionsshowthatcurrentresearchisconfrontedbyatleasttwochallenges.

On the one hand, one desideratum of this research is a further, andparticularly a methodologically reflective, study of the presuppositions, formsandconsequencesof thedevelopmentof themodernstate system, itspoliticaland (international) legal forms of organisation and the intellectual forms inwhichitisreflected.Thisrequirementarisesnotleastfromthedangerofbeingtaken in by widespread anachronistic ideas of a “Westphalian order” such as

Problemskizze”,Comparativ 5/6 (1999): 187–205.The currentdebateon the “waronpirates” is only themost recent reminder of the comebackofwell-knownphenomenafromearlymodernity.


maybeseeninnotafewhistorical,politicalandsocialstudies,especiallyinthefield of International Relations. One does not always resist the temptation ofconstructingasabackdroptothe(supposedly)completelynewdevelopmentsandchallengesofthepresentaschematicideaofthe(supposedly)completelydifferentconditionsandstructuresofthestate,internationalrelationsandwarthathaveprevailed since the beginning of modernity, and that are assumed to have nolongeranythingtodowithcontemporaryhistoricalrealityanditspracticalandsystematic-theoreticalsignificance.

To guard against this danger, on the other hand, requires a much strongerinterdisciplinary approach, that is to say, the systematic awareness and takingintoaccountofthefactualandmethodologicaldevelopmentsinotherdisciplinesandcontextsofresearch.Althoughinrecentyearsanddecades therehavebeennumerousnewapproachestoandstudiesoftheformingofmodernsocietyandthestatesystem,andtoquestionsofinternationallaw,warandpeace,thevariousbranchesandperspectivesofresearchhavehadthetendencytobecomeisolatedandindependentofeachotherinspiteofthefactthatintheendtheytreatthesamesubject.Preciselytheprogressanddifferentiationswithinthevariousdisciplineshaveledtohighlyspecialisedstudiesanddebatesthathardlyadmittotakingcognisanceofotherstudiesandapproaches,and,ifso,thenonlyinstereotypicalform.Thisiswellillustratedbyresearchonthedevelopmentofthestate,internationalrelationsandwarinearlymodernity.Herescholarshavedevotedstudiestointernationalrelations and their history, to international political economy and the “newpoliticalhistory”,toahighlydifferentiatedsocialandculturalhistoryinfluencedbynumerousnewmethodologicalapproaches,tointernationallawandphilosophicalandhistorical-systematicinvestigations,whichalsooftenpursuevariousnationalandregionalSonderwege;19yetarealexchangeandlearningprocessseldomtakesplace,andthiscanleadtomutualincomprehensionofresultsthatrepresentativesofvariousdisciplinesandmethodologicalperspectiveshaveobtainedaboutoneandthesamesubjectandsetofquestions.

19 On new methodological developments and perspectives, cf. John Macmillan,AndrewLinklater(eds),Boundaries in Question. New Directions in International Relations (London, 1995); Wilfried Loth, Jürgen Osterhammel (eds), Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten(Munich,2000);GunillaBudde,SebastianConradetal.(eds),Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien(Göttingen,2006);BarbaraStollberg-Rilinger(ed.),Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?(Berlin,2005);RonaldG.Asch,DagmarFreist(eds),Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozeß(Köln,2005);PeterBurke,History and Social Theory(Ithaca,N.Y.,2005);ChristineChwaszcza,WolfgangKersting (eds), Politische Philosophie der internationalen Beziehungen (Frankfurt amMain,1998);andPeterNiesen,BenjaminHerborth(eds),Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen(FrankfurtamMain,2007).


Forthesereasons,thisvolumehopestomakeacontributiontostimulatinganenlargedinter-andtrans-disciplinarydiscussionofthedevelopmentsandproblemsatthecentreofcurrentscholarlyandpoliticaldebatesonthestate,warandinternationalrelationsintheseventeenthcenturyandtheirhistoricalandcontemporarysignificance.Wehaveplacedparticularimportanceonincludingresearch that is based on interdisciplinary and international approaches andhasgivenafreshstimulusinthisdirection.Wehavethereforegatheredstudiesbyscholarswhocoveracorrespondinglybroadspectrumofthemes.Comingfromdiversedisciplinesandcountries,theypresentnewperspectivesonvariousaspects of the state, war and international relations in early modernity. Thestudiesrepresentedherecomefromdisciplinessuchashistoryandsocialscience,cultural and political science, philosophy and jurisprudence, and originatedinverydifferentnationalandregionaltraditionsofscholarship,sothateachcontainsaspecificangleonitssubject.Inthisway,readingthesearticlesaffordssome initialhintsofpossibledifferences, connections, andopportunities formutuallearning.

It is especially important to test the scope and compatibility of the newmethodologicalapproachesandperspectiveswithwhichthevariousdisciplinesornationalscholarlytraditionsandpracticesviewtheearlymoderndevelopmentofthestateandinternationalrelations,andthewaysinwhichtheyhavebeenreflectedupontheoretically.Aparticularlyinterestingexampleforthispurposeisthevariousmethodologicalapproachesthathavebeendevelopedforthepresentation,analysisandexplanationoftheemergenceofmodernstatestructures,theinternationalsystemandoperative conflicts anddynamicsofwar.Thecontributions to thisvolumepresentandconveysocial,political,socio-economic,culturalhistorical,discourseandintellectualhistoricalapproaches,andtheybeginatvariouslevels,thenationalandEuropeanlevelaswellastheglobal,justastheformationofthenewworldsystemofearlymodernitybegan.Exemplaryofthisisthediscussionbetween Johannes Burkhardt and BennoTeschke on the controversy over theconnectionbetween the state andwar in earlymodernity thatwas sparkedbyOttoHintze,MichaelMannandCharlesTilly, inwhichthe“state-makes-war-thesis” is confronted by the “war-makes-states-thesis”. Their articles illuminatethe debate from the point of view of the historical sciences, political science,internationalrelationstheoryandinternationalpoliticaleconomy.20

20 Both scholars have already written much-discussed studies on this question.JohannesBurkhardthas,sincethe1990s,beendevelopinga“theoryofthebellicosityofthemodernstate’sformation”(cf.“DieFriedlosigkeitderFrühenNeuzeit.GrundlegungeinerTheoriederBellizitätEuropas”,Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung24(1997):509–74),whileBennoTeschke,inhisMyth 1648(seenote9),hasmadeatheoreticallyambitiouscontribution to the scholarly appraisal of the seventeenth century. For a discussion ofTeschke’swork,seethearticlesin International Politics 43/5(2006).


Thisisafundamentaldebatetowhichtheothercollectedarticlesconstantlyrefer directly or indirectly. It is joined by articles here that analyse, from ahistorical, systematic and comparative perspective, the international relationsand the structure and conflict-generating elements that emerged in earlymodernityinatwofoldrespect:ontheonehand,withaviewtohowthesewereperceivedandtheoreticallyconceived;ontheother,withaviewtohowthesewerepracticallyandpoliticallyorganised.Thesearticlesgiveanimpetustorenewthediscussionofseventeenth-centurymodesofthoughtandconceptsofactionandorganisationthatarestillofconsiderablerelevancetodayandoftenrecurincontemporarydiscourses.

They discuss the forming of a new concept of international law and therules ofwar, of diverse tendencies and their formsof political anddiplomaticinstitutionalisation in various regions and traditions; this discussion concernsdebatesininternationallawaboutpositiveanduniversallaw,aboutthedeclineof traditional concepts such as those of the just war and external sovereignty,and about normative constraints on state action: (cf. the articles by Keller,Kleinschmidt,Kampmann,Schröder,Foisneau,ChwaszczaandAsbach).

At the same time, the articlesdiscuss thedevelopmentofmodernpoliticalconceptssuchasthe“balanceofpower”and“reasonsofstate”.Theyattempttoelucidatethespecificallynewformsandtoconceivetheinternationalrelationsthatemergedinmodernityunderthestate-organisedconditionsofpowercompetitionthat areoften referred to in various traditionsofdiscourseunder rubrics suchas“Machiavellianpowerandinterestpolitics”(cf.thearticlesinsectionIVandthosebyKleinschmidt,Boucher,Kampmann,SaundersandAsbach).

Thearticlesalsodiscussrelationsamongthenewnationalandinternationalpolitical,socialandeconomicactors,theinterestsandgoalsthatdevelopedintheseventeenthcenturyandhavebeen fundamental for the laterpolitical thoughtandconceptionsofinternationallaw.Hereitisaquestion(againbeingintenselydiscussed in contemporarydiscourses of crisis) of relationsbetween individualstatesandproblemsandintereststhatstandathwartandtranscendthem,andoftheinterplayofnational,Europeanandglobaldevelopmentsinthewakeofearlymodernprocessesof expansionandglobalisation.This setofquestions appliesbothattheEuropeanandatthegloballevel,andisdiscussedby(forinstance)thearticlesbyWeindl,Boucher,TeschkeandAsbach.

Allthearticlesareunitedbyacommoninterestinquestionssuchastheextenttowhichtherewereregionalornational“Sonderwege”alongwhichseventeenth-century international relations in war and peace were shaped in theory andorganised in practice. Geographically, therefore, they focus on conditions invariouscentralregionsofearlymoderndevelopmentsinpoliticsandinternationallaw, particularly Spain and the Netherlands, England, France and the HolyRoman Empire. At the same time, however, this volume also points beyond


Europeanddiscussesglobalaspectsoftheoreticalandpracticaldevelopmentsintheseventeenthcentury.Itisourhopethatthearticlesgatheredherewillthrowlightonmajorconcepts,consequencesandperspectivesofseventeenth-centurydevelopmentsintheirsystematicandhistoricalsignificance,andstimulatefurtherstudies.

PARTIIModernStateandWar–AnInternal

Nexus?

Chapter2WarsofStatesor

WarsofState-Formation?JohannesBurkhardt

Isthereaninternalnexusbetweentheformationofthemodernstateandwarinearlymodernhistory?Manyhistorianstakethisforgranted.Theirworkformsalongline,rangingfromtheclassicalhistorianOttoHintze’streatmentofthePrussianstateuptoWolfgangReinhard’sinitialstudy“DasWachstumderStaatsgewalt”,1whichwasenrichedwithhalfadozenadditionalitemsinhismasterlymonograph“OntheHistoryofStatehood”.2Yetit isonethingtofoundstate-formationinwar,theHintze-Reinhard“war-makes-states”thesis,andquiteanothertoexplainwarastheresultofstate-formation,the“states-make-war”thesis.ThelatterthesisisthatofthepoliticalscientistEkkehardKrippendorf.3Inhisprovocativestudy“Staat und Krieg”, he stressed that the machinery of state itself has repeatedlyandautomaticallycausedwars–andcontinuestodoso.Theconsequenceisclearenough:inordertoabolishwar,youwillhavetoabolishthestate.

Krippendorf ’s colleague Herfried Münkler protested against this thesis,producing Thomas Hobbes as his political crown witness, who described thestatelessconditionasthebellum omnia contra omnes.4Later,Münklerinvented“dieneuen”or“asymmetrischenKriege”(theneworasymmetricalwars)conductedwithout (or at least partly without) a state.5 This thesis, however, is the resultofarestrictedEurocentricperspective,asthehistorianDieterLangewieschehasrecentlydemonstrated.6Thesewarsare“new”onlytoourbelatedcognisanceof

1 WolfgangReinhard,“DasWachstumderStaatsgewalt”,Der Staat,31(1992):59–79.2 WolfgangReinhard,Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte

Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (München,1999).3 EkkehardKrippendorf,Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft

(FrankfurtamMain,1985).4 HerfriedMünkler,“Staat,KriegundFrieden.DieverwechselteWechselbeziehung.

Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ekkehard Krippendorf”, in Reiner Steinweg (ed.),Kriegsursachen (FrankfurtamMain,1987),pp.135–44.

5 HerfriedMünkler,Über den Krieg. Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexionen(Weilerswist,2002);HerfriedMünkler,Der Wandel des Krieges. Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie(Weilerswist,2006).

6 This thesis was the subject of Dieter Langewiesche’s lecture at the conference“MachtundRecht.Völkerrecht inden InternationalenBeziehungen”organisedby the


them.Nevertheless,itremainstrueforEuropeandEuropeanhistorythat“EuropehasinventedtheState(Europa hat den Staat erfunden)”,7asWolfgangReinharddeclared at the very beginning of his monumental Geschichte der Staatsgewalt.OneofEurope’sgreatestinventionsistheState,andoneofthecenturiesmostimportantforitsrisewasundoubtedlyintheseventeenthcentury.

Thiscenturywasnotonlyacenturyofthestate,butatthesametimeoneofwar.Itwasanepochofmanywarsintheearlymodernperiod:“anearlymoderndensificationofwar”,asIhaveputitinamonographontheThirtyYears’War.8Thiscoincidenceofmorewarsandmorestateisastrongargumentfortheassumptionthattheremustbearelevantconnection.Andsurelythestateisthesystematicpointthatexplainsthebellicosityofthecentury.Mythesis,however,isthatwehavetodoherenotwithstatewars,butwithwarsofstate-buildingorstateformation.9Thatistosay,theunfinishedstatemakeswar,andanunfinishedinternationalstatesystemcauseswar.Andbothdosobecausetheyareunfinished.

What does “unfinished” mean here? To explain this not uncomplicatedconstellation,Ihavedevelopedamodelthatenumeratesthreeclassesandsevenelementsofrespectivedeficiencies.Afirstversionofthemodelwaspublishedin1997,shortlyafterandinreactiontoKrippendorf ’sbook.10HereIshallexpoundprincipallythefirstclass,becauseitcomprisesthemosturgentproblemsofstate-buildingintheseventeenthcentury,andbecausecontemporary leaflets furnishmaterialforvisualisingtheproblemsandtheirsolutions.Then,inasecondpart,Ipresentasummaryofthefulltheory.

Iconic Approach

Monarchia Universalis

LetusbeginbyconsideringabroadmapofEuropebeforetheThirtyYears’War(Fig.2.1a).Ingeneral,asitisthecasehere,politicalfrontierswerenotmarkedon

Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung in Friedrichsruh and supported by the Gerda-Henkel-Stiftungon27–8March2008.

7 Reinhard,Geschichte der Staatsgewalt,p.15.8 JohannesBurkhardt,Der Dreißigjährige Krieg(FrankfurtamMain,1992,7.ed.2006),

pp.9–28.RevisedEnglishSummary:JohannesBurkhardt,“TheThirtyYears’War”,inRonniePo-ChiaHsia(ed.),A Companion to the Reformation World(Malden,2004),pp.272–90.

9 Burkhardt,Der Dreißigjährige Krieg,pp.20–28;JohannesBurkhardt,“DerDreißigjährigeKriegals frühmodernerStaatsbildungskrieg”,Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht,45(1994):487–99.

10 JohannesBurkhardt,“DieFriedlosigkeitderFrühenNeuzeit.GrundlegungeinerTheoriederBellizitätEuropas”,Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung24(1997):509–74.

Wars of States or Wars of State-Formation? 19

Europeanmapsinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.WecanidentifythecharacteristicgeographicshapeofnorthernScandinavia,ofsouthernItalyandofSpain,butEuropeasawholeisrepresentedasanundividedunit.

Andyetthiswasapoliticalmap:Europeispresentedasapoliticalunit.Ifthemapisturnedaround,Europetakesontheformofawoman(Fig.2.1b).The crowned “head” of Europe is Spain, and the “heart” Bohemia (undertheruler-shipofEmperorRudolfII,whomadePraguehiscapital).Inotherwords,themapsymbolisestheclaimtopoweroverallEuropebytheHouseofHabsburg.

Similar rulership symbolism was developed in both words and pictures bythecompetingpowerofFrance:the“FirstCrownofChristendom”(thisbeingthemeaningoftheFrenchroyaltitleRoi tres chrétien)and“HeadofallPrincesofEurope”.AndtheSwedishkingGustavAdolf,whocrossedtheBalticSeaandlandedon theGermancoast, also cultivated such symbolism.Hispropagandapresented him as the Protestant hero come to save the German princes. ButinvokinghisGothancestorswhoonceconqueredtheRomanEmpire,hemarchedontosouthernGermanyandattemptedtoseizetheimperialcrownofthenewHoly“RomanEmpire”(Fig.2.2).

Figure2.1a “EuropaRegina”


Figure2.1b “EuropaRegina”


Figure2.2 “GustavAdolfaufdemSiegeswagenAusschnittausderdreiteiligenFlugblattserieSchwedischerBeruf”


This Europe was obviously not a state system, but rather a battlefield foruniversalrulership:theruler-shipof,orpre-eminencein,Europeortheknownworld – a struggle that intensified during the ThirtyYears’ War in which thethreenamedpowerswereengaged.Theseimages,accompaniedbytermssuchasmonarchia universalis,imperiumandChristianitas,expoundahierarchicalmodelportrayingEuropeasanuniversalunitinwhicharuleroradynastywastoassumetheelevatedpositionofauniversalistpower.11

Westphalian System

Wefirstmeetwithacompletelydifferentvisual conceptofEuropewithin thecontextoftheTreatyofWestphalia.12

Thismaybeseeninthepictureofthefamousmessengerspreadingwordofapeacesettlement(Fig2.3a).HeisridingoverastylisedmapofEuropetoVienna,Paris and Stockholm. The map no longer depicts a universalist-hierarchicalorder,butrathertheequalityofthefutureEuropeancapitalcitiesbymeansofahorizontalarrangement.

Otherpicturesshowthecontractingparties–theEmperor,theFrenchkingandtheSwedishqueen–shakinghandswhilestandingonathree-leavedshamrockmadeofmussels(Fig.2.3b).TheEmperorisrepresentedassomewhatlargerthanLouisXIV(stillaminor)andthechildqueenChristine,butinprincipleallthreeareportrayedas equal.While in representationsof earlierpeace treaties itwasinvariablyonlyonepartythatappearedasthepeacemakeroreventhevictor,hereweseethatapersonifiedpluralityofstateshasenteredthepicture.

This plurality becomes even clearer in the image of the “chariot of peace”publishedinanAugsburgbroadsheet(Fig.2.4).Theallegoricalfigureofpeaceinthechariotisbeingdrawnbyfourhorses,whichappearasateamofEuropeanpowers

11 FranzBosbach,Monarchia Universalis. Ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen Neuzeit(Göttingen,1988);Burkhardt,DerDreißigjährigeKrieg,pp.30–62.

12 Cf. Burkhardt, “Auf dem Weg zu einer Bildkultur des Staatensystems. DerWestfälischeFriedenunddieDruckmedien”,inHeinzDuchhardt(ed.),Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte (Munich,1998),pp.81–114.SeealsoHans-MartinKaulbach,“DasBilddesFriedens–vorundnach1648”,inKlausBußmannandHeinzSchilling(ed.),1648 – Krieg und Frieden in Europa (3vols,Münster andOsnabrück,1998), vol2. “KunstundKultur”,pp.593–603;theresearchreportJohannesBurkhardt,“DasgrößteFriedenswerkderNeuzeit.DerWestfälischeFriedeninneuerPerspektive”,Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 49(1998):592–618;JohannesArndt,“EineuropäischesJubiläum.350JahreWestfälischerFriede”, Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte, 1 (2000):132–58; andHelmutNeuhaus,“Westfälischer Frieden und Dreißigjähriger Krieg. Neuerscheinungen aus Anlaß einesJubiläums”,Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 82(2000):455–75.

Figure2.3a “NeuerAußMünster...abgefertigter...Postreuter”

Figure2.3b “Danck-Gebet,fürden...nunmehrgeschlossenenFrieden”

Figure2.4 “AUGURIUMPACIS”(=AugsburgerFriedenswagen)


intheformofcoats-of-arms–fromlefttoright,France,Sweden,theEmperorandanowseparatedSpain.Intheseinitialpictorialtestimoniesofthestatesystem,theformeruniversalistpowersandaspirants to suchpower revoke theirclaimsandenterintoapluralistorderofegalitarianco-existence.Thistransformation,whichI have presented by means of expressive contemporary images and which is ofcoursenolessmanifestinhistoricalsources,conceptsandliterature,wasinfactalonger-termandsophisticatedchangeintheprevailingpoliticalmodel.

Whatthendidthischangesignifyforwarandpeace?13ItwasonlybecauseofthechangeinpoliticalmodelthatpeaceinEuropehadanopportunityofsuccess.Universal empires can be effectual as peaceful empires only if several individualpowers are not competing for leadership. As long as Europe was regarded as auniversalist-hierarchicalunit inwhichonlyoneof thecontenderscould takeupthe position at its head, there was virtually a compulsion to fight for rulershipifonepowerdidnotwanttoriskthatanotherwouldstakeaclaimandbecomepredominant.Originally, therewasnothing improperabout this struggle, as thepositionat thetopwas intendedforsomeoneandhadtobefilled.Accordingly,thebeginningsofthestatesystemwereviewedwithsuspicionasbeingmerelyaninterregnumoranarchy.However,afteritwasrecognisedduringtheThirtyYears’Warthatnosinglepowerwouldbeabletoachievethegoaloftheuniversalistideal,itwasnecessaryforallpowerstodissociatethemselvesfromthisearliermodelinordertoattainapeacefulcompromise.Onlyanewconceptoforder,foundedonthe avant-garde ideal of equality, facilitated the acceptance of a co-existence ofhomogeneousstatesinalasting,peacefulorder.ThustheThirtyYears’Warwasnotawarconductedbystates,butratherawar,whichresultedinpluralityofstates.

Thestruggle forpre-eminenceamong individualpowers,however,wasnotaproblemonlyduringtheThirtyYears’War,butalsoduringthewholeoftheearlymodernperiod.InthewarsbetweentheEmperorCharlesVandtheFrenchkingsinthesixteenthcenturyitwasalreadyaquestionoftheMonarchia universalisora “duel forEurope”.14Nevertheless, evenafter theTreatyofWestphalia,warsofstate-formationcontinuedtooccur.Thattheydidwasowing,inthefirstinstance,to relapses to theold systemandunresolved issuesdating from the timeof theuniversalistwarsoverEurope,theeffectsofwhichcontinuedtobefeltintheearly

13 Johannes Burkhardt, “Das größte Friedenswerk der Neuzeit. Der WestfälischeFriedeninneuerPerspektive”,Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht49(1998):592–618.JohannesBurkhardt,“VollendungundNeuorientierungdesfrühmodernenReiches1648–1763”,Gebhardt. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte(Stuttgart,2006),pp.25–54;HeinzDuchhardt,“WestphalianSystem.ZurProblematikeinerDenkfigur”,Historische Zeitschrift269/2(1999):305–16.

14 Bosbach,MonarchiaUniversalis;JohannesBurkhardt,Das Reformationsjahrhundert. Deutsche Geschichte zwischen Medienrevolution und Institutionenbildung 1517–1617(Stuttgart,2002),pp.136–99.


modernstatesystem.ThemostspectacularrelapsewaswitnessedinthecaseofLouisXIV,theRoi soleil,whodidnotwanthissuntoshineonlyonanabsolutistFrance,butalsoonthewholeofEurope.Thesituationwassubsequentlyremediedbythepowerswithinthestatesystemthatwereresponsibleforitsbalanceofpower.Theremedy,ofcourse,wasagainwar.A“SecondThirtyYears’War”(1667–97)ensued(atermIhaveintroducedtosummarisethefourindividualwarsthatculminatedinthe“NineYears’War”),andtheninthenextcentury,forinstance,the“WaroftheSpanishSuccession”.15

Thusthefirsthalfoftheearlymodernperiodwasspentatwartryingtodiscovertheegalitarianprincipleofthestate-system,andthesecondhalfinenforcingthisprincipleagainst intransigents.ButtheBritishclaimtothepositionofEuropeanarbiterandtoan“EmpireoftheSeas”stemmedfromthesameuniversalistroots,16asdidMoscow’sideaofitselfasthe“ThirdRome”andPetertheGreat’srestorationofthetitleofRussianEmperor.17InmanyrespectsanexcellentcomparisonwouldbetheOttomanEmpire,withitsclaimstosupremacyreachingintoEurope.ItrequiredmanybloodylessonsbeforetheuniversalistlegacyofEuropeanhistoryreallybecamehistoryandthestatesystemoftheeighteenthcenturycouldbeestablished.

State Building from Below

An additional problem concerning state formation from below was that ofemergent states. The formation of three states, which separated from theuniversalistHabsburgEmpireandwereforthemostpartofcorporateoriginandcomposedofparticularistunits,keptEuropewellprovidedwithwar.

First, there were the Swiss Confederates (Confoederatio helvetica), whichcomposed its inner andouter conflicts in thefifteenthand sixteenthcenturiesandgainedrecognitionofstatehoodin1648.Second,therewastheBohemianUprising.Thisledtotheformationofafederalstatecomposedoffivecountries,theConfoerderatio bohemia,whichlostitswarofstate-formationattheBattleoftheWhiteMountainandthencausedtheThirtyYears’War.Finallyandaboveall,thereweretheDutch,whofreedthemselvesfromtheHabsburgs,butonlyatthecostofaneighty-yearwarofindependence,thelastphaseofwhichcoincidedwiththeThirtyYears’War.

Thereare two images from theThirtyYears’War that especially typify thiskindofstate-formationfrombelow.

15 HeinzDuchhardt,“Vorwort”,inHeinzDuchhardt(ed.)Der Friede von Rijswijk 1697(Mainz,1998),pp.VII–VIII.

16 ChristophKampmann,Arbiter und Friedensstiftung. Die Auseinandersetzung um den politischen Schiedsrichter im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit(Paderborn,2001).

17 Burkhardt,“DieFriedlosigkeitderFrühenNeuzeit”,p.523.


IntheBohemiancase, there isanofficialcopperplateof thenewlyelectedroyalcoupleFrederickVoftheRhineland-PalatinatewithhisEnglishprincess,whoaretoconveyEuropeanrecognitiontoBohemiaasastate(Fig.2.5a).Thetruebearersofstatehood,however,arerevealedonacommemorativecoinasfiveconfederatedhands.Itisakingdom“bytheGraceofGodandtheEstates”.

InafinalimageonecanseetheimageopposingthefigureofEuropaReginaatfirstglance:theDutchlionarisingfromtheuniversalistempireoftheHabsburgs(Fig.2.5b).Inasimilarlypersonifiedform,therightoftheindividualsovereignstate composed of provinces is placed in opposition to the to the universalistEuropeoftheHouseofHabsburg.

There were other belligerent emergent states such as Savoy and especiallyPrussia.ThelatterwasinfacttheReichsstandBrandenburg,alongwithafewother

Figure2.5a “BöhmischeKrone”

Figure2.5b “NiederländischerLöwe”


imperialterritoriesandaPrussianDuchy,nowelevatedtothestatusofakingdom,locatedoutside theReichon theperipheryofEurope.ThekingdomofPrussiahadlittlechanceofenteringthestatesystemalreadydevelopedbytheeighteenthcentury.Nevertheless,Frederick theGreat forced the emergenceofPrussia as aEuropeanstatebymeansofthreewars–inoneofwhich,theSevenYears’War,therewereparticularlyheavyincasualties,costinghalfamillionpeopletheirlives.After the three continental powers Austria, France and Russia failed, despite acostly alliance, to “overthrow”18 this trouble-maker and spoilsport in a kind ofpoliceoperation,theytoowereforcedtoconcedealong-lastingrecognitionofthisstate-formation.Onlythendidthestatesystembecomemorepeaceful.

Thuson theonehandwehave todowithunresolveddifficulties resultingfromauniversalistpast,andontheotherhandwithlatecomersseekingstatehoodwhoprevented theprocessofEuropeanstate formation,whichwasaconstantsourceofwar, fromcoming to an end for almost300years.Thedestabilisingincompleteness of the state system was not, however, purely a result of thecontinuingdeficiency in equality andmutual recognition, but alsoof internalimperfectionsandweaknessesintheprocessofstate-formationthatpresentedarisktosecurityandcausedconflictsduringthisdevelopmentalstage.

A Typological Theory of Bellicosity

Atthispointwehavetoenlargetheiconicapproachandtakeintoaccountamoreelaboratetheoryofbellicosityoftheearlymodernperiod19thatIhavedevelopedonly recently and that has been discussed by German and Japanese historiansofthisepoch.20Inadditiontothepreviouslyanalysedfirstgrouppertainingtoequality,Inowincludetwofurtherclassesofstructuraldeficienciesanddangerstoearlymodernstatehood,eachofwhichposedaparticularriskofwar.TheEuropeanstatesdemonstrateddeficienciesof equality, institutionalisationandautonomy.Correspondingly, wars can be explained in terms of conflicts over equality ofstatus,crisesofinstitutionalstabilityandside-effectsofstate-creation.

Asummaryofthisthesisyieldsthefollowingtypologicalmodelofdeficienciesandtheirbellicoseeffect.

18 AquotationfromKaunitz:“ÜbernHaufenwerfen”;cf.Denkschrift vom August 1755,inGustavBertholdVolzandGerhardKüntzel(ed.),Preußen und Österreich. Acten zur Vorgeschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges(Osnabrück,1995),p.145.

19 Cf.Burkhardt,“DieFriedlosigkeitderFrühenNeuzeit”.20 EdgarWolfrum,Krieg und Frieden in der Neuzeit. Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum

Zweiten Weltkrieg (Darmstadt, 2003), pp. 35–7, 67–9. See also the JapaneseTranslation ofBurkhardt,“DieFriedlosigkeitderFrühenNeuzeit”,inTOIN Law Review8(2002):197–254.


Lack of Equality: Conflicts in the Emergent State System

Whathasbeenhithertoelucidatedisencapsulatedininthisfirstpoint:

Competitionbetweenandreductionoftheuniversalpowers.Thestruggleforrecognitionforspecificestate-basedstateformationsfrombelow.

Tosummarise,themodernstatesystemwasbasedontheprincipleofequality.Itwasconstructedontheprincipleoftheterritorialcontiguityofuniformand

equal-ranking political units, which recognised each other’s sovereignty. OlderEuropeanestate-basedsocieties,whichembodiedtheprincipleofinequalityandahierarchicalorder,founditdifficulttoacceptthisjuxtapositionofpluralityasalegitimateEuropeanorder.Ontheonehand,universalclaimstothewholeofEurope,relatingtosupra-statelegitimatingauthorities,continuedtobevoiced;ontheotherhand,Europeexperiencednumerouswarsforrecognitionfoughtbyspecificestate-basedstate-formationsfrombelow.Alongandwarlike learning-process was necessary before everyone recognised that the future Europeanpoliticalorderwouldbebasedonneither super-ordinationnor subordination,but on the egalitarian co-existence of large political units. Until well into theeighteenthcentury,olduniversalistclaimsandaggressive latecomerscontinuedtodisturbthepeace.

Lack of Institutionalisation: the Risk to Stability Posed by Incomplete Statehood

Intheearlymodernperiodasecondfactorthatpromotedwarwastheinstitutionalincompleteness of states. The early modern state was not yet the thoroughlyregulatedandstableinstitutionoftoday.Althoughadministrativesystemsweredeveloped further in themodernperiod, they still containeddestabilising andorganisationalweakpointsandfailings.Twooftheseinstitutionalshortcomingsprovetobeparticularlyimportantfortheinvestigationofwar:theinstabilityattheheadofthemonarchic-dynasticleadership,andamilitaryorganisationthatwasonlypartlyadministeredbythestate.

Dynastic instabilities The early modern state was so strongly identified withitsrulerthatithadtosharethefullrisksposedbythewarliketraditionofthearistocracy from which rulers were drawn and those inclinations inherent inindividual personalities – without Frederick the Great there would have been

1.2.


noFredericianwars.21Mostimportantly,however,wheneverrulerschangedandtherewasanyuncertaintyabout the succession,Europewas threatenedwithastatecrisis.Thisnaturallyappliedtoelectivemonarchies,buteventhedynasticprincipledidnotguaranteestatestability.MarriageswithinthehigherEuropeannobility,partitionsandpersonalunionsaswellasuncertaintiesaboutthefemalesuccession, led to a series of wars of succession. Not primogeniture, the law,contracts,norwillswasabletoaverttheriskofwarwhenarulerchanged.22

Military instabilities Asfarasmilitaryorganisationisconcerned,state-maintainedstandingarmieswouldnaturallyhavebeenastrongerforceforkeepingthepeacethantheseasonalarmiescomposedofmercenarieswholivedbyfightingandwhoneededwar as awork-creationprogramme.But standingarmieswerenot fullyintegratedintothestate.Theyhalfremainedtheruler’sprivatearmy,asthelongseparateco-existenceofarmyandstateadministrationsshows.Theolderdefenceforces,onthecontrary,hadbeenintegratedthroughtheestatesandcouldbeusedonlywithintheirowncountry.Yetstandingarmies,whichcouldbecalledoutatanytime,whichhadnodefensivecommitments,andwhichwerenotboundtothestatebutwereavailablefortheruler’spersonaluse,undoubtedlyconstitutedaprovocationtowar.23

Thus itwasactually the ruler’sposition,whichwasnotyet fully integratedintothestate,thatunderminedtheinstitutionofthestatebothdynasticallyandmilitarily,andhadbelligerentconsequencesintheearlymodernperiod.

Lack of Autonomy: Props for the State with Belligerent Side-effects

In theearlymodernperiod the institutionallyunfinishedstates soughtoutsidehelp. Religion, the economy, and political culture were particularly importantpropsinthedevelopmentofthestate,butunfortunatelyallthreehadsideeffects,whichencouragedwar.

Religion Intheareaofreligion,itwas“formationofconfessions”(Konfessionsbildung)

21 Johannes Burkhardt, “Vom Debakel zum Mirakel. Zur friedensgeschichtlichenEinordnung des Siebenjährigen Krieges”, in Helmut Neuhaus and Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger(ed.),Menschen und Strukturen in der Geschichte Alteuropas: Festschrift für Johannes Kunisch zur Vollendung seines 65. Lebensjahres(Berlin,2002),pp.299–318,andDennisShowalter,“Roi-ConnétableundKriegsherr.FriedrichII.(1712–1786)”inStigFörster,MarkusPöhlmannandDierkWalter(ed.),Kriegsherren der Weltgeschichte. 22 historische Porträts(Munich,2006),pp.147–67.

22 Johannes Kunisch, Staatsverfassung und Mächtepolitik. Zur Genese von Staatenkonflikten im Zeitalter des Absolutismus(Berlin,1979).

23 Burkhardt,“TheThirtyYears’War”,pp.281–4.


andtheconsequent“confessionalisation”ofthestatethatopenedupnewopportunitiesfor legitimating rule and strengthening identity, for expanding administrativecompetence and forhomogenising anddisciplining subjects.Thismeant that thestructurallackoftolerancedisplayedbyallearlymodernconfessions,eachofwhichclaimedtorepresentthewholeandonlyChristiantruth,becameaconcernofthestate,bringingwithitthedangerofreligiouswars,oratleastofconfessional-ideologicalconflicts,fromthesixteenthtothebeginningoftheeighteenthcentury.24

Economy In the economy, the emergent state combined with the capitalistcommercial world of the early modern period. But states themselves sufferedthebacklashagainstaggressivemercantilism,whichaimedatre-distributingthepresumedstaticwealthoftheworldinitsownfavour,andtheybecameinvolvedinconflictsoverdistributionandtradewars.25

Historic-political culture In political culture, history played a large part inlegitimating the rule of the states, but it also legitimated exaggerated claimsandhereditaryenmities.Intheearlymodernunderstanding,historywaslargelybasedonexamplesthatwereenshrinedasbehaviouralmodels.Hencethemanyhistoricalexamplesofwarlegitimatedfutureconflicts.26

Thusallthreepropsoftheearlymodernstatealsoincreasedtheriskofwar.

Conclusion

The historical theory presented here is not meant of course to resolve all theissuesofstate-and-war-problemsintheseventeenthcentury,anditneedstobecomplementedbystillcloserinvestigationsthatarenowinfullswinginstudies

24 Burkhardt,Das Reformationsjahrhundert,pp.77–135.25 JohannesBurkhardt,articleon“Wirtschaft”,inOttoBrunner,WernerConzeand

ReinhartKoselleck(ed.),Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland(8vols,Stuttgart,1972–92),vol.7,pp.511–13,550–94,andJohannesBurkhardtandBirgerP.Priddat(ed.)Geschichte der Ökonomie. Vierhundert Jahre deutscher Wirtschaftstheorie in 21 klassischen Texten – aus den Quellen herausgegeben und kommentiert(FrankfurtamMain,2000).

26 JohannesBurkhardt(ed.),Krieg und Frieden in der historischen Gedächtniskultur. Studien zur friedenspolitischen Bedeutung historischer Argumente und Jubiläen von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart(München,2000).


onpeacetreatiesandpoliticaltheorybeingconductedbytheleadingGerman-speakingcentresofearlymodernpeaceresearch.27

Butthemodelprovesthismuch:thethesisofthestateaswar-makerisnothistorically correct. The bellicosity examined in the early modern models didnot stem from the complete, fully developed state, but rather from the state’simperfections, failings and shortcomings. It is not the institution that is badandthatoughttobeabolishedsoaseventuallytoattainpeace:ratheritwastheincomplete formationof the institution thatwas responsible forwars.Troubleduringpubertyneednotdeterminecharactertraitsinlaterlife.Theearlymodernprocessofstate-formationwillcometoacloseonlywhennomorewarsarewaged.Theremaybenewproblemsandnewsolutions,buthistoryprovesthatitwasnottheinstitutionofthestateitselfwhichstoodinthewayofamorepeacefulworld.Perhapsquitethecontrary.

27 Institut für Europäische Geschichte Mainz in cooperation with the Institut fürEuropäische Kulturgeschichte der Universität Augsburg; Institut für Kulturgeschichte derFrühe Neuzeit der Universität Osnabrück; Sonderforschungsbereich “Kriegserfahrungen.Krieg und Frieden in der Neuzeit” der UniversitätTübingen; and the Japanese-Germanproject “Synthetische Forschung über den Krieg des frühneuzeitlichen Europas” at theShimaneUniversityandUniversityofTokyoincooperationwiththeAugsburgianInstitute.

Chapter3Revisitingthe“War-Makes-States”Thesis:

War,TaxationandSocialPropertyRelationsinEarlyModernEurope

BennoTeschke

Introduction: War and State-Formation in Early Modern Europe

Thebroadconsensusandwidespreadunanimityacrossthedisciplinesofhistory,historicalsociologyandInternationalRelationsonthesignificanceoftheinternalnexus between war – or, more broadly, geopolitical competition – taxationand earlymodern state-formation constitutes an exceptional rarity in thefieldof human enquiry. Seldom a year passes without the appearance of majorpublications that reviewand re-assert the centralityofmilitary rivalry and theattendantpressuresofnovelformsofrevenue-extractionfortheconstructionoftheinstitutionsofthemodernstate–absolutesovereignty,exclusiveterritoriality,public military monopoly, modern bureaucracy. This idea of a self-reinforcingdynamicsbetweenwarandstate-formationconstitutesalong-standing,ongoingand powerful theoretical preoccupation, going back at least as far as OttoHintze’s comparative studies on international rivalry, military organisationand constitutional development.1 Its overall intellectual thrust – the emphasison the primacy of geopolitics – constitutes a direct attack on both liberal aswell as Marxist conceptions of modern state-formation. For “nothing couldbe more detrimental to an understanding of this whole process than the oldliberal conception of European history as the gradual creation and extensionof political rights”.2 Similarly, and reacting against the “sociological proclivitytoabsorbthestate intosociety”, thecharge is that“classicalMarxismfailedtoforeseeoradequatelyexplaintheautonomouspower,forgoodandill,ofstatesasadministrativeandcoercivemachineriesembeddedinamilitarisedinternational

1 Otto Hintze, Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte,editedbyGerhardOestreich,thirdedition(Göttingen,1970)andOtto Hintze, “The Formation of States and Constitutional Development: A Study inHistoryandPolitics”[1902], inFelixGilbert(ed.),The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze(NewYork,1975),pp.159–77.

2 CharlesTilly,“ReflectionsontheHistoryofEuropeanState-Making”,inCharlesTilly(ed.),The Formation of National States in Western Europe(Princeton,NJ,1975),p.37.


states system”.3 Thus positioned beyond Liberalism and Marxism, the neo-Hintzean research programme constitutes a far-reaching paradigm-shift in thedisciplinesofHistoryandHistoricalSociology,recastingtheresearchagendaindecisiveways.Morerecentlyandovertheyears,thisliteraturehasbecomehighlydiversified,increasinglysophisticatedandsupplementedbytheincorporationofotherspheresofdeterminationintothegeopoliticalmatrix.Still,whiletheexactmodalitiesofcausation,timingandregionalvariationscandiverge,theunifyingcorepremise,grosso modo,isneverrevoked:warmadestates.

Thischaptermountsacriticalreviewoftheliteratureandarguesthat,whileitsemphasisongeopoliticshasidentifiedandaddressedasignificantweaknessinliberalandMarxisthistoriography,theNeo-Hintzeanperspectiveisitselfriddledwith empirical and theoretical problems that cannot be rectified from withinthis tradition. The chapter then provides elements for a theoretical recastingofhow to conceiveof the relationamongeconomics,politics andgeo-politics– revenueextraction, state formationandwar– inpre-capitalist earlymodernEurope,revolvingroundcontestedsocialpropertyrelations.Thisrecastingalsohas important implicationsforre-conceptualisingearlymodern“international”historyand“international”relationsbyproblematisingtheanachronisticmeaningof the very notion of the “international” in seventeenth-century Europe. Theexplanatorypotentialof thisrevisedMarxistperspective is thenexemplifiedbymeansofalong-termandlarge-scalereconstruction,setinageopoliticalcontext,oftheradicallydivergingtrajectoriesofclassandstateformationinmedievalandearlymodernFranceandEngland.ThisgeneratesanewinterpretationofhowthebellicosityofearlymodernEurope–whatIcall“geopoliticalaccumulation”– is structurally premised on pre-capitalist social property relations, as thisinterpretationshowshowconflictsoverpropertyrelationsaffectedfiscal-militaryperformance,differential statedevelopment and inter-state rivalry.Finally, thisperspectiveleadstoanalternativeunderstandingofhowtheseprocessesaffectedtheformationofthemodernsystemofstates.Thechapterconcludeswithashortreflectionontherelationbetweencapitalismandtheinterstatesystem.

The Rise and Rise of the Neo-Hintzean Perspective: the Primacy of Geopolitics?

The neo-Hintzean literature diverges regarding different ultimate sources ofcausation,broadlysuspendedbetweenamilitarytechno-determinism,revolvinground the autonomous development of military technology and strategicinnovations, and a systemic geopolitical determinism, revolving round thebehaviouralconstraintsimposedbytheanarchicalnatureoftheEuropeansystem

3 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China(Cambridge,1979),pp.28and292.

Revisiting the “War-Makes-States” Thesis 37

ofstates.Yetitdovetailsinthefinaloutcome:thegrowthandcentralisationofmodernstatepower.

Michael Roberts’s original thesis on the seventeenth-century “MilitaryRevolution”,arguingthatitconsistedofinnovationsinoffensiveanddefensivearmaments, tactics, army organisation and strategy, was extended by RichardBean,whosuggestedaco-constitutiverelationbetweenwarandthebirthofthenationstate.4ThiswasbroadlyconfirmedbyMichaelDuffyandothers,tracinghowtheadministrativerequirementssubsequenttotheMilitaryRevolutionledtoarevolutioningovernmentculminatingintheeighteenth-centurymodernstate.5CharlesParkerdrewevenbroader conclusions, suggesting that “thekey to the[successof ]Westerners”increatingthefirsttrulyglobalempiresbetween1500and1750dependeduponpreciselythoseimprovementsintheabilitytowagewarwhichhavebeen termed the “MilitaryRevolution”.6 Similarly,PaulKennedy’sinfluential thesis on uneven economic development, military rivalry, revenue-raisingcapacities,“imperialoverstretch”,andhegemonicsuccession,locatesthedifferentia specifica of “Europe’s Miracle” in the continent’s original conditionofgeopoliticalfragmentation,ifnotingeographyitself.7“ThelackofanysuchsupremeauthorityinEuropeandthewarlikerivalriesamongitsvariouskingdomsand city-states stimulated a constant search for military improvements, whichinteractedfruitfullywiththenewertechnologicalandcommercialadvancesthatwerealsobeingthrownupinthiscompetitive,entrepreneurialenvironment”.8Thesystemicexigenciesofwarinamulti-polargeo-strategiccontext,inconjunctionwith revenue-enhancing institutional innovations (the “FinancialRevolution”),constitutedthecentralexplanansofearlymodernstate-formationand,ultimately,Europe’ssuccessfuloutwardexpansion.9JohnBrewer,inanequallyseminalstudy,tookexceptiontothetimingandcausalityoftheMilitaryRevolutionforEnglishstateformation,objectingthatthefinancialrequirementsgeneratedbymilitarypressureledonlyaftertheGloriousRevolutiontoadecisiveseriesofinstitutional

4 Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560–1660”, in Michael Roberts,Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), pp. 195–225; Richard Bean, “War and theBirthoftheNation-State”,Journal of EconomicHistory,33(1973):203–21.

5 MichaelDuffy (ed.),The Military Revolution and the State, 1500–1800 (Exeter,1980).

6 GeoffreyParker,The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge,1988),p.4.For a surveyof thisdebate, seeClifford J.Rogers(ed.),The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe(Boulder,Col.,1995).

7 PaulKennedy,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000(London,1988),p.17.

8 Ibid.,pp.xvi–xvii.9 Ibid.,pp.70–139.


innovations–generalisedtaxation,publicfinance,modernpublicadministration–whichwereencapsulatedinthenotionofaneffectiveStuart-Hannoverian“fiscal-militarystate”.10Still,heconcursbroadlythat“themostimportantinnovationsintheworkingsofeighteenth-centurygovernmentoccurred,inthefirstinstance,initsrelationswithotherstates–inthespheresofwar,financeanddiplomacy”.11Here,eventhetraditionallyleast“militaristic”caseofstateformation,theprimeexampleofthetraditionalliberalsociety-centredview,wasbroughtintotheNeo-Hintzeanfold.

Thisorientation,coupledwithaSchumpeteriancomparativefiscalsociology,also constitutes the research-organising idea of the recent multi-volume seriesonThe Origins of the Modern State in Europe, editedbyWimBlockmans andJean-PhilipeGenet. It starts from the assumption that “interstate rivalries andconflictswereattheheartnotonlyofdemarcationsofterritories,butalsooftheever-growingneedtomobilizeresourcesforwarfare”–aresearchpremiseamplyconfirmedinthethreevolumesthatbearmostdirectlyonthewar-statenexus.12AccordingtoWolfgangReinhard,editorofPower Elites and State Building,“warwasthefatherofallthings.Initsdecisivephaseofgrowththemodernstateisawar state,which expands its administration and taxationmainly inorder tobe able to wage war”.13 Equally, Philippe Contamine’s special volume on War and Competition between Statesconcludesthat“surely,warwasthemostpowerfulelement in thedevelopmentof states,or ratherof ‘the state’”.14 Inahors seriescompanion volume on the Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, Richard Bonney,whileemphasisingEuropeanvariations,concursthat“thegradualemergenceofthe ‘fiscal-military state’ is now a truism for the evolution of European statesin general”. He concludes that “military need was the driving force for therecrudescenceofmoredevelopedfiscalsystemsinEurope”–anessentialpropertyofthemodernstate.15

Paralleltothesedevelopmentsinhistoriography,thefieldofhistoricalsociologyhasfurtherrefined,inatheoreticallymoresustainedandsystematicway,thisNeo-

10 JohnBrewer,The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (NewYork,1988),p.xvii.

11 John Brewer, “The Eighteenth-Century British State: Contexts and Issues”, inLawrenceStone(ed.),An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689–1815(London,1994),p.57.

12 PhilippeContamine(ed.),War and Competition between States(Oxford,2000),p.v.13 WolfgangReinhard(ed.),Power Elites and State Building(Oxford,1996),p.9.14 Contamine,War and Competition between States,p.2.15 RichardBonney(ed.)(1999),The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200–1815

(Oxford,1999),pp.9–10.SeealsoRichardBonney,“TheEighteenthCentury II.TheStruggleforGreatPowerStatusandtheEndoftheOldFiscalRegime”, inR.Bonney(ed.),Economic Systems and State Finance(Oxford,1995),pp.336–45.


Hintzeanorientation.16Theseauthorsdiffer,however,intheircompetingaccountsofexplainingvariationsinthetimingandresultsofstatebuilding.Movingawayfromearlieruni-linearexplanationstotheeffectthatallpolitiesfollowedsimilardevelopmentaltrajectories,temporallyandinstitutionally,historicalsociologistshavegenerally“openedup”theirgeopoliticalmodeltodomesticdeterminations,especiallytovariationsinthemodalitiesoftaxationandclass-coalitions.Whiletheideaoftheprimacyofgeopoliticalcompetitionisgenerallymaintained,thereisabroadermovetowardsacausalpluralism,ifnoteclecticism,inordertocapturetheregionalspecificitiesofdifferentcases.

ThisbodyofliteraturehasperhapsfounditsmostvocalandvisibleexpressionintheworkofCharlesTilly,encapsulatedinhisfamousdictumthat“warmadethestate,andthestatemadewar”.17Withinthisgeneralgeopoliticalmatrixandadopting a classical Weberian definition of the modern state, he argues thatrulersrespondedtothestrategicimperativesofmilitarycompetitionbyadoptingdifferentialstrategiestosupplyrevenuesandmanpower,dependingonregionallydifferent socio-economic arrangements.Coercion-intensive regions, definedbythe absence of cities and agricultural predominance (states like Brandenburgand Russia), are distinguished from capital-intensive regions, defined by citiesandcommercialpre-dominance,whererulersenteredintotemporarycoalitionswith capitalists (like the Italian city-states and the Dutch republic). Both are,in turn, set apart from capitalised coercion-intensive regions (like France andEngland),whererulersincorporatedcapitalistsintostatestructures(representativeassemblies) inorder tobuildup standingarmiesandrationalisebureaucracies,producing“fully-fledgednationalstates”bytheseventeenthcentury.18Insteadofuni-linearity,weseemulti-linearity–amulti-linearity,however,whosedifferential

16 Apartfromthethreeauthorsdiscussedhere,furtherimportantcontributionsintheWeber–HintzetraditionincludeBrianDowning,The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ,1992),HendrikSpruyt,The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton,NJ, 1994),ThomasErtman,Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe(Cambridge,1997),WolfgangReinhard,Geschichte der Staatsgewalt: Eine Vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, seconded.(München,2000),pp.24and305passim,andVictoriaTin-borHui,War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe(Cambridge,2005).

17 Tilly,“ReflectionsontheHistoryofEuropeanState-Making”,p.42.18 NoteTilly’sdifferentiationbetweencapitalistsandcapitalism:Capitalistsarepeoplewhospecializeintheaccumulation,purchaseandsaleofcapital.

They occupy the realm of exploitation, where the relations of production and exchangethemselvesyieldsurpluses,andcapitalistscapturethem.Capitalistshaveoftenexistedintheabsenceofcapitalism,thesysteminwhichwage-workersproducegoodsbymeansofmaterialsownedbycapitalists.Throughmostofhistory,capitalistshaveworkedchieflyasmerchants,entrepreneurs,andfinanciers,ratherthanasthedirectorganizersofproduction.


lineageseventuallyconvergebetween the seventeenthandnineteenthcenturiesonthesuccessfulcapitalised-coercionmodel.19

Inhercomparativestudyoninterstatewar,fiscalcrises,socialrevolutionsandthegrowthofbureaucraticstatepower,ThedaSkocpolhasformulatedarguablythemostanalyticallyrigorousandambitiousversionofthemodel.Basedontheobservationthat“recurrentwarfarewithinthesystemofstatespromptedEuropeanmonarchsandstatesmentocentralize,regiment,andtechnologicallyupgradearmiesandfiscaladministrations”,shere-defines“nation-statesasorganizationsgearedtomaintaincontrolofhome territories andpopulationsand toundertakeactualorpotentialmilitarycompetitionwithotherstatesintheinternationalsystem”.20Thisleadshertoargueforstateautonomyoverandagainstsocialinterestsderivedfromgeopoliticalexigencies.21InstrikingcontradistinctiontotheWeber-Hintzemainstream,andduetoherpreoccupationwiththeimpactofexternally-inducedmilitary-fiscalcrisesonpre-capitalistagrarianclass structures inanciens régimes, sheconceivesofmilitaryconflictnotasthekeydriverofspecificallymodernstateformation,butratherasthekeydynamicsingeneratingcrisesand,ultimately,thebreakdownofoldregimes(France,RussiaandChina).Theseprecipitatesocialandpoliticalrevolutionsthatresultinthepost-revolutionarygrowthofbureaucraticstatepower.NotwithstandingthissignificantdivergencefromtheWeber-Hintzemainstream,sheconcludesthat“theinternationalstatessystemasatransnationalstructureofmilitarycompetitionwas not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, itrepresentsananalyticallyautonomousleveloftransnationalreality–interdependentinitsstructureanddynamicswithworldcapitalism,butnotreducibletoit”.22Thus,whileSkocpolratesthecausaleffectsofmilitarycompetitiononstateformationinearlymodernEurope indiametricaloppositiontotheneo-Hintzeanmainstream,shealsoconceivesofmilitarycompetitionasanindependentandoverridinglevelofdetermination.Thisinsightresultsinatheoreticalpluralismofpre-existingmacro-structuresthatinteractonlyexternally.

MichaelMann’s (projected) trilogyon the “Historyof SocialPower” startsfromtheaxiomaticassumptionthathistoricaldevelopmentcanbeconceivedintermsoffouranalyticallyindependent,yetconstantlyinteracting,trans-historicalsources of social power (ideological, economic, military and political). Their

Tilly, Charles (1990), Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992(Cambridge,Ma.,1992),p.17.

19 Ibid.,p.31.20 ThedaSkocpol,States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,

Russia and China(Cambridge,1979),pp.21–2.21 Whiletheargumentforstateautonomyoverandagainstdomesticsocialinterests

duetoexternalpressuresmaybeplausible,itraisesthequestionofhowmuchautonomystateshadinrelationtotheseexternalpressures.

22 Ibid.,p.22.


relativepreponderancechangesovertimeandspace,yetnoneisfullyreducibletoanyother,undergirdingMann’sgenericpositionofmulti-causalpluralism.Hisaccountofthe“Europeandynamic”behindtheascendancyof“Europe”tracestheinterrelationbetweencapitalism,themodernstate,andthemodernstates-systemthrough three successive and cumulative phases: 800–1155, 1155–1477, and1477–1760.Bythelateeighteenthcentury,atthelatest,themodernstateandthemodernstates-systemareheldtohavebeenestablished.Manndetectstheoriginsofcapitalisminthefirstphase.The“acephalous”structureoffeudalpoliticalauthoritycreatedopportunitiesforprofit-orientedeconomicbehaviour.Urbanrevivalandtheresumptionoflong-distancetradecombinedwithtechnologicaldevelopments,intensiveagriculture,andthenormativelypacifyingframeworkofChristianity.Theoriginsandinterrelationsofthesepower-networksthatdrovethe“Europeanmiracle”werea“giganticseriesofcoincidences”.23TheonlynecessaryconditionisdeemedtohavebeenChristianity(ideology),whichdistinguishedEuropefromrivalcivilizations.Inthesecondphase, twofurtheraccidents,one internalandoneexternal,conditioneddevelopment.Internally,ecological(soilfertility)andgeo-commercial (Baltic-Atlanticnavigationalopportunities) factorscontributedto agricultural intensification and commercial expansion. Simultaneously, theriseof “co-ordinating states” (territorial federations that co-ordinatedpowerfuldomestic social groups) went hand in hand with the Military Revolution andgrowingintra-Europeangeopoliticalpressures,precipitatingthetransitionfromfeudal political fragmentation to a multi-state system. “By 1477 these powernetworksweredevelopingintotheirsimpler,modernform:amultistate,capitalistcivilization”.24Externally,Islamblockedeasternexpansion,sincetheconquestofConstantinople(1453)meanttheendofOrthodoxChristianity.TheclosureoftheEastandtheopportunitiesprovidedbytheWestensuredthat“power”travelledtowardstheAtlantic.Thethirdphasewascharacterisedbyarapidintensificationofmilitaryrivalry,drivingspirallingmilitaryexpenditures,creatingnewmodesoffiscalityandadministration,andgeneralizingthe“organicstate”.Politiesthatfailedtocompetemilitarilywereeliminated.WhiledifferencesbetweenFrenchabsolutism and the post-1688 British constitutional monarchy are recognised,they are quickly subsumed under the ideal-typical “organic state”. Absolutistregimes,likeFrance,were“mobilizedstates”thatenjoyed“despoticpower”over“civilsociety”and“ameasureoffinancialandmanpowerautonomy”inaterritoryrichinmanpowerandpoorinwealth.25Constitutionalregimes,likeEnglandandHolland,were“fiscalstates”withlittledespoticpowerbutstrong“infrastructuralpowers”interritoriespoorinmanpowerbutrichinwealth.Yetthesedifferencesinregimetypeareconflatedwithinasinglecategory–the“organicstate”,subject

23 MichaelMann,The Sources of Social Power,vol.1(Cambridge,1986),p.505.24 Ibid.,p.510.25 Ibid.,p.437.


toidenticalcompetitivepressuresthatproducedidenticalstate-responses.Mannconcludes that “the growth of the modern state, as measured by finance, isexplainedprimarilynotindomestictermsbutintermsofgeopoliticalrelationsof violence”.26 More sharply: “States and the multistate civilization developedprimarilyinresponsetopressuresemanatingfromthegeopoliticalandmilitaryspheres”.27 The wider theoretical conclusion is that the modern state and themodern inter-state system are not reducible to capitalism. Similar to Skocpol,Mannholds that “nothing in thecapitalistmodeofproduction (or the feudalmode if that isdefinedeconomically) leadsof itself to theemergenceofmanynetworksofproduction,dividedandatwar,andofanoverallclassstructurethatisnationallysegmental”.28

Irrespective of internal differentiations, there is a broad agreement in the“geopoliticalcompetition” literatureontheprimacyof interstaterivalry forre-thinkingearlymodernstate-formation.Summedupinanideal-typicalmanner,thefollowingschematicchainofcausationemerges:

Geopoliticalrivalry→war→military-technologicalandmilitary-institutionalinnovations→costincreases→increasedpublicresourceextraction→newmodesof taxation,fiscality,andpublicfinance→bureaucratisation→ statecentralisation and rationalisation → state monopolisation of the means ofviolence→modernsovereignty.

ThegeopoliticalcompetitionmodeldefinesthemodernstateasaMachtstaatwhose raison d’être resides primarily in Machtpolitik (power politics) driven byexternalimperatives.Onthisview,Europeanstate-formationisoverwhelminglydeterminedbygeopoliticalimperatives,precipitatinganeo-evolutionaryprocessofgeopoliticalcompetition,institutionaladaptationandselection.Inthisscenario,rulershad tomonopolise, centralise and rationalise theirmilitary capacities. Inaddition to state collapse, this ledà la longue to aEuropean-wide institutionalisomorphismofstate-formsconvergingonthemodern,sovereignstate.Overall,thetendencyistoassumearelativelong-termuniformityinthewar-drivenoutcomesofstate-formation:themodernstatedefinedasa“military-fiscalmachine”,touseJohn Brewer’s term. Reversing the traditional liberal and Marxist perspectives,Neo-Hintzeansadoptanessentiallyoutside-inandabove-belowexplanation.

26 Ibid.,p.490.27 Ibid.,p.511.28 Ibid.,p.515.ForcomprehensivecritiquesofMann’swork,seePerryAnderson,

“MichaelMann’sSociologyofPower”,inPerryAnderson,A Zone of Engagement(London,1992),pp.76–86andRobertBrenner,“FromTheorytoHistory:‘TheEuropeanDynamic’orfromFeudalismtoCapitalism?”,inJohnA.HallandRalphSchroeder(eds),An Anatomy of Power: the Social Theory of Michael Mann(Cambridge,2006),pp.189–232.


Preliminary Objections

This line of reasoning has become a ruling orthodoxy in historical sociology,providing a powerful counter-narrative and theoretical challenge to thetraditionalMarxist(andliberal)literature,associatedwithauthorslikeImmanuelWallerstein,BarringtonMooreorPerryAnderson.Foritbroachestheproblemof recognising, explaining and incorporating the insertion of early modernpolities into awider systemof states characterisedbymilitary rivalry, and theeffects thishadonthetrajectoriesof state-development, intoarevisedMarxistperspective.IfwecanagreethattheMarxisttraditionhaslargelyfailedtocometo termswith a geopolitical deficiency thatwas alreadybuilt into the originalMarxistresearchprogrammeduetoitspreoccupationwiththesocio-economicand internalistpremises intrinsic to theparadigmof“bourgeois revolution”, itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatMarxismisinherentlyincapableofrisingtothistheoreticalandempiricalchallenge.29Yetpriortoatheoreticalrecasting,severalprima facieobjectionscanberaised.

First,theverynatureoflatemedievalandearlymodernEuropeasageopoliticalpluriverse(thatis,itscharacterasaproto-states-system)istakenasagiven.Thisoriginalmulti-territorialconditionforgeopoliticalrivalryisneverexplainedandlies outside the model’s theoretical reach. For Paul Kennedy, for example, thefundamental reason for military rivalry lies in “Europe’s original geographicalcondition” – a politically decentralised region never subject, after the RomanEmpire,toimperialunification.30Inotherwords,atheoreticallycontrolledandempirically informed reconstruction of Europe’s medieval and early modernconfigurationas apoliticalpluriverse isnotprovided.Consequently, theNeo-Hintzeanmodelfallsbackonanaturalisedgeo-topologicaldeterminism,beyondallsocio-politicalinterrogation.Theabsenceofacontinent-wideempireisnoted,yetthepresenceofgeopoliticalmultiplicityisnotexplained.31

Second,whatactuallyaccountsforgeopoliticalrivalryinthismodel?Whatexplainsthefrequency,intensityanddurationofearlymodernwars?Whydoweseetheriseofthe“permanentwar-state”?Asarule,theargumentforearlymodern

29 ThisargumentissetoutinBennoTeschke,“BourgeoisRevolution,StateFormationandtheAbsenceoftheInternational”,Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory,13/2(2005):3–26andBennoTeschke,“MarxismandInternationalRelations”,inChristianReus-SmitandDuncanSnidal(eds),The Oxford Handbook of International Relations(Oxford,2008),pp.163–87.

30 Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,pp.16–22.31 For a detailed reconstruction of the socio-political dynamics that led to the

disintegrationoftheCarolingianEmpireandthesubsequentconsolidationofapluralityoffeudalkingdomsintheeleventhandtwelfthcenturies,seeBennoTeschke,The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations(London,2003),chap.3.


Europe’sbellicosityjumpsfromthemerefactofco-existingcontiguouspolitiestotheanalyticalconclusionthatitisthisthatexplainsgeopoliticalrivalry.Ifthereisatheoreticalargument,ittendstoresorteitherto(i)theneo-realisttheoremof a security-dilemma in an anarchical situation (si vis pacem para bellum), or(ii) to theclassical realist ideaofa subjectiveanimus dominandiof rulers–(aspower-holders, rulers want to expand by definition), or (iii) to technologicalbreakthroughsinmilitaryequipmentandorganisationinthecontextofanarms-race.Inthefirstcase,theinterstatesystemisessentiallynaturalisedasapre-social“stateofnature”inwhichforeignpolicybehaviourisafunctionderivedfromthesystem’sanarchicalstructure.Inthesecondcase,thepursuitofpowerisreified– the autonomy of politics as the quintessential quest for power. In the thirdcase,pressuresformilitaryinnovationsareanchoredinanautonomousmilitarytechno-determinism.Inshort,themodellacksasocialtheoryofwar.

Third,andreturningtoTilly’scentralthesison“war-makes-states”,towhatdegree did warfare actually make the state in the specifically modern sense oftheterm?If,inlinewiththeNeo-Hintzeanorthodoxy,wedeployMaxWeber’sstandard definition of the modern state – abstract state power, legitimate andpublicmonopolyinthemeansofviolence,consolidatedstate-territory,separationofbureaucratsfromtheirmeansofadministration–whichearlymodernpolityintheseventeenthoreveneighteenthcenturyactuallycompliedwiththesecriteria?Wheredoweseetheclassicalmodernseparationbetweenpublicauthorityandcivil society, the economy and the state, private andpublic powerduring thisperiod?Aswillbesetoutbelow,theeffectsofmilitaryrivalryhad,atleastintheFrenchcase (andthis is somethingthatcanbegeneralised for theContinent),precisely theopposite resultofwhat thegeopolitical competitionmodel asserts.Rather than driving an incremental and linear process of successful modernstate-formation, leading to a rationalised, centralised and de-personalisedstate-form,warfare exacerbated the social conflictswithinOldRegimeFrance,undermineditsfiscal-militaryhealth,exhausteditseconomicperformance,andshaped a distinct process of “unsuccessful”, “irrational” (in terms of outcome,not in termsof interests and strategies pursuedbyhistorically situated actors)and“involutionary”state-formationthatactuallyweakenedtheFrenchstateovertime.32Theseprocessescombinedtolead,especiallyduringandaftertheSeven

32 Thevocabularyof“strong”vs.“weak”statesmaybe inadequatetodescribethesituation.ItmaybebettertosaythattheFrenchstateapparatusbecame“heavier”overtimeintermsofthenumbersofofficersthatreproducedthemselvesthroughthestate,and“weaker”initsabilitytoabsorbthefinancialcostsassociatedwitheachwar,sinceroyaldebt-accumulation and theneed to retrieve income throughoffice-proliferationmeanta loss of state control over its fiscal andfinancial system and therewith its capacity torationaliseFrenchsocietyformilitarypurposes.“Efficient”and“inefficient”statesmaybeabetterpairing.


Years’War,toapermanentstateoffiscalcrisisand,finally,tostate-collapseunderthe geopolitical pressure exerted by a qualitatively distinct and comparativelysuperiorcapitaliststateandsocietycomplex:post-1688England.Inthisrespect,Bonney’sconcludingstatementthatby1815“onlyonestate,Britain,hadreachedthemoreadvancedstageofa‘fiscalstate’”,anditslogicalcorollaryconcerningthereasonsBritain’scontinentalrivalshadfailedtoreachthisstage,requiressustainedreconsideration.33

Finally,whatwastheroleofcapitalism?Somehistoricalsociologistadvancethefurtherclaimthatthewar-drivenpressurestowardstherationalisationofpublicfiscal systems for revenue-procurementdecisivelypromotedthedevelopmentofcapitalism.Therearethreevariantsofthisargument.First,state-ledmercantiliststrategiesofeconomicgrowthstartedtopenetratesocietyatlarge,includingtherationalisation of production (especially in military, infrastructural and luxurygoods),withthetwinobjectivesofharnessingcapital-accumulationformilitaryspendinganddeployingcapitalistmethodsofproductionforvitalpublicsecuritygoods.Second,mercantilistcolonialismestablishedoverseasmarketsthatfosteredinter-continental long-distance trade which expanded the division of labour,providingnotonlyincentivesforintensifiedandtaxablecommerce,butalsoformarket-oriented production. Colonialism also provoked large-scale investmentsoverseas.Third,morerationalisedmodesofregularisedandmonetarisedtaxation(rather than wilful seigniorial dues in kind or labour) provided incentives toreorient (agricultural) production to urban markets, leading to specialisationandgreater economiesof scale.Thus, capitalism is either conceivedof as aby-productof state-led revenue-procurementor,alternatively,asapre-existingandnotfurtherspecifiedphenomenonthatisselectivelymobilised,usuallyintermsofcompactsbetweentheCrownandmercantilefinancialcircles,fortheprovisionofwarfinance.Whatevertheprecisemodalitiesofdifferentexplanationsandtheexactdefinitionofcapitalismadopted,capitalismishereeitheraderivativeofwarmakingoronlycontingentlyrelatedtothestoryofearlymodernstate-formation.

Relations of Domination in Pre-Capitalist Europe: Re-Conceiving the Relation between the Political and the Economic

Approachingtheissuefromawider,epistemologicalangle,thesecontributionsareunitedbyanunder-problematiseddeploymentofanalyticalcategories–betheylevelsofdetermination,sourcesofsocialpowerormerefactors–forlarge-scaleandlong-termhistoricalanalysis.Theaxiomaticassumptionthatanyparticularmomentinworldhistorycanbereadintermsofthevariableconfigurationand

33 Bonney,The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe,p.14.


interactionbetweenpre-existinganduniversalisedspheresofdetermination–theideological, economic,military, political or, alternatively, the state, themarketandtheeconomy,society,war,thedomestic,theinternationalandsoon–assignsanunfoundeda prioriexistenceandautonomytothesephenomenaandascribes,simultaneously, a timelessness to an analytical vocabulary that is essentiallyabstractedfromaspecifichistoricalcontext(letuscallit“Europeanmodernity”)– and projected back onto history at large. Thus semantically neutered, thesesupra-historicalabstractionsgenerateanalyticalanachronisms.Thisfaciletrans-historicalpluralismhasbeenrepeatedlyandconvincinglychallengedfrombothendsofthepolitico-theoreticalspectrum,exemplifiedbyOttoBrunner’swarningsagainstthetemptationsof“disjunctivethinking”inhisanalysisoftheconstitutionofmedievalpolitiesandbyJürgenHabermas’shistoricalinquiryintotheriseandtransformationofapublicsphereinearlymodernEurope.34

These and many others writings have drawn our attention to a properhistoricisation of social phenomena and a corresponding sensibility to theircontext-specificsemantics.Moredirectly,theyhaveinsistedontheessentialunityoftheeconomicandthepolitical–theirnon-differentiation–inpre-capitalisttimes.Butas“the state”, “economy”and“society”arequintessentiallymodernconcepts,thehistoricisationoftheseconceptswillalsoallowustore-problematisethehistoricalconstructionanddifferentiationbetween“thedomestic”and“theinternational”,withimportantimplicationsforhowtoconceiveof“internationalhistory” and of “geopolitics” in medieval and early modern Europe.35 Centralto this theoreticalandsemantic recasting is the focusonHerrschaftsverhältnisse–relationsofdomination–in“OldEurope”,spanningtheperiod1000–1800.36Thistermconceptualisesnothinglessthanthethesisthatthepoliticalrelationsof domination (rights and privileges) constitute simultaneously the economicpowers of exploitation. Any expansion of rights of domination is tantamountto the expansion of rights of exploitation – the political constitution of

34 OttoBrunner,Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria, transl. from the fourth rev. edn by Howard Kaminsky and James van Horn Melton(Philadelphia,1992[1939])andJürgenHabermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, transl.byThomasBurger(Cambridge,Ma.,1989[1965]).Thelocus classicusremainsKarlPolanyi(ed.),Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory(Glencoe,Ill.,1957).Foraspiriteddefenceofasemanticallysensitiveapproachtomedievalpolitics,seeReesDavies(2003),“TheMedievalState:TheTyrannyofaConcept?”,Journal of Historical Sociology,16/2,pp.280–300.

35 Teschke,The Myth of 1648andBennoTeschke,“Debating‘TheMythof1648’:StateFormation,theInterstateSystemandtheEmergenceofCapitalisminEurope–ARejoinder”,International Politics,43(2006):531–73.

36 DietrichGerhard,Old Europe: A Study of Continuity, 1000–1800(NewYork,1981).


economicreproduction.Inthissense,politicsandeconomicsarefusedornon-differentiated.

TheMarxisttraditionhasapproachedthisnexuslessthroughaninstitutionalor constitutional lens than primarily with reference to Karl Marx’s notion of“extra-economic compulsion”, interpreted through a philosophy of internalrelations.37Thistermcapturestheideathatinallpre-capitalistcommunitiessocialinterdependence–andthetransferofsurplusfromproducerstonon-producers– relies primarily on direct relations of personal dependence or, alternatively,social bonds of obligation. Robert Brenner, in turn, suggested that theseHerrschaftsverhältnisseareinstitutionalisedinpoliticallyconstitutedandcontestedpropertyrelations,thenodalpointsofintersectioninwhichpowerrelationsshapesocial relations.38The focus thus shifts towards thehistorical andgeographicalspecificity of social property relations – the configuration between power andproperty–andthesocialconflictsoverthemodalitiesofsurplustransfer(duesandtaxes)thatareatthecentreofdifferentialtrajectoriesofstate-developmentinmedievalandearlymodernEurope.Inthis,thedistinctionbetweencapitalistandnon-capitalistpropertyrelationsiscentral.Theargumentisthatinsocialpropertyregimeswheredirectproducersareinpossessionoftheirmeansofreproduction,non-producers tend to re-invest in themeansofappropriationandcoercion–ratherthaninthemeansofproduction–tosecuretheextractionofsurplusandsotoaccumulatewealth.Henceaccumulationwasprimarilyapoliticalprocess:Marx’s“extra-economiccompulsion”.Andthisprocessofpoliticalappropriationvis-à-visthepeasantryalsointernallydividedtherulingclassintermsofconflictsoverpropertyrights,thetermsofappropriationandthedistributionofsurplus.Asthisprocessdividedelitesdomestically,italsodroveaninter-lordlyandinter-dynasticconflictovertheexpansionandcontrolof“landandpeople”–territoryand labour. I call this process “geopolitical accumulation”. Consequently,warfareandre-investmentinthemeansofcoercion(pressurestowardsmilitaryinnovations) were not a geopolitical imperative in pre-capitalist seventeenthCenturyEurope,butanormal rulingclass strategyof expanded reproduction,driven by the social and domestic needs of (geo-) political accumulation. In

37 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. by DavidFernbach(London,1981[1894]),pp.926–7.

38 RobertBrenner, “TheAgrarianRoots ofEuropeanCapitalism”, inT.H.Astonand C.H.E. Philpin (eds) The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe (Cambridge,1985),pp.213–27;RobertBrenner,“TheSocialBasisofEconomicDevelopment”,inJohnRoemer(ed.),Analytical Marxism(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 23–53. Compare also Ellen Wood, “The Separation of ‘TheEconomic’and‘ThePolitical’inCapitalism”,inEllenWood,Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism(Cambridge,1995[1981]),pp.19–48.


this sense, the early modern “permanent war-state” institutionalised the socialimperativesofpoliticalaccumulation.

Thenextsectiongivesexamplesofhowthesetheoreticalpremises,revolvingaroundtheregionallyspecificdevelopmentofsocialpropertyrelations,maybetranslatedintoareconstructionofthedivergingtrajectoriesofstate-formationinearlymodernFranceandEngland.ThisreconstructiondirectlychallengestheNeo-Hintzean“war-makes-states”thesis,notbydenyingtheefficacyandprominenceof military rivalry, but by providing an alternative explanation, and so rejectsTilly’sandMann’sthesisthatbothstatescanbesubsumedunderthesameregime-type.Atthesametime,itshouldbenotedthatthisrevisedMarxistperspectivebreakswithsomecentralassumptionsofclassicalMarxism,includingtheideaofhistoricalteleology,economicstructuralismoratechnologicaldeterminism,asitalsobreakswiththeunderstandingofcapitalismthatdefinesit(followingAdamSmithorImmanuelWallerstein)asthewideningofthedivisionoflabourdrivenby commercial expansion, that is, trade. As the following sections attempt todemonstrate,theequationofcapitalismwithcapitalistspursuingprofits(essentiallycommerceandfinance)isnothelpfulinunderstandingtheactualfundamentaldifference between “commercial capitalism” – the political maintenance andexploitation of price-differentials in long-distance trade – and capitalismunderstoodasasocialrelationbetweenproducersandnon-producers.Whereascommercialcapitalismreferstotheprincipleof“buyingcheapandsellingdear”,connectingdifferentmarketswithoutintegratingthem(whichcharacterisedtheItalianandDutchexperiencesandlater,intheformofmercantilism,theFrenchandEnglishexperiences)soastoreapwindfallprofitsinthesphereofcirculation,“capitalism”referstoasocialrelationinwhichallfactorsofproduction,includingmostcruciallylabour,arecommodified,leadingtomarket-dependencybybothproducersandnon-producers.39This typeofproperty regimeemerged inearlymoderntimesinonlyonecountry:England.

Social Property Relations, Fiscal-Military Performance, State Variations and Geopolitics: France and England

Whydidclassconflictanditsstrategicdimension–geopolitics–leadinFrancetoanabsolutistpropertyregime,an“inefficient”pre-modernpolity,andtherelativedeclineofFrance’sinternationalposition,whereastheyledinEnglandandBritaintoacapitalistpropertyregime,an“efficient”andmodernstate,andBritain’srisetoglobalprimacy?

39 It should be clear that this definition constitutes an ideal-type which requiresconcretisationforspecificinstances.


France: from Feudalism to Absolutism

AfullreconstructionoftheFrenchtrajectoryhastostartwiththeoutcomeofthe“feudalrevolution”aroundtheyear1000thatleftaterritoriallyfragmentedsocialpropertyregime(themultiplicityofbanal lords)thatwasslowlyandgraduallycentralised by the Capetian and, later, Valois monarchies.40 Here, in contrasttoEngland,competitionbetweenregional lordsandroyalpowercreatedroomfor apolicyofpeasantprotection. In thecourseof the crisisbeginning in thefourteenthcentury, the feudal rent-regimebetween lords andbondedpeasantswasunderminedandfinallyreplaced,aftertheseventeenth-centurycrisis,byanabsolutist tax-regimebetween thekingand freepeasants inpossessionof theirlands, creating wide-spread peasant small-holding.41 Peasant communities hadbenefitedfromcompetitionbetweenthemonarchyandlocalnobleswithrespecttotheirsurplus,gainingfreedomintheprocessandestablishinginheritabletenuresthatowedfixeddueswhichsubsequentlylostvaluewithinflation.Inthisprocess,theoldsword-carryingandindependentnobilitylostmanyofitsfeudalpowersandbecameeither impoverishedorabsorbedintothecourtsocietyof theOldRegimethroughofficevenalityandotherchannelsofprivilege.Simultaneously,the monarchy actively promoted the creation of a new “office nobility” thatstarted to administerpublicpower (taxation, justice andwar). In thisprocess,thedemilitarisationoftheoldfeudalnobilityandthelossoftheirautonomousfeudalpowersofdominationandappropriationimpliedtheirdomesticationandtheirneedtore-organisetheirprivilegesandpowersofextractioninrelationtotheroyalstate.

The class-distinctions between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy hadbecomeblurred,asmembersofbothclassesmadethemostoftheirwealthfromlandholdingsandlucrativestateoffices.Buttheincomefromtheselandholdingswasgeneratedthroughpre-capitalistsharecroppingandnotfromassertingdirectcontroloverproduction.42Additionally,bothclassesreproducedthemselvesfromfeescollectedintheircapacityasoffice-holders,investmentinstateloansandroyallargesse.Agrarian capitalismdidnot develop inFrance sinceneither peasants,whoformedsubsistencecommunitiesbasedonunmediatedaccesstotheirmeansofreproduction,northeupperclasses(nobleandbourgeois),whichreproducedthemselvesthroughland-rentsandthespoilsofpoliticaloffices,weresubjecttocapitalistimperatives.

40 Jean-PierrePolyandEricBournazel,The Feudal Transformation: 900–1200(NewYork,1991).

41 Brenner,“TheAgrarianRootsofEuropeanCapitalism”.42 StephenMiller,State and Society in Eighteenth-Century France: A Study of Political

Power and Social Revolution in Languedoc(Washington,D.C.,2008).


By the mid-seventeenth century, the demise of independent feudal centresofpowerfinallymeant that territorialitybecame internallymore consolidated,sincetheFrenchpolitywasnolongerafragmentedensembleof lordshipsthatdefined the “parcellised sovereignty” of themedieval polity, but a kingdom inwhichtheCrownwassovereign.Itwouldbeafundamentalmistake,however,toconfound“absolutist”withmodernsovereignty,fortherelationsofexploitationremainedpoliticallyconstituted,ifnowintheformofthe“tax/officestate”(theSteuer – und Ämterstaat).43Thismeantthattheprocessofpoliticalaccumulationcontinuedtorestonpracticesofdomination,revolvingroundthepersonalisedsovereigntyof the rulingdynasty:L’État, c’est moi. In thecontextof this socialpropertyregime,aseparationofpublicandprivaterealms,ofthepoliticalandtheeconomic,couldnotbecarriedthrough.Asthekingregardedtherealmashispatrimonialproperty, raison d’Étatmeantraison de roi.“Divinekingship”becamethedominantmodeoflegitimationratherthanaseculariseddiscourseandpraxisof“popularsovereignty”or“thenationalinterest”.

But “absolutism”, as the revisionist literature has confirmed, never impliedunlimited or unchecked royal power, but rather institutionalised a new andultimately unstable modus vivendi between king and privileged groups, mostnotably the sword and officenobility and thehigher clergy.44The relations of

43 HeideGerstenberger,Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State,transl.byDavidFernbach(LeidenandBoston,2007[1990]).

44 It should be noted that my account of French “absolutism” is consonant withthefindings,butnotwiththeexplanation,ofthedominantrevisionistinterpretationofabsolutism,Marxistandnon-Marxistalike,inhistoriography.See,forexample,WilliamBeik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc(Cambridge,1985);PhilipT.Hoffman,“EarlyModernFrance,1450–1700”,inPhilipT.HoffmanandKathrynNorberg(eds),Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789(Stanford,1994),pp.226–52;DavidParker,Class and State in Ancien Régime France: The Road to Modernity?(London,1996);RonaldAschandHeinzDuchhardt(eds),Der Absolutismus — ein Mythos? Strukturwandel Monarchischer Herrschaft in West- und Mitteleuropa (ca.1550–1700)(Köln,1996)andMarkPotter,“WarFinance and Absolutist State Development in Early Modern Europe: An ExaminationofFrenchVenality in theSeventeenthCentury”,Journal of Early Modern History,7/1–2 (2003): 120–47. Note that Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, and Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, arrive at similar conclusionsregarding the overall trajectory of French state-formation. In a recent survey, WilliamBeik nuances minor parts of the dominant revisionist thesis, particularly with respecttospecificFrenchprovinces.SeeWilliamBeik,“TheAbsolutismofLouisXIVasSocialCollaboration”, Past & Present, 188 (2005): 195–224. However, he strongly confirmstheviewofabsolutismas“socialcollaboration”incontrasttotheoutdatedTocquevillianaccountofatriumphantmonarchy-ledprojectofstatemodernisation,centralisationandrationalisationthaterasedallintermediarybodies.


exploitationbetweentheCrownandthenobilityandbetweentherulingclassandthepeasantryremainedgovernedthroughouttheancien régimebypoliticalconflicts over access to anddistributionof the total peasant-producedoutput.Consequently,taxationbecamethekeyarenaofdomesticconflict.Inthiscontext,every war tested and re-negotiated the balance of power between Crown andnobility,as themonarchytried tomeet itsfinancialneedsbyhigher taxes, theartificial creation and selling of venal offices, or by loans advanced by privatefinanciers who were often themselves tax-farmers. But while the nobility was,asarule,45exemptedfromtaxationandthereforenotrepresentedinanationalforum(theEstatesGeneralmetforthelasttimebeforetheFrenchRevolutionin1614),themonarchy’srelianceonthenobilityforfinancialsupporttranslatedintoanentrenchmentofitspositioninthevenal‘bureaucracy’intheprovincialestatesandotherregionalcorporatebodies,andintoafloweringofindirectandinformaldealsthatindividualfinanciersstruckintheclientelisticsystemofthecourt at Versailles.To remain financially afloat and pacify the office nobility,Frenchmonarchssoldandauctionedoffpublicofficesinevergreaternumbers.Over time, venal offices were held in perpetuity and heredity and so becameaprivatised sourceof income.TheCrown thus lost control over its fiscal andfinancial administration. It failed to establish a central bankor secure lines ofcredit,whilebeing forced toborrowon short-term loansathigh interest ratesfromaclassofwealthyfinanciers,whowerethemselvestax-farmers.EspeciallytherecourseunderLouisXIVtoofficevenalitypersistentlystrengthenedtheprivatepropertyrightsofofficeholders. Inthisway, thepretensiontoabsolutismwasbeliedbytheprogressivelossofcontrolbythemonarchyoverthestateapparatusasitwasre-privatisedbyanofficenobilityofheterogeneous(includingbourgeois)socialorigins.

WhilewarthusincreasedtheabsolutistclaimsofFrenchmonarchsovertheirsubjects,itsimultaneouslyparalysedtheirlong-termfinancialandadministrativecapacitytorule.Inshort,therewasadirectcorrelationbetweentheintensificationof warfare and office proliferation, the pursuit of international geopoliticalaccumulationandthedomestichollowingoutofstatepower.Caughtbetweenspirallingmilitaryexpenditures,itsinabilityofradicaladministrativereformduetodeeplyentrenchedvestedinterests,andtheexcessiveandpunitivetaxationofthepeasantrythatfurtherunderminedrelativelowratesofproductivity,pre-capitalist

45 Thereweresomesuccessful,butalwaysintermittent,attemptstotaxtheprivilegedthrough,forexample,thecapitation(headtax)andthedixième(incometax).“TheseriousfiscalpressureofthelastyearsoftheWaroftheSpanishSuccessionwasbitterlyresentedbytheprivilegedclasses,whomadeitclearthattheirconsenttothedixièmehadbeenforthedurationofthewaronly:theregentconcededitswithdrawalin1717.”Bonney,“TheEighteenthCenturyII.TheStruggleforGreatPowerStatusandtheEndoftheOldFiscalRegime”,p.325.


France underwent a series of fiscal crises.46 This downward spiral, precipitatedbytherisingcostsofwarfare,royaldebt-accumulation,officecreationandsub-letting,over-taxationandinabilitytorepayloans,contributedtotheincreasingdissatisfactionofaclassofprivatefinanciersandoffice-holdersthatfinallyledtoageneralcrisiswithintherulingclassovertheformofthestate,explodingatlastintheFrenchRevolution.47Theconclusionisthattheclassdynamicsandgeopoliticsoftheancien régimecouldnotanddidnotleadtoarationalised,efficient,and“modern”bureaucratic state. In fact,military rivalry reinforcedand intensifiedratherthanresolvedthepre-capitalistclasstensionsthatstructuredOldRegimeFrance.InareversalofCharlesTilly’sdictumthat“war-made-states-and-states-made-war”,itseemsmoreplausibletoarguethatpre-capitaliststatesmadewar,andthatwarunmadethesestates.

Westphalian Geopolitics

These domestic dynamics had their correlate in early modern “international”relations. The replication of similar, though by no means identical, processesof “absolutist” state-formation across most regions of the Continent gave rise,mutatis mutandis,toaEuropeansystemof“states”inwhichdynasticrulersactedas gigantic (geo-) political accumulators. It was this pre-capitalist complexionthatgavetheearlymoderncontinentalsystemof“states”itsover-militarisedandbellicosecharacter.48

Although the seventeenth centurywitnessed the riseof a territoriallymoresharply defined inter-state system (even though territoriality remained a fluidand exchangeable appendix of dynastic property rights of domination), thissystem still consisted of pre-capitalist “states”, in which sovereignty continuedtobepersonalisedand tied todynasties, rather thanade-personalisedabstractnotion of statehood. The inter-dynastic system remained defined by veryspecificforeignpolicypractices:thewar-drivenaccumulationofterritories;thepredatory and compensatory logic of dynastic equilibrium (convenance ratherthanpower-balancing); control over exclusive andmonopolistic trading-routessecuredbypolitico-militarymeans;theelaboratedynasticstrategiesofterritorial

46 Hoffman,“EarlyModernFrance,1450–1700”;KathrynNorberg,“TheFrenchFiscalCrisisof1788andTheFinancialOriginsoftheRevolutionof1789”,inPhilipT.HoffmanandKathrynNorberg(eds),Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789(Stanford,1994),pp.253–98.

47 Comninel, George C., Rethinking the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge(London,1987).

48 “Over-militarised”bothinitsquantitativesenseregardingthefrequencyofwarand itsqualitative sense regarding thecatastrophic ratiobetweenwarexpendituresandfiscalincome–theeconomicsustainabilityofwar.


aggrandisement through marital policies; the resulting dynastic unions andcompositemonarchiesandtheirflip-side,theendemicwarsofsuccession,includingageneraldrivetowardsterritorialempire-building.Inshort,itwastheseveryspecificpatterns of conflict and co-operation that characterised the logic and dynamicsof “Westphalian Geopolitics”. This interpretation relegates the Peace Treaty ofWestphalia, consistently regarded in the discipline of International Relations asthefoundingmomentofthemoderninter-statesystem,toapre-moderncompactbetweenpre-dominantly “absolutist”polities, irrespectiveof the special statusoftheHolyRomanEmpireandtheindependenceachievedbytheNetherlandsandSwitzerland.

England: from Feudalism to Capitalism

If continental patterns of property relations, state-development and warfareseemedtogenerateabreakthroughneithertocapitalisteconomicdevelopmentnor to modern state-formation, why and how did the English trajectory soradicallydiverge?HowdidtheriseofcapitalistpropertyrelationsintheagrarianeconomyaffecttheinstitutionalchangesintheBritishpolity,andhowdidthesechangesre-positionBritainintheinternationalsystem?

Returning to the millennium and the Norman Conquest, a tight feudalhierarchyofCrownmagnatesandlordswascarriedoverafter1066fromducalNormandy,inwhichtheKingretainedtheroyalban.Thisenabledaformofclose,thoughnotofcourseconflict-free,intra-rulingclassco-operationthatledtotheenserfmentoflargesectionsoftheEnglishpeasantry(aportionofthepeasantryremainedfree-holders)whilerulingoutthecompletegeographicalfragmentationofpowerineleventh-centuryFrance,characterisedbythemultiplicityofbanallords.Correlatively,thistightfeudalhierarchyreducedinter-lordlycompetitionover peasant surplus, so that the French pattern of royal support for peasantfreedomandpeasantpropertyinordertoturnlordlyrentsintoroyaltaxesfailedtodevelop. Instead,whileEnglish serfswere able to achievepersonal freedomduringthefeudalcrisisofthefourteenthcentury,theyfailedtosecurepropertyrightstotheirlandsinstrikingcontrasttotheircounterpartsinFrance.Backedbyroyaljustice,Englishlordstransformedrelativelysecurecopyholds(thecustomaryformofpeasantlandusethatwasinscribedintomanorialrolls)intocompetitiveleaseholdsforwhichtheychargedmarketrentswhilelevyinghighentryfines.49Intheprocess,theregulationoflandusethroughcustomarylawwasreplacedbyCommonLaw.This resulted in thegradualdispossessionof thepeasantry, theconsolidationof largerestatesandthemarket-drivenneedbycapitalisttenant-farmers to raiseproductivity inorder tomaintain their leases inacompetitive

49 Brenner,“TheAgrarianRootsofEuropeanCapitalism”.


landmarket.Bythemid-seventeenthcentury,weseethelarge-scaleemergenceofpeasantwage-labour,capitalisttenant-farmersandasocio-politicallyhomogeneousclassofentrepreneuriallandlords–theoverallconsolidationofagrariancapitalism.Thisprocesswasaccompaniedandintensifiedbytheenclosuremovement.

The English transition to agrarian capitalism led to a class-constellationin which an entrepreneurial aristocracy (supported by the new “interlopingmerchants”)enteredintoaperiodofconflictwiththemonarchy,theoldcolonialmerchantclassandsurvivingfeudalmagnatesovertheformandcontroloftheEnglishstate.50WhiletheStuartstriedtoestablishabsoluteauthority,thecapitalistaristocracysoughttoconstructastatethatwasresponsivetotheneedsofprivateproperty protection, limited taxation and capital accumulation, encapsulatedin theprogrammatic call for “political liberties”.This conflictbetween“court”and“country”culminatedintheGloriousRevolutionandthenewnotionofthe“King-in-Parliament”–aformulathatessentiallycodifiedtheCrown’sconcessionofcrucialpowerstoParliament,whichbecamethelocusofBritishsovereignty.Between1688and1715,theparliamentaryclassesconsolidatedtheirpowerbypassingaseriesof fundamentalconstitutionalacts–theTriennialAct, theBillofRightsandothers.Agrariancapitalismhadgeneratedasocialpropertyregimeinwhichthepoliticalconflictsamongstthemembersoftherulingclassoverthedistributionandtermsoftherightsofpoliticalaccumulationwereincreasinglyreplacedbyprivateformsofeconomicexploitationinthesphereofproduction,though thishardly tookplaceovernight.The shift frompersonalised formsofdomination and appropriation to de-personalised forms generated the formal,notsubstantive,separationbetweentheeconomicandthepolitical.Marketandstate,privateandpublic,cametobeincreasinglydifferentiated.51

Thisnewformofsovereignty,nolongerpersonal-dynastic,butabstract-nationalsovereignty,drovetheconcomitantrevolutioninpublicadministration–theFiscalRevolution,theFinancialRevolution,andtheMilitaryRevolutioninparticular.Coredepartmentsofgovernment–theTreasury,theExciseandtheNavy–turnedfrombeingpatrimonial tobeingmodernbureaucracies,52whilepublicfinancewasdrasticallymodernisedthroughtheestablishmentoftheBankofEnglandandthe“publicdebt”.53Thiscombinationofrevolutionaryinstitutionalinnovations(Britain’s naval superiority and exceptional fiscal-financial responsiveness in

50 Brenner,Robert,Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (Cambridge,1993).

51 EllenWood,The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States(London,1991).

52 Brewer,“TheEighteenth-CenturyBritishState:ContextsandIssues”.53 PeterDickson,The FinancialRevolution in England: A Study in the Development

of Public Credit, 1688–1756 (London, 1967); Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G., British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914(London,1993),pp.58–84.


the faceof externalmilitarypressureon thebasisof a self-sustainingcapitalisteconomy)gavetheHanoverianstatethedecisivecomparative economic, fiscal, and military advantage over its continental competitors – British exceptionalism.54There-organisationofpublicpowerconferreduponBritainaveryspecial,infactrevolutionary,positionwithintheEuropeansystemofabsolutist-dynasticstates:asystemthatcannowberegardedas“capitalismplusmodernsovereigntyinonecountry”,surroundedbyaseaofpre-capitalistpolities.

Itseemsthereforeinsufficienttoderivethecharacterofthepost-1688–1707British state as a “fiscal-military” machine from the exigencies of geopoliticalrivalry,asJohnBrewerhassuggested,55withoutreconnectingstate-developmentwithdomesticsocialdynamicsand,inparticular,socialpropertyrelations.Thepost-1688 British state responded to military competition as vigorously andsuccessfullyasitdidonlyonthebackofacapitalisteconomythatgeneratedtheresources to finance war without the constant threat of bankruptcy and royaldefaultingondebtswhichwassocharacteristicofFrance.AndtheuniquefiscalresponsivenessoftheBritishpolitywassecuredthroughtheself-taxationofthecapitalistaristocracyandmerchants,whichpassedlawsinParliamentthatmadetax-levelsnotonly sustainable and tax-collectioneffective,but alsomadebothsocio-politicallyfarlessdivisivecomparedwithabsolutistFrance.56

Wecannot,however,simplyextrapolatefromthesuccessfulcapitalistrevolutiontheliberalideaofa“state-lite”embracedbythevenerableWhighistoriography.Aliberalnight-watchmanstatecouldnotberealisedinaninternationalcontextthatforcedtheBritishstatetospendbetweenseventy-fiveandeighty-fivepercentofitsannualexpendituresbetween1680and1780onthearmy,navyanddebt

54 Britishfiscalexceptionalismisclearlyrecognised,butnotsufficientlyexplained,by historians who otherwise subscribe to the geopolitical competition model. PatrickO’Brien,“InseparableConnections:Trade,Economy,FiscalStateandtheExpansionofEmpire,1688–1815”,inP.J.Marshall(ed.)The Oxford History of the British Empire, 2: The Eighteenth Century(Oxford,1998);PatrickO’Brien,“FiscalExceptionalism:GreatBritainand itsEuropeanRivals fromCivilWar toTriumphatTrafalgarandWaterloo”, inD.WinchandP.O’Brien(eds), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience: 1688–1914 (Oxford,2002);PatrickO’Brien,PatrickandPhillipA.Hunt, “England,1485–1815”,inR.Bonney(ed.)The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200–1815(Oxford,1999),pp.53–100;mostrecentlyLeandroPradosdelaEscosura(ed.),Exceptionalism and Industrialisation: Britain and its European Rivals, 1688–1815(Cambridge,2004).

55 Brewer,“TheEighteenth-CenturyBritishState:ContextsandIssues”,p.56.56 It is therefore no “potent irony” (Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty,

and Representative Government, p.310)tofindthatratesoftaxationinabsolutiststates(SpainandFrance)wererelativelylightcomparedtostateswithrepresentativeinstitutions(Netherlandsandpost-1688Britain).Butnoneofthiscanbefullyunderstoodwithoutrelatingthepresenceorabsenceofrepresentativeinstitutionstodifferentialconstellationsofclassrelationsandsocialpropertyregimes.


servicing related to war.57 Consequently, the militarisation of the British statewaslargelyexternallydriven,notbyinternationalanarchyper se,butbyaveryspecific inter-stateorderwhose complexion remaineddefinedbygeopoliticallyaccumulating pre-capitalist states. Thus there was what may be described as ageopoliticalfeedback-loopthatmassivelycontinuedtoshapetheconstructionoftheBritishstate:themakingofamilitarysuper-power.

Still,thetransformationofpublicpower,propertyandclassrelationschangedthepositionofBritainintheinterstatesystem,forcingittoredefineandadaptitsroletothiswiderstrategiccontext.TheGloriousRevolutionnotonlystartedtorationalisetheEnglishstate,butalsooccasionedarevolutioninBritishforeignpolicy.Thiswascharacterisedbyashiftfromdynastictoparliamentaryforeignpolicy-making,nolongerdefinedbythewhimsofdynasticismbutratherbythe“national interest”, as articulated by the propertied classes in Parliament (theHanoverian stemlands inGermanywere regardedbyParliament as a constantsourceofirritation).Asaresult,Parliamentadoptedaverydistinctive“dualforeignpolicystrategy”based,ontheonehand,onpower-balancingversusitsrivalsonthecontinent(apolicydrivenfirstandforemostbyBritish“securityinterests”)and,ontheotherhand,onunlimitedcommercialandcolonialexpansionoverseas–theso-called“bluewaterpolicy”.58Powerbalancing,withBritanniaholdinginher hand the scales, implied the disengagement from the continental dynasticgameofterritorialgeopoliticswithitsendlesswarsofsuccession,politicalmarriagesanddynasticunions.AfterthePeaceTreatyofUtrecht(1713–15),BritainlargelywithdrewfromdirectterritorialaspirationsontheContinent,yetstartedtoregulatethestates-systembymeansofrapidlychangingalliances,hencegivingrisetotheimageof“perfidiousAlbion”,withitsmonetarysubsidiesandmercenaryexpeditioncorps to smaller powers always ready to counter any emergent continentalhegemony,usually,of course,French.TheSevenYears’War (1756–63) ideally

57 Brewer, “The Eighteenth-Century British State: Contexts and Issues”, p. 57;Bonney,“TheEighteenthCenturyII.TheStruggleforGreatPowerStatusandtheEndoftheOldFiscalRegime”.

58 DanielA.Baugh,“GreatBritain’sBlue-WaterPolicy,1689–1815”,International History Review, 10/1 (1989): 33–58. Although Britain’s commercial policy retainedthroughouttheeighteenthcenturyamercantilistcharacter,duetoitsinternationalstrategiccontext,itsdistinctivenesscomparedwiththemercantilistpoliciesofitscontinentalrivalslay in two areas. “Thefirstwas the commercialflexibility and efficiencyof theprivateeconomic sector in Britain compared with the state-run, rather rigid, mercantilism ofsomeotherwesternEuropeanpowers.Thesecondareawascontextualandbuiltaroundthestatesupportprovidedbynavalpowerandgovernmenttaxesandloans–the‘fiscal-military state’ – that allowed oceanic commerce to flourish in an era of internationalwarfare.”KennethMorgan,“MercantilismandtheBritishEmpire,1688–1815”, inD.WinchandP.O’Brien(eds)The Political Economy of British Historical Experience: 1688–1914(Oxford,2002),p.167.


exemplifiesBritishbluewater strategy.Whileheavily subsidisingPrussia in itsstruggleagainstAustria,FranceandRussia,BritaindefeatedFranceoverseasandincorporatedCanada,Florida,Louisianaandex-FrenchterritoriesinIndiaintoherexpandingcolonialempire.Toputitmetaphorically,Britainstartedto“dropout”oftheoperativelogicofcontinental“Westphalian”geopoliticswhilesteeringitby“remotecontrol”.Simultaneously,itbuiltupitscolonialempireoverseasandrosetoglobalhegemonybytheendoftheSevenYears’War,apositionfortifiedforanothercenturybyWaterlooandsealedbytheViennaSettlement.

Ironically,itmaywellbethecoretheoremoftherealisttheoryofinternationalrelations,namelythebalanceofpower,thatneedstobere-interpreted:notasthetimeless regulatorof“grandstrategy”betweengreatpowers,butas the specificconduit for theunintendedexpansionofcapitalismthroughouttheContinentduringthenineteenthcenturyandbeyond.Foritwasthroughpower-balancing,indeed through theadoptionof the roleof thebalancer, thatBritainwas ableto distribute military pressure on continental states. In response, continentalstateswere forced todesignpolitical counter-strategies thatwould secure theirmilitaryviabilityandfiscal-financialhealthsoastosurviveinthestates-system.Butthesestrategiesalwaysinvolvedintensepoliticalconflict,bothintra-ruling-classandinter-class,overtheredefinitionofthestateandthere-arrangementofclassrelations,aseitheroldformsoftaxextractionwereintensifiedornewmodesof taxation and property relations introduced, with regionally highly specificoutcomes. In the French case, Britain’s naval superiority and power balancingfinallycrackedtheshellofFrench“absolutism”anditspre-capitalistreproductivelogic,andthisisreallytheinnermeaningoftheSevenYears’WarandtheWarofAmericanIndependence,whichpavedthewayfor1789.59

Conclusion: Beyond the “War-Makes-States” Thesis

Toconcludebywayofreturningtothecentralquestion:Wasthereaninternalnexus between war and modern state-formation in the seventeenth century?Certainly,warwascentraltopatternsofstate-formation.Theintensity,frequency

59 ForrevealingfiguresonAnglo-Frenchdivergenceswithregardtowarexpenditures,public debts, costs of debt-servicing, taxation rates, tax compliance, interest rates andrevenue-debt ratios, see Bonney “The Eighteenth Century II. The Struggle for GreatPowerStatusandtheEndoftheOldFiscalRegime”,pp.336–45.Bonneyattributestheinferiorfiscalperformanceofpre-1789Franceand its repeated failures infiscal reformto“institutionalobstacles”,asifOldRegimeinstitutionswerenotdirectmanifestationsofdefinitesocialintereststhatreflectedthespecificconfigurationofveryresilientsocial-propertyrelations,butunspecifiedpresencesthathadnosocialrationale.SeealsoCainandHopkins,British Imperialism,p.64.


and duration of warfare, however, cannot simply be derived from systemicgeopolitical competition in a naturalised international context or from anautonomous techno-military determinism, but needs to be grounded in thedomesticdynamicsofsocialpropertyregimes.Warfarewasasocialphenomenonand not a derivative of geopolitical imperatives or a function of technicalinnovations.Furthermore,theeffectsofwarfaredidnotlead,inastraightforwardorlinearway,toageneralstrengtheningandrationalisationofstatepower–atleastnotinregimesthatwewouldliketorefertoas“absolutist”,andcertainlynotinthedirectionoftheWeberiandefinitionofthemodernstate.Ifanything,thecripplingcostsofwarfare,despiterepeatedattemptstobroadenthetaxbasis,toinventnewandmorecentralisedmodesoftaxation,andtorationalisepublicadministration, usually met with stiff resistance by entrenched social interests–leading,atleastintheFrenchcase,tothehypertrophicgrowthofapartlyre-privatisedstate-apparatus,revolvingroundofficevenalityandclientelism.Giventhatsocialpropertyrelations,regimetypesandthetemporalitiesofdevelopmentvariedquite dramatically in earlymodernEurope (even though thedominantstate-form was “absolutist”), there is a greater need to account for EuropeanvariationsandspecificitiessuchastheHolyRomanEmpire,thePolish“crownedaristocraticrepublic”,oligarchicmerchantrepublics,city-leagues,andothers.Thisespeciallyraisestheneedtoreconsidertheabilityofsmallerstateswithasmallertax-basistosurviveinanotherwisehostileinternationalenvironment.Warcannothavebeenthe“greatselector”thateitherledtofunctionallyequivalent“conflict-units”,norcoulditinvariablyhave“crowdedout”smallerpolitiesthatfailedtocomplyfunctionallywiththeimperativesofinternationalrivalrybytransformingthemselvesintoinstitutional“fiscal-military”states.AcrossEurope,modernstate-formationwasaveryunevenandgeopoliticallymediatedprocess,whichbeganwiththeformationofcapitalisminlatemedievalandearlymodernEnglandanditseffectsonthepost-1688Britishstateanddidnotextendtocontinentalstatesuntilthenineteenthcenturyandbeyond.Thishistory,initspropergeopoliticalcontext,remainstobewritten.Thetheoreticalconclusionisthat,whileallearlymodernpolitiesweredrawnintothevortexofinternationalrivalry,socialpropertyrelations and the associated struggles overpowerdetermined to a largedegreestate-development,fiscal-militaryperformanceandstate-collapse.

Still, the Neo-Hintzean literature has made one important argument thatrequiresreflection.BothMannandSkocpolhavearguedthatcapitalisminandofitselfcannotaccountforEurope’smulti-territorialcomplexion.Thereisnodirectgenerativelinkfromcapitalismtoasystemofstates.Butthehistoricalobservationthatastates-systemprecededcapitalismdoesnotwarrantthetheoreticalconclusionthat such a system represents a trans-historically independent or autonomousstructure(levelofanalysis)whichaffirmsthecallfortheoreticalpluralism.Quitethecontrary,aterritoriallypreconfiguredpre-capitalistmultistatesystemwasthe


resultofalonghistoryofclassconflictsoversourcesofincome(landandpeople)thatbeganintheeleventhandintensifiedinthefourteenthandtheseventeenthcenturies,crystallisingintoarecognisablemulti-territorialorderduringtheearlymodernperiod.Itwasnot“states”thatcompetedagainsteachotherforpowerandsecurity,butrulingclassesorganisedinterritoriallycentralisingcommunitiesthatstruggledovertheirrelativeinternationalshareofterritoryandothersourcesof income. The fragmentation of the European ruling class into multiple andseparately organised states was neither theoretically necessary nor historicallycontingent, but it is nevertheless retrospectively intelligible. Capitalism and apoliticalpluriversearechronologicallyandcausallynotcoeval,butpre-capitalistgeopoliticalaccumulationandapluriverseare.Capitalismandthestates-systemarethediachronicdisiecta membra,synchronisedinonecontradictorytotality.

PARTIIIModernLawofNations–fromSpanishScholasticstoGrotius

Chapter4TheLawofNationsandtheDoctrineof

Terra Nullius

DavidBoucher

Pope Benedict XVI, responsible under Pope John Paul II for counteracting thedangerous tendencies in Liberation Theology, addressed the Bishops of LatinAmerica inBrazilon13May2007.PopeBenedict thankedGod forbestowingthegreatgiftoftheChristianfaithupontheindigenouspeoples,whichhadservedforfivecenturiestoanimatethecontinent.Itssignificance,heargued,consistedinthecomingofthatGodwhomtheirancestorshadbeeninsearchof,unknowingly,intheirownreligiousquests.Tocompoundtheinsult,PopeBenedictXVIaddedthatatnopointhadtheintroductionofChristianityalienatedthepre-Columbiancultures.Norhaditbeentheimpositionofaforeignculture.Authenticcultures,heargued,areopenandreceptivetoothercultures,“hopingtoreachuniversalitythroughencounteranddialoguewithotherwaysoflife”.1PopePaulIIIhadbeenofasimilarmindalmostfivecenturiesearlier.In1537,heannouncedthat“theIndiansaretrulymenand...theyarenotonlycapableofunderstandingtheCatholicfaith,but,accordingtoourinformation,...desireexceedinglytoreceiveit”.2

The seventeenth century in Europe was a time of an immense openingof horizons, in which the new continent of America was firmly embedded inconsiderations of the territorial expansion of the state related to what waspermissibleundernaturallawandthelawofnations.AttheheartofconceptualisingtherelationshipbetweenEuropeandtheAmericaswastheissueofproperty,anissue absolutely essential to defining one’s politicalpersona from wherever onemighthail.Thecapacity toownandcultivate land, theobligationtoconformtonaturallaw,violationofwhichprovidedgroundsforwagingjustwar,andtheopportunityforEuropeanstoenslaveAmericanIndiansandtoappropriatetheirlandswithorwithouttheirconsent,affordednumerouscriteriathattheIndianscouldrarely,orbarely,meet.

1 Pope Benedict, “Apostolic Journey of his Holiness Benedict XVI to Brazil ontheOccasionoftheFifthGeneralConferenceoftheBishopsofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean: Address of his Holiness Benedict XVI” (Rome, 2007) 1–2 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2007/may/ documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20070513_conference-aparecida_en.html).

2 LewisHanke,The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia,1949),p.73.


InthischapterIshouldliketoexplorethepracticalimplicationsofEuropeanideasofnaturallaw,naturalrightsandthelawofnationswithspecificreferencetotheideaofterra nullius.ThecasesoftheEuropeanencounterswiththeAmericanIndiansandAustralianAboriginesprovideanexcellentillustrationofhowsuchabstractdoctrines,withtheiruniversalstandardsandapplicability,ledtowidelydifferingconclusionswhentranslatedintoconcretesocialandpoliticalcontextsrequiringpracticalprescriptionsandimperativeinjunctions,andultimatelycouldprovide justifications foroccupationandownershipevenamongapologists fortheIndians.Iwanttosuggestthatwhiletheideaterra nullius wascloselyalliedwiththerighttohusbandry,itwasmorefundamentallythedutytocultivatethelandtoitsutmostcapacitythatprovidedthemoraljustificationforappropriating“wasteland” and under-cultivated land. Of ultimate importance, however, wasthefactthatdespiteappearanceseventheconcessionoflandrightstoindigenouspeoplesdidnotatthesametimeconcedesovereignty.EvenmorehumanitarianEuropeansfromtheseventeenthtothetwentiethcenturybelievedthatIndianswereprimitive,butthatwithpropertrainingintheChristianreligion,Europeanagriculturalmethodsandliteracytheycouldbecomecivilized.

The Idea of Terra Nullius

TheLatinterra meansland,earth,orground,andnullius meansnoone’s;hencevacantoremptyland,oratleastunoccupiedbyanyonewhoqualifiesascapableofownership.Theideaofterra nullius hasbecomeincreasinglyprevalentinrecentdiscussionsofthelegitimacyofEuropeanexpansionism,butespeciallysointhecontextofthe“historywars”inAustralia.Iwanttosuggestthatwhileideasthatconstitutethe“doctrine”ofterra nulliuswereimportant,andwhilemostnaturallaw juristsacknowledgeda right to takepossessionofvacant lands, therewereothermuchmorefundamentalargumentsthatjustifiedEuropeanexpansionismin America, Australia and Africa, namely that the indigenous peoples were inderelictionoftheirdutytoGodtocultivatethelandandmakeitasproductiveaspossible.

Thiscontentionrestsuponanumberofpropositions:

That universal principles were used as instruments of oppression, andinsteadofconferringrightsanddutiesuponall,werethepreserveofonlythosewhoqualified.Inotherwords,universalrightswerealmostinvariablyspecialrights.Thattheoriesofpropertyandjustwarwerefundamentaltotheapplicationoftheprinciplesofnaturallaw,naturalrightsandthelawofnations.

1.

2.

The Law of Nations and the Doctrine of TerraNullius 65

That, contrary to the widespread contention that the likes of Grotius,Pufendorf and Rachel secularised the natural law and natural rightstraditions,thesetraditionsrestedontheobligationtoobeythenaturallawprincipallyasadutytoGod.3TheIndiansthereforehadadutytoGodtocultivatetheirland,whichtheysingularlyfailedtofulfil.

The third proposition is probably most contentious because it denies currentorthodoxy,asexpressed,forexample,byArthurNussbaum,A.S.McGradeandJamesGriffin.ArthurNussbaumfirmlybelievesthatbothGrotiusandPufendorfmayjustifiablyhavelaidclaimtosecularisingnaturallaw.4Griffin,forexample,contendsthattheuseofreasonasthemeansofdiscoveringnatural lawandasthegroundofourobligationtoobeyitisthehallmarkofmodernnaturalrightstheory.Inmyview,heiswrongtoattributetheseideastothinkerssuchasGrotius,PuffendorfandLocke.5A.S.McGradeisrepresentativeoftheprevailingviewinsuggestingthatduringtheperiodencompassingJohnofSalisbury(c.1115–76),RichardHooker(1554–1600)andFranciscoSuarez(1548–1617),thetheoryofnaturalrightsaroseoutofthereligiousviewofsociety.Afterthistime,McGradesuggests,thepoliticsofrightmoreorlessdispensedwithreligion.6

Itismycontention,however,thatevennaturalrightstheoristswhoaresaidtohavesecularisedthetradition,suchasHugoGrotius(1583–1645),SamuelvonPufendorf (1632–94), John Locke (1632–1704) and Johann WolfgangTextor(1638–1701),retainsuchaheavyresidueofabsolutetheologicalpresuppositionsthattheirargumentswouldbeunsustainablewithoutthereligiousoutlookuponwhichtheydepend.ItisnotmycontentionthatallnaturallawandnaturalrightsthinkersultimatelyrelyonGodasthegroundofobligation.7Myclaimismoremodest:thosethinkerswhohavebeenmostidentifiedwithsecularisingnatural

3 ThisprovedtobeaparticularlycontentiousissueattheconferenceandIthereforegotosomepainstosubstantiateit.IwouldparticularlyliketothankThomasPinkandKeesvanderPijlfortheircomments.IhaveelaboratedsomeofthethemesinthischapterinmybookThe Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, Human Rights in Transition (Oxford,2008).

4 ArthurNussbaum,A Concise History of the Law of Nations(NewYork,1953).5 JamesGriffin,On Human Rights(Oxford,2008),pp.10–12.6 A.S. McGrade, “Rights, Natural Rights, and The Philosophy of Law”, in N.

Kretzmann, Antony Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600(Cambridge,1982),p.739.

7 ThomasPink,“NaturalLawandtheTheoryofMoralObligation”,inJillKrayeandRistoSaarinen(ed.)Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht,2005),pp.31–50.ThomasPink,“MoralObligation”,inAnthonyO’Hear(ed.),Modern Moral Philosophy(Cambridge,2004),pp.159–86.

3.


law and natural rights tended not to abandon God as the ultimate source ofobligation.Why,indeed,wouldtheywantto,giventhecontemporaryconditionsofbelief?

It is important todistinguish in the classicwritersbetween themethodormeansbywhichwecometoknownaturallawandthegroundsforourobligationto obey it. My view is that in the earlier thinkers who are significant for thedevelopmentofnatural lawandthe lawofnations,reasonenablesustoknowthelawandGodultimatelyobligesustoobeyit.EmerVattel(1714–67)sawthisdistinctionveryclearlyandwasawareofwhatwasatstake.HedifferedfromthosewhowishedtopositGodasthefoundationofobediencetonaturallaw,preferringinsteadacomplicatedcombinationofmotive,interestandreason.8Hesaysthat“InnowaydoesitdetractfromtheauthorityofGodtosaythateverythingheordainsforusinnaturallawsissofineandusefulinitselfthatwewouldbeobligedtoadoptit,evenifGodhadnotorderedit”.9ForrevealedlawssuchasthosewefindintheScriptures,VatteldoesnotdenythatGodisthesourceofobligation.Fornatural laws,however,weknow them tobe thewill ofGodonly “by thereasonsfortheselaws”.10Thishardlyconstitutesasecularisationofthetradition.Indeed,itstillinhabitsthesameuniverseofdiscourseasthosewhopositHimasthefoundationofobligation.

As Charles Taylor has argued, belief in God was almost unchallengedbecausethe“conditionsofbelief ”madeitaxiomaticthatalternativeviewswereinconceivable formostpeople.Owing toa transformation in thoseconditionsofbelief, it isno longeraxiomatic tobelieve inGodbecause thereareevidentalternatives that make it more difficult to sustain faith.11 In the seventeenthcentury, if a philosopher did not rely at some stage in his argument on Godastheultimatefoundationofobligation,sometimesalongsideothercompellingreasons,wewouldneedtoseekanexplanationfortheomission;incontemporarysociety,itistheinclusionofsuchgroundsthatdemandsanexplanation.

FromthetimeoftheearlyChristianstotheseventeenthcenturyandbeyond,thedominantviewwasthatallauthorityultimatelyderivesfromGod.Itisdifficulttoseewhatwouldgivemoralandintellectualforcenotonlytotheargumentsbutalso to theobligations and rights that individuals andnationshaveunder thenaturallawhadGodnotwilleditso.St.Paul,forexample,contendsthat“Noauthority exists save by God’s sanction; such as do exist have been appointed

8 Emer D. Vattel, “Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the FirstPrincipleofObligationMenFindThemselvesUndertoObserveLaws”,inBélaKappossyandRichardWhatmore(ed.),The Law of Nations byEmerD.Vattel(Indianapolis,2008),pp.747–71.

9 Vattel,“EssayontheFoundationofNaturalLaw”,p.760.10 Vattel,“EssayontheFoundationofNaturalLaw”,pp.757–8.11 SeeCharlesTaylor,A Secular Age(Cambridge,Mass.,2007).


byGod”.12 It is commonduring the latermedievalperiodexplicitly to invokeGodasthegroundforobediencetothenaturallaw.Gratian,forexample,inThe Decretum Gratiani(c.1140),contendsthatanyprinciplethatcanbedeterminedasapre-conventionalnaturalrightmustberegardedtobeareflectionofdivinewisdomandwill.Hedeclaresthat“nothingiscommandedbynaturalrightexceptthatwhichGodwishestobedone,andnothingforbiddenexceptthatwhichGodforbidstobedone”.13

Grotius,Pufendorf,TextorandRachelsuggestthatthelawofnaturepertainsonly tohumans, and isobligatory in its force.An indubitableand immutablehumannatureprovidesthefoundationfornaturallaw.Startingfromthebasisofournaturalsociableness,Grotius,forinstance,suggeststhatproofsofthenaturallawarealmostasself-evidentasthedatawereceivethroughthesenses.14NaturallawissoinextricablytiedtohumannaturethatevenifGoddidnotexist,andHehadnointerestinthewelfareofhumanity,thelawwouldremainvalid.15ThishasoftenbeentakentobeGrotius’ssecularisationofthenaturallaw.Suchaviewisanachronistic.

WhenoneexaminesGrotius’sargumentclosely,itisevidentthathisstatementispartiallyrhetorical,andwhatliesattheheartofourobligationsisGod:asJeanBarbeyraccommentsinhisnotestoGrotius’stext,“theDutyandObligation,ortheindispensableNecessityofconformingtotheseIdeas,andMaxims,necessarilysupposesasuperiorPower,asupremeMasterofMankind,whocanbenootherthantheCreator,orsupremeDivinity”.16JeanJacquesBurlamqui,theauthorofThe Principles of Natural Lawwritesinasimilarvein.HearguesthatitisobviousfromGrotius’smodeofexpressionthatGrotiusdidnotwishtoexcludethedivinewillfromnaturallaw.Whilereasonisasourceofobligation,“itcouldneverproduceofitselfsoeffectualanobligation,aswhenitisjoinedwiththedivinewill”.17

Grotius, in fact, explicitly contends that there are compelling reasons forascribingtheprinciplesofthenaturallawtoGod.Godhasmadethemsoevidentandcleareventothose“lesscapableofstrictReasoning”thatHeforbidsustogiveintoimpetuouspassionswhicharecontrarytoourownandothers’interestsand

12 St. Paul, The Letters of St. Paul to seven churches and three friends, with theLettertotheHebrews,trans.ArthurS.Way(London,1926),Romans,XIII,p.i.

13 Cited in Jean Porter, “Custom, Ordinance and Natural Rights in Gratian’sDecretum”,inAmandaPerreau-SaussineandJamesBernardMurphy(eds),The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives(Cambridge,2007),p.89.

14 HugoGrotius,The Rights of War and Peace (1625),trans.JeanBarbeyrac,threebooks,editedwithanintroductionbyRichardTuck(Indianapolis,2005),BookII,chap.xxiii,I.

15 Grotius,Rights of War and Peace, BookI,PreliminaryDiscourse:§11.16 Grotius,Rights of War and Peace,PreliminaryDiscourse,ns1to§XI.17 Jean-JacquesBurlamaqui,The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (Indianapolis,

2006),p.191.


whichdivertusfromconformingtotherulesofreason.18IntheMare Liberum (The Free Sea) Grotius goes further and suggests that God directly insinuatescertainpreceptsintomen’sminds,whichare“sufficienttoinduceobligationevenifnoreasonisapparent”.19

ItistruethatPufendorfdidnotbelievethatGodhadinscribedthenaturallawinmen’shearts.Hebelievedhimselftobeinconformitywithorthodoxywhenhesaid,“Mostareagreed,thattheLawofNatureistobedrawnfromMan’sReason;flowingfromthetrueCurrentofthatFaculty,whenunperverted”.20YetnotonlydoesGodendowuswiththereasonweuseforcomingtoknowthenaturallaw;thereasonthatweareobligedtofollownaturallawisbecauseitisGod’s“WillandCommandweshouldactaccordingtothatLaw”.21

DespitethefactthatPufendorfisacknowledgedtoderivethenaturallawfromGod,andexplicitlyrejectedthetentativeGrotiansuggestionthatthenaturallawwouldretainitsforceevenifGoddidnotexist,NussbaumarguesthatinpracticaltermsPufendorfissolittleinfluencedbytheologicalandreligioussentimentsthathehascometobe“consideredthetruefounderofasecularlawofnature”.22Thisfliescompletely inthe faceof theevidence.Pufendorfexplicitly states that thedictatesofreasondonotaloneachievethepoweranddignityoflaws.Ahigherprinciplemustbeinvokedinordertoinstilanimmutableobligation.Therecanbenolawwithoutasovereignand,assovereignoftheuniverse,Godisthecreatorandenforcerofnaturallaw.Naturallaw,fromwhichournaturalrightsderive,isthecreationofGod,who,shouldwetransgressagainstit,punishesouractions.Pufendorfarguesthat“theobligationofNaturalLawproceedsfromGodhimself,the great Creator and supreme Governor of Mankind; who by Virtue of hisSovereigntyhathboundMentotheobservationofit”.23

The same can be said for Rachel,Textor and Burlamaqui. For Rachel, it isnotreasonthatgivesnaturallawitsobligatoryforce.Thesourceofnaturallawisdivineprovidence,anditsobligatoryforcederivesfromthesamesource:“ForiftheobligationofeverylawderivesitsauthorityinparamountfashionfromGod,NaturalLawreceivesitsauthorityinthehighestpossibledegreefromthatsamesource”.24JohannWolfgangTextorperhapshasastrongerclaimtohavingsecularised

18 Grotius,Rights of War and Peace,PreliminaryDiscourse,§13.19 Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, trans. Richard Hakluyt, with an Introduction by

DavidArmitage(Indianapolis,2004),p.105.20 Pufendorf,The Law of Nature and Nations, BookII,chap.iii,§XIII.21 Pufendorf,The Law of Nature and Nations, BookII,chap.iii,§XIII.22 Nussbaum,AConciseHistoryoftheLawofNations,p.148.23 Pufendorf,Law of Nature and Nations, BookII,chap.iii,§20.24 SamuelRachel,Dissertations on The Law of Nature and of Nations[1676],trans.

JohnPawleyBate,withanintroductionbyLudwigvonBar(WashingtonD.C.,1916),Diss.I,§xlv.


thenaturallaw.HefollowsandmodifiesthetheoriesofGrotiusandHobbes.Thelawofnatureforhimissuesdirectlyfromnaturalreason.God,however,implantsthisreasoninmenandoneoftheself-evidentlawsofnatureisthatwemustfulfilourobligationstoGod.WithoutGod,whoseexistenceTextorgoestosomepainstoprove,thereisnobasisforobligationandcivilsocietywouldcollapse.25

Eveninthemid-eighteenthcentury,natural lawwasstillbeinginextricablylinkedtoGod’sauthority.JeanJacquesBurlamaqui(1694–1748),aninfluentialSwissjuristwhosechiefworksarePrinciples of Natural Law(1747)andPrinciples of Political Law (1751), set out to demonstrate the efficacy of natural law byrelatingittoitsoriginalsourceinGod’srule,andtohumanreasonandmoralinstinct. International and domestic law were, for him, based on natural law.Burlamaquicontendsthatthelawofnatureconsistsincertainprinciplesofrightreasonthatteachuswhatisrightandwrongaccordingtotheextenttowhichthislawagreesordisagreeswithman’srationalandsociablenature.HenceGod,theauthorofnature,commandsorforbidsthoseactions.Theobligationtoobeythenaturallaw,then,isultimatelyadutytoGod.

Assoonaswehaveacknowledgedacreator,itisevidentthathehasasupremerighttolayhiscommandsonman,toprescriberulesofconducttohim,andtosubjecthimtolaws;anditisnolessevidentthatmanforhispartfindshimself,byhisnaturalconstitution,underanobligationofsubjectinghisactionstothewillofthissupremebeing. 26

Inessencetherationalistwhobelievesthatthenaturallawisrightbecauseitisrational,andthevoluntaristwhobelievesitisrightbecauseGodwillsitso,onthewholemaintainthatobligationstoobeyitrestonGod.

The Implications for Terra Nullius

Iwantnowtolookattheideaofterra nulliusandhowwhatIhavejustarguedhasabearingonit.Thedoctrineofvacantorunoccupiedlands,availableforotherstoacquireandappropriatewasacentralpillarinconceptualisingrelationsbetweenEuropeanandnon-Europeannations,thatis,betweencivilizedandbarbarousandsavagesocieties.Itwasanimportantissuebecause“unoccupied”didnotliterallymerelymean“uninhabited”, it alsocame tomeanunder-used,uncultivatedor

25 JohannWolfgangTextor,Synopsis of the Law of Nations[1680],trans.JohnPawleyBate,withanintroductionbyLudwigvonBar(WashingtonD.C.,1916),VI,pp.1–28.

26 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural and Politic Law (ed.) PeterKorkman(Indianapolis,2006),PartI,chap.1,§xi,p.129.Cf.PartII,chap.5,§§viandvii,pp.168–9.


under-cultivated landavailable forappropriation,and in this respect itwasanimportantconsiderationinthepartitionofAfrica.

Thetermterra nulliusitselfhascometobeemblematicofsomeofthemoreperniciousactsofEuropeansperpetrateduponAustralianAboriginalsaftertheytookpossessionof thecontinent.27Theideathatvacant landmaybeoccupiedthrough necessity, for example, was well established among the Greeks andRomans.Inordertoalleviateoverpopulationinthepolisorcity,establishingacolonyelsewhereprovidedapracticalsolutiontoapressingproblem.

MichaelConnorandMereteBorchdenythatthereisevidenceofanybodyofopinionthatregardedindigenouslandsasterra nullius.Connor simplyrejectsinternationaljuristicandphilosophicalopinionashavingnolegalsubstanceandirrelevanttohisclaimthatthetermitselfwasnotusedbygovernmentofficersandsettlersintheeighteencenturyorbefore.28Tosaythatithasnolegalsubstance,however, is tooverstatethecase.MichaelConnoraccusesHenryReynolds,29aleadingproponentofthe terra nullius thesis,offabricatingthedoctrineonthegroundsthatithadnobasisinBritishnorEuropeanlaw,andthathisuseofVatteltosubstantiatehiscasewasillegitimateinthatVattelwas“notmakinguprulesoflawformentofollow,hewasawriter,apublicist,atheorist”.30MereteBorchhassuggestedthat“itisdifficulttoseethatanyofthefrequentlyquotedinternationaljuristsprovidedargumentationforseeingindigenouslandasterra nullius eitherduringtheeighteenthcenturynorbeforeit”.31Thisview,Ithink,ismistaken.

Connor’s criticism assumes an excessively positivistic conception ofinternational law, and Borch’s is simply contrary to the evidence. The law ofnations, or ius gentium, was not a law enacted by an international legislaturenorwasitenforcedininternationalcourts;itwaslegalinthesensethatitwasinferredfromtheacceptedpracticeof“civilised”statesaseitherdirectlyderivativefromthenaturallaworfrominternationalcustom,butalsofromtheopinionsof learned theologians,philosophers and jurists. Itwasa law that comprisedacuriousamalgamofmoral,politicaland legalarguments in the justificationofstateandindividualpractice.

Therewasnodoubtingitsexistence,asSuarezsuggests,becauseit“isassumedbyallauthoritiestobeanestablishedfact,orsowegatherfromtheirveryfrequentuseof

27 Stuart Banner, “Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in EarlyAustralia”,Law and History Review,23(2005):1.

28 MichaelConnor,The Invention of Terra Nullius: Historical and Legal Fictions on the Foundation of Australia(Sydney,2003),p.4.

29 HenryReynolds,The Law of the Land(Ringwood,Melbourne,1992).30 Connor,The Invention of TerraNullius,pp.23and25.31 Merete Borch, “Rethinking the Origins of Terra Nullius”, Australian Historical

Studies,117(2001):232.


theterm”.32Oneofitsdistinguishingfeaturesisthatitsprecepts“arenotestablishedinwrittenform”and“itconsequentlydiffersinthisrespectfromallwrittencivillaw,evenfromthatimperiallawwhichisapplicabletoall”.33Furthermore,thelawofnationsdiffersfromnaturallawinthatthelatteristrulyuniversal,commontoallpeoplesandacceptedbyeveryone.Thelawofnaturecanfailtobeobservedonlybythoseinerror.Itmaynot,however,alwaysbeobservedbyallnations,andwhatisconsideredbysometobethelawofnationsmaynotbeconsideredsobyothers,andtherefore“without fault fail tobeobserved”.34AsSamuelRachelmaintains,“thelawofnationsisemployedasacommonbondofobligation;andpeoplesofdifferentformsofgovernmentandofdifferentsizelieunderthecontroloftheserules,whichdependfortheirefficacyuponmutualgoodfaith”.35

It is incontrovertible that the authorities on the Law of Nations generallyacknowledged a right, to the occupation of unoccupied lands, and in someinstances even if the lands were under the eminent domain of a recognizablesovereign.ThebasicpremiseamongjuristsandphilosophersintheearlymodernperiodregardingpropertyrightswasthatGodgavethewholeworldincommonto mankind, and those portions that remained unoccupied or uncultivated,whichdidnotnecessarilymeanuponwhichnopeopleresided,wereavailableforlegitimateoccupation.

Vitoria,Ayala,Suarez,Gentile,Locke,WolffandVattel,forexample,contendthatpeoplehaveanobligationtocultivatetheland,andiftheydonottheyhavenorighttopreventthosewhowould.AlthoughVitoriadidnotassuchdisagreewiththedoctrine,hedeniedthatmerediscovery,iusinventionis,wasalegitimateclaimtoownership.Occupationof land forhim isamannerofappropriatingterritorythathasnoowner, that is, illa quae sunt deserta, quod in nullius bonis est.36Forhim,undernatural law, allmenoriginallyhada right to everything.BecauseofGod’spremonitionofMan’ssinfulness,Hemadeprovisionforprivatepropertyinpermissivenaturallawinsofarasmencouldcometogetherandagreethat“YoutakethisandyouthisandIwillhavethis”.37VitoriawasinnodoubtthattheAmericanIndianshadownershiprightsandthatnotalltheirlandwasres nullius.Res nullius isnotanexactequivalentofterra nullius.Theformerrefers

32 FranciscoSuarez,Selections from Three Works,translationofthe1621editionbyGwladysL.Williams,AmmiBrownand JohnWaldron (Washington,1944),Book II,chap.XVII,§1,p.325.

33 Suarez,Selections from Three Works,BookII,chap.XIX,§6,p.345.34 Suarez,Selections from Three Works,BookII,chap.XIX,§2,p.342.35 Rachel,Law of Nations,Diss.II,§I,p.157.36 Coleman Phillipson, “Franciscus A Victoria (1480–[15]46) International Law

andWar”,Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation,NewSer.,15/2(1915):148.37 CitedinBrianTierney,“PermissiveNaturalLawandProperty:GratiantoKant”,

Journal of the History of Ideas,62(2001):389.


toitemsingeneralwithoutanowner,suchasbuffaloroamingtherange,whicharecommontoeveryone,ortothingsthatcannotbeowned,suchastheairwebreatheortheoceanswesail.

BalthazarAyalacontendsthatundernaturallaw,inprimitivetimes,allthingswere in common and no individual owned anything. Community of goods,however,didnotsuitman’sdebasednature.Natural reason informedthe lawofnations thata systemofprivatepropertywasrequiredtomitigate thesinfulnessofmortals.38Suarez,usingIsidore’sEtymologies (Bk.V,chap.vi),contendsthatius gentium,or thenatural law,confersupon individuals the right tooccupyplacesnotpreviouslyoccupiedbyothers.39AlbericoGentili(1552–1608),startingfromthepremise that humanity comprises a universal society, claimingTacitus as anauthority, and developing an idea from Thomas More’s Utopia, concluded thatexiles fromtheirowncountrieswereentitled,outofnecessity, towageoffensivewarsintheirquestforhabitableterritory,andthatvacantlandsmaybecolonisedbypeoplewhoneedthemfortheirownuse.Unoccupiedlandbelongstonooneandthosewhotakeithavearighttodoso.Natureabhorsavacuum.UndertheruleofSpain,heargues,almostallof theNewWorldremainsunoccupied.Theimplicationwasthattherighttooccupyitbymeansofpossessionwasstillvalid.40

Wolff confirms that uninhabited landsmaybe colonised and appropriatedbecausetheyarethepropertyofnoone.Thenationappropriatingthevacantlandacquirespropertyrightstoitandsovereigntyoverit.UnlikeLocke,forexample,heacknowledgesownershipandsovereigntybynationsoverthelandstheyoccupy,evenifthoselandsarewasteandbarren.Nevertheless,sinceeverynationshouldperfectitscondition,suchlandthatlaysvacantshouldbegiventoforeigners.41

Vattelsuggeststhat“Everynationisobligedbythelawofnaturetocultivatethelandthathasfallentoitsshare”,andthat“Thecultivationofthesoil…is…anobligationimposedbynatureuponman”.42Thelandwouldsimplynotfeeditsinhabitantsifitwereallowedtolayvacant.Itmayhavebeenallrightinprimitive

38 BalthazarAyala,On the Law of War And on Duties Connected with War And on Military Discipline,[1582],trans.JohnPawleyBate(WashingtonD.C.,1912),BookII,chap.v,[16],p.41

39 FranciscoSuarez,Selections from Three Works,translationofthe1621editionbyGwladysL.Williams,AmmiBrownandJohnWaldron(Washington,1944),p.837.

40 AlbericoGentili,De Iure Belli Libre Tres, translationof theeditionof1612byJohnC.Rolfe,andintroducedbyColemanPhillipson(Oxford,1933),BookI,chap.xvii,p.81[131–2].

41 ChristianWolff,The Law of Nations Treated According to Scientific Method in which the Natural Law of Nations is carefully distinguished from that which is voluntary, stipulative and customary [1764], trans. Joseph H. Drake, with an introduction by O. Nippold(Oxford,1934),chap.III,§275–§292,pp.40–152.

42 Vattel,The Law of Nations,BookI,chap.vii,§81,p.129.


timestolivethelifeofhuntingandgathering,butnowthatthepopulationhasgreatlyincreasedeachnation“isobligedbythelawofnaturetocultivatethelandthathasfallentoitsshare”.43

There was a distinction to be made, then, between the use of the land byAmerican Indians and ownership, between occupation and possession. EventhoughthiswasnotthewidespreadpracticeinAmerica,itneverthelessinformedthefamousJohnson v. M’Intoshdecision,whichwasitselfevidentiallysupportedwith reference to the authorities on the law of nations. It is a widespreadmisperception that Europeans refused to acknowledge Indian land rights,a myth perpetuated by the classic Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823) ruling by ChiefJusticeJohnMarshalltotheeffectthat,becausetheEnglishhadnotrecognisedtheIndiansaspropertyowners,neithershouldtheUnitedStates.44Infact,therewaswidespreadacknowledgmentofIndianpropertyrights,oftenforthebenefitof the settlers who ruthlessly exploited them, rather than from any altruisticmotivesormoralconscience.Evenwhenlandrightsweregrantedtoindigenouspeoples,governmentsfeltlittlecompunctioninseizingthemiftheirvaluebecamereassessed.

Prior to this decision, however, perception had already deviated from thefact.ItcametobeawidespreadbeliefthatIndianswerehunter-gathers,andforcenturiesthelawofnationshadnotacknowledgedthattheyownedthelandonwhichtheyhunted.Indeed,ifagriculturalistssettledonthesameland,itwastheywhoweredeemeditsowners.45

InGrotius’sview,forexample,Godhadgiventheworldtomanincommon,butalsomadeprovisionfortheacquisitionofpropertythroughindividuallabourandindustryas longasthisacquisitionconformedtotwoprimaryconditions,or natural laws. These were, first, that everyone may use common thingswithoutcausingharmtoothers,andsecondthateveryonebecontentwithhisportionandabstainfromcovetinganother’s.46ForGrotiusthere isadifferencebetween“occupation”(occupation) and“ownership”(dominium).Occupationisa natural right that pertains to self-preservation. There is a rudimentary formof private property, in owning one’s body, for example, and that extends totheappropriationof thingssuchas fruitandanimals forpreservingthatbody.“Ownership”(dominium) isaninstitutioncreatedbycivilsocietyandistheresultofagreement.

43 Vattel,The Law of Nations, BookI,chap.vii,§81,p.35.44 StuartBanner,How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier

(London,2005),p.11.45 Banner,How the Indians Lost Their Land,p.168.46 Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, trans. Richard Hakluyt, with an introduction by

DavidArmitage(Indianapolis,2004),p.6.


Various legal cases, including Johnson versus M’Intosh (1823) in theUnitedStates, served to reinforce the distinction between occupation and ownership.TheyreaffirmedthebeliefthatwhenJohnCabbotdiscoveredandsymbolicallyoccupied North America in 1497, he delivered full proprietary title to HenryVIIandthenativeseitherbecametrespassersorattainedsomeothertitle.They,and other aboriginals, were deemed licensees of the Crown, allowed rights ofoccupancyonsufferance,butnotofownershipunlessexplicitlygivensuchtitlebytheCrown.47TheimplicationisanaffirmationofGrotius’spoint.IftheCrownorgovernmentconferredlandrights,thenthoserightsqualifythemforprotectionbythelegalsystemjustastherightsofanyotherAmerican,CanadianorAustralianwhoderivedhistitlesfromthegovernmentorCrown.Whattheideaofvacantland effectivelymeantforGrotiuswasthatproprietaryorownershiprightsweredeemedtohavevalidityonlywithinthecontextofasystemoflaw.

There was a distinction to be made, then, between the use of the land byAmericanIndiansandownership,betweenoccupationandpossession.ThomasHobbes(1588–1679),althoughlessfulsomeinhisdiscussion,subscribedtotheviewofMore,GentiliandGrotiusthatthelandsoftheAmericaswereplentifulenough to accommodate a people that was still increasing in population andneededtoexpandintonewterritories.Thisdidnotgivesettlersarighttomassacrethenatives,buttheycouldconstrainthemtoliveclosertogether.48

The idea of wasteland was to figure prominently in Locke’s justificationof acquisition. The fact that the land was deemed empty was justification foroccupancy,butoccupancyinitselfdidnot,intheeyesofmanyapologists,givesufficientgroundsfortitleorownership.AswithGrotius,occupancyforLockehadtobeequatedwithpossession.Theprincipleofappropriatingwasteterritoriesthereforeneededtobesupplementedwithatheoryofpropertythatestablishedamoraltitletotheownershipofland.Vattelwasalsoquiteclearthatoccupancywasnotenough:“Thelawofnationswill,therefore,notacknowledgethepropertyandsovereigntyofanationoveranyuninhabitedcountries,exceptthoseofwhichithas really takenactualpossession, inwhich ithas formed settlements,orofwhichitmakesactualuse”.49

Various strategies were adopted to effect opportunities of appropriationandownership.CharlesMillsarguesthatwhitesettlers joinedinexpropriationcontracts,whichcreatedsocieties,withtheclearimplicationthatnosocietyhadpreviouslyexisted.50JamesTullyhasarguedthatEuropeantheoriesofproperty

47 Geoffrey Lester, Inuit Territorial Rights in the Canadian Northwest Territories(Canada,PublishedbyTungavikFederationofNunavut,1984),p.3.

48 ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,ed.RichardTuck(Cambridge,1991),p.239.49 EmerVattel,The Law of Nations, ed.RichardWhatmore (Indianapolis,2008),

BookI,chap.xviii,§208,p.215.50 CharlesW.Mills,The Racial Contract(Ithica,1997),pp.13,24and49–50.


aftersettlementservedtomisrecognisethesystemsofpropertyandthepoliticalorganizations of the aboriginal peoples they encountered.51 Carole PatemanextendstheseideastotalkaboutaspecificformofCharlesMill’sexpropriationcontract.Thisshecallsthe“settlercontract”,amongwhoseprincipalcomponentsaretherighttohusbandryandtheestablishmentofsovereigntywherethenativeswere deemed insufficiently organized and civilized to conceive of, let aloneexercise,it.Onthestrictlogicofthesettlercontractnativeswereexcluded,asinAustralia,oronthemodifiedlogicwereaffordedcertainconcessionaryrightsandpartiallyaccommodated,asinAmericaunderEnglishsettlement.52

Wheretherewasarecognisablesocialstructureandsystemofauthority–andthis,ofcourse,neverwentuncontested,irrespectiveofreligion–thepeoplesweredeemedtohavethesamerightsanddutiesundernaturallawasEuropeans.Fromthispointofviewtheuniversalityofthenaturallaw,andofnaturalrights,appearstoworkforthebenefitofindigenouspeopleswhoconformedtouniversal(thatis, to European) standards of social and political relations. The application ofnaturallaw,andthelawofnations,uniquelytheproductofthewesternpoliticalexperience,wereconceivedasuniversal,localvariationsonwhich,atleastintermsoffundamentalbeliefs,wereregardedasviolations.

Natural law and natural rights were the universal standards employed byEuropeanstojudgewhattheyencounteredandtoarriveatanswerstothemostfundamentalofquestions.Therecouldbenoexceptionstotheserationaluniversalstandards, but there might be mitigating circumstances, such as invincibleignorance,thatmadesomeinitialjudgmentslesssevere.FewEuropeanswouldhavedeniedthattherewerenaturalrights,andthatallhumanshadthembythemerefactofbeinghuman:whatwasatissuewaswhethertheAmericanIndiansmetthequalifications,orfellshortinsomeway,ofbeingfullyhuman.Iftheyqualified,thenlikeeveryhumantheypossessednaturalrightsandparticipatedintheuniversalcommunityofhumankind.This,however,wasadoubled-edgedsword.FarfromofferingtheAmericanIndiansunqualifiedprotectionsagainstviolationsbyEuropeans,itpresentedasetofcriteriafromwhichdeviationconstitutedajustcauseforwar,duringwhichmanyoftheserightswereinabeyance.Thereweredisputesastothecircumstancesthatgaverisetojustcause,oraboutpracticesthatinvitedwhatwewouldnowcallhumanitarianintervention,butfewwouldarguethattherewerenoconditionsthatcouldnotgiverisetothejustifiableacquisitionofterritoriesanddominionintheAmericasontheprincipleofthenaturalrightofterra nullius orongroundsofviolationsofnaturalrightsbytheIndiansagainsttheirownpeoplesoragainstEuropeans.

51 James Tully, “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a MiddleGround”,Social Philosophy and Policy,11(1999):158.

52 CarolePatemanandCharlesMills,Contract and Domination(Cambridge,2007).


TheappearanceoftheuniversalismofnaturalrightswasunderminedinpracticebywhatamountedtoanimpositionofEuropeanChristianstandardsofconductandrationality.Fundamentally,FranciscoVitoria’sarguments,forexample,restuponuniversalrights,whichtakepriorityoverthoseofspecificcommunities,thecontraventionofwhichjustifiably legitimates interventionbyaforeignstatetorestorerightsandpunishtheperpetratorsofthewrong.Indeed,VitoriabelievedinauniversalcommunitythatwasnotmerelyconfinedtoChristians.Eachstatehasarightandalegalobligationtocompelroguestatestoconformtointernationallaw and to the customary lawof the societa gentium.Vitoria assumed thatnotonly Christians, but also the American Indians, could discover natural law bytheexerciseof right reason,and that justas theSpanishwereobliged toact inacorrespondingmanner, so too theyhad the right toexpect the Indians todolikewise.The laudable intention to constrainheavily armedSpanish soldiers intheir relations with native Indians by reference to the natural law broke downultimatelywhentheIndiansactedinamanneratvariancewiththatlaw,asVitoriaconceived it.53 The gospels (Mark 16: 15) command Christians to spread thewordthroughouttheworld,andiftheIndiansobstructedthem,orpunishedtheconverted,theSpaniards“maytakeuparmsanddeclarewaronthem,insofarasthisprovidesthesafetyandopportunityneededtopreachtheGospel”.54

Inaddition,despitethevariationsinthedefinitionofthelawofnationsanditsrelationtothelawofnature,oneaspectofthatlaw,atleast,wasbasedupontheusageorcustomof“civilised”states,andtowhichallothernationsweresubjectirrespectiveofexhibitingsignsofconsent.Aslateas1680,Textor,invokingtheexampleoftheAmericanIndiansandAfricansoftheCapeofGoodHope,arguedthat“iftherebeapeoplesowildandinhumaneastolivewithoutLaw,TheLawofNations,whichReasondictatesandUsageaffirms,isnotonthataccountanythelesstheLawofNations”.55

Byapplyingtheuniversalstandardsofnaturallawandthelawofnations,eventhoughthismayhaveprotectedtheIndiansfromsomeadverseconsequencesongroundsofinvincibleignorance,justificationscouldbegivenforwagingwaragainstthem.Ifcertainoftheirinternalsocietalarrangements,suchashumansacrificeandcannibalism,wereanaffronttohumanity,interventiontosaveinnocentvictimscouldbejustified.Evenwheresuchaffrontswerenotacknowledged,transgressingthelawofnationsprovidedampleexcuse.Impedimentstotherightsofpassage,attemptstopreventtheappropriationof“vacantland”oracquiregoldfromthegroundthattheworldheldincommon,gavejustcauseforwar.Sepúlvedawentasfarastoarguethatifnaturalslaves,suchastheIndians,resistedthenatural

53 JamesTurner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton,1981),p.77.

54 Vitoria,Political Writings,Q3,Article2,§9–§11,pp.284–5.55 JohannWolfgangTextor,Synopsis of the Law of Nations,I,3.


dominionoftheirsuperiors,theygavegroundsforjustwaragainstthemwithnomoreinjusticethanonewouldhuntdownawildandsavagebeast.56

The Right to Husbandry and the Duty of Cultivation

There is anaspectofCarolePateman’s“SettlerContract” thatdeserves furtherexplorationandonwhich thecontinuinggroundingofobligation inGodhassignificantbearing:therighttohusbandrywiththeassociatedissuesofpropertyrights.Thereisnodoubt,aswehaveseen,thatsucharighthasstrongsupportinthelawofnationsthatcompriseselementsofnaturallaw,thecustomarypracticeofstates,theopinionsofphilosophersandjurists,andcaselaw.

To focus upon husbandry as a right, however, is to imply that the nativeshadaduty to allow settlement (from thepointof viewof the settlers) and togiveuplandsthatwerevacantornotfullyused.Thiscorrelationiscertainlytobefoundincommentariesonthelawofnationsandnature.Locke’sinfluentialargumentisemphatic:ifAmericanIndiansattempttosubjectEuropeanstotheirsystemofrules,ordenythemtherighttohusbandry,itistheywhohaveviolatednaturallawandgivenjustcauseforwar,inwhichcasetheinjuredpartiesmaypunishthetransgressorsandseekreparations.Inconditionsofwartheinjuredmayjustifiably“destroy”theviolatorsas“dangerousandnoxiousCreatures”bentthemselvesondestruction.57

TheemphasisofbothTullyandPatemanupontherightofhusbandryorofcultivationneverthelesshidesfromview,orattheveryleastobscures,themorefundamentalmoraljustificationforappropriatingnativelands.Itistheapplicationofauniversalprinciple,againstwhichsavagesandbarbariansarefoundwanting.Itisaprinciplederivedfromthenaturallaw,anddeeplyingrainedintheChristianreligion.ItisthedutyimposedbyGoduponhumanityofself-preservationthatrequiresmakingtheearthproductiveandbountiful.Themoreefficientlythisisdonethebetter.Tooptimiseproductivityofthesoilandfulfilman’sdutytoGodrequires thedevelopmentof techniquesof cultivation, and just as importantlytheestablishmentofcivilsocietyorsovereignty,toensuregoodgovernanceandsecurityinordertoprotectcitizensfromharmandtoallowthemtocultivatethelandinsafety.

Tojudgeindigenouspeoplesagainsttheuniversalobligationtocultivateorexploitthelandtoitsoptimummeantthattheyfellshortoftheirmoraldutyinanumberofrespects.Huntersandgatherersweredeemedtobemerelyparasitic

56 LewisHanke,Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World(Bloomington,1959),p.45.

57 JohnLocke,Two Treatises of Government,ed.PeterLaslett(Cambridge,1988),II,§§10–11and§16.


ontheland.Thoughrudimentaryagriculturethatexhaustedthenutrientsinthesoil and required abandoning one location for another fulfilled the obligationtoagreaterdegree,itstillfellfarshortofefficientexploitation.Thuscultivationbecomestheonlyrecognisedformoflabourthatfulfilsthereligiousobligation.It is the fact that land is not cultivated that makes it no man’s land, not thefactthattherearenopeopleonit.Inotherwords,acertaintypeoflabourwasdeemed synonymous with civilization. This deeply and long held convictionwasexpressedwithoutanycompunctionbyThomasArnold(1795–1842), theheadmasterofRugbySchool:“somuchdoestherightofpropertygoalongwithlabourthatcivilizednationshaveneverscrupledtotakepossessionofcountriesinhabitedonlybytribesofsavages–countrieswhichhavebeenhunted over butneversubduedorcultivated”.HegoesontosuggestthatthehuntinggroundsoftheAmericanIndiansbelongedtonoone,andintakingthemEnglishmenweresimplyexercising“arightwhichGodhasinseparablyunitedwithindustryandknowledge”.58

Locke’stheoryofprivatepropertyinthestateofnaturedoesnotrequirethecontextof civil society. In addition toGrotius’sprimitive formofproperty, inwhicheachhastherighttothefruitheorshepicks,andoftheanimalshuntedandkilled,Lockewantstogofurtherandestablishownershipofland.TheproblemwashowtodothiswithoutconcedingthattheAmericanIndiansalreadyownedtheland.Thedeviceheusedwastoemployaveryrestricteddefinitionoflabour.

Locke’ssubtleshiftfromownershipofthingstoownershipoflandisnothingshortofmasterly.Hunter-gatherers,deep-seafishermen,bakersorcraftsmeninthestateofnatureareentitledtowhattheyhavekilled,gatheredormade.Land,however, is adifferentmatter.Not all labour generates aproperty title.Lockerecounts that the curseplaceduponAdamrequiredmen to labourbecauseoftheirimpoverishedanddestitutecondition.59Onlysustainedlabouryieldsthefullpotentialofthefruitsoftheearth.Neithermereoccupationnorappropriation(thatis.takingpossession)countsassustainedlabour.

Lockeingeniouslyrestrictslabourandownershiptothattypeofactivitywhichisassociatedwithcultivation.Hearguesthat“As much LandasamanTills,Plants,Improves,Cultivates,andcanusetheProductof,somuchishisProperty”.60Inordertosecureapropertytitle,then,itisnotenoughtoroamoveruncultivatedland,engageinhuntingandgathering,ortograzeone’ssheeponit.Lockedoesnotstophere.Notonlyisprivatepropertyanentitlementofthespecialtypeof

58 ThomasArnold,‘TheLabourersofEngland’,Englishman’s Register,No.6,11June,1831,p.157.

59 Locke,Two Treatises, I,pp.144–5.60 Locke, Two Treatises, II, § 32, pp. 290–91. Cf. JeremyWaldron, God, Locke,

and Equality: Christian Foundation in Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge,2002),pp.164–70.


labourhecallscultivation;Lockealsowants tomakethemuchstrongerclaimthatthereisamoralobligationtoengageinlabour.Mixingone’slabourinthelandby,forexample,enclosures,plantingtreesandcropsfallsfarshortofwhatLockeintendedtoconvey.Hewantstosaythatweareobligedtodeveloplandtoitsgreatestproductivecapacity.Asindustriousandrationalcreatures,menweregiventheworldbyGod“fortheirbenefit.AndthegreatestConveniencesofLifetheywerecapabletodrawfromit”.61

Byimplication,theAmericanIndians,andanypeopleswhofailtocultivatethelandtoitsfullproductivecapacity,failedtoexhibittheindustriousnessandrationalityrequiredofthembyGodandhadnogoodreasonsforobjectingtothosewhoaremorecapableoffulfillingGod’swill.Locke’sargumentprovidedthephilosophicalgroundsforthecontentionthattheBritishhadjustasmuchrighttosettle“wasteland”asthosewholivedontherebutmerelyroamedoverit.InlandinginAustralia,forexample,theBritishsimplyexercisedarightthattheyheldincommonwithAboriginals,andofwhichtheAboriginalssingularlyhadfailedtoavailthemselves.62

Formostoftheeminentwritersonthenaturallawandlawofnations,nativepeoples,were thereforemorallyderelict in fulfilling theirobligationtoGodtomaketheearthbountifulandtoestablishcivilsocietiessoastoensureefficientexploitation of the soil. Locke, for instance, admonishes hunter gathers forproducingonehundredthorevenonethousandthoftheproductsforcommodiousliving that their European counterparts produce. Europeans use one tenth, orevenonehundredth, less land thanAmerican Indians toproduce the sameorequivalentproducts.63

Vattelwasnotsospecificinquantifyingtheextenttowhichnativepeoplesfellshortoftheirobligation,buthewasequallyadmonishing:“Everynationthenisobligedbythelawofnaturetocultivatethelandthathasfallentoitsshare”,andthosewhichdonot“have,therefore,noreasontocomplain,ifothernations,more industrious and tooclosely confined, come to takepossessionofpartofthoselands”.64

Strategieswerepragmatic, of course, and theuse of the idea ofwasteland,terra nullius, was one such strategy to take possession of lands that were notunder cultivation. Even Māori, who were deemed to occupy a higher level ofcivilizationthantheAustralianAboriginal,andweredesignatedagriculturalists,acknowledged to own the land they cultivated and (unlike the Australian

61 Locke,Two Treatises, II,§34,p.291.Cf.HermanLebovics,“TheUsesofAmericainLocke’sSecondTreatiseofGovernment”,Journal of the History of Ideas,47(1986):577.

62 SeeStuartBanner,How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier(London,2005),p.20.

63 Locke,Two Treatises, II,§§40–42.64 Vattel,Law of Nations, BookI,chap.vii,§81,pp.129–30.


Aboriginals) were credited with a capacity to alienate it, nevertheless failed tomeettheconditionsnecessaryforthefullexerciseoftheuniversalrightsenjoyedby civilized nations. The Māori, and American Indian farmers, were thoughtrudimentaryagriculturalistswhohadnotdevelopedplough technology.Whenthesoilwasexhausted,theymovedontonewlands.Thefactthattheywerenothunterswasusedbymanytotheoppositeeffectfromwhatonewouldexpect,namelyinordertoarguethatsuchpeoplesdidnotneedasmuchlandashuntergatherersoverwhichtoroaminsearchofgame,andthattheirproprietaryrightsshouldberestrictedtothatlandwhichtheyactuallycultivatedandnotextendedtothatwhichtheyclaimed.65

Political Society and Sovereignty

Whetherornotindigenouspeopleswereacknowledgedtohaveprivatepropertyrightswastosomeextentsecondarytotheissueofwhethertheyhadthecollectiveright of sovereignty. Even though Indians entered into so called treaties, sucharrangementsneverhadthefullimprimaturofinternationallaw.

ItwasarguedbyLockethattheobligationstoGodofself-preservationandofcultivatingtheearth,inordertomakeitmoreproductiveandconducivetoself-preservation,arebetterdischargedwithinapoliticalsociety.TheimplicationofLocke’s arguments is that theAmerican Indians fell far short of adequatelydischargingtheirobligationstoGod.Theystilllivedoutsidepoliticalsocietyina state ofnature and they failed to add to the common stockofmankindbyimprovingtheproductivityoftheland.Insodoing,theyhadnoclaimonvastterritoriesintheAmericasthat“lie waste”.66 Locke’swasnottheonlyview.Grotiusmakes the distinction between property and jurisdiction. Jurisdiction remainswiththe“ancientnation”evenwhenstrangersjustifiablylayclaimtowasteland.Pufendorf ’spositionwasthatnationsexerciseeminentdomain,orsovereignty,evenoverthosetractsoflandthatappearto“liewaste”,andtheseizureofsuchlandsisthereforecontrarytothelawsofnatureandnations,apositionostensiblyendorsed by Christian Wolff.67 Wolff contended that the original position of

65 Mark Hickford, “‘Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages on the Globre’: AnApproach to the Intellectual History of Māori property Rights, 1837–53”, History of Political Thought, xxvii (2006): 123. Further evidence that the central idea to focusuponisthefailuretoexploitthepotentialproductivecapacityofthelandisthefactthatthisargumentwasusedtojustifyEuropeantrusteeshipinAfricainthelatterpartofthenineteenthcentury.SeeWilliamBain,Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power(Oxford,2003),p.62.

66 JohnLocke,Two Treatise,II,§38,p.295.67 Wolff,Law of Nations, chap.VII,§866.


land in common was modified by families or communities jointly coming toholdterritoryasaproprietaryright.Theuseofthelandmadenodifferencetoownership.Landbelongingtosuchfamiliesorcommunitiescannotbetakenoroccupiedbyotherscomingintotheterritory.68 Thosewhooccupythesovereigntyof a territory also exercise eminent domain over property and persons.69 ThiswouldseemtoimplythatNativeAmericansownedandhadsovereigntyoverthelandstheyoccupy.ForLocke,theystilllivedinastateofnature.Justasearliertheorists tried todisqualifyAmerican Indians on grounds of their lacking fullhumanattributes,orbecauseoftheirsinfulness,orbecausetheyengagedinthewrongsortoflabour,Wolffappliesstringentcriteriaforwhatconstitutesanation.Hearguesthat“itdenotesanumberofmenwhohaveunitedintoacivilsociety,sothatthereforenonationcanbeconceivedofwithoutacivilsovereignty.Forgroupsofmendwellingtogetherincertainlimitsbutwithoutcivilsovereigntyarenotnations”.70ForAdamSmith,nationsofhunter-gatherers,whosesocietycouldnotsustainormaintainanarmyforself-defence,couldproperlybeconsideredneitheracommonwealthnorsovereign.71

In practice even when it was acknowledged that native peoples exercisedownershiprights,thecolonisingcountrylaidclaimtotherightsofeminentdomainanddeniedsovereigntytonativepeoplesonthegroundsofconquestorsecession.Even where the natural right of individuals to property was acknowledged,communityrightsunderthelawofnationsweredeniedbecausetheindigenouspeopleswerenotdeemedfullysovereignnations.Indeed,althoughtreatiespaidlipservicetoIndiansovereignty,therewasnosuggestionofequality.DuringtheeighteenthcenturyintheAmericas itbecamecommonpracticeamongBritishofficials to acknowledge the land rights of the Indianswhile emphasizing thatsovereigntyhadbeen ceded.72 JosephStory articulates theprinciplewellwhenhecommentedontheIndiansthat“Asinfidels,heathens,andsavages,theywerenot allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign andindependentnations”.73ChristianWolff,forexample,confirmsthatuninhabitedlandsmaybe colonised and appropriatedbecause they are theproperty of noone.Thenationappropriatingthevacantlandacquirespropertyrightsinitand

68 AlsoseeBorch,“RethinkingtheOriginsofTerra Nullius”,p.234.69 Wolf,Law of Nations,chap.VII,§866.70 Wolff,Law of Nations, chap.III,§309,pp.156–67.71 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

VolumesIand2(TheGlasgowEditionoftheWorks&CorrespondenceofAdamSmith),(Indianapolis,1976),p.690.

72 SeeBorch,“RethinkingtheOriginsofTerra Nullius”,p.229.73 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States with a

Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States Before the Adoption of the Constitution(Boston,1833),Book1,chap.XVI,§152).


sovereigntyoverit.Heacknowledgesownershipandsovereigntybynationsoverthe lands they occupy, even if those lands arewaste andbarren.Nevertheless,sinceeverynationshouldperfectitscondition,suchvacantlandshouldbegiventoforeigners.74

Conclusion

Mostofthegreatearlymodernandenlightenmentphilosophers,whoarehailedaschampionsofreasonandliberalism,werecomplicitintheuseofuniversalstandardstodispossesspeoples of their lands, oppress them,deny them sovereignty andcondemnthemtopermanentexclusionfromtheinternationalsocietyofnations.It was an exaggeration to contend that the American Indians did not engagein agriculture. Colonists frequently reported agricultural activity throughouteasternNorthAmerica,anditwaswellknownthatpartsofwhatisnowNorthCarolina had extensive cultivated fields. It was the growing acknowledgementthatIndians farmedthe landthatcontributedtotherecognitionof theirrighttoproperty.75Whether indigenouspeoplesweredeemed toown the landoverwhichthey“roamed”,orwhethertheymerelyhadauserightincommon,theywerenotdeemedtohaveentered intoasocialcontractamongthemselvesandwerethereforenotdeemedtohaveinstitutedsovereignpoliticalsocieties.Theseargumentswere almost invariably sustainedby invoking the authority ofGodwhoobligesustoconformtothenaturallaw,whichincludescultivatingthelandtoitsproductivecapacity.

74 Wolff,chap.III,§§275–92,pp.140–52.75 Banner,How the Indians Lost Their Land,p.38.

Chapter5TamingtheFoxandtheLion–Some

AspectsoftheSixteenth-Century’sDebateonInter-StateRelations1

PeterSchröder

AttheendofthesixteenthcenturyAlbericoGentiliwasperhapsthefirstpoliticalthinker who fully realised that the fundamental problem of the relationshipbetweensovereignstateswasthattheverynatureoftheirsovereigntyseemedtoundermineanypacificationofthisanarchicalsociety.AftertheCouncilofTrent(1545–63)hadfailedtoreuniteChristianity,2politicsinEuropeandbeyondwerenever to be the same, and any pacification of inter-state relations had to takeintoaccounttheexistenceofantagonistictheologiesandtheapparentlymutuallyexclusiveconfessions.Anybasisofuniversallyacceptedreligiousprinciples,evenamongChristianstates,seemedimpossible.Moreover,theimplicationsoftheseantagonisticpositionsunderminedtheargumentsabout legitimate sovereignty.Gentili,however,challengedthejustificationsofreligiousstrife,andoneaimofhis,De Iure Belli (1598),maycertainlybeseenintheattempttobanishreligionfromtheinternationalsceneasareasonforgoingtowar.InhisDe Legationibus (1585)hehadalreadywarned:“let sovereignsbecarefulof theiractionswhenthey use the pretext of religion in dealing with embassies”.3Clearly, more wasneededthansuchasimpleappealtopoliticalrulers.Itwastrulyanimmensetasktodenyreligiontheprominenceitcommandedasareasonforconflictinthelate

1 IwouldliketoexpressmyparticularthankstoOlafAsbach,NickJohnstoneandAngusGowland for theirhelpfulcommentsandcriticism. Ialsowant toacknowledgethesupportoftheBritishAcademy,whichenabledmetodonecessaryresearchontheHuguenotswhilstabroad.

2 The emperor Charles V aimed at uniting Christianity by means of a council,but when he eventually managed to bring it into existence, the Protestants refusedtheirparticipation.Thecouncilmet in threedifferent sessions,whichwere interruptedbecauseofconflictingEuropeanpolitics.ItwascrucialforreformingandregeneratingtheCatholicChurchandinauguratedtheCounter-Reformation.SeeJ.Bossy,“TheCounterReformationandthepeopleofCatholicEurope”,Past and Present47(1970):51–70;D.M.Luebke,The Counter-Reformation(Oxford,1999);M.Mullet,The Catholic Reformation(London,1999).A.D.,Wright,The Early Modern Papacy(Harlow,2000).

3 A.Gentili,Three Books on Embassies, ed.byG.J.Laing(NewYork,1924),p.91.


sixteenthcentury,giventhatamongChristianstatesallmajorconflictsseemedfuelledbyreligiouscontroversies.TheDutchRevoltagainsttheSpanishcrown,theFrenchwarsofreligionortheantagonismbetweenElizabethandPhilipII,areonlythemostprominentexamplesatthetimeGentiliwrotehismajorwork.

Thishumanistwaswell-readinthedifferentcurrentsofpoliticalphilosophy.Hewasnotonlyoneofthemostremarkablejuristsofhistime,butalsoequallyacquainted with the literature on reason of state, notably Machiavelli andGuicciardini.Furthermore,hewasclearlyalsowell-versedintheliteratureofFrenchpoliticalthought,whichhademergedinthecontextoftheHuguenots’struggleforrecognitionoftheirreformedfaith.AfterthemassacresofStBartholomew’sDay,thisliteraturehadconsiderablychangeditstoneandstrategy:theargumentnowexploredwhetherandtowhatextentresistancewaslegitimateevenagainstthemonarch.Themostnotoriousandwide-spreadargumentalong these lineswasadvocatedintheVindiciae contra Tyrannos(1579).

ThustheFrenchProtestantsthreatenedtoundermineGentili’stheoryfromaquarterwhichshouldhavebeenanaturalideologicalallytohisownposition,becausethe ideologicalandepistemologicalpositionsoftheHuguenotsshouldhavetalliedwellwithGentili’sownconvictionsinfavourofreligiousliberty.ThischapterwillarguethatGentiliperceivedthechangeofargumentinHuguenotpolitical writing as a menace to the European inter-state order. As has beenconvincingly shown by Diego Panizza, Gentili argued against, among others,the Dutch Protestant Justus Lipsius, who was involved in yet another of thedominant religious-political struggles for freedom of conscience and religioustoleration.4 Gentili denied the validity of Lipsius’ argument which, accordingtohim,culminated intheassertionthatreligiousunitywasessential forsocialcohesionandstability.Gentiliarguedonthecontrary that toenforcereligiousunitywasmoreareasonforseditionandstrifethanafactorofstability.ThusfarGentilishouldnothaveanyreasonforconcernregardingtheHuguenottheory.But after the St Bartholomew’s Day massacres, the Huguenot community feltbetrayedbytheFrenchCrown.Untilthisdramaticevent,despitesomedrasticrhetoric and the repeatedoutbreakofopencivilwar, theHuguenots’positionhadalwaysbeenthattheyneededtoaddressawrongwhichhadbeendonebyover-zealousadvisersoftheCrown,butnotbytheCrownitself.ItisimportanttostressthatthischangeintheHuguenotattitudewasprecededbygleefulCatholicpropagandaabout themassacres, suchas theanonymouslypublishedAllegresse chrestienne and Discours contre les Huguentoz. These aggressive anti-HuguenotwritingsweresecondedbysemiofficialpamphletsbyLegierduChesneorClaude

4 SeenotablyD.Panizza,“IlpensieropoliticodiAlbericoGentili.Religione,virtùeragiondistato”,inD.Panizza(ed.),Alberico Gentili Politica e religione nell’Età delle Guerre die Religione(Milan,2002),pp.57–213,esp.p.75andpp.88–9.

Taming the Fox and the Lion 85

Nouvelle,tonameonlytwootherauthors.5Thefundamentalchangeandobviousthreat topolitical stability inFrancewas arguably still perceivedbyGentili inthefactthattheVindiciae contra TyrannosandotherHuguenotpoliticalwritingsopenlydiscussedandendorsedresistanceagainstthemonarchy.6

Gentili’s attempt to provide a framework for and thus restrictions to thewars which threatened to tear Europe apart was fundamentally based on theconceptofsovereignstates,that istosay,theorderandstabilityofprincelyorrepublicangovernment.Anytheoryadvocatingresistanceagainstthefoundationsof government must therefore also undermine the attempt to organise inter-staterelationswithreferencetothisestablishedinner-stateorder.Itistruetosaythat “Gentili ... non possedeva compiutamente il concetto moderni sovranità,mamonstravaunchiarosensodelladistinzionedeidueordinidirealtà,quelladi interna e quella di internazionale”.7 I have argued elsewhere that the ideaof sovereign states poses a challenge to and at the same time the solution fororganisinginter-staterelationsinGentili’sview.8

5 Anonymous, Allegresse chrestienne de l’heureux succes des guerres de ce royaume (Paris,1772); Discours contre les Huguentoz, auquel est contenue et déclarée la source de leur damnable religion (Lyon, 1573). L. du Chesne, Exhortation au Roy, pour vertueusement poursivre ce que sagement il a commencé contre les Huguenots, avec les Epitaphes de Gaspar de Colligny etc.(Paris,1572);C.Nouvell,Ode trionfale au roy, sus l’equitable justice que sa majesté feit des rebelles, la veille et jour de sainct Loys(Paris,1572).SeeF.J.Baumgartner,Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League(Geneva,1975)andR.Birely,The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe(London,1990).

6 Cf.,forexample,anonymous,Remonstrance d’un bon Catholique françois aux trois estats de France(n.p.,1576).ThisgoodCatholicis,ofcourse,anythingbutagoodCatholic.Like the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos; the main thrust of the argument here claims thatMachiavelli’sodiousteachingsaretoblameforthemassacre.TheanonymouslypublishedDe furoribus Gallicis, horrenda et indigna amirallij Castillionei, nobilium atque illustrium virorum caede (Basle, 1573), which is now attributed to Hotman, argued in a similarvein.SeealsoF.deLaNoue,Discours politiques et militaires (Basle,1687).ParticularlyinstructiveontheStBartholomew’sDayMassacresareR.M.Kingdon,Myths about the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacres 1572–1576(Cambridge,Mass.,1988);A.Soman(ed.),The Massacre of St Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents(TheHague,1974).OntheFrenchWarsofReligionmoregenerally,seeM.Yardeni,La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion, 1559–1598 (Paris,1971);M.P.Holt,The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629(Cambridge,1995),andJ.H.M.Salmon,The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought(Oxford,1959).

7 D.Panizza,‘IlpensieropoliticodiAlbericoGentili’,p.158.8 TwoforthcomingpapersprepareandcomplementtheargumentIexploreinthis

chapter.


Theideaofaworldsovereignaspotentialarbiter,arolesuchasthePopehadindeedclaimedandassumedmostfamouslyintheTreatiseofTordesillasin1494,9woulddenytheverynotionofasovereignstateandwastherefore,onthisgeneralaccountalone,notafeasibleoption.Whereconflictsbetweenstatesensued,theprincipleof ipse-iudexwas inplace,andif theycouldnotbesolvedpolitically,warwouldnecessarilyensue.ForGentili“war”isthus“ajustandpubliccontestofarms”,andmore importantly thewarringpartiesare seenonanequal legalfooting.RightatthebeginningofchaptertwoofDe Iure Belli,wherehegiveshisdefinitionofwar,hestatesthat“hostisisapersonwithwhomwariswagedandwhoistheequalofhisopponent”.10

Hisassertionthat“itisthenatureofwarsforbothsidestomaintainthattheyaresupportingajustcause”11thuspaidtributetotheemergenceoftheconceptofsovereigntyandfundamentallychallengedandrevolutionisedtheclassicaljust-wartheory.Forhim,statesfightingeachotherasenemiesarethusbothmorallyandpoliticallyjustifiedinwagingwarinordertoobtaintheirpoliticalendsaslongastheyhaveajustcause.This,inanutshell,isthefirstaspectofhisargument,whichisofcoursewellknownandhasrightlyattractedattentionamongscholars.12

The focusofmyanalysisofGentiliwill beonwhatonemay consider thesecondaspectofhisargument,anditispreciselyherethattheHuguenotpoliticalwritings,andtheVindiciae contra Tyrannosinparticular,weremostunsettlingforGentili’sownposition.Needlesstosay,theintellectualengagementandideologicalchallengefoundinGentili’swritingsaremuchmorecomplexandmulti-layeredthanthefocusofmyanalysismightsuggest.Thefocusofthischapterisalreadycomplicatedenough,however,giventhattheshadowofMachiavelliloomslargeandsomewhatunspokenoverGentili’sendeavourtoargueagainsttheHuguenottheoryof resistancewithout at the same time abandoning religious toleration,andindeedtheProtestants’rightofcoexistenceinapoliticalworlddominatedbyCatholics.IntheprefaceoftheanonymouslypublishedVindiciae contra Tyrannos,therhetoricalploywastoaccusetheadvisersoftheFrenchCrownonceagainofplottingagainsttheHuguenots:

9 SeeF.deVitoria,“OntheAmericanIndies”,inVitoria, Political Writings,ed.byA.PagdenandJ.Lawrence(Cambridge,2003),p.285.

10 A.Gentili, The Three Books on the Law of War,ed.byJ.C.Rolfe(Oxford,1933),p. 12. See also Cicero, On Duties, ed. by M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge,2006),I–37,p.16.

11 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.31.12 C.Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum

Europeum (NewYork, 2003), p. 122, was perhaps the first modern scholar who drewattention to “the great advance of modern international law among European states”,whichhesawasconsisting“insubstitutingthedoctrineofthejuridicalequalityofjusti hostesforthedoctrineofjusta causa”.


You princes of men, I consider that these investigations [undertaken in theVindiciae contra Tyrannos]areabletocontradictboththeMachiavelliansandtheir books, by whose wicked counsels the commonwealth is divided by somanycivildissensions,factions,anddisturbances.13

TowhatextenttheVindiciae contra TyrannoseffectivelyengagedwithMachiavelli’sPrincipeisstillamatterofcontroversy.14ItiscertainlytruethatdespitetheardentrhetoricintheprefacethemainbodyofthetextonlyonceexplicitlymentionsMachiavelli, but there are many allusions to the Florentine (to which I shallturn later in this chapter) that will have been clear enough to contemporaryreaders.Gentili’sengagementwithMachiavelliandtheVindiciae contra Tyrannosdemonstrates the extent to which the arguments advanced in these texts wereperceivedastacklingtheunsettlingcoreissuesofsixteenth-centurypoliticalandmoral theory.Gentiliwasclearlyacloseandattentive readerand, itwouldbefair to say, also a great admirer of Machiavelli.What I have previously calledthesecondaspectofGentili’stheorythusprovidesatthesametimeameanstodiscernmoreclearlyhowGentiliperceivedandreactedtothevariouscompetingtheoriesandwhereheplaced,andtowhatextentheappropriated,Machiavelliinthisrhetoricalandpoliticalstruggle.Giventheanti-MachiavellianrhetoricoftheVindiciae contra TyrannosandGentili’sownintellectualengagementwithanddebttoMachiavelli’stheory,15itwillbecomeclearthatGentilitriedtore-worktheexistingpoliticaltheoriesinviewofacoherenttheoryofinter-staterelations,andthathisparticularunderstandingofMachiavelliwasacrucialstartingpointfortheproblemsGentiliperceivedandmeanttoaddress.

Machiavelli bequeathedone fundamentalquestion toGentili and all otherpoliticalthinkerswhoreflectedoninter-staterelationsandpoliticsingeneral.InchapterXVIIIofhisPrincipe,Machiavelliaskedifprincesshouldkeeptheirword.Thebeginningofthechapterposestheprobleminunambiguousterms:

13 S.J.Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos or, concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince,ed.andtrans.byG.Garnett(Cambridge,1994),p.10.

14 Cf.E.Barker,Church, State and Study(London,1930),esp.pp.72–108.PertinentandmostcomprehensiveisG.Garnett,“Editor’sIntroduction”,inS.J.Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,esp.pp.XXI–XXII.S.Mastellone,Venalità e Machiavellismo in Francia (1572–1610)(Florence,1972),pp.58–60,suggeststhatInnocentGentilletmightbetheauthorofthepreface.Butthisseemsmerelyaninterestingspeculation,lackingsubstantialproof,andIamratherinclinedtodoubtthis.

15 Panizza,“IlpensieropoliticodiAlbericoGentili”,p.126characterises“Machiavelli[nexttoAristotleas]l’altraautoritàparadigmaticadell’universoteorico-politicodiGentili”.


Everyoneknowshowpraiseworthyitisforarulertokeephispromises,andliveuprightlyandnotbytrickery.Nevertheless,experienceshowsthatinourtimesrulerswhohavedonegreatthingsarethosewhohavesetlittlestorebykeepingtheirword,beingskilfulratherincunninglyconfusingmen;theyhavegotthebetterofthosewhohavereliedonbeingtrustworthy....Therefore,aprudentrulercannotkeephisword,norshouldhe,whensuchfidelitywoulddamagehim,andwhenreasonsthatmadehimpromisearenolongerrelevant.Thisadvicewouldnotbesoundifallmenwereupright;butbecausetheyaretreacherousandwouldnotkeeptheirpromisestoyou,youshouldnotconsideryourselfboundtokeepyourpromisestothem.16

Itwas,ofcourse,thiskindofadvicegiveninthePrincipethatcausedCatholicsand Protestants alike to react to Machiavelli in such strong terms. In 1589,Gentili’s countrymanGiovanniBotero,whohad left the Jesuitorder in1581,publishedhiscritiqueofMachiavelli,Della ragion di stato,fouryearsafterGentili’sDe Legationibus of 1585 and nine years before hisDe Iure Belli of 1598. TheSpanishJesuitPedroRibadeneyrapublishedhisTratado de la religion y Virtudes que deve tener el Principe Christiano, para governar y conservar sus Estados.ThisexplicitattackonMachiavelliandthepolitiquesappearedfirstin1595,waswidelycirculatedandreprinted inseveraleditions.17Thesewritings, togetherwiththechef d’œuvreofJustusLipsiusandJeanBodin,andtheearlierpolemicalwritingsthatdominated the immediate aftermathof theStBartholomew’smassacres,18

16 N.Machiavelli,The Prince,ed.byQ.SkinnerandR.Price(Cambridge,1988),pp.61–2.

17 R.W.Truman,Spanish Treatises on Government, Society and Religion in the Time of Philip II(Leiden,1999),esp.pp.277–314andBirely,The Counter-Reformation Prince,esp.pp.111–35.

18 ThemostimportantwereInnocentGentillet’sAnti-MachiavelandthenotoriousVindiciae contra Tyrannos.GiventhatGentiliwasoneofthefewwriterswhodismissedGentillet’s criticism of Machiavelli and defended the latter against the charges issuedagainsthimintheanonymouslypublishedAnti-Machiavel,IshallfocusontheVindiciae contra TyrannosratherthanontheAnti-Machiavel whenassessingGentili’sinterpretationofHuguenotwritingsonreligion,stateandresistance.GentilimakeshisownpositionontheAnti-Machiavel abundantlyclear:

“Thefactthatsomeclaimthathewasamanofnolearningandofcriminaltendenciesmakesnodifferencetome.ItishisremarkableinsightthatIpraise;Idonotdefendhisimpietyorhislackofintegrity,ifactuallyhehadsuchfaults.AndyetifI,reviewingthe book issued against him [myemphasis], take into considerationhisposition, if I give ajustestimateofhispurposeinwriting,andifIchoosetoreinforcehiswordsbysounderinterpretation,IdonotseewhyIcannotfreefromsuchchargesthereputationofthismanwhohasnowpassedaway.Hewasnotunderstoodbythepersonwhowroteagainsthimandhehasbeencalumniatedinmanyways.ThereisnodoubtthatMachiavelli is


providethewiderintellectualcontextforassessingGentili’sowntheory.19ItwasthusinthiscontextthatGentilihadtopositionhimselfratherthaninthenaturallaw tradition,whichwas still largelydominatedbyCatholic scholastics.20ThismightexplainwhyGentiliratherhalf-heartedlyembracedthatlineofthought.OnlywithGrotiusdidtheProtestantsfullyexploreandreshapethenaturallawdoctrine.21Itiscertainlytruethattherewere“tworivalpoliticalmoralities”which“were now confronting each other in every commonwealth of late sixteenth-century Europe. One was the natural law theory ... the other was the theoryof ‘Machiavelli and the politiques’”.22Yet despite this predominant intellectualdivide,itisalsoevidentthatamongthenaturallawtraditionaswellasamongthepolitiquesthereexistednotjustonehomogeneousstrandofthoughtwithin

amanwhodeservesourcommiserationinthehighestdegree”(Gentili,Three Books on Embassies)p.156.

19 Thisis,ofcourse,stillaverylimitedselectionofamuchmorecomplexongoingdebate.FortheJesuit’sengagementwithMachiavelli,seeH.Höpfl’smasterfulstudy,Jesuit Political Thought The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540–1630(Cambridge,2004),esp.pp.84–90and164–7.SeealsoC.Benoist,Le Machiavellisme(Paris,1936);A.M.Battista,“Sull’antimachiavellismo francesedel secoloXVI”Storia e Politica 1 (1962): 412–447;G.Procacci,Machiavelli nella cultura Europea dell’età moderna(Rome,1995).S.Anglo,Machiavelli. The First Century(Oxford,2005),esp.pp.229–414is,despiteitsfocusonGentillet,helpfulonthewiderCatholicandHuguenotcontext,butaddshardlyanythingonGentili.

20 An excellent study of early Protestant natural law theories is M. Scattola,Das Naturrecht vor dem Naturrecht. Zur Geschichte des ius naturae im 16. Jahrhundert(Tübingen,1999).AcompetentanalysisofnaturallawtheoriesintheSpanishscholasticistobefoundinA.Brett,Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in later Scholastic Thought(Cambridge,1997).SeealsoM.Scattola,“Beforeandafternaturallaw:Modelsofnatural lawinancientandmoderntimes”, inT.HochstrasserandP.Schröder(eds),Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment(Dordrecht,2003),pp.1–30.

21 SeenotablyJ.Sauter,Die philosophischen Grundlagen des Naturrechts Untersuchungen zur Rechts- und Staatslehre (FrankfurtamMain,1966),andF.Grunert,Normbegründung und politische Legitimität. Zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der deutschen Frühaufklärung (Tübingen,2000).DespitetheobvioussimilaritiesbetweenGrotiusandGentili,RichardTuckdoesnot appreciate the fundamental differences onwhichbothmenbased theirargument. It seemsproblematic todenycategorically the influenceofpreviousnaturallawtheoristslikeVitoriaandSuárezonGrotius;thisinturnblurstheunderstandingofGentili’s specific approach, which relies much more on the tradition of the politiquesthanonthenaturallawtradition.Cf.R.Tuck,War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant(Oxford,1999),esp.p.108.

22 Q.Skinner,The Foundations of Modern Political Thought,vol.2(Cambridge,1978),p. 172. Quentin Skinner discusses this notably with reference to Pedro Ribadeneyra’sReligion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince against Machiavelli.


thesedistinguishabletraditions,butalsoseveralcompetingdoctrinesofpoliticalthought. Gentili was part of this tradition and contributed to the differenttendenciesamongstthepolitiques,whichbecomesparticularlyclearinGentili’sposition towards Machiavelli and some of the most prominent contemporarycriticismoftheFlorentine’sdoctrine,whichGentiliinturnalsoaddressedinhispoliticalwritings.

TheideologicalandpoliticalagendaGentilipursuedinhisinterpretationofMachiavellirevealshowheaddressedtherelationshipbetweenpoliticsandreligion.Heexploredthescope,andinhisviewthenecessity,oftolerationatthesametimeashediscussedthestatusofsovereignstatepower,orinotherwords,theissueofsovereigntyandresistance.Hewasclearthatthishadprofoundimplicationsforhismainattempttoprovideaframeworkforregulatingtherelationsbetweeninter-confessionalstates.23IwouldliketoargueherethatGentili’stwofoldstrategyin addressing these issues canbe grasped inhis groundbreaking assertion thateveryenemyisajustenemy,whichhelaterqualifiesandrestrictsbyintroducingtheall-decisiveprovisothatthereexistcertainunjustenemiesaswell.

Forthewordhostis,“enemy”,whileitimpliesequality,liketheword“war”...issometimesextendedtothosewhoarenotequal,namelytopirates,proscribedpersons and rebels; nevertheless it cannot confer the rights due to enemies,properlysocalled,andtheprivilegesofregularwarfare.24

Ifmyinterpretationiscorrect,Gentiliisnotcontradictinghimself,becausethenotionofanunjustenemywascomprisedinthetermpirate,whichinturnbecametheall-decisivecriterionofeitherinclusionorexclusioninhissystemoforganisingthe relations between sovereign states. This is the second and complementaryaspectofGentili’sargument.Hethusarguedfirstthat“theSpaniards[wagedawar]againstviolatorsofthelawofnatureandofcommonlaw,againstcannibals,andmonstersoflewdness.Itisrighttomakewaragainstpirates”.25Second,heappliedtheterm“pirate”toatheists,because:

23 ForthecrucialcontroversybetweenGentiliandtheorthodoxtheologiansatOxfordUniversity, see D. Panizza, Alberico Gentili giurista ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana(Padua,1981),andPanizza,“IlpensieropoliticodiAlbericoGentili”,esp.p.116.

24 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.25.25 Gentili, The Three Books on the Law of War,p.124.ContrastthiswithFrancesco

Vitoria’sview:Vitoria,“OntheAmericanIndies”,esp.p.286orwithB.DeLasCasas,A short Account of the Destruction of the Indies(London,2004),p.70:“TheSpanishalsoproveblindtotheirownwickednessinpersistinginwagingwar(eventhoughsuchacourseofaction is condemnedby all the lawsknown toman)on apeopleonwhom theyhavepreviouslyinflictedunpardonablewrongsandtowardswhomtheyhavebehavedinanevilandwickedfashion.Onthecontrary,theynowproclaimandrecordforposteritytheir


somekindofreligionisnatural,andthereforeifthereshouldbeanywhoareatheists,destituteofanyreligiousbelief,eithergoodorbad,itwouldseemjusttowagewaruponthemaswewoulduponbrutes.Fortheydonotdeservetobecalledmen,whodivestthemselvesofhumannature,andthemselvesdonotdesirethenameofmen.Andsuchawarisawarofvengeance,toavengeourcommonnature.26

Third,heturnedthissameargumentat leastpartlyandpotentiallyagainsttheTurks.27AlthoughGentilirealisedthattheOttomanEmpirecouldnotbeignoredintheattempttoestablishaninternationalsocietywhosememberswouldfollowcertain rules in their behaviour towards each other, he nevertheless remainedinsistentthatonlystatesthatshareacertainsetofvaluesareintheendsufficientlytrustworthytoconducttheirconflictsalongthelinessuggestedinhiswork.HowtheTurks–the perceivedthreatandenemytoEuropeatthetime28–shouldbetreated,isnotaquestionfortheologiansbutforpeoplelikeGentili.

AccordingtohimthedecisivequestioniswhethertheOttomansqualifyastrustworthyenemiesandthusdeservetobeconsideredasfallingundertheideaofajustenemy–thatis,anenemywhowillobservecertainrulesandwhowillthusremaincalculabletoacertaindegree.Gentiliseemsabsolutelystraightforwardonthispoint:

Warisnotwagedonaccountofreligion,andwarisnotnaturaleitherwithothersorevenwiththeTurks.ButwehavewarwiththeTurksbecausetheyactasourenemies,plotagainstus,andthreatenus.Withthegreatesttreachery[myemphasis]theyalwaysseizeourpossessions,whenevertheycan.ThusweconstantlyhavealegitimatereasonforwaragainsttheTurks.Weoughtnotbreakwiththem;no!We ought not to make war upon them when they are quiet and keeping thepeace,andhavenodesignsuponus;no!ButwhendotheTurksactthus?Letthetheologianskeepsilenceaboutmatterswhichisoutsideoftheirprovince.29

convictionthatthe‘victories’theycontinuetoenjoyoveraninnocentlocalpopulation,bydintofmassacringthem,comefromGod,andthattheirwickedcampaignsintheNewWorldamounttoajustwar”.SeealsoA.Pagden,The fall of natural man: The American Indian and the origins of comparative ethnology(Cambridge,1982),pp.67–108.

26 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.125.27 Cf.Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.332.28 W. Schulze, Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert. Studien zu den

politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung (München,1978); V. Aksan and D. Goffman (eds), The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge,2007);D.Goffman,The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe(Cambridge,2002).

29 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.57.


TowardstheOttomanEmpirehispositionisthusatleastambivalent.Gentili’sconstant appeal to custom serves toprompt (Christian) states tohave faith inthese rules and institutions and to observe them in their dealings with other(Christian)states.30Noneofthesegroupsmentionedmaythusbeconsideredjustenemies;allfalloutsidetheestablishedcustomsbetweenstatesandinternationallaw.Thediscriminationof thesegroups is anattempt toprovideananswer totheall-decisivequestionofhowtrustandfaithamongsovereignstatesmightbemaintained.BecauseGentilibelievedthatthosehehadsingledoutcouldnotbetrusted,eventheslightestbasisfortrustandmutualgoodfaithtowardsthemwasimpossible and hence, in classical Machiavellian terms, politically inadvisable.Gentilithusrestrictshisconceptofajustenemytosovereignstateswhodoseemtosharecertaingeneralmoralvalues.Amongthesetherewillalwaysbearesidueofunderstandingandmutualtrust.Thisiswhyhealsodemandsthatoneshouldnotdealwiththeenemytooharshly,becauseonecannotanticipate“whatbecomesofgoodfaith,whichistheessenceofthelawofnationsandofembassies”.31TrustandgoodfaiththereforeplayalargeroleinGentili’sconceptofprovidingrulesandcustomsonhowtoengagewiththeenemy.Hislegalandpoliticaltheoryonlyworksonthebasisofthiscardinalassumption.Henceitiscrucialtoassurethatallthosewhopotentiallyunderminethisassumption,becausetheydonotsharethefundamentalmoralvalues,areexcludedfromthesystemofequalitybetweenstates.HerewecanseethatthedifferencesofChristianconfessionsmaybeallowedtocomeinthewayofthisconcept.IfthispartofGentili’sargumentistowork,hemustshowthat,despiteMachiavelli’sadviceinthePrincipe,trustandgoodfaithinthedomainofpoliticsispossibleandevensensible.Obviouslyreligiousstrifewas evenmoreof a threat to this concept, because it profoundlyunderminedany basis of reconciliation. The explosive mixture of simplified Machiavellianconcepts inconnectionwithreligious strifewas thus the fundamentalobstaclethatGentilihadtosurmount.

Interestingly, Pedro Ribadeneyra seems to argue in a similar vein when heattacksMachiavelliandencouragestheChristianPrincenottofollowMachiavelli’sadvice:

becauseMachiavelliteachesthatsometimesthePrinceshouldbreakhiswordandhisfaith,...itisveryfittingthattheChristianPrincebeveryattentiveand

30 Thisiswhyhisconstantappealtocustomiscertainlymuchlessnaïvethanitmightotherwiseappear.See,forexample,hisassertionthat“toshowtheprevalenceofthecustomisofservice.Forbydoingthisweestablishfirmlytherightofsuchembassies”.Andinasimilarvein:“ButwhatpurposedoIserveincitingtheseandotherexampleswhichImightcollect?Itistoshowthattheinstitutionsofembassies,withtheirmaintenance,rights,anddignity,hasexistedamongallnations”.Gentili,Three Books on Embassies,p.19andp.50.

31 Gentili,Three Books on Embassies,p.87.


greatlyconsiderfirstwhathesays,promises,andswears;butafterwardsthathebeconstantandfirminfulfillingwhatbeforeGodhehaspromisedandsworn.Andlethimknowforcertainthatthekeepingofhis faithandwordisveryimportant for theconservationofhisStateand forbeingbetter thoughtof,richer,betterobeyed,andfeared.32

Theunderlyingissuehereisagainthequestionaboutthereasonableexpectationofmutual trustand faith.Ribadeneyraargues thatMachiavelli’s theory simplyunderminesallpossibilityoftrustinginthepromisesanddeclarationsofothers,notablybecauseof the lackof religion and thusof fundamentalmoral values.ButGentiliobviouslydrewonadifferentreadingofMachiavelli,whichiscloselyrelated to his republicanism. Machiavelli had elaborated on the political andmilitary organisation of the republic reflected in the need for education andmilitaryreform,andtheneedforengagementandparticipationofthecitizenry.ThiswholeargumentisinturncloselyrelatedtoMachiavelli’sdeliberationsabouttheGermanfreeimperialcities.Hisanti-clericalismandanewconceptofcivicreligion provide the ideological heart of this republican theory. Machiavelli’srepublicanidealfindsitsplaceinthetraditionfromTacitustoRousseau,anditiscertainlymorethanacoincidencethatallthreethinkersfindsimilarpraiseofTeutonic liberty.Politicalsurvivalinaprecariouspoliticalworldisfarfromself-evident.Machiavelli singlesout therepublicanvirtue inspiredbyadherence tocivilreligion,uncorruptedbyclericalmachinations,astheunderlyingfoundationofrepublics:

In the province of Germany it is quite clear that goodness and respect forreligionarestilltobefoundinitspeopleswiththeresultthatmanyrepublicsthereenjoyfreedomandobservetheirlawsinsuchawaythatneitheroutsidersnortheirowninhabitantsdaretousurppowerthere.…Thisgoodnessisthemoretobeadmiredinthesedaysinthatitissorare.Indeed,itseemstosurviveonly inthisprovince.This isduetotwothings. Inthefirstplace thetownshavebutlittleintercoursewiththeirneighbours,whoseldomgotovisitthem,orarevisitedbythem,sincetheyarecontentwiththegoods,liveonthefood,andareclothedwith thewoolwhichtheirown landprovides.Theoccasionforintercourse,andwithittheinitialstepontheroadtocorruption,isthusremoved, since theyhaveno chance of takingup the customs either of theFrench, theSpaniardsor the Italians,nationswhich, taken together, are thesourceofworld-widecorruption.33

32 P.Ribadeneyra,Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince – against Machiavelli,ed.byG.A.Moore(Washington,1949),p.303.

33 N.Machiavelli,The Discourses,ed.byB.Crick(London,2003),I–55,pp.244–5.


ThissomewhatsurprisingpraiseofGermanfrugalityandmoralrighteousnessismeanttofosterrepublicancivicvirtue.ContrastthiswithMachiavelli’soutrightattackonthecorruptedclergy:

owingtothebadexamplesetbytheCourtofRome,Italyhaslostalldevotion.…Thefirstdebt thatweoweto theChurchandtopriests, is thatwehavebecomeirreligiousandperverse.Butweowethemayetgreaterdebt,whichisthesecondcauseofourruin.ItistheChurchthathaskept,andkeepsItalydivided.34

Why?BecausethePapacywastooweaktoassumefullsovereignpowerandtouniteItaly,buttoostrongnottoplaypoliticsintemporalmattersand,mostimportantly,getotherpowersinvolved.ItalyasawholeandtheItalianrepublicsandcitystatesliveunderprecariousconditions.Germany,bycontrast,ismuchmorefortunate:“ThattherepublicsofGermanyhave…lastedaconsiderabletime,isduetotheconditionswhichprevailinthatcountryandarenotfoundelsewhere,conditionswithoutwhichitisimpossibletomaintainthistypeofpolity”.35

This kind of republicanism, which goes hand in hand with Machiavelli’spoliticalrealismandpragmatism,weretheintriguingaspectsofhisdoctrineforGentili.Machiavellididnotadvocateruthlessbehaviouramongstates.Onthecontrary,whendiscussingtheacquisitionofprincelypowerbywickedmeans,healready insistedthat“itcannotbecalledvirtuetokillone’s fellow-citizen,to betray one’s friends, to be treacherous, merciless and irreligious; powermaybe gainedby acting in such away, butnot glory”.36 In theDiscorsi, hecomplementedandsubstantiallyqualifiedtheadvicegiveninthePrincipe inthefollowingway:

Althoughtousefraudinanyactionisdetestable,yetintheconductofwaritispraiseworthyandglorious.Andamanwhousesfraudtoovercomehisenemyispraised,justasmuchasishewhoovercomeshisenemybyforce.…Idonotmeanthatafraudwhichinvolvesbreakingyourwordorthecontractsyouhavemade,isglorious;foralthoughonoccasionitmaywinforyouastateorakingdom...itwillneverbringyouglory.37

SuccessisthusalsoforMachiavellianambiguouscriterion,andhewashimselfapparently very much concerned with the problem he had presented in such

34 Machiavelli,The Discourses,I–12,p.144.35 Machiavelli,The Discourses,II–19,p.336.36 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.31.Cf.Cicero’sdiscussionofglory:On Duties,II–31,

p.74.37 Machiavelli,The Discourses,III–40,p.513.Cf.Cicero,On Duties,I–62,p.26.


radical terms when he attacked Cicero, the authority of humanist moral andpoliticalthought,maintainingthat“arulermustknowhowtoactlikeabeast”.38

It is worthwhile to recall that Cicero had famously claimed in De Officiisthat:

injusticemaybedone,eitherthroughforceorthroughdeceit;anddeceitseemstobelong toa little fox, force toa lion.Bothof themseemmostalien toahumanbeing;butdeceitdeservesthegreaterhatred.Andoutofallinjustice,nothing deserves punishment more than that of a man who, just in a timewhentheyaremostbetrayingtrust,actinsuchawaythattheymightappear[myemphasis]tobegood.39

To highlight the fundamental problem, Machiavelli had turned this assertiondeliberatelyonitsheadwhenhegavehisadvicetoprinces.Aruler:

shouldimitateboththefoxandthelion..onecouldgivecountlessmodernexamples...andshowhowmanypeacetreatiesandpromiseshavebeenrenderednullandvoidbythefaithlessnessofrulers;andthosebestabletoimitatethefoxhavesucceededbest.Butfoxinessshouldbewellconcealed:onemustbeagreatfeigneranddissembler.40

The question of trustworthiness was also quite clearly of major concern toMachiavelli,buthewasnotpreparedtoignorethatmanyrulerssimplypreferredpolitical success to faithful and honourable conduct. As previously quoted,Machiavelli said himself that his “advice would not be sound if all men wereupright;butbecausetheyaretreacherousandwouldnotkeeptheirpromisesto

38 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.61.39 Cicero,On Duties,I–41,p.19.40 Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 61–2. Cicero was not the first classical author who

usedthisfamousdictumaboutthefoxandthelion.SinceMachiavelli’snotoriousinversion,many polemicists and political thinkers referred in one way or another to this dictum.Besidesthereferencesbelow,cf.forinstance,theJesuitRibadeneyra,Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince,p.259andp.279andtheHuguenotLaNoue,Discours politiques et militaires,p.77,whobothrefertotheimageofthefoxtodenounceMachiavelliantreachery.LaNoueexplicityreferstoPlutarchastheancientsourceofthisdictum.Anglo,Machiavelli,providesmorereferencestocontemporarysourceswithasimilaranti-Machiavellianthrustnotconsideredinthischapter,andLysanderyetanotherancientsource:pp.251,267,280,291,347,349and387.SeealsoM.Stolleis,“LöweundFuchs.EinepolitischeMaximeimFrühabsolutismus”, inM.Stolleis,Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurtam Main, 1990), pp. 21–36; J. Barlow, “The Fox and the Lion: Machiavelli replies toCicero”,History of Political Thought 20(1999):627–45;M.Colish,“Cicero’sDeofficiisandMachiavelli’sPrince”,Sixteenth Century Journal 9(1978):80–93.


you,youshouldnotconsideryourselfboundtokeepyourpromisestothem”.41GentiliistakingMachiavelliasthethinkerwhohighlightedtheproblem,andnotastheonewhocreateditbecauseoftheadviceapparentlygivenagainstCicerointhePrincipe. ButperhapsthereismuchmorecommongroundbetweenCiceroandMachiavellithanthequotationsmightsuggest.

Cicerodiscussedtheproblematiqueoffaithmostprominentlyinthecontextofwar,whichinitselfwasoneofthecrucialpartsofhisdiscussionofjusticeinDe Officiis.UnderlyingthisdiscussionwashisconcernfortheRomanRepublic,whichhadcrumbledunderthecivilwarandCesar’srisetodictatorialpower.“Inmyopinion,ourconcernshouldalwaysbeforapeacethatwillhavenothingtodowithtreachery.IfIhadbeenfollowedinthiswewouldstillhavesomerepublicangovernment (if perhaps not the best); whereas now we have none”.42 AnotherequallynotoriousaspectinwhichMachiavelliapparentlyturnsCicero’spoliticaladviceonitsheadconcernsCicero’sassertionthat“thereisnothingatallmoresuitedtoprotectingandretaininginfluencethantobeloved,andnothingislesssuitedthantobe feared”.43Thereasonfor takingthispositionmaybeseen inCicero’sbeliefthattherecanbenotrustandhencenoreliableintercoursebetweenthe different parties. “For those who wish to be feared cannot but themselvesbeafraidoftheverymenwhofearthem”.44Asiswellknown,Machiavellihadinfamouslyclaimed“thatitisdesirable[foraPrince]tobebothlovedandfeared;butitisdifficulttoachievebothand,ifoneofthemislacking,itismuchsafertobefearedthanloved”.45Therulershouldnotdependonotherpeoples’sentimentsorpromises,but“onlyrelyonwhatisunderhisowncontrol”.46Itisthusinthenatureofprincelyrule,incontrasttotheconceptofarepublicsharedbybothCicero andMachiavelli, inwhich every citizenhas a stake and interest in thecommongood,thatitbeisolated,alwaysprecariousandunderpotentialthreat.Cicerohadalreadysuggestedtheconnectionbetweenawell-orderedrepublicangovernmentandtheappreciationoflove,anddictatorialruleandtheappreciationoffear,astheleadingandmotivatingprinciplesinsociety.“Therepublicwehavelost.Andwehavefallenintothisdisaster...becauseweprefertobefearedthantobehelddearandloved”.47InspiteoftherhetoricdirectedagainstCicero,itseemsthatMachiavelli is takingCicero’s thoughtonestepfurtherandspellingout even more clearly the autocrat’s dependence on fear, in contrast to a lessconflictual andmore virtuous republican government.There is simplynoone

41 Machiavelli,The Prince,pp.61–2.42 Cicero,On Duties,I–35,p.15.SeealsoI–57,pp.23–4.43 Cicero,On Duties,II–23,pp.70–71.44 Cicero,On Duties,II–24,p.71.45 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.59.46 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.61.47 Cicero,On Duties,II–29,p.74.


whomanautocratcouldtrust.Thus“rulersshouldhavetwomainworries:oneisinternal,andconcernsthesubjects;theotherisexternal,andconcernsforeignpowers”.48Stabilitycanthusneverbehad.Anyalliancewithotherpowersmustnecessarilyremainfickle,asdoestheinternaltranquillityofthecommonwealthwhichisonlypossiblethroughpermanentprincelyvigilanceandpotentialthreattothesubjects.Machiavelliarguedatlengththatarepublicshouldandcouldrelyonitscitizenmilitiaanddoesnotneedfortresses.

Thisargumentiswellknown,49butsofaritseemsnottohavebeenobservedthat it isalsoclosely related to thequestionof trust.Awell-governedrepubliccantrustinitsinstitutionsandhenceinitscitizens.Nocoercionorforceneedbeexercisedagainstthecitizen.Suchanexerciseofpowerwasamplysymbolised,and de facto exercised by the princely fortresses that dominated Renaissancecities.ForthisreasonMachiavellicouldmaintainthat“solongasRomeenjoyedfreedom and was loyal to her ... constitution she never held either cities orprovincesbymeansoffortresses”.50Theyaremilitarilyandpoliticallyuselessforawell-constitutedrepublic.Forprinces,however,whofindthemselvesintenserelationswiththeirsubjects,fortressesmightserveapurpose.Theyare,accordingtoMachiavelli,uselessagainstexternalenemies,but“ifarulerismoreafraidofhisownsubjectsthanofforeigners,heshouldbuildfortresses”.51Thefortressthusbecomesthesignumoftheprince’sfearofhisownsubjects.Wherethereisnoscopeformutualtrust,therewillbetheattempttocoercepeopleintosubmission.Inarepublic,thisisnotnecessaryandwouldbecounterproductive.Inthisrespectitseems,despitethefirstimpressionmadebythetextualevidence,thatCiceroandMachiavellieffectivelysharecommonground.Accordingtoboththinkers,arepublicangovernmentcanandactuallyneedstorelyonthecitizens’love,butnotsotheprince.

Interestingly, this is exactly how Gentili interpreted both Cicero andMachiavelli.Forhimtheywererepublicanswhonotonlygavegeneralpolitical

48 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.64.49 H. Münkler, Machiavelli. Die Begründung des politischen Denkens aus der Krise der

Republik Florenz(FrankfurtamMain,1982).SeegenerallyM.E.Mallett,Warfare in Renaissance Italy(London,1974),andM.E.Mallett,“ThetheoryandpracticeofwarfareinMachiavelli’srepublic”inG.BockandQ.Skinner(eds),Machiavelli and Republicanism(Cambridge,1990),pp.173–80.FormyownpositiononthecomplexityandoriginalityofMachiavelli’spoliticalthought,seeP.Schröder,Niccolò Machiavelli(FrankfurtamMain,2004).

50 Machiavelli,Discorsi,II–24,p.352.51 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.75.GiovanniBotero reiteratesMachiavelli’sviewof

theusefulnessoffortressesfortherulerinsubduinghissubjects,buthealsoaccordsthemaplaceinthedefenceagainstexternalenemies.Cf.theEnglishtranslationofhisDella Ragion di Stato:G.Botero,Practical Politics,trans.anded.byG.A.Moore(Washington,1949),p.131.


advice,butalsowerebothengagedinaconcretestruggleforpreserving,orratherattemptingtore-establish,therepublicanconstitutionoftheircommonwealth.Well before Rousseau’s famous dictum about Machiavelli’s Principe, Gentilieffectively anticipated Rousseau when he hailed Machiavelli as “an eulogist ofdemocracy,anditsmostspiritedchampion....Itwasnothispurposetoinstructthetyrant,butbyrevealinghissecretcounselstostriphimbare,andexposehimtothesufferingnation”.52Gentilithusimpliesthat,forMachiavelli,thecrucialquestionabouttrustworthinesshadalreadybeenhowtotamethefoxandthelionintherealmandintercourseofpolitics.53Gentiliimpliedthat,iftherewereonlystateswhichweregovernedunderarepublicanconstitution,thenevenMachiavelliwouldhaveconcededhisprovocativepoliticaladvicewouldnotbenecessary.54InhisappropriationofMachiavelli,Gentilidoesnotdiscussthefactthatrepublicscould also be, and in the case of Rome certainly had been, expansionist. HisreadingoftheDiscoursi andthePrincipe,however,stillseemstohaveapointinclearlyhighlightingtheproblematiqueoftrustandappropriatingtheargumentsfoundinMachiavellitothesphereofinter-staterelations.

HadMachiavellinothintedatthishimselfinthePrincipe,whenheassertedthat:

itmustbeunderstoodthataruler,andespeciallyanewruler,cannotalwaysactinwaysthatareconsideredgoodbecause,inordertomaintainhispower,heisoftenforcedtoacttreacherously,ruthlesslyorinhumanely,anddisregardthepreceptsofreligion.Hencehemustbepreparedtovaryhisconductasthewindsoffortuneandchangingcircumstancesconstrainhimand…notdeviate

52 Gentili, Three Books on Embassies, p. 156. Cf. J.-J. Rousseau, “Of the socialcontract”, in J.-J.Rousseau,Political Writings, ed.byV.Gourevitch,Cambridge2003,III–6,p.95:“WhilepretendingtoteachlessonstoKings,he[Machiavelli]taughtgreatlessonstopeoples.Machiavelli’sPrinceisthebookofrepublicans”.Asimilar,thoughlessardent and certainly less known argument in defence of Machiavelli had already beenmadebeforeGentiliinFlorence.Cf.M.Toscano,Peplus Italiae(Paris,1578)andR.Pole,Apologia Reginaldi poli ad Carolum V., ed.A.M.Quirini (Brescia,1744),p.151. I amindebtedforthesereferencestoAnglo,Machiavelli,p.409.

53 Theimageofthefoxinparticularhadanambivalent,positiveaswellasnegative,connotation in early modern political thought. See Stolleis, “Löwe und Fuchs. EinepolitischeMaximeimFrühabsolutismus”andBarlow,“TheFoxandtheLion:MachiavellirepliestoCicero”.

54 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophyed.byM.J.Gregor(Cambridge,1996),pp.315–51.TrustworthinessandtheexistenceofafederationofrepublicanstateswerebothcentralforKant’sconceptofinternationallaw.AnticipatingKant’sposition,Gentilialreadypointedtotheimportanceoftheseaspects,whichthenbecamecrucialforKant’swell-knowntheory.


fromtherightconductifpossible,butbecapableofenteringuponthepathofwrongdoingwhenthisbecomesnecessary.55

Partof the strengthof the republicanconstitution, forMachiavelli,was thatarepublicislessdependentonasinglepersonandsolessexposedtochanceandthewhimsof the goddess Fortuna.56 Gentili’s readingofMachiavelli thus alsofansthecontroversialquestionoftherelationshipbetweenthePrincipeandtheDiscorsi,anddemonstrates,fromadifferentandnotsowell-knownperspective,thecoherenceoftheseworks.57ThesimilaritiesbetweenCiceroandMachiavellishouldnot,ofcourse,obscurethesignificantdifferencesinstyleandemphasisoftheirrespectivemoralandpoliticaltheories.WhenCiceroinsiststhatawisemanshouldalwaysfollowwhatishonourableandhisviewshouldnotbedistortedbyexpediency,hemakesaprofoundlyun-Machiavellianpoint.Althoughheconcedesthat“ithappensthatonethingseemsbeneficialandanotherhonourable”,heisquite clear “that is amistake: for the ruleofwhat isbeneficial andofwhat ishonourable is one and the same. If someonehasnot grasped that,no typeofdeceit or crime will be beyond him”.58 In Gentili’s interpretation, Machiavelliissayingexactlythesamething,onlyheshowsmoreclearlythatpoliticalrulersdeliberatelyhaverecoursetothesemethodsandthat,horribile dictu,onehastoreckonwithsuchruthlessbehaviourandconductintherealmofpolitics.Gentili’sattempttodrawlessonsfromthiskindofpoliticalrealism,andtousethepositivefoundationsheclaimedtohavefoundinCiceroandMachiavellialike,aresetoutinhisDe Iure Belli.HisendeavourtotransfertheproblematiquealreadytackledbyCicero,andsoprovocativelyextendedbyMachiavelliespeciallytothesphereofinter-staterelationsinaperiodwhen(asHobbeslaterputit)“theinterpretationofaverseintheHebrew,Greek,orLatinBible,isoftentimesthecauseforcivilwar”,59madeevenmoreunlikelytheestablishmentofauniversallyacceptedbasisformutualtrust.Thus,ashasalreadybeenstatedatthebeginningofthischapter,Gentilihadtoengagewithquiteawiderangeofconsiderablydifferentwritersinordertodefendhisposition.ClearlythereligiouspolemicistsofCatholicandHuguenotconfessionalikehadamucheasiertaskthanGentili,whowantedand

55 Machiavelli,The Prince,p.62.56 Cf. Schröder, Niccolò Machiavelli, pp. 83–6; M. Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford,

1998),p.121andD.Hoeges,Niccolò Machiavelli. Die Macht und der Schein(München,2000),p.198.

57 Cf.H.Baron,“Machiavelli:theRepublicanCitizenandtheAuthorofThePrince”,The English Historical Review76(1961):217–53.

58 Cicero,On Duties,III–74,p.128.59 T.Hobbes,Behemoth or the long Parliament,ed.byF.Tönnies(Chicago,1990),

p.144.


needed toestablishabasis formutual trustbeyond the respectiveconfessionalfactionsinordertomakehissystemeffectiveinbridlingwar.

In conclusion, we may briefly look again at one prominent example fromtheprevailingHuguenotandCatholicpolemicsinordertoassessnotonlythehostile atmosphere against which Gentili had to argue, but also to appreciatefully his innovative approach. One might, indeed, be tempted to believe thatGentiliintendedtoapplythepreviouslycitedpositionthat“theologians[should]keepsilenceaboutmatterswhichisoutsideoftheirprovince”60not justtotheTurks, but also to the confessional polemicists, such as Ribadeneyra or theMonarchomachs.

TheVindiciae contra Tyrannos effectivelyequatedMachiavelli’sPrincipewithatyrant.ItisinthiswaythatthepolemicintheprefaceagainsttheFlorentinemakes sense and is carried through in the argument.Theconsiderationof thescopeandlegitimacyofresistanceculminatesinthethirdquestionsetoutintheVindiciaecontra Tyrannos where, in thediscussionofwhoqualifiesasa tyrant,Machiavelli’snameandobvious allusions tohisPrincipe again suddenlyfigureprominently inthetext:“Briefly, the ... tyrantwants toappear tobewhat thekingactuallyis.Sinceheknowsthatmenareinflamedbyloveofvirtue.Butatanyevent,howevermuchthefoxdissembles,thefox’stailalwaysshows;howevermuchheyelps,thegapingjawsandroarrevealalion”.61Atyrant“feignspraiseforjusticeandfaith”,62buttheVindiciae contra Tyrannosunmasksthetyrantbyshowinghim tobe anadherentofMachiavelli’sdoctrine.Thepreface and thecentralpartofthediscussiononthelegitimacyofresistanceagainsttyrantsareinfactcloselyandveryeffectivelyknittedtogether.Theassertionintheprefaceisthat“theMachiavellians[have]laboriouslyeducatedthem[thetyrants]”,whowouldthereforecalumniatetheargumentoftheVindiciae contra Tyrannos,whereas“toawise,pious,andfaithfulprince,whomtheseinvestigationsteachandinstruct,itcanonlybethehighestvirtue”.63Itisthereforeimpossible,atleastonthepremiseofthisargument,todenyandargueagainstthefindingsoftheVindiciae contra TyrannoswithoutatthesametimequalifyingasatyrantoraMachiavellian–thatis,a“slave...oftyrants”.64Resistancewas,atleastforthemagistrates,thoughnotfortheindividualcitizens,clearlylegitimateagainstatyrant.Butitismorethanquestionablewhethersuchacasecanbearguedonthegroundsofconfessionalallegiance.Anytheoryofresistanceisnecessarilyconfrontedbythecrucialquestionofwhomightbeinthepositiontomakesuchdecisiononlegitimategrounds.Itisobviousthattheopposingreligiousconfessionwouldstronglyobjecttoanysuch

60 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law ofWar,p.57.61 Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,p.147.62 Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,p.147.63 Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,p.12.64 Brutus,Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,p.10.


claimandthatthereisconsequentlynogroundformutualtrustoncepoliticsismixedwithconfessionalclaims.65

TheJesuitMarianaalsoadvocatedtyrannicide,buthispositionwasrejectedbytheJesuitsthemselves,whocondemnedresistancetolegitimategovernment,especially in its most extreme form of tyrannicide.66 If we turn again toRibadeneyra,weseethathefacedthesameproblematicissueoftrustworthinessoncehedenouncedProtestantsasheretics–althoughitseemsthat,forhim,secularpoliticians,thepolitiques,areevenworsethanheretics,becausehereticsatleastbelieveinsomekindofreligionandwillthereforeadheretocertainmoralvalues.ThisargumentofaJesuitpoliticalthinkerisconsiderablyclosertoGentili’sownpositionthanaremostHuguenotpoliticalwritings, inparticular theVindiciae contra Tyrannos.Ribadeneyraarguedthat:

theheretics,thoughtheyarelighteningfromhellandenemiesofallReligion,professsomeReligion;andamongthemanyerrorsthattheyteachmixsometruths.ThepoliticiansandthefollowersofMachiavellihavenoreligion,normakedistinctionwhetherthereligionbefalse,ortrue,exceptthatitisproperfortheirpoliticalthinking.67

As previously quoted, Gentili indeed said almost the same thing when hediscussedtheconceptofajust enemy.Thosewithoutanyreligionwerenottobetrustedandcouldnotbejustenemies.Bothauthorsadheretoacertainpoliticalrealism,especiallyininter-staterelations,andbothdiscriminateagainstatheists.Thefundamentaldifference,however,isthatGentilidoesnotcountMachiavelliamongtheatheists,whereasforRibadeneyraMachiavelliisobviouslytheprincipalthinkerresponsibleforintroducingatheismintopoliticaltheory:

becausethereisnodoubtthatmen,andkingsmoreso,liveamongenemies,andthattherearemanywhowiththeartofMachiavelliandafinehypocrisytrytodeceivethem...itiswellthattheyconsiderhowtheyoughttoconductthemselveswiththeotherPrinceswhentherearefalsefriendsandtrueenemies;thatontheonehandtheybenotdeceivedandthesincerityoftheirsimplicityand truthbenotmocked,andon theotherhandby takingcarewith thesetheydonotgoagainstthelawofGod.Whenonewalksamongenemiesitisnecessarythatonegoarmed,andwithdeceivers,tousesomedissimulation;but

65 Apart form the previously mentioned literature on religious strife and the StBartholomew’sDaymassacresinparticular,seealsothestillvalidstudybyA.Elkan,Die Publizistik der Bartholomäusnacht(Heidelberg,1901).

66 SeeHöpfl,Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the StateandH.E.Braun,Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought(Aldershot,2007).

67 Ribadeneyra,Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince,p.251.


theyshouldlookwellhowfaritistocontinuewithoutGodbeingoffended,andthelimitsandboundsthattheircareandartificehavetoobserve,inorderthat,beingChristianPrincesanddisciplesofChrist,theydonotmakethemselvesdisciplesofMachiavelli.68

Gentili had clearly and, given the circumstances of his time, courageouslycontradictedsuchaposition,whichwaswidelyheldbyProtestantsandCatholicsalike.Buthemusthavebeenawarethathecouldnotfullyanswertheproblemoftrustininter-staterelationsoncehehadallowedMachiavelli’srealismintohisargument.Intheendhewasunabletoprovidemorethanaprecariousstatusforthebindingforceofthelawsandcustomshesolaboriouslyunearthedandtriedtosystematiseinhisworks.Thisiswhy,towardstheendofhisDe Iure Belli,theissueoftakinghostagesisdiscussedatsomelength.Thiswas,ofcourse,onlyamakeshiftargument,notdesignedtoreplacebutrathertosecondthepainstakingattempttoprovideabasisformutualtrustininter-staterelations.“Hostages”,hearguedwithreferencetoBaldusandotherearlierjurists,“arethosewhoaregiventoasovereignortotheleaderofanarmyforthepurposeofbinding public faith [myemphasis]”.69ReligionwasthuscrucialforGentili’sconceptof“faithfulness,the most precious of possessions” in inter-state relations,70 in order to fostermoralvaluesasthecrucialbasisfortrust.Butconfessionalstrifemustnecessarilyundermine this idea and had to be excluded from the realm of politics. “Thepretextofreligion”hadthustobebannedfrompolitics,andbannedasareasonforgoingtowar,astheonlywayofestablishingreasonablegroundtobelieveinthepossibilitythatconflictingorwarringpartieswouldstillobserveaminimumofmutual trust and good faith towards eachother, and that on this basis thelawsofwarmightbeobservedbybothparties.Ifoneofthemfailedtodoso,theywouldclearlynotqualifyforjustifiablerecoursetotheselaws,because“thelawsofwararenotobservedtowardsonewhodoesnothimselfobservethem;one vainly implores the aid of the lawwhooffends the law”.71 In this respectGentilisuccessfullytookupsomeofthemostunsettlingconcernsofMachiavelli’spoliticaltheoryinamuchmoreconstructivewaythanthereligiouspolemicistsofbothconfessions.

68 Ribadeneyra,Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince,p.280.69 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.241.70 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.243.71 Gentili,The Three Books on the Law of War,p.272.

Chapter6War,DiplomacyandtheEthicsof

Self-ConstraintintheAgeofGrotiusHaraldKleinschmidt

Introduction: History, Theory and the History of International Relations Theory

What is the logical status of international relations theories? Many theoristsdistinguish theory from thought and confine theory to the arcane realm ofacademe.Theypositionacademeasanexclusive,ifnotthesole,theory-makinginstitution, while denying to political decision-makers the originality totheorise.1Thisposition,however,isfarfromobvious.Asnoonecandenythatthedoings of political decision-makers havebeen couched in current patternsof thought, the confinementof theorising to academehas the consequenceofartificiallypartitioningtheory(asthesupposedlygrandsynthesisingoranalyticalachievement) from thought (as the seemingly unreflected, rough-and-readyutilisationofconvenientbitsofideology).Theresultinggapbetweentheoryandpracticeisunfortunate,forthedenialoforiginaltheorisingtopoliticaldecision-makers is ideological in its own right and,more importantly, rests on specifictheoreticalassumptions thatcannotbegeneralised, since theyrelate toperiod-specificperceptionsof international relations.Thecore assumption, informingthepartitionof theory from thought, isEdwardHallettCarr’s time-honouredrealist insistence that,while thedoings of foreign-policydecision-makers suchasdiplomatsmaybetaintedbypoliticalpressuresorbetotallyunreflective,thetheory-basedstudyofinternationalrelations,categorisedasinternationalpolitics,istobesystematic,scientificandsubjecttocriticalscrutiny.2

Byconsequence,thehistoryofinternationalrelationstheoriesmakesexplicitsomeofthetheoreticalassumptionsaboutinternationalrelationswidelysharedbycontemporaryactors.Theseassumptionsare tobeexaminednotmerelyonthe high grounds of academic theorising but also in the lowlands of politicalpractice.Moreimportantly,theoriesofinternationalrelationsmayhaveexisted

1 Michael JosephOakeshott,Lectures in the History of Political Thought, edsTerryNardin and Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter, 2006). Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association(Indianapolis,2000).JamesTully(ed.),Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and His Critics(Cambridge,1988).

2 EdwardHallettCarr,The Twenty-Years’ Crisis.1919–1939, reprint(LondonandBasingstoke,1981),pp.9–10.


evenattimeswhenacademicsdidnotprovidenowextantrecordsoftheorisingon international relations. Separating theory from thought in the study ofinternational relations is thus tantamount to the unwarranted and untenablepostulate that therewasno theoryof international relations theoriesbeforeStThomasAquinastookuphispen.

Moreover, in looking at the change of international relations theories,historicalresearchinthesetheoriestracesaspectsofchangesintheperceptionoftheworldenshrinedininternationalrelationstheories.Specifically,internationalrelationstheorieshavefeaturedchangingstatementsaboutwhathasbeenreferredtoasaninternationalsystem,whetherthisrefersexplicitlytoEuropesincethebeginning of the seventeenth century or earlier and elsewhere avant la lettre.Consequently,rankinginternationalrelationstheoriesamongtheperceptionsoftheworldimpliestheassumptionthataninternationalsystemexistsintherealmof perceptions. From an historical point of view, then, theorists claiming thatthe international systemhas the statusofanobjective,quasi-tangibleentity intheworld,3adhere tooneorotherparticularbrandofobjectivist internationalrelationstheoriesthathaveflourishedatcertaintimesandplaces.

An inquiry into the history of international relations theories will seek todetermine the factors for and conditionsof the establishment, acceptance andcriticism of certain perceptions of the world and the international relationsconductedtherein.Inotherwords,inplacinginternationalsystemsintotherealmofperceptions,thestudyofthehistoryofinternationalrelationstheoriesseekstodescribeandexplainthechangeofinternationalsystemsaspartandparcelofbroadersocio-culturalchanges.

Whatare,ingeneralterms,thedifferencesbetweensixteenth-andseventeenth-century and twentieth- and twenty-first-century European or, for that matter,westernperceptionsofinternationalrelations?Thequestion,asIshallargue,relatestodifferences,intermsofepistemology,inmodelsusedtodescribeandanalysetheinternationalsystem;intermsofmetaphysics,ofassumptionsabouttheoriginoforderasthecorefeatureoftheinternationalsystem;andintermsofpragmatics,to the conceptualisation of actors within the international system. Regardingepistemology,thequestioniswellillustratedbyarecentcommentfrom2004ontheapparentlackofexplanatorycapacityofbalanceofpowertheorythatrefers

3 For examples, see Bartholomäus Keckermann, Systema systematum (Hannover,1613), p. 891; Samuel Pufendorf, “Systema ciuitatum”, in Pufendorf, Dissertationes academicae selectiores (Uppsala,1677),pp.210–61; JoachimErdmannSchmidt [resp.],Exercitatio politico-historica de ciuitatis origine ciuitatumque systematis, LLD. Diss.(University of Jena, 1745); Ernst Carl Wieland [resp.], Dissertatio politica de systemate civitatum,Ph.D.Diss.(UniversityofLeipzig,1777),p.V;HansJoachimMorgenthau,Politics among Nations,5thedn(NewYork,1975),p.4;andKennethNealWaltz,Theory of International Politics(Reading,MA,1979),pp.161–2.

War, Diplomacy and the Ethics of Self-Constraint in the Age of Grotius 105

to“thenotionthatstatesseektosurviveasindependententities.Theyalsoseekpowerintheanarchicalglobalsystem”.4Thestatementfocusesonthemetaphorof survival, lending expression to the view that states can be personalised intodynamicentitieswhichliveandcanbeputto“death”.5Inotherwords,presentsystemsanalysisinInternationalRelationsproceedsthroughtheuseofabiologisticmodel,drawnfromthehumanbody.Thisisnotanentirelynewphenomenon,specificonlytotheearlytwenty-firstcentury,forbiologismhasinformeddebateamonginternationalrelationstheoristsofvariousbranchesforabouttwohundredyears.6Thestatement is in linewithbiologistic internationalrelationstheory inarticulatingthegeneralandnon-historicalclaimthatstateshavealwaysbeenquasi-personalactorsnomatterwhenandwheretheyexisted.Inlayingclaimtoageneraltruthwherereferenceisinfactmadetoaspecificperceptionoftheinternationalsystem,thestatementpapersoverthedifficultythatsystemsanalysiscan,anddid,proceedwithoutresorttobiologisticmodelselsewhereintheworldandinformerperiodsofEuropeanhistory.Internationalrelationstheoriesoperatingundertheassumptionthatsystemsanalysiscanbebasedonaninalterableepistemologyare,attheveryleast,atalosstoexplainhowandwhymodelsofanalysiscanchangeandhavechanged.Inotherwords,theepistemologicaldimensionofthequestionabout thedifferencesbetweenpresentandpastperceptionsof the internationalsystembringstotheforethechangingimpactsthatanalyticalmodelscanhaveontheconceptualisationoftheinternationalsystem.

Incategorisingtheinternationalsystemas“anarchical”,thequotedstatementalsorevealsadispositionofcurrent internationalrelationstheoristsconcerningmetaphysics. Categorising the international system negatively as “anarchical”implies theascriptionofdefects, specifically theabsenceof institutionsof ruleoragenciesofgovernanceprovidingfororderintheinternationalsystem.Thisnegative ascription or, differently stated, the unfulfilled expectation that theinternationalsystemshould(butperhapscannot)haveorder-providinginstitutionsoragencies,reveals thebelief thathumanactorsshouldinprinciplebeseenascapableofestablishingorder-providinginstitutionsoragencies.Admittedly,notallinternationalrelationstheoristssharethescepticalviewthathumanactors,inestablishingtheinternationalsystem,havefailedtoequipthesystemwithorder-providinginstitutionsoragencies.Nevertheless,whilesuchscepticismistypicaloftheoristsintherealistcamp,rivaltheorists,amongthemfunctionalistsinthe

4 T.V.Paul,“Introduction.TheEnduringAxiomsofBalanceofPowerTheoryandTheirContemporaryRelevance”,inT.V.Paul,JamesJ.WirtzandMichaelFortmann(eds),Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century(Stanford,2004),pp.1–25,p.3.

5 Foramoreexplicitstatementofthisformofbiologism,seeTanishaM.Fazal,State Death. The Politics of Conquest, Occupation and Annexation(Princeton,2007).

6 For a survey, see Harald Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power. A History of International Relations Theories(London,2000),pp.21–44.


earlytwentiethcentury,andneo-liberal institutionalists inthe laterpartof thecentury,operatedonthecommonmetaphysicalassumptionthathumanactorsshouldbecreditedwiththecapabilityofprovidingfororderintheinternationalsystem.Theperceptionof a gapbetweenbasichumancapability and the lackof actual success in implementation is thus based on the metaphysical beliefthatorderintheworldflowsfromhumanactionandcannotberegardedasagiven.However,thisbeliefisfarfromself-evidentfromacross-culturalandlong-termperspective,whichillustratesthedifferentbeliefthatorderintheworldingeneralandtheinternationalsysteminparticular isdivinelywilled.Hencethemetaphysicaldimensionofthequestionaboutthedifferencebetweenpastandpresentperceptionsoftheinternationalsystemplacesanemphasisonchangingassumptionsabouttheoriginsoforderintheinternationalsystem.

Concerningpragmatics,currentinternationalrelationstheoriesappearstilltobebasedontherecognitionofthestateasthemajortypeofactorintheinternationalsystem.Thustheoristsarepronetodrawontheascriptionofanarchyandtorefertotheconventionalbalance-of-powertheoreticalhypothesis“thatstatesactrationallytomaximizetheirsecurityorpowerinanarchicsystemswithoutahigherauthoritytoregulatedisputes”.7Indoingso,thesetheoristsadmitonly“states”asactorsintheinternationalsystem,equatestateswithgovernmentsand,forthepurposeoftheory-making,excludeallothertypesofpotentialormanifestactors.Theproblemwiththisapproachprimarilyresultsnotfromitsrigidity,butfromtheconventionalprioritisingofstatesastheonlyseeminglyregularactorsintheinternationalsystemindistinctiontoapparentlyirregular,andthusonceagainnegativelycategorized,“non-stateactors”.Thedistinctiondrawsontheconventionofvestingtheconductof foreign policy and international relations in state rulers or governments andtheirappointeddiplomaticrepresentatives.Thisconventionhasbeenthepropertyof what has somewhat loosely been labelled the “Westphalian” state system.8Surprisingly,theconventionhascontinuedtoflourishdespitetheoftenreiteratedobservationthat“Westphalia”hasbecomethepropertyofhistorians.Evenwithintheso-calledWestphaliansystem,however,actorsotherthanrulersorgovernmentsof states, among them long-distance trading companies, were perfectly regularagents.9 Hence there is hardly anything new about “non-state actors” and this

7 JackLevy, “WhatDoGreatPowersBalanceAgainst andWhen?”, inT.V.Paul,JamesJ.WirtzandMichaelFortmann(eds),Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century(Stanford,2004),pp.29–51,p.34.

8 Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction”, in Gene M. Lyonsand Michael Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention(Baltimore,1995),pp.3–6.

9 For an articulate view that the so-called “Westphalian sovereignty” has beenrenderedat leastproblematic, seeStephenD.Krasner,Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy(Princeton,1999),pp.118–21;JamesN.Rosenau,“SovereigntyinaTurbulentWorld”,in


type of actor is also far from irregular. In conclusion, the pragmatic dimensionofthequestionaboutthedifferencebetweenpastandpresentperceptionsoftheinternationalsystemfocusesonchangesinthenotionofactorship.

Inthefollowinganalysis,Iintendtousethethreecategoriesofsystem,orderand actorship to specify the characteristic features of European sixteenth- andseventeenth-century perception of the international system. I shall describe theinterconnectednessofwarwithdiplomacyatthetimethatGrotiuswaswriting.Thedescriptionofpracticalactionsbymilitarypeopleandpractitionersofdiplomacywill serve thepurposeofdemonstrating that sixteenth-and seventeenth-centurytheorists analysed the international system in amechanistic and static, not in abiologisticanddynamic,way.

War and Diplomacy: The Eighty Years War in Context

Professionals versus Militiamen

In terms of military history, the major military confrontations over theNetherlandswere contests betweenSpanishTercios, professionalwarrior bandsontheoneside,andlocallyconscribedDutchmilitiamenandEnglish“TrainedBands”ontheother.Thestrategicadvantageofthedeploymentofprofessionalwarriorbandswasthattheycouldbedispatchedanywhereandwerethusreadyforcombatondistantbattlefields,wheretheywouldbeabletodemonstratetheirfightingprowess indual combat.Thepredominant threatpotential emanatingfromtheseprofessionalwarriorbandsresultedfromtheirprofessionalism,whichplaced a premiumonwillingness to fight to the very end and imposed heavysanctionsagainstdesertion,insubordinationanddefianceofgivenorders.Hencetherecruitmentofprofessionalswasexpensive,evenif theydidasarulebringtheirownweapons,butusuallytheywerefairlydisciplined,easytohandle,quicktodeploy and couldbeused to impress local people in enemy territorywhenappearinginlargenumbers.Bycontrast,militiaforceslentthemselvesmainlytocombatpro aris et focis,astheywererecruitedfordefensivepurposesandmannedbypractitionersofcivilianprofessions.Militiacombatantswould,asarule,receivenopay,sincetheywereconscripts,anddidnotbringtheirownweapons.Beingsummonedtowar,theywereusuallyunfitfordualcombatandhadtobetrained

GeneM.LyonsandMichaelMastanduno(eds),Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention(Baltimore,1995),pp.191–227;MarkZacher,“TheDecayingPillars of the Westphalian Temple”, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Governance without Government(NewYork,1992),pp.58–101;andKarl-HeinzZiegler,“PluralisierungundAutorität im europäischen Völkerrecht des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit”,Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung,30(2004):533–53.


todobattle, exercised in thehandlingofweaponsandordered intobattalionsremainingintactinthecourseofbattle.Aswarwasnottheirsourceofincome,theyhadtobefurnishedwithaspecificmotivetofight.Asarule,thismotivationwasdrawnontheinsistencebysomelegitimateinstitutionofgovernment,suchasthemilitarycommander,thatwarwasinevitabletorepelanalienaggressorandsafeguardthewelfareoftheresidents.

Inconsequence,onthevariousoccasionswhenmilitiaforceswereorganised,theorganisersdrewonwhattheyconsideredsuccessfulcasesrecordedinmilitaryhistory. Down to the eighteenth century, the legacy of warfare in Greek andRomanantiquityplayedbyfarthemostimportantroleastheproviderofmodelsfortheorganisationofmilitiaforces.10Againstthemassiveweightofcasesrecordedbytheancients,specificallyPolybiosandSallust,butalsoofAilianos,FrontinusandVegetius,thefewlatemedievalinstancesofsuccessfulmilitiawarfarefacedan uphill struggle, receiving recognition most notably in Machiavelli’s theoryof war.11 At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Italian scholar FrancescoPatrizi12andtheDutchphilologistJustusLipsius13wereforemostinpromotingGreekandRomanwarfareasthemodelformilitia-basedmilitaryorganisation.Thesetheoristsadvocatedthedeploymentofmilitiaforcesfordefensivepurposesanddemandedthatrulersshouldtakeproactiveattitudestowarfare,namelybymakingpreparationsforwarintimesofpeaceortruce.Asmilitiaforceswerenotreadyforbattleimmediatelyafterrecruitment,planningwarbecametheessentialprerequisitefortheiruse,regardlessoftheweaponstechnologyused.Asplanningrequirestheory,theorganisationofmilitiaforceshastendedtobeconnectedwitheffortstolaydowninwritingthoughtsonwarfare.Grotius’slegaltheoryofwarthusneedstobeunderstoodagainstcontemporaryDutchmilitarypractice.14

The need to plan war, if militia forces were to be deployed, ushered in aconservativeapproachtoweaponstechnology.Intheentiretimespannedbythefourteenth,fifteenth,sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,therewasonlyonecaseofaweapons-drivenpracticeof trainingwarriorbands,bothprofessionalsandmilitiamen.ThiscaserelatedtotheEnglishlongbowmen,forwhomgovernment-

10 Jean-CharlesChevalierdeFolard,Histoire de Polybe. Enrichi de notes critiques et historiques(6vols,Amsterdam,1753),vol.1.

11 NiccolòMachiavelli,L’arte della guerra (Verona,1979).Forastudyof this, seeMartin Hobohm’s still indispensable work, Machiavellis Renaissance der Kriegskunst (2vols,Berlin,1913).

12 FrancescoPatrizi,La militia Romana(Ferrara,1583).Patrizi,De paralleli militari(2vols,Rome,1594–95).

13 Justus Lipsius, De milicia Romana libri quinque (Antwerp, 1595). Lipsius,Poliorceticon(Antwerp,1596).

14 HugoGrotius,De jure belli ac pacis libri tres,lib.II,cap.1(Paris,1625).


stipulatedtrainingmeasuresarealreadyonrecordfromthefourteenthcentury.15Theeffectiveuseofthelongbowbylightlyarmed,poorlyprotectedcombatantsrequiredpre-combattrainingandrepetitiveexercisesundergovernmentcontrolandthecompositionoftacticalformationsmadeupfromlongbowmenandheavilyarmed cavalry capable of giving support to and willing to serve the archers.16Fifteenth-century Italian warfare provided evidence that this unique type ofmilitaryorganisationcouldbeusedoutsideEnglandonlyunderthecommandof English kings, as at Agincourt,17 or by commercially operating Englishcommanders.18Bythemiddleofthesixteenthcentury,thelongbowmenprovidedthemodelfortheregularisedTrainedBandsascharacteristicallyEnglishfightingforces.19TheEnglishTrainedBandshadaheavyimpactoncombatinthecourseoftheEightyYearsWar,boththroughtheirdirectparticipationassubsidiariestotheDutchsideandbyprovidingtheempiricalrecordforthesalienceoftrainingwarriorsandplanningwarattimesofpeace.20

Private and Public Actors in International Relations

The Eighty Years War, however, does not only present the case of a contestbetweentworivaltypesofmilitaryorganisation,butalsoarecordofthediversityof actorship in international relations. While the conduct of war against theSpanish armed forces, deployed in and to the Netherlands, was considered asthe legitimate activity of Dutch ruling institutions, private trading companieswerethoughttoactontheirownbehalfandattheirownriskinrelationswithrulersorstatesinAfricaandAsia.DuringthelatterpartoftheEightyYearsWar,theVOC, incorporatedfromsix local tradingcompaniesandcharteredwithamonopolyoftradebetweentheNetherlandsandplaceseastoftheCapeofGoodHopeandwestoftheStraitsofMagellanin1602,becamethemostsuccessfulofthesetradingcompanies,oustingPortuguesetradersfromsomeoftheirpositionsalongthecoastsofAfricaandAsia,interveningheavilyintheinnerAsiantradeandestablishingamonopolyoftradebetweenJapanandEurope.ThecharteralsogavelicensetotheVOCtoconcludetreatieswithrulersintheareasassignedtoit,tobuildfortresses,secureplaces,appointgovernorsanddeployarmedforces,

15 EdwardIII,[Ordonnance,dated1June1363],inThomasRymer(ed.),Foedera, conventions, literæ conventiones cujuscunque generis act publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosuis imperatores, reges … habita aut tractata(TheHague,1740),vol.3,pt2,p.79.

16 SeeJimBradbury,The Medieval Archer(Woodbridge,1992).17 SeeAlfredHigginsBurne,The Agincourt War,newedn(Ware,1999),pp.76–96.18 GeoffreyTrease,Die Condottieri(Munich,1973),pp.41–3.19 RogerAcham,Toxophilus(London,1545),pp.32,33,53,55,58,59,60–62.20 For further references, seeHaraldKleinschmidt,Tyrocinium militare (Stuttgart,

1989),pp.32–5.


tomaintainorderandadministerjusticeinitsowncapacity.Inotherwords,theStatesGeneralasthegovernmentoftheUnitedNetherlandsusedtheirthenself-claimedsovereigntytoequiptheVOCwithessentiallysovereignrights,therebyconstituting the company as an international actor in the areas and seawaysassignedtoit.TheVOCuseditsprivilegestoconcludecontractswiththeShahofIranandvariousrulersintheIndonesianarchipelago.21Theadmissionoftradersasregularactorsininternationalrelationshadastrongimpactontheconductofwarwherewaroccurredatall.

The common effect of the deployment of militia forces and the admissionof traders as international actors was the imposition of constraints on warfare.Organisers of militia forces would be subject to the demand that militiamenshould not be exposed to life-threatening campaigns unless these campaignswere warranted by the demonstrable need for the defence of the realm.22 Inthe courseof theEightyYearsWar, theVOCmanaged to conduct itsmilitaryoperationswithoutreducingstakeholderprofitsfromthetrade,whiletheHouseofOrangeastheleadersofthemilitaryresistanceagainsttheSpanishgovernmentsucceededinmobilisingafightingforcethat,thoughnottakenseriouslyatfirstbyitsopponents,wouldeventuallypavethewayforSpanishwithdrawalfromthenorthernNetherlands.Bythesametoken,theDutchmilitaryleaders licensedtheVOCtomaintainitsownarmedforcesbecausetheyassignedtothecompanythetaskofdrivingitsPortuguese-Spanishcompetitorsawayfromtheirstrongholdsonthecoastsof theIndianOcean.TheEightyYearsWarthus imposeddiverseandirreconcilabledemandsonbothconflictingparties.TheOraniandecisionto

21 Forthecharter,seetheeditionandtranslationinEllaGepken-Jager,GerardvanSolingeandLevinusTimmermann(eds),VOC 1602–2002. 400 Years of Company Law(Deventer:Kluwer,2005),pp.23–4(original),pp.34–5(translation).Thechartergaveexpressiontothemonopolyinthelegalformofbarringentrytoanyshipnotbelongingtothecompany(exceptforshipsholdingatemporarylicensethathadpreviouslybeenissuedandretainedvalidityuntilthedateofitsexpiration)totheareasandseawaysassignedtoVOC.ThechartertherebypreventedtheStatesGeneralfromdispatchingitsownvesselsto seaways eastof theCapeofGoodHope.Hence thegrantingof themonopolywasconsistentwith charteringof the company to conduct its own affairs in the areas andseawaysassignedtothem.Forthetreaties,seeJanErnstHeeres(ed.),Corpus diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum(TheHague:Nijhoff,1931),vol.1,passim,especiallypp.370–80(nr CXLVI), pp. 31–3 (nr XIV) (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde vanNederlandsch-Indië.87.)HugoGrotius,Mare liberum. Sive De iure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia[written1604–1605](Leiden,1618),pp.15–20,64–5.

22 ForstudiesseeChristianAntonKrollmann,Das Defensionswerk im Herzogtum Preußen(2 vols, Berlin, 1904–1909); Rolf Naumann, Das kursächsische Defensionswerk (Leipzig,1916);andRainerWohlfail,“DasHeerwesenimÜbergangvomRitter-zumSöldnerheer”,inJohannesKunischandBarbaraStollberg-Rilinger(eds),Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte der frühen Neuzeit(Berlin,1986),pp.107–27.


organisethewarasthecollectiveself-defenceoftheresidentpopulationagainstan allegedly illegitimate and tyrannical alien government forced the SpanishsidetoconductitsattackswithtroopsandsuppliesshippedtothebattlefieldsintheNetherlandsfromfar-awaylocationsinSpainandotherpartsofEurope.AstheSpanishsidecouldhopetocrushtheDutchresistancemerelythroughthemassivedeploymentofprofessionaltroopswithheavyweaponry,themostchallengingtaskwastheprovisionofsuchwarriorsandsupplies.Bycontrast,themostdemandingchallengefortheOraniansidewastolimitthesizeoftheDutchfightingforces,soasnottoimposeconstraintsontheeconomyandretainthecapabilityofdrillingthemilitiamen.Whiletheorganisationoftheso-calledSpanishRoadhasreceivedsomeattentionamonghistorians,23theOranianmilitiareformshaveattractedfewscholarsoutsidetheNetherlandsandGermany,eventhoughtheirsignificancefortheanalysisofseventeenth-centurywarfareisfargreaterthanthatoftheirfoes.24ThisissobecausetheOranianscreatedasetoftacticalschemesaimedatreducingthenumberofcombatantswithoutjeopardisingfightingpowerandsystematisedthetacticalformationsinheritedfromtheEnglishlongbowmen.Foremostamongthetacticalschemeswerethepracticeofrollingfire(asevenParkerhasrecentlyadmitted)andtheevolutionofthedrilltoperformit(whichParkerhascontinuedtounderrate,althoughitwastheessentialpreconditionfortheimplementationof the tactic).25Rollingfirewas a significant innovation because it allowed thecontinuinguseoffirearmsbysmallbattalionswhosesizepermittedmobilityandthus allowed commanders to shift units across the battlefield in the course ofcombat.Rollingfirecouldonlybeaccomplished if combatantswere trained toperform the necessary movements with their weapons and position themselvesvariouslywithintheirbattalionwhileunderenemyfire.Inotherwords,thedrillwasnotanaccidentaloddityaddedtoOranianwarfare,butitsessentialprecondition.

The Mechanicism Informing the Oranian Reforms

It seems that the military reformers in the House of Orange, supplementingLipsius’s work on the Roman military, drew on three sources for their drillcommands,namelyancientGreekmilitarytrainingmanuals,lansquenettradition

23 GeoffreyParker,The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road(Cambridge,1972).René Quatrefages, Le Tercio. Thèse (Université de Paris IV, 1975) [Spanish version(Madrid,1983)].

24 The major source on the Dutch military reforms is Werner Hahlweg (ed.),Die Heeresreform der Oranier. Das Kriegstagebuch des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen(Wiesbaden,1973).

25 Geoffrey Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs. Maurice ofNassau,theBattleofNieuwpoort(1600)andtheLegacy”,Journal of Military History,71(2007):331–72.


recordedfromthelatefifteenthcenturyandthepracticeoftheEnglishTrainedBands.ThecombinationofthesethreesourcesconstitutedthebeginningofDutchmilitarydrillpracticeinthe1590s.Bythefirstdecadeoftheseventeenthcentury,thepracticewasbecomingsystematisedtothedegreethatdrillmanualswentintoprintdisplayingdrillingwarriorsandlistingcommands.Theresult,tocutalongandcomplicatedstoryshort,26wasawell-organisedarmedforcecomposedofsmallbattalionsthatcouldbemovedonthebattlefield.War,astheOraniansconceivedit,wastofollowman-maderules,tobecomesubjecttopre-combatplanningandtobeconductedbyfightingforcesas if theyweremobilemachines.27Yet,onceconstructed, themachines signifiedtheregularityofprocessandthecontinuityofstructure.Themachineswouldnotchangeattheirowndiscretionandthroughtheirownwill.AsHobbeswouldsay:“TheMachinewasanartificialMan”.28

Themechanisticmodelassociatedwithwardidnotariseasamerecontingencyattheturnoftheseventeenthcentury,sincecontemporarypoliticalthinkersemphasisedhumanactionasaconditionforthecomingintoexistenceofinstitutionsofruleandpoliticalorderwithinandacrossstates.Theydidsowithincreasingfrequencyinthecourseof theseventeenthcentury.Theinsertionofhumanwill in themakingandtransformationofinstitutionsofrulehaslongbeenacceptedasthecorecharacteristicofrebellionsorganisedbylocalneighbourhoodsseekingtoasserttheirfreedomagainstan outside authority.29 The number of records of violent protest among rebelliousneighbourhoodgroupsincreaseddramaticallyfromthesixteenthcenturyonwards.30TheunrestspreadingintheNetherlandsduringthesecondhalfofthesixteenthcenturywasmerelyonecase,butone thathasbeengiven importancebecause it spiltoverfromadomesticneighbourhoodprotestintoawaragainstthethengloballyoperatingpredominant European military power. In other words, it was not primarily themobilisationofneighbourhoodresistancecapabilitythathasboostedthesignificance

26 Kleinschmidt,Tyrociniummilitare,pp.96–149.27 JohannJakobivonWallhausen,Progamma schola militaris(Frankfurt,1616),pp.

17–23,specificallynosV,X,XII.28 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction (London, 1651), p. 1. Newly ed.

RichardTuck(Cambridge,1991),p.9.29 SeePeterBlickleandElisabethMüller-Luckner(eds),Theorien kommunaler Ordnung

in Europa(Munich,1996);Blickle(ed.),Resistance, Representation and Community(Oxford,1997);Blickle,Kommunalismus (2 vols,Munich,2000);Blickle, “Die ‚Consociatio’ beiJohannes Althusius alsVerarbeitung kommunaler Erfahrung”, in Blickle, Thomas OttoHüglin andDieterWyduckel (eds),Subsidiarität (Berlin, 2002), pp. 215–35;FrantišekGraus,Struktur und Geschichte; Drei Volksaufstände im mittelalterlichen Prag(Sigmaringen,1971); Knut Schulz, Denn sie lieben die Freiheit so sehr. Kommunale Aufstände und die Entstehung des europäischen Bürgertums im Hochmittelalter(Darmstadt,1992).

30 Andreas Würgler, Unruhen und Öffentlichkeit Städtische und ländlicheProtestbewegungenim18.Jahrhundert(Tübingen,1995).


oftheDutchRevolt,butitseffectontheconductofinternationalrelationswithinand beyond Europe. The leaders of the Dutch Revolt successfully asserted theirwillingnessnotmerelytorestoreautonomytotheirgovernment,butalsotomanifestthemselvesasprivatelyoperatinginstitutionalactorsacrosstheinternationalsystem.Inbothrespects,thelegalmechanismusedtoaccomplishthesegoalswasthecontract.Althoughconjurationshavebeenrecordedsincetheeighthcentury,31andeventhoughtheideaofmakingacontracttoestablishlegitimategovernmentwasalreadyusedintheurbanfoundationchartersofthetwelfthcentury,32itwastheDutchRevoltthatprovidedthefirstrecordofwillingnesstoorganiseneighbourhoodresistanceagainstaperceived alien ruler on thebasis of awritten and formally approved contract.33Whereassincethefourteenthcenturycontractualismhadbeenemployedasatheorylegitimisingmonarchicalgovernment,34andcontinuedtobeusedinthesixteenth35

31 SeeOttoGerhardOexle,“GildenalssozialeGruppeninderKarolingerzeit”,inHerbertJankuhn,WalterJanssen,RuthSchmidt-WiegandundHeinrichTiefenbach(eds),DasHandwerk in vor- und frühgeschichtlicher Zeit(Göttingen,1981),pp.284–354.

32 Forinstance,seetheearlytwelfth-centuryFreiburgtownprivilege,ed.FriedrichKeutgen, Urkunden zur städtischen Verfassungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1899), Nr 133. Forfurtherevidence,seeCharlesPetit-Dutaillis,Les communes françaises(Paris,1947),S.26–36;ChristophDartmann,“InnereFriedensschlüsseindenitalienischenStadtkommunen.ÖffentlicheInteraktionundschriftlicheFixierung”,Frühmittelalterliche Studien,38(2004):355–69;GerhardDilcher,Bürgerrecht und Stadtverfassung(Cologne,WeimarandVienna,1996); andDilcher, “BürgerrechtundBürgereid als städtischeVerfassungsstruktur”, inRainerChristophSchwinges(ed.),Neubürger im späten Mittelalter. Migration und Austausch in der Städtelandschaft des alten Reiches (1250–1550)(Berlin,2002),pp.83–97.

33 Explicitly in the Pacification of Gent of 1576, the Union of Utrecht of 1579andtheedictoftheStatesGeneralof1581.PrintedinTexts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands,editedbyErnstHeinrichKossman[n]andAlbertFredrikMellink(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1974),pp.126–35,165–73,216–28.

34 WillemP.Blokmans,“Ducontratféodalàlasouveraintetédupeuple”,inAssemblee di stati e istituzioni rappresentative nella storia del pensiero politico moderno(Rimini,1983),pp. 135–50; Yves Marie-Joseph Congar, “Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari etapprobaridebet”,Revue historique de droit français et étranger,6(1958):210–259;AntonioMarongiu,“DasPrinzipderDemokratieundderZustimmung”,Studia Gratiana,vol.8(1962):555–75;WernerNäf,“HerrschaftsverträgeunddieLehrevomHerrschaftsvertrag”,Schweizer Beiträge zur allgemeinen Geschichte,7(1949):26–52;Näf(ed.),Herrschaftsverträge des Spätmittelalters(Bern,1951);GerhardOestreich,“DieIdeedesreligiösenBundesunddie Lehre vom Staatsvertrag”, inWilhelm Berges (ed.), Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie. Festgabe für Hans Herzfeld (Berlin, 1958), pp. 11–32; Gaines Post, “ARomano-canonicalMaxim‘Quodomnestangit’inBracton”,Traditio,4(1946):197–251;Post,“ARomanLegalTheoryofConsent”,Wisconsin Law Review(1950):66–78.

35 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Eyght Bookes (London,1594), pp. 70–73. JuandeMariana,De rege et regis institutione libri III, lib. I, cap. 1(Toledo,1599),pp.21–2.


andseventeenthcenturies,36theideologuessupportingtheDutchRevoltwentfurther.Theyusedtheinstitutionoftheconjurationnotmerelytoestablishthelegitimacyofgovernment,butalsotochartercontractualprivatetradingcompaniesandtoequipthemwiththeprivilegetoconductinternationalrelationsontheirown.37

Inshort,whilepoliticaldecision-makersattheturnoftheseventeenthcenturydeemedhumanactioncapableofprovokingtransformationsofpowerrelations,they perceived the structure and composition of the international system asunchangeableandbeyondthereachofhumanwill.38Withouthimselfemployingbalance-of-powerarguments,Grotiusfollowedsuitindemandingthat,inpursuitoflegitimateself-interest,rulersshouldnotmakeuseofallavailableandnotevenofalllegitimatestrategies,whetherinpreparationsfororintheconductofwars.39

Military and International Relations Theory: The Ethics of Self-Constraint, the Law of War and the Preservation of Stability

The Impacts of Political Aristotelianism and Augustinian Peace Theology

The decades around 1600 witnessed an unprecedentedly high density ofprinted works on politics, mostly but not exclusively drawing on thephilosophyofAristotle.40Whilesomeauthors,suchasCrucé,41Althusius42andArnisaeus,43havereceivedagooddealofattentionamonghistoriansofpoliticalthought,thegeneralattitudetowardsauthorswritingbetweenMachiavelliandHobbeshasbeenoneofneglect,astheseauthorshavebeenjudgedmainlymerelytorestateconventions.Whilethisverdictisfairtotheextentthatmanyauthorsof

36 JohannesAlthusius[praes.],HugoPelletarius[resp.],Disputatio politica de regno recte instituendo et administrando(Herborn,1602),theses6–56.Althusius,Politica methodice digesta,lib.I,cap.2,lib.I,cap.7,lib.IX,cap.12,lib.XIX,cap.12,thirdedn(Herborn,1614)[newlyed.CarlJoachimFriedrich(Cambridge,1932),pp.15,16,90,161].

37 ForthetextoftheVOCcharter,seeabove,note21.38 Keckermann,Systema,p.901.Theorists secondedandproclaimedthat formof

governmentasthebestthatwouldbeleastlikelyofsuccumbingtochange.39 Grotius,De iure belli,lib.II,cap.18,19.40 Forthecontext,seeWilhelmBleek,Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland

(Munich,2001),pp.62–4.41 EmericdeCrucé, Le nouveau Cynée [1623](Paris,1976).Englishversions.t.:The

New Cineas[1623](Philadelphia,1909).42 Althusius,Politica methodice digesta,passim.43 Henning Arnisaeus, Doctrina politica in genuinam methodum quae est Aristotelis

reducta(Frankfurt,1612).On Arnisaeus, see Horst Dreitzel, Protestantischer Aristotelismus und absoluter Staat. Die Politica des Henning Arnisaeus (c.1575–1636)(Wiesbaden,1970).


thelatersixteenthandtheearlierseventeenthcenturieswrotewithintheconfinesofAristotelianismandafewderivedtheirpositionfromtheYoungerStoa,44theverdictshouldnotbeusedtodenythatauthorslikeBartholomaeusKeckermanninGdanskandJustusLipsiusinLeidenwieldedconsiderableinfluenceintheirown time and should therefore be taken seriously as propagators of politicalthought. Of these, the Calvinist Aristotelian polymath Keckermann had thewidestinfluenceacrossthedisciplines,rangingfromtheologytogeography.45

44 Cf. Günter Abel, Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit (Berlin and New York, 1978);AlbertineMariavandeBilt,Lipsius’ De Constantia en Seneca,Ph.D.Diss.(CatholicUniversityofNimwegen,1946);JulienEymardd‘Angers,“LeStoicismeenFrancedans lapremièremoitiéduXVIIesiècle”,Etudes franciscaines,N.S.,vol.2(1952),pp.287–97,389–400,vol.3 (1953),pp.5–20,133–57;LeonardForster, “LipsiusandRenaissanceNeostoicism”, inAnthonyStephens,HaroldLeslieRogersandBrianCoghlan(eds),Festschrift for Ralph Farrell(Bern,1977),pp.201–20;MartinvanGelderen,“TheMachiavellianMomentandtheDutchRevolt.TheRiseofNeostoicismandDutchRepublicanism”,inGiselaBock,QuentinSkinnerandMaurizioViroli(eds),Machiavelli and Republicanism(Cambridge,1990),pp.205–23;Gelderen,“HollandunddasPreußentum”,Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung,23(1996):29–56;SimoneHopchet,Le Stoicisme de Juste Lipse,Ph.D.Thesis(UniversityofLouvain,1942);JacquelineLagrée,Juste Lipse et la restauration du Stoicisme(Paris,1994);JacquelineLagrée(ed.),Le Stoicisme aux XIVe et XVIIe siècles(Caen,1994);BoLindberg,Stoicism och stat. Justus Lipsius och den politiska humanism(Stockholm,2001);EcoO.G.HaitsmaMulier,“Neostoicisme en het vroegmoderne Europa”, Theoretische geschiedenis, 5 (1978): 69–82;Mulier, “Het neostoicisme in de zeventiende eeuw”, Theoretische geschiedenis, 9 (1982):130–33;GerhardOestreich, “Der römischeStoizismusunddie oranischeHeeresreform”,Historische Zeitschrift,176(1953):17–43;Oestreich,“DieantikeLiteraturalsVorbildderpraktischenWissenschaften”,inRobertRalphBolgar(ed.),Classical Influences on European Culture(Cambridge,1976),pp.315–24;Oestreich,Neostoicism and the Early Modern State,ed.BrigittaOestreichandHelmutGeorgKoenigsberger(Cambridge,1982),especiallypp.13–27,39–55,57–75,76–89,90–117;Oestreich,Antiker Geist und moderner Staat beiJustus Lipsius,ed.MarianneElisabethHenrietteNicoletteMout(Göttingen,1989);JohnHearseyMcMillanSalmon,“StoicismandRomanExample.SenecaandTacitusinJacobeanEngland”,Journal of the History of Ideas,50(1989):199–225;PetrusHermannusSchrijvers,“JustusLipsius.Overstandvastigheidbijalgemenerampspoed”,Lampas,16(1983):107–28;CarlSiedschlag,Der Einfluß der niederländisch-neustoischen Ethik in der politischen Theorie zur Zeit Sullys und Richelieus(Berlin,1978);WernerWelzig,“ConstantiaundbarockeBeständigkeit”,Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte,35(1961):416–32;LeontineZanta,La Renaissance du Stoicisme au XVIe siècle(Paris,1914).

45 For studies on Keckermann, see Manfred Büttner, “Die Neuausrichtung derGeographieim17.JahrhundertdurchBartholomäusKeckermann”,Geographische Zeitschrift,63 (1975): 1–12; Büttner (ed.), Wandlungen im geographischen Denken von Aristoteles bis Kant (Paderborn, Munich,Vienna and Zurich, 1979), pp. 153–72; Friedrich Goedeking,Die “Politik” des Lambertus Danaeus, Johannes Althusius und Bartholomäus Keckermann.DDThesis,typescript(UniversityofHeidelberg,1977);andWillenHenrdikZuylen,Bartholomäus Keckermann. Sein Leben und sein Werk,Ph.D.Thesis(UniversityofTübingen,1934).


Keckermann’s posthumously published two-volume Systema systematumrepresents a grand attempt at cross-disciplinary analysis, wherein politics,togetherwitheconomicsandethics,founditsplaceinthedisciplineofPracticalPhilosophy.Keckermannassignedtopoliticsthetaskofanalysingthe“happinessorcivilbeautyofseveralhumans…consociatedinahouse”.46Althoughthehousemetaphorforthestatesuggestshumanbuildingactivityasthebasicconditionforstate-making,Keckermannpositionedmonarchyasthebestformofgovernmentbecauseheranked itas themost stable.According toKeckermann, thiswas sobecausemonarchywasbestorderedandmostdifficulttodivide,sinceunderthegovernmentofadivinelyordainedrulerithadthemostsolidunity.47Keckermannthus ranked the absence of change as the prime condition of happiness. Thepreservationofthestatusquoasaconditionofhappinessrequiredthepermanenceoforder,whichKeckermanndeemedmosteasilyaccomplishediftherewasonlyone divinely instituted ruler and a clear distinction between the giver and therecipientsofcommands.48Insuggestingthathumanactorshavethecapabilityofchoosingamongavarietyofformsofgovernment,Keckermannimplicitlysurmisedthat formsofgovernmentwereneithergivensnordivinelywilled.ThushewasmoreAristotelian thansomeofhis fourteenth-centurypredecessors.49However,hearguedthathumanbeingsshouldreasonablyoptforthatformofgovernmentwhich,hethought,mostcontributedtomaintainingthedivinelywilledstabilityoftheworld.Thus,inhisquestforstability,KeckermannwasinlinewithauthorstheorisingonthejusticeofwaratthetimeoftheEightyYearsWar.

Inessence,justwartheorieswereelaborationsoftheAugustininantheologicalparadigm that prevailed into the late Scholastic law theories of the sixteenthcentury,50whichadmittedsolelytherestitutionofpreviouslyreceivedinjusticeasalegitimatewaraimandsoughttoconstitutejustwarasameansofrestoringpeaceinamorestableconstitution.Inpromotingthesequenceofpeace–war–peace,theAugustininantheologicalparadigmpositionedwarasasinfultemporaryhumaninfringementofthedivinelywilledconditionofpeace,whilealsoboostingthe

46 Keckermann, Systema, pp. 890, 891. “Consociatio” is a Lipsian term, alsoappearinginAlthusius,Politica.

47 Keckermann,Systema,p.901.48 Keckermann,Systema,p.900.49 CfEngelbertofAdmont,“DeortuetfineRomaniimperii”,cap.2,ed.Melchior

GoldastofHaiminsfeld,Politica imperialia(Frankfurt,1614),p.755,andJohnQuidortofParis,De potestate regia et papali, cap.1, ed.FritzBleienstein (Stuttgart,1969),pp.75–8.Engelbertregardeduniversalruleasdivinelyinstituted.

50 SeeFranciscodeVitoria,“Relectiodepotestatecivili[1528]”,inVitoria,Relectiones morales(Cologne,1696),p.5.


questforstrategiestowardsperpetualpeace.51Thus,atthetimeoftheEightyYearsWar,pamphleteerEmericdeCrucétookupthefifteenth-centurypleainfavouroftakingdeliberategovernmentactionforthepurposeofeffectivelyendingwarthroughtheformationofsomefederationofstatesandtheirrulers.52Crucé’sideathatgovernmentsshouldpurposefullyagreetoendallwars,therebyreconstitutingthedivinelywilledpeace,wasnotentirelyspeculative.In1518,severalEuropeanrulers,mostlikelyinducedbyErasmusofRotterdam’speacetractQuerela pacisof 1517, and including Emperor Maximilian I, had already signed an actualtreatyinstitutingageneralpeaceinEuropeandobligatingthesignatorypartiestorefrainfromresortingtowarandinsteadtosubmittheircontroversiestoaninstitutionofarbitration.53Thetreatyhadobviouslimitations.ItwasconfinedtotheChristianrulersofEuropeandhadanaggressivebackgroundinthatitwasconcludedforthepurposeoffacilitatingacrusadeagainsttheOttomanTurkishEmpire.Moreover,thetreatyfailedtoaccomplishitsgoal,sincetheinstitutionofarbitrationwasnotputintoaction.Nevertheless,thetreatyremainedontheagendaofdiplomatsuntil1525,albeitmainlyasthefocalpointofaccusationsthat ithadbeenbroken.54Thus the treatyprovidedevidence to theeffect thatjustwartheorieswerenotconfinedtothearcanerealmofpuretheory,butcouldactuallyhaveanimpactonthepracticalconductofinternationalrelations.

Lipsius’s Ethics of Self-Constraint and Grotius

Theinfluenceofjustwartheorieswasrestrictedneithertosettingtheagendafordiplomaticquibblesnortoestablishingtheconditionsforendingspecificwarsinaparticularpartoftheworld.Instead,themetaphysicsinformingjustwartheoriespromotedtheconstructionofaframeworkofnormsandrulespositionedabove

51 KurtvonRaumer,Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance(FreiburgandMunich,1953),pp.2–3.

52 Cruce,Cineas. Previousproposals in the samedirectionweremadebyGeorgeofPodiebrad,KingofBohemia, in the1460s, and contemporaneouslywithCrucébyMaximiliendeBéthunedeSully,Sully’s Grand Design of Henry IV [1607],ed.DavidOgg(London,1921).

53 ThetextofthepeacetreatyhasbeeneditedbyThomasRymer,Foedera, conventions, litteræ et cujusque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvius imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes vel communitates(London,1714),vol.13,pp.624–9[reprint(Farnborough,1967)],and by Jean Dumont, Baron de Carels-Croon, Corps diplomatique universel (The Hague,1726),vol.4,pt1,No.125,pp.269–75.Adler restated theproposal in1944:MortimerJeromeAdler,How to Think about War and Peace[1944](NewYork,1995),pp.158–9.

54 Onthetreatyanditsaftermath,seeHaraldKleinschmidt,Charles V. The World Emperor(Stroud,2005),pp.94–102.GarrettMattingly,“AnEarlyNon-AggressionPact”,Journal of ModernHistory,10(1938):1–30.Mattingly,Renaissance Diplomacy(LondonandBoston,1955).


rulersandthestatesundertheircontrol.ThegistofthewritingsofJustusLipsiusonpoliticaltheoryandthetheoryofinternationalrelationsconsistsofspecifyingthemetaphysicaloriginofuniversallyapplicablenormsandrulesfortheconductofinternationalrelations.WhileLipsiusdrewonmedievalcontractualismforhistheoryofthelegitimacyofgovernment,heappearstohavebeenthefirsttheoristtoapplythelegacyofcontractualisminthecontextoftheDutchRevolt,intheaftermathoftheUnionofUtrecht.55ItthusmadesenseforLipsiustospecifythatthehypotheticalcontractbetweentheruledandtheirappointedrulerconsistedinthedualismoftheruler’sobligationtoprovidesecurityfortheruledandtheobligationoftheruledtosupplyloyaltytotheruler.

Advising rulers on what he considered to be proper behaviour before andduringawar,Lipsiuswrote:

[N]evermakeanyattackthatisnotpermittedbycustom,andreason.Forwar,likepeace,hasitslaws:andyoumustwagewarnolessjustlythancourageously.Andindeedineverycommonwealththelawsofwarmustbeespeciallyupheld.Because rashly to go to war, and join battle with the enemy, is somethingheinousandclosetobeastlybehaviour.Andifweallowittohappen,whatelsewilltherebethanwarsbetweenallnations?Andshallwe,afterthemannerofBarbarians,avengekillingwithkillingandbloodwithblood?Weshouldnot.Andmaythefollowingideasneverpenetrateyourmind:Justiceisaquestionofarms,andeverythingbelongstohimwhoisstrong.56

Through his demand that rulers should constrain their rightful competence toresorttowar,Lipsiusestablishedanethicsofself-constraint.Despitehisdeclared

55 ForLipsius’seditionsandcommentaries, seeespeciallyJustusLipsius, [CorneliiTaciti] Historiarum et Annalium libri qui exstant … eiusdem Taciti liber de moribus Germanorum, Iulii Agricolae vita, Dialogus de oratore(Antwerp,1574);Lipsius,Ad Annales Cornelii Taciti liber commentaries sive notae (Antwerp, 1581); Lipsius, Animadversiones in Tragoedias quae L[ucio] Annaeo Senecae tribuntur (Leiden, 1588); Lipsius, Lucii Annaei Senecae Philosophi Opera quae exstant (Antwerp,1605).ForhisworkonpoliticalphilosophyseeJustusLipsius,Politicorum sive de doctrina civilis libri sex (Leiden,1589),Englishversion,Six Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine,ed.WilliamJones(London,1594)[reprint(AmsterdamandNewYork,1970)].Newlyed.JanWaszink(Assen,2004).IhaveusedWaszink’stranslationwithmodifications.Lipsius,De constancia libri duo(Antwerp,1584).ForcontractarianstatementswithinthepoliticaltheoryoftheDutchRevoltseeCopie eens sendtbriefs der Ridderschap, Edelen ende Steden van Holland(Dordrecht,1573),p.AIII.Discours contenant le vray entendement de la Pacification de Gand(1579),p.23.

56 Lipsius,Politicorum,p.128;ed.Waszink,p.540.ItisnoteworthythatLipsius,contrarytosomeofhismorepoliticallymindedcontemporaries,spotted“barbarians”inantiquity,notintheAmericas.


sympathyfortherealistaspectsofMachiavelli’spoliticaldoctrines,57Lipsiusarguedthatrulersshouldsubjectthemselvestomoralconstraintsinaccordancewithreasonandactinaccordancewithsuchconstraintsevenintheextremecircumstancesofwar.FollowingAquinas,hedemandedthatmorallawsofwarshouldbeacceptedbyallcontendingpartiesforthepurposeofreducingthelikelihoodofwarsandtheamountofviolencecommittedintheircourse.Inadditiontothis,hemaintainedthat humankind existed as a metaphysical unity overarching the multifariousantagonisticwarringterritorialpolitiesandurbancommunitiesandwasmanifestassuchinauniversalethics.Inthisrespect,heagreedonprinciplewiththesixteenth-centuryproponentsofinternationallaw,butemphasisedmorestronglythantheythenecessitythatuniversalethicsshouldandcouldbeacceptedvoluntarily:

Ifwerespectthewholenatureofman,alltheseearthlycountriesarevainandfalselysotermed,exceptonlyinrespectofthebodyandnotofthemindorsoulwhich,descendingdownfromthathighesthabitation,deemallthewholeearthasagaolorprison.Butheavenisourtrueandrightfulcountry,whether letusadvanceallourcogitationsthatwemayfreelysaywithAnaxagorastosuchasfoolishlyaskuswhetherwehavenoregardtoourcountry?Yes,verily,butyonderisourcountry,liftingourfingerandminduptowardsheaven.58

In thispassage,Lipsiusemployeda seriesofconventions.HedrewonancientGreekphilosophyforthejuxtapositionofthebodyandthesoulandjoinedtoittheimageryofheavenandearth.Yet,unliketheauthorsofhisGreeksources,Lipsiuswasnotinterestedinontology.Instead,heusedtheconventionalphrasesinthecontextofhisinternationaltheoryinordertodemonstratethatthemanifestlyexistingpluralismandparticularismofterritorialpolitiesandurbancommunitiesstood, as antagonistic spaces of regular communication, in opposition to thetheoreticalpostulateofthemoralunityofhumankindasawhole.Hence,whenrelieved of the fusion of the Platonic body-versus-soul dichotomy with theAnaxagorean earth-versus-heaven imagery, Lipsius’s international theory madeexplicitthedemandthattheideaofhumankindshouldoverarchthemultitudeofantagonisticspacesofregularcommunicationintheworld.

Lipsius justified thisdemandon thegroundsof reason.Hedefined reasonmetaphoricallyas“atruesenseandjudgmentofthingshumananddivine”59and

57 LipsiusmentionedMachiavellitwicebrieflyinPoliticorum,ed.Waszink,pp.230,508.HepraisedMachiavelli’splea for fraudwith thequalification that fraudneeds toremainconfinedwithinthelimitsofprudence.ThepapalcensorPeregrinus,commentingon Lipsius’s work, objected to this position, accusing Lipsius of having pleading forfraudulentconduct.SeeLaeliusPeregrinus,[Report],ed.Waszink,pp.712–4.

58 Lipsius,Constancia,p.98.[spellingandpunctuationhavebeenmodernised].59 Lipsius,Constancie,p.79[spellingandpunctuationhavebeenmodernised].


accepteditastheultimatesourcefromwhichtheprinciplesgoverninghumankindasawholeweretobederived.Lipsiusarguedthatreasonleadsto“patience”,the“truemotherofconstancie”which,inturn,heprescribedforrulersas“arightandimmovablestrengthofthemind,neitherliftedupnorpresseddownwithexternalorcasualaccidents”.Ifnecessary,“themindmustbechanged,nottheplace”.60Onthisbasis,hecouldconcludethatonlyactinginaccordancewithreasoncouldusher in“constancie”or steadfastnessand thuscontribute to thewell-beingofterritorialpolitiesandurbancommunities.

AlthoughLipsiuspleadedforflexibilityintheconductofpoliticsheequated“constancie”withstabilitas loci,thewillingnesstoremainwhereoneis,andwithtranquillitas animi, the stability of the mind, the latter of which he expressedthroughthetechnicalmodelofthescales.Inthecontextofinternationalrelations,thismeantthattheseveralrulersrepresentingthediversityofantagonisticterritorialpolities andurban communities could commit themselves to themaintenanceof thestatusquoas theconditionof stabilityandpeace ifandas longas theyremained guided by reason. Lipsius was aware, however, of the difficulty thatrulershadtheoptionofactingunreasonablyandcouldnotbepreventedfromdoingso.Theywoulddoso,hethought,outofneglectofthepolitiesentrustedto their rule. Thus Lipsius had to create a juncture between humankind as auniversalmoralentityandthepluralismofco-existingrivalpolities.Tothatend,hedrewonthecontractualismarguedbyfourteenth-centurypoliticaltheorists:

Iconfess, I say, thateveryoneofushasan inclinationandgoodwill tohislessercountry.ThecauseswhereofIperceivearetoyouunknown.Youwouldhaveitfromnature.Butthetruthis,itgrowsofcustomorofsomedecreeandordinance.Forafterthatmenforsooktheirwildandsavagemanneroflivingandbegantobuildhousesandwalledtowns,tojoininsocietyandtousemeansoffensiveanddefensive.Beholdthenacertaincommunionnecessarilybeganamongthemandasocialparticipationofdiversethings.Theypartedtheearthbetweenthemwithcertainlimitsandbounds.Theyhadtemplesincommon,also market places, treasuries, seats of judgment. And principal ceremonies,rites, laws. All which things our greediness began in time so to esteem andmakeaccountofasiftheywereourowninparticular?Andsobetheyinsomesort,forthateveryprivatecitizenhadsomeinterestinthem,neitherdidtheydifferfromprivatepossessionssavingthattheywerenotwhollyinoneman’spower.Thisconsociationandfellowshipgavetheformandfashiontoanewerectedstatewhichnowwecallproperlythecommonwealthorourcountry.

60 Lipsius, Constancie, pp. 77–9. Similarly in the letter on travelling. See JustusLipsius, “De ratione cum fructu peregrinandi et praesertim in Italia. Epistola ad Ph.Lanyum”,inLipsius,Epistolarum selectarum tres centuriae(Antwerp,1691),no.XXII,pp.23–9[firstpublished(Antwerp,1581).


Whereinwhenmensawthechiefeststayofeachperson’ssafetytoconsist,lawswereenactedforthesuccouranddefencethereof.Oratleastsuchcustomswerereceivedbytraditionfromthepredecessorstotheirposteritythatgrewtobeoflikeforceaslaws.Herehenceitcomestopassthatwerejoiceatthegoodofthecommonwealthandbesorryforherharm.Becauseourownprivategoodsaresecurebyhersafetyandarelostbyheroverthrow.61

Lipsiususedcontractualismtodemarcatetheconceptualboundarybetweenthepublicandtheprivatespheresandprovidedanargumentinsupportofhispositionthatthesecurityoftheprivatespherecannotbeestablishedinseparationfromthesecurityofthepublicsphere.62Hedidsoinordertodefendtheexistenceofterritorialpolitiesandurbancommunitiesasinstitutionsforthelegitimatesafeguardofprivateproperty,andemphasisedthevoluntarismwithwhichhumanactorsenterintoacontractandrenouncesomeoftheirnaturalfreedom.Admittedly,LipsiusdidnotemploythefullyfledgedphraseologyofcontractualismwhichJuandeMariana,63FranciscoSuarez,64RichardHooker65andJohannesAlthusius66weretouseshortlyafterhim.Butvoluntarismwasinherentinhisconceptof“consociation”(whichAlthusiuswould laterborrow fromLipsius). Itwas fromthis rationalistnotionof “consociation” thatLipsiusderived the “commonwealth” through customordecreeandordinanceandneitherfromthedivinelyordainedworldordernor(ashisfellowAristotelianswoulddo)fromsomenaturalsociabilityofhumanbeings.Thenotionof“consociation”displaysLipsius’seffortstodisentanglecustomaryandstatutorylawastheappurtenancesofvoluntaristicallyestablishedspacesofregularcommunicationfromthemoralnormspertainingtohumankindasawhole.

AsLipsiuscomposedhisinternationaltheoryintheUnitedNetherlands,itwasappropriateforhimtoavailhimselfofsuchcontractualism.ThiswasbecausetheUnitedNetherlandshadbeenestablishedasapolitythroughanactualcontractlaiddowninacharter.ThisagreementwassignedatUtrechtin1579intheformof a union treaty among the councils of towns and cities and rural aristocratswhoweretryingtofreethemselvesfromSpanishrule.67Theconstitutionsofthe

61 Lipsius,Constancie,pp.95–6[spellingandpunctuationhavebeenmodernised].62 Forearliersixteenth-centuryallusionsbytheoriststocontractualismseeVitoria,

“Relectio”,p.5.MariusSalamonius,De principatu libri septem(Rome,1544),p.38.63 Mariana,De rege et regis institutione,lib.I,cap.1,pp.21–2.64 FranciscoSuarez,De legibus (III 1–16): de civili potestate,III/ii,4–6,ed.L.Pereña

andV.Abril(Madrid,1975),pp.24–7.65 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Eyght Bookes (London,

1594),pp.70–73[reprint(AmsterdamandNewYork,1971)].66 Althusius,Politica.67 Printed inErnstHeinrichKossman[n] andAlbert Fredrik Mellink (eds),Texts

Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands(Cambridge,1974),pp.165–73.


Dutchtownsandcities,liketownsandcitieselsewhereinEurope,providedthebestpossibleempiricalsupportforcontractualistpoliticaltheories.EventhoughLipsius regardedmonarchy as thebest formof government, hewas far fromawholeheartedsupporteroftheDutchRevoltandmayhaveleftLeidenin1591inprotestagainstwhatheperceivedasaradicalisationoftherevolutionarymomentum.The established contractualism enabled Lipsius to juxtapose his ethical view ofhumankindasalastingandstablemoralentitytohislegalisticperceptionofthediversityof“commonwealths”aslocal,law-governedbutantagonistic,competitiveandconstantlychanginginstitutionsoflegitimateruleestablishedforthedefenceofthespecificpropertyandinterestsofprivateindividuals.68

68 ForthedebateonLipsius’sattitudetowardstheDutchRevolt,seeJ.A.C.Lancée,“DepennestrijdtussenLipsiusenCoornherr”,Spiegel historiael,12(1977):671–6;Francinede Nave, “De polemiek tussen Justus Lispius en Dierck Volckertsy. Coornherr (1590).Hoofdoorzaak van Lipsius vertrek uit Leiden”, in De Gulden Passer, 48 (1970): 1–39.AgainstNave,MarianneElisabethHenrietteNicoletteMout,“Inhetschip.JustusLipsiusendeNederlandseopstandtot1591”,inSimonGroenveld,MarianneElisabethHenrietteNicoletteMoutandIvoSchöffer(eds),Bestuurdes en geleerden. Opstellen over onderwerpen uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis van de zestiende, zenevtiende ende achttiende eeuw, aangeboden aan Professor Jan Juliaan Woltjer bij zijn afschied als hoogleraar van de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden (Amsterdam,1985):55–64,arguedthat itwasnot the specificpolemicwithoneof his adversaries that induced Lipsius to leave Leiden but general disgruntlement withtheprocessoftherevolt.SeealsoMout,“JustusLipsiusandLeidenUniversity”, inAloïsGerlo (ed.), Juste Lipse (1547–1606). Colloque international (Brussels,1988),pp.84–99;Mout, “IdealesMuster oder erfundeneEigenart.RepublikanischeTheorienwährenddesniederländischenAufstands”,inHelmutGeorgKoenigsbergerandElisabethMüller-Luckner(eds),Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit(Munich,1988),pp.169–94;H.T.Oberman,“VanLeidennaarLeuven.DeovergangvanJustuisLipsiusnaareendeRoomscheuniversiteit”,Nederlandsch archief voor kerkgeschiedenis,N.S.,vol.5(1908):68–111,191–227,269–304.ForgeneralstudiesofLipsius’slifeandanalysesofhisworkseeKnudBanning,Justus Lipsius(Copenhagen,1975);RonnyDusoir,JeanineG.deLandtsheerandD. Imhof (eds), Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) en het Plantijnse Huis (Antwerp,1997);KarlAlfredEngelbertEnenkel,“DeneolatijnsePolitica.JustusLipsius,Politicorum libri sex”,Lampas,18(1985):350–362;EnenkelundChristianLambertHeesakkers(eds),Lipsius in Leiden. Studies in the Life and Works of a Great Humanist(Voorthuizen,1997);JeanineG.deLandtsheer(ed),Iam illustravit omnia. Justus Lipsius als lievelingsauteur van het Plantijnse huis (Antwerp, 2006); Justus Lipsius (1547–1606). Een geleerde en zijn Europese network. Catalogus van de tentoonstelling in de CentraleBibliotheek te Leuven, 18 Oktober–20 December 2006 (Louvain, 2006); Marc Laureys (ed.), The Work of Justus Lipsius. A Contribution Towards His Intellectal Biography(RomeandBrussels,1997);ChristianMouchel(ed.),Juste Lipse (1547–1606) en son temps. Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 1994(Paris,1996);FrancinedeNave, “JustusLipsius, schrijver ‘inpoliticis’”,Res publica, 11 (1969): 590–622;ViljoAdolfNordman,Justus Lipsius als Geschichtsforscher und Geschichtslehrer (Helsinki,1932);ThéophileSimar,“NoticessurleslivresdeJusteLipse”,Revue des bibliothèques,17(1907):


Hence, Lipsius’s unequivocal plea for monarchy as the best form ofgovernment and his close association with Oranian military leadership,specifically Maurice of Orange, positioned him against radical republicanism.He used the historiographical work ofTacitus, which he had carefully edited,tosupporthispleasthatrulersshouldusetheirlegitimatepowerwithprudence.Inextractinghistoriographicalsourcesformoralwisdom,Lipsiuswasinaccordwithhiscontemporaryhumanists.Consequently,LipsiusappreciatedTacitusforwhatheperceived as thehistorian’s insights into themoralityof rulers, ratherthan as a sourceof informationonRomanpolitics of thefirst centuryA.D.69

261–83;Tournoy,J.PapyandJeanineG.deLandtsheer(eds),Lipsius en Leuven. Catalogus van de tentoonstelling in de Centrale Bibliotheek te Leuven(Louvain,1997);Tournoy,J.PapyandJeanineG.deLandtsheer(eds),Iustus Lipsius Europae Lumen et Columen. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven, 17–19 September 1997(Louvain,1999);MaurizioViroli,From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics. 1250–1600(Cambridge,1992);HansWansink,Politieke wetenschappen aan de Leidse Universiteit. 1575–ca. 1650 (Utrecht, 1981); On early modern republicanism seeEstates and Revolutions(Ithaca,1971);HelmutGeorgKoenigsberger(ed.),Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit(MunichandVienna,1988).

69 ForargumentsagainstStoicismandinfavourofsomeTacitisminLipsius’swork,see Waszink, pp. 10–41, 93–8, 148–55. However, Waszink’s arguments are far fromconvincing. They boil down to the observation that Lipsius did not refer explicitly toconstantia inDe politicorum (p. 13).While this observation is correct, it bynomeanssupportstheconclusioninviewofthefactthatLipsiushadpublishedanentirebookonConstantiafiveyearsbeforeDe politicorum.Moreover,associatingLipsiusretrospectivelywithTacitusratherthanwiththeStoaneglectsthatfactthatLipsius’sworkwasreceivedoutsidetheNetherlandsinconjunctionwiththepleasforStoicpositions.Thiswasthecasespecificallyinthecontextofargumentsconcerningmilitaryreformsandtheformulationofideologiesofstateinstitutionbuilding.ItisnoteworthyinthisrespectthatthereceptionofLipsius’spolitical theorywasnotconfinedto theDutchCalvinistallies in theHolyRomanEmpirebut,despitetheobjectionsbytheVatican(note57),extendedfarintotheCatholicworld.OnthereceptionofLipsius’swork,seeBarbaraBauer,“JacobPontanusSJ,einoberdeutscherLipsius”,Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,47(1984):77–120;KarlAlfredBlüher,Seneca in Spanien. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Seneca-Rezeption in Spanien vom 13. bis 17. Jahrhundert(Munich,1969);TheodoreG.Corbett,“TheCultofLipsius.ALeadingSourceofEarlyModernSpanishStatecraft”,Journal of the History of Ideas,36(1975):139–52;GarethAlbanDavies,“TheInfluenceofJustusLipsiusonJuandeVerayFigueroa’sExbaxador(1620)”,Bulletin of Hispanic Studies,42(1965):160–73;MartinvanGelderen,Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt. 1550–1590(Cambridge,1992); Hans Hescher, “Justus Lipsius. Ein Vertreter des christlichen Humanismus inderkatholischenErneuerungsbewegungdes16. Jahrhunderts”,Jahrbuch für das Bistum Mainz,6(1954):196–31;Siedschlag,Einfluß;andMichaelStolleis,“Lipsius-Rezeptioninderpolitisch-juristischenLiteraturdes17.JahrhundertsinDeutschland”,Der Staat,26(1987):1–30.AccusingLipsiusofhavingremainedalooffromthemoreradicalvariants


However,contrarytomanyofhiscolleagues,Lipsiustookauniversalistapproachto the past and therefore refrained from usingTacitus to fuel proto-nationalistsentiment. Thus Lipsius’s praise ofTacitus made him as little into aTacitist ashispraiseofMachiavellimadehimintoaMachiavellian.Instead,theparamountgoalofhispolitical theoryremainedthe limitationofwarfare to thepursuitofdefensivewaraimsand,inthatrespect,reflectedthecontemporaryDutchmilitaryexperience. Because Lipsius was sceptical that rulers could be prevented fromcommitting immoral actions,heneeded to specify theconditionsunderwhichsuchactionscouldbepunishedintheinterestofhumankindandatthelevelof

ofcontemporaryDutchpoliticaltheoryappearsparochialinviewofthemassiveevidenceforhispopularity.Itiscorrect,however,tosaythatinpraisingTacitus’sapprovingreportontheriseoftheBataviansagainsttheancientRomans,Lipsiusdisplayedsomedegreeofopportunismtowardstherevolutionaryauthorities.ThepassageisinLipsius’scommentonTacitusof1581andhasbeenreeditedinJustusLipsius,Epistolae,ed.AloïsGerlo(Brussels,1978),vol.1,p.81.Forsixteenth-centuryTacitism,seePeterBurke,“Tacitism,ScepticismandReasonofState”,inJohnH.BurnsandM.Goldie(eds),The Cambridge History of Political Thought. 1450–1700(Cambridge,1991),pp.479–99;Else-EllyEtter,Tacitus in der Geistesgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts(Basel,1966.);PaulJoachimsen,“TacitusimdeutschenHumanismus”,Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik,27(1911):697–717; JoseRuysschaert,Juste Lipse et les Annales de Tacite(Turnhout,1949).KennethC.Schellhase,Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought (Chicago, 1976); Jürgen von Stackelberg, Tacitus in der Romania(Tübingen, 1960); André Stegmann, “LeTacitisme. Programme pour un nouvel essaidedéfinition”,Il pensiero politico,2(1965):445–58;HansTiedemann,Tacitus und das Nationalbewußtsein der deutschen Humanisten,Ph.D.Thesis(UniversityofBerlin,1913);EnriqueTiernoGalván,”EltacitismoenlasdoctrinaspoliticasdelSiglodeOroEspañol”,inTiernoGalván,Escritos. 1950–1960(Madrid,1971),pp.13–93;AndGiuseppeToffanin,Machiavelli e il “tacitismo”. La “political storia” al tempo della controriforma(Padua,1921).WaszinkhasalsobeencorrectininsistingthatOestreich’sweaknessforastrongstateandforsocialdisciplinehadcloserconnectionswiththeNaziperiodthanwithLipsius.OnOestreich,specificallyhisearlyworkbefore1945[Oestreich,“DaspersönlicheRegimentderdeutschenFürstenamBeginnderNeuzeit”,Die Welt als Geschichte,1(1935):218–37,300–316;Oestreich,“VomWesenderWehrgeschicht”,Historische Zeitschrift,162(1940):231–57],seeStefanBreuer,“Sozialdisziplinierung.ProblemeundProblemverlagerungeneinesKonzeptesbeiMaxWeber,GerhardOestreichundMichelFoucault”,inChristanSachsse and Florian Tennstedt (eds), Soziale Sicherheit und soziale Disziplinierung(Frankfurt,1985),pp.45–69;HansMaier,“Sozialdisziplinierung–einBegriffundseineGrenzen”,inPaoloProdi(ed.),Glaube und Eid(Munich,1993),pp.237–40;RalfPröve,“DimensionundReichweitederParadigmen‘Sozialdisziplinierung’und‘Militarisierung’imHeiligenRömischenReich”, inHeinzSchilling(ed.),Institutionen, Instrumente und Akteure sozialer Kontrolle und Disziplinierung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa (Frankfurt,1999),pp.65–85;andMohammedRassem,“Bemerkungenzur‘Sozialdisziplinierung’imfrühmodernenStaat”,Zeitschrift für Politik,N.F.,vol.30(1983):217–38.


international relationsoverarching the“consociations”of territorialpolities andurbancommunities.Lipsiusdemandedsuchpunishmentsasmandatorycoerciveactionsindefenceofthemoralintegrityofhumankindagainstthosewhowishedtoignorethepreceptsoftheethicsofself-constraint.Theonlyavailablemeansofenforcingsuchpunishmentswas,accordingtoLipsius,warfare.ThisconclusionwasonlyapparentlycontradictorybecauseLipsius,contrarytofourteenth-centurycontractualists,tookintoaccounttheabsenceofinstitutionsofuniversalruleandthushad topermit resorting towar as ameansof enforcing acceptanceof theethicsofself-constraintatthelevelofinternationalrelations.Hencehedemandedthatwarsshouldbelimitedtotheuseofforceasameansofenforcingsanctionsagainst thosewhochosetoactunreasonablyandagainst thestipulationsof theethicsofself-constraint.Inordertoexplicatetheseviews,Lipsiusnotonlydevotedthesectiononinternationalrelationsinhisbookonpoliticstowarfare,butalsoproducedtwomajorandwidelyreadworksonthetheoryandpracticeofwar.

Lipsius thus positioned his ethics of self-constraint at the metaphysicallyconstitutedlevelofhumankindasawhole,therebypostulatingauniversalethics.Asthisethicswasnotenforciblebydefinition,humanactorscouldsinfullydecideto act against its precepts and resort to war. But Lipsius refused to ascribe tohumanactorsthecapabilityoftransformingorevenannihilatingtheethics.Hisnotionoftheethicsofself-constraintthuscontainedatwofoldimpedimenttothe resort towar.First and foremost,Lipsius’s variant of contractualismmadetheprovisionofsecurityoneofrulers’highestdutiesandlegitimisedattitudesofcriticismtowardsrulerswhomtheruledhadreasontoidentifyaswarmongers.Moreover,Lipsius‘suniversalethicsobligedrulersnotmerelytoavoidwar,butalsotolimitthedeploymentofmilitaryforcetowhatappearedtoberequiredinpursuitofdefensivewaraims.LiketheOranians,Lipsiusconceivedofwarasastrugglepro aris et focis.

Grotius elaboratedLipsius’s ethicsof self-constraint into adetailedbellicistcasuisticsofwhatrulerscould,butoughtnot todo, inwar.Groundingthe lawofwarinthelawofnature,heappliedLipsius’sethicsasavehicletoreducethedecision-makingcapabilityofactorsinwarfare.Insodoing,heestablishedthebasisforatraditionofreasoningthatwouldcontinueuntilthemiddleoftheeighteenthcenturyandtowhichAdamSmithstilladhered.70

ThefusionofAristoteliantheoriesofgovernment,AugustinianpeacetheologyandtheNeo-stoicethicsofself-constraintcontextualisedtheoriesofthelawofwarwithinmorebroadlyconstitutedbeliefs about thedivinelywilledpoliticalorder of the world which ascribed to human actors no more than a limitedcapabilityof affecting thatorder.While theorists sawhumanactors as capable

70 ForAdamSmith’sapplicationofprinciplesofGrotius’stheoryofthelawofwar,seeAdamSmith,Lectures on Justice, Poilice, Revenue and Arms. Delivered in the University of Glasgow. Reported by a Student 1763,ed.EdwinCannan(Oxford,1896),pp.1,265–80.


ofinfringingupontheorderbyactingsinfullyandgoingtowar,theyconcurredwithpracticalpoliticaldecision-makersindenyingthatwarcouldjeopardisethetexturemanifestintheEuropeaninternationalsystem.Theoriststookitastheirtask tooutline the conditionsunderwhich theEuropean international systemandeachofitsunitscouldattainstability,therebyestablishingtheframeworkforactionsbypoliticaldecision-makers.

The Relevance of the Ethics of Self-Constraint in Warfare and Diplomacy

WhiletheOranianswereemergingassuccessfulorganisersofmilitaryresistanceagainstSpanishpower,ProtestantaswellasCalvinistestates intheEmpirehadadifficult timecopingwith thebetterequippedandmorecombat-ready forcesemployed by the Catholic League.71 Only the partial revision of the OranianreformsunderGustavusAdolphusofSweden,whoreliedheavilyonprofessionalwarriors,strengthenedtheProtestantsideagain.72Asaresult,andinstarkcontrastto Lipsian speculative political theory, the numbers of combatants increaseddramatically, and so did the numbers of war dead. As a consequence, warfarebecame brutalised, bothon the battlefield and against civilian non-combatantsas military discipline declined. At Breitenfeld, for instance, 130,000 men wereengagedincombat,withroughlyhalfofthemdyingonthebattlefield.73Privatemilitaryentrepreneursputtogethertheirwarriorbandsattheirownexpenseandsoldthemtosovereignrulerstodobattleforwhateverpurpose.Contrarytothedoingsofthelong-distancetradingcompanies,thecommercialisationofmilitaryservicewithinEuropeentailedalackofconcernforinvalidsleftafterbattle.Themiseryoftheinvalidsbecamerecognisableinthedramaticincreaseinthenumberofbeggarsandtheensuingfrequencyofgovernmentedictsagainstbeggingthroughouttheareasmost severelyhitbywarfare.74Seventeenth-century literaturedepicted

71 SeeRolfNaumann,Das kursächsische Defensionswerk(Leipzig,1916).72 In the wide-ranging debate about the so-called military revolution, Oranian

dependence on Lipsius’s Neo-stoicism has not been given the attention it deserves,specifically in the intention to limit the scope of warfare that informed the Oranianreforms.Forthedebate,seeMichaelRoberts,The Military Revolution. 1560–1660[1956],inRoberts,Essays in Swedish History(London,1967),pp.195–225;GeoffreyParker,The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West. 1500–1800(Cambridge,1988);JeremyBlack,A Military Revolution?(Basingstoke,1990);andCliffordJ.Rogers(ed.),The Military Revolution Debate(Boulder,Col.,1995).

73 CicelyVeronicaWedgwood,The Thirty Years War,editedbyRoyStrong(London,1999),pp.259–63.

74 Forreferences,seeA.L.Beier,MasterlessMen.TheVagrancyProbleminEngland.1560–1640(London,1985);RobertJütte,AbbildundsozialeWirklichkeitdesBettler-


theprofessionalwarriorasthestereotypeofthelawless,irresponsible,greedyandbrutalsuppressorofrighteouspeopleandcontainedoutrageousstoriesoflackofwarriordiscipline.75Inaword,theOranianreformsappearedtobetheworkofpetty ignorant dreamers, who went to militarily inexperienced theoreticians asauthoritiesratherthanacceptingtheseeminglyharshrealitiesofwarfare.EventherelativesoftheDutchOraniansintheEmpireburiedsomeoftheprinciplesofthereformduringtheearlyphaseoftheThirtyYearsWar.Thusin1617CountJohannVIIofNassau-Siegen,whowasoneof themost insistent reformers in theveryearlyseventeenthcenturyandhadfoundedoneoftheearliestEuropeanmilitaryacademiesathisresidenceatSiegenin1613,sackedtheacademy’sfirstdirector,CaptainJohannJakobivonWallhausen,forfearthatWallhausen’steachingandevenmorehispublishedwritingscouldbenefitthehatedpapists.Eventually,theacademy folded in 1621. Obviously, there was no public sphere for debate onmilitarymattersinthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcenturyequivalenttothatofthe“MilitaryEnlightenment”ofthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury.76Theideathatwarcouldbecomesubjecttoplanning,theethicsofself-constraintandevenlegalrulesseemedveryremotefromrealityatthetime.

Asciviliangovernmentcontroloverthearmedforcesincreasedinaccordancewith the principles of the Oranian reforms, the doings of soldiers acquireda higher domestic significance, since regiments and battalions were no longerdisbandedimmediatelyafterbattle.Armiesthatremained“standing”turnedintoinstrumentsofdomesticcoercionapttoenforceorderamongtherulers’subjects.Patterns of military behaviour transgressed the confines of the battlefield andthecampasstandingarmiesmovedintogarrisonsstationedintowns.Reviews,parades and other forms of public spectacle made the soldiers part of urbanlife.Thedependentpeasant,whendrafted as a soldier into a ruler’s army,notmerelymovedfromthevillageintothetownbutalsoshiftedloyaltyfromarural

undGaunertumszuBeginnderNeuzeit.Sozial-,mentalitäts-undsprachgeschichtlicheStudien zum Liber vagatorum (1510) (Cologne and Vienna, 1988); Jütte, Povertyand Deviance in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1994); Norbert Schindler, “DieEntstehungderUnbarmherzigkeit.ZurKulturundLebensweisederSalzburgerBettleramEndedes17.Jahrhunderts”,BayerischesJahrbuchfürVolkskunde(1988):61–130;Ingeborg Titz-Matuszak, “Mobilität der Armut. Das Almosenwesen im 17. und 18.JahrhundertimsüdniedersächsischenRaum”,Plesse-Archiv,24(1988):9–338.

75 Cf.HansJakobChristophvonGrimmelshausen,Der abentheurliche Simplicissimus teutsch [1669], ed. Rolf Tarot (Tübingen, 1967) and Hanns Wilhelm Kirchhof,Wendunmuth,ed.HermannÖsterely(Stuttgart,1869).

76 Onthis term, seeDanielHohrath,Die Bildung des Offiziers in der Aufklärung. Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai (1740–1814) und seine enzyklopäischen Sammlungen(Stuttgart,1990).


aristocrattotheparamountruler.77Armieswerethusconvertedintoinstrumentsforthecentralizationandbureaucratizationofgovernmentunderthecontrolofaparamountruler.Onlyrulersoflargeterritoriesandeconomicallysuccessfulcitiescould afford the centralization and bureaucratization of government activitiesthroughthemediationoflesserruralaristocratsandthesubordinationoftheirless powerful neighbours. Thus, as the seventeenth century wore on, smallerprincipalities, specifically within the Empire and in Northern Italy, gravitatedtowardsadecreasingnumberofsovereignrulerswithdominantmilitary,economicand political capacity. In the long term, the Oranian reforms were significantbecausetheunderlyingethicsofself-constraintdisseminatedrespectforthelawofwar,boosted thequest for stability andpromoted thebelief in thedivinelywilledcontinuityoftheorderoftheworld.Theestablishedpluralismofactorscontinuedas agentsother than sovereign rulerswereadmittedas internationalactorsinAfrica,Asiaandtheseawaysthither.

Conclusion

AstudyofwaranddiplomacyintheageofGrotiusreveals,firstandforemost,thespecificityofthepropertiesoftheEuropeaninternationalsystematthetime.Itsfeaturesweredifferentfromwhatinternationalrelationstheoristshavetakentobepermanentpropertiesofapostulatedglobalinternationalsystemsincethenineteenthcentury.Whereastheoristshavepostulatedavaryingdegreeofdynamicsinstigating systemic and even systems change since the nineteenth century,78theorists intheageofGrotiustookforgrantedthestabilityof thesystemandtheentireworldarounditWhereastheoristssincethenineteenthcenturyhaveemphasisedthesignificanceofhumanactioninwaranddiplomacy,79theoristsin

77 SeeHansBleckwenn,Zum Militärwesen des Ancien Régime,ed.JoachimNiemeyer(Osnabrück,1987).

78 Cf.HenryPeterLordBroughamandVaux,“BalanceofPower”,inBrougham,The Works(6vols,LondonandGlasgow,1855),vol.1,pp.12–13[thepassagewasfirstpublishedanonymouslyinEdinburgh Review,1(1803):353–54]andJohannGottliebFichte,Reden an die deutsche Nation [1807–1808], ed. ImmanuelHermannFichte (Berlin,1846),pp.264–79.Forarecentrestatement,seeAndreGunderFrankandBarryK.Gills(eds),The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand(LondonandNewYork,1996).

79 JohnEmerichEdwardDalbergLordActon,History of Freedom and Other Essays,ed.JohnNevilleFiggisandReginaldVere(London,1922);ErnestRenan,“Qu’est-cequ’unenation?”,inDiscours et conférences(Paris,1887),pp.277–310;WoodrowWilson,The Public Papers(NewYorkandLondon:Harper,1926),vol.4,pp.407–14,vol.5(ibid.,1927),pp.182–3,vol.6 (ibid.,1927),pp.309,362–64;AlexanderWendt,“Anarchy isWhatStatesMakeofIt:TheSocialConstructionofPowerPolitics”,International Organization,46(1992):391–425;WendtandDanielFriedhelm,“HierarchyunderAnarchy.Informal


theageofGrotiusfollowedthelinessetdownbytheirmedievalpredecessorsinsubjectinghumandecisionstodivinewill.Whereastheoristssincethenineteenthcenturyhavemadeactorshipamonopolyofrulersandgovernmentsofsovereignstates,80theoristsintheageofGrotiusassumednotmerelythatlargenumbersofactorsbutalsothepluralismofactorshipwereconducivetothestabilityoftheinternationalsystem.

EmpireandtheEastGermanState”, inThomasJ.BierstekerandCynthiaWeber(eds),State Sovereignty as a Social Construct(Cambridge,1996),pp.240–72,pp.242–5;Wendt,Social Theory of International Politics(Cambridge,1999),pp.185–6.

80 Fichte,Reden,pp.264–79.

Chapter7LiquefiedSanctity:Grotiusandthe

PromiseofGlobalLawBertramKeller

Warhasmanyfacestoday.Iraqhasbeenpacifiedintoastateofguerrillawarfare.Yugoslavia imploded. Terror disseminates stateless fear. China struggles foreconomicgrowth.Aclimatebattlelooms.Whatisthepositionofinternationallaw? UN reform is stuck, the ICC ignored, WTO development blocked, theKyotoProtocolstagnated.Facingacrisisofinternationallaw,everyonelookstoitsorigins.Hopesforthefuturerestonthepast.

Prologue – Violating (the Father of) International Law

The Father of International Law

Whenretracingthepathoftoday’sinternationalorder,alldisciplinesstumbleoverHugoGrotius,the“fatherofmoderninternational law”.Thistitlecorrespondshisownestimation:“Manyhaveundertakentoexpound...thecivillaw…Butfewhavetreatedthatlawthatexistsbetweenpeoples…andnooneasyethasdiscusseditinacomprehensiveandsystematicway”[Prol,1].1Tobesure,extensiveacademic debate over the last century has deconstructed Grotius’s originalityineverydetail.His systemofnaturaland international lawhasbeentracedtoSpanish scholastics.2 Even Grotius’s famous dictum that his argument would

1 Quotations from Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis (1625) are indicated bysquare brackets [book, chapter, paragraph] in the text and follow the modern EnglishtranslationofLouisR.Loomis(NewYork,1949).Ifoundhiscolloquialaccountmuchmore appropriate for my “liquefied” reading of Grotius than the more old-fashionedeighteenth-century translation by John Morrice (originally printed 1715 and 1738),recentlyre-editedbyRichardTuck(Indiana,2005),andthecarefulbutcumbersome1925translationofFrancisW.KelseyfortheCarnegieEndowment(Oxford,1925).Wherevermorerigorouswordingisrequired,IrefertotheLatinoriginalinformofthe1919editionbyP.C.Molhuysen(Leyden,1919).

2 By Josef Kohler, Grundlagen des Völkerrechts (Stuttgart, 1918), p. 41, Otto vonGierke,Natural Law and the Theory of Society (Toronto,1934),p.36,QuentinSkinner,The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2vols(Cambridge,1978),II,p.135,and


remainvalid“evenif…thereisnogod”(etiamsi daremus non esse deum) [Prol,11]issuspectedofhavingbeentakenfromthatsource.3Thehumanisttradition,4inparticular Stoic thought,5 is another possible blueprint.Nonetheless, itwasDe iure belli ac pacis thatspreadtheideaofamodernlawofnations.ThebookmetthecruelrealityoftheThirtyYearsWar,influencedthePeaceofWestphalia,andestablishedGrotiusasanenduringauthorityoninternationallaw.6Overthecenturiesitwashisnamethat,amongother,changingsources,alwaysappearedastheacademicandpoliticalreferencefortheoriginofinternationallaw.7Grotiuscouldbesaidtohave“founded”moderninternationallaw,“iffornootherreasonsthanbecausehewasthoughttohavedoneso”.8Reputationproducedthefather.

Modern International Law

Beforetestingpaternity,wemightwanttoknowwhatthechildlookslike.Whatdoes“moderninternationallaw”mean?

KnudHaakonssen,“HugoGrotiusandtheHistoryofPoliticalThought”,Political Theory,13(1985):239.

3 Haakonssen,“HugoGrotius”,p.248;LeonardBesselink,“TheImpiousHypothesisRevisited”, Grotiana, 9 (1988): 3 contextualizes the etiamsi daremus argument in thedebateofthetime.

4 RichardTuck, The Rights of War and Peace (Oxford, 1999) reads Grotius in ahumanisttradition,therebyexplicitlyrevising(p.4)hispositioninRichardTuck,Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge,1979).

5 AxelHägerström,Recht, Pflicht und bindende Kraft des Vertrages, ed.K.Olivecrona(Uppsala,1965),p.44seq.,andrecentlyBenjaminStraumann,Grotius und die Antike (Baden-Baden,2007).

6 His prestige in the twentieth century is manifest in the large conferences ofrenownedinternationallawscholarsandjudgestocelebratehisvariousanniversaries.Cf.T.M.C. Asser Instituut (ed.), International Law and the Grotian Heritage (The Hague,1985); Alfred Dufour, Peter Haggenmacher and Jirí Toman (eds), Grotius et l’ordre juridique internationale (Lausanne,1985);HedleyBull,BenedictKingsburyandAdamRoberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford, 1990); in the earlytwentiethcenturynolessafigurethanHarvardLawSchoolDeanRoscoePoundalreadypraisedGrotiusasthefatherofmodernlaw:RoscoePound,“GrotiusintheScienceofLaw”,American Journal of International Law,19(1925):685.

7 Durward Sandifer, “Rereading Grotius in the Year 1940”, American Journal of International Law,34 (1940):459, analyses thedisseminationof references toGrotiusinvariousdisciplines:26percentinreligionandtheology,22.5percentinlaw,20.5percentamonghistorians,11percentamongwritersofliterature,8percentinphilosophy,4.5percentamongpoliticalscientists,2.5percentamongrhetoricians,and2percentamonggrammarians.

8 Haakonssen,“HugoGrotius”,p.239.

Liquefied Sanctity: Grotius and the Promise of Global Law 133

Modern international law is “international”, that is, between nation states(internationes).Thesubjectsofmodern international laware sovereign states,coordinatingtheirbilateralinteractions.MultilateralregulationsintegratemultiplestatesinaninternationalsystemliketheUnitedNations.Theterm“international”impliestheautonomousactionofsovereignnation-states.

Modern international law is “law”. Law is a hierarchical and enforceablesystemofrules.Alawofnationsorpeoplesdefinescommitmentsandsubjectiverights for the interactionbetweensovereignstates.TheUNGeneralAssembly,the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice form a well-structured and stable legal order. Even if its sanctions are limited, the generalclaimofmoderninternationallawistoestablishahomogenous,enforceablelegalsystem.

Moderninternationallawis“modern”.Modernityisgenerallytiedtorisingindividualism,orasubjectiveperspective,andtosecularisation.9Therecognizedsources of modern international law are conventions, custom and generalprinciples.10Allareconsideredaggregatecommonnormativestandards.Moderninternationallawappealstoshareduniversalvalues.Theuniversalclaimofhumanrights,asexpressedintheUNCharterortheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,revealsitscloserelationtotheideaofnaturallaw.

Grotian ius Gentium

Grotiusoutlinedallthreeaspectsofmoderninternationallaw:“[J]ustastherearelawsineachstatethataimatsecuringsomeadvantageforthatstate,sobetweenallormoststates(inter civitates) somelawscouldbeandindeedhavebeenestablishedbycommonconsent,whichlooktotheadvantagenotofsinglecommunitiesbutof the whole great concourse of states (magnae illius universitatis). And this isthelawwecallthelawofnations(ius gentium),wheneverwedistinguishitfromnatural law” [Prol,17].TheGrotian ius gentium is lawbetween states, that is,inter-national law. Its sources are commonconsent rooted in a greatuniversalidea.Grotiusconstructs the lawofnationsasamultilateral systemthatallowsforcloserunions:“Sotooitmayhappenthatseveralstatesarejoinedtogetherinacloseconfederation,andmake...asystem,andyeteachretainsthestatusofaperfectstate”[I,3,7].ClassicalfreetradeunionslikeNAFTAorASEANcouldeasilybe integrated intohispicture.Demonstrating a family relationship thus

9 ParadigmaticallyCharlesTaylor,Sources of the Self (Cambridge,MA,1989)andA Secular Age (Cambridge,MA,2007).

10 According to Art. 38 of its statutes, the International Court of Justice can apply“international conventions”, “international custom”, “general principles of law recognizedby civilized nations”, “judicial decisions” and “teachings”. For the debate on the sources ofinternationallaw,cf.MarttiKoskenniemi(ed.),Sources of International Law (Aldershot,2000).


provestobeeasy.Grotiuscanbeendorsedasthefatherofmoderninternationallawwithaclearconscience.Butsomesuspectthathissonisdying.

Postmodern Global Governance

Contemporary political and legal debates erode every single element of theconceptionof“moderninternationallaw”.

The“international”isbecomingthe“global”.Financialtransactionsandvirtualonlinecommunitiesdonotrecognizeanynationalborders.Statesarebeginningtofray.Powerfulmultinationalenterprises,NGOsandprivateregulatoryagencies,arecreatinga“newworldorder”ofhorizontalandverticalpoliticalnetworks.11Sovereigntyisdisintegrating.

“Law” is turning into “governance”. Independent legal systems govern freetrade,financialdevelopment,environmentalprotection,humanrightsandwarcrimes.Theinternationallegalorderisfragmentingintofunctionalregimes.

“Modern”universalismtottersinthefaceof“postmodern”pluralism.Areterroristattacks only the harbinger of a real “clash of civilizations”12? Individual humanrights conflict with collectivist policies like China’s one-child policy. UniversalliberalvaluescanbereadasapoliticaleffortbyWesternsocietiestopreservetheirglobal power. When does economic dominance become imperial hegemony?13Could the subversive “multitude” fight an omnipotent global “empire”?14 The“postmodern condition” calls any common normative or narrative ground intoquestion.15Universalandhomogenousinternationallawismeltingintopluralisticandheterogeneousstructuresofglobalgovernance.Whocaresaboutthefatherofmodernityinapostmodernage?Hasfatherhoodbeenestablishedjustasthesonisbeinglost?

Liquefying Grotius

Afathergrowswithhis children.Grotius’sDe iure bellis ac pacis changeswithitsreaders.Everyinterpretationofhistoricalsourcesforcesitsideasintopresentconcepts.Everyreadingviolatestheauthor.Everyreadingdeconstructsthepast.

11 Cf.theinfluentialclaimofAnne-MarieSlaughter,A New World Order (Princeton,2004).

12 SamuelP.Huntington,The Clash of Civilization (NewYork,1996),thoughunderpermanentacademicattack,continuestohavealargepublicimpact.

13 Thisquestionseemstomeaconsistent resultofDavidSaunders’ reflections inthisvolume.

14 MichaelHardtandAntonioNegri,Empire (Cambridge,MA,2000)andMultitude (NewYork,2004).

15 Jean-FrancoisLyotard,La condition postmodern (Paris,1979).


Deconstructingthepastmeansreconstructingthepresent,andrestructuringthepresentmeansconstructingthefuture.16Again,hopesforthefuturerestonthepast.Fromapurelyhistoricalperspective,IshallviolateGrotiusinthefollowing.IshalltreatDe iure bellis ac pacis asanautonomoustext17addressingpresent-dayreadersinthecurrentgloballandscape.Ishallnotcontextualizebutliquefythetextinordertoconsidercontemporaryproblemsofinternationallaw.Howcansovereigntyberestructured?Howcandifferentfunctionalregimesbeintegrated?Howcananexpandedpluralismbestabilized?A“liquefied”Grotiussuggestswaysofconstructinghighlytopicalanswers.Aglobalsocietyrestsonmultiplesocialcontracts: integratedbymultiplenormative reasonsand framedbya commonpromiseThe“performativesanctity”thatemergesfromthisreadingpromisesaliquefiedlawofnatureforaglobalsociety.

Multiple Social Contracts

New Sovereignty

A mouse click in Japan can cause a financial disaster in Europe. In a trulyglobalised economy states are not independent but interdependent, united byshared resources, markets, information, and so on. Yet today’s paradigm-shiftgoesfurther.Globaltrading,globalcommunicationandglobalnormspenetratedeeplyintotheinternalaffairsofeverystate.NearlyeveryactofEuropeannationallegislationisinfluencedbyEUregulations.Nationalsovereigntyis,tounderstatethecase,“in transition”.18Whereas interdependenceonlydelimits therangeof

16 “Deconstruction”isusually,thoughnotexclusively,linkedtothenameofJacquesDerrida;cf.JonathanCuller,On Deconstruction (London,1983).JacquesDerrida,Force de loi (Paris 1994) pp. 44 and 46, expounds deconstruction as revealing the politicalcontextsandstructuralaporiaioftexts.My“liquefaction”focusesonstructurebutneglectscontext.IreconstructtheGrotiantextintheworldoftoday,drawingonthe“interpretivecommunity” (Stanley Fish, Is there a text in these class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities [Cambridge,MA,1980])oflegalandpoliticalthinkers.Thus,contrarytoatleasttheself-descriptionofpractitionersof“deconstruction”,mymethodof“liquefaction”restsonastrongconstructivistunderpinning.

17 ContrarytoreadingsofDe jure bellis ac pacis inthelightofearliermanuscriptslikeDe indis, publishedinthenineteenthcenturyasDe iure praedae (TheHague,1868).Cf.Tuck,The Rights of War and Peace,p.79etseq.

18 NeilWalker(ed.),Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford,2003).InparticularontheEuropean Union, see Neil MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State”, Modern Law Review,56 (1993):1, andRobertO.Keohane, “IroniesofSovereignty:TheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates”,Journal of Common Market Studies,40(2002):743.ForamorecosmopolitanvisionofEuropeancitizenship,seeJürgenHabermas,“TheEuropean


autonomous actions, global penetration undermines the bases of all sovereigngovernments.Whatcoulda“newsovereignty”looklike?19

Summa Potestatis

ForGrotius,that“poweriscalledsovereign(summa) whoseactsarenotsubjecttothelegalcontrolofanyoneelse”[I,3,7].Onlyiftheactorisautonomous–thatis,canmakehisownlaws–ishesovereign.20Grotiusleaveslittledoubtthatthe“common subject of sovereignty (summa potestatis) is the state (civitas)” [I, 3,7].WithreferencetotheRomanandJewishtraditionof“privateslavery”[I,3,8],hejustifiestheabsolutiststateofhistime.Howcouldarigorousdefenderofthealmightystatehelpusunderstandfrayingsovereignties?Tocircumventtheseproblems,onecouldargueforaglobalsuper-state.21Asattractiveascosmopolitanvisionsmaybe,theyarenotplausiblewithintheforeseeablefuture.Grotiustracesamuchsounderroutetoglobalgovernance.Eventhesumma potestatis orsummum imperium [II,14]ofanabsolutesovereignisrestricted,since“contractswhichakingentersintowithhissubjectsarebindingonhim”[II,14,6].Contractsmaydelimitortransfersovereignpower.Thesummum imperium mightbereadasthepoliticalplaceholderforanempoweredinstitutionrepresentingthecommunity.“Forwhateverakingdoesinhisactsasking(in regiis actibus) mustbeconsideredasifdonebythecommunity(quasi communitas)”[II,14,1].Theinternationalsuccession of sovereign rights is an application of this construction that isstill topical today.Grotius ties the obligationof a succeeding sovereign to thecommunitywithinastate.“Acommunity(coetus),nolessthanasingleindividual(persones singulares),hastherighttobinditselfbyitsownact...Itcantransferthisright,bothexplicitlyandasanecessaryconsequenceofotheracts”[II,14,11].Sovereigntyisbasedontherightofthecommunitytobinditselfandtotransferthisright.Twofundamentalquestionsremain:howdoesonebindoneself?And

NationState.ItsAchievementsandItsLimitations.OnthePastandFutureofSovereigntyandCitizenship”,Ratio Juris,9(1996):125.

19 AbramChayesandAntoniaHandlerChayes,The New Sovereignty (Cambridge,MA,1995),p.27,definetheir“newsovereignty”as“status”inglobalgovernancesystems,thatis,“theconnectiontotherestoftheworldandthepoliticalabilitytobeanactorwithinit”.

20 Consideringtheunderlyingquestionofwar,sucharigorousandreducedideaofsovereigntywouldsuggestadecisionistaccount.InhisPolitische Theologie (Berlin,1922),forinstance,CarlSchmittdefinessovereigntyaspowertodecideonastateofemergency:Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet (p.1). SuchaninterpretationofGrotiuswouldresembleSchmitt’s readingofHobbes,whichLucFoisneaupersuasivelyarguesagainstinhiscontributiontothisvolume.

21 IntheKantiantraditionofperpetualpeace:JamesBohman(ed.),Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge,MA,1997).


howisthisrighttransferred?Grotiusoffersasingleanswer:theabilitytobindoneselfandthetransferofrightbothresultfromcontracts.

Multiple Social Contracts

IfitscontractualbasismakestheGrotianapproachattractivetoday,whynottakeanother“socialcontractarian”ofGrotius?Grotius’sconstructiondiffersfromitsprominent successors.ThomasHobbes requires a “common-wealth”unitedbythe explicit “covenant of every man with every man”.22 Quite similar in formis Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s construction of the unification of individual livesandwills intoonevolonté générale throughan explicitpacte social.23Of courseHobbes’sLeviathan justifiesanomnipotentsovereign,whereasRousseau’spacte social createsa republicanpopular sovereignty.Yetboth layoutaclear stateofnaturetobeovercomebyasinglesocialcontract.Grotiusdrewhisownpictureofhumannature,buthedidnotsetupanexplicitstateofnature.Onemightsaythathelackedafullydevelopedmethodofsocialcontracting.Instead,hementionsexplicit or tacit agreements in different social contexts: property, transfer ofproperty,personalstatus,punishment,andpoliticaldecisions.EvenifGrotiustooconceivedofasingle,all-embracingsovereignstate,histheoreticalconstructionofsocietydoesnotnecessarilydependonit.Hisaccountcanbereadaslegitimisingdistinctsocialrights(propertyrights,personalrights,rightstopunishandpoliticalrights)throughmultiplesocialcontracts.Grotius’s“underdeveloped”methodofsocialcontractingprovestoberemarkablywelladaptedtotoday’sglobalorder.Multiplesocialcontractscouldconstituteawebofoverlappingsocietieswithoutasuperveningstate.

Property Rights

Inconsideringpropertyrights,Grotiusstartswiththefictionthatallthingsoncebelonged tomankind incommon[II,2].This startingpointaccordswith thecurrent renaissanceof a “commons”of sharedcultural andnatural resources.24Then“thingspassedfromcommontoprivateownership(proprietatem) notalonebyanactofdeliberateplanning(non animi actu solo)....Buttheremusthavebeeneithersomeexpressagreement(pacto),asforadivision,oratacitunderstanding,

22 ThomasHobbes,Leviathan, ed.R.Tuck(Cambridge,1996),Chapter17.23 Jean-JacquesRousseau,Du Contrat Social, ed.P.Burgelin(Paris,1992),I,6.24 TwoparadigmaticexpositionsofthedebateareGarretHardin,“TheTragedyof

theCommons”,Science,162(1968):1243,onnatural“commons”,andLawrenceLessig,The Future of Ideas (NewYork,2002)oncultural“commons”.DanWielschhasproposeda corresponding transformation of the intellectual property regime, Zugangsregeln (Tübingen,2008).


asforsimpleoccupation”[II,2,2].Propertyrightsoriginateinasocialagreementamong all those concerned. In contrast to Locke, for whom labour createsproperty,25 this contractual origin of property rights allows for public goods.Intellectualpropertyandnaturalresourcesarebothrealglobalgoodsinsofarastheyareboundbyfewgeographicrestrictions.Theinternet,theatmosphereandtheclimatetranscendnationalboundaries.Inthedomainofintellectualpropertyrights,theTRIPSAgreementundertheWorldTradeOrganizationcouldbereadasaspecificfunctionalsocialcontract.Whenitcomestonaturalresources,there-nationalizationofoilextractionintheMiddleEastoverthrewallexistingpropertyrights.ThefoundingofOPECmightbeseenasasocialcontractamongmainlyArabnationsgoverningthereallocationofoilfortheentireworld.Similarly,thepollutionoftheatmosphereandtheoceansconcernsthewholeworld.Evenso,therearenoexclusiverightstotheair,whiletheseaisfree(mare liberum)26anditssustainableusagecouldthusbepartofaglobalagreementliketheKyotoProtocol.Thesharedusageofasmallriver,bycontrast,mayonlyconcerntwostatesoreventwofarmersinthemiddleofWales.Noteverysocialcontractassigningpropertyrightshastobethoughtonaglobalscale.Propertymightberethoughtintermsofmultiplesocialcontractsondifferentlevels.

Personal Rights

“Arightmaybeacquirednotonlyoverthingsbutoverpersons”[II,5,1].27“Rightsover persons (ius in personas) based on consent, come either from association(consociatione) orfromsubjection(subiectione)”[II,5,8].Ascasesofconsensualsubjection,Grotiusmentions adoptionandvoluntary slavery.28Marriage ishismainexampleofconsensualassociations.Presupposingmalesuperiority,Grotiusportraysmarriageas“pledgebywhichthewomanbindsherselftotheman”[II,5,8].Unburdenedofitshistoricalgenderbias,thispassagemightbeunderstoodasassertingthatmanandwomanbindthemselvesinthecontractofmarriage,therebyfoundingthe“mostnaturalassociation”.Themoreinterestingassociation

25 JohnLocke,The Second Treatise of Government, ed.D.Wotton(London,1993),Chapter5.

26 AclaimGrotiusdefendedrigorously.Cf.Mare Liberum andDe jure bellis ac pacis,II,2,3.

27 Apersonalright“hasitssourceineitherprocreation,consentorcrime”[II,5,1].Byprocreation,parentsacquirerightsoverchildren,whichdiminishwiththeircomingtomaturity.Crimeisconsideredundertherighttopunish.

28 ReadingGrotius’passageontherelationbetweenmasterandslaveinparalleltoHegel’sfamousreflections(GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,Phänomenologie des Geistes, Akademie Ausgabe, vol. 9 (Hamburg, 1980), pp. 114–28) would be a tempting butdistractingendeavour.


for today’s reader is the one for “transactingbusiness (expediendi negotia)” [II,5,17].Grotius’saccountofcorporate lawisfar lessdevelopedthanitsRomanmodel, but he takes the important step of integrating it into social contracttheory.29Althoughheseparatesprivateandpublicassociations,“theyallhavethistraitincommon,thatwhendealingwithmattersforwhichtheassociationwasformed, thewholebody,or amajority, acting in thenameof thewhole,maybindeveryindividualintheassociation”[II,5,17].Hisexamplesdemonstrateafluidtransitionfromprivateassociationstothepublic,“mostperfectassociation”,the state. Indeed, the relationbetween thepowerfulEast IndiaCompany andtheprecariousUnitedProvincesintheseventeenthcenturyresemblesthecurrentglobalsituationmorethantheintegratednationaleconomiesofthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcentury.Multinationalenterprisesareoftenfarmoresovereignactors than thepoorAfrican states theycontractwith.Byprivatisingpensionsand childcare, large companies break down any private-public partition. Yetinternationallawcontinuestolackconsistentintegration.30Businessassociationsarebuiltonacorporatecontract,acquireinvestmentsbycontract,employtheirworkersbycontract,outsourceproductionbycontractandofcoursedobusinessbycontract.EconomicdependenceresultsinrightsoverpersonsmuchlikethoseGrotius described in the case of private slavery: “For in compensation for theperpetualservitudeistheperpetualassuranceofmaintenance,whichoftenthosewhoworkfordailyhiredonothave”[II,5,27].Notonlystatesbutalsomoreandmoreglobalenterprisesacquiremultiplerightsoverpersonsbyacomplexnetoffunctionalcontracts.

The Right to Punish

Oneparticularrightoverapersonistherighttopunish.ForGrotiuspunishmenttooapproaches“thenatureofcontracts.Forjustasaseller,eventhoughhemakesnospecialstatementtotheeffect,isunderstoodtohaveboundhimselftoperformalltheactsnaturaltoasale,so,punishmentbeingaconsequenceofseriouscrime,thecriminalseemstohavevoluntarilysubjectedhimselftopunishing”[II,20,2].PunishmentmakesuppartofAristotelian commutativeor contractual justice,

29 Gierke,Natural Law,p.77,remarksthatforGrotiusanassociationwithincivilsocietyandthegovernmenthavethesamecontractualfoundations.ThusGrotius’stheoryofsocietyresemblesGierke’sown“generaltheoryofthegroup”(Verbandstheorie).

30 Structural transitions could include international legislation like the ICSIDConventionof1965,mediatinginvestmentdisputesbetweenstatesandprivateinvestors.Anexampleofnationallegislationissection302USTradeAct1974,whichentitlesprivatecompaniestorequestgovernmentalactionagainstforeignstatesifitstradinginterestsareconcerned.OninterrelationsandcompatibilitywiththeWTOregime,cf.WTOPaneldecisionWT/DS152/Rof22December1999.


whichGrotiuscalls“expletivejustice”(expletiem iustitiam)[II,20,2].31Fromthisperspective,punishmentislike“abusinesstransaction,asifoffenderswerebeingpaidsomething,astheyareincontracts”[II,20,2].InGrotius’sdayasinourownthetwofundamentalquestionsofacontractualconstructionofpunishmentremainidentical:“[W]hoisthepossessoroftherighttopunish”[II,20,3]?Andwhatare“theendsproposedbypunishment”:to“undoawrong”orto“protectthetimetocome”[II,20,4]?Acontractualaccountallowsfordistinctinstitutionsofpunishment.TheYugoslaviaTribunalandtheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)trytoaccusehighmilitarycommandersorevenheadsofstatesofseriouswarcrimesorgenocide.TheTruthCommissionsinSouthAfricafocusedmoreonthelocalpolitical,ordinaryandpersonalunderpinningsofapartheid.Differenttypesofcrimecallfordifferentsocialresponses.

The Right to Govern

Finally, an independent people may “submit itself to one or more persons,completelytransferringtothemitsrighttogovernitself ”[I,3,8].Doesthisrighttogovernnotembraceallotherrightsinonepoliticalcommunityandoverridethemultiplesocialcontractthesis?Indeed,Grotiuscouldbeandgenerallyisreadalongtheselinesofclassicalsocialcontracttheoryasjustifyingoneunifiedstate.YetGrotiuscomparestheacquisitionofgovernmentalrightstopropertyrights[I,3,8], thereby structurallydistinguishing the two spheres.Andhedoesnotrestrictthetransferofpoliticalrightstostates.Populus eligere potest qualem vult gubernationis formam [I,3,8]–apeoplemaychoosewhateverformof“governance”itpleases.Gubernationis isneitherregnum norimperium.Agubernator steerstheboat,butdoesnothavetobeitssolecommander.To“steer”(gubernare)resemblestechnicalcontrolmorethanimperialreign.Whereasgovernmentisnormallytiedtoanall-embracingstate,governancesignifiesafunctionalregimethatmaycoverdistinct parts of social life. Cultural identity need not follow the structure ofownership,nordothetwostatusesnecessarilyoriginateinthesamecommunity.Governanceallowsfortheoverlappingofmultipleidentitiesaswellasdifferentformsofpoliticalrights.OnecouldbeacitizenofBerlin,Germany,theEUandtheUN.Each levelmay grant civil rights anddemand specificduties.Globalgovernanceopensmultiplepoliticallevelsanddistinctfunctionalspheres.

31 GrotiusdiscussestheAristoteliandistinctioninmoredetailin[I,1,8].


Contracting Societies

Governance breaks established frames.32 Traditional components of nationalaffairs become global. Labour markets, for instance, increasingly ignore stateboundaries.Firmsactglobally.Withoutnationalcontrol,internationalregulationis useless. Global structures undermine autonomous sovereignty. Consumerprotectionfollowstransnationalpatterns.33Internetcommunitieselecttheirowngovernmentsandsetinternalcodesofconduct.Globalsocietieswilldividelessintonation-statesthanintoseparatefunctionalspheres.Thesenormativesystemsareorganizedbymeansofcontracts.Functionalregimesareself-stabilizingsocialcontracts.Contrarytomostconstructionsinrecentsocialcontracttheory,thesecontractshavetoestablishrealcontractualregimes,notonlyfictiveunderstandings.Theseinstitutionscreatenewsociallife-worlds.Onepersoncanbelongtodifferentfunctionalcommunities,livingsimultaneouslyindifferentsocieties.Individualshaveandwillhaveincreasinglymulti-layeredidentities.Multiplesocialcontractsformmultiple“contractingsocieties”.

Functional Wars

Sovereigntymeansbeinganactorwithinaparticularcontractualregime.Actorsincludeindividualsaswellas local,regional,nationalandglobalcommunities.Sovereignty is being disaggregated into different levels and spheres withinmultiplecontractingsocieties.Theinternalstructureofeverycontractingsocietyisdeterminedandjustifiedbythecontractingagentswhoparticipateinit.Buthowcandifferentregimesbeintegratedincomplexlife-worlds?Whathappenswhen regimes collide?34 Collisions between regimes provoke new “functionalwars”.Openaccesstonetcommunitiesstruggleswithexclusivecodes.Intellectualpropertyconflictswithhealthandenvironmentalregimes.Socialorhumanrightsmightendangerbio-diversity.Warsarealways inonewayoranother strugglesoversovereignty.Thecharacterofwarchangeswithsovereignty.“9/11”wasnotanattackbyIraq,Afghanistanoranothernation-state.Areligiouscommunitystruckaneconomiccommunity.Assumingclosedfunctionalsystemswithincompatiblevocabulariesmakeswartheonlypossiblesolution.Yetallcommunitiescouldbe

32 GuntherTeubner,“BreakingFrames:EconomicGlobalisationandtheEmergenceoflex mercatoria”,European Journal of Social Theory,5(2002):199.

33 Gralf-Peter Callies, “Transnational Consumer Law”, in Olaf Dilling, MartinHerberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-governance in transnational economic transactions(Oxford,2008),p.225.

34 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: TheVainSearchforLegalUnityintheFragmentationofGlobalLaw”,Michigan Journal of International Law,25(2004):999.


reconstructedascontractingsocieties.Thetoolofcontract itselfmightprovideacommongroundforalternativedisputeresolution.Howcouldcontractsservethisdemandingpurpose?Howcansuchacontractualmythbefounded?

Multiple Contractual Reasons

Stare Pactis

Peace and pacts are true friends.35 Regardless whether one follows the idea ofmultiple social contracts or simply considers the fundamental role of treatiesbetweenstatesinmoderninternationallaw,contractsaretheessentialbuildingblockofapeacefulglobalorder.Thusglobalorderisfocusedononequestion:whyshouldweobservecontracts?ForGrotiusstare pactis wasanaturaldemand,“sinceitwasnecessarythatmenshouldhavesomewayofbindingthemselvestooneanother”[Prol,15].Hobbes,ontheotherhand,pointedoutthat“Covenants,withouttheSword,arebutWords,andofnostrengthtosecureamanatall”.36Thestandardanswerofalawyerwouldbethatcontractsarebindingbecausethelawenforcespromises.37Butonthegloballevelthereisnolawprecedingthecontract.Internationaltreatiesestablishtherulesforthepartiestothem.Thecontractcreatesthelaw.Thatispreciselytheideaofeverysocialcontract:peoplecometogetherinastateofnatureandagreeonaninstitutionalframe.

The Founding Paradox

Here we face the founding theoretical paradox of every contract theory.38 Acontract, be it explicit or tacit, establishes the social foundationof legal rules,whileenforcementofthecontractdemandsthatsomerulesalreadybeinplace.Foundingthecontractitselfinlawleadstoaviciouscircle.Wittgensteinandawhole tradition of analytical philosophers addressed a corresponding problem

35 Ulpianalreadystressedtheconceptualrelationbetweenpactum andpaxinDigests2.14.1.1(De pactis).

36 Hobbes,Leviathan,Chapter17.37 Cf.§1USRestatement(Second)ofContracts:“Acontractisapromiseorsetof

promisesforthebreachofwhichthelawgivesaremedy,ortheperformanceofwhichthelawinsomewayrecognizesasaduty”.

38 GuntherTeubner,“IntheBlindSpot:TheHybridizationofContract”,Theoretical Inquiries in Law,7(2006),describesthisparadoxastheblindspotofcontracttheory.Theresulting“latency”isthenever-endingprocessofcreatingdifferencesandcompensationbyinventingafalseunity.


in the paradox or regress of rule following:39 to know how to follow a rulerequires a new rule that sets out standards for the applicationof thepreviousone.Thisapplication-ruleitselfneedstobeapplied,ad infinitum.Thisparadoxis implicit in our daily use of language as dynamic process between meaningand interpretation.And everynormativeorder faces an equivalentparadox, atleastwhen its deep justification– its “founding”– is addressed.40The circularrelationbetweenlawandcontractisthefoundingparadoxofglobalorder.Socialcontracttheorydissolvesthefoundationofaglobalorderwiththequestionwhyweobservecontracts.

Individual versus Social

Fromtoday’sperspective,Kantofferedastraightforwardanswertothatquestion:a subjectivewill is freeonly if it canbind itself autonomously (autós nómos).41Thescholastictraditionhadalreadydevelopedsuchawill-basedmodelofself-legislation. Contracts are two promises. Each promise commits the promisorbecausehe intends tobebound.Many scholars readGrotius in this line, as akeyfigureofmodernwilltheory.42Andindeedhestatesthat“[T]hemanwhohasmadeapromise…isboundofthisownwilltofulfilwhathechosetomakehisobligation(obligatur in quod obligari voluit)”[II,16,1].ButGrotiusisnotaliberalbeforeliberalism.Allattemptstoportrayhimasaproto-Kantianbreakdown with his famous appetitus societatis – that “peculiar to man is his socialdesire,thatis,forlifeinacommunity”[Prol,6].HereGrotiusseemstoemphasizetheAristotelianzoon politicon, thatis,thatmanisbynatureasocialanimal.The“caretopreservesociety(societatis custodia) … whichischaracteristicofhumanintelligence,isthesourceofalllaw...Fromitcometherulesthatwe…mustkeepourpromises”[Prol,8].Socialstabilitycounts.Thepromisee’sreliancecommits

39 LudwigWittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, ed. J. Schulte (Frankfurt,2003),§§201,202;SaulA.Kripke,Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (London,1982),Chapter2;JohnMcDowell,“WittgensteinonFollowingaRule”,inJohnMcDowell(ed.),Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge,MA,1998),p.221;RobertBrandom,Making It Explicit (Cambridge,MA,1994),1.3.

40 ThisisadominantthemeforbothLuhmannandDerrida.Cf.GuntherTeubner,“Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter”, in Oren Perez andGuntherTeubner(eds),On Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in Law (Oxford,2006),p.41.

41 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. W. Weischedel (Darmstadt,1956),Thirdantinomy(p.444);ImmanuelKant,Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed.W.Weischedel(Darmstadt,1956),§6(p.52).

42 ThisisMalteDiesselhorst’sreading,Die Lehre des Hugo Grotius vom Versprechen (Köln,1959).DiesselhorstevenusestheKantianterm“autonomy”(p.34),whichneverappears in Grotius. Yet Diesselhorst’s alternative principle of reliance (pp. 69 and 75)worksonlyascountermovetoadefinitewill.


thepromisor.Contractsandpromisesobligeassocialexpectations.DidGrotiusanticipatecommunitarianism?43Doestherepublicanspiritbeartheobligation?Wrongagain.

Utility versus Justice

Instead,individualutilityprevails.44“Man…possessesnotonlythestrongsocialfaculty…butalsothejudgementtoweighhisjoysandpains.…Whateverwedothatisplainlycontrarytogoodjudgementiscontraryalsotothelawofnature,thatistosay,ofthenatureofmen”[Prol,9].OneimmediatelyfeelsaMachiavellianbreathonone’sneck:“aprudentrulercannotkeephisword,norshouldhe,wheresuchfidelitywoulddamagehim,andwhenthereasonsthatmadehimpromisearenolongerrelevant”.45Todayrationalchoicetheorywouldinsistthatapromissorystrategywillbestableonlyaslongasthepromisormaximizeshisutility.AclassicalpointofreferenceisCicero,whostatedthatpromisesthatareuselessneednotbekept.46Grotiusexplicitlyrefutesthisexpedientaccountwithcounter-referencetoCicero,HoraceandtwoPlatonists.Keepingone’swordshouldbeconsideredamatterof“justice”[II,11,1].Atthebeginningofhisbook,GrotiusalreadycontrastsCarneades’scepticalclaimforutilitywithaharshpleaforjustice[Prol,5].JusticeforGrotiusrequires“equality”incontracts[II,12,8]and“inpoweroffreechoice”[II,12,10].Justicemeansformalandmaterialequality.

Reasoned Pluralism

Freewill, socialdesire,utility, justice– therearemultiple reasons tohonouracontract.Grotius isbynomeans inconsistent; ratherhe is agenuinepluralist.“[T]herearemanywaysof living (multa sunt vivendi genera),onebeingbetterthananother,andeveryindividualisfreetochosefromthemanykindswhathelikesbest”[I,3,8].Whywekeepcontractsinfluenceshowwekeepthem.Thereasonsforcontractualobligationdetermineitsrange.Justicedemandsequality.Autilitarianaccountfocusingonthe“ownwell-being(suum statum)”[I,2,1]mightlead to opposite results. The reasons thought to underlie a contract influencethecontractualobligation.Reasonsaredecisiveforpracticaloutcomes.Differentreasonsrepresentdifferentcontractualrationalities.Reasonsplaydifferentroles

43 Overview in Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford, 1993);historicalrootsinAlasdairMacIntyre,After Virtue (NotreDame,1981).

44 ThisisthereadingofTuck,The Rights of War and Peace,pp.78–108.Alongthesamelines,Haakonsen,“HugoGrotius”linksGrotiustoAdamSmith.

45 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and ed. Q. Skinner and R. Price(Cambridge,1988).

46 Cicero,De officiis,ed.H.Gunermann(Stuttgart,1976),I,10,32.


in different functional contexts. Whereas trading regimes foster free will andutility,environmentalandsocialconventionsfocusonjusticeandsocialstability.Conflictsbetween regimes are clashesof reasons.Thepluralismof contractingsocieties is represented by a pluralism of contractual reasons. As different asreasonsmaybe,theyareallbasedonthecommonhumanfacultyofreason.Isthatthe“lawofnature”?

Positive and Natural Law

Law(ius) mightsignify“nothingbutwhatisjust(iustum)”[I,1,3].Justiceisusedhereinabroadersensethanmereequality.“Anythingisunjustwhichisopposedtothenatureofarationalsociety(naturae societatis ratione)”[I,1,3].Yet“thelawobligesustodowhatisgood(rectum),notsimplywhatisjust(ad iustum),becauselawinthissensehastodowithmattersnotonlyofjustice(iustitiae) ... butofallothervirtues(aliarum virtutum)”[I,1,9].Whereasnaturallawreferstojustice,positivelawisbasedonhumanordivinevirtuesofthegood.Thisdivisionresemblesthedistinctioninmoralphilosophybetweentherightorjustandthegood.47Positivelawmeansvoluntarylawmadebyhumanordivinewill.Positivelaw follows the legislator’s particular conception of the good life. Positive lawreflectslegislativereasons.“Naturallawisadictateofrightreason(dictatum rectae rationis),showingthemoralnecessityormoralbasenessofanyactaccordingtoitsagreement(convenientia) ordisagreementwithrationalnature(natura rationali)”[I,1,10].Thepluralityoflegalreasonsisbasedonacommonlawofreasoning.

Contract and Promise

The division between positive and natural law reflects the relation betweencontract andpromise.Contracts are voluntarily establishedby the contractingparties.Indeed,everycontractisavoluntarylawbetweentheparties.Themorecomplexcontractsare,themoreobvioustheirabstractlegislativequality.Ontheotherhand,everypositivelawcouldbereconstructedassocialcontractbetweentheaffected legal subjects.Asvoluntaryorpositive law,contractsarebasedona variety of reasons.Howcan this plurality be integrated?Given thepluralityofunderlyingreasonsandthemanyfacesofcontract,theruleof stare pactis initselfseemsuseless.Oncewehaveacontractualframe,theinterplayofreasonsmaybegin.Butwhatjustifiestheinitialassumptionofcooperation?Herewefindourselvesbackagainatanotherversionofthefoundingparadox.Willdifferentfunctional godsfight eachotheruntil one surrenders?Grotiushimself seemednottobesatisfiedwithhispragmaticstare pactis formula,concealingtheproblem

47 John Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), §68;RainerForst,Contexts of Justice (Berkley,2002),ChapterV.


behindaveilofnaturallaw.Atanyrate,hefoundedhiscontracttheoryonanelaborateaccountofpromising.

Common Promises

Transfer of Right

Promisescommitwithoutaparticularcausa [II,11,10].Promisesdonotneedfurtherunderlyingreasonstoformthebasisofanobligation.GrotiuselevatedtheformthatRomanlawconsidereditsweakest,thenuda pacta, totheheartofhiscontracttheory.48Amerepromise“conveysaspecialrighttoanother(ius proprium alteri conferre)”[II,11,4].Thistransferofrightisreadasa“moralpower”creatinganinnernecessityintheotherparty.49Inhisdefinitionoflaw,Grotiusalreadystressesthesubjectivemoraldimensionofius,thatis,a“right”.“Thereisanothermeaningofthewordlaw(iuris significatione),differentfromthis,butyetarisingoutof it,whichhasreference topersons. Inthis sense,a right (ius) isamoralquality(qualitas moralis) annexedtoaperson…Thismoralquality,whenperfect,wecallafaculty(facultas)”[I,1,4].Apromisecarriesamoralfacultycapableoffulfillingthepromisedcontract.Grotiuscomparestheprocesstothealienationofownership.Wealienatecertainpartsofourliberty–Est … alienatio particulae cuiusdam nostrae libertatis [II,11,4].There is a certain circularity inGrotius’sargument.50Apromiseisatransferofright,likethealienationofownership.Yettherightofpropertyoranyotherparticularrightitselfrestsonanagreement.Arewecaughtagaininthefoundingparadox?Istherenowayoutofcircularity?

Linguistic Contract

But we should not give up on a “promising solution” so quickly. Grotius’stheoryofpromisingisbestunderstoodasaproceduralaccount.Promisingisthelinguistic medium through which multiple reasons are transmitted. Man “hasthe special instrumentof speech (sermonem), and the facultyofunderstandingandconductinghimselfinaccordancewithgeneralrules”[P,7].Languagemakesushuman.“[I]t is thepeculiarnatureofmanaboveotheranimalsthathecanexpresshisthoughtstohisfellowsandforthatpurposehasinventedwords”[III,1,8].Grotiusbuildsonaconventionalaccountoflanguage,asheexpresslystateswith reference to Aristotle. For him language itself entails certain obligations.

48 Diesselhorst,Versprechen,p.55.49 KarlOlivecrona,“TheConceptofaRightAccordingtoGrotiusandPufendorf”,

inKarlOlivecrona(ed.),Law as Fact (London,1971),pp.275and286.50 Olivecrona,“TheConceptofaRightAccordingtoGrotiusandPufendorf”,p.291.


“It is merely the mutual obligation which men intended to introduce at thetimetheybegantousespeechandsignsofasimilarsort.Forwithoutsuchanobligationtheirinventionwouldhavebeenvalueless.Werequiretoothatatthetimeastatementismadethisrightshouldexistandcontinuetobevalid”[III,1,11].Linguisticconventionsestablishcommunicativerightsandobligations.A“linguisticcontract”precedesallothercontracts.51

The Performative Force of Promising

The normative force of promising derives from the normative obligation oflanguage. Linguistic obligations enable the existence of language. Language iswhatconstituteshumanrationality.Grotiusillustratesthisrelationwithhisstronginsistenceongoodfaithbetweenenemies:“Certainlythosewhoareenemiesdonotceasetobemen.Andallmenwhohavearrivedattheuseofreasonarecapableofacquiringrightsfromapromise....Onthisconnectionbetweenreasonandthespokenwordisbasedthebindingforceofapromise...Fortheobligationtotellthetruthcomesfromareasonthatexistedbeforethewarandmay,tosomeextent,possibly,beremovedbywar,butthepromiseitselfestablishesanewright”[III,19,1].Howexactlydoesthepromisecreatethisright?GivenhisconventionalaccountoflanguageandthenormativeforceGrotiusattachestothespokenwordanditsconsequencesintherealworld,itistemptingtocomparehisaccounttorecentspeechacttheory.52ForthispurposeIturntoJohnSearle53andparticularlytoJürgenHabermas’versionofspeechacttheory,whichunderlieshis“theoryofcommunicativeaction”.54Thestructuralparallelscouldnotbemoreremarkable.

51 VictoriaKahn,Wayward Contracts (Princeton,NJ,2004),p.33.52 PeterFriedrichaddressesthisrelationin“Rechtsakt/Sprechakt–DieStellungdes

‘Performativen’inderVersprechenslehredesHugoGrotius”,inDieterHüning(ed.),Die Naturrechtslehre des Hugo Grotius(forthcoming).ThecontributionsinManfredSchneider(ed.),Die Ordnung des Versprechens (München,2005)alsoanalysethelinguisticdimensionsofnaturallawtheory.

53 JohnSearle,Speech Acts (Cambridge,MA,1969),especiallyChapter3.Searle’stheoryofferedthefirstsystematicapplicationofAustin’sideas,buthispurelyintentionalreadingofspeechactsunderminestheirdecisivecommunicativenature.

54 Jürgen Habermas, “Was heißt Universalpragmatik?”, in Jürgen Habermas (ed.),Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie (Frankfurt,1976),p.174;alsoJürgenHabermas,Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2vols (Frankfurt,1981), II,p.97 seq.Thecentral issuesofHabermas’ speech act theory already appear inhisGaussLectures (Princeton,1971),reprintedinJürgenHabermas,On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction (Cambridge,2001).


Grotian Speech Acts

Grotiusdistinguishes“threedifferentwaysofspeakingofthingstocome(gradus loquendi de rebus futuris)”[II,11,1]:assertio,pollicitatio andperfecta promissio.Habermas also uses a three-fold structure, distinguishing between cognitive,expressiveandinteractivemodesofcommunication.Grotius’sassertio setsforth“ourpresentintentionregardingsomethinginthefuture”[II,11,2].HabermasandSearleidentifyacognitivepropositionineverypromise,thatis,anassertionofitsintendedcontent.EverymodeofcommunicationforHabermascarriesadifferentnormativevalidityclaim(Geltungsanspruch).Thecognitivepropositionclaims the truth of the assertion. With Grotius’s second way of speaking, thepollicitatio,“thewilldeclaresitscourseinthefuturebyanoutwardsign,sufficientto indicate a senseofobligation to abideby its intention” [II,11,3].Grotiusrequires internal “constancyor faithfulness (constantiae sive fidelitatis)” [II, 11,3]. Correspondingly, Searle demands “sincerity” and Habermas truthfulness(Wahrhaftigkeit) ofthespeakers’expressionofintention.Finally,Grotius’sperfecta promissio requiresthat“totheoriginaldeclarationofpurposeisaddedasignofanintentiontoconveyaspecialrighttoanother”[II,11,4].Transferringarightillustratestheexternaleffectofthe linguisticaction.SinceJohnL.Austin,thisperformative effect has been called the “illocutionary force” of a speech act.55Searlestressestheassumingofanobligationinhis“essentialrule”ofspeechacts,whileHabermasdefineshisthirdinteractiveorregulativemodeasaninterpersonalrelation,claimingmoralrightness(Richtigkeit).

GROTIUS’S SEARLE’S HABERMAS’Sgradusloquendiderebusfuturis

rulesforillocutionaryforces modesofcommunication

assertio=settingforthourpresentintentionregardingsomethinginthefuture

propositionalcontentrule=speakerexpressestheplanofhisfutureact

cognitivemode=propositionalcontent(truth)

pollicitatio=outwardsigntoindicateasenseofobligationtoabidebytheintention

sincerityrule=speakerreallyintentsact

expressivemode=speaker’sintention(truthfulness)

perfectapromissio=conveysaspecialrighttoanother

essentialrule=speakerassumestheobligationtofulfiltheact

interactivemode=interpersonalrelation(rightness)

55 JohnL.Austin,How to Do Things with Words (Oxford,1962),Lecture8.


Dialogical Nature of Promising

The crucial third step, the Grotian perfecta promissio, produces a normativeeffect that transcends the promisor. A promise has an explicit dialogicalnature. It is addressed to the promisee, carrying a normative validity claim(Geltungsanspruch) thatonlythepromiseecanclaimfromthepromisor.Grotiusillustrates the interpersonal orientationofpromising inhis treatmentof lies:“when a statement (sermo) is made to one who is not thereby deceived, if athird person draws a false conclusion from it there is no lying in the case.No lie has been told to the person addressed ... Nor has a lie been told tothepersonwhoaccidentallyheardthestatement,sinceitwasnotaddressedtohim(eo non agitur),andconsequentlytherewasnoobligationtohim”[III,1,13].Promiseshavenormativeforcewhenusedasperformativesinaprocessofcommunication.Apromiseistheprototypeofpurecommunicativeaction.Or,inGrotius’swords,ac de verbis quidem expedita res [II,4,3]–onecaninferthefactsdirectlyfromthewords.

PrimaFacie Obligation

Promisescreatealegalobligationoutofthemuchlowerconventionalobligationoflanguage.Thepromiseestablishesaprima facie obligation,which,ifdisputed,maybejustifiedwithreasonslikefreewill,socialsecurity,utilityorjustice.Withthe speech actofpromising, thepromisor transfers to thepromisee a right todemandreasonsforfutureactionscoveredbythepromise.Theperformativeforceofpromisingopenstheinter-subjectivegameofgivingandtakingreasons.56Withtheuseoflanguage,allhumanbeingsrelyonacommonnormativestructure.Ofcourse linguistic andculturaldifferences aremassive.But allmenandwomenarerationalanimals,andreasonimpliestheuseofreasons.Apromisecreatesanormativeclaimthatinitiatesagameofreasonsinthecommunicativeframeofacontract.Ifthisframeofreasoningbecomesmoreinstitutionalised,forinstancewithexternalarbitrators,itcanalreadybecalledlaw.Commonpromisesenablelegalfoundations.

56 WilfridSellars,Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Minneapolis,1956),§36,broughtuptheideaofa“spaceofreasons”,whichwasdevelopedintoanelaborated“gameofgivingandtakingreasons”inBrandom,Making It Explicit,3.3,andJohnMcDowell,Mind and World (Cambridge,MA,1994).


Epilogue – Etiamsi Daremus non esse Nationes

God’s Nature

Doesapromisereallyescapethefoundingparadox?Ofcoursenot.Butitestablishesanidealpotency(ideelle Macht)ofbeginning.57 Thatiswhattheideaofnaturallawis all about.Natural lawprovides afictive founding scenario, stabilizing thefirstentryintothecircleofjustification.Oncereasoninghasstarted,thenormativegamestabilizesitself.Withhistheoryofpromising,Grotiusoutlinesacommunicativelawofnature.OnemightobjectthatinhistimenotreasonbutGodwasstilltherealsourceofobligation.58ButGoddoesn’thelpeither.Godisjustanothergroundlessentrypointintonormativereasoning.Grotius’sfamousdictumthat“Godhimself…wouldactcontrarytohisownnatureifhedidnotfulfilhispromises”[II,11,4]pointstothismethodologicaldilemma.ThoughharshlycriticizedbyPufendorf,59this brilliant metaphor was not cheap talk, but consistent logic. When Grotiuswritesthat“menatfirst,notbyanypreceptsofGod,butbytheirownaccord…didmeettogetherincivilsociety,fromwhencecivilpowertookbeginning”[I,4,7],hesituatesthenormativepowerofobligationdirectlyinhumansociety.Grotius’s“nature” is“rationalandsocial” [II,20,5].Naturemeans logical reasoning.This“lawofnaturealsoissounalterablethatitcannotbechangedevenbyGodhimself…evenGodcannotcausetwicetwonottomakefour”[I,1,10].Grotiusdidnottakehislineofargumenttoitsend:givenaconventionalaccountofsigns,Godtooisboundbyahumanconvention.Thoughperhapsthemostfundamentalandmostbrilliant,Godisstillahumanconstruction.Goditselfremainsaneternalpromise.

Performative Sanctity

GrotiusinitiatedwhatHabermaswouldmuchlatercallthelinguistictransformationof the sacred (Versprachlichung des Sakralen).60The sourceofobligationmovedfrom religion to communication. This secularisation did not kill God, butreplacedonemythologicalsourcebyanother.61Thistransformationmightbetterbecalledthecanonizationoflanguage.Theperformativeactbecomessortofa

57 Hägerström,Recht, Pflicht und bindende Kraft des Vertrages,p.64.58 Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,DavidBoucherclaimsthatforseventeenth-

centurynaturallawtheoriesthesourceofobligationremainedGod,whilereasonwasonlythemethodofelaboratingitscontent.

59 SamuelPufendorf,De jure naturae et gentium (Frankfurt,1684),III,5,7undII,1,3;Olivecrona,“TheConceptofaRightAccordingtoGrotiusandPufendorf”,p.290.

60 Habermas,Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns,vol.II,p.118seq.61 LudwigWittgenstein,On Certainty, trans.anded.D.Paul,G.E.M.Anscombe

andG.H. vonWright (Oxford, 1969): “Themythologymay changeback into a state


sacredrite,thefoundingofanormativeorder.Butthisperformativesanctityisnomore justified thanwasGod.Etiamsi daremus is thenatural underpinningofeverynormativeorder.Giventhecontractualreconstructionoflegalsystems,promisingcouldbedescribedasthefoundingriteoflaw.JacquesDerridacalledthisperformativeforceoflawthemysticalfoundationofauthority(Fondement mystique de l’autorité).62Lawnever reaches,but still strives for justice.Becauseof its conceptual structure, justice is a justice to come. Justice, like God, is apromise.Thefigureofpromisingembodiestheperformativesanctityofhumancommunicativenature.Inordertostabilizeanormativeorder,uncoveredpromiseshave tobevalidatedby substantial reasons.But theparadoxical entry into theworld of reasoning has been accomplished. Performative sanctity indicates acommonfaithincooperativehumancommunication.

Reasoned Sovereignty

Promises initiate cooperative reasoning by transferring a right to demandjustification. Such a basic “right to justification” could form the core of adeliberative conception of global justice.63 Given the plurality of functionalvocabularies,reasonsareacommongrammar.Theyintegratesingleactorswithina systemand enablenormative representation.But evenmore, reasons formacommongroundbetweendistinctfunctionalsystems.Ofcoursetheunderlyingrationalesmaybequitedifferent,butallsharethenormativegroundthateachlegalsystembalancesmultiplereasons.Justificationisarelationbetweendifferentvocabularies within or beyond one functional system. On this interpretation,sovereigntyassumesanotherform.Actinginalegalsystemrequirestheabilitytoreason.Sovereigntyentailsthepossibilityofgivingandreceivingreasons.Withinthe global sphere, an actor that can reason its case might be called sovereign.Toachievenewformsofsovereignty,weneednewcommunicativeinstitutions,enlargingthespectrumof“reasoners”.

Global Promises

And what we have just said would hold even if we granted that there are nonations.The faith in communication transcendsnationalboundaries.Lookingback on thousands of years of global trade, different cultures and languageshavenotposedinsuperablebarriers.Yetfaithisnotenough.Contractsbearthe

offlux, the river-bedof thoughtsmay shift” (§97) and“Thedifficulty is to realise thegroundlessnessofourbelieving”(§166).

62 SubtitleofDerrida,Force de loi.63 Rainer Forst, “The Basic Right to Justification”, Constellations, 6 (1999): 35;

RainerForst,Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt,2007).


concrete task of mediating, translating and proceduralising plural normativeorders.Contractsconstitutionalisereasons.Theinstitutionaldesignofcomplexcontractualregimeswilldecidetheglobalfuture.64Thequestionofwarandpeacedependsonmechanismsforchannellingreasonsfromonefunctionalsystemtoanother.Only if adequatebalancingprocedures canbe establishedwithin andbetweenthedifferentsystemsisthereachanceofachievingglobalpeace.Multiplesocialcontractsintegratedbymultiplereasonsonthebasisofcommonpromisesoffer a promising theoretical basis for pluralistic global governance structures.On this liquefied reading, then, Grotius is neither the sorry comforter Kantpronouncedhimtobenoraconservativerestorerofreligiousvalues,butratherthe“GrandfatherofGlobalLaw”.

64 Gunther Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centredConstitutionaltheory?”,inChristianJoerges,Inger-JohanneSandandGuntherTeubner(eds),Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance (Oxford,2004),p.3,setsouttheessentialtasksofsuchaprivateconstitutionalism.

PARTIVStateandInternationalRelations

–fromMachiavellitoHobbes

Chapter8TheAnatomyofPowerinInternationalRelations:TheDoctrineofReasonof

Stateasa“Realistic”Impact

PeterNitschke

International Relations in the Seventeenth Century

Did International Relations exist in a premodern world? Such a perspectivemayappeartobethewrongwaytodealwiththetopicofreasonofstate.ItisproblematicinmorethanonerespecttoadaptamodernunderstandingfortheanalysisofhistoricalstructuresintheRenaissanceandEnlightenment.

There are no special relations that can be strictly said to lie within theinternationalsphereintheseventeenthcenturybecausetherewasnounderstandingof“international”inourpresentsense.Everythingthatcanbediscussedinthissenseis,afterall,fixedinthephenomenonofinternational politics.Andyetthisassumes a very traditional understanding of politics that relates to the specialsphereofthestate.

This special sphere of an entity called the state reflects a relatively newunderstandingofhowtotreatquestionsofpowerandjusticewithrespecttoallsuchentitiesthatareorganisedinrelationtoeachotherindifferentways.Seen from thisperspective,wemaybe allowed touse the term international relationstorefertotheseventeenthcenturybecausepoliticswasthenstructuredbyfamiliesandtheirclannetworkingandmixedwithelementsofmonarchyandaristocracyineveryterritoryofEurope.Soapplied,“internationalrelations”doesnotmeanthesamethingasitdoestoday,butithasasimilarmeaninginmorethanonerespect.

Astheconclusionreachedinthesetworemarksreveals,theconceptofthestatewas,atthetimeoftheseventeenthcentury,anewtopicintheunderstandingofpoliticsinaninternationalcontext.Thekeyissueregardingthisnewunderstandingis the doctrine of reason of state, which is finally an instrumental synthesis ofMachiavelli’stheoryofpowerandvirtueinthepivotalfieldofpolitics.


The Doctrine

Machiavelli’s whole theory can be seen as an instruction manual for politicalpractise.Andatthecentreofthisinstructionmanualstandsthedoctrineofreasonsofstate.Thisdoctrineoffersaninnovativeprogrammefortheunderstandingofpoliticsinaninternationalsphere,whichgoesfarbeyondtheleveloftraditionalgenealogical bonds and relationsofmonarchies and aristocracies. It argues forsettingupnewrulesoflawandpower–withpowerofcourseattheforefront.EvenMachiavelli’sproclamationofthenew princefollowsthisline;ithastobefoundedinaclassical(Aristotelian)topostounderstandhierarchyandpoliticalorder without any special orientation towards a concrete national dimension.Consequently, the new prince or the new state can be founded anywhere inpoliticallife.Itmakesnodifferencewhetherthestatebearepublic,amonarchyoranaristocracy:“Rather,thereareasmanystatiasthereareprinces”.1Theconceptofreasonsofstaterepresentsasortoftransformationfromapersonalunderstandingofpoliticalordertoaninstitutionalapproach.Itisnottheprincealonewhoisresponsible for politics; it is more a question of the self-understanding of thestate.Inthissense,wecandetectahermeneuticaltransformationinthedebatesoftheseventeenthoreighteenthcenturiesawayfromMachiavelli;thepersonalattributes of the political leader as virtuous, energetic, courageous, decisive,prudent,andsoon,2arenowfixeduponthestateitself.Itnowbecameaquestionof cleverness for the state to find ways of interacting with similar institutionsandtheirdifferentcapacities.Thedoctrineofreasonofstateindicatesthattheremustbesomethinglikeaspecificknowledgeforeachstateabouthowtoestablishits own ambitions in an inter-territorial arena of different opinions and ideas.Thusthequestforvictoryinconflictsandwars,whichistheessentialdimensionin which the classical prince as well as the (new) state moves, has to becomemorerationaland,inaspecialsense,evenmorescientific.Pursuingrealpoliticsmeanstohavetheabilitytosetnewstandardsinpoliticalaction:instrumentally,methodicallyand,ofcourse,successfully.

Relatedtothisaimofsettingnewstandards,reasonofstatepresentsthesamehermeneuticalproblemasdoestheprinceinMachiavelli’sanalysis:howcanthestateestablish its “own”understandingof ruleasaconcentrationofpower foritsownsake?ThisisaquestionthathastobeansweredbyaninternalstrategyofstateandthatcanbesolvedinthemannerexemplifiedbyThomasHobbesinhisLeviathan.Yetthatcannotbeasufficientanswerwithintheinter-territorialcontext,wherethequestionishowtoactamidstthedifferentdesiresofnumerousstates?

1 Peter Breiner, “Machiavelli’s ‘New Prince’ and the Primordial Moment ofAcquisition”,inPolitical Theory36/1(2008):67.

2 SeeBreiner,“Machiavelli’s‘NewPrince’”:68.

The Anatomy of Power in International Relations 157

Machiavelli’s Rationalism

In this perspective, Machiavelli’s theory affords the first hints towards anunderstanding of politics in an international field of action. The topic ofinternational politicsisinfactcentraltoMachiavelli’stheorybecausethehistoricalframework that he describes in the Principe and in the Discorsi refers to theinternationaldimensionofpolitics.Foreignpolicy is,onthisunderstanding,aquestionofpower,perhapsevenmoresothaninternalpolicy.Inthissense,powerdescribes the ability to concentrate behaviour and desire on specific aims. Anagendaisthereforeneededforcarryingthingsoutintherightmannerand,aboveall,forsuccessinreachingthegoal.

It iswellknownthatintheMachiavelliananalysisthemaintoposreferstoa sort of behaviour that is described as rational. “Rationality” means here thewayinwhichanindividualcanactsuccessfullyinaspecificsituationinfarfromharmoniouscircumstances.IntheworlddescribedbyMachiavelli,confrontationsare normal. To act rationally requires the abilities that can be designated asprudence,virtueand(ofcourse)fortune.Arationalwayofbehavingisbasedupontheanalyticalcompetencetomaketherightdecisionaccordingtotimeandplace,whereverthatmightbe.

Thekeytothis,asmentionedinMachiavelli’stheory,isexpressedbythetermnecessity.Doingthingsrationallymeanstoactintheknowledgeoftherealnecessitypresentineveryhistoricalsituation.Amancannotbesuccessfulinhisactionsaslongashedoesnotrealisethehiddennecessityforbehindhisspecificbehaviour.Powerinpoliticalquestionsisbasedonthisrelation:tofindtherightcombinationof prudence and of necessity for the specific action. In this sense, Machiavelliis the first author since the Greeks and Romans to reveal a concrete theory oftheunderstandingofpower.AsFriedrichNietzschewaslatertoremark,itisthe“absolutewillnottodeludeoneselfandtoseereasoninreality–notin‘reason’,stilllessin‘morality’”.3Thisisthestartingpointforthedoctrineofreason of state.

Doing Things Reasonably

Machiavelli’s theory presents an understanding of individual capacities for apersonal regime.Butduringthetransformationofthedebatesthattookplacein

3 “Thukydidesund,vielleicht,derPrincipeMachiavellis,sindmirselberammeistenverwandt,durchdenunbedingtenWillen,sichnichtsvorzumachenunddieVernunftinderRealitätzusehen,–nichtinder‘Vernunft’,nochwenigerinder‘Moral’”(FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche), “Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887–1889”, in Friedrich Nietzsche,Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 13. ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari(München,1980),p.625).


thesecondhalfofthesixteenthcentury,thispersonalunderstandingchangedintoaninstitutionalapproachtothepracticeofpolitics.Powerisnownotsomuchaquestionofthepersonalbehaviouroftheprinceasaquestionofhowthe state should actwithin the institutional structure for itsown reasons. Inthis sense, the doctrine is the starting point for neo-realism in InternationalRelations,whoserepercussionscontinuetothisday.Questionsaboutsovereigntyorterritorialitythathavebeencentralsincetheseventeenthcentury4cannotbediscussedwithouttakingintoaccountthedoctrineofreasonofstate,becauseitisthestatethathastoorganisethemotives ofthepeople,thesebeingtheirdesires and their necessities. The Hobbesian question quis iudicat gives thecentralindicationofwhattheproblemofthestatemightberegardingitsownorganisation.5Ananswertothisquestionrequiresconsideringthepeoplewhoareinthepositiontomakethedecisionsonwhatisrightandwrongwithinthestate.These are thepolitici, and this groupofpersonsoperatesunder specialobligationsandconditionsinthefieldofstateaffairs.Duringtheseventeenthcentury,itbecameatoposthatapoliticianhadtodohis“job”inaccordwithcertainattitudesthatconflictwithaChristianlife.Asonewriterin1674putit:“APoliticusthatisaStatist,thatisaMachiavellist,thatisanAtheist,thatisnotaChristian”6(cf.Stolleis1980:61).Thetechniquesofpowerdifferconsiderablyfrom the mainstream interpretations of how to organise social life. On thisunderstanding,thedoctrineofreasonofstaterevealsthemostusefulbehaviourinpolitics.Anythingcanbereasonableifitisforthebenefitofthestate.Therearenolimitsortaboosrestrainingministers,politiciansandprincesastohowtothinkandactinprotectingthestate.Theirspecificobligationfollowsfromthenecessityofpreventinganythingthatmightbedetrimentaltothepeoplelivinginthestate.7Meineckemaybeconsultedonthispoint;heindicatedthatthe

4 Jens Siegelberg, “Staat und internationales System – ein strukturgeschichtlicherÜberblick”, in Jens Siegelberg, Klaus Schlichte (eds), Strukturwandel internationaler Beziehungen. Zum Verhältnis von Staat und internationalem System seit dem Westfälischen Frieden(Wiesbaden,2000),p.18.

5 Cf.alsoPeterNitschke,“GrundlagendesstaatspolitischenDenkensderNeuzeit–Souveränität,TerritorialitätundStaatsräson”,inJensSiegelberg,KlausSchlichte(eds),Strukturwandel internationaler Beziehungen. Zum Verhältnis von Staat und internationalem System seit dem Westfälischen Frieden(Wiesbaden,2000),p.95.

6 MichaelStolleis,“ArcanaImperiiundRatioStatus.BemerkungenzurpolitischenTheoriedes frühen17. Jahrhunderts”, inMichael Stolleis,Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen Neuzeit. Studien zur Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts(FrankfurtamMain,1990),p.61(transl.byP.N.).

7 Cf. also Peter Nitschke, Staatsräson kontra Utopie? Von Thomas Müntzer bis zu Friedrich II. von Preußen(StuttgartandWeimar,1995),p.54.


doctrineofreasonofstatecontainsthewholecomplexofautonomy,libertyandsovereigntythatgoestomakeupthemodernstate.8

The (new) Method

Thequestionsabouttheinstitutionalunderstandingofthestatearebynomeanstheonlyone.Evenmorerelevantisthechangeinthemethodologicalapproach,therealisationofwhathappensandwhat isreally important forbenefitof thestate. The discorso method, which was quite successful in the second half ofthe sixteenth century,9 favours questions both about reality and about formalprudence.InMachiavelli,itisakindofmechanicalunderstandingofdialecticalreasoning,asortofcontrary dialecticsasRenéKönighasdescribedit.10Withthismethod,antitheticalsentencescanbeformulatedandgivensuchastrongspinthattherewillbeonlyonesolutionattheend.Eachprobleminpoliticallifecanbeconstructedtoapointwhereonlytwopossibilitiesremain–andonlyonewillbetheright one.

On this understanding, there is no place for any relative propositions anddecisions; the prince and the ministers of state have to choose the very bestpossibility.Necessityshowsitsfaceintheformofalogicalrigorismthatresemblesahermeneuticalexistentialism.Eachproblemcanbediscussedfromtheperspectiveofneitherandnor,andapoliticalaction isalwaysaphysicalone.There isnovirtualityinanalysingpoliticsbecausethebody politicisarealphysicalbodythatundergoespain,desiresandfears.Thefieldinwhichthephysicalunderstandingofpoliticsrevealsitsinnerlogicalstructureiswar,becauseinwarthephysicalactionofallbodies(menandstates)reachtheirfinalconclusion:whowillkeepandwhowilllosehisbody.Thestate(andtheprince)thatisbetterabletocoordinateitswillintermsofreason,ratherthanintermsofdesire,willderivegreaterbenefitfromitsactions.Thusreasonable actionmeansutilityinpractise.11

8 FriedrichMeinecke,Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte [1929],ed.W.Hofer(München,1957).

9 Cf. Cornel Zwierlein, Discorso und Lex Dei. Die Entstehung neuer Denkrahmen im 16. Jahrhundert und die Wahrnehmung der französischen Religionskriege in Italien und Deutschland(Göttingen,2006).

10 Cf. René König, Niccolò Machiavelli. Zur Krisenanalyse einer Zeitenwende(München,1979),p.267.

11 Cf.alsoFrankGrunert,Normbegründung und politische Legitimität. Zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der deutschen Frühaufklärung (Tübingen,2000),p.279.


A World of Concurrence

Theorientationtowardsutilityforthesakeofstatebenefitunderlinesthestrategicimpulsecontainedinthedoctrineofreasonofstatethatproducesadifferentviewforeachstate.Thereisnouniversalapproachpossibleaccordingtothisconcept.Thescepticaltraditioninwesternpoliticalphilosophy,whichdoesnotexpectpeaceandjusticefromasuper-territorialorsuper-nationalinstitutionalstructure,12isalegacyfromMachiavelli.Eachstateisresponsibleforitsownterritoryandaffairs:thisistheclassicaltoposofthecontemporaryneo-realisticschoolininternationalrelations,correspondingtotheunderstandingofreasonsofstateinthedebatesofthepremodernworld.Inthishermeneuticalcontextthewholestructureofstatesisananarchisticsetting.Statesmen(andkings)whoactwithinthisstructuremustbeboundprimarilytotheirnationalinterests.Tooperatesuccessfullyinthefieldof internationalpoliticsmeans that theprimaryconcernofeachstatemustbetoorganiseitsmilitarypower.13Actingaccordingtoreason of statemeanstodopracticalthingsinpolitics,withoutesotericism,withoutmetaphysicalsymbolism.Thisdoctrinefocusesontheconstitutionalfactsofthebodypoliticcalledstate.Theaimis topreventalldangerouseffectsuponthespecificbodypolitic.Themostimportantthreatofcourseis anarchy,14becauseitleadstocivilwar,whichisalwaysadisasterforpeopleandstate.

Inthisconnection,thedoctrineofreasonofstatehasnotonlyarealisticimpactbutalsoanethicalsense.Searchingforgoodreasonsofstatemeanstoexaminehowtheinstitutionsofaparticularstate(anditspeople)canorganisetheirownbenefitsintospecialtopics.Intheareaofinternationalaffairs,thisunderstandinggivesastrategicvaluetopoliticiansandstatesmen:desires,culture,historyandstateareallstructuredinaspecific(thatis,anational)sense.Eachstatehasitsownhistorythathastobeconsultedindeterminingitsownspecificinterests.

Thesespecificnationalinterestsoftenoccurinanantagonisticconstellation;thereforethesituationofthestatesamongthemselvesmaybeseenparadigmaticallyasbeingastateofwar.Thusthetoposofthereasonforwaristhehiddencentreof all politics and is basically the reason for the hermeneutical behaviour ofpoliticianswhoargueusingreasonsofstateandthebasictenetsofcontemporaryneo-realists. Each government (and especially the governments of republics),

12 Cf.HerfriedMünkler,“NiccolòMachiavelli–GedankenzudenzwischenstaatlichenBeziehungen”, in JürgenBellers (ed.):Klassische Staatsentwürfe. Außenpolitisches Denken von Aristoteles bis heute(Darmstadt,1996),p.47.

13 Cf.alsoDanielS.GellerandJ.DavidSinger,Nations at War. A Scientific Study of International Conflict(Cambridge,2000),p.6.

14 See also Rüdiger Voigt, “Im Zeichen des Staates. Niccolò Machiavelli und dieStaatsräson”, inHerfriedMünkler,RalfWalkenhaus,RüdigerVoigt(eds),Demaskierung der Macht. Niccolò Machiavellis Staats- und Politikverständnis(Baden-Baden,2004),p.43.


therefore,mustorganiseitspoliticsinsuchawayas“tolovepeaceandtoknowhowtofightawar”.15

15 Machiavelli,cit.byMaurizioViroli,Das Lächeln des Niccolò. Machiavelli und seine Zeit(Reinbek,2001),p.277.

Chapter9SecurityasANorminHobbes’s

TheoryofWar:ACritiqueofSchmitt’sInterpretationofHobbes’sApproachto

InternationalRelationsLucFoisneau

ItiswellknownthatsecurityisacentralconcernofHobbes’stheoryofthestateandinternationalrelations.Indeed,theendforwhichmenagreetosubmitthemselvestothecommonpowerofasovereignis“tolivepeacefullyamongthemselves,andbeprotectedagainstothermen”.1ItisalsowellknownthatHobbeswroteverylittleonsecurityandwarininternationalrelationsproper.Nolongandtechnicaltreatise such as Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis, not even a separate chapter inoneofhisthreemajorpoliticaltreatises.Despitethisratherthinproductiononthe subject, coming to no more than a few paragraphs and remarks here andthere, Hobbes’s name appears to be very familiar to contemporary specialistsin international relations, who tend to consider him the original proponent,alongsideThucydidesandMachiavelli,of the realistviewthat therecanbenomoralityinthewaystatesdealwithoneanother.

Even though international life is not only a battlefield, it seems possibleto describe it in Hobbesian words as a permanent war, consisting “not in theactoffighting,but in a tractof timewherein thewill to contendbybattle issufficiently known”.2 Contemporary references to Hobbes’s views on powerpolitics,3ortheanarchicalsociety,4canbeconsideredeitherasasymptomofthehistoricalignoranceofspecialistsininternationalrelations,5orastestimonytothe

1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII, 1, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis andCambridge, 1994), p. 110.Whenpossible, I give references toHobbes’sworks in theformofthechapterandparagraphnumber.ForLeviathan,Idothesame,althoughtheparagraphnumberdoesnotappearintheoriginalversion.

2 Hobbes,Leviathan,XII,8,p.76.3 Hans J.Morgenthau,American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination (London,

1952),p.34.4 HedleyBull,The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London,

1977).5 Noel Malcolm’s frontal attack against international relations theorists illustrates

thisposition: “And the interpretationofHobbesput forwardbymodern international


productivityofHobbes’stheorybeyonditshistoricalcontext.NoelMalcolmhasfollowedthefirst lineof interpretation,showingthat thestandardportrayalofHobbes’stheoryofinternationalrelations“appearstobebased,forthemostpart,onahandfulofpassagesinoneortwoofhisworks(ignoringmanycommentson internationalaffairs elsewhere inhiswritings); andeven those fewpassageshavebeenmisunderstood”.6ThiscriticaltextualapproachisahelpfulreminderthatwhatHobbes actually says about relationsbetween states is very far fromthecaricaturewhichoftencirculatesunderhisnameinthefieldofinternationalrelationstheory.

Contrary to that view, Iwould like to considerhereHobbes’s approach tosecurityininternationalrelationsasanormativeone,andinordertodosoIshallcontrastitwiththereadingofthemostradicalformofrealisminthisfield,thatofCarlSchmittandhisviewsontheformationofEuropeaninternationallaw.ThiscomparisonisallthemoreinterestingbecausetheideathatsecuritycouldbeaHobbesiannormclashesfromthestartwithSchmitt’sdecisionistinterpretationofHobbes.Myapproach,however,willnotbetodiscussSchmitt’sinterpretationoftheHobbesiansovereignasthetypicaldecision-maker,7butrathertoexaminehowHobbesfitsinto,orratherdoesnotfitinto,theSchmittianinterpretationoftheseventeenth-centuryinternationalworldorder.

Despite its political origins in Nazi Germany,8 Carl Schmitt’s approach tointernational relations still exerts a fascination and claims a right to imposeitsmarkonthereadingofHobbes’splaceinthehistoryofwarandstate.Oneexplanation for this fascination is thatSchmitt’s theory is supposed tohelpusconsiderthedoubleaspectofaclassicalsovereignstate:asameans,ontheone

relationstheorists,meanwhile,hasbecomefixedandossified, functioningatbestasan‘idealtype’andatworstasacaricature.”“Hobbes’sTheoryofInternationalRelations”,inNoelMalcolm,Aspects of Hobbes(Oxford,2002),p.433.

6 Malcolm,“Hobbes’sTheoryofInternationalRelations”,p.435.7 ForadefinitionofHobbesasthecharacteristicdecisionistthinker,seeCarlSchmitt,

Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens(Hamburg,1934),chap.1.2;On the Three Types of Juristic Thought,transl.byJ.W.Bendersky(Westport,Conn.andLondon,2004), p. 61: “The classic case of decisionist thinking first appears in the seventeenthcenturywithHobbes.AllRecht,allnormsandstatutes,allinterpretationsoflaws,andallordersareforhimessentiallydecisionsofthesovereign,andthesovereignisnotalegitimatemonarchorestablishedauthority,butmerelytheonewhodecidesinasovereignmanner.”

8 ForaclearpresentationoftheoriginsofthebookandinterestingremarksonthelinkwiththeGlossarium,seePeterHaggenmacher,“Présentation.L’itinéraireinternationalistedeCarlSchmitt”,inCarlSchmitt,Le Nomos de la terre,trad.L.Deroche-Gurcel(Paris,2001),pp.1–46.OnthevariousfacetsofSchmitt’santi-SemitismandinparticularontheoriginsofthenotionofnomosintheProtestanttheologyofnomos,seeRaphaelGross,Carl Schmitt and the Jews: the “Jewish Question”, the Holocaust, and German Legal Theory,transl.byJ.Golb(Madison,2007).

Security as A Norm in Hobbes’s Theory of War 165

hand,oflimitingtheintensityofwarwithinthefrontiersofEurope,andontheotherhand,asaninstrumentforwagingwarsofdestructionbeyondthebordersofEurope.9Beingas it isageopoliticalapproachtolawandpolitics,Schmitt’sanalysishasbeen claimed tohelpusunderstandHobbes’sphilosophy inwhatwouldbeitsreal,thatis,geographical,internationalcontext.10

InordertobreaktheSchmittianspell,itisnecessarytostressfirst,asIshalltrytodointhefirstpartofthischapter,thattheaspectofHobbes’sforeignpoliticswhichisstressedinThe Nomos of the Earth (abookpublishedin1950,butwhosematerial is alreadypresent in articles andessaysof thewarperiod)11 ispartofabroaderinterpretationofinternationalrelationsbasedonsovereignterritorialstatesatwarwithoneanother.Thisinternationaltheory,whichwastogovernthelifeofEuropeanstatesfromthesixteenthtothenineteenthcentury,isbasedatthesametimeontheassumptionofterritorialsovereigntyastheultimatedefinitionofpolitics,andontheparadoxicalhypothesisthatapluralityofsovereignstatesislessdangerousforpeacethanthespiritualcompetitionbetweenvariousChristianfaiths,sinceitallowsforamoderatestateofwarwithinthefrontiersofEurope.WeshallseewhetherHobbesfitsintothisSchmittianinterpretationofthehistoryoflawandpolitics.

Inthesecondpart,IturntowhatSchmittsaysaboutHobbes’sinternationalrelations theory in the context of the division of the earth according to whatSchmitt called “global lines”. Global lines theory is used to explain how theHobbesianstateofnaturecouldalsoapplytotheterriblewarofallagainstallsupposedtoberagingbeyondcertaingeographicallinessecretlyagreeduponbytheEuropeanpowers.

Inalastpartofthischapter,IofferevidenceforthecontradictionbetweenthisinterpretationandtheactualHobbesianapproachtointernationalrelations.

9 Cf.CarloGalli,Spazi politici. L’étà moderna e l’età globale(Bologna,2001)andalsothequotationsfromthisbookinEtienneBalibar,Europe Constitution Frontières(Bègles,2005),p.96,note2:“Parmisesnombreusespublications[whichisGalli’s]figureletravailderéférencesurlapenséedeCarlSchmitt:Genealogia della politica: Carl Schmitt e la crisi del pensiero moderno,IlMulino,Bologna,1996,dontunegrandepartieestconsacréeàladiscussiondelathéoriedu‘Nomosdelaterre’(audoublesensdedistributionetdeloi).Abeaucoupd’égardsledernierlivredeGallirelèvedudébatinternationaltrèsaniméquitendàrechercherdesalternatives non schmittiennes au problème géo-politique posé par Schmitt,etàlaphilosophiedel’histoirequilesous-tend”(myitalics).

10 Inhis interpretationofHobbes,CarloGallistressesthe“spatial”characteristicsofthestateofnatureandofthecivilstateinawaythatblurstheideologicaldimensionofSchmitt’sargument,notablyinthecaseofthenon-discriminatingconceptofwar:“…datalaparitàontologicadeicontendenti,laguerrarisultalimitataenon‘giusta’,ovverononassolutanédiscriminatoria.”(CarloGalli,Spazi politici,p.47;myitalics).

11 Forsomeofthosearticles,seeCarlSchmitt,Staat, Grossraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren, 1916–1969,ed.GünterMaschke(Berlin,1991).


The Hobbesian State of Nature and the Schmittian jus Publicum Europaeum

LetusbeginwiththeanalysisofHobbesasagoodrepresentativeoftheEuropeanlawofnations.Thefirstcharacteristicofthis law,referredtobySchmittas jus publicum Europaeum, is that it isbasedon the concreteprincipleof territorialsovereignty, or more exactly on a division of the territory of Europe amongstseparatesovereignentities.12 Incontrastwiththe legalorganisationofempires,either spiritual (papacy)or temporal (themedievalHolyRomanEmpire),andwiththefeudalorganisationofmedievalkingdoms,thisnewlegalsetofprinciplescanbecalledtrulyinternational,orinterstatal,asitaimsatorganisingtherelationsbetweenstates,soontobecomenation-states,onthebasisoftheoccupationofawell-defined territory.This territorial divisionofEurope intodifferent stateswithborderstodefendpresupposestheoccupationofageographicalspacethatis not limited to the borders of Europe but extends to territories in the NewWorld.13Theclassicalinternationalorderisthusbasedondiscoveryasalegitimatetitletooccupyingnewlyfoundlands.14Seventeenth-centuryEuropeanstatesdonotthereforeproceedfromanabstractmodel,whichwemightcalltheuniversalstate-form,but fromaEuropeanwayoforganising theworldorderbymeansofdiscoveryandconquest: this ispreciselywhat theGreek termnomos isheretaken to mean, that is, a juridical world-ordering based on the occupation oftheearth.Schmitt’sunderstandingoftheworldorderasa“nomosoftheearth”thusexplainshisrefusal toconsider thestateasauniversalpoliticalcategory.15Thestate-formislinkedtothegeopoliticaldevelopmentofEurope,toacertain

12 “ContinentalEuropeaninternationallawsincethe16thcentury,thejus publicum Europaeum,originallyandessentiallywasalawamongstates,amongEuropeansovereigns.ThisEuropeancoredeterminedthenomosof therestof theearth.”(CarlSchmitt,Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum(4thedn,Berlin,1997;[1stedn,1950]),p.97; The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,transl.byG.L.Ulmen(NewYork,2003),pp.126–7;Abrev.:The Nomos of the Earth,pageintheGermanedition/pageintheEnglishtranslation.

13 OnthefactthattheenclosedEuropeanterritorialorderislinkedtotheopeningof amaritime space, see Jean-FrançoisKervégan, “Carl Schmitt and ‘WorldUnit’”, inChantalMouffe(ed.),The Challenge of Carl Schmitt(London,1999),pp.65–6.SeealsoSchmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.112/140:“TheconcretespatialorderoftheseterritorialstatesgaveEuropeansoilaspecificstatusininternationallaw,notonlywithinEurope,butinrelationtoboththefreespaceoftheopenseaandtoallnon-Europeansoiloverseas.”

14 Cf. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 100–104/130–33: “Occupation andDiscoveryasLegalTitletoLand-Appropriation”.

15 “‘Statehood’isnotauniversalconcept,validforalltimesandallpeoples.Bothintimeandspace,thetermdescribedaconcretefact.”(Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.97/127).


relationshipbetweenEuropeandtherestoftheworld,andthereforecannotbeconsideredastheuniversallyvalidresultofalogicaldeduction.

ThisstatementconstitutesafirstdifferencebetweenSchmitt’sandHobbes’sapproachestothestate.Hobbesconsideredhisdemonstrationtohaveauniversalscope:“Thefinalcause,end,ordesignofmen(whonaturally love libertyanddominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselvesin which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their ownpreservation,andofamorecontentedlifethereby”.16ThisquotationclearlyshowsthatLeviathanwasnotwrittenforthecitizensofEuropeonly,letaloneforthecitizensofGreatBritain,butforanymanwillingtoliveapeacefullifeundertheprotectionofastate.Thereisnoreferenceheretothewell-delineatedterritoryofaparticularstate,butthegeneralformulaofthesolutiontoauniversalproblem:ifthetimberofhumannatureiscrooked,asindicatedbythefactthatmosthumanpassionsarecontrarytomorality,thenthereisonlyonesolutiontotheproblemofhavingmenactmorally,thatis,toestablisha“visiblepowertokeeptheminawe,andtiethembyfearofpunishmenttotheperformanceoftheircovenants”.17Sincethe“visiblepower”isageneralsolutiontoauniversalproblem,itisofnoimportancewhoinventedthesolutionandwhereonearthitwasinvented.

Theemergenceofseveralstates,insteadofasingleempire,wasofcourseanewsourceof contention in seventeenth-centuryEurope, as theThirtyYearsWarwasnotablytodemonstrate;sincethosestatesexertedtheirpoweroveradeterminedterritory,thedefenceofterritorialborderswaslikelytoleadtowar.However,thisobviousfeatureoftheinterstatalorganizationofclassicalEuropehas–andthisisasecondaspectofSchmitt’sanalysis–concealedthefactthatthose interstatewarswerefar lessdangerousforthestabilityofthecontinentthanhadbeenthepreviouswarsofreligion.Thereasonforthisdifferenceinthe intensityofwar is that the stateoperates ade-theologisation ofpublic life,inbothdomestic and foreignaffairs.18Thus thenew interstatewarsno longersplitsocietyintoopposedfactions,eachfightingfortransnationalreligioustruths,such as sixteenth-century wars between French Protestants and Catholics haddone.Nolongerawarforeternalsalvation,thatis,atheologicallyjustifiedwar,interstatewarissupposedtobelessviolentbecausetheenemy’scauseisnotipso facto consideredunjust and theenemyhimselfwicked.Playing itspart inDer Nomos der Erde,thisconceptualdistinctionbetweentwokindsofwarisalready

16 Hobbes,Leviathan,XVII,1,p.106.17 Ibid.18 “Thefirsteffectiverationalizationofthe‘state’asaspatialform,intermsofboth

domesticandforeignpolicy,wasachievedbythedetheologizationofpubliclifeandtheneutralizationoftheantithesesofcreedalcivilwars.”(Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.112/140;modifiedtranslation).


centraltoSchmitt’s1938bookontheconceptofdiscriminatingwar;19inbothcases, the idea is that the violence of awar is duenot only to the techniquesand technologies of war, but also to the claim that the war being fought is ajustwar.SchmittreferstothejustwartheoriesoftheMiddleAges,notablytotheonedevelopedbyFranciscodeVitoria,buthealsohasinmindthemilitaryinterventionoftheUnitedStatesin1917andthespiritoftheTreatyofVersailles.Theidyllicpicturehedrawsofseventeenth-centuryinterstatewarsistheexact,andperhapsall-too-clear-cut,oppositebothofsixteenth-centuryreligiouswarsandtwentieth-centuryideologicalwarsofdestruction.Whencomparedwithwarsofannihilation,fightingforlimitedgoals,suchasamodificationtoaborderoraclaimtodynasticheritage,canappearasrelativelybenign.

Howdoesthishistoricallyfar-reachingSchmittiananalysisapplytoHobbes’sconceptionofinterstaterelations?Letusturnfirsttothefamouspassageaboutstates’ relations in the description of the state of nature in chapter XIII ofLeviathan:

But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were inaconditionofwaroneagainstanother,yetinalltimeskingsandpersonsofsovereignauthority,becauseoftheirindependency,areincontinualjealousies,andinthestateandpostureofgladiators,havingtheirweaponspointing,andtheireyesfixedononeanother;thatis,theirforts,garrisons,andgunsuponthe frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours,which is apostureofwar.Butbecause theyuphold thereby the industryoftheirsubjects,theredoesnotfollowfromitthatmiserywhichaccompaniesthelibertyofparticularmen.20

Twothings,atleast,areclearinthistext:first,Hobbesrecognisesthatstateshavealwaysbeeninaconditionofwarwithoneanother;second,thattheinterstatecondition of war is not as bad as the inter-individual state of hostility, sincetheformer,andnotthelatter,allowsforpeace,thatis,foreconomicexchangesandindustryathome.Whereascommentatorshaveoftenreadthistextas if itdescribed relationsbetween states as anarchical, stressing the less than friendlydescriptionof“theirweaponspointing,andtheireyesfixedononeanother”,theyhavehardlynoticedthatthewholedescriptionreliesonacomparisonofstateswithgladiators,whichcouldallowforaverydifferent interpretation.Andthisis preciselywhat Schmitt puts forward. If states canbe legitimately comparedtoduellists,thereiscertainlyagoodreasonforconsideringtheirconflictsintheHobbesianstateofnatureinadifferentperspective.Althoughduelscanbefatalto

19 CarlSchmitt,Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff(Munich,1938).20 Hobbes,Leviathan,XIII,12,p.78.


thelifeofthoseactuallyengagedinthem,SchmittstressesthefactthatthisdangerislessthreateningthaninprivatewarswagedinthenameofGodorofjustice.Ifjusticematters,itisnotbecausethejustcauseshouldalwaystriumph,butbecausetherearejuridicalformsthathavetoberespected.21Theduellistsmustbemenofhonour,theymustkeeptotherulesestablishedinsuchcircumstances,andtheymustabidebythedecisionsofareferee.

Justasinduelsfightingislimitedbyrespectforstrictjuridicalrules,sotheeffectsofwarbetweenstatesintheclassicalperiodareconsideredbySchmitttohavebeenlimitedbyrespectforjuridicallawsdefiningthecasus belli,thejuridicalconditionsofwarfare,andtheobtainingofpeace.Justasinduelstherearewitnesseswhoattesttothepropercourseofthefight,sointheclassicalEuropeanlawofnationsthereareneutralstatescapableofplayingthepartofmediatorsbetweenconflictingparties.Theplausibilityofthisanalogyrestsononecentralelement,namelythedefinitionofthestate,butthisdefinitionitselfvariessomewhatinthetwotextswheretheanalogyisintroduced.InSchmitt’sThe Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes,thestateisfeaturedasajuridicalmechanism,allowingforbothtechnicalefficiencyinthetransmissionofordersandforastrictlypositivisticrespectofthelaw,excludingbydefinitionallkindofresistance;22inThe Nomos of the Earth,anewdimensioncomestothefore,thatis,theterritoryoccupiedbythestate,whichisthespatialsubjectrepresentedasaperson.23Thisdoesnotmeanthatthetwootheraspectshavebeendenied,butratherthatthegeopoliticaldimensionisnowthecrucialdimension.Therehasbeenanevidentchangeinthepresentation,butthecorethesisremainsunchangedbythetransformedhistoricalcontext:themodernstatehasmodifiedthenatureoftherelationsbetweenjusticeandwar,sincejusticeinwarisnolongerofasubstantialtheologicalnature,but

21 “Inotherwords,aduelisnot‘just’becausethejustcausealwayswins,butbecausetherearecertainguaranteesinthepreservationoftheform–inthequalityofthepartiestotheconflictasagents,intheadherencetoaspecificprocedure(effectedbybracketingthestruggle),and,especially,intheinclusionofwitnessesonanequalfooting.Here,lawhasbecomeacompletelyinstitutionalizedform;here,menofhonorhavefoundasatisfactorymeans of dealing with a matter of honor in a prescribed form and before impartialwitnesses.”(Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.115/143;modifiedtranslation).

22 On themechanistic andneutraldimensionsof themodern state illustratedbyHobbes,seeCarlSchmidt,Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag einer politischen Symbols (Hamburg,1938),transl. inEnglishbyG.Schwabeand E. Hilfstein as The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol(Westport,ConnecticutandLondon,1996),chap.4.

23 “Nowthestatewasconceivedofjuridicallyasameasurerelativetoanewspatialorder,asthenewlegalsubjectofanewinternationallaw;asajuridicalconcept,ithadbecome irresistible.However, essentially this statewas aunified, self-contained areaofEuropeansoilthatwasatthesametimerepresentedintheguiseofamagnum homo[greatman].”(Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.117/145;modifiedtranslation).


ofaprocedural juridicalnature,whichcanbeaddressed in frontofa tribunal–precisely the tribunalofwar.Tothemain featuresSchmitthasaddedanewone,spaceanditsimportanceforthestate,butthecentralthesisisstillthesame:reintroducingadiscriminatingconceptofwar inthetwentiethcentury,aswasdoneaccordingtoSchmittbytheTreatyofVersailles,wasanenormousjuridicalandpoliticalmistake.Inaway, theviolenceofEuropeanconflictsafterWorldWarIisadirectconsequenceofthismistake.ThisremarkshowstheSchmittianthesis on discriminating war to be more relevant to the situation of the earlytwentieth century than to seventeenth-century Europe.24 The question now istodeterminehowthistwentieth-centurycontextaffectsSchmitt’sinterpretationofHobbes,and,inparticular,thedescriptionofinterstaterelationsasa“stateofnature”.IsthisnotincontradictionwithwhatSchmittsuggests,thatis,thatastateofwarbetweentwostatesshouldbelessopposedtoarapidreturntopeacethanaHobbesianstateofnatureisusuallyconsideredtobe?

Onewayofdealingwiththisembarrassingquestionistosay,asSchmittdoes,thattheimportantpointisnotthenatureofthestateofnature,butthenatureofthestate.Asamatteroffact,thestateofnatureisonlyatypeofrelationexistingoutsidethestate-order.WhetherthenewEuropeaninternationalorderistobeconsidered“anantisocialstrugglebetweenLeviathans(accordingtoHobbes)or(with Locke) as an already sociable community of gentlemen” is a “secondaryquestion”25forthehistorianofpoliticalthought,butnotforthelegalphilosopher.What reallymatters is the “international personal analogy”26 at thebasisof thenewinternationalorder,inasmuchasitallowsthejus gentiumtobeconsideredastherightexistingbetweenpersonswhoaretherepresentativesofstatesequallyentitledtowagewar.

24 But themainreferencehere is theessayonthe transformationsof theconceptofwarafterWorldWarIandtheTreatyofVersailles:CarlSchmidt,Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff(Munich,1938),andalso“ÜberdasVerhältnisderBegriffeKriegundFeind”(1938),inCarlSchmitt,Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923–1939(Hamburg,1940).

25 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.118/146(modifiedtranslation):“Forexample,onesuchsecondaryquestionisthedisputeaboutwhetheroneshouldthinkofthese‘greatmen’ as existing in a ‘stateofnature’ beyond an amity line and, in turn,whetheroneshould consider this state ofnature (in the sense ofHobbes) tobe an asocial struggleofleviathans,or(inthesenseofLocke)alreadytobeasocialcommunityofthoroughlypropergentlemen”.

26 Ibid.ThispassageisquotedinEnglishinthetext.Whenfirstusingthisexpression,Schmitt(The Nomos of the Earth,p.119,note1/147,note7)refersto“theextraordinarilyimportantarticlebyEdwindeWittDickinson,‘InternationalPersonalAnalogy’,intheYale Law Journal,vol.XXII(1916–17),pp.564–89”,whichdoesnotsupporthisthesisand was published under a different title: “The Analogy between Natural Persons andInternationalPersonsintheLawofNations”.


HobbesisimportantforSchmittnotsomuchforhischaracterisationofthestateofnatureasforhisdefinitionoftheinternationalpersonalanalogy.27Thecomparisonbetweenstatesandpersonsmustneverthelessbecorrectlyinterpreted,thatis,onthebasisnotofapsychologicalanalogy,butofajuridicaldefinition.28Whenthegiganticpersons–states–arecomparedtogladiatorsinapostureofwar,itdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheydonotbelongtothesamesociety.Allthemoresoasthosegiganticpersonsarelinkednotonlybytreatiesandinternationalcontracts,butalsobymoretraditionalbondssuchasreligionandeconomy,29nottomentionthebloodtiesofmostthesovereignsofseventeenth-centuryEurope.Seen in theperspectiveof thisnewconceptof statepersonality, it isclear thatHobbes’scontributiontothedefinitionofanewEuropeaninternationalorderhasbeenquitecentral.Althoughtherepresentationofstatesasmagni homines,or“bigmen”,canbetracedtoitsuseinallegoryandsowasnotinventedbyHobbes,itremainstruethatHobbescontributedgreatlytothejuridicalclarificationofthenotionitself,notablyinchapterXVIofLeviathan.Itisthereforenolesstruetosaythattheruleswhichapplytoseventeenth-centuryEuropearenotthoseofananarchicalsociety,butratherthoseofarelativelypolite,ifundisciplined,societyofstates.Afterall,duelstakeplaceonlybetweenpeoplebelongingtothesamearistocraticmilieu.

ThefamousHobbesianobservationintheprefacetoDe Cive–homo homini lupus–maybeinterpretedwithinthesameperspective:notonlydoesitnotmeanthatmenbehaveas ferociousbeasts tooneanother; italsodoesnot implythatsomestatesareewes.Sinceeveryoneofthosepublicpersonshasanequaljus ad bellum,thereisnosinglewolfamongtheEuropeanflock.IfHobbesisrighttoconsiderthesebigindividualsaswolvestooneanother,itisbecauseallsharethisquality.Schmitt’sfixedideaisthatnoonecandeprivetheothersoftheirjus ad bellum;noonecandeclare thathe isaewe,whileonly theothersarewolves.30

27 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 118–19/p. 146 (modified translation):“Moreover,Hobbes’stheoryofmagni homines inthe[international]stateofnaturewasacceptedastrueand exercisedthestrongestintellectualinfluence.”

28 NoelMalcolmgivesaclearformulationofthedifferencebetweenthepsychologicaland the juridical conceptsofpersons: “As the famous engraved titlepageofLeviathanreminds us, Hobbes does indeed have a theory of the collective person-hood of thecommonwealth.Buthis use of the concept of a ‘person’ here is not amatter of somegeneralized psychological comparison between individual and collective behaviour”.(Malcolm,“Hobbes’sTheoryofInternationalRelations”,p.443).

29 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.120/148:“But,inreality,strongtraditionalties–religious,social,andeconomic–endurelonger.”

30 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.119/147:“Evenifoneacceptsthat‘manisawolfamongothermen’ in thebellum omnium contra omnes [warofeveryoneagainsteveryone]ofthestateofnature,thishasnodiscriminatorymeaning,becausealsoinastate


Here,again,thesameobsessioncomestothefore,thatis,thattheclassicalrightofwarisrightbecauseitdoesnotrecogniseadiscriminatingconceptof(just)war.

Ifthisduel-likeattitudeofperson-likestatestowardsoneanotherwerethewholestory,however,therewouldbenoreasontodiscussSchmitt’sinterpretationanyfurther,sincethereisnosuchacontradictionbetweenthelatterandanormativeapproachtoHobbes’sstateofnature.Indeed,duelswouldnotexistweretherenoestablishedrulestoorganisethem.Similarly,thewarsbetweenclassicalEuropeanstateswouldnothavearisenwithoutacertainamountofregulation,31towhicheach stateagreed to submit.Butwhereas recentcommentatorshave tended toconsider this moderate view on the international state of nature as the wholeHobbesianstory,Schmittaddsafewfeaturesinrelationtohisconceptionofthespatialdimensionofpolitics,andthosefeaturescompletelychangethenatureofthepicture.

The Hobbesian State of Nature and the Space Beyond the Lines

OnecharacteristicfeatureofSchmitt’sreflectioninThe Nomos of the Earthisitsinterestintheprocessthatestablishesanewinternationaljuridicalorder:notonlyconstitutedpowermatters,thatis,thestatesystemanditsbureaucracy,butalsoconstitutingpower, that is, the original violencebehind institutions. Inworldhistory,thisphenomenonisdescribedbySchmittasaphenomenonofconquest,whathecallsLandnahme,thetakingofland,whichhesaysismorefundamentalthan Landteilung, the division of conquered territory.32 Since not all kinds ofconquestsarethebeginningofanewjuridicalorder,whatisofinteresttoSchmittis how Europe juridically organised its conquest of the new world, and whatconsequences this way of conquering the world had on the organisation of aEuropeanlawofnations.

ThishistoricalapproachtotheformationoftheEuropeanstatesystemconstitutesasecondmajordifferencebetweenSchmittandHobbes,sinceHobbessaysextremelyclearlythatthequestionoftheoriginsofcommonwealthsisofnoconsequenceasfarastheobligationtoobeythemisconcerned.AlthoughtheEnglishphilosopher

ofnaturenoneofthecombatantshastherighttosuspendequalityortoclaimthatonlyheishumanandthathisopponentisnothingbutawolf.”

31 N.Malcolmprovidesevidencethatthisregulationfindsitsexpressioninthelawsofnature:“Indeed,thereissomethingveryimplausibleabouttheclaimthatHobbes’slawsofnaturecannotapplyattheinternationallevel,giventhatoneofthemrelatesdirectlytodiplomaticpractice”.(“Hobbes’sTheoryofInternationalRelations”,p.439).

32 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.49/81(modifiedtranslation):“Forourpurposes,thetermland-appropriationisbetterthanland-division,becauseland-appropriation,bothexternallyandinternally,pointsclearlytotheconstitutionofaradical title.”


acknowledgesthatsomecommonwealthsaresuchbyacquisition,33hestressesthefactthatthelatter’sviolentoriginsarenotrelevantasfarasrightsofsovereigntyare concerned: “… the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same inboth [therefore in the commonwealthby institution and in the commonwealthbyacquisition]”.34Schmittmaintainsexactlythecontrary:thewayapieceofland(orofsea)isconquereddeterminesthekindoflawthatwillapplytoitandalsotherelationsbetweentheconqueringpowers.WhenconsideringtheinterpretationSchmittgivesofHobbes’sstateofnatureinrelationtothediscoveryofAmerica,thisimportantdifferenceshouldbeborneinmind.

The latter interpretation of the Hobbesian international state of naturedepends on the idea that, once European powers took possession of the NewWorld, they established their respective properties on it by means of globaldivisions of the earth, which established very different regimes of law and ofwar according to where one lived or waged war. The peace treaties signed bythepowerfulkingdomsofEuropethroughouttheclassicalperiodwouldnotbecomplete,insistsSchmitt,35ifoneweretoignoreafewsecretclauseswhichwereattachedtothem.Thosesecretclauses,basedontheglobaldivisionoftheearthamongsttheEuropeanpowers,describeaverydifferentpictureofinternationalrelationsthanthepeacefulonethatwehavepreviouslyenvisaged.BeforeturningagaintoHobbes’sstateofnature,itisthereforenecessarytosayafewwordsaboutthe ideaofglobal linesdividing the earth, since theyplaya significant role inSchmitt’sinterpretationofHobbes.

Thefirstthingtobenotedisthatthoselineshavehadaglobalcharacterfromthestart,thatis,sincethediscoveryoftheNewWorldbySpainandPortugal.Thoselinesaretherefore,accordingtoSchmitt,theexpressionofaEurocentricapproachtoworldpolitics.Thesecondthingtobenotedisthat,althoughthegeographicalsituationofthoselineshavegreatlyvariedfromthetimeofthefirstdiscoveriesandtheinterventionofthepapacytotheendofnineteenthcentury,theMonroedoctrineandtheinterventionoftheUnitedStates,theyhavebeen,fromthestart,notmerelygeographicalbutalsogeopoliticaland,ifitmaybeputthisway, geojuridical36divisions,basedonaglobal viewof thedominationoftheearth.Inthisperspective,globalisation,orglobalthinking,isnotatallanew

33 Hobbes,Leviathan,chap.XX,“OfDominionPaternalandDespotical”.34 Hobbes,Leviathan,XX,3,p.128.35 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.60/92:“Althoughthehistoricaltypeofso-

calledamity lineswasrelatedtoEuropeanland-andsea-appropriationsoftheNewWorld,itwasbasedoncompletelydifferentpremises.Amitylinesfirstappeared(andwereagreedupononlyverbally)inasecretclauseintheTreatyofCateau-Cambrésis(1559).”

36 Friedrich August von der Heydte described Schmitt’s approach as constitutingsomekindof“Geojurisprudence”.Cf.Haggenmacher,“Présentation”,inCarlSchmitt,Le Nomos de la terre,p.41,note2.


concept,foritdatesbacktothefirsttreatiesbetweenPortugalandSpainattheendoffifteenthcentury.ButthecharacteristicfeatureofthisSchmittianapproachto globalisation is that it is an anti-universalistic one: global lines are there todelineatedifferentkindsofjuridicalregimesaccordingtothepowersthathavecommandoveraland;theyaretheexpressionofageographicalwayofthinkingaboutinternationalmatters,wherethecentralquestionisnotsomuchthevalidityofthenormsper seasoftheimperialpowersbehindthenorms.Amajoraspectofthisgloballineofthinkingis,indeed,thatitrestsontheideaofempiremorethanontheideaofstate.This,ofcourse,raisestheessentialquestion(towhichIshallreturninmyconclusion)whetherornotHobbes’svisionofpoliticsissympathetictoanimperialapproachtointernationalrelations.

But before treating that point, it is necessary to consider what Schmitt’sgloballineswere,andinparticularwhattheywereatthetimeofHobbes.AmongthethreemaindivisionsconsideredbySchmitt,thefirsttype–theraya–wasclearlylinkedtothehegemonyofthepapacyinEuropeanpolitics,sincethefirstglobal line was defined in the papal bull Inter caetera divinae, issued by PopeAlexanderVI(4May1494[infact1493]),andwasfollowednotlongafterbythefamousTreatyofTordesillas(7June1494),whichdividedtheAtlanticOceanbetweenPortugalandSpain.37Butwhatisofmoreinterestforourseventeenth-centuryperspectiveisSchmitt’scommentonthesecondtypeofgloballines.Alsocalled“Amity” lines, since theyexpress somekindof “friendship”between thecontractingEuropeanpowers,thoselinesestablishednewrulesfordividingnewlydiscoveredterritoriesamongEuropeanpowers.Butcontrarytowhatwasthecasewiththeraya,theagreementwasnowbasedontheabsenceofacommonreferee,sincethePopecouldnolongerplaysuchapartinmediationsbetweenProtestantand Catholic powers. In the absence of a common judge capable of decidingconflictingclaims,thepowersagreethatforcewillbethejudgebeyondcertainlines.Forthestudyofthetreaties,includingclausesonAmitylines,SchmittreliesmainlyonF.G.Davenport’sEuropean Treaties bearing on the History of the United States (Washington,1917),buthistoricalevidence is scarce:Schmitt refers, forexample, to a declaration of the King of France, Louis XIII, on 1 July 1634,forbiddingFrenchsailorstoattackPortugueseandSpanishboatsontheEuropeansideoftheTropicofCancer,butallowingthemtodosobeyondthatline.38

37 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth, p. 57/89: “PopeAlexanderVI’s global linewasconsistentwiththeonedrawnsomewhattothewestofit,approximatelythroughthemiddleoftheAtlanticOcean(370mileswestofCapeVerde),bytheSpanish-PortugueseTreatyofTordesillas(June7,1494),inwhichthetwoCatholicpowersagreedthatallnewlydiscoveredterritorieswestofthelinewouldbelongtoSpainandthoseeastofthelinetoPortugal.Thislinewascalledapartition del mar océano,andwassanctionedbyPopeJuliusII.”

38 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 61/93: “Thus, Cardinal Richelieu made adeclarationinthenameoftheFrenchkingonJuly1,1634,accordingtowhichFrench


OntheEuropeansideofthoselines,peacewasmoreorlesspreservedthankstoalawofnationsallowingwaronlybetweenstates;39butbeyondthoselinesthelimitsonwarnolongerexisted,andprivateerswereallowedtoransomordestroyforeignshipsandwagewhatmightbecalledtotalwar.IncapableofagreeingonafairdistributionoflandsandseasintheNewWorld,theEuropeanpowerscouldonlyagreeonthefactthatthenewspaceswerefree,whichmeans,accordingtoSchmitt,thatthedistributionoflandsandseascouldonlybedecidedbyforce.Ofcourse,theotherimplicitpointofagreementwasthattheNewWorldcouldonlybedividedbetweentheEuropeanpowers.WhatwasthenthejuridicalconsequenceofthoseAmitylines?Thatwhathappened“beyondtheline”wasnotsubmittedtothemoral,juridicalandpoliticallimitationsimposedonEuropeanstatesbythejus publicum europaeum,thatis,thelawofsupposedlycivilizednations.Thenewspaceoflibertythusopenedbothonlandandseawasindeedaspaceinwhichinternational laws limiting theviolenceof interstate conflictswouldno longerapply.Properlyspeaking,thespacebeyondtheAmitylineswasanythingbutafriendlyone;rathersomethinglikethewildwestofEurope.40

ThefewelementsthatIhavejustmentionedwillhelpustounderstandtheseconddimensionofSchmitt’sinterpretationofHobbes’sinternationalrelationstheory.Ifweallowthisglobaldivisionoftheearthinseventeenth-centuryEurope(apointIshalldiscussinthefinalsection),wecanclearlyseethatthereisroomforacompletelydifferentapproachtotheHobbesiannotionofaninternationalstateofnature.

Ontheonehand,aswehavealreadyseen,therelationsbetweenstatescanbeinterpretedonthemodelofaduelbetweenpublicpersons,andthestateofnatureasajuridicalconceptliabletoimposelimitsontheeffectsofwarwithinEurope;but,ontheotherhand,thereisalsoroom–andquitealot,itcouldbesaid–foramoreradical interpretationinwhichthestateofnaturewouldbeconsideredaradicalstateofwaramongpirates,withnojuridicallimitsimposedonviolence.TheideaofgloballinesthusallowsustoconciliatetwoapparentlycontradictoryreadingsofHobbes,onewhichinsistsontheabsenceoflawsintheinternationalstateofnature

seafarerswereforbiddentoattackSpanishandPortugueseshipsonthissideoftheTropicofCancer,butweregivenlibertytodosobeyondthisline,iftheSpanishandPortugueserefusedthemfreeaccesstotheirIndianandAmericanpossessionsonlandandsea.”Foraconvincingcritiqueofthehistoricalevidence,seeHaggenmacher,“Présentation”,inCarlSchmitt,Le Nomos de la terre,p.41.

39 Onthisaspect,seeSchmitt’scomments(The Nomos of the Earth,p.122/149)onRousseau’sstatementinOn the Social Contract(BookI,chap.IV,ed.byDonaldA.Cress,Indianapolis,1987,p.21):“War isarelationbetweenonestateandanother.”SchmittquotesRousseauinFrench:“Laguerreestunerelationd’EtatàEtat.”

40 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.62/pp.93–4:“Beyondthelinewasan‘overseas’zoneinwhich,forwantofanylegallimitstowar,onlythelawofthestrongerapplied.”


(theanarchical society reading)andtheotherwhichpresses theexistenceof thenaturallawasthelawofnations(thesocietyofstatesreading).Butbeforeassessingthevalidityofthispossibleconciliation,letusconsidertheinterpretationgivenbySchmittofthestateofnatureinthelightoftheAmitylines.

The reference to Hobbes is one among three, the two others drawing onPascalianandLockeanarguments,butitmaybeconsideredthemostimportantone.SchmittdeclaresherethattheHobbesianideaofastateofnatureisthe“effectoftheAmitylines”41andthatthegeneral,quasineo-Kantian,interpretationofitmustberejectedonthebasisofthishistoricalevidence.Althoughhedoesnotdeny that this idea may have had other historical origins (following here LeoStraussandFranzBorkenau),42andthatitmighthavegainedingeneralityinthelaterworks(agreeingherewithFerdinandTönnies),43hestressesthefactthattherealandmostconcreteoriginofHobbes’sideaistobefoundinthetransformationofinternationalrelationsandtheinstitutionofAmitylines.Thestateofnatureisnotageneralidea,butratheraconcreteideathatcanbeascribedalocalorigininthespacebeyondtheline.AfirstargumentistakenfromtherevivalinHobbes’sworkofthefamousLatinformula,homo homini lupus.WhereasVitoriarejectedthis formulation, for which he substituted the humanistic formulation homo homini homo,HobbeswastorecasttheideaundertheimpactoftheabsenceofcommonpowerintheNewWorld.ButthegeographicaldimensionofthestateofnatureonlyappearswhenHobbescomestoconcreteexamples.

WhenHobbesdeclaresinchapterXIIIofLeviathanthat“Itmayperadventurebethought,therewasneversuchatimenorconditionofwarasthis;Ibelieveitwasnevergenerallyso,over all the world”,44Schmittwouldunderlinethelastpartofthesentence.Ifthestateofnature,initsmoreradicalform,wasnotgenerallysoallovertheworld,itmaywellbebecauseofthedivisionoftheearthbetweenEuropeandthespacesbeyondtheline.Ifweunderstanditinthisway,wecanalsobetterunderstandthemeaningoftheexamplegivenbyHobbesinsupportofhisthesis:

41 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 64/95: “The second [example] is ThomasHobbes’sdoctrineofthestateofnaturecontainedinhisconstructionofthestate.”

42 Herefersheretothehistoricalinterpretationofthestateofnatureastheanarchyof feudal organisation; Leo Strauss, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 67(1932),pp.738–9;FranzBorkenau,Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild(Paris,1934),p.458.

43 FerdinandTönnies,“HobbesunddasZoonPolitikon”,Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht,12(1923):471–2.WhilepraisingTönniesasthebestspecialistofHobbesandacknowledgingtherelevanceofhisinterpretationofthedevelopmentoftheideaofthestateofnatureintermsofinteriorisation,SchmittinsistsonthefactthatTönniesisnotaneo-Kantianphilosopherandthathedoesnotcontenthimselfwithgeneraldistinctions.

44 Hobbes,Leviathan,XIII,11,p.77(myitalics).


ForthesavagepeopleinmanyplacesofAmerica,exceptthegovernmentofsmallFamilies,theconcordwhereofdependethonnaturallust,havenogovernmentatall;andliveatthisdayinthatbrutishmanner,asIsaidbefore.Howsoever,itmaybeperceivedwhatmanneroflifetherewouldbe,wheretherewerenocommonpowertofeare;bythemanneroflifewhichmenthathaveformerlylivedunderapeacefulgovernmentusetodegenerateintoacivilwar.45

The surprising comparison of the life of the savage people of America to theconditionoflifeduringcivilwarscanthusbereadastheeffectoftheabsenceoflimitsontheuseofviolenceonthepartoftheEuropeancolonisingpowers.SchmittconcludeshisanalysisbysayingthatifHobbes’sstateofnatureisano man’s land,asthereclearlyexistsnoownershipinit,“itisnotthereforeanowhere”,for“itissituatedbyHobbesin,amongotherplaces,theNewWorld”.46Hereagain,SchmittstressesthefactthatHobbes’sthoughtmustbegeographicallysituated.Beforeturningtomycritique,Ishouldliketoaddthreeadditionalremarks.

First, this interpretation is a new historical interpretation. There are otherhistorical interpretationsof theHobbesian stateofnatureofwhichSchmitt isaware(forexample,thoseofLeoStraussandFrankBorkenauthathavealreadybeenmentioned),buttheoriginalityofhisownisduetothefactthatitisbothhistoricalandgeographical.Thisinterpretationisalsonewwhencomparedwiththe previous Schmittian interpretations. Thus Schmitt writes in a note of The Nomos of the Earththat,inhisThe Leviathanin the doctrine of the state of Thomas Hobbes (Hamburg,1938),hehadnot“yettakenintoconsideration,inpresentingthe theoryof the stateofnature, thehistorical relevanceof theAmity lines”.47Second,theevidencepresentedbySchmittinfavouroftheAmitylinesisscanty,andheacknowledgesthis.Hesaysinparticularthatthereferencestothosesecretclausesarerareinthejuridicalliteratureofthetime.InPufendorf ’sJus naturae et gentium,forexample,thereareonlyafewremarksonthenotionofarmistice(bookVIII,c.7),butnothingdirectlyonsecretclausesappendedtotreaties.48Third,Schmittishostiletotheinterpretationofthestateofnatureasascepticalhypothesis.ThisscepticalinterpretationofHobbes,initiatedbyBarbeyracandofwhichwefindacontemporaryversioninRichardTuck49andinMichaelWilliams’s

45 Ibid.46 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 64/96 (modified translation): “Thomas

Hobbes’sstateofnatureisano man’s land,butthisdoesnotmeanitexistsnowhere.”47 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 65, note 1/96, note 20. Cf. Schmitt, The

Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes.48 Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.60/92:“…juristshardlyknewwhattomake

ofthemandtreatedthemperfunctorilyunderthecategoryof‘truce’.”49 RichardTuck,“HobbesandDescartes”, inG.A.J.RogersandAlanRyan(eds),

Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes(Oxford,1988),pp.11–41.


reconsideration of Hobbes’s international relations theory,50is considered bySchmittasbeingtooabstract;thatis,failingtocapturetheimpactoftheexistenceoffreespacesonseventeenth-centurywaysofthinking.Inordertosupportanon-sceptical interpretation when the reference to scepticism seems most obvious,SchmittcitesPascalonameridianthatdecidestruth,51butHobbestoo,aswehaveseen,playsacentralpartinthewholeanti-scepticaldemonstration.

In thefinal section,whichwill add a fourth remark to the threepreviousones,IshallsuggestawayofassessingtheSchmittianinterpretationofHobbesandthesituationofinternationallawinthehistoricalperspectiveoftheideaofagloballine.

Reconsidering Schmitt’s Reading of Hobbesian International Theory and the Question of Empire

The link between politics and space is clearly central to Schmitt’s wholeinterpretation of Hobbes in The Nomos of the Earth. The first question isthereforetodeterminewhetherthisinterpretationistruetoHobbes’sapproachtointernationalrelations.HowmuchisthereinHobbesabouttheterritoryofthestatesandtheconquestofnewterritories?Aswehavealreadyseen,Hobbescertainlypresupposestheexistenceofstateterritory,butitisnotamajortopicinLeviathan.Moreover,thenotionofastateofnatureisnotconsideredspatially,butasa stateof relationbetween individualsorgroups. If the introductionofgeography into thepicture (as inAbrahamBosse’s frontispiece of Leviathan)52

50 MichaelC.Williams,“HobbesandInternationalRelations:aReconsideration”,International Organization,50–52(1996):213–36.

51 Schmitt gives the followingquote inFrench: “Troisdegrésd’élévationduPôlerenversenttoutelaJurisprudence.UnMéridiendécidedelavérité,oupeud’annéesdepossession. Les lois fondamentales changent. Le droit a ses époques. Plaisante justicequ’unerivièreouunemontagneborne!VéritéendeçadesPyrenées,erreuraudelà.”[“Athree-degreeriseofthePolewouldruinthewholejurisprudence.Ameridiandecidesthetruthoratleasttheyearsofpossession.Fundamentallawschange.Lawhasitsownepochs.Thisisastrangejusticethatisdefinedbyariveroramountain.TruthonthissideofthePyreneesiserrorontheother.”](The Nomos of the Earth,p.63/95).Foramoreaccuratequote,seeBlaisePascal,Pensées,ed.LouisLafuma,no.60.Schmittmakesthefollowingcomment:“Pascal’sMeridianisnothingotherthantheamitylinesofhistime,whichhadcreatedanabyssbetweenfreedom(thelawlessnessofthestateofnature)andanorderly‘civil’modeofexistence.”(Schmitt,The Nomos of the Earth,p.64/95).

52 On the authorship of Abraham Bosse, see Horst Bredekamp, Thomas Hobbes’ visuelle Strategien(Berlin,1999),I.2.c;seealsoJean-ClaudeVuillemin,“Bosse,Abraham(1602–76)”, in Luc Foisneau (ed.), The Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century French Philosophers,LondonandNewYork,2008,vol.1,pp.176–9.


nodoubtaddsanewdimension,itisnotadimensionthatiscentraltoHobbes’spreoccupation.

Although Schmitt never says it so clearly, his interpretation of Hobbes’sinternational relations theorypresupposes thatalmostallEuropean stateswereempires, since their relations beyond the lines are basedon thewill to create,maintainorextendtheirterritorialpossessionsintheNewWorld.Thiskindofanalysis is certainly consonantwith thenewadditions to the thirdand fourtheditionsofVölkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung,whosechapters’titles(forexample,“EmpireandSpace”)insistonthefactthatcolonialismhasbeenthemainvectoroftheinternationallawofpeoples,allowingalmosteverystate,withthenotableexception of Prussia, to enlarge their empires beyond the line. But Schmitt’spreoccupationof the1940scannotbeattributed toHobbes in the1640sand50s,forthereisnoevidencethatHobbessupportedtheimperialistventuresofhistime,53stilllessthathebasedhispoliticaltheoryonthenecessityofbuildingempires.InDe Cive,commentingonthefactthatRomeandAthenssometimesenriched themselves by conquest and in accord with a recurrent critique ofMachiavelli,54 Hobbes says that no state can count on such a means, since itseldomsucceeds.55

Amity lines are central to the Schmittian construction, since they are anopencritiqueof the formalismofanormativist,not to sayKantian,approachtointernationalorder.ButisHobbes–andthisisathirdquestion–sofarfromthenormativistapproachwhenhestressesthelinkbetweensecurityandlawsofnature,bothatthestateandattheinterstatelevel?Hisdoubtsabouttheforceofpositivenormsintheinternationalrealmdonotmeanthathedoesnotbelieveintheexistenceoforganisingrules:thepointisthatheconsidersthedeterminingfactorsnottobethepositivetreaties,butthenaturallaws,which,wheneveritispossibleandusefultotheinternationalstabilityandnotcontrarytothesecurityof a state,mustbeobeyed. In the seventeenth-centurydebateonwhether theinternationalorderwasbasedonpositiveornaturallaws,Hobbesclearlyansweredthatitwasbasedonthesecondcategoryoflaws.56Inthatcategory,hecouldbeportrayedasarepresentativeofsecurityasanormoption,thatis,aproponentof

53 OnHobbes’sparticipationintheSandysandVirginiacompanyandhisopiniononimperialism,seeNoelMalcolm,“Hobbes,Sandys,andtheVirginiaCompany”,inId.,Aspects of Hobbes,pp.53–79.

54 Cf.LucFoisneau,“Hobbesetlathéoriemachiavéliennedelavirtù”,Archives de philosophie,60–3(1997):371–91.

55 Hobbes,De Cive,XIII,14,Englishtransl.,p.150.56 Cf.Malcolm,“Hobbes’sTheoryofInternationalRelations”,p.439:“Thedebate

was a real one, and even those contemporary writers who strongly rejected Hobbes’sviewpointtreateditasaseriousargumentabouthowtoclassifyinternationallaw,notasarejectionofinternationallawassuch”.Foramorethoroughpresentationofthedebate,


applyingthelawofnaturetothecontextofsecurity.ButHobbes’biasinfavourofnaturallawdidnotparticularlymakehimapartisanofinternationaltreaties,andstilllessofthesecretclausesappendedtothosetreaties.Onemayfearthat,inastrictlyhistoricalperspective,Schmittgotthisthewrongwayround.

Toconclude,IwouldsaythatthereismoreintheSchmittianinterpretationofHobbes’s stateofnature than is generally found in the latterby scholarsofHobbes.SchmittdoesnotmaintainthatthestateofnaturethatexistedamongEuropeanstatesintheseventeenthcenturywasasanarchicalashasbeenclaimed,butratherthatthisstateofnaturewastwofold:arelativestateofpeacewithinthebordersofEurope,andaterriblespaceofliberty,thatis,ofopenviolence,beyondthosefrontiers.Ifthereiswarinbothcases,thiswardoesnothavethesameintensity.Intheonecase,itiswarbetweencivilizedstates,awarthereforetobewagedaccordingtocertainrules;intheothercase,itisaterriblewarfare,inwhichallmeansareusedtoachieveconquest.

ThisSchmittiancontrastisfascinatingforwhoeverwantstounderstandtheviolencethatbeganwiththedevelopmentofanewphaseofimperialismattheendofthenineteenthcentury,andwhicheventuallyturneditselfagainsttherelativelyprotected statesofEuropeduring the twoWorldWars.Nothing compared inintensitytothekillingofAtabalipa,theKingofPeru,bytheSpanishsoldiers,recalledbyHobbesinBehemoth,57buttheconnectionbetweenthetwoeventshasbeenjudgedenlightening,eveninthepresentpost-colonialsituation.

Thedifficulty,however,restswiththefactthatthisgeopoliticalinterpretationof Hobbes’s state and Hobbes’s state of nature decidedly ignores the fact thatHobbesisnotanimperialistthinkerandthathisvisionofinternationalrelationsrests on a universalistic theory of the laws of nature. Just as Schmitt turnedLeviathan upside down in reading it from a decisionist perspective, so too heturnedHobbes’sworldviewupsidedowninreadingitasthevademecumofanimperialisticEurope.SettingthingsuprightagainisallthemoreimportantforustodayinviewofthestillopenpoliticaldebateregardingtheinterpretationofEurope’sbordersandofEurope’srelationstotherestoftheworld.

MalcolmreferstoP.E.Corbett,Law and Society in the Relations of States(NewYork,1951),pp.21–6.

57 Hobbes,Behemoth,ed.F.Tönnies,2ndedn,London,FrankCass,1969,p.11.

Chapter10HobbesontheConceptsoftheStateand

PoliticalSovereigntyChristineChwaszcza

In his introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes invokes God’s creation of man as themodel by which the creation of a commonwealth can be understood. Similarly,in the introduction to thefirst part of theElements of Philosophy (De Corpore, or“Concerning Body”),Hobbespresentsthe“new”philosophy,thatis,philosophybasedonnaturalreason,asanimitationoftheorderofcreation.Wherecreationstartedwith“light”andthe“distinctionofdayandnight”,De Corporestartswith“reason”and “definition” and straightaway a definition of philosophy itself: “Philosophy”,accordingtoHobbes,“issuchknowledgeofeffectsorappearances,aswerequirebytrueratiocinatiofromtheknowledgewehavefirstoftheircausesorgeneration:Andagainofsuchcausesandgenerationsasmightbeknownfromtheireffects”.1

The paradigm of philosophical knowledge for Hobbes is, notoriously, themodeofdemonstrationinEuclid’sgeometry(mos geometricus),andhisparadigmofgivingaphilosophicaldefinitionistheinstructionforhowtogenerateaperfectcircle,assumingthatwecaninferall(geometrical)propertiesofthefigurefromtheknowledgeofitsgeneration,evenifnoneofouractualdrawingsevercomesclosetoresemblingtheconceptual“ideal”ofaperfectcircle.

The following reconstruction of Hobbes’s analysis of sovereignty and thegenerationof the statewill read chapters16 and17of theEnglish versionofLeviathan from 16512 as an analysis of the concepts of “commonwealth” and“sovereignty.”3Chapter16playsacrucialroleinHobbes’sanalysisoftheconceptsof state and sovereignty, but is notoriouslydifficult to interpret.4 I shall argue

1 ThomasHobbes,Metaphysical Writings,ed.MaryWhitonCalkins(LaSalle,Ill.,1989),p.6.

2 ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,ed.EdwinCurley(Indianapolis,1994).Thechaptershave the titles “Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated” and “Of the Causes,GenerationandDefinitionofaCommonwealth”.

3 SeeBerndLudwig,Die Wiederentdeckung des epikureischen Naturrechts: Zu Thomas Hobbes’s philosophischer Entwicklung von De Cive zum Leviathan im Pariser Exil 1640–1651(FrankfurtamMain,1998),forthesystematicdifferencesofHobbes’sversionofthesocialcontractinLeviathanandinDe Cive.

4 Chapter 16 has recently been discussed more carefully in David Runciman,Pluralism and the Personality of the State(Cambridge,1997),pp.6–33;QuentinSkinner,


that,despitetheanalogybetweenthecreationofmanandtheLeviathan,Hobbesconceptualisesthestateasanimpersonalinstitutionor,asonemightsay,a“legalfiction”,thatisfullydefinedbythe legal statusofgovernmentandsubjectsandthe legal relations between them. In order to function, the state needs to be“represented”byasovereigngovernment;or,asHobbesputs it, inordermakeLeviathanmove, itmustbegivenanartificial soul,which in the introductionisidentifiedwiththesovereign.Whatthemetaphorsuggests,asIshallargue,isthatHobbesconceivesofgovernmentasanoffice, that is,a legalcompetence,which must be represented and impersonated by natural persons who receiveauthorisationfromthesocialcontract.

Ifthisinstitutionalaccountiscorrect,itfollows,first,thatHobbes’suseofthesocial contract model is not meant to inform us how to “create” the state, butrathertoclarifythefactthat“thestate”isneitheridenticalwiththegovernmentthat represents it nor with the persons who constitute the government. Thecontractualagreementconcernsnottherightofthegovernmenttoexerciseforceoversubjects,butitsrighttoactasrepresenterofthestate.Allrightsanddutiesofthesovereignareassuchfunctionsofthestate,notrightsofanynaturalperson,be it thepersonofthekingorthepersonswhoarethemembersofParliament.Second,itfollowsthatthelegalstatusofthesovereignisdeterminedbythetaskoftheofficeofgovernmentandthat,accordingly,sovereignpower,evenifsupreme,isnot“unlimited”,butconditional.Third,althoughHobbesdoesnotsaymuchaboutinternationallawandinterstatepacification,hisanalysisofsovereigntydoesnotentailanysystematicarguments,whichwouldexcludethedevelopmentofasystemofinternationallawforanysystematicreasons,althoughhealsodoesnotencouragesuchanextension.Infact,hisfewfragmentaryremarkssuggestthathesimplyconsidersinterstatewaraslessdamagingandlessimportantachallengethanintrastateconflict.AsfarasHobbes’sphilosophicalmethodisconcerned,itcaneasilybeadjustedtotheanalysisofinternationalinstitutionsandinternationallaw.Ifhisaccountsofsovereigntyandthestateareinterpretedasclarifyingtheirinstitutionalstructure, they in fact provide a fruitful startingpoint for theunderstandingoftheirinternationalcounterparts.MyreconstructionwillthereforeendwithabriefaccountofthedifferencesbetweenstateandlawandthelawofnationsforHobbesasfarastheycanbereconstructedfromthefewfragmentaryremarksthathemakesaboutthelatter,andsuggestaperspectivefromwhichinternationalpeacemightbepromotedwithinaHobbesianframework.Ishouldliketostart,however,withabriefcommentonHobbes’saccountofphilosophicalknowledgeandanalysis.

“HobbesandthePurelyArtificialPersonof theState”,Journal of Political Philosophy,7/1(1999):1–29;DavidRunciman,“WhatKindofPersonisHobbes’sState?”,Journal of Political Philosophy,8/2(2000):268–78;QuentinSkinner,“HobbesonRepresentation”,European Journal of Philosophy,13/2(2005):155–84;andAlexandervonPechmann,“DerSouveränals‘TrägerderPersona’”,Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,59(2005):164–85.

Hobbes on the Concepts of the State and Political Sovereignty 183

Philosophical Knowledge and Political Philosophy According to Hobbes

Hobbes’s rhetorical use ofmetaphor is sometimes taken at face value, andhispolitical philosophy is accordingly understood as informing us about how to“create”acommonwealthinordertopacify interpersonalrelationsbyagreeingtoestablishanauthoritythatconstitutesandenactsalegalorder.Inthelightofsuchaninterpretation,Hobbesappearsasa“socialconstructivist”avant la lettre,oratleastsomebodywhotellsuswhatwehavetodoifwewanttotransformasituationofwarintooneoforder.HispoliticalphilosophyisinthissenseoftenconsiderednotonlytobemotivatedbyhisexperienceoftheEnglishCivilWar,butalsotoreflecthisperceptionofhishistoricalsituation.

Althoughitwouldcertainlybestrangeifapoliticalphilosopherignoredhisownhistoricalcontext,Hobbes’smethodofphilosophicalreasoningisasabstractandidealasphilosophycanget.Heleavesnodoubtthathisphilosophicalwritings,whichincludeLeviathanaswellasDe Cive,arenotderivedfromexperiencebutexemplifyratiocinatio,thatis,philosophicalreasoning.“Experience”,infact,isatechnicaltermthataccordingtoHobbesspecifiesaparticularformofacquiringknowledge,namelyrepeatedobservationofsimilarsequencesofevents.5Althoughexperiencegeneratesexpectationsaboutfutureevents–becausetheoccurrenceof an event that has repeatedly been observed to be followed by another willraise an expectation that an event of the other type will occur – the type ofknowledgegeneratedbyexperienceiscalledbyHobbes“prudence”or“foresight”and considered to be much less reliable than true philosophical knowledge asdefinedinDe Corpore.WhereastheAristoteliantraditionofpoliticalphilosophyregardedprudence(phronesisinGreek)6astheintellectualvirtuethatcharacterizesthevirtuouspolitician,theonlydisciplinethatcan(andmust)relyonexperience,accordingtoHobbes,ishistory–andexplicitlynotpoliticalphilosophy.7

WhatHobbescalls“philosophicalknowledge”aimsata formofepistemicinsight that isprimarily concernedwith theattainmentof clear concepts anddefinitions. In that sense, it resembles in a way what today would be called“conceptual analysis” in Anglo-American philosophy. Although Hobbessometimestalksasif“analysis”concernstheresolutionofcomplexobjectsintotheir constituent parts, the largest part of philosophical analysis in Leviathan

5 SeeHobbes,Leviathan,chap.3,andchap.46,para.2,p.454.ForhiscriticismoftheAristotelianandCiceroniantradition,andmaybeevenmorebroadlyoftheconceptionofpoliticalphilosophyasapartoftheethicsofvirtue,seealsoThomasHobbes,Behemoth,ed.FerdinandTönnies,intro.StephenHolmes(Chicago,1990),pp.43–6,56.

6 SeeAristotle,Ethica Nicomachea,trans.W.D.Ross,inRichardMcKeon(ed.),The Basic Works of Aristotle(NewYork,1941),pp.935–1126,Book.7.SeealsoMarcusTulliusCicero,De re publica,trans.ClintonWalkerKeyes(Cambridge,Mass.,1977).

7 ForHobbes’shistoricalaccountoftheEnglishCivilWar,seeHobbes,Behemoth.


concernsconcepts,moreprecisely legal(ornormative)conceptssuchas“right”(ius), “sovereignty”, and so forth. Concepts, of course, cannot be resolved ordividedintoparts.EvenHobbes’sparadigmexample,theanalysisoftheconcept“man”intothecomponents“body”,“moving”,and“rational”,doesnotmentionparts in any material sense, but rather characteristics that help to clarify orspecify themeaningof the concept. In another sense,Hobbes’s philosophicalanalysisdifferssignificantlyfrommodernaccounts.Firstandforemost,theunitofHobbes’sanalysisisconceptsconsideredassinglewords,notsentences.Andsecond, the idea that we achieve philosophical understanding of concepts byknowingthecausesandgenerationsofwhatthoseconceptsaremeanttosignifyis one that fewphilosophers today share.AsHobbes’sparadigmdefinitionofman shows,not all understandingof concepts is achieved in such away,butunderstandingachievedby“knowledgeofgeneration”seemsobviouslyofmajorimportanceforconceptsthateitherrefertocomplexphenomena,suchassocialphenomena,orarenon-referentialinthestrictsense,asaremost,ifnotall,legalandnormativeterms.

Whereas“man”canbeconsideredasimpleconceptand“body”,“moving”,and “rational” considered as attributes or properties of man (or ideal men),Hobbesclearlyregardscentralpoliticalconceptsascomplexconceptsandseemstoconceiveofthemprimarilyintermsoflegalrelationsthatholdbetween(naturalorlegal)agentsordefinesocialrolesinrelationtoeachother.Unlikeattributes,the analysis of legal relations, according to Hobbes’s definition of philosophy,mustofferanaccountofhowthoserelationscanbe conceivedofbeingestablished,or,asHobbessays,“generated”.Theirlogicalanalysismustaccordinglycombineanalysisandsynthesis.Thepointofofferinganaccountofhowtoconceiveofthe establishment of legal relations, however, is quite different from actuallyestablishingthem,becausetheaimisnotpracticebutphilosophicalknowledge,that is, a better and clearer understanding of the meaning of concepts. AsHobbes’sreferencetotheconstructionofgeometricalfiguresanddemonstrationsclearlyindicates,suchgenerativeknowledgeisunderstoodtoexemplifyan“ideal”generationinagenuinelyPlatonicsense:aperfectparadigm,whichatbestmightbeapproximatedbyanyconcretephenomenon.

Sovereignty and the Representation of the State and Unity of the Commonwealth

The most striking aspect of Hobbes’s use of the social contract model is histransformationofthetraditionaltwo-stepstructure,pactum unionisfollowedbypactum subjectionis,intoasingleactofauthorisation.Authorisation,asHobbesunderstandsit,isalegalrelationandauthorityalegalstatus,namely“the rightto


doanyact”.8Sincelegalrelations,accordingtoHobbes,arenotpartofthenaturalcondition or equipment of men and have a place only within the context ofpoliticalsociety,theconstitutionofsocietyeithercannotbeconceivedofintermsof legal relationsor itmust coincidewith the establishmentofpoliticalorder.Accordingly,alogicallyconsistentversionofthesocialcontracthastocombinethehorizontalandverticallegalrelationsthatcharacterisepoliticalsociety,thatis, those that hold among subjects and those that hold between subjects andgovernment.Hobbesmastersthechallengebygivingthesocialcontracttheformofamutual(conditional)agreementamongdisconnectedindividualstoauthorisea third party to govern them, which thereby transforms the multitude into apoliticalsociety.Fortheunityofamultitude,asHobbesinsists,liesinthepersonoftherepresenter,notthepersonsrepresented.Itis,however,notunambiguouswhorepresentswhomorwhat.

A common interpretation understands the contract as generating politicalorderbyinvestingthegovernmentwithamonopolyofpower,becausewhoeverit is that is authorised to govern, not being party to but beneficiary of thecontract,retainstherightsofnaturetodowhateverheconsidersaptforhisownpreservation.Thisinterpretation,however,fallsshortofclarifyinginwhichwayLeviathanrepresentspoliticalunity.Asamatteroffact,thecontractsounderstoodfailstoestablishacommonwealthatall,becauseonlynaturalpersonsholdarightofnature,andifthepowerofLeviathanweretorestinaman’srightofnature,thecommonwealthwoulddieanaturaldeatheachtimethekingormembersofParliamentdie,whichisanabsurdconsequence.

Thepicture,accordingly,mustbemorecomplex,althoughprimafacieHobbes’saccountofthegenerationanddefinitionofacommonwealthinChapter17seemstosuggest that individuals straightforwardlyauthorise“aman”or“assemblyofmen”torepresentthem:

Iauthoriseandgiveupmyrightofgoverningmyselftothisman,ortothisassembly,onthisconditionthatthougiveupthyrighttohim,andauthoriseallhisactionsinalikemanner.Thisdone,themultitudesounitedinonepersoniscalledacommonwealth,inLatincivitas.Thisisthegenerationofthegreatleviathan,orrather(tospeakmorereverently)ofthatmortalgodtowhichweowe,undertheImmortalGod,ourpeaceanddefense.Forbythisauthority,givenhimbyeveryparticularmaninthecommonwealth,hehaththeuseofsomuchpowerandstrengthconferredonhimthatbyterrorthereofheisenabledto conform the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid againsttheirenemiesabroad.Andinhimconsisteththeessenceofthecommonwealth,which(todefine) isoneperson,ofwhoseactsagreatmultitude,bymutual

8 Hobbes,Leviathan,chap.16,para.4,p.101.


covenantsonewithanother,havemadethemselveseveryonetheauthor,totheendhemayusethestrengthandmeansofthemall,asheshallthinkexpedient,fortheirpeaceandcommondefence.9

Intheverynextsentence,however,Hobbescontinueswithafurtherdefinition:“And he that carrieth this personiscalledsovereign,andsaidtohaveSovereignPower,andeveryonebesides,hissubject”.10If,asthefirstquotationsuggests,thegovernment is identicalwith the“person”calledLeviathanwhounites themultitudeintoonesingleperson,itseemssuperfluoustorefertoafurtherperson,that is,“hethatcarrieththisperson”(Leviathan),whoiscalled“sovereign”.Inaddition, in the introduction,Hobbescomparedsovereigntywith“anartificialsoul”thatmovesthebodyandlimbsofthecommonwealth,andsothesovereignmustbeinsomesensedifferentfromthecommonwealth.Anobviousresponseisthat“hethatcarrieththisperson”isnotidenticalwiththecommonwealthandthatHobbes’sunspecifiedreferencetopersonsreferseithertodifferentpersonsor,asIwillargue,topersonsindifferentsensesoftheterm.

“Aperson”,asdefinedinChapter16,is:

hewhosewordsoractionsareconsideredeitherashisown,orasrepresentingthewordsor actionsof anotherman,or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.Whentheyareconsideredashisown,thenheiscalledanaturalperson;andwhentheyareconsideredasrepresentingthewordsandactionsofanother,thenheisafeignedorartificialperson.11

AsHobbes’sdistinctionbetweennaturalandartificialpersonsreveals,conceivingofthecommonwealthasapersonbynomeansimpliesthatitresemblesnaturalhumanbeingsinanyontologicalorsubstantiveaspectswhatever,becausewordsandactionscanbeattributedtoany“thing”by fiction.Inordertoconceiveofthecommonwealthasaperson,itmustbepossiblethatitbe“represented”byapersonor“impersonated”,wherebytherepresentingpersoncanbeeitherasinglenaturalpersonoranassemblyofnaturalpersons.AsHobbesunambiguouslymakesclearafewparagraphslater,almosteverythingcanberepresented,notonlyhumansbutalso“[i]nanimatethings(suchasachurch,ahospital,abridge)maybeimpersonatedbyarector,master,oroverseer”.12Whereasabridgeisa“thing”inthecommonsense of “medium-size solid object”, a church and a hospital represented by arectorarebetterunderstoodasinstitutionsorcorporations.Theydonot“exist”inanymaterialsense,butonlyquaservingaspecificpurposeandappropriatesocial

9 Ibid.,chap.17,para.13,p.109.10 Ibid.,para.14,p.109.11 Ibid.,chap.16,para.1,p.101(emphasisadded).12 Ibid.,para.9,p.102.


or legal conventions.Hospitals andchurches in this sense resembleuniversitiesand states.13 Since inanimate things, however, cannot themselves be authorsand invest somebodyelse toactas their representative,Hobbes states that theycannotbeimpersonatedoutside“somestateofcivilgovernment”,14becausetheirrepresentationalreadypresupposesthevalidityoflegalrelations.

Following Hobbes’s definitions of legal personhood and representation, itmakesperfectlygoodsensetoconceiveofthesovereignaseitherthesingleman(inamonarchy)orassemblyofmen(inarepublic)whorepresentsthegovernment,whereby “government”, like universities or churches, is just a legal “fiction”,thatis,anofficeorinstitution.Consideredasaninstitution,theestablishmentof a government constitutes the commonwealth and transforms themultitudeof individuals into political society by establishing legal order. Governmentconsideredasaninstitutioncaninthissensebesaidto“unite”themultitudeofindividualsandtoconstituteacommonwealth.Butsinceneithertheinstitutionofgovernmentnorthecommonwealthcanbeconceivedto“exist”unlesssomebodyisauthorisedtorepresent theoffice, thecommonwealthcannotbealiveunlessthosenaturalpersonswhoaremeanttobeunitedbytheinstitutionofpoliticalgovernmentauthorisesomebodytorepresenttheinstitutionofgovernment.The“person”ofLeviathaninthissenseisconstitutedbyauthorisingarepresenterfortheinstitutionofgovernment,thatis,byappointingasovereign.Thesovereign,accordingly,hastworelatedbutformallyindependentlegalpersonalities,insofarashe,asanaturalperson,representstheofficeofgovernmentand,atthesametime,quahisoffice (that is, as anartificialperson) represents theunityof thecommonwealth.15 In this sense, unification and subjection fall together into a

13 IdisagreeherewithRunciman,whoconsidersthesovereigntobean“author”,thatis,ofthecommonwealth.AccordingtoRunciman,beingapersonrequiresthepossibilityofabeingasubjecttowhomwordsandactscanbeattributed.Thestate,forRunciman,isafictitiouspersoninthesenseinwhichEmmaBovaryisafictitiouscharacter.SeeRunciman,Pluralism and Personality,pp.29–31.Theinterpretationdefendedhereconsidersthestatetobeapersoninthesenseinwhichauniversitycanbeconsidereda(legal)person,thatis,bybeingrepresentedbynaturalpersons.Unlikemostotherthingswhoserepresentationpresupposestheexistenceofthelegalcontext,thecommonwealth,thepersonofthestateor commonwealth itself comes into existenceby authorising somebody to represent it.Toask “Whatkindofbody”Leviathan (or the commonwealth) is in this sense recallsthequestionerinRyle’sConcept of Mindwho,afterhavingbeenshownthroughcolleges,libraries, and soon, asks, “Butwhere is theuniversity?”SeeGilbertRyle,The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth, 1990), pp. 17–20. I therefore see no difficulty or paradoxin Hobbes’s concept of personhood and representation, as does von Pechmann, “DerSouveränals‘TrägerderPersona’”.

14 Hobbes,Leviathan,chap.16,para.9,p.109.15 Inaddition,ofcourse,thepersonwhoisappointedassovereignisalsoanatural

person.Thatoneandthesamepersoncanhavedifferentlegalpersonalitiesandalsorepresent


singleactofauthorisationthatinveststhesovereignwiththelegalauthority,thatis,theright,notonlythepower,togovernandtorepresentthestate.

Unfortunately,thetextualevidenceisnotentirelyunambiguousandthereforedoesnotruleoutalternative interpretations. I shouldtherefore like tosupporttheonepresentedherebyshowingthatitstrengthensthesystematiccoherenceofHobbes’spoliticalviewsonthestateandsovereignty.

A Few Arguments in Support of an Institutionalist Reading of Hobbes

TotheextentthattheaboveinterpretationoffersanappropriatereconstructionofHobbes’sversionofthesocialcontract,itshedslightonseveralcontroversialaspects concerning the concept of political sovereignty in Leviathan. First, itstronglysupportsthethesisthatHobbes’ssovereign,although“above(positive)law”, is not unconstrained in his power and competences. His rights andcompetencesarerestrictedbythefunctionoftheofficeofgovernment,asHobbesexplicitlydeclaresinChapter30,whereinhediscussesthedutiesofthesovereign representative:

Theofficeofthesovereign(beitamonarchoranassembly)consistethintheendfor which he was trusted with the sovereign power,namelytheprocurationofthesafetyofthepeople,towhichheisobligedbythelawofnature,andtorenderanaccountthereoftoGod,theauthorofthatlaw,andtononebuthim.Butby safetyhere is notmeant a barepreservation, but also all othercontentmentsoflife,whicheverymanbylawfulindustry,withoutdangerorhurttothecommonwealth,shallacquiretohimself.16

AlthoughHobbeshasaverywideviewofwhat this is supposed to imply, thesovereignisclearlyobligedtorespectthe“ruleoflaw”atleastintheformalsenseof respecting equity and having to rule (exclusively) through law (see below).Sovereign competences are in this sense regulated partly by law, but partlydeterminedbythestatusofthesovereignamongothersovereigns,andtheywillthereforebediscussedinmoredetailinaseparatesubsequentsection.

Second, and more precisely, sovereign rights and competences “belong” inthestrictsensetotheinstitutionofgovernment,nottothenaturalpersonwhorepresentsit.Accordingly,nonaturalperson“possesses”arighttoruleorgovern.Thisexcludestheinvocationofdynasticprivilegesandadivinerightofkingsand

differentpersonsisclearlypartofthequotationfromCiceroinHobbes,Leviathan, chap.16,para.3,p.101:“Unussustineotrespersonas:mei,adversarii,etjudicis”[Ibearthreepersons:myown,myadversary’s,andthejudge’s].

16 Ibid.,chap.30,para.1,p.219(emphasisadded).


religiousorotherformsofpersonalauthority,aswellasclaimssuchasarightof“thepeople”toparticipateingovernment.Whereastheclaimthatarighttorulecannotbeconceivedofasapropertyorattributeofanynaturalpersonexplainsitself,itmightbeworthwhiletoremindourselvesthat“thepeople”alsodoesnotexistoutsidethecontextofacommonwealthwithaspecificformofgovernment,becausetheconceptreferstoasocio-politicalorlegalstatusthatisgrantedsomeindividualsinaccordancewithcertaincriteria(inHobbes’stime,“thepeople”,ofcourse,wasarathersmallsubgroupoftheoverallpopulation).Thusconceivingof government as an institution implies that not only the appointment of apersontorepresentgovernment,butalsothespecificstructureororganizationofgovernmentisamatterofmereconvention–whichmightexplainwhyHobbes’sanalysiswasattackedequallyfiercelybyproponentsofallpoliticalparties.Thequestionwhether,forinstance,republicangovernmentistobepreferredoveranabsolutemonarchy,orviceversa,appearsintheendasonethatisbestdecidedonpurelypragmaticandfunctionalistgrounds.

Third, the internal constitution of the representer of the institution ofgovernment is irrelevant for thedeterminationof sovereignpowers,which are(andmustbe)derivedfromthefunctionalneedsofgovernment.Hobbesthereforecorrectlyinsiststhatsovereignpowersarethesameinallformsofgovernment,regardless of whether the government is represented by a single person or anassemblyoramixtureofbothaccompaniedbysomeformofdivisionorbalanceofpowers.Howeverpowersaredividedbetweenbranchesofgovernment,theymust sum up to the same powers. Despite Hobbes’s explicit preference forabsolutemonarchy,hisanalysisdoesnotstructurallyexcludemixedorrepublicangovernment,andreinforcestheclaimthatnoformofgovernmentismorenatural(orlessconventional)thananyother.

Fourth,ifthelegalpersonalityofthesovereignisunderstoodtobethatofarepresenterof thegovernment,Hobbes’s claim thatgovernmentbyusurpationisnoless“artificial”thangovernmentbyauthorisationcanbemadeintelligible.Althoughusurpationclearlydiffersfromtheidealofauthorisation,theusurpernomoredeserves theright togovernthana sovereignwhohasbeenelectedorauthorisedinanyotherway–theusurpersimplycannotberesisted.17Nevertheless,hehasnotgainedhislegalstatusbynaturalforce,becausebeingarepresentativerequiresbeingacknowledgedassuchbythepeople,ifonlybecauseoftheirfearorresignation.Thelegalstatusofasovereignbyusurpationisthusstructurallythe same as that of an authorised sovereign: he represents the institution ofgovernment.

17 Hobbes’s discussion about at what point of events exactly Cromwell must beacknowledgedtohavebecomesovereignshowsthatacquisitionofsovereigntycanbeamatterpartlyofpowerandpartlyof formalacknowledgement.SeeHobbes,Behemoth,dialogues3and4(passim).


Finally,toconceiveof“government”asaninstitutionorofficeinanimportantsensemeanstoconceiveofitasimpersonalordetachedfromthosewhohappentobeincharge.Althoughthelattercangovernwellorbadly,theinstitutionofgovernmentremainsthesame.ThatexplainswhyHobbescriticizesthetraditionalclassificatory scheme of governments into monarchy-tyranny, aristocracy-oligarchy,and“polity”-democracy(“anarchy”inHobbes’sterms).Atyrantmightbeconsideredsimplyassomebodywhoabuseshissovereignpowers.

Itseems,however,thattheproposedinterpretationrunsintooneofthewell-known difficulties that trouble the interpretation of Hobbes, because Hobbesnotoriously insists that the sovereign cannot commit any injustice towards thesubjects(beyondinfringingonentitlementsandcommitmentsthatarearticulatedinpositivelawbyhisownlegislation),eventhoughhecanviolateequity.18AlthoughHobbes’sformulaofauthorisationexplicitlyobligesindividualswhoaregovernedtoregardallwordsandactionsofgovernmentastheirown,itseemsawkwardthataninstitutionshouldbeacceptedhoweverwellorbadlyitservesitsverypurpose.Institutions,unlike “men”, shouldbe expected either to functionwell or tobechanged.AsLockefamouslyremarked,“ThisistothinkthatMenaresofoolishthattheytakecaretoavoidwhatMischiefsmaybedonethembyPole-Cats,orFoxes,butarecontent,naythinkitSafety,tobedevouredbyLions”.19

InthelightofLocke’sobjection, Hobbes’saccountofgovernmentbyauthorisationmightbealternativelyinterpretedalongthelinesofhisdictumthat“authority,nottruth, makes law” (auctoritas non veritas facit legem), and be taken to refer to aradicallydifferentinterpretationof“authorisation”,namelybruteempowermentoforunconstrainedsubjectiontosomeman(ormen).Thealternativeinterpretation,ofcourse,doesnotmeetthechallengeraisedbyLockeandinsteadseemssomewhattosoftenit,because“men”canneverbefullytrusted.

Twoconsiderations,however,canbeinvokedtoshowthataninterpretationofgovernmentbyauthorisationalong the linesdeveloped in thisarticle isnotincompatiblewiththeclaimthatthesovereigncannotcommitinjusticestowardsthe subjects. It might first be argued that Hobbes’s absolutism reflects hisfunctionalandpragmaticviewsabouttheappropriateformofgovernment.Theclaimthatthesovereigncannotcommitanyformofinjusticemustapplytothelegalstatusoftheofficeofgovernment,howeveritisorganised,andthusalsotorepublicangovernment.Second, if it isaccepted that theofficeofgovernmentisdistinctfromthepersonswhorepresentit,itcanbearguedthat,whereastheofficeofgovernmentstandsabovethelaw,thepersonswhorepresentitcanabusetheirlegalpowers.Totheextentthatsuchabuseconstitutesamoraldeficiency,itisavicetobeattributedtotherepresentersofgovernmentconsideredasnatural

18 Hobbes,Leviathan,chap.43,para.6,p.113.19 John Locke, Second Treatise, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett

(Cambridge,1960),para.93,p.328.


persons.Aslongastheyrepresenttheoffice,theycannotbechargedwithabuse,because the officeprotects them.Butneither can theybe accusedof abuse ofsovereignpowersoncetheyleaveoffice,becausethosepowerswereneverattributedtothemasnaturalpersons.Suchaconjecturestillsoundsunacceptablefromaliberalpointofview,because itconcedesgeneral immunitytoofficeholders. Itarticulates,however,apositionthatcameveryclose to theestablishedpracticeof international lawuntilquiterecentlyandcan, inaddition,befoundalsoinotherhistoricalsources,suchasKant’scommentsontheJacobins’decapitationofFrencharistocrats.20

Government and Legal Order

Unlikethestructureandpurposeofthestate,thedeterminationofthemeansandcompetencesthatmustbegrantedtogovernmentinordertoaccomplishitstaskisinformedbypragmaticandfunctionalconsiderationsthatmustreflectempiricalconstraintsandchallenges.Atthispoint,experience,finally,mustcomeintoplayandinformorenrichconceptualanalysisbyidentifyingthemaininstitutionalorstructuralobstaclesorchallengestothestabilityofpoliticalorderandprosperity.21AlthoughHobbesseemswellawareofthefactthatsocialandeconomiccleavagesandmotivationsplayeda significant role in theEnglishRevolution,heclearlyregardsfactionalismbasedonpluralismof(religious)allegianceandopinionsasthemainsourceofdisorderanddiscord22–ifonlybecausenotnatural reasonbutreferencetoreligiousargumentsstillconstitutedthemajorformofjustificationforanyclaim,andbecausetheclergyexercisedadominatinginfluenceonpublicopinionandinuniversities,especiallyinthefacultiesoflaw.

Hobbes’spracticalremarksdonotsuggestthathethinksthatthingswillchangeverysoon,becausetheremediesherecommendsarenotallasinnovativeastheymightseematfirstsight.Theclaimthatthesovereignmustrepresentnotonlythestate,butalsothechurch,infactmerelyreinforcesaninstitutionaldevelopmentthatcanbeconsidered tohavebeenfirmlyestablished inEnglandat the time

20 SeeImmanuelKant,“PerpetualPeace”,inPolitical Writings,trans.HansReiss,ed.H.B.Nisbet(Cambridge,1970),pp.93–130;appendixI,p.118.

21 “Structural”hereismeanttorefertocausesofquarrelinpoliticalassociations.GiventhewidespreadviewthatHobbespromotesa“negative”or“pessimisticanthropology”,italsoseemsworthmentioningthatthe“threeprincipalcausesofquarrel”inthestateofnature–“first,competition;secondly,diffidence;thirdly,glory”–are“structural”causesinthesensethattheyconcernpatternsofsocialinteraction.SeeHobbes,Leviathan,chap.8,para.6,p.76.

22 InBehemoth,thepublicationoftheEnglishtranslationoftheBibleismentionedasthecrucialtrigger,ifnotcause,forthegrowthofdissentandcivildiscord.


of Elizabeth I. The most interesting aspect of the amalgamation of politicaland religious sovereignty is that, insofar as political sovereignty is territoriallydefined,itindicatesasteptowardaterritorialconceptionofsovereigntyalreadyestablishedbythePeaceofWestphalia.Fromthedomesticperspective,Hobbes’spositionisinthisregardclearly“conservative”,althoughprogressivewithregardtotherestrictionoflawtoactionsandpublicconduct,whichleaveslegalspaceforfreedomoffaithandconscience.23

ThepointwhereHobbesmoreclearlybreakswiththetraditionofpoliticalphilosophy,andprobablythedominantopinionofhistime,concernshisrejectionof the idea that stabilitycanbeachieved throughabalanceof (socio-political)powers,arejectionthatliesbehindHobbes’sinsistencethatsovereigntymustbeundivided,unified, and supreme.Chapter29 explicitlymentions thedoctrineof mixed government as among the “things that weaken a commonwealth”.Whereas themodelofabalanceofpowers ischaracteristic for theAristoteliantraditionofmixedgovernmentaswellasMachiavelli’sinterpretationof(Roman)republicanism,itisimportanttonotethatHobbes’saccountofsovereigntyisfullycompatiblenotonlywithasystemofabsolutemonarchybutalsowitharistocraticandrepublicangovernment if theprecedingreconstruction iscorrect.Hobbes,indeed,repeatedlyconcedesthathisanalysisdoesnotexcludeeitherrepublicanoraristocraticgovernment,althoughheisconvincedthattheunityofsovereigntycanbestbepreservedifthegovernmentisrepresentedbyasinglenaturalpersonwhounitesallthesovereignpowersinonehand(ormind).Thepointofinsistingonthesupremacyofsovereigntyinthatcaseagainconsistsinexcludingforeignintervention,mostnotablybythePope24andtheexemptionoftheCatholicclergyfromstatejurisdictionbythecanonlaws.25

Moredifficulttoansweristhequestionwhetherthesupremacyofsovereigntyalsoeliminatesallnormativeormoralconstraintsandamountstoastraightforwardaccountof legalpositivism,because thequestion leads to adebate abouthowtounderstandtheveryconceptof law,which is itselfcontested.SinceHobbesrepeatedlyconcedesthatthesovereignmustrespectthelawsofnaturelistedinchapters14and15,thesovereignremainsatleastconstrainedbysomenormativerestrictions,whichare far frombeingmerely formalbut include,amongotherthings,gratitude,complaisance,blameofcontempt,prideandarrogance,“equity”understoodasimpartialityinjudgmentsconcerningquarrelsofotherparties,andtheprinciplethatnomanshouldbethejudgeinhisowncase.“Equity”isalso

23 Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seePeterSchröder,“ThomasHobbes,ChristianThomasius and theSeventeenthCenturyDebateon theChurchandState”,History of European Ideas,23/2–4(1997):59–79.

24 SeeHobbes’sattackonCardinalBellarmine’sDe Summo Pontifice inLeviathan,chap.42,para.81–135,pp.373–97.

25 SeeHobbes,Leviathan,chap.26.


repeatedly invokedas anormative standard for conduct in interstate relations,which clearly includes some form of normative settlements even for Hobbes,who in Behemoth several times refers to just war theory.26 Those referencesunambiguously indicate that Hobbes acknowledges the validity and practicalrelevanceofatleastsomeformofmoralorgenerallynon-legalnormativerulesorprinciples,butthathesharplydistinguishesthemfrompositivelaw.

Inaddition,Hobbes’s sovereign isclearlyobliged to respect the ruleof lawunderstoodasrulethroughlaw,whichexcludesarbitraryandadhoccommandsand punishments, and establishes at least the framework of a legal state, butwhich need not, of course, be identical with a “just” state in any substantivesense.Yet a careful readingof the chapters shows that the legal constraintsongovernment are far from unsubstantial. They include among other things theprohibition of retroactive accusation or retroactive increase of punishment foranycrime;theyallowforpositivelegalconstraintsonandcommitmentstotheuseofsovereignpowerthataredefactobinding(andassuchrestricttherecoursetoprecedence);andtheyrequirethatalllegalregulationsmustbemadepublicandthatallsubjectsbetreatedequallyandimpartiallybeforethelaw.27Insistingonthesupremacyofthesovereigninthis lightagainseemsprimarilyaimedateliminatingcontroversialopinions,mostimportantly,ofcourse,theinfluenceofjudgesonthedevelopmentandinterpretationoflaw,asintheEnglishtraditionofcommonlaw.Hobbes’sremarksaboutthestructureandformofdomesticlawseem much closer to the Continental system of Roman law than the Englishcommonlawtraditionorasystemofcustomarylaw.28Thesupposedadvantageofthecontinentalsystem,itseems,isthe(ratheroptimistic)expectationthatitspracticeyieldsincontestablejudgmentsaboutrightandwronginthelegalsense,becauseincaseofdisagreementthejudgmentofthesovereigndecidesthecase.

If such an outline of the legal structure of government catches Hobbes’sintention,thenhisargumentclearlyconcernsnotsomuchthetransformationofthestateofnatureintopoliticalandlegalorder,butmorepreciselytheestablishmentofalegalsystemthatyieldsuncontested judgments.SuchaninterpretationreadsHobbes as showing not why men must have a legal order and how they canconstructit“outofnothing”,butratherwhytheyshouldadoptaspecificlegalsystemor structurebecause it serves the agreed-uponpurposeof legal systems(namely:peace, justice, security, andpromotionofwell-being)better than thealternatives.The latterargument, in fact, is less fundamental,butprecisely forthatreasonalsostronger.

26 SeeHobbes,Behemoth,dialogue3,pp.124,128,anddialogue4,pp.176,167forareferencethatcanalsobeunderstoodasacomplaintabouttheambiguityofjustwardoctrine.

27 SeeHobbes,Leviathan,chap.26.28 Ibid.,chaps25and26,forHobbes’scriticismofthecommonlawtraditionand

thejurisdictionalinfluenceitgrantstojudges.


Interstate War and Peace

Inlightoftheprevioussection,itis,ontheonehand,obviouswhyHobbesdoesnot consider an extension of his analysis to interstate relations: the scope andpurposeofthelawofnationsseemsnottorequiretheestablishmentofagloballegal state.Mostobviously,theorderandsituationofstatesdoesnotresemblethatofindividualsincrucialrespects:statesarenotequalanddonothaveequalpower;acommonwealthcanverywellsurvivechangesofthestructureofgovernmentoritsrepresenters;andsovereignsthemselvesarethreatenednotsomuchwithdeathbutwithlossofstatusorpower.Althoughsomehowsurprisingfromapost-twentieth-centuryperspective,ampletextualevidencesuggeststhatHobbesregardsinterstatewarasmuchlessdamaginganddevastatingthanintrastatewar.29

On the other hand, nothing said so far suggests that interstate relationsconstituteanentirely“norm-free”sphere.Theprinciplesofequity,justwar,andcustomarylawofnationsarticulateanormativebackgroundstructurethatmightverywellregulateinterstateconduct.AlthoughHobbesseemswellawareoftheproblemthatthedoctrineof justwarishighlyambiguousandhascontinuallyprovokedcompetingclaimsandinterpretationsofentitlements,rights,obligations,and the assessment of justice or reparations, an ambiguous normative orderneverthelessisstillanormativeorder,eventhoughitmightbecalledimperfector,rather,ineffectual.Hobbes’sgeneral strategyofimprovingtheeffectivenessoflegalorder,bydefininglegalregulationsmorepreciselyandmakingsurethattheywillbeapplied,caneasilybeextendedbeyondHobbes’sownphilosophicalintereststointerstaterelations.Abstractingfromhispersonalexperienceandhisconcernwithfactionalism,modernhistoryprovidesampleevidencetosustaintheclaimthat legal andpoliticalorder canbe stabledespitepluralismanddecentralizedorganisation. The seemingly greater obstacle, from today’s perspective, lies inthe revival of the idea that – paceHobbes–political ordermustbebasedonsomeformofsocialornationalcohesion:beforetherecanbeunityofpoliticalassociation,theremustexistaunitedpeople.Sincethisideaismoreoftensimplytakenforgrantedthansystematically(orconceptually)explored,Hobbes’sanalysisofrepresentationcertainlydeservestobereconsidered.

29 Foradetailedassessment,seeTomSorrell,“HobbesonTrade,ConsumptionandInternationalOrder”,The Monist,89/2(2006):245–58.

PARTVWarandStateintheExpanding

EuropeanStateSystem

Chapter11PeaceImpossible?:TheHolyRoman

EmpireandtheEuropeanStateSystemintheSeventeenthCentury

ChristophKampmann

The Holy Roman Empire, the Thirty Years’ War and the State System

The concept of a state system has been intensely and repeatedly discussed inrecent years.1 This discussion about the character of such a system has takenplacemainlyamongphilosophers,politicalphilosophersandpoliticalscientists.Historianshaveoftenbeenveryreluctanttoparticipateinit.Thisdoesnotmeanthat historians do not use the term “state system”, but rather that they oftendosoinaratheruncriticalmanner.Thisofcourseisalsotrueofearlymodernhistorians.OneimportantexceptionamongGermanhistoriansofearlymodernityisHeinzDuchhardt.Sometimeagohecriticisedthesomewhatunspecificuseoftheconceptofsysteminawaysimilartothecriticismoftheuseoftheterm“stateorganism”(Organismus der Staaten)byanearliergenerationofhistorians.Atthesametime,hewarnedhistoriansagainstintroducingexcessivelyabstractnotionsof“system”thatarehardlyapplicabletotheirnormalsource-basedwork.2Onthisbasis,hethenproposedadefinitionofa“statesystem”.

For Duchhardt, a “state system” is a multiplicity of states that maintainspermanentrelationsindifferentfieldsofinteraction:policy,diplomacy,cultureoreconomy.Thecrucialpointisthecharacteroftheserelations:withinastatesystemthefinalintentionoftheserelationsis not,accordingtoDuchhardt,theexterminationofothermembersandtherebythedestructionofthewholesystem.3Thisis,sotosay,avery“light”andnothighlyprofileddefinitionofastatesystem.

1 Fora recenthistoricalanalysis fromtheviewpointofpolitical science,cf. BarryBuzanandRichardLittle,International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations(Oxford,2000).

2 HeinzDuchhardt,“DasReichinderMittedesStaatensystems.ZumVerhältnisvoninnererVerfassungundinternationalerFunktionindenWandlungendes17.und18.Jahrhunderts”,inPeterKrüger(ed.),Das europäische Staatensystem im Wandel. Strukturelle Bedingungen und bewegende Kräfte seit der Frühen Neuzeit(Munich,1996),pp.1–9.

3 Ibid.,p.2:“Staatensystem”as“einedurchzahlreichekulturelle,ökonomischeundpolitischeVerflechtungenverbundeneVielheitvonpolitischenOrganismenverstanden,


Yetevensuchacareful,reluctant,rathervaguedefinitionofastatesystemdoesnotmakeitpossibletospeakaboutastatesystemwithregardtotheThirtyYears’War,oratleastnotatthefirstglance.TheThirtyYears’Warwascharacterisedbythirtyyearsofpermanent,bitterandmercilessmilitaryconfrontation.Evenmoreimportantly,itwasawarinwhichthemainpartiesandopponentswerenotatall interested in apeaceful settlement, and instead sought thedestruction andannihilationoftheirenemies.

Thesecommonassumptionsarebasedverymuchonthecharacterofthewarasaconfessionalconfrontation,inwhichacompromiseseemedtobeimpossibleforreligiousreasons.Inshort,itisimpossibletocometoanagreementwithAntichrist.Thecharacterofthewarasamercilessconfessionalconflicthasbeenunderlinedinrecentliteraturebycatchwordslike“HolyWar”(aphraseusedbyRobertBireley)4or“confessionalfundamentalism”(Konfessioneller Fundamentalismus,aphraseusedbyHeinzSchilling).5Bothphrasesrefertothemoreorlessdestructiverelationshipbetween the opponents until solutions were found at the Westphalian Peaceconference.Thesamedestructiverelationshipseemstohaveexistedonthepoliticallevelbetweenthemainparticipants,the“superpowers”,oftheThirtyYears’War.Thecatchwordhereis“UniversalMonarchy”.Aslongastheultimateintentionofthesuperpowers,especiallyFranceandSpain,wastoacquiredominatio totius mundi,dominationofthewhole(Christian)world,therewasevidentlynoplaceforastatesysteminDuchhardt’ssense,sothatthepolicypursuedcouldonlybethedestructionoftheenemy,atleastasanindependentpoliticalentity.6

InrecentyearstherehasbeenintenseresearchintothepolicyanddiplomacyoftheprincipalpowersduringtheThirtyYears’War.Thishasbeenoccasionedbyarenaissanceofpoliticalhistoryingeneral.IshouldliketomentiononlyafewmoreextensiveworksIshallrelyonhere.First,therearetwonewandveryvaluableHabilitationsschriften,onebyThomasBrockmannaboutEmperorFerdinandII7andtheotherbyMichaelRohrschneiderontheFrench-Spanishrelations;8and

derenmehroderwenigerausgeprägteInteraktionaufDauerangelegtsindundnichtinersterLinieaufdieVernichtungdesPartnersunddamitdesSystemszielen”.

4 Robert Bireley, “The ThirtyYears’War as Germany’s religious war”, in KonradRepgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven(Munich,1988),pp.85–106,herepp.95–6.

5 Heinz Schilling (ed.), Konfessioneller Fundamentalismus. Religion als politischer Faktor im europäischen Mächtesystem um 1600(Munich,2007),Foreword,pp.VII–VIII.

6 JohannesBurkhardt,Der Dreißigjährige Krieg(Frankfurt,1992),pp.30–63.7 Thomas Brockmann, Dynastie, Kaiseramt und Konfession. Politik und

Ordnungsvorstellungen Ferdinands II. im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Paderbornetal.,2009).8 MichaelRohrschneider,Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster. Spaniens Ringen mit

Frankreich auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress (1643–1649) (Münster,2007).

Peace Impossible? 199

thentherearenewstudiesbyRandallLesaffer9andAnjaV.Hartmann10ontheFrench-Spanish Relations and those of Erik Thomson11 and Jenny Öhmann12onSweden.Thankstothesevaluablestudies,wehavebeenaffordedmanynewinsightsnotonly intodetails,butalso intogeneralaspectsof theThirtyYears’War. One of the most fascinating results is that the traditional picture of theconflictasahopeless,“fundamentalist”,thoroughlydestructiveconfrontationissuperficialandnotreallyappropriate;andthatitisinsomesensejustifiedtospeakevenhereofastatesysteminthesensethatDuchhardthasgiventheterm.

IshouldliketoillustratethisbydiscussingthreeimportantaspectsofpoliticalhistoryduringtheThirtyYears’War.

Thefirstaspectisthatofthewarasafieldofpermanentpoliticalanddiplomaticrelations between the opponents. One of the most astonishing features of thewaristhatitwasaccompaniedfromtheverybeginningbyalmostuninterruptedpoliticalanddiplomatictalksbetweenthemainparties.Thesediplomaticrelationsondifferentlevelsstartedasearlyas1618,andthehistoryofthesetalks,whichcontinuedoverthewholethirtyyears,13andnotonlyduringthepeaceconferences,isatleastascomplexandcomplicatedasthehistoryofthemilitaryevents.Evenmore striking is that parties which from a strict juridical point of view couldnotnegotiate at all,negotiatedwith eachother; touse amodernphrase, theyrepeatedlyenteredintoutterly“incorrect”negotiations.Itwouldhavebeeneasytorefuse toenter intosuchdealingsby invokingtheirunlawfulcharacter.Thepermanentpresenceofthese“illegal”negotiationsisoneofthemostinterestingaspectsofthewar.Ishallgivetwobriefexamples,onefromthebeginningandonefromtheendoftheconflict.

Shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion in Bohemia, which marked thebeginningofthewar,differentprincesoftheHolyRomanEmpirerecommendedthe Emperor to enter into direct negotiations with the rebellious Bohemian

9 RandallLesaffer,“DefensiveWarfare,PreventionandHegemony.TheJustificationsoftheFranco-SpanishWarof1635”,PartI–II,Journal for International Law,8(2006):91–123and141–79.

10 AnjaV.Hartmann,Von Regensburg nach Hamburg. Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem französischen König und dem Kaiser vom Regensburger Vertrag (13. Oktober 1630) bis zum Hamburger Präliminarfrieden (25. Dezember 1641) (Münster,1998).

11 ErikM.Thomson,Chancellor Oxenstierna, Cardinal Richelieu, and Commerce. The Problems and Possibilities of Governance in Early-Seventeenth Century France and Sweden(Leiden,2007).

12 Jenny Öhmann, Der Kampf um den Frieden. Schweden und der Kaiser im Dreißigjährigen Krieg(Vienna,2005).

13 ChristophKampmann,Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Geschichte eines europäischen Konflikts(Stuttgart,2008).Theresultsofthisbookareimportantforthefollowingconsiderations.


estates.14Theoretically,fromthepointofviewofinternationallaw(Ius Gentium)andthelawoftheEmpire (Reichsrecht),thiswouldhavebeentotallyimpossible.For the government in Vienna, these Bohemian estates were nothing otherthancriminals,guiltyofcrimen laesae majestatis,whohad just tried tokill theimperialgovernorsinPragueandnotoriouslymadewaragainsttheirlawfullord,theEmperorandKingofBohemia.15Intheorytherewasnothingtonegotiateaboutuntil theysurrendered.Ineffect,exactly this strictpositionwasadoptedtowardstheproposednegotiationsbytheimperiallawyersintheReichshofrat.16TheproposaloftheprincesoftheEmpirewasinthissenseaprovocationfortheEmperor.Evenworseintheeyesoftheimperialjurists,itwasproposedthatthesetalksshouldtakeplaceundertheneutralmediationoftheseprinces,thatis,underthemediationofvassalsoftheEmperor.ItwasaltogetherprovocativetoproposethattheEmperorshouldnegotiatewithrebelsandcriminals,andthathisownvassals,whointheorywereboundbyfeudaldutytosupporttheirlord,shouldplay the role of neutral mediators. But astonishingly enough, after only shorthesitation,theEmperoracceptedtheproposal.17ThatmeantheformallyacceptedtoenterintodubiousnegotiationswiththeBohemianrebels.Between1619and1620,thesetalksindeedtookplaceandforashorttimewereverysuccessful.Thiswasthefirstchapterinthepermanentnegotiationsthataccompaniedthewar.

Another example comes from the end of the war, from the WestphalianPeace conference: When the peace talks between France and Spain ran intoseriousdifficulties,itwasproposedthattheofficialmediatorsshouldbereplaced.Officially thePapalnuncio,FabioChigi, and theVenetian ambassador,AlviseContarini,undertookthedifficulttaskofmediation.18Then,in1646,diplomaticcircles suggested that no longer the papal andVenetian diplomats, but rathertheNetherlandsshouldundertaketheneutralmediation.19Again,athoroughly“incorrect”proposal:intheeyesofSpain,theNetherlandswerestillmererebels,

14 FrankMüller,Kursachsen und der Böhmische Aufstand(Münster,1997).15 ChristophKampmann,Reichsrebellion und kaiserliche Acht. Politische Strafjustiz im

Dreißigjährigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634(Münster,1993),pp.20–22.16 Ibid.,pp.18–46.17 Müller,p.197.18 KonradRepgen,“FriedensvermittlungundFriedensvermittlerbeimWestfälischen

Frieden” inKonradRepgen,Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Friede. Studien und Quellen, eds Franz Bosbach and Christoph Kampmann (Paderborn et al., 1998), pp.695–719.

19 Cf.Braun,IntroductiontoActa Pacis Westphalicae, Serie 2 [Korrespondenzen],B5,pp.XCV–XCVI;AnuschkaTischer,Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß. Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin (Münster,1999),pp.83–4.


notanindependentstate;20intheeyesofFrance,theywereclosealliesandcouldnotbeneutral;21andintheeyesofthePope,theywereheretics.Moreover,thetransferofresponsibilitymeantnolessthanasevereblowtothePope’sreputation,becausebytransferringthemediationtotheNetherlandsthetwoleadingRomanCatholicpowerswouldbedeclaringpapalmediationtobeuseless.Butagainandastonishinglyenough,afterashorttimeboththeleadingRomanCatholicpowersagreed to the proposal. And for more than a year the theoretically impossiblebecamepossible:papalmediationwasreplacedbyDutchmediation,theDutchbeingnowcalledthe“new”mediatorstodistinguishthemfromtheoldpapalandVenetianmediators.22

These are only two examples of “illegal” negotiations; many more couldbeaddedtothelist.TheThirtyYears’Warwasaccompaniedbythirtyyearsofpermanent,flexibleandsometimesabsolutelyincorrectdiplomaticandpoliticalcontactsamongthemainparties.Theleadingpowerswerenotonlypreparedtonegotiate,butalsotoadoptveryinnovativeandflexiblemeansofnegotiations.

Iturnnowtothesecondcommonopinionaboutthewar,itscharacterasanecessarilydestructiveconfessionalconfrontation,asakindof“HolyWar”(RobertBireley)intheviewoftheparticipants,oratleastoftheradicalconfessionalistparticipants such as theEmperorFerdinand IIorKingGustavusAdolphusofSweden.Theresultofrecentresearchsuggestsadifferentpicture.Toalargeextentthecommonviewwaspropagandafabricatedbyfollowersandpublicistsofthemonarchssoastostylebothasardentreligiousheroes.Ifwelookmoreclosely,itbecomesclearthattherelationshipbetweentheconfessionalenemieswasofadifferentcharacter.

In general, we must distinguish between the attitude of the politicallyresponsibleelitesontheonehandandtheologiansontheother;andevenamongthetheologians,theextremistgroup,whoopposedeverysettlement,shouldnottobeseenastheoverallmajority.

I shall again offer a few examples illustrating this general thesis. The peakofconfessionalconfrontationduringthewarseemedtocomeduringthereignof Emperor Ferdinand II (1619–37), and especially during the short time ofclearRomanCatholicpredominanceintheEmpireafterWallenstein’sandTilly’svictoriesintheDanishwarof1626–27.TheolderGermanhistoriographyspoke

20 ForthebestaccountabouttheSpanish-Dutchconflict,cf.GeoffreyParker,The Dutch Revolt,2ndedn(NewYork,1985).

21 FritzDickmann,Der Westfälische Friede, 5th edn (Münster, 1985), pp.261–3;Tischer,pp.209–11.

22 TheNetherlandswerecalledthenouveaux médiateurs incontrast totheanciens médiateurs,thePopeandVenice(Braun,p.XCVI,fn.137).Theexchangeofthemediatorswasformallyannounced,buttherelationshipbetweentheoldandthenewmediatorswasuneasy.


oftheimminentdangerthattheEmperorandhisallieswereabouttocrushallProtestantismintheHolyRomanEmpire.23Ourknowledgeofimperialpolicyatthistimeisnowconsiderablygreaterthanbefore,thankstothehistoricalstudiesofThomasBrockmannandthejuridicalstudiesofMichaelFrisch.24

These studies show very convincingly that the party of radical theologiansat the Imperial court never had the slightest chance of imposing their viewon official imperial policy. The basis of all political, juridical and confessionalconsiderationsattheVienneseCourtwastheAugsburgPeaceof1555 (Augsburger Religionsfriede), which guaranteed the existence of both Roman Catholicismand Lutheran Protestantism. The leading political circles at the Hofburg, theEmperorandhismainadvisors,neverhadany intentionofwithdrawing fromtheAugsburgreligiouspeacewiththisgeneralguaranteeforProtestantism.ThemainquestionunderdiscussionatcourtwasthatoftherightinterpretationoftheAugsburgTreaty,buttherewasnodisputeabouttheTreaty’svalidity.Intheend, theViennese court decided to impose a relatively strict Roman CatholicinterpretationontheAugsburgPeace,butnot–andthisisdecisiveinourcontext–towithdraweitheropenlyorsecretly.25

WithregardtotheprincipaldecisionoftheImperialGovernmenttoupholdtheAugsburgReligiousSettlement,MartinHeckel,aleadingProtestanthistorianoftheearlymodernHolyEmpire,couldmaintainconvincinglythatthepoliticaland confessional policy of the Imperial court in the moment of its greatestsuccess canbe characterised as a confessionalvia media between the extremistand the pacifist solutions, and not at all as an extremist position.26 From thetraditional viewpoint, Heckel’s interpretation is puzzling, but recent studiessupportit.AlthoughEmperorFerdinandIIhatedthe“Protestantheresy”,hehadnointentionofwipingitoutwithintheHolyRomanEmpireduringhislifetime.Ferdinand’schiefconcernwasthefateofhisdynasty,theAustrianbranchoftheHabsburgs,andhishereditaryterritories.27

23 For example Wilhelm Mommsen: “Die Ausführung des [Restitutions-]EdiktshättedieAxtandieWurzeldesdeutschenProtestantismusgelegt,damitwohlüberhauptdie Vernichtung des Protestantismus herbeigeführt”, Propyläen-Weltgeschichte, vol. 5, Reformation und Gegenreformation(Berlin,1930),p.424.

24 MichaelFrisch,Das Restitutionsedikt Kaiser Ferdinands II. vom 6. März 1629. Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung(Tübingen,1993).

25 SeeBrockmann’sdetailedinvestigation,chap.V,6.26 OntheRestitutionsediktasthevictoryofaconfessional“middleoftheroad”policy

(Mittellinie)overtheologicalextremists,cf.MartinHeckel,Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter(Göttingen,1983),p.146.

27 Brockmann,chap.VI,II.6;FriedrichEdelmayer,“EinheitderCasadeAustria?PhilippII.undKarlvonInnerösterreich”,inFranceM.Dolinatetal.(eds),Katholische


ThesameistrueforSwedenatthemomentofGustavusAdolphus’sgreatestsuccessin1631–32.Incontrasttohisfiercelyconfessionalpropaganda(orbetter,thepropagandaofhisfiercelyconfessionalfollowers),theSwedishkingactedverycautiouslyinreligiousmattersandmadenoseriousefforttochangethegeneralreligious situation.First and foremost,he feltobliged touphold theAugsburgPeace.28HesupporteditsProtestantinterpretation,butnotitsdestruction,inthelastpointverylikehismainopponent,theEmperorinVienna.

Noneofthismeansthatconfessiondidnotplayanimportantrole.Ofcourseit did, and did so until at least the end of the century. But total destructionoftheopposingconfessionalpartywasnotpartofit.Itisremarkablethatthiswas,inpoliticalterms,trueevenforthePope,asAlexanderKollerhasrecentlyshown in an impressive study.29Evenpapal policydistinguished very carefullybetweenpoliticalandconfessionalintentions.In1631,atthepeakofSwedish-Protestant predominance in the Empire, Pope UrbanVIII did what he couldto bring Bavaria into an alliance with France. The Pope knew very well thatthis meant leading Bavaria into an indirect alliance with Sweden, which hadsignedthe treatyofBärwaldewithFrance.This led toa famousconfrontationin thesolemnConsistoriumofCardinalswhenoneof theCardinals,Borghia,openlyattackedtheHolyFatherforhavingtheresponsibilityforthedestructionof Roman Catholicism in the Holy Roman Empire on his hands because hesupportedFranceandSweden.30Insomesense,theCardinalwasright.

Again,wecouldaddmanyexamples.ThepictureoftheThirtyYears’WarasaHolyWarbetweentheconfessionsisamyth,createdbyclericsandpastors,andinapplicabletothepoliticallyrulingelites.

Thesameistrueforthethesisthata“universalmonarchy”wastheultimateintention of France and Spain. Again, recent research has changed and added

Reform und Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich, 1544–1628(Klagenfurtetal.,1994),pp.373–86,herep.386.

28 ForthechangeinhistoriographicviewsofGustavusAdolphus’sGermanwaraims,cf. Öhmann, pp. 23–4. The older historiography generally preferred a more defensiveinterpretationofGustavusAdolphus’spoliticalaims.RecentlyGustavusAdolphushasbeenseenasamoreaggressive leaderwithimperialisticaims,butevenrecenthistoriographyregardsSweden’sreligiousaimsinGermanyasrelativelyunimportant.AgeneralreligioustransformationoftheHolyRomanEmpiredoesnotseemtohavebeenontheSwedishagenda.

29 Alexander Koller, “War der Papst ein militanter, kriegstreibender katholischerMonarch?DerHl.StuhlunddieprotestantischenHäresienum1600”,inSchilling(ed.),pp.67–82.

30 LudwigvonPastor,Geschichte der Päpste,vol.XIII/1 (Freiburg,Br.,1928),pp.431–41.


toourknowledgeonthispoint.31Ithasbecomeclearthatalthoughtheideaofuniversalmonarchyplayedofcourseanimportantroleforbothpowers,itwasneverintheformofanopenorsilentaim.Insteadbothsidessuspectedtheothersideofstrivingtoattainuniversalmonarchy.32ThepolicyofSpainandFrancewasbasedverymuchonthefeelingoftheirownweaknessandthefearthattheothersidewouldexploittheirweaknesstoadvanceitshegemonicplans.Inaremarkablyparallelmanner,bothsawthedangerofbeingoverwhelmedbytheuniversalisticambitionsoftheother.OlivaresandRichelieuthereforestruggledtoachieveonecentralaim,namely,nottostandaloneagainsttherival.33

Inthisrespect,itisveryrevealingtolooktotherelationshipbetweenSpainandtheNorthernNetherlandsduringtheThirtyYears’War.Aftertheturnofthecentury,SpanishpolicywasneverdirectedtoreoccupyingthewholeNetherlandsinthemannerofaMonarchia UniversalisandabolishingtheindependentDutchState.Madridknewverywellthatthisaimwasimpossibletoachieve.Thewholequestion rather turnedonwhat conditionsMadridwouldoffer for the formalrecognitionofDutchindependence.34

Tosumup,itispossibletospeakofastatesystemduringtheThirtyYears’WarinthesenseofHeinzDuchhardt’sdefinition.Theongoingwarwasaccompaniedbypermanentnegotiations and theopponentsnever totallybrokeoffpoliticalcontact.Evenmoreimportantly,ideasofmutualdestructiondidnotexerciseadecisiveinfluenceoverthepoliticalelites.Andthisistrueevenoftheconfessionalconflict.Thewaraimwastoweakentheconfessionalenemy,nottodestroyhim.IntheologicalcirclesthereexistedtheideaofacompletelyRomanCatholicoracompletelyProtestantHolyRomanEmpire,butpoliticalleadersdidnotsharethisview.

Theseresultshaveconsequencesfortheconceptofpeaceanditsrealimportancefor the political agents during the Thirty Years’ War. All political parties and

31 Hartmann, Von Regensburg nach Hamburg. Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem französischen König und dem Kaiser vom Regensburger Vertrag (13. Oktober 1630) bis zum Hamburger Präliminarfrieden (25. Dezember 1641);Rohrschneider, Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster. Spaniens Ringen mit Frankreich auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress(1643–1649).

32 ForFranceandSpain,cf.Rohrschneider,pp.289–93.Kampmann,Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,pp.103–9.

33 OlivaresalwaystriedtobringtheAustrianrelativesofhiskingintoaclosealliancewithSpain–anaimthatheneverreallyachievedduringthewholewar.Richelieu’swholepolicy was directed to forming solid alliances with the Netherlands and Sweden; andthough initiallybothwere reluctant toaccept theFrenchoffer, in theendtheyhad toconcludeanalliancewithFranceformilitaryreasons.

34 JonathanIsrael,The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661(Oxford1982),p.XIV.


allprinces solemnlydeclared that theirwaraimwaspeace. Inalldeclarations,manifestos,pamphletsandthelike,theirrepeatedcredowasfinis belli pax esto,thatis,theaimofallwarmustbetheachievementofpeace.

Foralongtimehistorianshaveregardedthesedeclarationsasemptyphrasesthat had no influence on the actual policy of the warring powers. In view ofthe recenthistorical research,we shouldbevery careful inmaking suchquickjudgements.Thepoliticallyresponsibleelitesgenuinelydesiredthepeace.Theirprofessionofthisdesirewasnotmerepropagandaintendedtoconcealtheirrealintentions.

Pax honesta and Ongoing War

Theseresultsraiseanotherimportantquestion.Iftherewasasortofstatesystem(inDuchhardt’ssense), ifthewarringpowerswerenotseekingtodestroytheirenemies,andifpeacedidinfactplayaroleforthem,whythendidthewargoonforthirtyyears?WhyhadGermanytoexperiencesuchalongwar?Ishallnowturntothisquestioninthesecondpartofthisarticle.

Therewereofcoursemanyreasons,butIshallconcentrateononlyonehere.Thisisthespecialconceptofpeacethatwassharedbythemainpoliticalagentsandthatexercisedgreatinfluenceontheirpoliticalbehaviourandtheformulationoftheirpoliticalaimsandintentions.AsIhavealreadymentioned,thereisnodoubtthatthedifferentpartiesgenuinelytriedtoachievepeace.Butthepeacetheywantedtoachievemeantmorethanthemereabsenceofwar,morethanwhatpoliticalsciencecalls“negativepeace”.35Thepeacesoughtbytheopposingpartieswasaveryspecialpeace,apeacethatcorrespondedtotheirownoftendifferentand sometimes incompatible ideasof security and justice.Thecrucialpoint isthattheattainmentoftheseveryspecialconceptsofpeacewasmoreimportantthanaswiftendtothemilitaryconfrontation.Thispositioncanbesummarisedin the statement thatwar seemed tobebetter than thewrongpeace. Inotherwords,becausethemainpartieshadhighlyelaborate,complicatedideasofwhatapeacefulordershouldlooklike,thewarwentonandon.Inthisrespecttherearestrikingsimilaritiesamongthevariouswarringparties,eveninthedefinitionoftherightpeace.Usuallytherightpeacewascalledthe“honourablepeace”(Pax honesta, paix honnête, der Ehrenvolle Friede).InordertoachievethePax honesta,the different parties were prepared to continue the war, even in very difficultcircumstances.

35 For the concept of “negative” peace in the political science, cf. Ernst-OttoCzempiel,Friedensstrategien. Eine systematische Darstellung außenpolitischer Theorien von Machiavelli bis Madariaga,2ndedn(Opladen,1998),pp.45–52.


It is very important to understand what honour (honneur) meant in thiscontext.Honour shouldnotbe confusedwith glory (gloire). In fact, the earlymodernconceptsofhonourandofglorymeanttotallydifferentthings.Ofcourseglory,especiallythegloryofwar,wasimportantfortheprincelyrulers.Theyallbelongedtothehigharistocracyandglorywastraditionallyofcentralimportancetothem.36Nevertheless,glorywasnot indispensable.Inseverecircumstances itwaspossibletorelinquishtheprospectofglory.AndtherulersintheThirtyYears’Warwerepreparedtodoexactlythat.Wehavemanyexamplesofthiswillingness.Forexample,theoccasionswhenprincesintendedpersonallytoleadtroopsintobattlebecausetheythoughtthiswasrequiredfortheirglory,butwerepersuadedbytheircounsellorsnottodoso,ortopostponethecampaign,despitethelossofgloire.Agoodexampleof this isCardinalRichelieu’sconstantadvice tohismonarchtousejuste modération,thatis,nottostriveforsuperfluousglory.Thiswasinaccordwiththecommonprudentialgubernatoria,whichtoldtheprincesthatgloryisimportant,butthatitisalsosometimesimportanttodispensewithglory.37

Honour was a completely different matter. Honour was an indispensableconditionforaprincetobetakenseriouslybytheotherprincesandstates,tobeacceptedasanimportantplayerinthepoliticalgame,andtoplayapoliticalroleatall.38

This is crucial for theunderstandingofPax honesta.Pax honestawasmorethanamereadditiontoeachparty’smostimportantpeaceconditions.Itmeantapeacesettlementthatguaranteedthefundamentalreputationandtherankofthe monarchy. This guarantee depended upon certain political questions andpeacesettlements–settlementsthatinretrospectivesometimesseemnottobesoimportant,butwereextremelyimportantfromthepointofviewofthepoliticalelites.Thevariouswarringpartiescontinuedthewarinordertoaccomplishthese

36 Ongloryasimportantaristocraticvalue,cf.JohannesKunisch,Fürst – Gesellschaft – Krieg. Studien zur bellizistischen Disposition des absoluten Fürstenstaats(Cologneetal.,1992).

37 On juste modération, just moderation, in the thought of Cardinal Richelieu,cf. Fritz Dickmann, “Rechtsgedanke und Machtpolitik bei Richelieu. Studien an neuentdecktenQuellen”,inFritzDickmann,Friedensrecht und Friedenssicherung. Studien zum Friedensproblem in der neueren Geschichte(Göttingen,1971),pp.36–78,herepp.64–5.

38 For the understanding of honour (Ehre), see Sibylle Hofer, “Ehrverlust”,in Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 2006), pp. 88–90; François Billacois,“Honneur”,inFrançoisBluche(ed.),Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle(Paris,1990),pp.729–30;andKlausGraf,“Adelsehre”,inEnzyklopädie der Neuzeit,vol.1(Stuttgart,2005),pp.54–6,herep.56.Forthedifferencebetweenhonourandglory,seethearticle“Ruhm,öffentlich”, in JohannH.Zedler, Großes vollständiges Universal-Lexikon, vol.32 (Halle,Leipzig,1740)column1596.Adetailedinvestigationofthepoliticalconceptofhonourisstilllacking.


goals, even in extremely unfavourable circumstances. The prolongation of thewarwasthen inevitable,especiallywhenonepartydeclaredsomethingtobeacrucialandindispensableconditionforaPax honestathatanotherpartyrejectedforexactlythesamereason.

Ishouldliketoclarifyandillustratetheseratherabstractexplanationsbygivingoneexample.ItreferstooneofthecrucialconflictswithintheThirtyYears’War,theFranco-Imperialconfrontationoverthemeanstoauniversalpeace.

The historical picture of the French Prime Minister, Cardinal Richelieu,andhisattitudetowardspeace,hasundergoneatotaltransformation.Theolderliterature, especially the older German historiography, regarded Richelieu as a“Machiavellianinredrobe”,whowasnotreallyinterestedinpeacebutonlyintheextensionofhispowerandthepowerofhismonarch.Intenseresearchinrecentdecadeshasconvincinglyshownthatthispictureisutterlymisleading.HistorianssuchasFritzDickmann,HermannWeberandmorerecentlyKlausMalettkehavemadeveryimportantcontributionstothisrevision.39TodayitmaybetakenforgrantedthatRichelieuwasinfactinterestedinpeaceandtheconstructionofapeacefulandstableChristianorder.YetatthesametimetheextensiveresearchhasalsomadeitclearthattheCardinalhadaveryspecialideaofpeace:ithadtobeapeaceinaccordancewiththehonouroftheFrenchmonarchy,asortofPax honesta gallica,whichwas regularly called thepaix universel, theuniversalpeace of Christendom.40 In other words, Richelieu and his monarch, LouisXIII,wouldagreeonly toapeacesettlement thatwouldsolveallcontroversialquestionsofFrenchforeignpolicyandwouldabolishalltheFrenchmonarchy’sproblemswithitsneighboursandrivals.Richelieuthereforeconstantlydemandedthatallhisallieshadtobeincludedinthepeacetalksandconsequentlyinthefinalsettlement.Exactlythislastconditionprovedtobeextremelydifficultandproblematic for concluding a peace. Moreover, Richelieu demanded that theestatesoftheEmpire(Reichsstände),oratleastthosealliedwithFrance,shouldalsoparticipateinthepeacecongressandinthepeacetreaty.41ThisconditionwasextremelydifficulttoacceptfortheEmperorbecauseheregardedtheestatesasvassalsandnotindependentforeignpowers,andbecausehewasnotwillingto

39 KlausMalettke,Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Beiträge zum Einfluß französischer politischer Theorie, Verfassung und Außenpolitik in der Frühen Neuzeit (Marburg, 1994), pp. 286–302; Dickmann, “Rechtsgedanke undMachtpolitikbeiRichelieu.StudienanneuentdecktenQuellen”,pp.36–78.

40 Cf. Hermann Weber, “Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg. RichelieusKriegsgründe und Kriegsziele 1634/35”, in Konrad Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven (Munich,1988),pp.203–17;KlausMalettke,pp.286–302.

41 Kampmann,Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,p.133.


acceptthataforeignpowershouldinterveneinthequestionofthefutureorderoftheHolyRomanEmpire.

The French demand had much to do with honour and reputation. Thisbecomes clear from the fact that Richelieu demanded the participation of hisallieswithintheEmpireonlyfromFrance’sentryintothewarin1635onwards.Itshouldbenotedthatin1635–36FrancehadonlyveryfewallieswithintheHolyRomanEmpire–infactonlytwoofanyimportance,theelectorofTrierand theLandgraveofHessen-Kassel.Andboth these alliesweredrivenoutoftheirterritoryandwereofnogreatrealmilitaryuseforFrance.Buttheir“real”usewasnotamatterofgreatimportforRichelieu.ForhimthewholequestionoftheparticipationofFrance’sallieswasaquestionofhonour;whatwasreallyimportantfortheFirstMinisterwastodemonstratethatFrancewouldnotagreetoanypeacewhichwasincompatiblewithitshonour.

OneyearafterFrance’sentryintothewar,itbecameclearhowimportantthePax honestaorpax universaliswasforRichelieu.In1636Francefellintoseriousmilitarytroublesandwasat thebrinkofdefeat.Aftersuccessfulattacksof theSpanishandImperialarmies,thewaytoParisseemedtobeopenandthisledtoageneralpanicintheFrenchcapital.Richelieu’swarpolicywastotallydiscreditedandhispoliticalenemieswithinandoutsideFrancetriumphant.TheEmperortriedtoexploitthissituationbyofferingaseparatepeacetoFrance,accompaniedbyveryfriendlygestures.42

But the Emperor’s gestures were fruitless; Richelieu stood firm. He wasconvincedthatevenamidstsuchseriousanddangerouscircumstancesnothingbutaPax honestawastolerableforFrance.Andoneofthemostimportantconditionsof thisPax honestawasnottoconcludeapeacetreatywithouthisallies intheEmpire.RichelieuheldoutforthispeaceconditioneveninasituationinwhichFranceseemedunabletohelpitself,muchlessitshelplessallies.

EventhosehistorianswhotakeaverysympatheticviewofCardinalRichelieucouldnotdenythathisdemandforapaix universel,auniversalpeace,contributedmuch to theprolongationof thewar, althoughhis quest for peacewas honest.43Richelieu’sfightforthePax honestaaspax universalisbecameagreatobstacletopeacebecauseitcollidedwiththeEmperor’sideaofaPax honesta.TheEmperorwasnotinterestedinalongwarwithFrance,aswehavealreadyseen.Buthewasnotatall

42 Forexample,FerdinandIIforbadehisson,FerdinandIII,commander-in-chiefofthe intervening imperial army, topublishadeclarationofwaragainstFrance.Weshouldimaginetheratheroddsituation:imperialtroops,movingagainstParisalthoughnostateofwarexistedbetweentheopponents,offeredRichelieuaswiftwithdrawalofalltroopsandthereturntothestatusquoanteifFranceagreedtoaseparatepeace;Hartmann,pp.258–62.

43 Hermann Weber, “Une Paix sûre et prompte. Die Friedenspolitik Richelieus”,inHeinzDuchhardt(ed.),Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit(CologneandVienna,1991),pp.111–29,herepp.128–9.


preparedtoadmittheestatesoftheEmpiretopeacetalkswithFrance.Inspecialcircumstances,hewaswillingtoaccepttheparticipationofotherforeignpowersandtheelectorswhowereseenassortofco-sovereignsintheEmpire.ButthedemandthatheshouldallowtheparticipationofhisvassalswasseenasamajorinsulttothehonouroftheEmperor,incompatiblewithaPax honestaandaltogetherintolerable.

In the last years of the war, the imperial government took the same firmstand in this respectashadtheFrenchGovernmentbefore.Even inextremelycomplicated and dangerous circumstances, Vienna rejected any proposal tosignapeacetreatywithouthonour.Withastonishingpersistenceandobstinacy,the Emperor and his Privy Council rejected any idea of participating in theWestphalian Peace conference, because they were not willing to accept theparticipationof the imperial estates.As thiswasnot in accordwith their ideaofPax honesta,thegovernmentdecidedthatitwouldbebettertofightevenindifficultcircumstancesagainstanobviouslymorepowerfulenemythantoagreetoapeacewithouthonour.44Threetimes,in1642,1644and1645,theimperialarmywasbadlydefeated.Afterthedisastrouscampaignof1644,whichledtothelossofawholearmywithoutabattleandrevealedtheweaknessoftheEmperor,onecouldhaveexpectedachangedattitudeinVienna.Buttheoppositewasthecase:attheendof1644,EmperorandPrivyCouncilunanimouslyagreedthatitwouldbebettertofightevenindesperatecircumstancesthantoforfeitimperialhonourinapeaceconferencewithparticipantsfromtheEmpire.Itwasthereforedecidedtoraiseanotherarmyagain–forthethirdtimewithinthreeyears.Theraisingof this army represented an extremeanddevastating efforton thepartofthealreadyheavilyexploitedHabsburghereditarylands(Erblande).Inspring1645 this armywas sent on campaign,nowunder the symbolic commandoftheEmperorhimself.Thepredictablehappened: this army,whichwas to turntheimperialmilitaryfortuneandsavetheEmperor’shonour,wasagainbeatenandvirtuallydestroyedinMarch1645.Nowthemilitaryandmoralcatastrophewascomplete.ThevictoriousSwedishArmyadvancedswiftlyintothehereditarylands,appearingontheDanubeandthreateningViennaandLowerAustria.Atthesametime,fromthesouth-easttheSwedishally,thePrinceofTransylvania,appeared.TheEmperorwasfacedwiththelossofhiscentralterritories.Moreover,hisclosestallies,BavariaandSaxony,desertedhim.Andonlynow,atthebrinkofutterdefeatandgiventhechoicebetweendishonourabledefeatanddishonourablepeace,didthegovernmentaccepttheuniversalpeaceconferenceatMünster.45

Again, many other examples could be adduced. A very impressive one istheSwedishpolicyduringtheThirtyYears’War,whichwasshapedbythefight

44 Karsten Ruppert, Die kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß(Münster,1979),pp.75–9;Kampmann, Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,pp.148–9.

45 Kampmann,Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,pp.148–50.


foraPax honesta.AfterthedeathofGustavusAdolphus,theSwedishpolicyinGermanybecamehighlyflexible.Butthereremainedseveralpoliticalgoalsthatwere essential for Swedish “honour”: Satisfactio, territorial compensation fortheSwedishwar effort;Contentament, financial compensation for theSwedishwareffort;andAmnestia,thereturntothepoliticalandconfessional status quo ante inGermany.Eveninmostdiremilitarycircumstances,whentheSwedisharmyseemedtobeonthevergeofsurrender,theSwedishgovernmentrefusedtowithdrawfromGermanywithouthavingachievedSatisfactio,Contentament andatleastpartialAmnestia,thatis,withouthavingachievedanhonourablepeace.46Recently Jenny Öhmann has published a book on Swedish policy during theThirtyYears’WarwiththeeminentlyappropriatetitleDer Kampf um den Frieden(The Fight for Peace).ButitwasnotpeaceassuchthatSwedenwasfightingfor,butitsveryspecialideaofhonourablepeace–atermwhichappearsfrequentlyintheSwedishrecordsandpoliticalcorrespondence.Öhmannmightalsohavecalledherbook“TheFightforHonourablePeace”,andthiswouldbeafittingdescriptionforthepolicyofalltheimportantpowersintheThirtyYears’War.

Conclusion

AtthetimeoftheThirtyYears’Warthereindeedexistedasystemofstates:therewas permanent and uninterrupted communication among the warring partiesandareadiness touseflexiblemeansofnegotiations.Andamongthepoliticalelitestherewasnopredominantintentionofmutualdestruction.

Butallthiscouldnotpreventthemilitarycatastrophe.OnemainreasonforthiswastheuniversalinsistenceonaPax honesta.Allimportantparticipantsagreedthatapeacesettlementwasonlypossibleonthebasisoftheirownunderstandingofanhonourablepeace.ItwasthisspecialideaofhonourandpeacethatledtothemilitarycatastrophewithintheEuropeanstatesystem.

46 Sigmund Goetze, Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegenüber Kaiser und Reich(Kiel,1971).

Chapter12HegemonHistory:Pufendorf ’sShifting

PerspectivesonFranceandFrenchPowerDavidSaunders

Introduction

Asapoliticalphenomenon,“hegemony”meritsattention.1Itraisesthequestionofenforcement,thatis,ofimplementationandexecutionofnorms,asdistinctfromtheirconception.Conceivinganorm–forinstancethatofajustpeace(une bonne paix)–isonething.Enforcingthenormisanother.Theactualenforcementofinternationalpacts,andsometimestheirdesignandfashioning,mightrestmoreonthepoliticalinterventionofahegemonicsuper-stateorstatesasarbiter-brokerthanoncosmopolitanimperativesortranscendentalvalues.Intheinternationalasinthedomesticsphere,“Covenants,withouttheSword,arebutWords”.2

AtissueisFrance’s(alongwithSweden’s)roleashegemonintheWestphaliansettlementof1648.GivenourGermancontext,itisfittingtoreviewthisFrenchaction through the Brandenburg-Protestant perspectives of Samuel Pufendorf.Thesearetwosharplydivergentperspectives,theonepost-datingtherevocationoftheEdictofNantesin1685,theotherpre-datingwhatEuropeanProtestants(includingPufendorfasexemplar)perceivedasthatseismicevent.Atmid-centuryFrenchhegemonycould serve toguaranteeageneralpeaceandallowreligiouspluralism.After1685,PufendorfsawFrenchdominationnotasapositiverelationof force, but as threatening an antipluralist re-Catholicisation of Europe by awould-be“universalmonarchy”.

How should we characterise this mutation? Does it signify a more intenseexerciseofhegemony,adifferenceofdegree?Ordoes it signifyadifferenceofkind,adifferentmodeofdominationexercisedbyagreaterpoweruponlesser

1 Onhegemony,seeRandallLesaffer,“Defensivewarfare,preventionandhegemony.ThejustificationsoftheFranco-SpanishWarof1635”,Journal of the History of International Law8/1(2006):91–123(especiallyon“hegemonicdefence”inthecontextoftheFranco-Spanishwarof1635andtheriseofFranceasa“power-broker”ontheseventeenth-centuryscene).SeealsoGerrySimpson,Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order(Cambridge,2004)on“legalisedhegemony”astheconditionof“greatpowers”exercisingdominationoverlesserstatesfromthetimeoftheCongressofViennain1815.

2 ThomasHobbes, Leviathan(Cambridge,1991),p.117.


states?Thefactofraisingtheseconceptualquestionsismotivated,inpart,byanoverridingpoliticalfeatureofourowntimes:theshiftinAmerican“hegemony”fromWorldWarIItotherecentUSadministration.Ireturntothiscomparisonbrieflyinaconcludingreflection.

ButfirstIshallprovideabackgroundnoteonPufendorfasnaturallawtheoristonpubliclawandreligiouspeace.ThenIpresenthisperspectivesontheusesandabusesofFrenchpoweras formulated intwoquitedifferentgenresofwriting:religious polemic and political history. To establish the sense of a perceivedmutation in French power, I take the post-1685 negative perspective first, asformulatedinPufendorf ’s1687De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem(Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society).Bywayofunderscoring thecontrastand tooutlineapositivepre-1685“Westphalian”perspectiveonFranceashegemon,Iproceedtoconsiderhis1682–85Einleitung zu der Historie der vornehmesten Reiche und Staaten so itziger Zeit in Europa sich befinden(Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe).IntheHistory,thefactofFrenchpowerisrecognised–“thereisnotanyStateinChristendomwhichFrancedoesnotequal,ifnotexceed,inPower”–butinnowaycondemnedasageneralthreattopeaceandProtestantisminEurope.

Pufendorf, Public Law and Religious Peace

With the rupture of the universal Christian church, triple waves of Lutheran,Calvinist and Catholic confessionalising had been rolling across northwesternEuropesincethemid-1500s.Thesesectarianconfessionalisationsconvergedwithforces of territorial state-formation, propelling a new political entity onto theEuropean scene: the confessional territorial state. This was an “organic” state,its political legitimacy founded in its spiritual mission to save the souls of allwholivedwithinitsborders.ThemodernFrenchterm,intégrisme,wellcapturesthe nature of these confessional programs, each aimed at incorporating wholepopulationswithinoneoftheexclusiveChristiantruths.Withthismissioncameadynamismoffaith,butalsoadeadlyrivalryoffaiths.WhereoncetherehadbeentheunityoftheRespublica christiana,nowtherewasinter-confessionalreligiouswar.Andoncetherewaswar,whocoulddoubtthattheabsolutepreconditionforsurvivalofthestateremainedaunityofreligion,imposedascommoncausebybothprinceandbishop?

SamuelPufendorfwasonewhodoubted.ThisdoubtwaselaboratedinhisDe jure naturae et gentium(1672).3Asanexitfromintractableconfessionalconflict,

3 ForrecentAnglophonediscussionofPufendorf ’snaturaljurisprudenceasa“civilphilosophy”,seeIanHunter,Rival Enlightenments. Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany(Cambridge,2001).

Hegemon History 213

apeacerelayhademergedintheformofanimperialpubliclaw(ius publicum)aimedatcontainingtheviolencebetweenrivalconfessionalparties.Throughanextraordinary process of juridification, the conflict was thus in some measureaddressed in legal terms. The settlements of Augsburg (1555) and Westphalia(1648),legalsolutionstoreligiousconflict,carriedtheforceofimperiallaw.TheImperial jurists’ creation was a “non-confessional or supra-confessional orderof coexistence between the two great confessional blocs”.4Thisunprecedented“orderofcoexistence”signalledanovelpolitical-legalconceptionofcivilpeacethatwasnotcontingentonsettlingthequestionofreligioustruth(orerror).True,therivalconfessionsthemselvescould(andofcoursedid)treatthehistoriclegalsettlementsasmerelyprovisional,pendingtheirownfuturereturntothesceneastheone“true”anduniversalchurchforallofareunitedChristendom.

Preparedtolearnfromhistory,Pufendorfrecognisedwhathadensuedwhenconfessionalising princes deployed their civil powers to render the citizenrytheologically virtuous by means of an imposed conformity. With De jure, hemountedamassivepost-Westphalianprogramtowrestthelawofnations,positivelawandworldlypoliticsawayfromthegraspoftheology,therebyseparatingwhattheconfessionalstatehadconjoined.InthePufendorfianmodeofmodernnaturallaw,civilpeaceundersovereignrulewastobetheoverridingnormofpositivelawandpoliticalorder.This suggests somethingof the complex religious,politicalandlegalbackdroptoPufendorf ’sshiftingperspectivesonthehegemonicroleofFrance.

TheHobbesianPufendorfofDe juretooknoparticularissuewithabsolutistrule in France.5 Symptomatic of this disposition is the fact that his translatorandglossator, JeanBarbeyrac,wouldfindoccasion to “adjust”whathe clearlyregardedasPufendorf ’sunderstatingthenegativedimensionofsovereignpower.6Atonepointinhis1706FrencheditionofDe jure,Le droit de la nature et des gens,BarbeyracconcludesasequenceoftenfootnoteswithwhatisclearlyanimpliedcriticalreflectiononFrenchhistoricalpractice:

CivilGovernmentbeingaproperMeans to restrain theMaliceofMen, theCivil State,withoutContradiction,maybemoresociableandhappythanthe

4 MartinHeckel,“DasSäkularisierungsprobleminderEntwicklungdesdeutschenStaatskirchenrechts”,inGerhardDilcherandIlseStaff(eds),Christentum und modernes Recht. Beiträge zum Problem des Säkularisation(FrankfurtamMain,1984),p.50.

5 ThecaseforPufendorfas“theonlygreatjuristicexponentofHobbes”ispowerfullymadebyFiammettaPalladini,Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes. Per una reinterpretazione del giusnaturalismo moderno(Bologna,1990).

6 On Barbeyrac as translator and editor of Pufendorf, see David Saunders, “Thenatural jurisprudence of Jean Barbeyrac: translation as an art of political adjustment”,Eighteenth-Century Studies36/4(2003):473–90.


State of Nature;butthenwemustsupposetheCivil Societytobewellgoverned,otherwise, if a King abuses his Power, or devolves the Management of civilAffairstoMinistersbothignorantandvicious,asitoftenhappens,aCivil Stateis thenmoreunhappy than theState of Nature;whichappearsby theWars,CalamitiesandViceswhichspringupfromsuchAbuses,andfromwhichtheState of Naturewouldbefree.7

TwodecadesafterLouisXIV’srevocationoftheEdictofNantes(forProtestantsthemostegregiousof“Abuses”),BarbeyracthusdarkenedtheroseateimageofthecivilstatethatPufendorfhaddrawnin1672.Infact,in1687,withDe habitu,PufendorfwashimselfalreadywritinginagenrequitedifferentfromthatofthenaturallawtreatiseDe jure.

Before considering the purpose and polemic of De habitu, however, it isworthwhilere-statingwhatWestphaliaachieved.Forthefirsttime,legalstandingwas extended to the Reformed Protestant Church, Calvinism having beenexcludedfromthe1555settlement.Nowprincelyandimperialsignatoriestothe1648settlementwouldhavetotoleratefreedomofworshipforthreeconfessionswithin their territorial jurisdictions. Inprinciple, therewouldbeno return toenforcedreligiousunitygiventhisconstraintuponaterritorialprince’scapacitytoexercisethejus reformandi.Importantly,iftheRespublica christiananolongerruled,treatiessuchasWestphaliabecametheveryfoundationofalawofnationsconceivedinPufendorfianstyle.

YetifthetermsoftheWestphaliantreatyweretobebinding,itwouldhavetobebyvirtueoftheguaranteeprovidedbyFrenchpower.ThiswasofcourseanactofnationalinterestquiteinkeepingwithFrance’slongstandinganti-imperialaims:resistingtheHabsburgs’Madrid-ViennaaxisandneutralisingtheCatholicco-ordinatesoftheGermanHolyRomanEmpire.Thoughanti-imperialismsatawkwardlywithPufendorf ’srespectfortheimperialpubliclaw,asajuristically-minded“Westphalian”hecouldnonethelessapprovemid-centuryFrenchpowerasacontributiontoreligiouspeaceinEurope.

Pufendorf ’s Post-1685 Perspective on France

Thesituationwasdifferentafter1685.AstheinstrumentofCatholicBourbonpower,Francenowposedthedanger.WithintwoyearsoftherevocationoftheEdict ofNantes,Pufendorf publishedDe habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem(Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society).

7 Barbeyrac,inSamuelPufendorf,Le droit de la nature et des gens, ou Système général des principes les plus importants de la morale, de la jurisprudence, et de la politique,trans.J.Barbeyrac(Amsterdam,1706),p.102.

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De habituisaresolutelyanti-Catholicandanti-LouisXIVpolemicdedicatedtoFriedrich-Wilhelm,PrinceElector ofBrandenburg.Theone sovereignwas thecurrent aggressor againstChrist’s church, the other its potential defender.Thehegemon-protectorremainedinplace,butnowinadifferentguise,threateningProtestantswiththeancient“YokeofPopishSlavery”.

Speakingwiththevoiceofhistory,PufendorfendsDe habituwithanappealtoprincesandstatesthathavenotenduredsuchslavery:“iftheyseriouslyreflect,howtheirfellow-Protestantsarepersecuted,andinwhatbarbarousmannertheyaretreated,[they]will,questionlesswithoutmyAdvice,takesuchmeasures,asmaybemostconvenienttosecurethemselvesfromsoimminentaDanger”.8

ThepointistocementtheProtestantcaseasjustandtheCatholicasunjust,firstingeneraltermsandthenintheconcretetermsofcontemporarycircumstances.Themethodistodeconstructonceandforall–intheeyesofGod,theGreatElectorandthelaw–anyresidualjustificationforenforcementofreligionbyacivilstate.De habituconfrontsitsreaderswithanormativepedagogysustainedbyScripturalreferencing,thelessonofwhichisthatstateandchurchconstituteirreduciblyseparate“Kingdoms”:

TheKingdomofChrist therefore, is aKingdomofTruth,wherehe,by theforceofTruth,bringsoverourSoulstohisObedience;andthisTruthhassuchpowerful Charms, that the Kingdom of Christ needs not to be maintainedby the same forcible means and Rules, by which Subjects must be kept inObediencetotheCivilPowers.(35)

This fundamental distinction between different spheres of human duty isconfirmed by the Scriptural evidence that Christ’s kingdom established nocivilstateandfoundednotemporalcourt(48).Thusthe“CivilPowerdoesnotreach this Kingdom; true Piety being not implanted by Human Force, whichisinsufficienttoprocureGod’sGrace,orraisethoseinwardMotionswhicharechieflyacceptabletoGodAlmighty;andwithoutwhich,allourexteriorActions,thatmaybeenforcedbyaCivilAuthority,aretobedeem’dvainandfruitless”(57).Pufendorfallowshisreadersnochoicebuttoagree:“Whoissoignorantasnottoknow,thatforobtainingtheEndsofCivilSocieties,itwasrequisitetoconstitutevariousDegreesofDignitiesappertainingtotheManagersoftheState;whereasthemostplainandnaturalDistinctionbetwixtChristiansinreferencetotheChurch,isonlythatofTeachersandAuditors”(68–9).

8 SamuelPufendorf,De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem/Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society, trans. J. Crull, ed. SimoneZurbuchen(Indianapolis,2002),p.121.Inthissection,furtherreferencestothisworkofPufendorfgivepagenumbersonly.


Thedemarcationisdrawnandredrawn,butnevertothesimpledisadvantageofthecivilstate(orFriedrich-Wilhelm).Thus,ontheonehand,“SovereignsarealwaysinvestedwithafullPowertoforcetheirSubjectstoacompliancewiththeirCommands,byinflictingPunishmentsuponthem”.Ontheotherhand:

But how is it possible to imagine that any Church or Congregation of theBelieversshouldever,oroughttosubjectthemselvessoentirelytothePleasureandDisposaloftheirTeachers;astoobligethemselvestoacquiescebarelyin,andtofollowblindly,whatevershallbeproposedtothem,asconducingandleadingtothewayofSalvation.(69)

By 1687, Pufendorf had been around long enough to know his adversaries’moves. For instance, the latter would argue that if church and state are suchdifferententities,thenwhycouldnoteachexercisecoterminoussovereignpower?Pufendorf ’scounterargumentisimmediate:“ItisafrivolousObjection,thattheChurchandcivilGovernmenthavedifferentEndsandObjects,notrepugnanttoone another;For, from thence isnot tobe inferred, that theChurchmustbeaState,orthattheChristianReligioncannotbepropagated,maintainedorexercised,withouttheChurchassumethesamePowerthatbelongstothecivilGovernment”(93).

These were not messages for a tranquil, normal time. De habitu is not anexerciseinmetaphysicalabstraction,anarchitectonicforaworlddefinedbytheidealrelationbetweenreligionandthecivilstate.Itisnotaspeculativediscourseontoleration,butacampaigntext,acall toarms.Atstakewasanemergency:theverysurvivalofEuropeanProtestantsnowconfrontedbyaperceivedFranco-Catholic claim to supra-sovereignty. Responding to Louis XIV’s revocation ofwhatremainedofstateprotectionforHuguenots’securityinFrance,Pufendorfisperfectlyconcreteinhispoliticalaim:tocutthegroundfromunderadvancingCatholicforces.

Theanti-Catholicismofthesepagesismultiformandunrelenting.Depictedasindeliblytemporalinitsinterestsandthuslesschurchthanstate,theRomanChurch’sclaimtoapostolicstatusisplacedindoubt:

That the Church, according to the intention of Christ and his Apostles,neitherwas,norcouldbeaState,itmayfromthencebeconcluded,whetherthatChurchwhichpretendstoaSovereignty,consideredassuch,beChrist’sChurch?(59)

Yet Rome’s claim to legitimacy as a state is dismissed, regardless of its allegedantiquity:“ForitisaveryinsignificantProof,toallegeinacaseofsuchMomentTradition,andalongcontinuedUsurpation,whichaddsnothingtotherightof

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alongcontinuedillegalPossession”(77).Tomakethepointcrystalclear,wearethenremindedthatnomatterwhatmighthavebeenthecase in“inprimitivetimes”,theancientclaim“inprocessofTime,hasbeenabused,andconsequentlydegeneratedintoaninsufferableTyranny”(77).

AstothePapalofficeintheroleof“JudgeGeneralofControversies intheChurch”,theattackiswithering.Farfromsettlingsuchcontroversieseitherbyoblivionorbyameasureofflexibility,the“PopishMonarchy”hasonlyincreasinglyhardeneditsdoctrinalposturing.Thus“itisimpossiblefortheRoman CatholickstorecedeanInchfromthepointofthecontrovertedArticles,withoutdiminutionof their Authority, and endangering their great Revenues” (80). Consensusbetween Catholics and Protestants is impossible, since the Catholics always“attributeonlytothemselvesthegloriousNameoftheTrue Church,excludingallotherChristiansfromit,butsuchasareofthesameCommunionwiththem”(81).RatherthanthedeliberationthatPufendorfregularlyrecommendstosettledifferences,theCatholicpracticeis“toendeavourtoestablishtheirAuthoritybyallmannerofviolenceagainstthose,thatdaretomaintainTruthinoppositiontotheirDoctrine.ForwhichreasonGodhasthreatenedinamostpeculiarmannertodestroythisMonsterofaState”(81).

ShouldanyChristian“prince”stillhesitateastothemostjustandpoliticchoicebetween Protestant and Catholic ways, Pufendorfian counsel is forthcoming.TheProtestantsallowthe laity toreadtheBible for themselves soas to“makethe Scriptures the Touchstone of their Doctrine, and the true Judge of theirControversies”.Bycontrast:

[I]n the Church of Rome, the Laity is not allowed the reading of the holyScripture,nay, that they leavenostoneunturn’d, to suppress theValidityoftheholyScripture;so,thatinthoseplaceswheretheInquisitionisinvogue,aManmaywithlessdangerbeguiltyofBlasphemy,Perjury,andtheothermostenormouscrimes,thantoreadandexaminetheMysteriesoftheholyScripture.(110)

Thisdevotionalnoteissupplementedwithapredictableremindertotheprince.Protestant clergy are “stinted in their Revenues” such that “their Persons andEstatesdependfromtheAuthorityoftheirSovereigns,neitherhavetheyanywhereelsetoseekforProtection”.Conversely,“inwhatPompandaffluenceofFortunedoesthePopishclergylive!UntowhatheighthavetheynotexaltedtheirPowerinEurope!HavetheynotsoorderedtheirMatters,astobealmostindependentfromtheCivilMagistrates?”(111).

ThepoliticalregisterintensifieswithawarningagainstCatholicencroachmentson the territorial sovereign’sauthority.TheRomanCatholicclergy“byvariousArtificesandIntrigues…haveat lastpatch’dupaPotentStateof theirown”,


with the Pope as their “Supream Head”, exercising “an Absolute Authority ofdeterminingallMattersofFaith,bywhichmeansheissuretoguidetheMindsofthePeoplewhereeverhepleases”(113).Thedangertocivilordercouldnotbegreater:

IfanythingintheWorldisdestructivetotheCivilPowers,itmustofnecessitybethis,whenaPartyinhabitingtheirTerritories,disowntheirJurisdictionanddependingfromaForeignPower;denytheAuthorityoftheirNaturalPrinceoverthem,oratleastacknowledgeitnolongerthantheythinkitconvenient.IfNeighbouringStatesarecommonlythemostjealousofoneanother,mustitnotbelook’duponasagreatSolecismofState,topermitsuchasdependfromaForeignJurisdictiontoabideintheCommonwealth.(113)

Addingthatthisis“nextdoortotakingForeignGarisonsintoourforts”,PufendorfremindshisreadersthattheRoman“EcclesiasticalState”drainsawaythematerialwealthoftheprincelyterritory.Whatismore,itclaimslegalauthorityto“inflictPunishmentsupontheSubjects,andtoabsolvethemfromtheirAllegianceduetotheirSovereign”(113).

Alongside this sustained polemic against Catholic ambition in general, De habitu targets the specific case of France. In fact, Pufendorf offers more thandenigration.MindfuloftheFrenchstate’smanyhistoricalclasheswithRome,hevergesoncomplimentingaGallicanchurch’seffortsat independence fromthe“PopishMonarch”.Discussingtheadvisoryroleofexpertcouncils inresolvingdoctrinalcontroversies,PufendorfcannotresisttheclassicGallicanthemeof“The Council is above the Pope”, a theme that allows him to signal “somewhat of aContradiction,thatthisPointisassertedbytheself-samePeople,whomakethePapalChairtheCenteroftheChurch,andthePopetheOecumenickBishop”(84).Thiscontradictionnoted,anopportunisticFrenchclergygainsonlyback-handedpraisefortheirhistoricalstancetowardstheultramontanepower:

TheFrenchclergyallowsthePopetobetheSupreamHeadoftheChurch,asfarastheyfinditsuitablewiththeirInterest.Butwheneverheattemptsanythingagainstthem,ortheStatesPolicyofthatKingdom,theoldSongoftheLibertyof the Gallican Church, and the antient Doctrine of the Sorbone is revived,which serves the French Clergy now and then for a Pretext, to persuade thevulgarsortofPeople,thattheGallicanChurchhasnotbeenpollutedwiththosegrossandabominableErroursasareintroducedintheChurchofRome.(85)

Thisalmostirenictoneis,however,theexceptionratherthantheruleinDe habitu.TheattackonFrancebeginswithgeneralities.Thusdiscussionofreligionin

thestateofnaturerecognisesthat“astotheMysteriesoftheChristianReligion...

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thesemustbeacquiredbytheassistanceofDivineGrace,whichiscontrarytoallViolence”.Thencomesthepoliticalpoint:

‘Tistrue,aPrincemayforceaSubjecttomakeanoutwardConfessionbywayofMouth,tocomplyinhisBehaviour,withhisCommands,andtodissemblehisThoughtsortospeakcontrarytohisBelief;buthecanforcenobodytobelievecontrarytohisownOpinion.(15)

TheLouisofthemid-1680s–rex christianissimus–fittedthismouldofaviolentconfessionalisingprince,atyrannicalabuserofthesovereignoffice.Civilpowerisabusedwhenusedtoenforcereligion.Thus“wheneverSovereignspretendtoextendthusfartheirAuthority,theytransgresstheirBounds;andiftheyinflictanyPunishmentontheirSubjects,forrefusingtobeobedienttotheirCommands,on this Account; such an Act ought to be look’d upon as illegal, unjust, andtyrannical”(18).

Reference to French abuse can be more explicit. De habitu opens with astatement of its occasional (in the serious sense) nature, being undertaken “atthisjunctureofTime,whennotonlytheRomish PriestsapplyalltheirCunningfor the rootingout of theProtestants, but also someof the greatestPrinces inChristendom(settingasidetheAntientwayofConvertingPeoplebyReasonandforceofArguments)havenowrecoursetoopenViolence;andbyDragooning,forcetheirmiserableSubjectstoareligion,whichalwaysappear’dabominabletothem”(12).HavingobservedthatChristtheteacherusednoexternalcoercion,Pufendorfwrites:“ItwasnotGodAlmighty’spleasuretopullPeoplehead-longinto Heaven, or to make use of the new French way of Converting them byDragoons”(33).LouisXIV’sdeploymentofdragonnadesagainsttheHuguenots(thebilletingof soldiers inProtestanthouseholds in theMidi,LanguedocandBéarnsincetheearly1680s,these“dragoons”havingfullfreedomto“convert”byanymeansthatcametohand)providestheoccasionforaleadingquestion:

HowcanaPrincebeesteemedtofollowtheFoot-stepsofChrist,whomakessuchprofligateWretchesastheDragoonshisApostles,fortheConversionofhisSubjects?ThatPretenceoftheLoveofSovereignstowardtheirSubjects,letitbeneversospecious,heoughtnotunderthatcolourendeavourtosubvertoraltertheMethodofpropagatingtheChristianDoctrine,accordingtothetrueGeniusoftheChristianReligion.(105)

Nolesscontrarytothis“trueGenius”isthestretchingof“thePowerofSovereignstosuchapitch,astomakethemtheabsoluteJudgesoftheChristianReligion…and to forceupon theirSubjects a certainReligion,under severePenalties,


oroblige themeither toprofessordenycertainPointsofDoctrine,whicharecontrovertedamongstChristians”(103).

Foralltheirtraditionalloyaltytothemonarch,theHuguenotsofFrancewerenowvictimsofforcedexpulsion.“WhatPrince”,Pufendorfasksrhetorically,“canbesounreasonable,astoexpectthathisSubjectsshouldSacrificetheirSoulstotheDevil forhis sake” (119).Theanswer follows: “ThatPrince thereforewhodoestroubletohisfaithfulSubjectsfornootherreason,butbecausetheycannotconformtohisOpinion(especiallyiftheycanmaintaintheirsoutoftheHolyScripture)commitsanActofInjustice;Nay,IcannotseehowhecanwithJusticeforcethemoutofhisTerritories”(119).Forcedexpulsionof“anin-bornNaturalSubject”istermed“thegreatestInjusticeintheWorld”(120).Thehyperbolerestsondualground.Notonlyisdivinejusticeviolated,butsotooarethecivillaws:

A much greater Obligation lies upon Sovereigns to tolerate Dissenters,if they, when they first submitted to the Government, had their Liberty ofConsciencegrantedthembyContract;orhaveobtain’ditafterwardsbycertainCapitulations,anyfollowingStatutes,orbythefundamentalLawsoftheLand.(108)

Allsuchpositivelaws,Pufendorfadds,oughttobe“sacred”totheprince,tobeobservedbyhimwithnolesscarethanhedemandsfromanobedientcitizen.TheHuguenotswerepreciselythebeneficiariesofsuchacontract:theEdictofNantesthathadsurvivedvariousrescissions–until1685.

AfinalpointaboutDe habitu.DedicatedtoPrince-ElectorFriedrich-WilhelmasthepresumptiveleadingdefenderofEuropeanProtestantisminthefaceofanadvancingFranco-Catholicenemy,Pufendorfcouldnotdenyasubstantialroleforthesovereignregardingreligion–andthisdespitehisradical“separationist”thesisontherelationofstateandchurch.InbecomingaChristian,thesovereignbears“certainObligations,whichowetheiroff-springtotheunionofthatDuty,whichisincumbenttoeveryChristian,withthatoftheRoyalOffice”(94).Theprincipalobligationistobe“DefendersoftheChurch”,anobligationexercisedinmatterssuchasdeterminingwhichwrongsarejusticiableundercivillaws,andwhichpasstothejurisdictionofecclesiasticalcourts.Policingtheboundarylinebecomescritical ifever thesovereignuses force(inthemannerofLouisXIV’sdragooning) toachieve religiousends.Thesovereignmaynotenforce religion.Yetuseofforcetoprotectpublictranquillity–andtoprotectthoseofthe“true”religion–isjustified.

HowdoesPufendorfcutthisknotforthebenefitofFriedrich-Wilhelm?OnemoveistoenvisageabasicformofChristianfaithknownthroughnaturalreason,anasyetundenominated“NaturalReligion”towhichallcanadhere,andindefenceofwhichthesovereigncandeployworldlypower,includingbanishment:

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Neither can it be called in question, but that Christian Sovereigns have aRighttoinflictCivilPunishmentsuponsuchasrevilethewholeSystemoftheChristianReligion,andridiculetheMysteriesoftheChristianFaith,atleast,theymayBanishthemtheCountry.(103)

WearethustodistinguishbetweenLouisexpellingHuguenots(anactionbackedbysheerviolence)and“ChristianSovereigns”banishingthosewhohaveengagedin “Idolatry, Blasphemy, Profanation of the Sabbath” (103). Small wonder, asPufendorfthenwarns,that“neverthelessgreatcareistobetaken”insuchactionsagainstthosewhothus“strikeattheveryFoundationofCivilSocieties”.

At stake is peaceful coexistence in multi-confessional settings. Facing thefact of Christian division, Pufendorf contemplates a desire for religious unity.Cautiously,heenvisagesanon-controversial“minimalist”creed.Hetakesstepsto de-dramatise the religious question, suggesting that princes confronted bydiversityofconfessionsshouldcooltheirfears:

[I]tisnotabsolutelynecessarytomaintainthePublickTranquillity,thatalltheSubjectsingeneralshouldbeofoneReligion,or,whichisthesameineffect,thedifferencesaboutsomePoints inReligion,consideredbarelyassuch,arenotthetruecausesofDisturbancesinaState.(105)

Rather,what causes real civil disturbance is the “pervertedZeal of some,whomaketheseDifferencestheirTools”.Thus“whatshouldmoveaPrincetodisturbhisgoodSubjectsuponthescoreofDifferencesinOpinion,aslongastheylivequietlyunderhisGovernment?For,supposingtheirOpiniontobeerroneous,itisnotathis,buttheirownPeril,andtheyalonemustbeanswerableforit”(106).

AlikeappealforsomeprincelyindifferencetoreligiousdifferencehadbeenmadeearlierinDe habitu,totheeffectthatthestateneedconcernitselfonlywiththe“outward”conductofcitizens.Ifanyone“shouldattempttodenypublicklytheExistenceofaGod”orto“setuppluralityofGods”,thecivilsovereignmustsanction them. Yet “if these [actions] are kept within the compass of PeoplesThoughts,withoutbreakingout intopublickoroutwardActions,theyarenotpunishableby theLaw”(20).Thus,whileuniformityof religioncouldremaindesirable,“SovereignsneednotbesoveryanxiousonthisAccount,becausetheseDifferencesdonotOverturnreligionitself…NeithercanSovereignsbeanygreatLoosers by theBargain, if their Subjects differ in someCeremonies” (20–21).UnderthiscalmingshieldPufendorfplacesnotonlyatheismandpolytheism,butalso idolatry,blaspheminganddevil-worship,as longas these remainharmlessprivateacts.

Yet the very fact that the civil sovereignmustprotect thepublicpeacehasfurnishedcertainpersonswitha“speciousPretence”,namelytoclaimthatreligious


conformitymaybe justifiably enforced so as “to extirpate theseDifferences inReligion”byanymeans,“tho’neversoviolent”:

Theyalledge,thatasmuchmorepreciousourSoulsarebeforeourBodies,themoreSovereignsareobligedtobewatchfuloverthem;and,thatthetrueLovewhichaSovereignbearstohisSubjects,canneverbemoreconspicuous,thanwhenhetakeseffectualcareoftheirSalvation.(104–5)

Ifcertainprinceshaveaccepted“theseplausibleArguments”,itwasbecausetheyhave been “prevailed upon to assist with their Authority the cruel Designs ofPriests”. If this Pufendorfian statist and therefore secularising account affordsanalibiforaterritorialprinceasdangeroustoProtestantEuropeasLouisXIVappearedtobein1685,itlayinhisroyalofficehavingfallenintothehandsofevilclericalcounsellors

ThefinalsectionofDe habituexplainsthatthe“certainProverbamongtheGermans,viz.He that Commands the Country, Commands Religion…cannotbeappliedtothePrincesoftheRoman Catholick Religion,whocannotlayanyClaimtoit,itbeingevidentthatthePopishClergydonotallowanysuchthingtothesePrinces”(120).Bycontrast,whenthe“ProtestantEstatesofGermany”citedtheprincipleofcuius regio eius religio,theydidsoforaquitedifferent,praiseworthyandnon-Frenchreason:

That they denied the Emperor to have any Power of intermeddling in theAffairsoftheirownDominions,not,thatonlytheyclaim’ditasbelongingtotheRightsofSovereigntytoimposeanyReligion,tho’neversofalse,upontheirSubjects.(120)

WemustimagineFriedrich-Wilhelm–aCalvinistterritorialprinceconfrontingtheresistanceofnobleestatesthatwerepredominantlyLutheran–readingthishappily.

The strategic issue of Protestant defence continued to focus Pufendorf ’sattentionbeyondtheimmediateresponseinDe habitutotherevocationoftheEdictofNantes.Publishedin1695,oneyearafterhisdeath,Jus feciale divinum sive de consensu et dissensu protestantium exercitatio posthuma(The Divine Feudal Law; or, Covenants With Mankind, Represented Together With the Means for the Uniting of Protestants)proposedgroundsforCalvinistsandLutheranstosetasidetheirhistoryofmutualantipathysoastoprotectacommonProtestantinterestagainst theuneliminatedCatholic threat.Catholics remainedbeyond the civilpale,beingjudgedincapableofloyalobediencetothecivilsovereignandthereforeincapableofpeacefulcoexistence.InJus feciale,oncemoreagainstthehistoricalbackdropofconfessionalconflict,Pufendorfadvocatedthesupremecivilnormof“PublickPeace”:

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TheLutheranPrincesurged,thatalthoughitwasnottobedeniedbutthese[Reformed]MendissentedfromtheminsomeThings,yettheyshouldnotbeexcludedfromthePublickPeace,especiallysincetheremightbesomeHopethattheymightforsaketheirErrors,andreturntotheirformerCommunion.9

ButencouragedbythePapists,theLutheransproceededtooppresstheCalvinists,who formed themselves intofighting leagues such that this “gaveMatter forahorrid Civil War”. Only the Osnabrück treaty afforded a measure of peace.YetPufendorfremainedconcernedwiththecivilorderconfrontedbyreligiousdifferences to the end. Thus, in Jus feciale, to better ensure the well-being ofthe state, he accords civil standing only to those who have “no Principles ofReligion,whicharecontrarytothePeaceandSafetyoftheState,norsuchasareaptandtendingintheirownNaturetocreateTroublesandCommotionsintheCommonwealth”.10

Pufendorf ’s Pre-1685 Perspective on France

Viewing post-1685 Catholic France through the alienated German Protestanteyesof thePufendorfofDe habitu,mightoffer theadvantageofwhatBertoltBrechtwouldterma“distancingeffect”.Butitalsohasadisadvantage: itrisksflattering the Anglophone disposition – a residual Protestant empathy withoppressed Huguenots – to reduce the political-legal history of pre-RevolutionFrancetothebrutalismofanabsolutistLouisXIV.

In1682–85,however, thiswasnot at all thepicturepaintedbyPufendorfinhisroleasapoliticalhistorian.HisEinleitungorIntroduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of EuropetreatsthereligiouscivilwarsthathadtornFrance,recognisinghowunderFrançoisII“theFrenchDivisionsbegantobreakoutwithFuryintheirownBowels,whichcontinuednear40Years”.11TheHuguenots,herecords,“labouredthenunderaseverePersecution,andwantedaHead,underwhoseConducttheymightobtainthefreeExerciseoftheirReligion”(187).PrincipaleventsoftheFrenchwarsofreligionarecited:the1561Colloque

9 Samuel Pufendorf, Jus feciale divinum sive de consensu et dissensu protestantium exercitatio posthuma /The Divine Feudal Law: Or, Covenants with Mankind, Represented Together with the Means for the Uniting of Protestants, trans. T. Dorrington (London,1703),p.198.

10 Pufendorf,Jus feciale divinum /The Divine Feudal Law,p.15.11 SamuelPufendorf,Einleitung zu der Historie der vornehmesten Reiche und Staaten so

itziger Zeit in Europa sich befinden/An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, trans. J. Crull, 8th edn (London, 1719), p. 185. In this section,furtherreferencestothisworkofPufendorfgivepagenumbersonly.


dePoissy,theEdictofJanuary1562,theGuisemassacreofHuguenotsatVassyas“thefirstBloodshedinthiscivilWar”(188),andtheStBartholomew’sDayMassacre.

Pufendorf ’s characterisation of the politiques is interesting as a politicalreflectiononthequestionofreligion:from1573“athirdFactionaroseinFrance,whichwascall’d,That of the Politicians;theypretended,withouthavinganyregardto theReligiousDifferences, to seek thePublicWelfare” and“were afterwardsvery instrumental in helping Henri IV to the Crown” (190). This is scarcelyProtestantpropagandadirectedagainstFrance.Indeed,wenotethecommentonthe“famousEdictofNantes,asitiscalled,byvirtueofwhich[theHuguenots]havehithertoenjoyedthefreeExerciseofReligion”(198).“Hitherto”mustmeanuntil1682–85.ConfirmationfollowswithadescriptionoftheHuguenots’thencontemporarysituationunderLouisXIV:“Andtho’theKinghithertodoesnotforcetheirConsciences,yethedrawsoffagreatmanyfromthatParty,byhopesofhisRoyalFavoursandPreferments”(214).HerePufendorfisnotyetthefuturepartisanProtestantofDe habitu.Indeed,hewritesthatunderLouisXIIIitwastheHuguenotswho “grew stiffer andmore violent” (199), leaving the taskof“extirpatingtheintestineEvilsofFrance”tothestatecraftofRichelieu:

HelaidthisdownasaFundamentalPrinciple,thatheshouldtakefromtheHuguenots the Power of doing any Mischief, considering that such as weredissatisfiedatanytime,orwereofaTurbulentSpirittookalwaysrefuge,andwereafflictedbythem.(200)

Pufendorf ’sown“princelyabsolutist”tendencyallowshimtorecognisethat,inFrance,thankstoRichelieu,thenobles“now…darenotutteraWordagainsttheKing”(213).Frenchstrengthisrecognisedbutnotcondemned:“itiseasilyperceiv’dthatthereisnotanyStateinChristendomwhichFrancedoesnotequal,ifnotexceed,inPower”(214).

In the Preface to his History, Pufendorf advised that “What I have relatedconcerningtheInterestofeachState,istobeconsider’dasrelatingchieflytotheTimewhenIcompos’dthisWork”(np).Perhapsthisdisclaimerprovidessomedispensationforhispre-1685perspectiveonaFrancewhoseexerciseofhegemonicpower,asthesuper-stateoftheWestphaliansettlement,heappearsfullytohaveaccepted.Yet compared to thevirulent anti-FrenchpolemicofDe habitu, thisearlieraccountofFranceasthedominantpowerisbenign,evenshockinglyso.ThattherewasaswingfrompositivetonegativeperspectivesonFrenchhegemonyaftertherevocationoftheEdictofNantesisbeyondquestion.

De habituexemplifiesthepanic-polemicpublicationsthatsweptthroughtheProtestantmediaafter1685.Ratherthanretellingthatfamiliarstory,however,canweinsteadconstructthepoliticalrationalityofPufendorf ’spreviouslypositive

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perspectiveonFrance,inrelationtoaFrenchcapacityforhegemonicinterventionatWestphalia?Asnoted,hecreditsRichelieuwith“extirpatingtheintestineEvilsofFrance”,thatis,withconfrontingthehorrorsofreligiouscivilwar,establishingstable government and providing a unifying measure of civil peace. These areinfactcrucialnormsforPufendorf ’sown1670sre-thinkingofthenaturallawtradition.

InHermannWeber’soncerevisionistbutnowacceptableaccount,Richelieugainedrecognitionasakeypeace-makingfigureinseventeenth-centuryEurope.12ForWeber,theCardinal’senduringgoalwastosecure“unebonnepaixentoutela Chréstienté”, that is, a “framework … and yardstick for all practical peacepolicies”asformulatedinthegeneraldirectivefortheWestphaliannegotiations.13Implementationofsuchpoliciesascrediblerulesofsettlementwouldreston“agroupofforceswithFranceat itscentre[that]wouldserveasacounterweightto Habsburg predominance”.14 That the protective framework for an “orderedpeace”underFrenchhegemonyhad tobepolitical and legal in character, notconfessional,wouldhaveprovedmostamenabletothePufendorfofDe jure.

It is true that in Weber’s assessment Richelieu’s peace policy of the 1620s“fittedperfectly intoa theocentricworld-viewandwas inaccordwith thewillof God for order”. An “ultimate re-establishment of the confessional unity ofChristendom”wasdeferred,butnotabandoned.15ForRichelieu,“homo politicusneverexcludedhomo religiosus”,suchthat“inhistheologicallyorientedviewofthetemporalworld’sdutytocreateorder,thedimensionsofpeaceextendedwellbeyond the merely political”.16 In Pufendorf ’s normative schema, too, divinesovereigntywasindeedagiven.

12 While Hermann Weber made the case for granting a serious measure ofrespectabilitytoRichelieu’simaginativediplomacyforpeaceinEurope,thereisnowlessneed towhitewash theCardinal asprecursorof a “balanceofpowers” solution for theEuropeanstatessystem.ForacurrentassessmentofRichelieuasagentofapax honesta,seeChristophKampmann’s“Peaceimpossible?TheHolyRomanEmpireandtheEuropeanstatesystemintheseventeenthcentury”(inthepresentvolume),withspecificreferencetothe1636Frenchrefusal,despiteduress,tonegotiatea“dishonourable”peacewithSpain.Restrictiveconditionsappliedtopeace,astowar.

13 Hermann Weber, “‘Une bonne paix’. Richelieu’s foreign policy and the peaceof Christendom”, in Joseph Bergin and Laurence Brockliss (eds), Richelieu and his Age (Oxford, 1992), pp. 46–7. As set out in Richelieu’s Instructions pour Messieurs les Ambassadeurs de France, envoyéez à Cologne pour le Traité de Paix générale.

14 Weber,“‘Unebonnepaix’.Richelieu’sforeignpolicyandthepeaceofChristendom”,p.48.




Inconcretepoliticalterms,fashioningacommonfrontforpeaceagainstSpainentailedFrenchad hoc allianceswithProtestantpowersincludingEngland,SwedenandtheNetherlands,andwithcertainProtestantStatesoftheGermanEmpire,notleastBrandenburg.Strategicnon-confessional“coalitions”thusunderpinnedthis“firstpracticalattemptatapeacefulsolutionforthewholeofEurope”.17Peacewasnotmadecontingentonfirstsettlingtheintractableissueofreligioustruth.

Moreover,since“itwasofdecisiveimportancethatthestateofpeaceshouldlast”,18collectiveactionforasecurepeacedidnotendwithatreatyendingthewar.ItwastobeextendedintoanewarrangementwherebyFranceashegemonwouldguaranteefuturecollectivesecurityinChristianEurope:

The“paixsûre”thushadatriplebasis:itrequiredtheparticipationofallthestates of Christendom in setting up the treaty; it could rely on a guaranteebasedoninternationallawandgivenbyallthecontendingparties;itpreservedtheoptionofmilitaryinterventionforFrance.Inthismannerlastingpeacewastobeestablished:peaceforthewholeofChristendom.Becausetheoptionofmilitaryinterventionwaspreserved,theFrenchkingmaintainedhisdominantroleasthechiefprotectorofChristendom–asitwasunambiguouslyformulatedinthepreambletothegeneraldirective.19

Such was the theory. In the event, the “whole of Christendom” did not signup,nordidthetwocollectivesecurity“leagues”orblocs(GermanandItalian)envisagedbyRichelieucomeintobeing.Instead,despiteintentions,Westphaliasetthesceneforterritorialstateindependence.

Pufendorf ’sownoverridingcommitmenttocivilpeacecouldthereforefinditscounterpartinessentialsofRichelieu’speacepolicy:anexchangeofobedienceforprotectionbyahegemonicpower,andaframeworkforapolitically,andlegally,grounded “ordered peace”, enforceable by that power through thedeliberativedecision-makingofWestphalia.

Yetgiven thepolitical complexitiesof theGermanEmpire, thedispositionof a radically anti-Catholic territorial statist with absolutist leanings such asPufendorfwasnever going tobe simple. IfWestphaliawas aFrench-brokeredpactwhosepoliticalorderingofcivilpeaceheendorsed,itnonethelessenabledforeigninterventionsintoGermanaffairs,assignalledinhis1667De statu imperii



19 Weber,“‘Unebonnepaix’.Richelieu’sforeignpolicyandthepeaceofChristendom”,pp.60–61.

Hegemon History 227

Germanici.20 Here Pufendorf identified this risk to German states’ territorialintegritywiththeambivalentconsequencesoftheircapacitytoenterintopactswithforeignpowers:

ThePrincesofGermany enter intoLeagues,notonlywithoneanother,butwithForeignPrincestoo,andthemoresecurely,becausetheyhavereservedtothemselvesaLibertytodosointheTreatyofWestphalia,whichnotonlydividesthePrincesofGermanyintoFactions,butgivesthoseStrangersanOpportunitytomouldGermanytotheirownparticularInterestandWills.21

Thispatriotic-xenophobicstance,however,foundnoechoinPufendorf ’shistoryoftheFrenchstate.

ApositivePufendorfianperspectiveonpre-1685FrenchhegemonycouldbefurtherconstructedthroughhischaracterisationofthepolitiquesorhisreferencestotheColloquedePoissyandtheEdictofJanuary.ItwouldbeamatterofrecordingthepolitiqueroleofGallicanCatholicmoderatesintheParlementdeParis,orthepeace-brokinginitiativesofCharlesIX’sChancellor,Micheldel’Hospital,whointheencroachingshadowofreligiouswarputthecaseforcivilpeace.Speakingon 26 August 1561 to the States-General assembled at St-Germain-en-Laye,L’Hospitalfirstrecognisedasfactthenew“diversityofreligions”.Regrettingthestrife now flowing from this Christian division, he then indicated his wish toaddress“notthecontroversiesofreligion…butonlywhatpertainstopolice,inordertocontainthepeopleinrestandtranquillity”.Finally,L’Hospitalproposedacivillogicthatmightgovernreligiouspluralitypeacefully:

The King does not want you to engage in dispute over which [religious]opinionisthebest;forhereitisnotaquestionofestablishingthefaith,butofregulatingthestate.ItispossibletobeacitizenwithoutbeingaChristian.Eventheexcommunicatedoesnotceasetobeacitizen.Wecanliveinpeacewiththosewhoholdtodifferentopinions.22

20 De statu imperii Germanici (The Present State of Germany)waspublishedin1667underthepseudonymofSeverinusdeMonzambano,theauthorappearingintheguiseof an Italianobserverof theGermanEmpire as anarrayofmultiple competingmini-sovereigntiesmarkedbyconfessionaldisunity.Giventhepoliticalweaknessesconsequentuponthislackofunifiedsovereignty,PufendorfcontentiouslyassessedtheEmpiretobean“irregular”or“monstrous”state.

21 SamuelPufendorf[SeverinodeManzambano],De statu imperii Germanici /The Present State of Germany,trans.E.Bohun(London,1696),p.182.

22 MicheldeL’Hospital,Discours politiques, 1560–1568(Clermont-Ferrand,2001),p.62.


Thestrikingpreceptthat“eventheexcommunicatedoesnotceasetobeacitizen”required the listeners to conceive a communityof citizenship in the state as aneutral space of political governance, apart from the contested confessionaldomain.ThefollowingmonthatPoissy, facingfortyCatholicclerics includingtheCardinalofLorraineandDiegoLainez,Generalof the Jesuits, and twelveCalvinistsincludingtheGenevanThéodoredeBèze,L’Hospitaladoptedagainhispacificatorystance:“Fortherealm,peaceismoreimportantthandogma”(Pour le royaume, la paix est plus importante que le dogme).ItcouldhavebeenSamuelPufendorfspeaking,acenturylater.

Beyond Hegemony?

By 1687, Pufendorf ’s previous perspective on the rise of French power hadsharply altered. Now the Protestant commentator in Brandenburg saw not apositiverelationofforcebutthesectarianthreatofaFranco-Catholic“universalmonarchy”.WiththisperceivedmutationinthenatureofFrenchpowercameaconceptualquestion:Atwhatpoint,theoreticallyspeaking,doesanascendinghegemoncrossthethresholdfrombeingaWestphalianguarantorofageneralpeaceinChristendomtobecomesomethingelse,apredatorymonarchia universalisor,perhaps,awould-be“imperial”power?Hencemyopeningquestions:Doesthismutationsignifyamoreintenseexerciseofhegemony,adifferenceofdegree?Ordoesitsignifyadifferenceofkind,adifferentmodeofdominationexercisedbyagreaterpoweroverlesserstates?

Reflectiononaseventeenth-centurystate’smutationfromprotectivehegemonto predatory universal monarchy is in part motivated by our own currentexperience.Likeothershere,IhavelivedunderthemilitaryprotectorateoftheUnitedStates,firstinLondonandlaterinAustralia.TheUnitedStateswasthehegemonicpower thathadprotectedEurope against totalitarian threats–firsttheNazisandthenthepost-warSoviet–andhadestablishedageneral“orderedpeace” by institutional means that included the United Nations, the MarshallPlanandNato.Morerecently,theUnitedStateshasseemedtomanyobserverstohavebecomesomethingelse:anomnipresentpowerthatposesageneralthreatto peace by belligerent intervention everywhere. Hence the wholesale talk of“empire”,“empire-lite”,“liberal imperialism”andsoon.Howshouldthis shiftbecharacterised?HasanAmericanhegemonybecomeamoretotaldomination,perhapsacurrent“unipolar”versionof“universalmonarchy”thatemployswar-making to improve the world in a domination reaching beyond the limits ofprotectivehegemony?

Butcomparaison ne fait pas raison,particularlyacrosscenturiesduringwhichcircumstanceshavegreatlychanged.Whilerecognisingthatinternationallawas

Hegemon History 229

such still has no enforcement mechanism against a hegemonic state, it wouldbeanachronistic ifnotparanoiac toseek in today’sgeopolitical scene forexactequivalents to the modes of power exercised by seventeenth-century France.Better,then,returntothehistoryofFrenchhegemonyandwhat,forPufendorf,wereitsdivergentprojectionsofpower.

In 1629 La Rochelle fell. With the Edict of Alès ending six years of war,Richelieu “demilitarised” the Huguenot party, voiding political-territorialentitlements granted to the latter under theEdict ofNantes.On the ground,inter-confessional tensions persisted: each sect disrupted the other’s religiousobservances,acontinuingbattleofCalvinistpsalmsandCatholicchurchbells.There was mounting governmental action against “heretics”. In 1665, theAssemblée du clergé submitted a consolidated list of demands for “anti-heretic”actiontoLouisXIV,whosepersonalrulehadcommencedonlyfouryearsearlier.In1676,Kingandclergy tookadirectlymaterial approach to theproblemofreligious disunity: a Caisse des conversions would purchase the conversion of aCalvinistatagoingrateofsixlivres tournoisperturn.Paidapostasyprovednotunsuccessfulatleastamongthepoor.Bytheearly1680s,withtheAssemblée du clergéintensifyingthedemandforCatholicconformity,LouismovedfromsweetcommercetocoarsecoercionasthebettermeanstoextirpatetheCalvinistcultinFrance.Theferocityofthedragonnades(recordedinDe habitu)becamethesavageemblemofthisshift.

AtFontainebleau inOctober1685 theorder revoking theEdictofNantesreceived the royal signature, its terms to go into effect immediately. Despitetheapparent“toleration”grantedinthetwelfthandfinalarticleoftheEdictofFontainebleau,Huguenotabjurationsfollowedanddiasporaensued.23TheEdictandtheKing, its signatory,werecelebratedbythegreatandthegood,amongthemRacine,LaFontaine,FénelonandMadamedeSévigné.InhisJanuary1686funeralorationforLeTellier,BishopBossuetwaxedhyperbolicinpraiseofthemonarch:“Vousavezaffermi la foi,vousavezexterminé leshérétiques:c’est ledigneouvragedevotrerègne,c’enestleproprecaractère.Parvousl’hérésien’estplus:Dieuseulapufairecettemerveille”.24 Inthe intégristewordsofLouvois,

23 ThefirstclauseofArticle12oftheEdictofFontainebleaureadsasfollows:PourrontausurpluslesditsdelaR.P.R.[ReligionPrétendueRéformée],enattendant

qu’ilplaiseàDieude leséclairercommelesautres,dedemeurerdans lesvilleset lieuxdenotreroyaume,paysetterresdenotreobéissance,ycontinuerleurcommerceetjouirde leurs biens sans pouvoir être troublés ni empêchés sous prétexte de ladite R.P.R. àcondition,commeilestdit,denepointfaired’exercicesnides’assemblersousprétextedeprièresoudecultedeladitereligiondequelquenaturequ’ilsoit,souslespeinesci-dessusdeconfiscationdecorpsetdebiens.

InthetheviewoftheHuguenots,theclauseremainedanemptyformality.24 Bossuet,Jacques-Bénigne,Oraisons funèbres de Bossuet(Paris,1837),p.267.


Minister of State and of the dragonnades: “Tout est catholique”. By 1687,Pufendorf ’s response to such claims of all-encompassing but coerced Catholicfaithwouldfindfull-throatedexpressioninthecombativepolemicofDe habitu.

NoteveryvoiceinFranceremainedsoenrapturedbythegreateventof1685.Threedecadeslater,theDucdeSaint-SimonreflectedontherevocationoftheEdictofNanteswithadisenchantedwordoncircumstanceswhere“LeRoiétaitdevenudévot,etdévotdansladernièreignorance”.25Thememorialistdrawsthepictureof aLouisXIVblinded,byflattery andbyhisown religiouspride, toChrist’swayofconvertinghereticsbyloveandteaching:

Ontouchaundévotdeladouceurdefaireaudépensd’autruiunepénitencefacile,qu’onluipersuadasûrepourl’autremonde.Onsaisitl’orgueild’unroien luimontrantuneactionquipassait lepouvoirde tous sesprédécesseurs.…Onledétermina,luiquisepiquaitsiprincipalementdegouvernerparlui-même,d’unchef-d’oeuvretoutàlafoisdereligionetdepolitique.26

InaprecisereversaloftheseparationthatPufendorfendorsed,withtheEdictofFontainebleauthepoliticalwas thusrejoinedto thereligious. InSaint-Simon’sjudgment, thiswas to the sharpdetrimentof the fortunesof theFrench stateand its people. As for Louis XIV, “[il] s’applaudissait de sa puissance et de sapiété.Ilsecroyaitautempsdelaprédicationdesapôtres,etils’enattribuaittoutl’honneur”.27Perhapsitishere,wherearuleriscapturedbymessianicvaluesandsalvificvoicesappealingtohisheightenedsenseofreligiouscalling,thatFrenchpoliticalcalculationfavouringaEuropeanpeacewithhonourfellvictimtothecounterimperativeofauniversalreligioustruth.Atthisthreshold,withSamuelPufendorfascontemporarywitness,wecouldmarkoffamorepredatoryformofdomination,withitsresurgentuniversalistaspiration,fromwhathadbeenapoliticalexerciseofprotectivehegemonicforce.

25 DucdeSaint-Simon,Mémoires I(Paris,1990),p.377.26 Saint-Simon,Mémoires I,pp.378–9.27 Saint-Simon,Mémoires I,pp.381–2.

Chapter13ColonialDesigninEuropean

InternationalLawoftheSeventeenthCentury1

AndreaWeindl

Introduction

Questioning the part played by non-European territories and peoples in theformation of international law of the seventeenth century, we may trace twodifferentaspects.First,wewillhave toaskwhichrole theoreticaldiscussion inEuropeprovidedfornon-Europeanpoliticalunitswithininternationallaw.Thisappearstobeparticularlyworthpursuingwithrespecttotheseventeenthcenturyinviewofthevividdiscussionabouttheissueinthecenturybefore.Second,wemay trace the political functionalising of non-European territories over whichEuropean states thought themselves to possess authority in interstate treatieswithinEurope.

Inthefollowing,Ishalloutlinethemainaspectsoftheissue.First,Igiveashort survey of the recognition of non-European political units as subjects ofEuropeaninternationallawthatshowstheextenttowhichEuropeanauthoritiesconcluded treaties with Non-European political leaders. Then I consider thetheoretical discussion about the position of non-European peoples withinEuropeaninternationallaw.Finally,Ienlargeuponthedevelopmentthatbroughtthe handling of non-European territories within the interstate policy insideEurope.

Non-European Political Units as Subjects of International Law

AlthougheverynowandthenEuropeansconcludedtreatieswithpoliticalleadersin areas of the world discovered up to the seventeenth century, we may notedifferentpositionsfordifferentareaswithinEuropeaninternationallawaccordingtothedegreeofcolonialpenetration.

1 ForhelpintranslatingtheGermantextintoEnglish,IamgratefultoMrMartinSteininger.Iamofcoursefullyresponsibleforanyerrors.


American societies were incorporated into the collective of Spanish orPortuguesesubjects.Theytherebylosttheirstatusassubjectsofinternationallawwith their own scope. Although the respective colonial administrations in thecourseofprotectivelegislationfortheIndiansrestoredsomepersonalrights,thecolonialadministrationsexercisedallsovereignrightsofindigenoussocieties.ThiswasatleastaclaimoftheIberianpowersdirectedagainsttheexpansiveeffortsofotherEuropeanstates,whichwassurelytrueintheSpanishAmericanEmpire’scentresofpowerinMexicoandPeru.Asamatteroffact,atthebordersoftheAmerican Empire, the relationship between Europeans and American Indianswere arranged according to the principles of interstate relations well until theeraof independence.Forexample, in the southof their empire, theSpaniardsfoughtforcenturiesagainsttheMapucheandconcludedtrucesandpeaces.2IntheirquarrelsoverBrazilianterritories,PortugueseandDutchdependedonthesupportofIndianallies,andmainlythePortugueseunderlinedtheirpretensionswith the argument of stable alliances with local peoples. Land seizures by theBritish, Dutch and French had to take place along with treaties about landownership,settlingrightsandpoliticalalliances,preciselybecausetheyhadtobeenforcedagainstSpanishclaims.Ifnecessary,EuropeanrivalsofSpainalsousedargumentsbasedon international law.Thus, inhis attackonSpanishoverseasterritory,Cromwell used (amongother things) the argument that the SpanishdidnotrespecttherightsoftheIndians.Forhispart,CromwellaimedatakindofrightofrepresentationofIndianinterestsbycombiningthisargumentwiththatoftheinfringementofBritishtradinginterestsinAmerica.3ThisshowsthatCromwelldidnottaketherecognitionofAmericanpoliticalunitsassubjectsofinternationallawseriously.

Completely different conditions existed in the European relationship toAfricanandAsianterritories.Inthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury,theefforts

2 Intheyear1641,theMapucheobtainedacceptanceasanindependentnationintheTreatyofQuillin,which remainedvaliduntil the independenceofChile.Between1861and1883,theMapuchestatewasoverthrownbytheindependentstateofChile.SeeHugoRosatiAguerre,“Elimperioespañolysusfronteras:MapuchesyChichimecasenlasegundamitaddelsigloXVI”,Historia29(1995–96):391–404.ArmandodeRamón,Breve historia de Chile. Desde la invasion incaica hasta nuestros días (1500–2000)(BuenosAires,2001).

3 Cromwell justified his attack on Spanish-American territories in the followingwords:

…sinceGodhathmadeofoneblood,allNationsofmen,fortodwellonallthefaceoftheEarth,andhathdeterminedthetimesbeforeappointed,andtheboundsoftheirhabitation;Andcertainly,atonetimeoranother,bysomehandorother,GodwillhaveanaccomptoftheInnocentBloodofsomanyMillionsofIndians,sobarbarouslyButcheredbytheSpaniards,andoftheWrongandInjusticethathathbeendoneuntothem(QuotedinBerndKlesmann,Bellum Solemne(Mainz,2007),p.155).

Colonial Design in European International Law of the Seventeenth Century 233

todevelopoverseastradeofmostwestEuropeancountrieswereconnectedwiththeestablishmentoftradingpostsonthecoastofWestAfrica.InAfricatherewerenolandseizuresinthesenseofcolonialoccupation.TheEuropeansratherfoundedtradingposts,whichtheyprovided,ifallowed,withforts.Bothforthefoundationandforthemaintenanceorpossibledefenceoftheforts,theydependedonthesupport of the Africans, with whose political leaders they concluded treaties.EuropeanstriedtosecuretheloyaltyoftheirAfricanpartnersbyregulardonations,whichmaysurelybeseenastributepayments.AfricanleadersusedtheirallianceswiththeEuropeanswithinthelocalpoliticalsystem.WedonotknowexactlyhowfarAfricansandEuropeanswereabletounderstandeachothers’mechanismsofauthorityandrepresentation,buttherearehintsthatbothsideswereawareofthe“international”characteroftheirrelationship.ThusAfricanprincesoccasionallytravelledtoEuropeancourtsinordertostrengthentheirallianceswithaparticularmonarch.Further,casesareknowninwhichAfricanswhohadbeensoldasslavesintheCaribbeanhadtobeescortedbacktoAfricabecausetheyweremembersofnoblefamiliesandcouldnottobeenslaved.4

We can also detect the recognition of African political units as subjects ofinternationallawinthepracticeanddiscussionofslavetrade.JuandeSolórzanoy Pereyra, a lawyer in the Spanish Indian council, declared that blacks weresold into slavery or volunteered or were taken as captives of just wars amongthemselves, sothat itwas legal todrawontheirservices inSpainorAmerica.5ThislineofargumentincludedtheapprovalofAfricancommunitiesassubjectsofinternationallawand,inprinciple,allEuropeanstatesagreedonthisattitudeuntiltheproscriptionoftheslavetradeinthenineteenthcentury.

4 See,forexample,ClarenceJ.Munford,The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies 1625–1715 (2vols,Lewiston,1991),vol. I:“Slave trading inAfrica”,pp.174–5;PeterMartin,Schwarze Teufel, edle Mohren(Hamburg,1993),p.86.

5 Inhisownwords:Alocualnocontradicelapráctica,quevemostanasentada,éintroducidadelosesclavos

Negros,quesetraendeGuinéa,CaboVerde,yotrasProvincias,yrios,ypasanportalessinescrupúloenEspaña,yenlasIndias.Porqueenestosvamosconbuenafé,dequeellossevendenporsuvoluntad,ótienenjustasguerrasentresí,enquesecautivanunosáotros,yáestoscautivoslosvendendespuesálosPortugueses,quenoslostraen,queellosllamanPombeyrosóTangomangos,comolodicenNavarro,Molina,Revelo,Mercado,yotrosAutores;concluyendofinalmente,quetodavíatienenporhartopeligrosa,escrupulosa,ycenagosaestacontratación,porlosfraudes,queenelladeordinariosesuelencometer,ycometen,peroéstasnolestocaálosparticularesaveriguarlas(JuandeSolorzanoyPereyra,Política Indiana(Madrid,1930[1648]),vol.1,p.138).

AsimilarargumentismadebyanunknownspeakeroftheIndianCouncil,whoin1685outlinedthelegalquestionsinconnectionwithslavery.SeeGeorgesScelle,La Traite negrière aux Indes de Castille. Contrats et Traités d’assiento (2 vols, Paris, 1906), vol. 1,AppendixDoc.34:“ConsulteduconseildesIndessurlalégitimitédutraficnégrier”.


In Asia, the European naval powers found an international system of“multiplestagedrelationshipsoftributesandvassalsthatresembledinternationalrelationsformedbyfeudalismoftheEuropeanmiddleages”.6Forthepermissionto tradeand tobuild tradingposts in the sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,Europeanshadtofit themselves into that system,so that fromanAsianpointofviewEuropeansenteredintoakindofvassalrelationshiptothembypayingtribute or obtainingunilateral privileges. In territorieswith aminordegree ofpoliticalorganisation,theserelationscouldbeinverted,asshownbytheexampleof the Dutch policy of destruction and resettlement in some of the Moluccaislands.Moreover,thePortuguese,accordingtotheircartazsystem,wereabletobringapartofthemaritimetradeundertributerelationstotheirownbenefit.Nevertheless,ingeneraltheEuropeanshadtoadapttotheconditionsofAsianinternational law. InEuropeandebates about international law, therefore,Asiamainly appeared in the context of granting a trademonopoly in certain areasagainstotherEuropeanrivalsorpostulatingtherighttoconcludetreatieswithlocalleadersinterritoriesclaimedbythePortugueseking.

The European Debate Over the Legal Status of Non-European Dominions

In general, legal titles for land seizures outside Europe were not at the centreofdebatesaboutinternationallawintheseventeenthcentury.EventhoughnotonlyProtestantpowers7challengedtheauthorityofthePopeoverundiscoveredterritories, theclaimtouniversalitybyChristendomorthemissionto instructtheheathenremainedthefoundationforlandseizuresthatweremainlycarriedout in America. In Europe, however, almost nobody questioned the right oftheSpanishandPortuguesekingstoruleoverterritoriesthattheirsubjectshadeffectivelytakenpossessionof.Claimstothepossessionofterritoriesnotactuallyseizedremainedindispute,thatis,scholarsandnavalpowersconsistentlydeniedtherighttosetuptrademonopoliesnotonlyforcertaintradingpostsbutalso

6 JörgFisch,Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht(Stuttgart,1984),p.37(Transl.byA.W.).

7 ThefactthatPortugalandSpainsecuredclaimsassignedbythePopethroughaninterstatetreatysuggeststhediminishingarbitralauthorityoftheVaticanintheprocessof European state building. In another bill of 1506, however, the Pope approved thetreatyofTordesillas.See“VertragvonTordesillas1494VI7,SpanienPortugal”,inHeinzDuchhardt, Martin Peters (ed.), www.ieg-mainz.de/friedensvertraege (viewed 29 Feb.2008).SeeHansJürgenPrien,“LasBulasAlejandrinasde1493”,inBerndSchröter,KarinSchüller (ed.),Tordesillas y sus consecuencias. La política de las grandes potencias europeas respecto a América Latina (1494–1898) (Frankfurt amMain,1995),p.18.FrancealsoquestionedthePope’spowertodisposeoverterritoriesnotyetdiscovered.


for whole continents. In addition, in light of shrinking Spanish political andmilitarypower,overseasterritoriesbecameentangledinEuropeanpolitics,sothatnorthwesternEuropeannationsuseddifferentlinesofargumentdependingupontheirrelationshiptoSpain.

Still,duringthesixteenthcentury,theEnglishcrownhadsentoutexpeditionstoAmericatodiscoverandsettlenewterritories.ThechartersissuedbytheEnglishcrownweregearedinprincipletothelanguageofthepapalbullInter caetera.BasedontheEnglishmonarch’stitleasheadofAnglicanChurch,theexpeditionsweresentwiththecommandtopreachtoallnationsandtocoloniselandsthatwerenotoccupiedbyotherChristianprinces.ApartfromthedisavowalofarbitrationbythePope,therewasthereforenodifferencefromtheIberianattitude.Thereexisted a right (and the duty) to a Christian mission, namely where no otherChristian prince performed this task.8 Somewhat different were the efforts ofsome French Huguenot to found a colony in Brazil that would be safe fromreligiouspersecution.ThattheycouldbedrivenoutveryeasilybythePortuguesemaybeattributedtolackofsupportfromtheirmothercountry.9

Besidestheselandseizures,bywhichFranceandEnglandchallengedtherighttoclaimwholecontinentsunderthetitleofapapaldonation,itwasmainlytheAmerican territories thatwere exposed to the vicissitudesofEuropeanpoliticsfromthebeginningoftheconquest.UntilthepeaceofCateau-Cambrésis(1559),the antagonism between Spain and France was accompanied by fierce attacksonSpanish settlements and trade ships in theAtlantic byFrenchCorsairs. IntheirfightagainstdominationbytheSpanishHabsburgs,theDutchalsoattackedSpanishoverseasterritories,apracticetheywerehappytoextendtoPortugueseterritories in Africa, Asia and America after the union of the Iberian crowns.Politico-philosophicaltreatiseswrittentosupporttheoreticalclaimsaccompaniedthe military conflict, but, depending on the case, they could be diametricallyopposedtoreasonsofstate.

ThusHugoGrotius’streatiseMare liberum,inwhichheadvocatedthefreedomoftheseasasauniversalprinciple(thatis,therightofallmentofreenavigationand trade),mightbe seen as a request,whichdifferent statespursuedatmosthalf-heartedlyinregardtotheirowninterests.Thehistoryofthebook’soriginandcirculationalreadybearseffectivewitnesstothissupposition:In1603,aDutchsquadroncapturedtherichPortuguesecarrackSantaCatarinaintheSingaporeStraitsinreactiontovariousnavalactionsofthePortugueseagainstDutcheffortsto establish trade relations in the Far East. Crew and passengers were set free

8 SeeJamesMuldoon,“Christendom, theAmericas,andWorldOrder”, inHorstPietschmann, Atlantic History. History of the Atlantic System 1580–1830 (Göttingen,2002),pp.73–5.

9 SeeGüntherKahle,Lateinamerika in der Politik der europäischen Mächte1492–1810(Köln,Weimar,Wien,1993),pp.17–19.


andshipandfreightwereauctionedintheNetherlandsatagreatprofit.On9September1604,theCouncilofAdmiraltydecidedthatthecaptureoftheSantaCatarinawaslawfulandthatthereforetheshipandfreightwerea“goodprize”.Notwithstanding, the lawfulness of the capture remained a topic of debate intheNetherlands. Somemembers of theUnitedEast IndianCompany (VOC)resignedfromthecompanybecausetheyobjectedtoitsmilitarisation.TheVOCthencommissionedtheyounglawyerHugoGrotiustocomposealegalopinionconfirming the lawfulness of the prize capture. The Grotius’s expert opinionformulated the principle of the freedom of the seas. Grotius acknowledgedexplicitlythesovereigntyrightsofEastIndianprinces.TheDutchVOCcouldconcludecommercialtreatieswithEastAsianprincesonlyontheassumptionthattheyweresubjectsofinternationallawwithequalrights,whichcouldbeenforcedagainstPortugueseclaims.10

Theexpertopinionwrittenin1604–1605remainedunpublishedforabout300 years. Parts of it, however, were published in 1609 under the title Mare liberum sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia dissertatioshortlyaftertheconclusionofthetwelveyeartrucebetweentheUnitedProvincesandSpain.Appealingtothejus gentium,Grotiusreasonedthatnavigationandtradeshouldbefreeandthatneitheronthegroundsofbeingthefirstdiscoverersnorofpapaldonation,war,seizure,prescriptionorcustomdidthePortuguesehaveanexclusiverighttopossessionoftheEastIndies,ortoregulatenavigationortotradethere.11

Intheyearofthetreatise’spublication,JamesIforbadeitssaleinEngland.ThreeyearslatertheSpanishInquisitionplacedtheworkontheIndex.Grotius’streatisealsoprovokedvariousobjections.TheEnglishmanJohnSeldenadvocatedin1635therightofthestatestoruleovertheirsurroundingwaters.Inconnectionwith the later recognition of possession rights of non-European territories ininnerEuropeantreaties,thisargumentleddefactotoavindicationofoverseasmonopolies, even though Selden did not explicitly claim the lawfulness ofdominionovernon-Europeansocieties.12InarefutationofGrotiusentitledDe justo imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico, the Portuguese writer Seraphim de Freitasderived the right of the Portuguese to restrict the freedom of trade from thediscoveryofthesearoutes,thetreatieswithlocalprincesandthepapalbulls.Inthisrespect,therighttoestablishtradingpostsfollowedfromthedutyofChristianproselytisingandtheabilitytofundthismissionspecifiedandsanctionedbythePope.Interestingly,FreitasdidnotdenytheDutchaProtestantChristianrightto

10 SeeFisch,Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht,p.251.11 SeeJörgP.Hardegen“Einführung”,inSeraphimdeFreitas, Über die rechtmässige

Herrschaft der Portugiesen in Asiened.JörgP.Hardegen(Kiel,1976),pp.18–29.12 SeeJörgFisch,Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht (Stuttgart,1984),

pp.251–2.


proselytiseinprinciple;rather,heconsideredtheDutchmissioninoppositiontothepapalinstruction.13

With respect to entitlements of non-European peoples and states, Freitas’sdistinctionbetweenSpanishandPortugueseentitlementsisstriking.Althoughthe:

Indians[hemeanstheAmericanIndians,A.W.]weredeprivedoftheirgoodsandforciblyandtyrannicallypressedbythemilitaryleaderstoacceptthedominionoftheSpanishkingsagainsttheintention,thewillandtheinstructionsofthePopeandtheSpanishkings…theSpaniardswereentitledtogoverntheIndianterritories [because] empires conqueredbyarmed forceareacknowledged inthecourseoftimethroughapprobationofthepeople.14

By contrast, the Portuguese did not need to invoke (following Vitoria) theirfundamentalrighttoenforcethepreachingofthegospelatgunpointbecausetheydidnotattempttoestablishdominionoverabroadarea.TheywagedwaragainstAsianprincesonthegroundsofthesamecriteriaastheywagedwarinEurope,namelybecauseofbreachofagreementsorsupportforthreatenedallies.15FreitasassumedafundamentalrighttodemandsubmissiononlyfromMuslimprinces,because on the one hand in former times they occupied territories possessedbyChristians,andbecauseontheotherhandMuslimswerethemselvesalwayspreparedtomakewaronChristians.16

More important than the question of the status of non-European peoplesin European international law of the seventeenth century was the problem ofhandlingterritoriestowhichanyEuropeannationmightclaimarighttodisposeover,whetherintheformofeffectivelyexecuteddominionoroftradeandsearoutemonopolies.Inthefollowing,therefore,Ishalldescribethetreatmentofoverseas territories within inner European treaties from the time of Grotius’s

13 SeeFreitas,Über die rechtmässige Herrschaft der Portugiesen in Asien,chap.VIII,40/41.

14 Ibid.,chap.XII,12,XII,13(Transl.byA.W.).15 Seeibid.,chap.IX,14–16.16 Seeibid.,chap.IX,10.ForproblemsofinternationallawbetweenMuslimand

ChristianstatesthatuntilnowhavebeenstudiedmainlywithrespecttotherelationshipbetweenEuropeandtheOttomanEmpire, seeKarl-HeinzZiegler,“ThepeaceTreatiesof the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers”, in Lesaffer, Randall, Peace Treaties and International Law in European History (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 338–61.Guido Komatsu, “DieTürkei und das europäische Staatensystem im 16. Jahrhundert.UntersuchungenzuTheorieundPraxisdesfrühneuzeitlichenVölkerrechts”,inChristineRoll(ed.),Recht und Reich im Zeitalter der Reformation: Festschrift für Horst Rabe(FrankfurtamMain,1997),pp.121–44.


first formulation of the freedom of the seas to theTreaties of Utrecht, whichprovisionallyendedthereshapingofglobalrelationshipsofdominance.

Colonial Design in the Inner-European International Law

UptothePeaceofWestphalia,Spainhadonlyaslightneedtoconcludeagreementsregardingoverseasterritories,sinceshewasatwarwiththeUnitedProvincesaswellaswithFrance.OneexceptionwastheTwelveYearTruce,concludedwiththeStates-Generalin1609.TheTrucewassupposedtocomeintoforcein1610,includinginoverseasterritories.ThetradewithSpanishdominionsintheEastandWestIndieswasexplicitlyexcludedfromthefreedomoftradebroadlyagreedupon.IndeedtheStates-GeneralwereabletostipulateasecretandseparatearticlethatallowedtradewithprincesoutsideEuropewhoissuedapermittothisend.Atthesametime,thetrucecodifiedtherightofthesovereignstoalloworforbidsubjectsof foreignpowers to tradewith theirdominionsoutsideEurope.Thistreaty admitted for thefirst timeamonopoly tradewith areasoutsideEuropeto anon-Iberianpower.Althoughat this time theUnitedProvincespossessedonlyfewbasesoverseas,theadditionaldeclaration(guaranteedbytheFrenchandEnglishkings)amountedtothefirstrecognitionofnon-Iberiantradingposts.17

By contrast, in the treaty concluded between England and Spain in 1604thatendedthewarstartedintheyearoftheArmada,overseasterritoriesorthetradewiththemwerenotmentioned.TheEnglishsideenteredintonegotiationsdemanding free trade inboth Indies, butweakened this demand veryquicklyso as to receivepermission to tradewith territoriesnot inSpanishpossession,andfinallysettledforaformulationthatomittedmentionofoverseasterritoriesaltogether.Tradewastobeasfreeasbeforethewaraccordingtoformertreatiesor“deusoyobservancia”.18Nevertheless,thetreatyfollowedtheinherentlogicof

17 SeeCorpsuniversel diplomatique du droit des gens; contenant un recueil des traitez d’alliance, de paix, de treve, de neutralité, de commerce, qui ont été faits en Europe, depuis le Règne de l´Empereur Charlemagne jusques présent ed. J. Dumont(8vols,2suppl.,DenHaag,Amsterdam,1739)vol.5/2,p.102.After forbidding the subjectsof theStates-GeneraltotradeintheIndianterritoriesoftheSpanishkingwithouthispermission,thedeclarationsays:“Qu’ilneseraloisibleaussiàsesSujets[oftheCatholickings,A.W.]detrafiquerauxPorts,LieuxetPlacesquetiennentlesditsSieursEstatsesditesIndes,sicen’estavecleurspermission”.Allegedly,thedeclarationwasneverratifiedbytheSpanishking.SeeMartineJuliaIttersum,Profit and principle. Hugo Grotius, natural rights theories and the rise of Dutch power in the East Indies, 1595–1615(Leiden,2006),p.357.

18 ThismeantitwasuptotheEnglishtoprovethattheyhadtradedbeforethewarwithaplaceoutsideEurope.SeeAndreaWeindl,Wer kleidet die Welt? Globale Märkte und merkantile Kräfte in der europäischen Politik der Frühen Neuzeit(Mainz,2007),pp.87–93;“TratadodePaz,AllianzayComercio,entreelSenorReyCatholicoDonPhelipeIII.y


EnglishcommercialinterestsinthattheagreementadmittedspecialconditionsforEnglishmerchantswithrespecttointermediatetradetoandfromtheIberianPeninsula.TheyachievedanadvantageinthetradewithcolonialgoodsoverthemerchantsoftherebelliousDutchprovinces,whosufferedundertradeembargosagainstSpainandPortugal.AtthistimethebulkofcolonialgoodsfromAsiaandAmericawerestillbroughttoSevilleandLisbonandafterwardsdistributedviaAntwerporAmsterdam.19TheimportanceofintermediatetradewithSpainandPortugalbyfaroutweighedanyadvantagetobegainedbypermissiontosailtoregionswhosegeographicalpositionwasnotknownexactly.AlthoughtheEnglishargued against thebinding characterof thepapaldonation, they accepted therightoftheprincestoregulatethetradewithintheirdominions.EventhelineofargumentusedbyElisabethI,namelythatitwasunintelligiblewhyoverseasterritories shouldenjoyanexceptionalpositionoutside thegeneralagreementsaboutinterstatetrade,disappearedfromtheEnglishconductofnegotiations.20

The treaty of 1604 was reinforced after a new military conflict betweenEngland and Spain in 1625–30, whereas the peace treaty of 1630 stipulatedthesameagreementsfortradeassixteenyearsbefore.Indeedthetreatyof1630extendedthepeacetoAmericanterritories,thatis,toterritoriesbeyondtheLineofDemarcation.21Thus,alongwiththetrucewiththeUnitedProvinceselevenyearsbefore,thisfamousLinedrawninthemiddleoftheAtlanticocean,whichhadbeenbargainedout invarious treaties since thesixteenthcenturybetweenSpainandFranceandwhich,accordingtoCarlSchmitt,dividedtheworldintoaEuroperuledbyinternationallawandanunlegislatedareatothewestoftheline, lost whatever significance it ever possessed. Of course Spain, threatenedwith the loss of its political and military power, reserved the right every nowandthento ignore infringements in theAmericanarea indecisionsaboutwarand peace in Europe.22When the Spaniards considered themselves sufficiently

losSenoresArchiduquesAlberto,eIsabelClaraEugeniasusHermanosdeunaparte,yelSerenissimoReydeInglaterraJacoboI.delaotra”Art.9,inJosephAntoniodeAbreuyBertodano,Collección de los Tratados de Paz, Alianza, Neutralidad, Garantia, Protección, Tregua, Mediación, Accesion, Reglamento de Limites, Comercio, Navegación, &c. hechos por los Pueblos, Reyes y Principes de España(25vols,Madrid,1740–1801),herevol.1.

19 SeeOscarC.Gelderblom, “FromAntwerp toAmsterdam, the contributionofmerchantsfromthesouthernNetherlandstothecommercialexpansionofAmsterdam”(ca.1540–1609),Review26/3(2003):247–82.

20 See(London)PublicRecordOffice,StatePapers103/66/21.21 See“TratadodePaz,Confederación,yComercioentreelReyD.PhelipeIV.y

CarlosI.ReydeGranBretaña”,15.11.1630,Art.2,inCollección de los Tratados de Paz, Alianza, Neutralidad, Garantia ...,vol.2.

22 The additional verbal agreement to the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis 1559 orVervins 1598 between France and Spain mentioned by Davenport, which limited thepeacetoEurope,shouldbeseeninthiscontext.Significantly,thereexistsnoconsensusas


strong,however, theyconnectedAmericanconcernswithEuropeanpolitics.AtrucewiththeDutchatleasthadtoslowupifnotcutofftheDutchexpansionintheEastandWestIndies.OtherwiseitwouldbeworthlesstoSpain.ItwouldhavemeantcedingtotheDutchthetradewithSpainthattheSpanishadministrationlooked upon as pivotal for Dutch economic prosperity, and at the same timeopeningoverseasterritories,whichmadethistradesoimportantforEurope,toconquest.23ThiswasalsotruefortherelationshipbetweenSpainandEngland,asSpanishdiplomatsweretodiscoverinthecourseofthecentury.24Thephrase“nopeacebeyondtheLine”wasnotrelevantintheseventeenthcentury,evenifin1634RichelieuapprovedpermissionforFrenchsubjectstoattackSpanishandPortugueseshipsbeyondtheLine.25Sincethebeginningofthecentury,AmericahadbeenincludedinEuropeanpeacetreaties.Evenbreachesof thepeacethatcouldorshouldnotbepunishedforpoliticalreasonsdidnotchangethisfact.26

Referencestonon-Europeanterritoriesintruces,peacesoralliances,bywhichtheDukesofBragançaaccompaniedthestruggle forPortuguese independenceafterPortugal’sdefectionfromSpanishcrown,wereevenmoreprecise.Whenevernecessary,thePortugueseadministrationbarteredtherecognitionorsometimesthepossessionofoverseasterritoriesforanassumedorrealsupportforPortugueseindependence.Forthenavalpowers,thisturnedouttobethegatewaytopossessionsinAsia,AfricaorAmericainaccordancewiththeinternationallaw.ItisnowonderthenthatmainlythenavalpowerswereinterestedinPortugueseindependence.Although theDutchoften attackedPortugueseoverseas territories, theUnitedProvinces,with their longfight for independence fromtheSpanishHabsburg,

towhenthisarticlewasstipulatedbecauseitwasneversetforthinwriting.SeeFisch,Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht,pp.146–7;alsoGundolfFahl,Der Grundsatz der Freiheit der Meere in der Staatenpraxis von 1493–1648(Köln,1969),pp.54–63.Fahlmentionssomeindirectsourcesofreferencetothelineexpresslystipulated.

23 Duringthenegotiationsforatruce,theVOCadvocatedacontinuationofwarin theEast Indiesor total free trade.TheSpanishadministrationcouldnotagreewitheither proposal. See Martine Julia Ittersum, Profit and principle. Hugo Grotius, natural rights theories and the rise of Dutch power in the East Indies, 1595–1615(Leiden,2006),p.280.Kahle,Lateinamerika in der Politik der europäischen Mächte,pp.12–16;Hans-OttoKleinmann,“DeratlantischeRaumalsProblemdeseuropäischenStaatensystems”,Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas38 (2001):7–30. Jörg Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht (Stuttgart, 1984), pp.25–8,146–52.

24 SeeWeindl,Wer kleidet die Welt?,p.173.25 Fisch,Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht,p.117.26 Ithastobeadmittedthatonlyin1684didatreatybetweenFranceandSpainalso

stipulateatruceinAmerica.SeeEuropean Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its dependencies,ed.byF.G.Davenport(4vols,Washington,1917–37),vol.IandII.SeealsothecontributionofLucFoisneauinthisvolume.


seemednaturalalliestotheDukeofBragançainthePortuguesestruggle.Bothcountriesthereforeconcludedacommercialtreatyin1641,combiningitwithatruceconcerningoverseaspossessionsandanallianceinEurope.InthistreatythePortugueseacceptedforthefirsttime,evenifonlytemporarily,DutchcoloniesandtradingpostsinterritoriesclaimedbyPortugalandthusbarteredformilitarysupportinEurope.27WhereasFranceandSweden,withoutinterestsinPortugueseterritories, bartered their support for the Duke of Bragança in exchange forbreakinguptheSpanishtradeembargosinEurope,28thetreatybetweenPortugalandtheUnitedProvincesbroughtthekeenestcommercialrivalofthelatterintoaction.ThepeacefuluseofAmericancoloniesbytheDutchresultedforthefirsttimeinthelegalimportationofAmericancolonialgoodsdirectlytocentralEuropeandendangeredthepositionofEnglishmerchantsintheEuropeanintermediatetrade,whichtheEnglishhadsecuredthroughtheirpreviouslymentionedtreatieswithSpain.Thus,althoughCharlesI(alreadyinaprecariouspoliticalsituationathome)didnotachieveasustainablesuccessinhisdemandforfreetradewithBrazilandwiththeEastIndiesinPortuguesepossessioninhiscommercialtreatywithPortugalof1642,hedid founda long-lastingPortuguese-Englishalliance thatsurvivedalldomesticandexternalvicissitudes.OnlyafewyearslaterthisalliancesecuredtheBritishgriponoverseasterritoriesinaccordancewithinternationallaw,becauseGreatBritainlargelysucceededinmaintainingagoodrelationshipwithPortugalwithoutbeingforcedtowarwithSpain.

First, however, in thePeaceofWestphalia theUnitedProvinces compelledSpaintorecognisealltheirpossessionsinAmerica,AfricaandAsia,whileavoidingmentionoftheirgeographicalsituation.AEuropeantreatywasonething;localfactscouldchangeveryquickly.ThetreatyexplicitlymentionsonlytheterritoriesinBrazil,whichhadbeenrecapturedbythePortugueseandtheiralliesin1648,

27 AlthoughtheDutchRepublichadtoabandontheircoloniesinBrazilin1654,mostformerPortugueseterritoriesinAsiaremainedinDutchhands.ResponsiblefortheconquestweretheDutchoverseascompanies,whoseclaimswerefixedininternationaltreaties.Seeforexample“WaffenstillstandundBeistandspaktvonDenHaag,Generalstaaten,Portugal1641VI12”,inwww.ieg-mainz.de/friedensvertraege(viewed28Feb.2008).

28 ItseemsthatattheMunsternegotiationsFrance,SwedenandeventheNetherlandssacrificedoverseasinterestsintheireffortstoreachanagreementwithSpain,allthemoreso asPortuguesediplomats “hadbeen instructednot to cede anypartof the colonies.Nevertheless,onmanyoccasionsthePortugueseproposedtheexchangeofcertainBrazilianterritoriesformilitaryassistance”.PedroCardim,“‘PortugueseRebells’atMünster.TheDiplomatic Self-Fashioning in mid-seventeeth Century European Politics”, in HeinzDuchhardt(ed.),Der Westfälische Friede(München,1998),p.304.


andthesewerecededtotheNetherlandsinareciprocaldemarcationoftradingspheres.29

InanewtreatywithPortugalthirteenyearslater,theDutchdefinitelycededtheirclaimstoBrazilforacompensationoffourmillioncruzados(eightmillionflorins),butcompelledthePortuguesetopermitthemtotradebetweenPortugalandBrazilandwithallPortuguesetradingpostsinAfrica.ThisresolvedDutchclaimsonIberianstatesforoverseasterritories.NowtheDutchcontestwithBritainbecamemoreimportant.ThetreatiesconcludedafterseveralnavalwarsbetweenEnglandandtheNetherlands,settlingquarrelsabouttradeinconnectionwiththeNavigationActandstipulatedthetransferringofsometerritory,30wasareflectionofboththeeconomicrivalryofthetwonavalpowersandtheirtreatieswithSpainandPortugal,whichwrestedtradeadvantagesfromtheIberianpowers.

TheincorporationofoverseasterritoriesintoEuropeaninternationallawhastobeexaminedagainstthebackgroundofthetensionsamongEuropeannationstates.AfterthePeaceofWestphalia,therivalryfounditsmainprotagonistsinEnglandandtheUnitedProvincesandhaddevolved,bytheendofthecentury,onFranceandEngland.AgreementsofoneofthesepowerswithastateoftheIberianPeninsula therefore necessarily brought about treaties initiated by the otherpowerswithSpainorPortugal.Thegoalof international economicpolicywasnottoobtaingoodconditionsincertainmarkets;thegoalofeconomicpolicy,whichwastobeenforcedbythemeansofinternationallaw,wastoobtainbetterconditionsthanone’srivals.

TheDutchagreementswithSpainandPortugalbetweentheyears1648and1661madeit incumbentontheBritishgovernmenttoreshapeitsrelationshipwiththestatesoftheIberianPeninsula.Afterthevictoriousrevolution,LondonnegotiatedinparallelwithbothPortugalandSpaintoconcludenewpeacetreatiesortorenewoldones.Portugal’ssupportforCharlesIcausedmilitaryconfrontation

29 See Recueil complet des traités, conventions, capitulations, armistices, autres actes diplomatiques de tous les états de l’Amérique latine ...: depuis l’année 1493 jusqu’à nos jours ... / par M. Charles Calvo (11 vols. Paris, 1862–68), vol. 1, pp. 68–9. The agreementbetween theStatesGeneral and thePortuguesekingof the sameyear thatobliged thelattertorestoretheconqueredterritoriesofBrazilandtomakepaymentsofcompensationprobablyfailedduetolocalconditions.Seeibid.,pp.75–99.

30 Whereas in the treaty ofWestminster of 1654 the Dutch were obliged to paycompensationfortheAmboynaMassacreof1623,tomakeannualpaymentstofishinEnglishwatersandtorespecttheNavigationAct(seeFriedensvertragvonWestminster,1654IV5),intheTreatyofBreda,SurinamwassurrenderedtotheDutchandNewAmsterdamtotheEnglish.ThetreatyofWestminsterof1674stipulatedfreepassageofEnglishsettlersoutofSurinam.QuarrelsoverEastIndiawerereferredtoarbitration,butthestatusquoofpossessionswasmaintained.(SeeFriedensvertragvonWestminster,1674II19,both:Großbritannien and Generalstaaten, in www.ieg-mainz.de/friedensvertraege, viewed 28Feb.2008).


between Portugal and the English Republic. Although Spain recognized theRepublic,theEnglishsideurgedthereadjustmentoftheoldcommercialtreatiesof1604and1630inaccordancewiththechangedconditionsoftheWestphalianPeacefortheDutch.Regardingoverseasterritories,EnglishministersplacedatthecentreoftheirnegotiationstheclaimforfreetradewithEnglishcoloniesinAmerica,whichwerestillsituatedinterritoriesclaimedbySpain.TheEnglishsidemusthavebeenaware thatcomplete free-trade, that is, includingtheSpanish-Americancolonies,wasneitherenforceablebymaintainingtheNavigationActnorreallydesirableinviewofsomefuturemost-favourednationclausesintreatiesbetweenSpainandotherpowers.31

Simultaneously, London pressed its negotiations with Portugal. The smallcountryatthewesternedgeofEuropestillneededEnglishsupporttomaintainitsindependencefromSpain.InthetreatyfinallyconcludedbetweenEnglandandPortugalin1654,OliverCromwellsucceededinachievingeverythingthathadbeendenied theEnglish in1642.PortugalnowallowedEnglish subjectsto trade between Portugal and Brazil and with the other Portuguese coloniesinAfricaandAsia.32Sevenyearslater,CharlesIIprovidedhimselfwithaveryrichdowrythroughhismarriagetothePortugueseprincessCatharine.Portugalhadtoacceptalltheconcessionsoftheprevioustreatyof1642again,handoverTangierandBombaytoEngland,permitEnglishsubjectsfreetradewithallitsoverseasterritories,licensethesettlementofuptofourBritishfamiliesatmosttradingpostsandhandoverinadvancesomeEastIndianterritoriestoEnglandin thecaseof their recapture fromtheDutch. In return,Englandengaged tosupportPortugalmilitarilyandnottoconcludeatreatywithSpaindetrimentaltoPortugal.33

ThetreatywithPortugalof1654signedandsealed,CromwellheadeddirectlyforawarwithSpain,sothattheSpanishadministrationveryquicklyrecognisedthattheessenceofhisclaimstoopenalltradewithAmericatobeamerepretextforwar.

Weneednotdwellhereonthemilitaryconflict.ApartfromtheconquestofJamaica,theBritishcouldchalkuplittlesuccess.Moreinterestinginthepresentcontextisthat,betweentheendofthewarshortlybeforetheaccessionofCharles

31 TheNavigationActof1651reservedthetradewithEnglishcoloniestoEnglishshipsandmerchants.TheactwasaimedmainlyagainsttheDutchintermediatetrade.SeeJ.E.Farnell,“TheNavigationActof1651,thefirstDutchwar,andtheLondonmerchantcommunity”,Economic History Review,secondser.16(1963–64):439–54.

32 SeeWeindl,Wer kleidet die Welt?,pp.147–56.EventuallythePortuguesekingwasforcedtosignthetreatybysendinganEnglishfleettothemouthoftheTejo.SeeCharlesBoxer,“SecondThoughtsontheAnglo-PortugueseAlliance,1661–1808”,History Today36(1986):24.

33 SeeWeindl,Wer kleidet die Welt?,pp.162–3.


IItothethroneandtheconclusionofanewpeaceandcommercialtreatybetweenbothcountrieseightyears later,thereprevailedakindof“coldpeace”betweenEnglandandSpain,whiletheiroverseasrelationscameunderastrictlyseparateheading.IntheWestIndies,apiracywarwasraging,whichtheEnglisharguedcould not be stopped because of the lack of a newly formulated peace treaty,althoughthereinstatementofthepeacetreatyof1630theoreticallyincludedapeaceforAmerica.

Based on the Spanish-English relationship of the 1660s, we can see veryclearlytheinterrelationshipbetweenoverseasinterestsandinnerEuropeanpeacepolicy,anditschangedpatternintheseyears.Fordecades,Spainusedthethreatof interruptingEuropean tradeas apawn.Spainwasnot always able toavoidwar,butbyblockingEuropeantradeitwasalwaysabletoforceEnglandbacktothenegotiatingtable.Moreover,Spainalwayssucceededingainingcontractualrecognition of its American trade monopoly in exchange for granting tradeprivileges inEurope.With reason,we can argue that for theoverseas coloniesofanyEuropeancountrytherewasnearlynodifferenceifittradedwithforeignnations in a legal or illegal manner. For a long time the Dutch, English andFrench had disputed provinces, harbours and places in the territories claimedbytheIberians.TradebetweenthecoloniesofdifferentnationswasprobablyasmucharealityasthesupplyingofSpanish-AmericabyDutch,EnglishandFrenchmerchants.WehavetobearinmindthatitmadeafundamentaldifferenceforthepowerpositionoftheEuropeanmothercountryifandhowfaroverseasprivilegesforsubjectsofforeignnationscouldbenegotiatedornot.Claimstofreetradewithoverseas territorieswere thereforenotcrucial for theEnglishnegotiationsof the 1660s. The English had obtained the access they wanted some yearsbeforebytheiragreementswithPortugal.Onthecontrary,becauseofSpain’sthemilitaryweakness,EnglishministersfearedtheopeningofAmericanmarketstoallEuropeannations.Thiswouldhavebroughtaboutanundesirablerivalry.ItisnowonderthatwhentheSpanishtrademonopolyseemedtobefailingbecauseofthe lackofmilitarypower,asolemonopoly,namelythat fortheslavetradewithSpanishAmerica,founditswayintotheEuropeaninternationallaw.Inthe1660s,Englishdiplomatspromised to ensure theSpanish trademonopoly forAmerica inexchange forSpain’s signingover theAsiento de negros toEngland.Accordingly,overseasterritorieswerealmostabsentfromthepeaceandcommercialtreatyfinallyconcluded in1667betweenEnglandandSpain.English subjectssimplyobtainedtherighttosellgoodspurchasedonbothsidesofCapeofGoodHopeinSpainwithoutdeclaringtheirorigin,whichenabledthemtosellgoodscoming fromPortugueseoverseas territories.34Apart fromthis, severaldetailedimport regulations strengthened theposition ofEnglishmerchants in Spanish

34 Considering Portugal as a rebellious province, the Spanish crown forbade thistradeuntilapeacetreatywasconcludedwithPortugal.


ports. Three years later another treaty cleared up the relationship in America,thatis,bothtreatypartnersweretoretainhispossessionsandtrademonopoliesweretobemutuallyrespected.35OnlyapeaceinAmericaofferedthepossibilityof economic expansion in theWest Indian possessions. Further, theTreaty ofBreda(1667),whichestablishedtheUnitedProvincesasapredominantpowerintheEastIndiesandWestAfrica,andsignedoverterritoriesontheAmericanmainland(Surinam)tothem,oncemoreputtheball inBritain’scourt.Inthefollowingyears,theDutchWestIndianCompany(WIC)builtupitsslavedepotinCuraçao,mainly to supply theAsiento. IfEnglishmerchantswanted touseBarbadosandJamaicainasimilarway,theywouldneedapeaceintheCaribbean.Againsttheseadvantagesfortrade,wishestoexpandEnglishpossessionstookabackseat.

TheAsiento de negrosfinallybecameapartof international lawthroughthequarrels over the Spanish succession. For being allowed to manage the Asiento de negros,firsttheFrenchandthentheBritishgovernmentensuredtheSpanishmonopolyfortradewithAmerica.Theconsolidationofpossessionsinallknowncontinents entailed thatnoEuropeanpower challenged themonopoly tradeofanotherpower, even though smugglingpersisted.With theAsiento de negros in1713,whichwasstipulatedinaninterstatetreaty,GreatBritainprocuredaccess totheSpanishmonopolysystemwithoutopeningthissystemtootherrivals.Curiouslyenough,theGeneral-statesnowpushednotforashareinlegaltradewithSpanishAmerica, but for a codification that would maintain the Spanish monopolisticsystemintheirpeaceandcommercialtreatywithSpain,withtheexceptionoftheAsiento,andpromisedtohelpintheenforcementofthismonopoly.36

Conclusion

Thecall for the freedomof the seas,whichwasfirstheardon theoccasionofquarrelsovertheEastIndiesbetweenPortugal,SpainandtheUnitedProvinces,hadfallensilentbythebeginningof theeighteenthcentury.Apart froma fewtheoretical reflections and treatises,European international law regardingnon-European territorieswasoriented throughout the seventeenth century towardstheeconomicinterestsofthecolonialpowers.

The questions of the lawfulness of overseas land seizures discussed withvaryingemphasissincethebeginningoftheageofexpansiontookabackseatinseventeenthcenturytothehandlingoftheseterritoriesininner-Europeanpolitics.

35 See Recueil complet des traités, conventions, capitulations, armistices, autres actes diplomatiques de tous les états de l’Amérique latine,vol.1,pp.162–72.

36 See“Friedens-undHandelsvertragvonUtrecht,Generalstaaten,Spanien1714VI26”,inwww.ieg-mainz.de/friedensvertraege,Art.31(viewed28Feb.2008).


The de facto position thus conceded to non-European political units withinEuropeaninternationallawreflectsmuchmoretherealpowerrelationshipsthanthetheoreticaldiscussionsofSpanishscholarsofthesixteenthcentury.

PARTVIConclusionsandPerspectives

Chapter14DynamicsofConflictandIllusionsof

Law:MakingWarandThinkingPeaceintheModernInternationalSystem

OlafAsbach

The Paradox of Modern World

AstrangeparadoxhasrunthroughthemodernEuropeanworldsinceitsorigins:theprocessesof founding and institutionalising the conditionsof securedpeaceandlawgohandinhandwiththeexpansionofconflictandwar,oftheviolationand annihilation of individual and collective rights. The emergence of themodern state as a guarantee of law and peace, the expansion of doux commerceandthedevelopmentofaninternationalsystemregulatedbyinternationallawanddiplomacy:alltheseprocesseshavebeenpushedthroughandmediatedbymeansofconflict,war,expansionistforceandexploitation.Andthisdidnotcometoanendwiththeaccomplishmentofstatebuildingandofthecapitalistworldsystem.1

Thecontinuityofthisdialecticsofconflictandorder,warandpeace,findsitsreasoninatwofold,andinterconnected,relationbetweenpastandpresent.Ontheonehand,both thepolitical and social institutions and structures and theconceptsandideasgeneratedinthemodernerahavehadaformativeinfluenceontoday’spoliticalandsocialworld;thisconcerns,sotospeak,thedimensionofsocial“objectivity”.Ontheotherhand,theyhaveaffectedthewaythisworldisperceived,graspedandjudged;thisisthedimensionof“subjectivity”.Exactlythatisthereasonmanyactualdebatesconnectthediagnosisofarealorimaginedcrisis (or even the end) of modern states and state system with the quest fornewconceptstounderstandandorganizetheworld.2Howcanthiscontinuityinfundamentalstructuresandproblemsinsocietysincetheadventofearlymodern

1 OntheconnectionbetweenwarandstateformationinearlymodernEurope,seeJohannesBurkhardtinthisvolume.Thatpeacewillberealisedwhencapitalismbecomesglobally dominant, has been asserted by Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, “Handel und Frieden.Ein klassischerTopos der Friedensbestrebungen und seine Bedeutung im Zeitalter derGlobalisierung“, in Ulrich Menzel (ed.), Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom Wohlstand der Nationen(FrankfurtamMain,2000),esp.pp.342–6.

2 Cf. the manifold works that deal with the crisis or end of “Westphalian” stateand/or state system, discussed under titles such as Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty


Europebeexplained,andhowfardoactualinstitutionsandconceptsreproducetheir contradictions? In order to avoid anachronistic arguments, ahistoricalcomparisonsorprojections,thefollowingconsiderationswillstartwithashortremark on the fundamental characteristics of the social order developed inmodern Europe to which political and international discourses and practicesreactedandwhosepersistenceestablishedthematerialconditionsoftheirlastingrelevance.Subsequently,Ishalldistinguishthreepivotalcurrentsofitsperception,conceptualisationandorganisationofthissocialorderthatbecameparadigmaticforconcepts,discoursesandpracticesuptonow.IneachcaseIaskhowtheytrytomanagetheoreticallyandpracticallythosenewcircumstancesandproblems,whattheirlimitsandinherentcontradictionsareandhowfartheymaystillberelevanttoourunderstanding,criticismandmanagement,ormismanagement,oftoday’sglobalisedworld.

Basic Structures and Dynamics of Conflicts in Modern Europe

Howtoexplaintherelevanceandpersistenceofthetheoryandpracticeofmodernpoliticsandinternationallaw?Theyresultfromtheemergenceofacompletelynew,modernorder,whichwasfirstgeneratedinearlymodernEuropeandis,despiteallcontemporarydifferences,stilldominantatthepresenttime.3Itpervadesandreconfiguresthesocialworldandgeneratesnewstructures,dynamicsandwaysofactingandthinking.Generally speaking,modernsociety ischaracterisedbythe factofpluralisation. It supersedes formersocialorderswhosecohesionhadbeensecuredbytheindisputablevalidityofgivenstructuresandbelief-systemswhichguaranteedtheunityofthesocialworldandascribedtoeverybodyhisorherrespectivesocialposition,meaningandend.Suchorderscollapsedbecauseofprocessesofsocialdifferentiation,leadingtoapluralityofsocialactorsandinterestscompetingandstruggling forpower,goodsandrecognition.WhenHegel saysthatthe“principleofthemodernworldasawholeisfreedomofsubjectivity”,4hedenotesthedrivingforceofthisneworder,whichispervadedandsustainedbyheterogeneousinterests,objectives,beliefsandthematerialandmoralstakesof

and International Intervention,edsGeneM.LyonsandMichaelMastanduno(Baltimore,1995).

3 Icannotaddresshere the issueofwhether it is thereforea specificallyEuropean modernity. I discuss the fact that “Europe” itself, as a new sphere of action andcommunication,was“invented”inthemodernerainOlafAsbach,Europa – Vom Mythos zur‚ “Imagined Community”? Studien zu Erforschung und Bedeutung des Europabegriffs(Berlin,2009).

4 GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,Philosophy of Right, transl. anded.T.M.Knox(Oxford,1952),additionto§273,p.286(transl.corrected).

Dynamics of Conflict and Illusions of Law 251

differentactors,groupsandclasses.Thisorderisthuscharacterisedontologicallybyantagonismandconflict.Wheretheallocationofsocial,economicandpoliticalresources and positions and the validity of norms and values are left to thebalancingofpowersofcompetingactorsandtheirrelativestakesandcapacities,italwaysrunstheriskofturningintoconflictandviolence.Thissystematic structureofcontingency,antagonismandconflictisatthesametimethereasonforandtheresultofthemanifoldconflictsandwarsthathavehistoricallypervadedthemodernera.Theprocessesofdifferentiation,pluralisationanddynamisationofsocial actors and interests reciprocally intensifiedeachotherand led toawiderangeofsocial,politicalandreligiousstrugglesandwars.5

Theemergenceofthemodernstatetakesplaceviatheinstitutionalisationofthecapacitiesoforganisationandregulationthatareessentialformaintaininganddevelopingthesenewsocialstructures.Sovereigntyasthecoreofthemodernstatereferstopreciselythisfunction.6Thestatebecomestheonlylegitimateauthoritytomakeandenforcelawandtousephysicalviolenceinordertopreventsocialactors from pursuing their own interests and logic of action, from generatingconflictswhichcanbesolvedonlybymeansofsubjectivedecisionsabouttheirrespectiveclaimsand,inthelastresort,bytheuseofforce.Thiscentralisationofthefieldsofforceandmediaofrightandviolenceproducesandsecuresthesphereofactivityrequiredbypluralactorsandinterestsinmodernsocieties.7Hencethe

5 Thisincludes,tonamejustafewkeywords,thereligiousstrugglesattendantupontheReformation,thewarsofstateformation,andthepolitical,socialandculturalconflictsinthecourseoftheriseofnewsocio-economic interestsandclassesor inducedbytheoverseasexpansionoftheEuropeanpowers.

6 Cf.OlafAsbach,“SovereigntybetweenEffectivenessandLegitimacy.DimensionsandActualRelevanceofSovereigntyinBodin,HobbesandRousseau”,Eurostudia. Revue transatlantique de recherche sur l’Europe, 2/2 (2006) (http://www.cceae.umontreal.ca/-revue-Eurostudia).

7 AlbeitthestatehashistoricallybeendevelopedinEuropeinverydifferentwaysandhastakenverydifferentforms,itisimpossibletodistinguishbetweenapre-modern“personalizeddynasticsovereignty”before1800andamodern“depersonalizedsovereignty”sincethen,asBennoTeschkehassuggestedinThe Myth of 1648. Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations(London,2003),pp.10–12andchap.VandVIII(seealsohiscontributioninthisvolume).Inthe1640s,ThomasHobbeswasalreadyable todetect thegeneral tendencyanddeepgrammarof themodernstatecompletelyindependent of its contingent empirical forms and representations, long before it wasobjectifiedandbecameanimpersonalpowerinreality.Whatevertheempiricalfigureofthesovereignwas,theemergingstatepowersjustifiedtheirpositioninearlymodernsocietiesbytheircapacitiestogenerateandenforcelawandorderonbehalfofthecommongood.Through these discourses, even “personalised dynastic sovereignty” contributed to theearlymodernprocessesofgeneratingaconceptofandinstitutionalstructures forade-personalisedsovereignty;hence,attemptstosettheminoppositionbystrictchronological


realisationof themodern–Westphalian – state and state systemdoesnotputanend tocompetitionandconflict.Quite thecontrary, stateandstate systemestablishacompletelynewformofgeneralizedandperpetuatedcompetitionforpolitical, economic and social power among aplurality of actors and interestsonthesocialandinternationallevel.Themodernstatethereforeisasmuchtheorganiserofasthebattlegroundforcompetingsocialinterests.Thestateisorganiserinsofar as it provides a society that is split by pluralisation, heterogeneity andpowerwithageneralwillbywhichitisenabledtoact,imposeandenforcerulesandguaranteesnon-violentformsofpursuinganactor’s interestsandresolvinghisorherconflicts.Thatiswhythestateisatthesametimeabattleground:asacentralauthorityitnecessarilybringsaboutparticulardecisionsonpoliticalandsocialrules,goodsandpower,whicharegeneralisedbyitsmonopolyofthemeansoflegitimatepower.Consequently,thestatehasneverbeenseparatedfromsocietyandtheparticularinterests,conflictsandcompetingrelationsthatactwithinit.Onthecontrary,preciselybyassumingaseparateexistence,thestatebecomesanelement andamediumof thesepolitical, social andeconomicaspirations andinterestsininternalandexternalrelations.

The Dialectics of War and Peace in the Modern Era

ThestatebasedandstatecentredWestphalianorderthatemergedinmodernEuropeandwassubsequentlyglobalisedwasnot,ashasbeenshown,anorderinwhichStateshavebeentheonlyimportantactorsinthesensethattheywerecompletelyautonomous in their structure, functioningand logicof action.Modern statesratheremergedasnewformsoforganisationandnodesofdifferentiatingmodernsocieties, which are in principle marked by antagonistic social relations andinterestsonalllevels,withregardtopolitical,social,economic,cultural,religiousandotherdimensions.Thus,beinginstitutionalisedaswellasimaginedsystems,states emerge, persist and work as imaginary but permanently substantiated“actors” in concrete situations, as “unities of action and effect” in questionsof internal and external relevance.8Theywork as agencies of organisation andmediationforapluralityofsocialactorsandactorconstellations,andexactlythis,sotospeak,setssocialactorsfreetopursuetheirparticularinterests,valuesandaimsonthenationalaswellasonthetransnationallevel.Consequently,territorialandnationalbordershavebeentransgressedsincethebeginningoftheformation

limits(suchasbeforeorafter1800)orbyterritorialornationalborders(suchasFranceversusEngland)promotearatherahistoricalandabstractpointofview.

8 Cf. Hermann Heller, Staatslehre (Tübingen, 1983), pp. 259 and 269–79 (mytranslation).


ofmodernstatesinfifteenth-andsixteenth-centuryEurope.9Theglobalaswellasthesocialdimensionsareinscribedintheso-calledWestphalianstatesystemfromitsonset,justas,viceversa,intheglobalisedworldstatesareandremaincentralrelaystationsoftheorganisation,theguaranteeandtheenforcementofpolitical,socialandeconomicinterestsandpower.

In this condition moderne, understanding, theorising and organising lawandpeace is facedwith aparadoxical situation.On theonehand, there is anintrinsic quest for law and peace.To the extent that modern societies lead toapluralisationofcompetingsocial,economicandculturalactors, interestsandvaluesystems,newwaysofunderstandingandinstitutionalisinglawandpeaceare indispensable for the functioning of this complex social and internationalsystem.Ontheotherhand,thereareintrinsicdynamicsofconflict.Totheextentthatstatesactasorganisersandguarantorsoftheconditionsof lawandpeace,theygenerateandreproduceatthesametimerelationsofcompetition,conflictandlackofpeace:bothdomesticallyandabroad,statesalwaysadvocateparticularpoliticaldecisions,claimsandinterestsandthereforenecessarilynegatealternativeinterests and legal claimsof other actors.Thisproblemhasdriven theory andpracticeinmodernpoliticsandinternationalrelationsandstimulatedattemptsto get a clear understanding of the emerging political and social conditionsat the national and international level, its principles and problems in findinginstitutionalandnormativeconceptstoachievepeaceandstableorderininternalandexternalaffairs.Notwithstandingalldifferences,thereensuedatraditionofpoliticalandsocialdiscoursesandactionthathasbeeneffectivetheoreticallyandpractically inpolitical, cultural and socialpractice ever since. In the followingsections,Ishalldistinguishanddiscussthestructureandproblemsofthreemaincurrentsof thinkingandorganisingmodern international relations inorder tosecurestability,self-preservationandthepursuitofinterestsundertheconditionsofthemodernworld:attemptstoorganisethembymeansofpoliticallybalancingandcoordinatingapluralityofactorsbyinstitutionalisinginternationallawanddiplomacy,orbytheconstructionofaglobalorder,includingamonopolisationofthemeansofviolence.

9 Theanalyticaldistinctionbetweena“worldof states”anda“worldof societies”shouldthereforeneitherbeontologisednorhistoricisedinthesensethattheformerhasonlyrecentlybeentransformedintothelatter(Ernst-OttoCzempiel,Kluge Macht. Außenpolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert(Munich,1999),p.11andchap.I,pp.17–101passim).Thesocialaswellastransnationalandglobaldimensionsoftheearlymodernprocessesof–European–statebuildingcanbeidentifiedfromitsbeginnings,includinganddependingontheconstructionof traderoutesandmonopolies, theconstitutionofnationalandregionalmarketsandcustomsbarriers,ofinternalandexternallegalrelationshipsandsoon.


Peace by Balance of Power and International Cooperation?

The first current of modern political theory and practice aims at achieving abalanceofpowerinordertosecurepeaceandstability.Thisconceptimpliesthegeneralsecularisationandrationalisationofthestructuresofthepoliticalsystemaswellaspoliticalaction.10Moderninternationalrelationsarecharacterisedbythedynamicsandproblemsofmediationresultingfromasystemofstateswhich,ontheonehand,arecorrelatedtoeachotherasfreeandcompetingactorsand,ontheotherhand,arethemselvestheresultaswellastheagentsofspecificsocialandeconomic interests at the internal andat the transnational level.Thus theinternationalsystemisahighlycomplex,dynamicandfragilenetofrelations:theconditionsrequiredformaintainingandstabilisingthewholeanditsmembersarenotgivenbyall-embracingnormsorreligiousbeliefs,11butemergeasaresultantofconstellationsofinterestsandpower.Thisiswhymodernpoliticaltheoryandpracticeareconfrontedwiththetaskofdevelopingreliableandbindingrulesandmechanismsforsuchaconstellationofbasicallyequalactors,sincethecalculabilityofrelationsintheinternationalsystemisamajorconstituentofsustainingandpursuing both the interests of states and those of social and economic actorsthataredirectlyorindirectlyconnectedwithordependentonthissystem.Thestabilityistobeachievedbybalancingandinterrelatingtheinterestsandpoweroftheactorsintheinternationalsystemorbyconnectingthemthroughalliancesandnegotiationsystemsinsuchawaythattheynolongerharmorthreateneachother.SinceMachiavelli,political theoryhasmade this a subjectofdiscussionundertheheadingofthe“raison”or“interestofthestate”ininternalandexternalaffairsorinthe“balance”amongstates.12Inpoliticalpractice,theexistenceofapluralityofcompeting(state)actors,as thepointofdeparture in internationalrelations, was increasingly recognised in the period between the peace treatiesofWestphaliain1648andUtrechtin1713,pursuinginternationalsecurityand

10 Secularisationdoesnotnecessarilyapplytothecontentsandtheaimsofpoliticalaction,buttothestructureofthepolitical,sothattoachievepoliticalsuccessitis“bettertoconcentrateonwhatreallyhappensratherthanontheoriesorspeculations”(NiccolòMachiavelli,The Prince,transl.anded.QuentinSkinnerandRussellPrice(Cambridge,1988),chap.XV,p.54).

11 EvenifallrelevantactorsconceiveofthemselvesasgoodChristiansandadheringto the same religious belief and norm system, after the breakdown of the respublica christiana they are all accountable only to themselves for their interpretations and theactionsfollowingfromthem,andtheynecessarilyregardanybodyelseasactualorpotentialcompetitors.

12 Cf.FriedrichMeinecke,Machiavellism: the doctrine of Raison d’État and its place in modern history,ed.W.Stark(Epping,1984).


orderbyvaryingsystemsofbalanceand“convenance”ofpowers,byconcertsofGreatorSuper-Powersorbybi-ormulti-polarsystems.13

Theproblemsofthesewaysoforganisinginternationalrelationsareevident.Abalanceofpowersystemwherethewholeisnothingbutthefunctionalnetofpurequantaofpowerisnecessarilycharacterizedbycompetition,conflictandapossiblerecoursetoviolenceinordertoenforceparticularinterests.Thisconflictualdynamics is thus not accidental but results from the structural contingencyof the modern international system. It is always up to the calculations of theactorsthemselvestodecidewhattherespectiveinterestsandpowerrelationsinthe international systemareandwhat theeffectsof thereciprocalperceptions,assessments and supposed long-term consequences of actions are going to be.This system therefore systematically excludes the possibility of permanentenforcementandtheguaranteeofsecuredconditionsofpeaceandlaw.ThomasHobbesexpressedthislogicofactionwithprecisionwhenhedemonstratedthatthestateofnatureis in itselfastateofwar–andthatitdoesnotbecomeoneonlyforauxiliaryreasonssuchashumanmalice,scarceresourcesorhistoricaldecline.14Inasystemofactorsthatareinprinciplefreeandequal,conflictsofrightsandinterestsarelogicallyinevitablebecauseofthestructureoftheirrelationsofwillandappropriation.Evenif thequest forpeaceandsecuredright isanecessarycondition of self-preservation, prosperity and progress,15 as long as the actionstructureof free,unrestrictedandcompetingactorswithoutageneral coercivepowerpersists,itispossibleatanygivenmomentthatconflictsofaction,rightandpropertyshouldswingtoviolence,theapplicationofforceand,finally,war.

Critiquesoftheconceptofabalanceofpowerbetweenstatesthatcaneasilyplungeintoturmoilandcollapseareasoldasthissystemitself.Inaphrasethat

13 Cf.MichaelSheehan,The Balance of Power: History and Theory(London,2000).14 Inthestateofnature–betweenindividualsaswellasbetweenstates–everybody

“hath a right tomakeuseof, and todo allwhatsoeverhe shall judge requisite forhispreservation”; Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society,EnglishWorks, ed.Molesworth,vol. II (London,1841), I.10note,p.10;andbecausethisrightnecessarilyharmstherightsoftheotheractors,thestateofnatureisassuchastateofwar(cf.ibid.,I.12,p.11).

15 ThisiseventrueforHobbes,whodeclaresthatthelawofnaturecommands,“thatpeaceistobesoughtafter,whereitmaybefound”,“toperformcontracts,ortokeeptrust”andsoon,andthatthose“lawsofnatureareimmutable,andeternal;whattheyforbid,canneverbelawful;whattheycommand,canneverbeunlawful”(Hobbes,Philosophical Rudiments, II.2,III.1andIII.29,pp.16,29and46);andwhodemonstratesthateventhe strictestcommandscannotaloneguaranteepeaceand legallyorganisedrelationsaslongastheyareaddressedonlytotheindividualconscience,theforo interno,anddonotbindactorsin foro externo;seeThomasHobbes,Leviathan Or The Matter, Forme, & Power Of A Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical And Civill,EnglishWorks,ed.Molesworth,vol.III(London,1839),chap.XV,pp.145–6.


becamefamous,EmmanuelKant,in1793,ironicallycalledthehopeof“alastinguniversalPeaceonthebasisoftheso-calledBalance of Power in Europe”as“amerefantasy”:“likeSwift’shousethatthebuilderhadconstructedinsuchperfectaccordwithallthelawsofequilibriumthatitcollapsedassoonasasparrowalighteduponit”.16Butthisappraisalisonlythelatestinalongseriesofcomparableverdictsby European political theorists since the late seventeenth and throughout theeighteenthcentury.BeitFénelonorSaint-Pierre,Justi,RousseauorMably,theyallagreedonthefactthatthebalanceofpowersystemwaspronetopermanentstrugglesratherthanbeingaguaranteeofpeaceandstability.17And,infact,thislogicofpoliticalrationalitywasneverintendedtostriveunconditionallyforpeaceor even the abolishment of war in itself. Balance of power politics is a modus operandiofmovingandsubsistinginthegivenorderoftheinternationalstateofnature.Thecoreandtelosofpoliticalactionarethusnotpeaceandlawasendsinthemselves,butasconditionalmeansofself-preservation,self-determinationand self-developmentunder conditions of general competition and conflictualrelationswithothers–otheractors,otherproprietors,otherstates,othersystemsofbeliefandvaluesandsoon.Andaslongasthisisthecase,therewillalwaysbethepossibilityoftherecoursetopower,violenceandwar.

Itwouldbenaïvetosupposethatthisdynamicshasbeenovercomeinthetwenty-first century. The increase of inter-, trans- and supranational interdependencies,integrationandcooperationisbornebyapluralityofactors,interestsandpowersthat perpetuate the dynamics of competition and conflict. The globalisation ofneo-liberalpoliticsinthelastdecadeshasdemonstratedhowthesestructuresandplatformsofallegedpost-nationalcooperationserveasmediasfortheenforcementof the particular interests of national or transnational, private or public, actors.Thisyieldsparadoxicalresults: theextensionofmarketeconomy,commerceandcooperationisrunningunderthebannerofpeaceandlawandgoeshandinhandwithaconstantextensionofthedomainofstrugglesbetweenprivateandpublicpowers; the alleged processes of de-nationalisation and internationalisation of

16 ImmanuelKant,“Onthecommonsaying:Thatmaybecorrectintheory,butitisofnouseinpractice”[1793],inKant,Practical Philosophy,transl.anded.MaryJ.Gregor(Cambridge,1996),p.309.

17 Thus,thephysiocratPierre-PaulLeMercierdelaRivièrearguesthat“lesystêmedela balancedel’Europe…estpeupropreàprévenirlesguerresparmilesPuissancesdel’Europe;ilsembleplutôtservird’occasion,oudeprétexte;cartouslesjoursilssefontlaguerrepourmaintenir labalance; lespeuplesainsis’entr’égorgent,arméslesunscontrelesautresparunsystèmeimaginépourlesempecherdes’entr’égorger.“(L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques(2vols,LondonandParis,1767),vol.2,pp.228–9)ForacloserlookatSaint-PierreandRousseau,seeOlafAsbach:Die Zähmung der Leviathane. Die Idee einer Rechtsordnung zwischen Staaten bei Abbé de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau(Berlin,2002),pp.113–16and228–33.


sovereigntyareaccompaniedbythestrengtheningoftheexecutivesofpowerfulstatesandbynationalist,ethnicandseparatistnationbuildingprocesses“frombelow”aswellas“fromoutside”.Theconstructionoftrans-andsupranational institutionsasforexampletheEuropean Uniondoesnotcancelthelogicanddynamicsoftheinternationalstateofnatureanditsintrinsicelementofforceandwar.Whatmaybeseenanddescribedasasupranationalnetworkofcooperationtoorganisetheproblemsofglobalisedmarkets,orevenasa“peaceproject”,18hasitsJanusfaceincreatingnewglobalplayersandpoliticalregimesreproducingthemechanismsofregionalandglobalcompetition, inclusionandexclusion.19Theyalways serveasagenciesanddrivingforcesofparticularinterests,dynamicsandcontradictionsandconstitutenewactors in internationalcompetition,boundupwithpotentialsofmilitary,economicandotherformsoftheuseofpowerandforce.20

Peace by International Law?

A second current inmodernpolitical theory andpractice relies on the lawofnations. It can be said that this tradition works as a legal complement to thepreviouslyoutlinedapproachesforstabilisingandsustainingmodernstatesandstatesystembypoliticalmeans.Inthemodernera,theideaofalegalunityoftherespublica christianawasreplacedbyapluralityofstatesclaimingsovereignty,thatis,tobetheonlylegitimatepowerinpublicandinternationallaw.21InconnectionwiththeformationoftheEuropeanpowersystemandoverseasexpansion,SpanishScholastics,Grotiusandothersinitiatedanewlegaldiscourseonthelawofnations.Althoughmarkedbyfundamentaldifferences,whetherseeingthelawofnationsjustifiedbynature,byreasonorbypositiveacts,customandconsent,thosetakingthistendencyagreeononecrucialpointthattheonlyultimateauthorityabout

18 SeeDieterSenghaas:Friedensprojekt Europa(FrankfurtamMain,2002).19 Thistransformationandreconfigurationofsovereignty“doesnotcircumventthe

inside/outsidedivideassociatedwithstatehood”(DavidBoucher,“ResurrectingPufendorfandcapturingtheWestphalianmoment”,Review of International Studies27(2001):576);rather itreproduces itatanewlevel–withall itseffectsconcerningthe inclusionandexclusionofotheractorsandinterests.

20 ItisilluminatingtoseethatJürgenHabermas,tryingtolegitimatetheEuropeanUnionasanewactorandglobalplayerintheso-called“postnationalconstellation”(sothe titleofhisbook,Cambridge,2001),convergeswiththe theoryofapost-sovereignspatialworldordercomposedofcontinentalgeopoliticalunitiesastheywerepromotedbyHabermas’sproclaimedpoliticalopponent,CarlSchmitt;seeSchmitt’sStaat – Großraum – Nomos(Berlin,1995).

21 Onthisconcept,seeAsbach,“SovereigntybetweenEffectivenessandLegitimacy”(chap.2).


whatisacceptedandenforcedasinternationallawisthewilloffreeandsovereignactors.22ThisistherealmeaningoftheMyth of 1648:itservesasanimaginarypointofreferenceforanactuallyemergingorderofinternationallawwhoseraison d’êtreistheexistenceandfreedevelopmentofthepluralactors,andassuchitisofpracticalimportance.23Themutualrecognitionofterritorialintegrityensurestheself-preservationofitsmembersintheinternationalsystemandtheirequalityinlegalrelations,whilethenetworkofdiplomacyandnegotiationscreatesandmaintains common legal interactions and respective independence. In all thevarious forms of this modern law of nations it is always a question of a legalstructureinwhichtherestraintsonfreeactionarelefttothewilloftheactorsinthisinternationalsystem,totheirmoralinsightandpoliticaldecisions.

Nevertheless, this attempt to tame the modern state system by theconstructionofacommoninter-nationallawnotonlyshowsupinternallimitsand contradictions; itmoreoverprovokes anewdynamicsof competition andconflict.Mostmoderntheoreticiansandpractitionersofthelawofnationseitherdisregard these problems or else see no problem at all, contenting themselvesinsteadwithdeducingtherulesandvalidityofthelawofnationsandshowingitssupposedpracticabilityandbindingcharacter.Onlyafewcriticisethelawof

22 Thedecisivemoveofallmodern international lawcanbe identified in nuce inFranciscodeVitoria’sobservationthatneitherthePopenortheemperorcanclaimtobe“thelordofthewholeworld”(Vitoria:Deindis,II.1and3),andinhisshiftfromthetraditional ius gentium to the ius inter gentes, that is, to theprimacyof“the rulersandmagistratestowhomthecommonwealthhasdelegateditspowersandoffices”;Vitoria,“OnCivilPower”,inPolitical Writings,tansl.anded.AnthonyPagdenandJeremyLawrance(Cambridge,NewYork, 1991), I.5, p. 12.Thewhole rangeofdifferent andopposinginterpretationsoftheoriginsandvalidityofthislawofnations,whethergivenbygod,nature,reason,consentortradition,fromsixteenthcenturyonwards,arelittlemorethanvariationswithinthisnewparadigmofaius gentiumasa“law-of-what-free-actors-decide-to-be-law”,andthisaccordingtowhattheyjudgetobe,orareabletoenforceas,thetruegroundsandcontentsoflawininternationalrelations.

23 Itcertainly isamyththat thepeaceofWestphalia in1648historically realisedthespecificallymodernprinciplesofinternationalrelationssuchassovereignty,territorialintegrity, legal equality, the principle of non-intervention and so on (seeTeschke, The Myth of 1648, pp. 215–16). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish, as Boucherdoes(“ResurrectingPufendorf”,pp.560–62),betweenthehistoricalandtheemblematiccharacterof“1648”.Asan importantpointofdepartureandpointof reference in thefollowingpoliticalthinkingandacting,1648became,preciselyasamyth,aformativefactorin the constructionof themodern state system; cf.HeinzSchilling, “DerWestfälischeFriedeunddasneuzeitlicheProfilEuropas”,inHeinzDuchhardt(ed.),Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatiepolitische Zäsur – Kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte (Historische Zeitschrift. Beiheft 26) (München, 1998), pp. 3–32, esp. 22–4. On the Westphaliansystembetweenmythandreality,cf.MatthiasZimmer,Moderne, Staat und Internationale Politik(Wiesbaden,2008),pp.37–53.


nationsasnecessarilystumblingbeforethehurdleofthe“modern”principleofsubjectivity–forthesubjectiverighttodecidewhatisrightandwrong,justandunjust,isatthesametimetheguaranteeoffreedomandthereasonofconflicts.Aslongasitremainsuptotheactorsthemselvestooperateastheultimateauthorityanddecideuponwhatisright,onthevalidityofcontractsandalliancesandsoon, therecanbeno such thingasLaw sensu strictu.24Theexistenceofa“real”international lawwould requirewhat isdefinitivelynonexistent in the stateofnature:aclearandlegallyenforceabledifferentiationoftherespectiverightsandspheresofactionandfreedomofthemanifoldactors.Thatiswhyexponentsofmodernlawofnations,intheeyesofHobbes,Saint-Pierre,RousseauorKant,arenothingbut–asthelatterputit–“miserableconsolers”,insofartheyspeakoflawwhereithasnobindingforce,thusprovidingtothosewhohavethepowerandintereststouseittheopportunity“forthejustificationofanoutbreakofwar”.25Theyproduce,sotospeak,theillusionof international lawandtheillusionoftheexistenceofobjectivelimitsandrestraintstowarfare,butdefactotheyonlyconceal in this way the impossibility of realising, under these circumstances,securedconditionsoflawandpeace.

Whatseemstobeaparadoxandafailure,however,isactuallyinfullaccordancewiththedemandsonthetheoryandpracticeofthemodernlawofnations.Thelaw of nations emerges as a form of organisation of a plurality of actors in anewEuropeanworldsystem,ofstates,corporationsandcompanies,competingforterritoriesandmarkets,tradeandsearoutes,resourcesandmen–toenslaveorconvertthem.26Themodernlawofnationsneveraimedatthecategoricallyeliminating force and war: the law of nations has therefore always comprisedthelawsofwar,specifyingtheconditionsofthestate’srightanddutytodeclare,conductandendwars.Inthemodernsocialaswellastheinternationalsystem

24 AsHobbeshasputit,inaconditionwhereeverybodyhastherighttojudgewhatisjustandunjust,rightandwrong,“theeffectsofthisrightarethesame,almost,asiftherehadbeennorightatall”(Hobbes:Rudiments,I.11,p.11).Hence,nointernationallawbetweensovereignstatesandactorsispossible,orastheAbbédeSaint-Pierreputit:“iln’yaaucunDroit danslasignificationpréciseduterme,Droit,duterme,Jus”.AbbédeSaint-Pierre,Mémoire pour diminuer le nombre des procès(Paris,1725),pp.393–5.

25 Immanuel Kant: “Toward perpetual peace. A philosophical project” [1795],inKant,Practical Philosophy, tansl.anded.MaryJ.Gregor(Cambridge,1996)seconddefinitivearticle,p.326.

26 The successive formation of the early modern Ius Publicum Europaeum in theSpanishandFrenchAge(cf.WilhelmG.Grewe:The Epochs of International Law(Berlin,2000), part II and III) was always part of the movement to legitimise and secure theconditionsofandrightstoterritorialpossessionsandacquisitionsinEuropeandoverseas.Its major aim was thus to found and reproduce the structures of pursuing particularinterestsof(European)statesandotheractorsandinterestgroups.Andthisalwaysincludedthepossibilityaswellastherealityofmanifoldconflictsandwars.


ofcompetingactors,freelydeterminingtheirinterestsandends,lawisalwaysanelementandexpressionofextra-legalinterestsandpowerrelations.Theseinterestsandpowerrelationsarenotexternaltoit,butratherconstituteitsfundamentandcore.Consequently,theychargelawwithconflictpotential.

Inrecentyears,thetheoryandpracticeofinternationallawhaveoftenbeendescribedasasuccessstory,evenifadelayedone,thathasfinallyovercomeitscontradictions and bellicist implications by outlawing war, undermining theprinciple of sovereignty, and establishing networks of international rules andobligations,thusproducingthehopethathistoricaldevelopmentsininternationalandhumanitarianlawandinstitutionswillultimatelyturnouttobeguaranteesof the general rule of peace and law.27 There are reasons, however, to doubtthis interpretation. In the first place, all this does not cancel the fundamentalcontradiction of rights in international relations: the international system isandremainsapluralityofstate,trans-andsupranationalactorsthatdecideonthevalidity andenforcementofwhat is considered tobe justice– actors that,dependingonopportunity and their respectivepositionsofpower, are able toenforcetheirownparticularinterests.Thisiswhyliberalanddemocraticconcepts,withtheirreferencetoalawofnationsenforcingpeaceandrights,easilybecomeinstruments spreadingandacceleratingconflicts to thepointofmilitary force.Theyprovideasetofuniversalnormativearguments,principlesandvaluesthatservestofeedthearsenalofnecessarilyparticularactorsinaglobalstateofnature.Thus,andsecondly,eventheallegeduniversalityofinternationallawalwaysrevealssomeparticulardimension.Underthegivenconditionsofafragmentisedworldofinterestsandpowerscompetingatthetransnationalandgloballevel,itfunctionsas a driving force for pushing through specific interests, whether “egoistic” or“universalist”,andsoitselftendstoprovokeandjustifyconflictsandwars.Whatcomesalongintermsoftheuniversallawofnationsandisexecutedinitsnamealwaysincludestheaspectofparticularity,ofpowerandtherightofthestrongest.Andsucha“right”necessarilyprovokesresistance,with inturnitsclaimto itsownright.28Therefore,thirdly,itprovestobehighlydangerousandconsequently

27 G.I.A.Draperconcludesthat,“after150yearsofitsdevelopment”,aremarkable“progressofthehumanitarianlawofwar”hasbeenachieved(“HumanitarianismintheModernLawofArmedConflicts”,International Relations8(1985):394).And,followingnumerouscorrespondingaccounts,Habermasreconstructsakindofsuccessiveformationprocessofagloballegalorder,whichhascomeabout,despiteallreversals,sincetheendof theFirstWorldWar; formoredetail, seeOlafAsbach,“Jenseitsdes internationalenNaturzustands? Habermas und dieTransformation des neuzeitlichen Völkerrechts“, inGaryS.Schaal (ed.),Das Staatsverständnis von Jürgen Habermas (Baden-Baden,2009),pp.223–8.

28 This confirms Hobbes’s insight that in such a state of nature the competing“rights”provokeastateofwarandthenegationofanyrightbecauseeverybody“hatha


politicallyinadvisablesimplytorelyonthehistoricalcontinuityofactualprocessesofjuridification,includingtheirallegedpreconditionsofdemocracyandmarketeconomy,processesthatareproclaimedtobeafootininternationallawandinthe internationalsystem.29Todosowouldresult inafataldialectic,consistingontheonehandinthespreadofthesedevelopmentsundertheaegisofadoubly“good”conscience,becausenowbackedbybothhistoryandreason,andassistedifnecessarybymilitary force,andon theotherhand in the therebygeneratedresistancethatseesitselfaslegitimatelyfoundedintherighttoself-preservationandself-determinationagainstthelatestmanifestationsoftheoldEuropeanandwesternaspirationforhegemony;30andtogether,feedingoneanother,theywouldheraldtheproliferationofconflictsandwarsamongthepluralityofactorsattheinternationalandregionallevels.

Peace by Institutions of Global Law?

Athirdtendencytriestoendtheinternationalstateofnaturebymeansofglobalinstitutions. From seventeenth century onwards, it was developed mainly bypoliticalphilosophersinwhathasoftenbeencalledprojectsofperpetual peace.31

righttomakeuse,ofandtodoeallwhatsoeverheshalljudgerequisiteforhispreservation:whereforebythejudgementofhimthatdothit,thethingdoneiseitherright,orwrong;andthereforeright”(Hobbes,Philosophical Rudiments,I.10note,p.10).

29 Even–or precisely – “critical” peace researchers and cosmopolitan thinkers asHabermas,Pogge,Senghaasandothers(cf.above,note1and18)tendtosupposethatthefulfilmentoftheholytrinityof(initiallyEuropean orWestern)capitalism,democracyandlegalsystemswillguaranteegeneralpeace,lawandwealthonearth.Thisisnotonlydubious for systematic reasons, but also in the light of the fact that this is inevitablya historically specific – European or Western – form of political, economic and socialorganisationandthusexclusiveofallotherwaysoflivingandthinking.

30 “Forthoseweexclude,andevenforalotofthosewewishtoinclude,…allthisisahorribledéjàvu:Thewhitemanridesagain.SincetheMiddleAges,theWesthasstruggledtomaketheworldhappybyimposingitsvaluesupontherest.ItislikeaRussianbabushkadoll”thatleadsfromactualcosmopolitanismbacktotheimperialistmission civilisatrice,SpanishmissionariesandChristiancrusaders:“Forus,cosmopolitanjusticeseemstoberatherabreakwiththispast.Formostoftherestoftheworld,itisanoldpatterninanewdisguise:TheinexorabledrivebythewhiteWesternmantoimposehimselfontheglobe”;HaraldMüller,“Whatwearefighting for:WhytheQuest forUniversal JusticeMightMeanPerpetualWar”,unpubl.conferencepaper(FrankfurtamMain,2007).

31 ThefirstimportantworksofthistraditionareÉmericdeCrucé’sLe nouveau Cynée ou Discours des occasions et moyens d’établir une paix générale et la liberté du commerce par tout le monde (1623)andWilliamPenn’sEssayTowards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates(1693).Forabrief


Unlikepre-modernorhumanistpeacetheories,whichtrytorevoketheongoingprocessesofpolitical,socialandeconomicdifferentiationanditsspecificconflictstructures,thesetheoriesaimatfoundingandrationallyaswellasfunctionallyorganisingapolitico-institutionalordercapableofregulatingthecompetingwillsandinterestsofparticular(stateandother)actorsthatcannotbepacifiedbymeansofthepoliticalbalanceofpowerortheclassicallawofnations.Bycreatinggeneralinstitutions,theytrytopreventviolenceamongactorswithouteliminatingtheirfreedomofaction.FollowingtheargumentsofmoderncontractualisttheoryfromHobbeson,theoristssuchasSaint-Pierre,RousseauorKanttriedtodemonstratethattheantagonisticstructureofthemodernstatesystemcanbepacifiedonlyifthisstateofnatureisabandoned.Thestabilityofpeaceisthefunctionandtheresult of an institutionally guaranteed system that constitutes and ensures thesubjectiverightsofitsmembersbyasystemofobjectivelawaffordedbycommoninstitutions(suchasaparliamentofrepresentativesofthememberstates,acourtofjusticeandsoon)withthecapacitiestoenforcethem.Nomemberstateretainstherightandthemeanstoenforceitsprivateclaimsandinterpretationsofthelawagainsttheother’swill,andisinsteadcontainedwithincommoninstitutionsandtheirmeansoflegitimateviolence.Althoughstatesarethussubordinatedtoasuperiorpower,theyaresubjectednottoanexternalwillbutonlytotheirownwill,sincetheythemselvescreateandsustainthegeneralinstitutionsthatmakeandenforcelaw.32

In the recent decades, these ideas of the European enlightenment haveexperiencedacertainrevival inpoliticaltheoryandpractice.Thissuggeststhatplansof“perpetualpeace”byglobalinstitutionsaremorethansimplechimerasof naive philosophers and refer to real problems of the modern world. Thecurrentphenomenaof globalisation seem to attest to the actual relevance andmodernityoftheseplans.Institutionsthatarecapableofdealingeffectivelywithregulations, problems and crisis of amore andmore complex and interwovenworldsystemprovetobedecisiveconditionsofanorderofactorswhopursuetheir self-preservation,political, economic andother interests and endswithina global system of competition and accumulation of power and capital, andthereforehavetosecureitspreconditions–freemarkets,commodityproduction,privateappropriation,personalfreedomandpropertyrightsatthenationalandtransnational levels.Moreover, the ideaoftransnationalandglobal institutionsguaranteeingpeaceandlawastheycanberecognisedinatleastrudimentaryforms

overview,seeOlafAsbach,“Friedensutopien”,inEnzyklopädiederNeuzeit,ed.Horst Carl and Christoph Kampmann,vol.4(Stuttgart,Weimar,2006),pp.27–34.

32 Concerningtheconcreteforms,feasibilityanddesirabilityofsuchcommonlawgivingandenforcinginstitutions,thedifferentauthorshavevaryingopinions;onSaint-PierreandRousseau,seeAsbach,Zähmung der Leviathane; forKantseeOtfriedHöffe,Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace(Cambridge,2006),chaps10–12.


in institutions suchas theUnitedNationsor theEuropeanUnion, sometimesseemstohavebecomeakindofcentralthemeorprevailingideologyduringthelastdecade.Thisisparticularlythecaseinthe“oldEurope”,whoseproponentsfight for the primacy of global juridification by common institutions so as todirectpowerandthepursuitofinterestsintothechannelsoflegalorganisationandconflictresolution.33But,paradoxically,theseattemptstosubordinatepowertolawandtopreventtheuseofforceandwarbymeansofcommoninstitutionsoftenprovokenewformsofexercisingpower,ofconflict,violenceandwar.Tworemarksonthereasonsforthisdarksideofglobalinstitutionsofpeaceandlawmaygosomewayinaccountingforthis.

In the first place, this conception of globalising peace and law-enforcinginstitutionsistiedtothespecific,conflict-generatingdialecticsofrightandpowertowhichRousseauandKantalreadypointedwhentheyspokeofthethreatofanewdespotism.34Theabstractnessandeffectivenessofglobalinstitutionsimplythat only few actors – primarily the national, international and transnationalelites–haveaccess to themanddisposeof thenecessary resources tobring inand to enforce their interests as global players. Such a configurationof globalinstitutionsthusincreasesthegiveninequalitiesandconflictsofpowers.Despiteandbecauseoftheirformaluniversalityandimpartiality,theseinstitutionsactasmediaofthecompetitionbetweenactorswho,providedwithdifferentdegreesofpolitical,economicandsocialpower,fightforthegeneralisationandenforcementof their respectiveparticular interests andvalues; so that these formsofglobalgovernancecontain“aconsistentbias in favourof interestswell-represented ininternational institutionsandactorswithsufficientresources tocarryout theirpolicychoices”.35Thisinturnevokesresistance,conflictsandwarsagainstthesenational,regionalorglobalinstitutionsoragainsttheagentsofthisglobalorderthatarefelttoberepressiveandheteronomous.

33 “We,citizensoftheEuropeanUnion,Paradise”,asMarttiKoskenniemi(“GlobalGovernance and Public International Law”, Kritische Justiz 37 (2004), pp. 241–2)ironicallyputit,“shareanintuitionabouthowtheworld–theinternationalworld–isandhowitwillbeinthefuture.Wethinkitwillbelikeweare”.Andthis“quintessentiallyEuropeanreadingofpublicinternationallaw”follows“theimageofthelawofthenation-state”withMultilateraltreatisesaslegislationandinternationalcourts“asanindependentjudiciary.Andtheydoproliferate”.

34 Thisiswhytheybothfinallyrejectedtheideaofglobalinstitutionswithalaw-enforcingmonopolyof themeansofviolenceandoptedfordemocratisationofnationstatesandtheprincipleofnationalautonomyandnon-intervention.

35 Koskenniemi,“GlobalGovernance”,p.451.Examplesarelegion;onehasonlytoconsiderinstitutionssuchastheWTOortheWorldBankandtheirpowertoinfluenceordirectnationaleconomicandsocialpoliciesandenforcethereconstructionofpublicandprivatesectorsofmanystatesandregionsallovertheglobeinaspecificdirectionduringrecentdecades.


Secondly,andatthesametime,thispointsouttheproblemsofsuchinstitutionsin light of the claims of democratic self-determination. Despite all existingmechanismsofinfluencebynationalorsectoralactors,publicsandinterestgroups,suchinstitutionstendtoproduceakindof“geo-governancewithoutdemocracy”.36Political decisions are made far away from concrete situations, problems andintereststhatareculturally,politicallyandeconomicallyhighlydisparate,sothattomanyoftheaffectednationstheyappeartobethedictatesofaforeignpower.This situation would not be rectified by the most honest attempts to excludepartial interestsandpowerrelations,orevenbyrestricting thecompetencesofglobal institutionspurely to theprotectionofpeaceandhumanrights.37Sincethe realisation of peace and human rights necessarily depends on complexpolitical,economicandculturalfactorsandtheirspecificinterpretation,anysuchdecisioninvolvesfar-reachinginterventionsintotherespectiverelationsofpower,interestsandculturaltraditions.38Allthisgivesrisetonewclashesofinterestandresistance,newdivisions and conceptsof the enemy: some feel they arebeingpatronisedandareapawninthehandsofpowerfulandforeigninterests,whileothersactinthefullconsciousnessoftheirresponsibilitytoprotectpeace,humanrightsandtheirpreconditionsand,ifnecessary,toenforcethemby“justwars”proclaimedbyinstitutionswhosegeneralityandneutralityaresharplycontested.Eveniftheseinstitutionsarenotvehiclesforenforcingwesternsystemsofvaluesandworldorder,capitaliststructuresortheinterestsofpowerfulactors,underthegivenconditions,aglobalorderformakingandenforcinglawandpeacerunstherisktoinitiatinganever-endingchainofconflictsandwars:warsforpeace,warsforhumanrights,warsforhumanitarianaid–andalltheresistance,divisions,conflictsandoldandnewwarsthatthiswillprovoke.

36 Cf. Mark Imber, “Geo-governance without democracy? Reforming the UNsystem”, in Anthony McGrew (ed.), The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy (London, 1997), pp. 201–30; Michael Th. Greven, “SomeConsiderationsonParticipationandParticipatoryGovernance”, inBeateKohler-Koch,Berthold Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union(Lanham,2007),pp.233–48.

37 See,forexample,JürgenHabermas:The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays(London,2001),chap.V.

38 Itisasadironythatthe–correct–understandingofthecomplexconditionsoftherealisationofpeaceandhumanrightsisoftendeducedfromtheparticular EuropeanandWesternexperiencesand,abstractedandnaivelyunderstoodasuniversal,canbeusedasanargumentandweaponforitsimposition,violatingjustthoseconditionsofpeaceandhumanrightsthatitpresumestoprotect.


War, Peace and Self-Criticism of Modernity

Pointing to the manifold international institutions, forms of cooperation andgovernance, processes of denationalisation and transnationalisation of law, therise of NGOs, proclamations of human rights and international law, manycontemporary scholars and political activists convey the impression that weare near to a global post-histoire.We already know the ways, the axis and thepracticesofwhat isgoodand true,andwehaveonly toovercomethe troubleof teething andother imperfectionsbefore realising and imposing it. Lookingbackon the theory andpracticeof internationalpolitics and law in and sincetheearlymodernage,however,showsthatitwouldbenaïveanddangeroustosuppresstheinherentproblemsandcontradictions.Thisholdsforallthecurrentsformingandorganising theconditionsofglobalpeaceand law in themodernandcontemporaryworldthathavebeensketchedhere.Theyinvariablytendtoprovokenewformsofexclusionandrepression–sometimesevenwhentheyareparadoxicallyproclaimingdemocracy,peaceorhumanrights.Repressing thoseproblemsthathavebeeninherentinthedifferentwaysofseekingpeaceandthejuridificationofconflictsinthemodernworldwouldforgotheopportunitytoidentify,andpossiblytoovercome,thecontradictionsthatarereproducedbywell-intentionedconceptsandactivities.Onlyifcriticalanalysisdoesnotdeceiveitselfwiththeachievedprogressinthetheoriesandpracticesofpacifyinginternationalrelationswillitbecapableofidentifyingthereasonsfortheirconflict-generatingconsequences.Constantcriticismofthesedevelopmentsandtheirdarksides,andself-criticism,isanindispensableconditiontopreventthethreatening–andtoooftenactual–relapsefrommodernityandenlightenedreasonintobarbarism.

Index

9/11141

absolutism41,49–52,57,58AfricaandAfricans

internationallaw232–3,240–45passim

internationalrelations109,128,139terra nullius64,70,76

Agincourt,Battleof109Ailianos108Alès,Edictof229AlexanderVI,Pope174Althusius,Johannes114,121AmericanIndependence,Warof57AmericanIndians

internationallaw177,232,237terra nullius64,71–2,73,74,75–6,

77–82Americas

internationallaw172–80passim,232,234–5,237,238–45passim

terra nullius63,64,71–2,73,74,75–6,82

anarchism105–6Anderson,Perry43AnglicanismandAnglicans235Aquinas,StThomas119Aristotelianism114–16,125,139,143,

156,183,192Arnisaeus,Henning114Arnold,Thomas78AsiaandAsians

internationallaw234,236,237,239–43passim

internationalrelations109,128Asiento de negros244–5AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

(ASEAN)133asymmetricalwars17Atabalipa,King180

atheismandatheists101–2Augsburg,Treatyof202,203,213Augustinianpeacetheology116,125Austin,JohnL.148Australia64,70,75,79AustralianAboriginals64,70,75,79AustriaandAustrians30,57autonomyofstates,lackof32–3Ayala,Balthazar71,72

BaldusdeUbaldis102Barbados245Barbeyrac,Jean177,213–14

naturallawandreligion67Bärwalde,Treatyof203Bavaria203,209Bean,Richard37BenedictXVI,Pope63Bèze,Théodorede228biologism105Bireley,Robert198Blockmans,Wim38Bodin,Jean88BohemiaandBohemians19,27–8,

199–200BohemianRevolt/Uprising27,199–200Bonney,Richard38,45Borch,Merete70Borghia,Cardinal203Borkenau,Franz176,177Bosse,Abraham178Bossuet,Jacques-Bénigne229–30Botero,Giovanni88Bragança,Catharineof243Bragança,Dukesof240–41Brandenburg28,39,226Brazil232,235,241–2,243Breda,Treatyof245Brenner,Robert47Brewer,John37,42,55


Brockmann,Thomas198,202Brunner,Otto46Burlamqui,JeanJacques67,68,69

Cabbot,John74CalvinismandCalvinists126,212,214,

222–3,228,229Canada57capitalism40,41,42,45,53–7,58–9Carr,E.H.103Cateau-Cambrésis,Peaceof235CatharineofBragança243CatholicLeague126CatholicismandCatholics212

afterrevocationofEdictofNantes211,214–23,228,229–30

beforerevocationofEdictofNantes223–8,229

andHuguenots84,99–100,216,219–21,223–4,229

inter-staterelations99–100,102,167,174

legalstatusofnon-Europeandominions234–7

Machiavellion94statejurisdiction192terra nullius63ThirtyYears’War201–3,204TreatyofWestphalia213–14,223–8

CharlesI,King241,242CharlesII,King243–4CharlesV,Emperor26CharlesIX,King227Chesne,Legierdu84Chigi,Fabio200China40ChristianityandChristians117,158

afterrevocationofEdictofNantes214–23,228,229–30

beforerevocationofEdictofNantes223–8,229

inter-staterelations83–4,165legalstatusofnon-European

dominions234–7originsofcapitalism41terra nullius63,64,66,76,77

Christine,Queen22,24Cicero95–9,144ColloquedePoissy224,227,228Connor,Michael70Constantinople,conquestof41Contamine,Philippe38Contarini,Alvise200contractualism113–14,118,120–22

see alsosocialcontractsCouncilofTrent83Cromwell,Oliver232,243Crucé,Emericde114,117

DanishWar201Davenport,F.G.174Derrida,Jacques151Dickmann,Fritz207Duchhardt,Heinz197–8,199,204,205Duffy,Michael37DutchEastIndiaCompany109–10,139,

236DutchRevolt28–9,84,113–14,118,

121,122DutchWestIndiaCompany245

EastIndies236,238–45passimEdictofAlès229EdictofFontainbleau230EdictofJanuary(1562)224,227EdictofNantes211,214,220,222,224,

229–30EightyYears’War107–14ElizabethI,Queen84,192,239EnglandandtheEnglish191–2,226

capitalism39,45,48,53–7colonialism235,236,238–45passimstateformation37,39,41,45,48,

53–7EnglishCivilWar183EnglishRevolution191equalityofstates,lackof31ErasmusofRotterdam117Euclid181EuropaRegina19–20EuropeanConventiononHumanRights

133

Index 269

EuropeanUnion135,257,263

Fénelon,François229,256FerdinandII,Emperor198,199–200,

201–2,207–9FerdinandIII,Emperor22,24,209FinancialRevolution37,54FiscalRevolution54Florida57Fontainbleau,Edictof230FranceandtheFrench57,167,174

absolutism41,49–52,58afterrevocationofEdictofNantes

214–23,228,229–30beforerevocationofEdictofNantes

223–8,229capitalism39,48colonialism232,235,238–45passimhegemonyandWestphalia211–14,

223–8andHuguenots84–6,216,219–21,

223–4,229republicanism93stateformation26–7,30,39,40,41,

44,48,49–52,58ThirtyYears’War22,198–205passim,

206–9visualrepresentationof19,22,26–7

FrançoisII,King224Fredericianwars32FrederickII,King(FredericktheGreat)

30,31FrederickV,ElectorPalatine28Freitas,Seraphimde236–7FrenchRevolution52,191Friedrich-Wilhelm,PrinceElectorof

Brandenburg215,216,220,222Frisch,Michael202Frontinus108

Genet,Jean-Philipe38Gentili,Alberico

inter-staterelationsandreligion83–93,99–102

republicanism93–9terra nullius71,72,74

GermanyandGermans19,56,93–4,164,205,214,222,226–7

globalgovernance134,140,152globallines165,172–80globalisation5–6,134,256–7,262–3

andgloballines173–4andsocialcontracts137–42,151–2andsovereignty135–7

GloriousRevolution37,54,56GreatBritainandtheBritish27,79,81

colonialism232,238–45passimGriffin,James

naturallawandreligion65Grotius,Hugo107,108,131–5,163

freedomoftheseas235–6governance140,152language146–7,149,150–52lawofnations133,257naturallaw145naturallawandreligion65,67–8,69,

89,150personalrights138–9pluralism144–5positivelaw145promising146–52property78,80,137–8,140punishment139–40self-constraint125socialcontracts137–46,151–2sovereignty135–7speech147–9,150–52terra nullius73,74utility144

Guicciardini,Francesco84GuisemassacreofHuguenots224GustavusAdolphus,King19,21,126,

201,203,210

Habermas,Jürgen46,147–8,150Habsburgs19,22,26,27,28,128,202,

214,225,235,240Hanovers55,56Hartmann,AnjaV.199Heckel,Martin202HenryIV,King224Hintze,Otto11,17,35


Hobbes,Thomas17,69,112,255,259imperialism172–80inter-staterelations99,194philosophy181,183–4politicalsovereignty181–2,186–93reasonofstate156,158religioussovereignty191–2security163–5socialcontracts137,142,182,184–5,

262terra nullius 74warasaduel166–72

Holland,seeNetherlandsandtheDutchHolyRomanEmpire19,53,58,214

ThirtyYears’War199–205passim,207–9

Hooker,Richard65,121hostages102Huguenots

colonialism235inter-staterelations84–6,99–101revocationofEdictofNantes216,

219–21,223–4,229

imperialism172–80see alsoterra nullius

India57,139InnocentX,Pope201institutionalstabilityofstates,lackof31–2InternationalCourtofJustice133InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)140IsidoreofSeville72IslamandMuslims41,237ItalyandItalians19,39,48,93–4,109,

128

Jacobins191Jamaica243,245JamesI,King236Jesuits101,228JohannVII,Count127JohnofSalisbury65Justi,Johann256

Kant,Immanuel3,143,152,191,256,259,262,263

Keckermann,Bartholomaeus115,116Kennedy,Paul37,43Koller,Alexander203König,René159Krippendorf,Ekkehard17KyotoProtocol138

l’Hospital,Michelde227–8LaFontaine,Jeande229Lainez,Diego228Langewiesche,Dieter17language146–7,149,150–52lawofnations63,64,66,70–71,76–7,

132,133,194andpeace257–61

Lesaffer,Randall199liberalism35–6,43Lipsius,Justus84,88,108,111,115

contractualism118,120–22self-constraint117–25

Locke,John170,190naturallawandreligion65property78–9,138terra nullius71,72,74,77,78–9,80,

81Lorraine,Cardinalof228LouisXIII,King174,207,224LouisXIV,King22,24,27,51,215,216,

219–22,223,224,229–30Louisiana57LutheranProtestantismandLutherans

202,212,222–3

Mably,GabrielBonnotde256Machiavelli,Niccolò84,108,119,124,

144,163,179,254inter-staterelations86–90,92–3,

98–102rationalism157reasonofstate155–61republicanism93–9,192

Malcolm,Noel164Malettke,Klaus207Mann,Michael11,40–42,48,58Māoris79–80Mapuche232

Index 271

Mariana,Juande101,121Marshall,John,ChiefJustice73MarshallPlan228MarxismandMarxists35–6,43,47–8MauriceofOrange123MaximilianI,Emperor117McGrade,A.S.65Meinecke,Friedrich158–9Mexico232MiddleEast138MilitaryRevolution37,41,54militiamen107–9Mills,Charles74–5Moluccaislands234Monarchomachs100Monroedoctrine173Moore,Barrington43More,Thomas72,74multiplesocialcontracts137–42,152Münkler,Herfried17Münster,Treatyof3,209Muslims,see IslamandMuslims

Nantes,Edictof211,214,220,222,224,229–30

NATO228naturallaw63,64,89,145

andreligion65–9,77,150andterra nullius75–6

naturalrights64andreligion65–9andterra nullius75–6

neo-Hintzeanism36–42,43,44,48,58neo-Stoicism125NetherlandsandtheDutch

capitalism39,48colonialism232–7passim,238–45

passimcontractualism121–4DutchRevolt28–9,84,113–14,118,

122EightyYears’War107–14,126–8stateformation39,41,48,53ThirtyYears’War200–201,204,226see alsoUnitedProvinces

newwars8–9,17–18

Nietzsche,Friedrich157NineYears’War27NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement

(NAFTA)133NorthCarolina82Nouvelle,Claude84–5Nussbaum,Arthur65,68

Öhmann,Jenny199,210Olivares,GaspardeGuzmányPimentel,

Count-Dukeof204OPEC138Orange,Houseof110,123,124

militaryreforms111–14,126–8OrthodoxChristianity41Osnabrück,Treatyof3,223OttomanEmpire27,91–2,100,117

Panizza,Diego84Parker,Charles37Parker,Geoffrey111Pascal,Blaise178Pateman,Carole75,77Patrizi,Francesco108Paul,St66PaulIII,Pope63peace116–17,152

bybalanceofpower254–7byinstitutionsofgloballaw261–4byinternationallaw257–61andwar152,252–3visualrepresentationof22,25

Peru180,232PetertheGreat27PhilipII,King84pluralisation250–52pluralism144–5Poland58Polybios108PortugalandthePortuguese110,173–4

colonialism232–7passim,238–45 passim

promising146–52property

andsocialcontracts137–8,140andterra nullius63,64,78–80


see alsosocialpropertyrelationsProtestants

afterrevocationofEdictofNantes211,214–23,228,229–30

beforerevocationofEdictofNantes212,214,223–8,229

inter-staterelations89,101,102,167,174

legalstatusofnon-Europeandominions234–7

ThirtyYears’War126,201–3,204Prussia28–30,57,179Pufendorf,Samuelvon177

CatholicismandProtestantism214–23,223–8,229–30

churchandstate214–23Frenchpost-1685hegemony214–23,

228,229–30Frenchpre-1685hegemony223–8,

229naturallawandreligion65,67,68,150terra nullius80

punishment139–40

Rachel,Samuellawofnations71naturallawandreligion65,67,68,69

Racine,John229reasonofstate155–61Reinhard,Wolfgang17,18,38republicanism93–9Reynolds,Henry70Rhineland-Palatinate28Ribadeneyra,Pedro88,92–3,100–102Richelieu,Cardinal204,206–8,224–7,

229,240Roberts,Michael37Rohrschneider,Michael198Rousseau,Jean-Jacques93,98,137,256,

259,262,263RudolfII,Emperor19RussiaandRussians27,30,39,40,57

Saint-Pierre,Bernardinde256,259,262Saint-Simon,Ducde230Sallust108

Savoy28Saxony209Scandinavia19Schilling,Heinz198Schmitt,Carl164–5

globallines165,172–80,239imperialism172–80warasaduel166–72

ScholasticismandScholastics116,131,143,257

Searle,John147–8Seldon,John236self-constraint125–8Sepúlveda,JuanGinésde76–7SevenYears’War30,44–5,56,57Sévigné,Madamede229Skocpol,Theda40,42,58Smith,Adam48,81,125socialcontracts137–46,151–2,182,184–5

andpromising146–52socialpropertyrelations36,47–59SolórzanoyPereyra,Juande233SouthAfrica140SpainandtheSpanish

Asiento de negros244–5colonialism76,90,180,232–7

passim,238–45passimDutchRevolt84,121EightyYears’War107–11inter-staterelations90,93,173–4republicanism93ThirtyYears’War198–205passim,

208,226visualrepresentationof19,26

SpanishInquisition236SpanishSuccession,Warof27speech147–9,150–52StBartholomew’sDaymassacres84,88,

224StoicismandStoics115,132

see alsoneo-StoicismStory,Joseph81Strauss,Leo176,177Stuarts54Suarez,Francisco65,121

lawofnations70–71

Index 273

terra nullius71Surinam245SwedenandSwedes19,22,26,211,241

ThirtyYears’War199,203,209–10,226

SwissConfederates27Switzerland53

Tacitus72,93,123–4Taylor,Charles

naturallawandreligion66terra nullius

andhusbandry77–80ideaof64–9implicationsfor69–77andsovereignty80–82

Textor,JohannWolfgangnaturallawandreligion65,67,68–9terra nullius76

ThirtyYears’War3,22,127,132,198–9diplomaticrelationsduring199–201asa“HolyWar”201–3andPax honesta205–10andstateformation26,27–8,167anduniversalmonarchy203–4see alsoDutchRevolt

Thomson,Erik199Thucydides163Tilly,Charles11,39–40,44,48,52Tilly,JohannTserclaes,Countof201Tönnies,Ferdinand176Tordesillas,Treatyof174TrainedBands107–9,112TRIPSAgreement138TruthCommissions140Tuck,Richard177Tully,James74–5,77TwelveYearTruce238tyrants100–101

UnitedNations133,228,263UnitedProvinces139,238–42passim,245

see alsoNetherlandsandtheDutchUnitedStates73,74,168,173,212,228UrbanVIII,Pope203Utrecht,Treatyof56,118,254

Vattel,Emernaturallawandreligion66terra nullius70,71,72–3,74,79

Vegetius108Versailles,Treatyof168,170ViennaSettlement57Vitoria,Francisco168,176,237

terra nullius71–2,76VOC(VereenigdeOost-Indische

Compagnie),seeDutchEastIndiaCompany

Wallenstein,Albrechtvon201Wallerstein,Immanuel43,48Wallhausen,JohannJakobivon,Captain

127Waterloo,Battleof57Weber,Hermann207,225Weber,Max44,58WestIndies238,240,244,245Westphalia,PeaceTreatyof198,200–201,

209,254andcolonialism241–2,243andFrenchhegemony211,212–14,

223–8Grotius’influenceon132andsovereignty192andstate/statesystemformation4,

22,26,53,254visualrepresentationof22

Westphalianorder4,9,52–3,57,106,252,253

creationof22–7upheavalswithin7–9

WhiteMountain,Battleof27WIC(WestindischeCompagnie),see

DutchWestIndiaCompanyWilliams,Michael177–8Wittgenstein,Ludwig142Wolff,Christian71,72,80–82WorldTradeOrganization(WTO)138WorldWarI168WorldWarII212

YugoslaviaTribunal140