Regulatory update6 Ballast Water Management Convention: an overview

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association LimitedRISK WATCH

Volume 24: Number 2

April 2017

Navigation and seamanship

1 Charts: the importance of keeping charts up to date

2 Port of Chittagong: risk of collisions3 Piracy update

Charts: the importance ofkeeping charts up to dateContainers and cargoes

4 Cockroaches; a cautionary tale5 Gas carriers: make sure that the crew have appropriate training

Personal injury7 Moving heavy objects: consider the risks

Loss prevention8 Loss prevention poster campaign: Look-out and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)

The Club’s surveyors have noted in a numberof recent condition surveys that temporary &preliminary (T&P) notices to mariners have notbeen correctly applied to charts. In some cases,the notices have been identified but have notbeen applied correctly to the charts in use onthe passage. In other cases, the T&P noticeshave not been noted at all. These deficiencieshave been found on ships that are usingtraditional paper charts and also on ships thatare using ECDIS as the primary means fornavigation. The application of T&P notices is avital part of keeping charts up to date andthey must be treated with the same care andattention as permanent notices to mariners.

The information contained in all notices tomariners is of great importance to safenavigation and without it mariners could findthemselves in peril or in contravention oflocal laws. If the information is not correctlytransferred to the charts, this could result in aship grounding, a risk of damage to property,a pollution incident or contravention of locallaws. Additionally, if there is a casualty, theseaworthiness of the ship could be called intoquestion. There may also be otherconsequences such as detention of the ship,fines for the owners and also personal finesfor the master and crew.

An example of where T&P notices are oftennot correctly applied is in a traffic separationscheme (TSS). If the TSS has been altered anda preliminary notice issued to warn marinersof the changes, it is intended that thesechanges are noted on the existing chartspending the release of new editions. If thepreliminary correction has not been applied,the mariner could easily contravene the newlimits of the TSS, which could result in heavypenalties as well as the obvious safety risk.

Feedback received from the Club’s conditionsurvey programme and from discussionswith mariners attending the Club’s technicalseminar programme shows that someseafarers are unsure about how the T&Pnotices should be applied to ElectronicNavigational Charts (ENCs). It is important tonote that not all ENC producers include T&Pnotices in their ENCs. The current status ofT&P inclusion in ENCs can be found at thefollowing link:

tinyurl.com/Admiralty-PDF

Where T&P corrections are not included inthe ENCs, they can be applied manually byreferring to the notices to mariners.Additional services are available such as the‘Admiralty Information Overlay’ servicewhich ensures that T&P information is up todate on electronic charts. Again it isimportant for all persons concerned with theupkeep of the navigational charts to ensurethat all relevant notices are applied.

In summary: failure to keep charts up to dateis in contravention of SOLAS and puts theship, the owner and seafarers in danger. It canalso lead to action being taken by port statecontrol officers. It is important that all noticesto mariners are noted, including T&Ps,NavWarnings and local notices on the charts.

It is essential that masters and any personsresponsible for the upkeep of charts areaware of the procedure for collating theinformation from all notices to mariners andensuring that all applicable notices areapplied to the charts in use.

Navigation and seamanship

2 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 24: Number 2: April 2017

In recent years, the port of Chittagong hasdeveloped into a very busy port, currentlyhandling more than 220 ships per month.Inevitably, vessel traffic at the anchorages hasalso increased.

Anchorages:The Port of Chittagong is situated in the lowerestuarial section of the Karnaphuli River, whichmeets the Bay of Bengal near its north easterncorner. Chittagong is a tidal port. The tides inthe Bay of Bengal are semi-diurnal and thetidal range is between 1.5 and 6 metres.

On arrival, deep draft ships (those with draftsin excess of 10 metres) usually drop anchor atKutubdia open sea anchorage, south ofChittagong outer anchorage, and dischargepart of their cargo before shifting to the outeranchorage. Pilotage from Kutubdia to theouter anchorage is not compulsory but theappointment of a pilot is recommended.

The Chittagong outer anchorage area isdivided into three sections as follows:

Alpha: for ships with a draft of more than 10 meters.

Bravo: for ships scheduled to enter theKarnaphuli river within 24 hours.

Charlie: for lightering ships and others notscheduled to enter the port within 24 hours.Lightering is necessary to ensure that shipscomply with the port’s maximum draft, whichranges between 8.50 and 9.50 metres.

Approaches to the anchorages:From Kutubdia to Alpha anchorage isapproximately 4 hours steaming. Mostincidents occur when ships are navigatingfrom Charlie to the busier Alpha and Bravoanchorages. Ships with limited under keelclearance are more prone to lateral drifting,with increased risk of losing steering controlwhen performing manoeuvres in closeproximity to other ships.

Weather and sea conditionsThe weather in Bangladesh is governed bythe monsoon. The wind direction is fromsouth to south east during the months ofApril to September. Winds then turn to anorth and north easterly direction fromNovember to January and to a westerlydirection during February and March. In May,October and November cyclones often occurwith wind velocity in excess of 30 knots.

Conditions at the anchorages• Tidal streams during spring tides are verystrong, between 6 and 8 knots and the ebbtide is stronger than the flood tide. Heavyrainfall may cause the flood tide to increase. • The height of tide between low water andhigh water usually varies from 0.4 to 1.5metres (low) and 2.4 to 4.6 metres (high)during the year.• During high winds and long swells,conditions can be even more difficultparticularly during the southwest monsoon.• Due to the strong underwater current, thereis a significant risk of anchor dragging forrelatively deep water draft ships (drafts inexcess of 10 metres) but this risk decreases for ships with drafts of less than 10 metres.• The sea bed at Alpha and Bravo anchoragesis soft mud with holding ground described as ‘moderate’.

Lightering operationsLightering of cargo at Chittagong outeranchorage becomes more challenging withthe onset of the south west monsoon duringthe period from May to October. Rough seasand bad weather are common during themonsoon and the weather conditions oftendeteriorate rapidly. Lightering ships made fastalongside a mother ship usually experienceheavy rolling and pitching which may causehard scraping, bending and indentations tothe mother ship.

Port of Chittagong: risk of collisions

The Club has noted a recent increase in the number of incidents at Chittagong, particularly at the outeranchorage, involving ships either dragging anchor or colliding with anchored ships whilst manoeuvring at closerange in what is currently a very congested port area.

Alpha

Bravo

Charlie

Members should remind masters:• To manoeuvre with great care whileembarking/disembarking pilots• That the usual dragging line is 160 deg (T)and 340 deg (T) and therefore not to attemptto cross the bow of adjacent ships in closeproximity or underway to avoid possiblecollision/contact • To anchor at a safe distance from other ships bearing in mind the swinging circle of anchored ships at the change of the tide• If possible, to approach the anchorageduring slack water when the tide is almostneutral• To avoid anchoring near the river entrance• To use a sufficient length of cable whenanchoring• To take extra care if the ship’s under keelclearance is less than 2 metres because of the strong underwater current• To have the main engine ready forimmediate use in case of dragging anchor,especially during spring tides• To maintain strict anchor watch and, ifrequired, the anchor should be heaved upand dropped into a new location • To monitor the weather closely so as toenable a prompt response to any suddenchange • To cast off lighter ships alongside if draggingof the anchor is suspected• To avoid heaving up the anchor during low tides, especially if the ship's draft is over10 metres or the under keel clearance is lessthan 10% of her length overall.

SummaryMembers are recommended to pay specialattention to the prevailing conditions andcircumstances in order to assess the risk ofcollision and dragging of anchor atChittagong. The navigating officers shouldremain vigilant and, if there is any sign ofdragging, they should have the enginesmade ready for immediate use, anylightering ships should be cast off and theofficers should be prepared to heave theanchor up promptly.

From January to December 2016 the IMBrecorded 191 actual or attempted attacks onships worldwide, a reduction from 246 theprevious year and the lowest annual figuresince 1998. However, the number of crewkidnappings was the highest in ten years. A total of 151 crew members were takenhostage and 62 kidnapped from their ships.

Somalia/Gulf of AdenThere were two new attacks recorded by the IMB, neither of which were successful. A typical incident involves high speed skiffscarrying armed pirates which target shipsnear the pirates’ base close to the coast ofSomalia or which come from mother ships inthe Gulf of Aden. The pirates will attempt toboard the ship, bring it to a stop and capturethe crew, even when the ships are high sidedand moving at high speed.

While the presence of naval ships in the regionand the adoption of Best Management Practice4 (BMP4) have contributed to a significantreduction in pirate activity, Somali piratesremain capable of launching further attacks.The IMB believes that a single successfulhijacking will result in more attacks by pirates.Shipowners and masters are therefore urgedto remain vigilant and avoid complacency.

Guinea/Nigeria/Benin/Ivory CoastThere has been a reduction in the number ofreported attacks in Guinea, Benin and IvoryCoast, while attacks in Nigeria have increasedfrom 14 in 2015, to 36 in 2016. Attacks areoften connected with the movement of oil,particularly bunkering and STS operationswithin territorial waters.

Piracy updateIn January 2017 the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a specialised division of the International Chamberof Commerce (ICC), published its 2016 annual report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.

In Guinea, three ships were boarded by armed pirates while at anchor off Conakry. In each case the pirates stole cash andpersonal belongings and also harmed orthreatened the crew.

In Nigeria, 17 ships were boarded and onehijacked. Of these, 14 ships were attackedwhile underway and four ships were berthed.Attacks while underway typically involvearmed pirates approaching ships between 30 and 110 nm off the coast of Nigeria.

In Benin, a refrigerated cargo ship washijacked by armed pirates while anchored inCotonou Outer Anchorage. The Nigerian Navydispatched two warships to locate andintercept the ship. As the warship approachedthe cargo ship, 15 pirates escaped with threekidnapped crew members.

In Ivory Coast, a product tanker was hijackedby 18 armed pirates approximately 77 nmfrom Abidjan and the crew were takenhostage. The pirates repainted the tanker’sname and provided false information to theTogo Navy. After the true identity of the shipwas established, a Nigerian warshipintercepted her and after an exchange of gun fire, recovered the ship and crew.

Indonesia/Malaysia/PhilippinesIn the Sulu Sea, South West of the Philippines,armed pirates linked with a militant group,Abu Sayyaf, have attacked several ships usinghigh speed boats in order to kidnap the crewand hold them for ransom. These attacksrepresent a change in tactics, whichpreviously focused on slow moving targetssuch as tugs and barges, and now represents a threat to all merchant shipping.

In the Philippines, there have been 10 attackswith the most violent attacks occurring onships underway. Crew have been takenhostage and kidnapped, with piratestargeting both personal property and cargo.

In Indonesia, there were 49 attacks reportedand of these, 45 ships were boarded, one shipwas hijacked and three attacks failed. Mostattacks occurred while at anchor andinvolved the theft of ship stores. Typically theattackers escaped once the alarm was raised.Nevertheless in one example armed piratesboarded a product tanker 26 nm from thecoast and took the crew hostage.

In Malaysia, there have been several attacksby heavily armed pirates. The attackers oftenapproach ships in small boats and take thecrew hostage before targeting equipment,personal property and cargo.

While the number of attacks recorded by theIMB has fallen in 2016, piracy still represents a significant threat to merchant shipping. It is important that shipowners and crewmembers are aware of the risk of piracy,remain vigilant in areas where piracy isreported and continue to take action tominimise these dangers in accordance with BMP4.

Members are referred to the Piracy focuspage on the Britannia website:

tinyurl.com/Piracy-focus

3

Somalia/Gulf of Aden Guinea/Nigeria/Benin/Ivory Coast Indonesia/Malaysia/Philippines

– Attempted attack – Boarded – Fired upon – Hijacked – Suspicious vessel

In a recent case reported to the Club, a Member found a significant number of cockroaches on board amodular container ship. This meant that all the cargo had to be discharged and the cargo and the ship had tobe fumigated, leading to additional expense and causing significant delay to the ship.

Containers and cargoes

There are three types of cockroachcommonly found as domestic pests; German, Oriental and American. Of these, the German cockroach is the type mostcommonly found on board ships. This is due to a number of factors:

• They are present on all continents and allmajor islands • They have a faster reproductive cycle thanthe other species • They produce a large number of off-spring • They have adapted and developedimmunity to a number of chemicalpesticides.

The German cockroach is smaller than theother species (around 1.6 cm) and prefers tohide in confined spaces, which means it canbe difficult to detect. The cockroach is lighttan in colour and has two easily identifiablestripes behind the head.

Identification on board Frequent inspections and early identificationof sites of infestation may eliminate breedingsources. German cockroaches normally feedat night, therefore seeing them during theday is usually a sign that there is a largenumber of them on board. The presence ofimmature and adult cockroaches togetherindicates that the cockroaches are well-established on board. Cockroaches like warm,confined spaces such as: steam lines, cablebundles, behind false bulkheads, lagging andtorn pipe insulation, ovens and oven hoodsand the housing of motors such as reefermotors.

PreventionOther pests, such as the destructive AsianGypsy Moth, have been targeted by carryingout inspections in high risk areas during theflight season and these measures can provesuccessful in preventing the pests getting onboard. However, these are specific measuresfor specific pests which originate in specificgeographic locations. Their aim is to preventthe pests from being carried to anotherlocation.

Cockroaches are a very different type of pestas they are present in all continents. Given thenumber of container movements and thevariety of cargoes that are carried they canonly be contained through the use of avariety of preventative strategies describedbelow.

Before loading cargoCockroaches can come on board a ship inmany ways. They can arrive in the cardboardpacking of ship’s stores and with personalitems carried by the crew – all of which caneasily be inspected before they come onboard. However, inspecting cargo is a differentand more complex matter.

For containerised cargo, the IMO/ILO/UNECECode (Code) for the Packing of CargoTransport Units (CTU) does contain somepractical advice in Annex 6, although it mustbe remembered that the Code is mainlywritten for shore side movement of cargo. Itshould also be noted that the Code is notmandatory unless made so by a nationalbody and is not intended to conflict with anynational legislation.

The Code provides some useful guidance onhow to prevent pests such as cockroachescoming on board and then how to deal withthem if they get on board. CTU doors must bekept closed and the seals should be keptintact. There is guidance on the use of stickytraps, light traps, chemical and biologicalcontrols as well as advice on using pesticidesin various formulations such as dusts, granularformations, microcapsules, wettable powderand in suspension applications. The Codeexplains where fumigation should be used tosuffocate or poison the pests and how thisshould be done safely. The full text of theCode is available on the IMO website:

tinyurl.com/IMO-safety-code

Cockroaches: a cautionary tale

4 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 24: Number 2: April 2017

Training in these cargo handling systems isessential to ensure that crews, even verycompetent ones, are fully familiar with theiroperation and procedures for maintaining full segregation and avoiding crosscontamination of cargo, including the cargo heels.

A recent case handled by the Club involvedvarious parcels of cargo carried over threevoyages. The first voyage was a full cargo ofethylene, which was loaded and dischargedwithout incident. The second voyage was anLPG mix of butane and propane which werecarried separately and were also loaded anddischarged without incident. A heel ofethylene, taken from the first cargo, had been retained in a deck tank for the purposesof gassing up and cooling the tanks prior to loading a cargo of ethylene for the third voyage.

On the second voyage, the LPG cargo wasloaded into tanks which already containedethylene vapour as the voyage orderscontemplated that the tanks would notrequire further conditioning for this LPGcargo. However, the ethylene heel in the decktank had to be segregated.

The LPG cargoes had to be mixed on boardprior to discharge. During the voyage to thedischarge port for this LPG voyage, the portand starboard cargo and refrigerationcompressors were segregated from eachother. The starboard system was set to run tocool and reduce pressure in the deck tank and the port cargo compressor system wasused to condition the cargo of LPG.

After discharge of the LPG cargo, and onpassage to the third load port, the ship gas-

freed all cargo tanks to breathable air forvisual inspection, purged all the cargo tanksand the cargo system with nitrogen and thengassed up and cooled with the ethylene heel from the deck tank. At this point, the shiphad made common the refrigeration andcompressor systems across all tanks. A fullcargo of ethylene was then loaded for thethird voyage.

Samples taken immediately prior to dischargeof this ethylene cargo showed it to becontaminated with hydrocarbons and furthertesting and investigation confirmed that thecontaminants were butane and propane inthe same proportions as the mix of cargofrom the second voyage. This contaminationwas also confirmed to exist in the deck tank.

Two possible causes of contamination weresuggested: • Either the LPG had not been properlypurged from the system during the change ofgrade process; or • The coolant parcel in the deck tank wascontaminated with LPG during the time it wascarried on board.

Several simulations were planned and thencarried out on board. The conclusion was thatthere had been insufficient segregationbetween the compressor and refrigerationsystems used for the deck tank and thesystems used for the LPG cargo. Analysis ofsystem data identified crossover readings onthe condensate return lines between the twosystems which were supposed to bephysically segregated. This indicated that thetwo systems were not completely segregatedas they should have been, although theresponsible officers had believed that thesystem was sufficiently segregated by design.

The investigation identified two distinctpoints where the physical segregation wasnot complete, with one point identified bythe ship and the other only discovered by aprofessional investigation team.

During the investigation the Memberidentified various problems and issues onboard which, although not exclusively theroot cause of this loss, can be shared toprovide guidance to others:

1) There was no fixed procedure foroperations such as changing grades of cargo.

2) There were also no valve checklistsavailable on board explaining what valves,spool pieces, blanks and spectacle blindsshould be in place for various operations,especially when loading or operating withsegregated cargoes.

3) None of the valves in the cargo systemswere numbered or labelled, which madeidentifications and checking individualvalves more complicated. (The ship hadactually been delivered from the yard withno identification name plates on any of thecargo system valves).

SummaryThere must be a thorough riskassessment when different grades andtypes of cargo are carried. All crewshould receive the necessary trainingand must be familiar with the ship’ssystems, especially if the ship is a newdesign. Even if the crew are experiencedin the trade, they may not be familiarwith the individual ship’s cargo carrying system.

Gas carriers: make sure that the crew have appropriate training

With recent design and technology advances, a new generation of gas carrier is being built that is capable ofcarrying segregated cargoes of gases which may each require different cooling specifications.

5

Regulatory update

Ships can be stopped, detained and fined fornon-compliance with BWM Conventionrequirements. Compliance may be monitoredby both flag and port states. To assistcrewmembers with these new compliancerequirements, we provide the followingsummary of the main provisions of the BWMConvention.

Documents required:The BWM Convention requires ships tomaintain the following documents on board:• BWM Convention certificate or statement ofcompliance• Ship-specific BWM plan (approved by theflag state) • Ballast water record book

Inspection procedure:

Stage one: During an initial inspection,inspectors will look for the documentsmentioned above. These should all be foundon board and should meet the BWMConvention requirements. Paperwork shouldalways be consistent with operations onboard the ship. Inspectors may check crewfamiliarity with the BWM system. Checks willbe in the nature of a general impression andvisual observation of the system.

Stage two: If inspectors are not satisfied withthe initial investigation, they may investigatefurther to establish the following:• Is the BWM system working properly?• Has it been bypassed?• Is the crew managing sediment according tothe appropriate plan?• Can the designated officer demonstratenecessary knowledge of the system and howit operates?

Stage three: If inspectors are not satisfiedwith the two stages above, they may takesamples of ballast water and perform anindicative test for compliance.

Stage four: If the results for any samplestested do not meet the BWM Conventionstandards then a further detailed analysismay be carried out.

If problems are found with the BWM system,port state authorities may permit a ship to goto the nearest repair yard to resolve anyissues with the faulty system. It may also bepermitted to keep untreated ballast water onboard in order to either discharge it to areception facility ashore or to return it to theport of origin.

Contingency planning:As part of the compliance requirements,contingency plans should be developed forproblems which may arise with BWM systemson board.

The ship’s flag state may require that any ship-based contingency measures should beaddressed in the ship’s BWM plan. This couldinclude the following situations:• When a ship cannot process ballast water• Where no tank-to-tank transfer is possible• Where no reception facility is availableashore• Where no emergency treatment is possible

Training:Crew members responsible for BWMoperations should have adequate training todeal with all the compliance requirements. Ifthe ship is fitted with a BWM system, crewmembers should have all necessaryadditional training to enable them to operatethe equipment and to deal with minormaintenance issues.

Sediment:Ballast tanks should be cleaned and sedimentmust be removed before a BWM system isinstalled. The BWM plan should also explainhow to deal with sediment. Port state controlmay require inspection of the sedimentremoval plan to check for appropriate entriesin the ballast water record book.

Ballast water exchange:Until a BWM system is installed, the ship willbe dealing with numerous ballast waterexchanges at sea. A risk assessment should becarried out to determine any potential effecton the ship’s pumps, strength or stability.

National BWM requirements:In addition to the requirements of the BWMConvention, there are a number of national,regional and local BWM regulations. It isrecommended that port state authoritiesshould be contacted before entering theirjurisdiction to ensure compliance with anyrelevant local BWM regulations that may be inforce in addition to the requirements of theBWM Convention.

For further information on the issues involvedwith BWM and details of the alternativesystem in place in the United States, pleasesee the BWM Focus page on the Association’swebsite:

tinyurl.com/BWM-focus

Ballast Water Management Convention: an overview

The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention) enters into force on 8 September 2017 and will apply in numerous states (with the notableexception of the United States).

6 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 24: Number 2: April 2017

An oiler and an engine cadet were holdingthe plates against the railings in the engineroom, while another oiler (positioned in themiddle) was trying to secure the plates to therailings using a piece of rope. The ship rolledunexpectedly due to the large swell and theplates moved. They fell on top of the oiler,partially crushing him as he tried to escape.The oiler was extremely fortunate that theother crew members were there to helpremove the plates but he did suffer veryserious leg, arm and internal injuries.

The ship was diverted so that the oiler couldreceive emergency medical treatment. Hespent six weeks in hospital before hiscondition stabilised sufficiently to allow hisrepatriation home to continue his medicaltreatment.

A risk assessment and tool box talk wascarried out but were found not to have beendone properly. During the risk assessmentprocess, the risk of personal injury wasidentified as highly likely. Therefore the taskshould not have been carried out withoutproper consideration of the liftingarrangements. In this case the lifting shouldhave been carried out using chain blocks orother specialised equipment, not just with apiece of rope. Also, the lifting arrangementsshould have been checked by a responsibleofficer which did not happen in this case. The tool box talk was a tick box exercise only;the risks were not discussed and the job was not adequately supervised as per thework plan.

According to the master’s analysis, the rootcause was a failure to comply with the safepractices on board which included thefollowing issues:

• Crew negligence • Lack of concentration • Lack of materials and resources • Lack of procedure and control • Failure to follow procedures and instructions • Lack of knowledge and experience • Improper lifting, handling and storage • Improper position for task

In order to prevent such incidents infuture the following actions arerecommended:

• The risk assessment should be fit forpurpose and should be clear to everyoneinvolved• During a tool box talk the risks andactions must be discussed thoroughlywith the people involved • The crew should be encouraged tochallenge and contribute during riskassessment and tool box talks• Whenever possible the correct liftingequipment (such as chain blocks andcranes) should be used • The crew must be encouraged to use the‘stop and think’ approach if things do notgo according to plan • If the procedures are not effective theyshould be reviewed and changed • Lesson learned should be shared with the fleet

7

Personal injury

Moving heavy objects: consider the risks

In a recent case handled by the Club, three crew members were moving ten pieces of steel plate around thesteering gear room while the ship was underway. Each piece measured 2.4m x 1.2m and was 5mm thick.

8 Britannia RISK WATCH RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam ShipInsurance Association Limited, and can be found atwww.britanniapandi.com/publications/risk-watch/

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance AssociationLimited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watchto be reproduced but would ask that writtenpermission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

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Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942 www.britanniapandi.com

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Loss prevention

Rule 5 of the International CollisionRegulations (COLREGs) states that:Every vessel shall at all times maintain aproper look-out by sight and hearing as wellas by all available means appropriate in theprevailing circumstances and conditions soas to make a full appraisal of the situationand of the risk of collision.

In the scenario shown in the poster, we cansee that the ship is in an area of high trafficdensity. The master has just arrived on thebridge and is asking the officer of the watch(OOW) what the container ship is doing. Theflustered junior OOW has not actually seenthe ship, even though it is clearly visible. Thecontainer ship is not transmitting AIS andtherefore is not being displayed on the ECDIS.

The radar, which is clearly not beingmonitored, shows the target quite clearly. If the ECDIS had a radar overlay installed, then the ship would show up on the screenbut without any AIS data.

AIS relies on a ship to transmit theappropriate signal and therefore the shipkeeping look-out has no control over theaccuracy of the information received. For thisreason, the COLREGs do not specificallyrecognise AIS as an aid to collision avoidance.Information obtained from AIS does notbecome more reliable or accurate merelybecause it is displayed on an ECDIS screen.Rule 7(c) states that assumptions shall not bemade on the basis of ‘scanty information’.

Rule 5 requires ships to use all availablemeans to make a full appraisal of thesituation. AIS, whether displayed on an

Look-out and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)

The next in our series of posters on collision avoidance deals with look-out and the use of AIS.

ECDIS screen or not, may be one of thosemeans but should not be the only means. The ARPA radar will provide course and speedand closest point of approach of the targetship, based on a series of ranges and bearings,and is more reliable than the AIS feed whichmay be incorrect.

The Club’s loss prevention team believethat many navigational errors andresulting incidents stem from over-relianceon the data as presented on the ECDISscreen and a simple visual observation isoften forgotten.