Andrew Marcoux

MA Thesis

Professor Gray Tuttle

April 4, 2016

Lamas and Bolsheviks: Tibetan Buddhism and National Identity Post-Qing Mongolia

Introduction

Mongolia’s relationship with China has been traditionally viewed through the lens of the

tributary system. In exchange for their open recognition of the Chinese Emperor’s authority, the

Mongols received material riches.1 Beyond presenting a Sinocentric outlook, this view ignores

Mongol religio-cultural behavior, depicting them as a people “without history.”2 Even the so-

called “New Qing” historians portray the Qing’s relationship with the Mongols as a purely

economic transaction. Discussions of Tibetan Buddhism write-off the religion as an ideological

framework within which the Qing engaged the Mongols. Nationalist historiography in present-

day Mongolia, deriving heavy influence from Marxism, takes this claim a step further, portraying

Tibetan Buddhism as an ideological tool through which China, the lamas, and the nobility

exploited the peasantry.3

The latter narratives takes as its starting point the conventional historiography regarding

nations and nationalism, which begin with the French and American revolutions. Once horizontal

relations of citizenship displaced vertical, especially religious, hierarchies, print culture and

capitalism shattered provincial identities in favor of the “imagined community.” The nineteenth

century witnessed liberation by creole elites in Latin America from their Spanish and Portuguese

1 John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (June 1941): 135-246; John K Fairbank, “The Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” The Journal of Asian Studies 1, no. 2 (Feb. 1942): 129-49.2 Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, 12 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 3: 15.3 See the works of Sechin Jagchid, notably “Mongolian Lamaist Quasi-Feudalism during the Period of Manchu Domination,” Mongolian Studies 1 (1974): 27-54.

colonizers and the creation of new nations. Imperial competitions generated international

sympathy for self-determination movements, provided that they were subjects of a rival power.

After World War I the victorious Allied Powers theoretically, if not in actuality, supported

national self-determination in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, expanded to include Africa

and Asia following World War II. Like industrialization, mass communication, and participatory

politics, therefore, secular nationalism became a key aspect of modernity.4

Underpinning this scholarship is the assumption that religious hierarchies hail from the

“imagined community.” Mongolia, however, does not fit this model. No Buddhist equivalent to

the Protestant Reformation or French Revolution occurred within either Tibet or Mongolia, and

the Qing implemented policies ensuring that the Mongols’ religious elites came from borderland

regions such as Kokonor and Kham. Mongolia’s “hyphenated” Tibetan-Buddhism, therefore,

remained firmly entrenched within the Tibetan cultural sphere. Only the Qing’s Emperor’s

personal intercession ensured that the Mongols retained a distinct religio-cultural identity despite

their commitment to the Dalai Lama. This role displays clear differences to Charlemagne’s

“patron-priest” relationship with Pope Leo III, Charlemagne guaranteeing that the distinct

cultures within Christendom express a common Catholic identity and obeisance to the Pope.5

The Qing also invite comparison to the Russian Empire, with whom they shared a

common border. Although to a lesser degree than their Qing counterparts, Russia’s Tsars shared

a “patron-priest” relationship with their Tibetan Buddhist subjects. Only their interactions with

religious and secular elites kept this ethnically diverse empire a unified whole. It comes as no

4 A comprehensive list of scholarship is untenable, though notable examples include Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991).5 See Alessandro Barbero, Charlemagne: Father of a Continent, trans. Allan Cameron (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

surprise, then, that Outer Mongolia immediately turned to the Russians for patronage following

China’s Xinhai Revolution. Even after the new Republic of China established control over the

region, their hostility towards religious institutions prevented them from securing the populace’s

loyalty. Secularization proved equally problematic in Inner Mongolia, where China initially

enjoyed limited success in their competition with Outer Mongolia for influence. Both states

adapted conceptions of the mythical kingdom Shambhala as a future Pan-Mongol empire.

Inner Mongolia once again became contested territory after Outer Mongolia fell into the

Soviet sphere-of-influence. Unlike previous conflicts, though, both China and Russia struggled

to gain influence due to their openly secular administrations. It was not until Japan adopted

vestiges of the Qing Empire via Manchukuo that a foreign power secured indirect control over

Inner Mongolia. This fact distinguishes Mongolia form other nationalist movements in Soviet

Central Asia, such as the Jadidist movement in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which sought to

completely secularize political affairs.6 Instead, Mongol nationalist movements conjoined

religion and politics.

The Mongols and Tibet: Origins of the “Patron-Priest” Relationship

Tibetan Buddhism’s affiliation with non-Tibetan patrons began during the Western Xia

dynasty (1038-1227). In exchange for the ruling family’s sponsorship of temples, monasteries,

and religious publications, lamas from the Kagyupa sect served as their spiritual preceptors.7

Although this relationship ended with the royal family’s execution by Chinggis Khan (d. 1227),

his great-grandson, Mongke Khan (r. 1251-59), invited these lamas to perform similar functions

6 Adeeb Khalid, "Nationalizing the revolution in Central Asia: the transformation of Jadidism, 1917–1920," in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, Roger Suny and Terry Martin, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 145-62.7 Elliot Sperling, “Tangut Background to Mongol-Tibetan Relations,” Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the Sixth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes, 1992 (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994), 801-24.

at Karakorum.8 The “patron-priest” (Tib. chod-yon) model was formally instituted by Khubilai

Khan (r. 1260-94) and the Sakyapa sect’s Pakpa Lama Lodro Gyentsen (1235-80) during the

Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). This bond entailed Khubilai’s establishing Sakyapa control

over Tibet as a reward for him being declared a cakravartin (Sanskrit for “wheel-turning”) king9

and incarnation of the “bodhisattva lord” (Ch. dafu dagui pusa shengzhu) Manjusri.10

Following the dynasty’s collapse the Sakyapa lost power to the resurgent Kagyupa. The

Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-24) of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) attempted to revive Khubilai’s

“patron-priest” framework by inviting the Kagyupa Karmapa Lama Lama Deshin Shekpa (1384-

1415) to Nanjing in 1406, where he was appointed imperial preceptor. It is unlikely, though, that

Karmapa accepted this position and, if so, he refused to act on its authority.11 By the Jiaqing

Emperor’s reign (1521-67) Ming forces had retreated behind the changcheng (Great Wall)

fortifications and adopted “divide and rule” policies towards the Mongols.12

These policies exploited the “fatal individualism” plaguing Mongol political

institutions.13 Four main units existed within this structure: otogs (clans), aimags (tribes), ulus

(nations), and toros (states).14 Aimags and ulus consisted of domains granted to the hereditary

8 Yun-hua Jan, “Chinese Buddhism in Ta-tu: The New Situation and New Problems,” in Yuan Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion Under the Mongols, eds. Hok-lam Chan and William Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 394-398.9 This concept described a ruler whose conquests brought about the Dharma’s spread, Balkrishna G. Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 1 (1966): 15–22.10 Herbert Franke, “Tibetan in Yuan China,” in China under Mongol Rule, ed. Herbert Franke (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 308.11 Heather Karmay, Early Sino-Tibetan Art (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1975), 79.12 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 164.13 Veronika Veit, Die Vier Qane von Qalqa: ein Beitrag zur Keentnis der politishen Bedeutung der nordmongolishen Aristokratie in den Regierungsperioden Kang-hsi bis Chien-lung (1661-1796) anhand des biographischen Handbuches Iledkel sastir aus dem Jahre 1795, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: O. Harrowitz, 1990), 1:10, cited in Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 174, n. 1; Charles R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1989), 115.14 David Sneath, The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, & Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 67-68, 97, 168; Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 17.

nobles (Mong. noyons) ranked in a strict hierarchy (Mong. ungu bogol).15 Although generally

divided into the Khalkha ulus--comprised of the Buryat, Chahar, Ordo, and Tumed aimags16--the

Oirat ulus--encompassing the Dzungar, Torghut, Derbet, and Khoshut aimags17--and the

Kharchin ulus--consisting of the Kharchin, Asud and Yunsheebuu aimags18--these divisions did

not necessarily overlap with political realities displayed by the toro. Unlike otogs, which were

formed around kinship relations, aimags, ulus, and toros were rooted in the material exchanges

between the ongs (chieftains), khans (kings), and khaghan (emperor). Ongs and khans swore

fealty to the toro in exchange for the distribution of silks, teas, and other goods by the khaghan.19

Since this relationship emphasized personal loyalty to individual khans over ongs over

national identity, the Ming began conferring titles and trade privileges upon khans who paid

tribute (Ch. gong) to the Emperor. The Mongol practice of “lateral succession,” dubbed “bloody

tanistry” by Joseph Fletcher, in which "the most talented male member of the royal dynasty

[inherited] the throne, commonly by murder and war," guaranteed conflict amongst would-be

khaghans.20 Each time a khan gained followers, imperial bureaucrats supported a rival khan,

ensuring constant warfare.21 This scenario resulted in Tibetan Buddhism’s heightened status as a

way for khans to attain legitimacy.

The newly-founded Gelukpa played a key role in this development. Facing threats from

Central Tibet’s Kagyupa-aligned rulers, Sonam Gyatso (1543-88), the sect’s leader, petitioned

15 Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 367; Perdue, 76.16 Owen Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria: Their Tribal Divisions, Geographical Distributions, Historical Relations with Manchus and Chinese, and Present Political Problems, with Maps (New York: The John Day Company, 1934), 259-67.17 Owen Lattimore, The Desert Road to Turkestan (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929), 101.18 Rene Grousset, Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, trans. Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 687.19 Henry Serruys, “Sino-Mongol Trade during the Ming,” Journal of Asian History 9 (1975), 42; Peter Jackson, “From Ulus to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220- c. 1290,” in The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy, eds. R. Amitai-Preiss and D. O. Morgan (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 12-37.20 Joseph Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” in Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz (Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1995): 236– 51.21 Fairbank and Teng: 135-246; Fairbank: 129-49.

the Tumed Altan Khan (1507-82) for protection.22 During their meeting Altan declared Sonam

the third Dalai Lama (Mongolian for “oceanic teacher”), an incarnation of the bodhisattva

Avalokitesvara, and a reincarnation of Je Tsongkhapa (1357-1419), founder of the Gelukpa.

Sonam reciprocated by recognizing Altan as a cakravartin monarch, reincarnation of Khubilai,

and incarnation of Manjusri.23 Turrell Wylie defines “reincarnation…[as a] uniquely

Tibetan...conception” distinguishable from incarnation (Tib. sprul sku) in that it allows an

individual to “exist again” (yang-srid) in the person of his successor.24 Through their joint

proclamations, therefore, Sonam and Altan “became” Tsongkhapa and Khubilai, respectively.

Tumed patronage slowed when they joined with the Jurchens in 1603. Undeterred,

Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (1617-82), the fifth Dalai Lama, turned to the Khoshut Gushri Khan

(1582-1655) in 1642. Unlike their Khalkha brethren, Oirats did not share direct lineage with

Chinggis, disqualifying them from becoming khaghans. Being declared a reincarnation of

Khubilai would allow Gushri’s circumvention of this restriction.25 Gushri in turn enthroned the

Dalai Lama as the Dharmaraja (king of Tibet) responsible for religious affairs. Secular authority

resided with the regent (Tib. deba), Sonam Chopel.26 Religious authority nevertheless gained for

the Dalai Lama considerable influence, especially following Gushri and Sonam’s deaths in 1655.

Mongol khans turned to him for legitimacy, and even let him order troop movements outside

Tibet. Missionary campaigns in Khams, Kokonor, and Mongolia further strengthened his

22 W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New York: Potala, 1988), 92-10423 Henry Serruys, “Early Lamaism in Mongolia,” Oriens Extremus 10 (1963): 181.24 Turrell Wylie, “Reincarnation: A Political Innovation in Tibetan Buddhism,” Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Memorial Symposium Held at Mátrafüred, Hungary, 24–30 September 1976, ed. Louis Ligeti (Budapest:Akademiai Kiado, 1978), 579.25 Fabienne Jagou, “The Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s Visit to Beijing in 1908: In Search of a New Kind of Chaplain- Donor Relationship,” in Buddhism between Tibet and China, ed. Matthew T. Kapstein, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009), 350.26 Ishihama Yumiko, “On the Dissemination of the Belief in the Dalai Lama as a Manifestation of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara,” Acta Asiatica 64 (1993): 38–56.

position.27 When the Jurchens launched campaigns against the Mongols, therefore, they were

forced to engage with the Dalai Lama.

The Manchus and the Mongols: Origins of the “Five Races”

The chieftain of the Jurchen’s Aisin Gioro clan, Nurhaci (r. 1616-26), unified rival clans

as the Later Jin dynasty in 1612.28 Subjugated peoples were incorporated into three-hundred man

companies (Ma. niru) that served as the basis for the Eight Banners (gusa), instituted in 1615.29

That same year Nurhaci appointed his sons Hosoi Beile (Senior Princes), who exercised

authority to appoint the banner leaders’ successors and “held [the banners] virtually as private

property. Banner companies maintained ethnic homogeneity even as the Jurchen conquests

brought Korean, Mongol, Chinese, into their ranks.30 Cutting across these ties, yet maintaining

their distinctions, by emphasizing personal loyalty to one’s commander, the banners successfully

integrated people from many ethnic backgrounds into a single organization.

The Jurchens’ military strength stemmed largely from a military alliance with the

Khalkha Mongols. Ligdan Khan’s retaliatory “scorched-earth” campaigns forced these aimags to

propose joining together with the Jurchens.31 Nurhaci recognized that this alliance would not

only greatly increase his military prowess, but also substantially decrease possible threats from

his western flank when he chose to invade China. On June 26, 1626, Nurhaci sealed an alliance

with the Khalkhas nad Kharchins, accepting the title “wise and respected khan” (Sure kundulen

27 Michael Khordakovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 15, 126, 152; Wuyunbilege, “Heshite han ting de jianli guocheng” (The Process of Establishing a Khoshut Court), Nei Menggu shehui kexue 4 (1988): 70–74.28 This name harkened-back to the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115-1234).29 Mark C. Elliot, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 54; G. V. Melikhov, “The Process of the Consolidation of the Manzhou Tribes under Nuerhaqi and Abahai (1591-1644),” Manzhou Rule in China, ed. S. L. Tikhvinsky,(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 67-87.30 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 54.31 Perdue, China Marches West, 135.

Han). This title replaced that of “wise prince” (sure beile), raising his status from clan chieftain

to khan. He eventually declared himself “the radiant khagan, whom Heaven has designated to

nourish the many countries” (Geren gurun be ujire genggiyan han) in 1616.32

Nurhaci’s eigth son, Hong Taiji (r. 1626-36), coopted the Hosoi Beile into the Six

Boards, Three Courts, and Deliberative Council of Ministers.33 He also took steps towards

autocratic rule. The Jurchens traditionally practiced “electoral tanistry” in which princes (beile)

selected which of the chieftain’s sons should become ruler. Hong Taiji replaced these beile with

banner chieftains at all levels of government. Since banner chieftains personally received

authority from Hong Taiji, these leaders expressed loyalty to him above the renamed Qing state,

the Jurchens now being called Manchus.34 After Ligdan’s son, Ejei, surrendered to the Qing in

1635, Hong Taiji integrated noyons as banner chieftains, the ulus becoming banners. The Oirat

Mongols came under Qing rule in 1758 after a decades-long series of conflicts between the Qing

and the Dzungar Mongols.35 Qing policy split the Khalkhas and Oirats into Inner and Outer

Mongolia, respectively. Unlike Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia existed outside the banner

system, being ruled by the noyons under the supervision of an imperial representative (Ma.

amban) from the Mongolian Affairs Commission, later renamed the Court of Colonial Affairs

(Li Fan Yuan).36

32 David M. Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” in The Chinese World Order, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 198-205.33 Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, Manchu Politics in the Obloi Regency, 1661-69 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 30-31.34 Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia, c. 1800,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, pt. 1, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 67; Gertraude Roth-Li, “The Rise of the Early Manchu State: A Portrait Drawn from Manchu Sources to 1636,” (Ph.D. dissertation, 1975), 134. The reasons for the name change remain ambiguous. Dynastic records indicate that the name “Manchu” was derived from “Manjusri,” see Agui, Manzhou yuanliu kao (Etymology of the Manchu Name) (Liaoning: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 1988), 2. Crossley similarly proposes that the character for “Qing” combines “water” and “azure,” both referencing Manjusri, Pamela K. Crossley, The Manchus (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 212-1335 Elverskog, 41; For a detailed account of the Dzungar-Qing wars, see Perdue.36 Chia Ning, “The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch’ing Dynasty” (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins, 1992), 225.

In the same sense that Gush was barred from being khaghan, so, too, were the Manchus

illegitimate according to Mongol political tradition. Therefore, Manchu emperors attempted to

revive the “patron-priest” relationship. This patronage began when Nurhaci appointed a lama as

state preceptor. Hong Taiji not only continued this policy, but also performed yidam (tutelary

deity) rituals to channel powers from Mahalaka, a warlike deity and Protector of the Law.37 His

successor, the regent Dorgon (r. 1643-50), constructed a temple dedicated to this deity, the

Sishengsi, alongside four temples housing additional deities from 1643 to 1645.38 Though these

acts clearly favored the Sakyapa, the Shunzhi Emperor hosted the Dalai Lama Beijing in 1653.39

The Qing formally established relations with the Gelukpa after freeding Tibet from

Dzungar occupation in 1720. Continued tensions between Tibet’s Khoshut nobility resulted in

the Qing temporarily garrisoning 1,500 bannermen in Lhasa and handing authority to an

amban.40 A succession of Dalai Lama’s who died before or shortly after reaching maturity

solidified later ambans’ power.41 After 1792, imperial policy also required that the Emperor

personally determine succeeding incarnations’ legitimacy, a power expanded to include other

reincarnation lineages, though it was more frequently ignored than observed. This measure

likewise permitted Qianlong to start recognizing Tibetans as the traditionally Mongol

Jebtsundamba Khutughtu and appoint minor hierarchs such as the reincarnations of Janggiya

Khutughtu, Rolpe Dorje (1717-86).

37 Samuel Grupper, “The Manchu Imperial Cult of the Early Qing Dynasty: Texts and Studies on the Tantric Sanctuary of Mahākāla at Mukden” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1979), 146.38 Samuel Grupper, “Manchu Patronage and Tibetan Buddhism during the First Half of the Qing Dynasty: A Review Article,” Journal of the Tibet Society 4 (1984), 56. 39 Zahiruddin Ahmad, Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Rome: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1970), 152-62.40 Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950), 13.41 Luciano Petech, “The Dalai-Lama and Regents of Tibet: A Chronological Study,” in Selected Papers on Asian History, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 60 (Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), 125-49.

Qianlong’s policies bear close resemblance to Napoleon III’s policies towards

Catholicism. Rather than renounce Pope Pius IX, Napoleon weakened papal authority by

establishing himself as the de facto protector of the Papal States, founding Catholic universities

intended to train patriotic clergy, and granting religious freedom provided that religious

institutions did not threaten imperial prestige. These actions created a distinct “French”

Catholicism centered on the Emperor that still acknowledged the papacy.42 In the same sense,

Qianlong promoted a “Mongol” Tibetan Buddhism that lessened the Dalai Lama’s influence in

Mongolia without completely undermining his spiritual authority.

Qing policies additionally facilitated Tibetan Buddhism’s spread throughout Mongolia.

At the dynasty’s close nearly 30 to 60 percent of the male population in Inner Mongolia was

lamas residing in monasteries, with their numbers reaching 30 percent in Outer Mongolia.43

Furthermore, Qianlong’s reign saw the number of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in southern

Mongolia and Khalkha territories reach 800 and 136, respectively, as well as an additional

increase to between 500 and 600 in Amdo, Gansu, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Shanxi.44 They also

created several titles for use in Mongolia, among them jasagh lama (“Prince of the Church”) and

jasagh da lama (“Grand Prince of the Church”). The latter wielded religious and secular

authority over the seven monasteries that were designated banner units, while the former

performed secular functions in monasteries administered by a reincarnate hierarch (khubilgan).45

In order to ensure that the Dalai Lama did not threaten his influence over these new

jasaghs, Qianlong officially placed western Tibet (Tib. Gtsang) under the Panchen Lama’s

42 Michael Rapport, 1848, Year of Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 241.43 Robert J. Miller, Monasteries and Culture Change in Inner Mongolia (Wiesbaden, 1959), 27; Cai Zhichun, “Menggu lama guizu xingcheng chutan” (An Inquiry about the Mongol Tibeten Buddhist Nobility’s Formation), Minzu yanjiu 1 (1987): 51.44 Xu Xiaoguang and Zhou Jian, “Qingchao zhengfu dui lamajiao li fa chutan” (The Establishment of Laws Concerning Tibetan Buddhism by the Qing), Nei Menggu shehui kexue 1 (1988), 55–59.45 Chen Yuning and Tang Xiaofang, “Qingdai lamajiao zai Mengguzu diqu de tequan ji qi rongluo” (Tibetan Buddhism’s Privileged Position and Decline in Mongolia during the Qing), Qinghai shehui kexue 5 (1988): 98–102.

control. Tibet’s “second supreme deity” resided at Tashilhunpo Monastery, which had been

gifted alongside the title bogdo (“teacher”) by Gush, and was recognized by the fifth Dalai Lama

as an incarnation of the Buddha Amitabha. In the same sense that an incoming Panchen Lama

received initiation from the sitting Dalai Lama, so too did the current Panchen Lama confer

recognition on a newly-declared Dalai Lama. This practice supported each other’s position, and

was why the fifth Panchen Lama, Lobsang Yeshe (1663-1737), had previously refused

Yongzheng’s “donation” of western Tibet.46 His successor, Lobsang Paldan Yeshe (1738-1780),

accepted this offer from Qianlong, and even visited Beijing for the Emperor’s seventieth birthday

celebration. Although this visit ended in the lama’s death from smallpox, it solidified Qianlong’s

image as an incarnation of Manjusri, which he had been declared by the Janggiya Khutughtu.47

This identity was one of many that Qianlong assumed throughout his reign.48 Defensive

fortifications such as changcheng and the Willow Palisade began serving a political, rather than

military, purpose, segregating the “five races” (Ch. wuzu) of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Muslim,

and Tibetan (Han Man Meng Hui Zang). Legal statutes further prohibited intermarriage between

peoples.49 Each race represented a unique cultural-historical ideal through which the Qing could

claim legitimacy.50 Only Qianlong’s “vertical relationships” with religious and secular leaders

maintained the empire’s unity.51 When Qing influence declined in the aftermath of the Opium

Wars (1839-42, 1856-60), Tibet turned to the Russian Empire for backing.

46 Zhang Yuxin, Qingdai si da huofo (The Qing Period’s Four Great Living Buddhas) (Beijing; Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989), 32.47 Elverskog, 12.48 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 371-72.49 Edward Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, Studies on Ethnic Groups in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 76.50 Pamela K. Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” Late Imperial China II, no. 1 (1990): 12.51 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Eurasia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 201-202.

Russia and the Mongols: Origins of Pan-Mongolism

Despite having liberated themselves from the Kipchak Khanate, anachronistically known

as the Golden Horde, in 1480, Mongol political practices nevertheless exerted considerable

influence over the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Each ruler hailed from a single “clan polity,” with

the heads of other clans ranked in a strict hierarchy (Russian mestnichestvo system).52

Furthermore, “bloody tanistry” opened succession to every male from the ruling clan.53 In order

to distinguish themselves from the Khan of Kazan with whom he competed for succession to the

Kipchak Khanate’s legacy, however, Muscovy’s royal family reinvented their city as the “Third

Rome” following Rome itself and Constantinople, which fell to the Turks in 1453.

Grand Prince Ivan III (r. 1462-1505) cemented this claim in 1472 after marrying Zoe

Palaiologina (1440/49-1503), daughter of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine X (1449-53).

Ivan alleged that the Byzantine emperor Constantine Monomakh (r. 1042-55) conferred Kiev’s

Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh (r. 1113-25) with an imperial insignia and crown.54 With this

myth Muscovy became a rising Christian empire tasked with conquering the “remnants of the

Golden Horde” comprised of Turks, Mongols, and Muslim caravaneers.55 The monarchy

additionally represented itself as the descendants of the “Varangians” (Vikings) who had crossed

the Baltic Sea and settled Russia.56 Since they had adopted Russia’s language and traditions,

though, they could now be considered Russian.

52 George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 333; Donald Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions,” Slavic Review 49 (Winter 1990): 525– 42.53 Perdue, 76.54 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 5. 55 Edward Keenan, “Muscovy and Kazan’, 1445– 1552: Some Introductory Remarks on Steppe Diplomacy,” Slavic Review 26 (1967), 548–558.56 Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4.

It was not until Ivan IV (r. 1547-84) that the title “Tsar” (derived from the Latin

“Caesar”) was appropriated. As with Rome and Byzantium, this title established Ivan as a

divinely ordained ruler tasked with defending the Orthodox Church and creating order.57 All

people and territory within the tsarstvo (kingdom) were the Tsar’s personal property, each title

being doled out to loyal princes.58 The ‘state patriotism” implemented by Peter I (r. 1682-1725)

further eroded princely authority by instituting compulsory military service and organizing a

bureaucratic Table of Ranks in 1722. Military officers and rank eight (out of fourteen) civil

servants automatically became non-hereditary “service nobles.”59

State centralization in the metropole sharply contrasted with the irregular administration

witnessed in Siberia. Expansion had begun during Ivan’s reign. Sable, otter, and mink furs

served as Muscovy’s primary source of income. As demand for this “soft gold” rose with

increased military expenditures, merchant-entrepreneurs (promyshlenniki) and Cossacks,

autonomous military units led by governor (voevody) steadily pushed eastward, eventually

crossing the Bering Strait into present-day Alaska. Distracted by his wars with the Mongols,

Ottomans, and Lithuanians, Ivan made little effort to subjugate these peoples beyond exacting

tribute.60

Tsar, later Emperor, Peter I (Tsar r. 1682-1721, Emperor r. 1721-25) expressed scientific

interest in Siberia, encouraging the investigation and classification of all Siberian flora, fauna,

and peoples. Determining that nomads lacked the Enlightenment virtues of rationality,

cleanliness, and social graces, Russian officials declared them “aliens” (inorodtsy) and “wild

57 Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation (New York: Arnold and Oxford University Press, 2001), 41.58 Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4.59 Tolz, 29.60 Janet Martin, “Muscovy’s Northeast Expansion: The Context and a Cause,” Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 24 (1983), 459– 470; Mark Bassin, “Expansion and Colonialism on the Eastern Frontier: Views of Siberia and the Far East in Pre-Petrine Russia,” Journal of Historical Geography 14 (1988), 3– 21.

men” (dikii).61 Peter decreed that they remain segregated from the Russian populace and oversaw

construction of a defensive fortification--stretching from Ust-Kamenogorsk in present-day

Kazakhstan to Kuznetsk along the Upper Volga River--separating Russia from their Siberian

possessions.62 Imperial proscriptions barred citizens from settling beyond this barrier.63 Russian

law exempted inorodtsy from military service and offered protections against Russian Orthodox

missionizing.64 As with Qianlong, Peter himself linked these diverse peoples together into a

cohesive state.65

Russia and the Buryats: The Link to Tibet

Among these groups were the Buryat Mongols of Transbaikalia. Tibetan Buddhism had

reached Buryatia via Outer Mongolia during the seventeenth century. Empress Elizabeth

Petrovna (r. 1741-62) recognized this faith in 1741, earning for the religion imperial patronage.

This sponsorship inspired Buryat religious leaders to declare Empress Catherine II (r. 1762-96)

and her successors incarnations of the Buddha White Tara.66 Unlike other ethnic minorities,

furthermore, Buryats such as Peter Badmayev (1851-1919) served in the central government.

61 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 47-72.62 Carol B. Stevens, Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995), 122-39.63 David Collins, “Subjugation and Settlement in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Siberia,” in The History of Siberia: From Russian Conquest to Revolution, ed. Alan Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), 45.64 John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” The Russian Review 57 (April, 1998): 173-90.65 Miles Kahler, “Empires, Neo-Empires, and Political Change: The British and French Experience,” in The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 287. 66 John Snelling, Buddhism in Russia: The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa’s Emissary to the Tsar (Rockport, Mass.: Element, 1993), 53-65.

Badmayev advised the Foreign Office’s Asia Desk from 1875 to 1893, during which time

they began employing Buryat and Kalmyk pilgrims travelling to Lhasa as spies. With Tibet

playing a key role in the growing rivalry between Great Britain and the Russian Empire dubbed

the Great Game, these agents provided valuable intelligence concerning British activities

throughout Inner Asia. He also proposed arming Mongols as a precursor to a proposed Russian

conquest of China and Tibet. Although these plans were summarily rejected by Tsar Alexander

III (1881-94), Badmayev nonetheless continued lobbying powerful individuals within the Tsar’s

inner circle, among them Prince Esper Ukhtomsky (1861-1921). 67 The Buryat’s commitment to

this strategy was not simply out of loyalty to the state.

Following their defeat during the Crimean War (1853-56), Russian authorities sought

solutions to the state’s economic and military weakness. Contrasting the decaying, ethnically

diverse Ottoman Empire with the powerful, ethnically homogenous French and English Empires,

they determined that the empire’s cultural and linguistic diversity created social barriers that

produced disorganization throughout the military. As a solution these officials recommended that

the state impose Russia’s language and cultural practices upon ethnic minorities, beginning with

the Poles after the Uprising of 1863. Alexander brought these assimilation drives to Siberia in

1881.68

Badmayev suggested as an alternative that the Russians “liberate” geographically

contiguous territories in China and Tibet whose populations primarily consisted of Mongols,

afterwards establishing an autonomous Pan-Mongol confederacy within the larger Empire. This

approach provided Russia with an impetus for expansion that simultaneously ensured their

67 Robert A. Rupen, "The Buriat Intelligentsia," Far Eastern Quarterly 3 (1956): 392; Baabar, History of Mongolia: From World Power to Soviet Satellite (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 116-18.68 Edward W. Walker, “The Long Road from Empire: Legacies of Nation Building in the Soviet Successor States,” in Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, eds. Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 312.

Mongol subjects’ continued loyalty. After his tenure expired Badmayev founded an exclusively

Buryat school in Saint Petersburg with an eye towards encouraging Pan-Mongolism. The

government’s insistence that this school teach Russian Orthodoxy rather than Tibetan Buddhism

sparked student protests in 1897 that resulted in the school’s closure.69 He then founded a

hospital specializing in Tibetan Buddhist medicine. Badmayev’s practice garnered attention from

Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna (1872-1918), who sought treatment for the hemophiliac

Tsarevich Alexei Nicolaevich (1904-1918), and she requested that he provide medical services

alongside the “mad monk” Grigori Rasputin (1869-1916).70 His compliance secured him an

influential position at the court that soon led to a private meeting between Tsar Nicholas II (r.

1894-1917) and the Buryat lama Agvan Dorzhiev (1854-1938).

Dorzhiev had studied under the renowned instructor Purchok Rinpoche, who first

initiated the young Buryat into the Kalachakra tradition. Kalachakra taught that Maitreya, the

Buddha of the Future, ruled the heavenly kingdom of Shambhala. His coming would be preceded

by Regdendagva, a cakravartin and incarnation of Je Tsongkhapa. In 1901 Dorzhiev visited the

ninth Panchen Lama, Thubten Choekyi Nyima (1883-1937), receiving from him secret teachings

and a copy of the Prayer of Shambhala written by the sixth Panchen Lama.71

Fusing this teaching with his Pan-Mongol political orientation, Dorzhiev believed this king to be

the future ruler of a Mongol empire that encompassed Mongolia, Tibet, and parts of China.72 He

even included Kalmyk Mongols west of the Caspian Sea in this envisioned kingdom,

constructing schools in Kalmykia dedicated to teaching Pan-Mongolism and Kalachakra.73

69 Rupen, “Buriat Intelligentsia,” 393.70 Ronald C. Moe, Prelude to the Revolution: The Murder of Rasputin (San Diego, CA: Aventine Press, 2011), 152.71 Snelling, 77.72 Ekai Kawaguchi, Three Years in Tibet (London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1909), 499-500.73 Rupen, “Buriat Intelligentsia,” 393.

Pan-Mongolism marks a critical turning point in Mongol political ideology, adopted

conceptions of national identity comparable to the Europe. However, Buryat nationalists

envisioned a continued role for Tibetan Buddhism in a Pan-Mongol state, unlike the Pan-Turkish

Jadidist movement in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which viewed Islam as an outdated aspect of

their national identity and a threat to modernization. This vision found support within Russia’s

imperial court. After being informed of this charismatic young lama in 1899, Badmayev

persuaded Prince Ukhtomsky to invite Dorzhiev to the Tsar’s Lividia Palace while Dorzhiev

travelled to Saint Petersburg “[collecting] subscriptions for his monastic college.” Understanding

that the Tibetans barred foreigners from entering the plateau, Nicholas asked that the lama serve

as an unofficial diplomat to Lhasa.74 In accepting this task, Dorzhiev unknowingly set the stage

for war with Great Britain.

Believing Tibet’s “three million tea drinkers” to be the ideal market for their expanding

tea industry, British India sought direct trade with the plateau.75 Their efforts came to fruition in

1876 with the signing of the Chefu Convention, in which the Qing Emperor promised safe

passage for British merchants entering Tibet, an arrangement that met with stiff resistance from

the Tibetans.76 Undeterred, the British exploited a relatively minor boundary dispute to secure

greater trade privileges. After Tibetan soldiers crossed an unguarded border and marched

eighteen miles into the British protectorate of Sikkim, the British, claiming Tibetan “aggression,”

demanded renewed negotiations. The subsequent treaties, signed in 1890 and 1893, completely

ignored territorial issues, instead granting special trade privileges to the British. These treaties

finally convinced Tibetan elites that the Qing no longer represented Tibetan interests.77

74 Snelling, 80.75 Alex McKay, Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre, 1904-1947 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 7.76 Sarat Chandra Das, Yig kur nam shag: Being a Collection of Letters, Both Official and Private, and Illustrating the Different Forms of Correspondence Used in Tibet (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1901), 50-55.77 Francis Younghusband. India and Tibet: A History of the Relations Which Have Subsisted between the Two Countries from the Time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a Particular Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (1876-1933), came of age the same year that

Japan defeated the Qing, 1895, and shortly afterwards launched a sweeping modernization

campaign that included creating a modern army.78 Financial constraints plagued these projects,

prompting the Dalai Lama’s search for a new patron. Dorzhiev suggested that he seek help from

Nicholas, whom he now knew.79 By this time he identified Nicholas with the cakravartin

Regdendagva, making the Dalai Lama Maitreya.80 This proposal coincided with the Nechung

Oracle’s declaration that a bodhisattva had appeared in the northeast. Therefore, Dorzhiev

returned to Saint Petersburg in 1901 to meet with Nicholas.81

The Tsar offered aid to Tibet, which the Dalai Lama interpreted as a promise of

protection against the British. In 1902 Russia’s minister to Beijing recommended that the Qing

grant Tibet independence and sought permission for the Russo-Chinese Bank to “conduct a

geological survey in Tibet.”82 Great Britain responded to these alarming developments by

sending a military expedition under Sir Francis Younghusband to Tibet the following year. Beset

by internal rebellion and their own war with Japan, Russian aid failed to materialize. Without

this aid the Tibetans proved incapable of countering the better-equipped British soldiers,

prompting the Dalai Lama’s flight to Urga (present-day Ulan Bator) in Outer Mongolia.83

Qing “New Policies” and Assimilation

Pleading that their spiritual leader was “ignorant of the ways of great nations,” Lhasa’s

remaining authorities, inexperienced in international diplomacy, asked the imperial amban to

(Delhi: Book Faith India, 1998 [1910]), 45-53.78 Alastair Lamb. British India and Tibet, 1766-1910 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986 [1960]), 183.79 Snelling, 38.80 W. A. Unkrig to Dr. R. Loewenthal, letter of Dec. 17, 1954, cited in Robert A. Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 106-07.81 Snelling, 38.82 Ibid., 53-65.83 Younghusband, 60-69.

negotiate with the British. Recognizing his precarious position, the amban, Youtai, ordered the

assistant amban, and later amban, Zhang Yintang, to negotiate with the British. Zhang Yintang

secured from them assurances not to interfere in Tibet’s internal affairs as well as recognition of

Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in exchange for trade concessions in Sichuan.84 Nicholas accepted

these provisions in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The following summer the Dalai

Lama visited Beijing in an effort to restore the patron-priest relationship. After performing long-

life rituals for the Guangxu Emperor and Empress Dowager Cixi, he recognized the latter as an

emanation of the Buddha Guanyin.85

Zhang Yintang’s successor, Zhao Erfang, sought the total integration of Tibet into China.

Having brought a large army into Tibet on December 9, 1909, he subsequently launched

programs encouraging Chinese migration, developing agriculture, mining, and commerce, as

well as establishing educational institutions in order to propagate Chinese customs amongst the

Tibetans. He also forbid the construction of new monasteries and restricted the number of

ordained monks with the intention of curbing monastic authority, which he blamed for Tibet’s

continued intransigence. These harsh measures sparked uprisings throughout Tibet. Outgunned

and outmanned, they too met with failure. Fearing reprisals, the Dalai Lama fled to Darjeeling,

India and from there dispatched telegrams addressed to “Great Britain and all the Ministers of

Europe,” requesting that “all the other countries should intervene and kindly withdraw the

Chinese troops.” Pleading the neutrality stipulated in the Convention, however, Europe refused

to interfere in an “internal” Chinese matter.86

84 Josef Kolmas, The Ambans and Assistant Ambans of Tibet: A Chronological Study (Praha: Oriental Institute, 1998), 535-38. 85 Jagou, “The Thirteenth Dalai Lama,” 354.86 Elliot Sperling, “The Chinese Venture in K’am, 1904-1911, and the Role of Chao Erh-feng,” Tibet Journal I, no. (1976), 11-14, 18-24.

The Qing implemented assimilationist policies in their Mongol possessions as well. The

Guangxu Emperor (1875-1908) encouraged Han migration to Inner Mongolia as a “shield”

against the Russian Empire. Tensions between settlers and their noyon landlords erupted in 1891

when a Han secret society named Jindandao (Golden Elixir) massacred 150,000 Mongols before

imperial soldiers led by Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) arrived a month later.87 Guangxu likewise

implemented these policies in Outer Mongolia as part of the “New Policies” (xinzheng) instituted

following the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901). Overseeing this shift was the former lieutenant

governor of Guihua, Sando, who set about consolidating authority over commerce and taxation.

Sando later welcomed Lieutenant Colonel Tang Zaili to oversee the new Mongol army, whose

repressive treatment of the populace generated considerable opposition from the noyons.

A month following Sando’s arrival a brawl between intoxicated lamas and Chinese

carpenters occurred. When Zang’s army arrived at Ganden monastery to arrest the perpetrators,

however, they were pelted with rocks, forcing their withdrawal. He then asked Jampal Namdrol

Chokye Gyeltsen (1869-1924), the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, to order these lamas’

surrender. When his refusal caused Sando to issue a hefty fine, the noyons petitioned the

Emperor for his removal.88 Guangxu ignored their plea, leading to greater difficulties with the

noyons. After Togtokh Taij, a prominent noyon, began robbing Chinese merchants, his fellow

noblemen shielded him from arrest. Mongol forces ambushed the two brigades dispatched by

Sando, and the noyons refused to provide replacement soldiers. They also denied merchants’

compensation for their stolen goods.89 Qing efforts to keep their frontier possessions were

rendered fruitless with the Xinhai Revolution’s outbreak on October 10, 1911.

87 Paul Hyer, “The Chin-tan-tao Movement -- A Chinese Revolt in Mongolia (1891),” Altaica (1977): 105-112.88 Petition found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, Wai Men Chin-shih shih (Outer Mongolia’s Recent History) (Taibei: 1967), 589 Thomas E. Ewing, “Revolution on the Chinese Frontier: Outer Mongolia in 1911,” Journal of Asian History 12, no. 2 (1978), 106; Chen Lu, Jishi biji (Reminisces) (Shanghai: Shuju chubanshe, 1919), 179.

The Frontier Question in the Republic of China

Two days later revolutionaries in Hubei issued a statement demanding that the Manchus

abdicate, relocate to Manchuria, and reestablish tributary relations with China.90 Conspicuously

absent from this proclamation was any mention of the non-Manchu Inner Asian peoples,

highlighting the revolutionaries’ uncertainty concerning what role, if any, the “five races” were

to play in the new government. Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) considered minorities, especially

Mongols, too stupid to be assimilated into a republic, and proposed forcefully removing them to

their traditional homelands, where they would serve as a buffer separating China from the

imperial powers.91 Liang Qichao (1873-1929), on the other hand, advocated assimilating the

“five races” into one Han republic to create a strong front against imperialist encroachment.92

However, Liang knew that “without an emperor, the cultural simultaneities, the coexistence of

historicized constituencies, had little chance of being coherent”93 and advocated “[severing] the

connection between ethnicity and national identity.”94

The latter opinion influenced Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), leader of the Tongmenghui.

Arguing for “monoracial” unity, Sun believed that only uniting could the “five races” thwart

imperialist ambitions, stating that “Manchuria is in the sphere of Japanese influence, Mongolia,

according to recent reports, is under the influence of Russia, and Tibet is the booty of Great

Britain. These races have not sufficient strength for self-defense but they might unite with China

90 Chen Yabo, Wuchang geming zhen shi (The True History of the Wuchang Uprising) (Xianggang: Wanyou tushu gongsi, 1971), 151-53; Zhang Nanxiang, Hubei geming zhizhi lu (An Account of the Revolution in Hubei) (Chongqing: Shangwu Minguo, 1945), 208.91 Zhang Binglin, “Zhonghua minguo jie” (Explaining the Republic of China), in Zhang Taiyuan quanji (The Collected Works of Zhang Taiyuan), 4 vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985), 4:252-62. 92 Liang Qichao, “Guojia sixiang bianqian yitong lun” (Difference in Conceptualizing the State), in Yinbingshi heji, wenji, 6 vols. (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1941), 6:20.93 Pamela K. Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 360.94 John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33 (January 1995), 87.

to form a single state.”95 He further noted that “Mongolia and Tibet [did] not yet fully understand

the true meaning of a republic, so they [were] inclined to oppose it.”96 Sun became Provisional

President of the newly-proclaimed Republic of China (ROC) after the revolutionary leader Song

Jiaoren (1882-1913) captured Nanjing on December 4, being elected December 29.97 During his

inaugural address he reiterated his hope for a unified nation, stating that the root of a nation is its

people: “National unity means unifying the areas where Han, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and

Tibetans live as a single nation, and the union of these peoples as one people.”98 Accomplishing

this task entailed continuing Qing policies of migration and modernization, with a particular

emphasis on constructing railroads.99

This rhetoric nonetheless represented a minority opinion among the revolutionaries, for

their objectives necessitated that they adopt an uncompromising hostility towards the Manchus.

Therefore, heeding the call of Zou Rong (1885-1905) for ethnic extermination, revolutionaries

throughout China engaged in anti-Manchu violence.100 The Manchu Yang Du, having befriended

General Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) and Wang Jingwei (1883-1994), both Han, spread notions of

“five races in harmony” to temper ethnic hostility.101 As commander of the modern Beiyang

Army, Yuan recognized that the revolution’s success depended on his support. He also

recognized that he would have limited influence in the imperial government following the

revolution’s suppression. Therefore, Yuan agreed to retake rebel-held provinces in exchange for

95 Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Great Britain [Taipei]: [Sino-American Publishing], [1918 [1953]]), 180-81.96 Julie Wei, Raymond Myers, and Donald Gillin, Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen, trans. Julie Wei, E-su Zen, and Linda Chao (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994), 89.97 Marie-Claire Bergere, Sun Yat-sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 216.98 Sun Yat-sen, The Teachings of Sun Yat-sen: Selections from his Writings (London: Sylvan Press, 1945), 33-34.99 Wei, 89.100 Zou Rong, The Revolutionary Army : A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903, trans. John Lust (Paris: Mouton, 1968); For an analysis of the economic and social causes of this violence, see Mark C. Elliot, "Bannermen and Townsmen: Ethnic Tension in Nineteenth Century Jiangnan," Late Imperial China 11, no. 1 (1990): 36-74.101 Rhoads, 207.

being appointed Prime Minister, recaptured Hankou and Hangyang, and then immediately

persuaded the rebels to open negotiations with the Imperial Household.102

During these talks Wu Tingfang (1842-1922) suggested that “with regard to the

Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans...they would be treated on a basis of equality with the

Han.”103 Empress Dowager Longyu struggled to accept equal status with the Qing’s former

vassals, and asked Yuan “to arrange in advance the terms for the future treatment of the imperial

household, the Eight Banners, and the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans.”104 Only Wu and Yuan’s

insistence convinced the imperial family to embrace racial equality on February 1912 in an

abdication edict stating their “hope that the ‘territories of the five ethnic groups--Manchu,

Mongol, Han, Muslim, and Tibetan--would unite to form one great Republic of China.”105 Yuan

also insisted that he be designated Provisional President of the new state. Desiring support from

the Beiyang Army, Sun Yat-sen reluctantly agreed to this proposal. The Provisional Senate

elected him President of the Republic of China (ROC) on February 14, 1912, and was sworn in

on March 10. Befitting his interest in the frontiers, Sun was appointed Railroad Commissioner.106

In order to accomplish this task, Yuan inserted two clauses into the imperial abdication

edict promising religious toleration as well as financial support for religious and secular elites.

He also continued appointing Inner Asians--usually Manchus or Mongols--to oversee frontier

outposts.107 Continuing imperial policies did not guarantee retention of the imperial borders.

Tibet insisted that as a vassal of the Qing their ties to China ended with the Revolution. By April

1912 Tibetan soldiers had expelled the remnant Chinese garrisons from Tibet and declared

independence. That same month Yuan issued orders stating that this event was to be treated as an 102 Bergere, 212.103 Rhoads., 221.104 Ibid., 223.105 Ibid., 238.106 Bergere, 212.107 Ibid.223-24.

act of rebellion, for Tibet, Mongolia, and Turkestan were Chinese provinces.108 He backed this

rhetoric with military force three months later.109

While his forces struggled against the Dalai Lama’s reorganized military, Yuan,

undeterred, proclaimed Tibet part of the “family of five races” during his October 21 presidential

address, published in the Peking Gazzette. He further apologized for Zhao’s prior excesses and

“restored” the Dalai Lama’s “Title of Loyal and Submissive Vice-Regent, Great, Good, and Self-

Existent Buddha.”110 The British Political Officer to Tibet, Charles Bell, described the Dalai

Lama as retorting “that he was not asking the Chinese Government for any rank, as he intended

to exercise both temporal and ecclesiastical rule in Tibet.”111 In 1913 Tibetan forced the Chinese

to retreat a second time, giving weight to his assertions.112

International recognition nevertheless proved unforthcoming. In 1914 Tibet’s army went

into Khams as a defensive measure against the region’s Chinese garrisons.113 This bold move

alarmed Great Britain, already preparing for war in Europe, and they hastily organized the Simla

Convention, attended by delegates from China, Tibet, and British India.114 Neither China nor

Tibet expressed a willingness to compromise, resulting in the latter’s private negotiations with

the British. Great Britain persuaded Tibet to accept autonomy, not independence, with promises

108 Translation of the Presidential Order enclosed in a letter from Britain’s Chinese minister, cited in Michael C. van Walt, “Whose Game?” Records of the Indian Office concerning Events Leading up to the Simla Conference” in Soundings in Tibetan Civilization, ed. International Association for Tibetan Studies Seminar, Barbara Nimri Aziz and Matthew Kapstein (New Delhi: Manohar, 1985), 219.109 Melvyn C.Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1989), 65-67.110 Eric Teichman, Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet Together with a History of the Relations between China,Tibet, and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 16-17.111 Sir Charles Arthur Bell, Tibet, Past and Present (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000 [1924]), 135. 112 Goldstein, 67.113 Warren W. Smith., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 183.114 Alastair Lamb, Tibet, China, and India, 1914-1950: A History of Imperial Diplomacy (Hertingfordbury: Roxford, 1989), 18.

to “assist [them]...by provision of arms and ammunition.”115 They also made their diplomatic

recognition of the ROC contingent upon China’s acceptance of this accord.116 China’s

representative, Ivan Chen, simply initialed an early draft of the document, leaving before the

formal signing occurred. His refusal left the agreement’s validity ambiguous.117

Outer Mongolia presented a similar dilemma for the ROC. The Jebtsundamba Khutughtu,

was “elevated” as the Bogd Khan (“Holy Khan”) of the newly declared Bogd Khan Mongolia on

October 29, 1911.118 Ferdynand Ossendowski, a Polish traveller, personally attests that the Bogd

Khan practiced Kalachakra and envisioned a Pan-Mongol kingdom ruled by an earthly

cakravartin.119 S. L. Kuzmin and L. J. Rejt point out that Ossendowski’s account is questionable,

highlighting that known evidence does not support allegations that the Bogd Khan and

Ossendowski knew each other.120 From September 1914 to July 1915, however, Inner Mongolian

noyons attended a khuriltai convened by the Bogd Khan to consider recognizing the hierarch as

the ruler of the Holy Khaganate Mongol Nation. Evidence shows, then, that irrespective of

Ossendowski’s claims, the Bogd Khan supported Pan-Mongolism.

Russia and China: The Fight for Outer Mongolia

Yuan tried opening communications with this new government on March 16 the

following year, promising security and prosperity should they join the ROC.121 The Bogd Khan

115 Ya Hanzhong, The Biographies of the Dalai Lama, trans. Wang Wenjiong (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1991), 322.116 Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 142.117 Goldstein, 75.118 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 16.119 Ferdynand Antoni Ossendowski, Beasts, Men, and Gods (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922), 294.120 S. L. Kuzmin and L. J. Rejt, “Notes by F.A. Ossendowski as a Source on the History of Mongolia,” vol. 5 of Oriens (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences Publishers, 2008), 97-110.121 Full text found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, 39-43.

replied on March 25 that China’s inability to protect Korea and Taiwan from colonization122

raised questions concerning the ROC’s military strength. He further boasted that the Gobi Desert

served as a geographic hindrance to troop movements.123 After Yuan again implored him to

reconsider independence on April 6, the lama stated that all diplomatic communications were to

be channeled through Russia.124

Russia considered Mongolia a viable buffer against Japanese expansion, and accordingly

stationed troops in the capital, Urga. They also lent 2 million rubles to the fledgling state,

provided that they employ Russian advisors to oversee government finances as well as the

national bank.125 Furthermore, secret treaties signed earlier that year secured from Japan

recognition of Mongolia as a Russian sphere of influence.126 While the Bogd Khan’s refusal to

accept Chinese diplomats infuriated Yuan, he faced little choice but to comply with this demand.

Already facing opposition in the National Assembly for gradually stripping their power through

constitutional revisions, Yuan wished for the Beiyang Army to remain within China.127

Therefore, China’s Foreign Minister, Liang Ruhao, initiated discussions with Russia’s Minister

to Peking, Krupensky, on September 10, with instructions to preserve China’s territorial integrity

as well as secure their rights to strategic resources in Mongolia.128

These talks came to an abrupt end on November 6 after Krupensky informed Liang of

protocols signed by Russia and Mongolia three days prior to granting Russia commercial

122 The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) following the First Sino-Japanese War established Korea as a Japanese protectorate and Taiwan as a colony, see Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 428-44. 123 Full text found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, 15-16.124 English translation found in Onon and Pritchatt, 64-65 (Yuan); Full Chinese text found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, 17 (Bogd Khan).125 Ewing, “Revolution on the Chinese Frontier, 116-18.126 Thomas E. Ewing, Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1911-1921 (Bloomington: Research Center for Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1980), 49-50.127 Jerome Ch’en, 111-33.128 Translation found in Onon and Pritchatt, 66.

privileges and barring Chinese troops from Mongolia. Liang condemned this treaty as a violation

of China’s sovereignty, but made little effort to prevent its implementation.129 When news of his

inaction reached Beijing, Liang fled to Tianjin out of fear for his life. His temporary

replacement, Lu Zhengxiang, restarted negotiations in a less ideal political environment than that

of his predecessor.130 Though Lu shepherded a revised document through both the Cabinet and

the House of Representatives, he faced considerable opposition from the Senate’s GMD

majority, who vetoed this treaty on July 11, 1913.

That same month the GMD rebelled against Yuan’s increasingly autocratic government.

The Bogd Khan claimed that this civil war shook Mongol confidence in the ROC and again

rejected Chinese overtures. Shortly afterwards Mongolian representatives signed a treaty

granting bilateral recognition to each state with a delegation representing Tibet led by none other

than Dorzhiev.131 The tide nonetheless turned when Yuan’s Beiyang Army made short work of

the ill-prepared Guomindang. Government bureaucrats who did not disavow the GMD were

immediately expelled, and the National Assembly was formally dissolved. He also convened a

“Celebrity Cabinet” comprised of his most loyal supporters, among them the new Foreign

Minister Sun Baoqi.132

Facing a more amenable diplomatic situation than Liang, Sun negotiated a compromise

with Krupensky on October 7, 1913. This agreement, signed in Beijing a month later, secured

Russia’s diplomatic recognition for the ROC in exchange for the ROC’s concession of Mongol

129 Chinese translations of Krupensky’s communication and Liang’s reply found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, 44-45; English translation of the treaty found in H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough and R. B. Otter-Barry, With the Russians in Mongolia (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1912), 26.130 Jerome Ch’en, 142-43.131 Ibid., 176; Snelling, 150-51. The treaty’s validity, and even authenticity, remains a topic of considerable discussion, see the translation and analysis by Parshotma Mehra in Alex McKay, The History of Tibet, vol. 3, The Modern Period: 1895-1959, The Encounter with Modernity (Routledge/Curzon, 2003), 171-90, originally published in the Journal of Asian History 3, no. (1969). 132 David Bonavia, China’s Warlords (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 36.

autonomy.133 Attached to this document were four notes promising a future conference intended

to define Outer Mongolia’s territory.134 Claiming that their absence rendered this treaty invalid,

Outer Mongolia sought assistance and recognition from Japan. Russia’s consulate in Harbin kept

these requests from leaving China. They in turn placated the Mongols by offering increased

financial assistance.135 During the Simla Convention, furthermore, Great Britain demanded that

Tibet cancel their treaty with Outer Mongolia.136 The ROC met with similar successes in Inner

Mongolia. With noyons divided between those who supported Bogd Khan Mongolia and those

who considered the Bogd Khan’s theocratic government a hindrance to secular modernization,

Yuan’s government easily suppressed anti-ROC uprisings. He afterwards divided Inner

Mongolia into several provinces.137

Overseeing the ROC’s frontiers was the Court of Colonial Affairs, renamed the

Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau (Meng Zang Ju) in 1912 and the Mongolian and Tibetan

Ministry (Meng Zang Yuan) in 1914. Linda Benson marginalizes this administration’s

importance due to its primary function as a performer of rituals, a criticism that fails to consider

rituals as a political tool.138 Statistics compiled by this body confirm that during each year of the

ministry’s existence they allocated nearly their entire budget towards diplomatic ceremonies.139

The cash-strapped government’s insistence that they continue these practices indicates that they

attached considerable significance to their being performed. Considering the key role that rituals

133 Jerome Ch’en, 68; Chinese version of this treaty found in Ch’en Ch’ung-tsu, 17.134 John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements (with and concerning) China, vol. II, 1894-1919 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), 1067; For a firsthand account of this conference, see Chen Lu, 16-41.135 Ewing, Between Hammer and Anvil, 50.136 Bell, Tibet Past and Present, 304.137 E. A. Belov, “Anti-Chinese Rebellion led by Babujav in Inner Mongolia, 1915-1916 (Moscow: Annaly, 1996).138 Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 15.139 Meng Zang Yuan Tongjibiao: Minguo Yi Nian (Statistical Tables of Meng Zang Yuan: The First Year of the Republic of China) (Peking, 1912); Meng Zang Yuan Tongjibiao: Minguo Er Nian (Statistical Tables of Meng Zang Yuan: The Second Year of the Republic of China) (Peking, 1913); Meng Zang Yuan Tongjibiao: Minguo San Nian (Statistical Tables of Meng Zang Yuan: The Third Year of the Republic of China) (Peking, 1914).

played in their interactions with the frontiers, China’s retention of the Qing’s frontier territories

necessitated ritual continuity.

Yuan and the Bogd Khan: The Fight for Inner Mongolia

Outer Mongolia nevertheless continued behaving as an independent entity. The Bogd

Khan awarded titles such as “Forefront Hero” (Mong. Manglai Baatar) to the Barga Mongol

Damdinsuren, “Thoughtful Hero Duke” (Bodolgot Baatar Gung) to the Daur Tsende, and even

honorary “Duke” (Gung) to the Swedish merchant Frans August Larson.140 Yuan in turn

promised aristocrats higher ranking titles and greater salaries than those received from the Qing

and Bogd Khan, provided that they back the Republic. This approach generated considerable

support for China amongst Inner Mongolian dukes and princes, with even non-aristocratic

lineages being ennobled.141 Among these newfound loyalists was the sixth Janggiya Khutughtu,

Lozang Penden Tenpe Dronme (1890-1957).

The Janggiya Khutughtu feared submission to the Bogd Khan. Beyond the loss of

political prestige that this lower status entailed, he would also lose a substantial government

stipend. Since a divided Mongolia could potentially safeguard this privileged position, he

therefore professed allegiance to the ROC a mere four months after Yuan’s inauguration.142 In

response Yuan awarded him the title Great State Master with Complete Benediction and

Radiance (Hongji guangming da guoshi) and provided an annual salary of 10,000 yuan. He also

gave titles to the lama’s parents, younger brother, and religious instructor. In 1915 Yuan received

140 Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 116.141 Uradyn E. Bulag, “From Empire to Nation: The Demise of Buddhism in Inner Mongolia” in The Mongolia-Tibet Interface: Opening New Research Terrains in Inner Asia, eds. Uradyn E. Bulag and Hildegard G. M. Diemberger (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 24.142 Fang Jianchang and Wang Shiyu, “Modai zhangjia hutuketu xiaozhuan” (Biography of the Last Janggiya Khutughtu), Shehui Kexue Cankao 20: 20.

a statue of Amitabha as a gift from the hierarch.143 Despite these public displays of friendship,

Yuan expressed reluctance to promote the inexperienced hierarch to an official position, instead

appointing the fourth Kanjurwa Khutughtu head of the Beijing Lama Seal office. It is widely

believed that the Janggiya Khutughtu’s supporters orchestrated the Kanjurwa Khutughtu’s death

due to his sympathies for the Bogd Khan, resulting in the younger hierarch’s appointment to this

position.144

Not holding a government position did not prevent the Janggiya Khutughtu from exerting

influence over Chinese policy. Yuan hosted him on two separate occasions in 1912.145 During the

first of these visits the lama “urged Yuan to give equal protection to Buddhism of every sect and

suggested that the problem of Mongolia and Tibet could be solved through religion.”146 The end

of imperial patronage left once prominent monasteries open to confiscation by secular

nationalists wishing to establish schools and other public works.147 Since these programs

threatened Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists alike, the once divided adherents joined together to

form Buddhist associations dedicated to protecting religious property and instituting schools of

their own. The first of these groups, the aptly named Chinese Buddhist Association, secured a

charter from the central government in 1912.148 Underlying this act was the belief “[that] the

143 Shi Miaozhou, Mengzang Fojiao Shi (History of Mongol Buddhism) (Yangzhou: Jiangsu Guangling Guji Keyinshe, 1997), 115-117.144 Paul Hyer and Sechin Jagchid, A Mongolian Living Buddha: Biography of the Kanjurwa Khutughtu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 32-33, 161-62.145 Zhangjia dashi yuanqi dianli weiyuanhui, Huguo jingjue fujiao dashi Zhangjia hutuketu shiji ce (Historical Traces of the Changja Qutughtu, the State-Protecting, Completely Enlightened Master Who Assists with Teaching) (Taipei: Zhangjia dashi yuanqi dianli weiyuanhui, 1957), 32.146 Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, Harvard East Asian Series 33 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 174.147 Susan Naquin, Peking: Temples and City Life, 1400-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 591.148 Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 75.

government could not use Buddhism as a tool for cementing relations with Tibet if it allowed

China to be persecuted in its own territory.”149

Support for this proposal dissipated shortly after the Simla Convention, resulting in his

passing legislation that imposed restrictions on monasteries and outlawed lobbying by religious

organizations.150 Labelling these actions secular modernization overlooks Yuan’s continued

relations with Tibetan Buddhism. Peter Zarrow argues that Yuan’s decision on December 12,

1915, to stylize himself Emperor and restore imperial rituals was an “immediately useful

technique of rule” designed to maintain control over China.151 This same motivation inspired his

policies towards the frontier. Since only the Qianlong Emperor linked frontier peoples to China,

only an Emperor could retain these territories. Performing rituals at the court likewise remained

MTAB’s largest expenditure.152 Furthermore, considering that the Qianlong Emperor imposed

restrictions on monastic institutions, Yuan’s attempted revival of imperial policies necessitated

creating similar regulations for religious organizations. Unlike Qianlong, however, Yuan’s

ideology remained thoroughly secular at its core, resulting in the Mongol’s hostility towards the

ROC.

Yuan’s decision to become Emperor sparked uprisings throughout China. Beginning with

Generals Cai E and Tang Jiyao in Yunnan, military governors-general across China declared

independence from the Empire. The Beiyang Army, still awaiting payment from the bankrupt

government, made little effort against these rebels, and suffered numerous defeats despite their

better equipment and training. Although Yuan renounced the monarchy on March 22, 1916, by

149 Welch, 174.150 Tuttle, 76.151 Peter Zarrow, “Political Ritual in the Early Republic of China,” in Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, eds. Kai-Wing Chow, Kevin Doak, and Poshek Fu (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 179.152 Meng Zang Yuan Tongjibiao: Minguo Si Nian (Statistical Tables of Meng Zang Yuan: The Fourth Year of the Republic of China) (Peking, 1915); Meng Zang Yuan Tongjibiao: Minguo Wu Nian (Statistical Tables of Meng Zang Yuan: The Fifth Year of the Republic of China) (Peking, 1916).

his death on June 5, China had been fragmented into various “warlord” factions. The two

succeeding Presidents of the ROC, Li Yuanhong (1864-1928) and Xu Shichang (1855-1939),

were elected based upon their ability to please every faction, not their political acumen. True

power resided with the Premier, Duan Qirui (1865-1936).153 Beijing’s relationship with the

Janggiya Khutughtu continued under the Premier’s direction. On July 21 Duan added 1,000 yuan

to the lama’s salary and assigned a unit of cavalrymen to serve as his bodyguard.154 The hierarch

later joined Chinese monks in restoring the Chinese Buddhist Association in 1917, only to be

forced by the government to disband following Tibet’s invasion of Khams. Yuan’s secular

policies towards Buddhists, it seemed, remained the norm within China Proper.155

Warlords and Bolsheviks: Outer Mongolia during the Bolshevik Revolution

An opportunity to restore Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia arose during the

Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent Russian Civil War (1917-20). The Buryat Grigory

Semyanov (1890-1946), supreme commander (R. ataman) of the now-independent Baikal

Cossacks, envisioned a “Great Mongol State” that encompassed Inner and Outer Mongolia,

Tibet, and Xinjiang. 156 Japan considered Semyanov’s ambitions a useful tool for creating a

barrier between their troops stationed at Vladivostok and the Soviets. Therefore, Japanese

representatives promised him financial assistance and diplomatic recognition following a

successful unification campaign.157 All that remained was for Semyanov to gain support from the

Bogd Khan, whom he repeatedly offered a high-ranking position in his government, to no avail.

153 Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800’s to 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 168-69.154 Shi, 118.155 Welch, 39.156 S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 316-17.157 Jamie Bisher, White Terror: Cossack Warlords of the Trans-Siberian (London: Routledge, 2009), 152.

The Bogd Khan considered himself the rightful leader of the Pan-Mongolist movement,

and refused subordination to a Buryat. When offering incentives failed, Semyanov vowed to

forcefully induce his compliance. China’s Minister to Outer Mongolia, Chen Yi, received from

the Bogd Khan requests for Chinese intervention shortly afterwards. Soldiers commanded by the

Northwest Frontier Commissioner, Xu Shuzheng (1880-1925), reached Urga in July 1919.158

Russia’s Minister to Beijing, Prince N. A. Kudashev, argued that these troop movements violated

the Khyakhta Agreement. Duan replied that these were simply temporary measures designed to

preserve Outer Mongolia’s independence.159 Subsequent developments gave truth to Kudashev’s

suspicions.

China’s military presence sparked uprisings by one Daur and two Buryat regiments in

Transbaikalia, blaming clerical and princely elites for surrendering Mongolia to foreign powers.

Two viable options presented themselves as defenses against these aggressors. On August 4

Khalkha noyons convened a khuriltai to discuss possibly joining Semyanov’s campaign.160 Chen

Yi received telegrams from a different group a week later pleading for their continued protection

against Semyanov. They further stated that they were willing to accept a restored Qing system

overseen by secular administrators, not the Bogd Khan. The Minister agreed to this arrangement

provided that the princes accept sixty-four points, including the appointment of Chinese

government officials and introduction of permanent garrisons, which they accepted.161 The

National Assembly formally ratified this treaty on October 28.

158 Document found in Jinshisuo, ed., Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao hubian (Compiled Sources of Modern Chinese History), vol. 159, Zhong-E guanxi shiliao: Wai menggu (Historical Sources on Chinese-Russian Relations: Outer Mongolia) (Taipei, 1959). 416.159 Ewing, Between Hammer and Anvil, 118.160 S. L. Kuzmin, The History of Baron Ungern. An Experience of Reconstruction (Moscow: KMK Sci. Press, 2011), 134.161 Document found in Jinshisuo, 461-62.

Prince Kudashev lamented to Moscow that the princes complied with these terms simply

to retain their feudal titles. The Bogd Khan, for his part, sent a delegation to Beijing claiming

that Chen Yi had imposed these terms on the princes. It is clear from the available evidence that

a division existed amongst the noyons, with certain princes supporting Chinese suzerainty and

others opposing their loss of autonomy. In true “divide and rule” fashion, Chen Yi backed the

faction whose interests aligned most with Beijing’s objectives. These successes nonetheless

proved fleeting.

Although Duan sent a conciliatory letter to the Bogd Khan promising continued

reverence for his office and Buddhism, Xu Shuzheng envisioned a different future for Outer

Mongolia.162 Tensions began when Xu deeply humiliated the Mongols during the ceremonial

handing over of authority to the Chinese, requiring “the kowtowing of all official to [him] and

the personal reverence of the [Khutughtu] to the Chinese flag.”163 He later informed them that the

agreed upon sixty-four points were to be cancelled and his proposed Eight Articles to be adopted,

containing provisions permitting Han migration, and implementing commercial, industrial, and

agricultural modernization programs.

The Bogd Khan accepted these terms under threat of deportation.164 Prime Minister

Gonchigjalzangiin Badamdorj, installed by Xu, afterwards proposed ending autonomy.

Government ministers and deputy ministers persuaded the Bogd Khan to support this measure in

the interest of national unity.165 With his approval secured, Xu proceeded to replace government

administrators with Chahars from Inner Mongolia, abolish the Khalkha army, and implement the

162 Thomas E. Ewing, “Russia, China, and the Origins of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1911-1921: A Reappraisal,” The Slavonic and East European Review (1980), 58: 407-08.163 Bawden, 205.164 The Eight Articles and correspondence between Xu and the Bogd Khan can be found in Jinshisuo, 593-94.165 Baabar, 158.

Eight Articles.166 Fed up with Xu’s continued abuses, the Mongols rebelled once again on

October 1, 1920. They received support from the Russian Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg

(1885-1921).

Ungern-Sternberg believed himself to be an incarnation of the Mongol “God of War”

Jamsaran and incarnation of Chinggis Khan and attributed Russia’s decadence and self-

destruction to their failure to honor their Mongol origins. He proposed as a solution restoring the

Tsars and establishing a Pan-Mongol Empire.167 The Baron’s commitment to Pan-Mongolism

earned him the trust of Semyanov, who declared him the successor ataman of the Baikal

Cossacks in 1920. This appointment permitted Semyanov to assume command over the anti-

Bolshevik White Russians following Admiral Alexander Kolchak’s execution.168 Semyanov

proved equally incapable as a military leader, fleeing to the United States via Harbin and

Nagasaki a year later.169

This setback occurred alongside Japan’s withdrawal from Siberia, leaving Xu in a

precarious position.170 His government depended on the political recognition and financial

assistance procured from the Japanese, who considered Outer Mongolia another possible buffer

against the Soviets. Without this aid, Xu struggled to maintain control over an increasingly

disaffected populace.171 Chen Yi replaced Xu as Northwestern Frontier Commissioner following

Duan Qirui’s loss to Wu Peifu (1874-1939) that July.172 The Bogd Khan’s supporters exploited

166 Xu Daolin, Xu shuzheng xiansheng nianbu hekan (The Life of Mr. Xu Shuzheng) (Taipei: Shuju chubanshe, 1962), 561.167 Ossendowski, 246-48, 269.168 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 94-96; Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Vintage, 1995), 46.169 Bisher, 152. 170 Leonard A. Humphreys, The Way of the Heavenly Sword: The Japanese Army in the 1920s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 26.171 D. P. Pershin, Baron Ungern, Urga and Altan Bulak (Samara: Agni, 1999), 103.172 Gray, 178-79.

the chaos concomitant with this change to arrange the Baron’s intervention. After a nearly five-

month campaign, Ungern-Sternberg restored the Bogd Khan on February 21, 1921.173

Two main groups had formed in opposition to Xu’s Eight Articles, Consular Hill

(Konsulyn denj) and East Khuree (Zuun khuree). On October 25, 1920, they joined together to

form the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and sent representatives to Moscow requesting

support from the Soviets, to which they agreed. In conjunction with the Soviet Red Army the

MPP defeated Chinese forces at Kyakhta on March 18, 1921. Two days later they announced

Outer Mongolia’s independence, established a provisional government, and launched campaigns

against Ungern-Sternberg. Four months later they captured Urga as well as the Baron.174 The

Bogd Khan’s continued influence, however, required that the MPP grudgingly enthrone him as a

constitutional monarch. Immediately following his death in 1924 they proclaimed themselves the

Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR).175 This political shift occurred alongside a renewed

interest in the recently exiled Panchen Lama.

The Panchen Lama and the Bolsheviks, Part I: The Soviet Union as Shambhala

Desperately seeking revenue for his new military, the Dalai Lama resorted to a

eigthteenth-century precedent requiring that the Panchen Lama donate one-quarter of his estate

to pay military expenses. The Panchen Lama correctly viewed this policy as an attack on his

authority.176 While never intending to replace the Dalai Lama, his independence challenged the

former’s ability to establish control over Tibet. During the Dalai Lama’s exile from 1904 to

1905, and again from 1910 to 1911, for example, the Panchen Lama demanded greater autonomy

173 Owen Lattimore and Sh Nachukdorji, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 171.174 Thomas E. Ewing, The Origin of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: 1920 (Bloomington, Ind., 1979), 79-105.175 Bawden, 261-63; 176 Goldstein, 112.

for his estate, Tashi Lhunpo monastery, and even sought help from China and Great Britain in

this endeavor.177 Relations between the two hierarchs, therefore, eroded immediately following

Lhasa’s creation of the Revenue Investigation Office, tasked solely with reassessing estate taxes.

When the Panchen Lama refused to acknowledge Lhasa’s claims to his estate, the Dalai

Lama closed religious administrative positions to everyone outside of Lhasa’s three major

monasteries--Drepung, Ganden, and Sera--and gave Lhasa’s representative at Tashi Lhunpo

authority to demand corvee labor.178 The Panchen Lama’s 1922 appeal to Great Britain further

describes “officials of the Tashi Lhunpo Government...undergoing imprisonment at the Potala

Palace” until they paid the requisite funds.179 Citing stipulations in the Simla Accord barring

intervention in Tibet’s internal affairs, Great Britain remained neutral, resulting in the Panchen

Lama’s flight to Amdo in 1923.180

While staying at Kumbum Monastery he received delegates from the MPRP offering

residence in Urga.181 Although initially successful, Duan, restored by a coup in 1923, learned of

this mission and ordered that the Panchen Lama come to Beijing under threat of force. When

news of Duan’s intimidation reached the Soviet Union they sent Agvan Dorzhiev to plead with

the Panchen Lama to avoid going to Beijing, claiming that this visit amounted to a declaration of

war against the Dalai Lama. Though this visit proved fruitless, O. Jamyan Gung, the MPR’s

Minister of the People’s Education, again invited the Panchen Lama to Urga while travelling to

Beijing in December 1924. Gung claimed that this act could encourage rapprochement between

177 K. Dhondup, The Water-bird and Other Years: A History of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and After (New Delhi: Rangwang, 1986), 98.178 Geoffrey Samuel, Civilized Shamans (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 1993), 52.179 Goldstein, 112.180 Ya Hanzhang, Biographies of the Tibetan Spiritual Leaders Panchen Erdenis, trans. Chen Guansheng and Li Peizhu (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 258-60.181 Christopher Atwood, Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 1911– 1931 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002), 328-29; Owen Lattimore and Fujiko Isono, The Diluv Khutughtu: Memoirs and Autobiography of a Mongol Buddhist Reincarnation in Religion and Revolution (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982), 121.

Tibet and the Soviet Union, thereby forming a united front against British imperialism.182 The

Soviet Union’s interest in the Panchen Lama stemmed from their desire to portray the Soviet

Union as the earthly Shambhala, a cause that Dorzhiev wholeheartedly supported.

Despite having suffered a major setback in 1905, Dorzhiev continued advocating a

Russian-backed Pan-Mongol state. In 1909 Nicholas permitted construction of a Tibetan

Buddhist temple in the capital. During both the temple’s opening service on February 21, 1913,

and a ceremony consecrating a gilded copper statue of Shakyamuni Buddha gifted by Siam’s

King Rama V, Dorzhiev reminded attendees that Nicholas was a cakravartin monarch that would

rescue them from samsara (Sanskrit for “the worldly experience—birth, death, etc.”).183 It is

noteworthy that only Buryats and Kalmyks were part of this rhetoric. Clearly his experiences

with the British had dampened his ambitions. The Bolsheviks, though, seemed to renew hope for

a Pan-Mongol empire.

Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) believed that, while Communism ultimately sought the

elimination of national distinction in favor of an international proletarian identity, anti-

imperialist nationalist movements served as a critical precursor to a proletarian revolution.184

Bolshevik revolutionaries granted Russia’s ethnic minorities--defined by their race, language,

and culture--autonomy within the Soviet Union. Though theoretically permitting these groups to

declare independence, Soviet policymakers ensured that they remain dependent on Moscow by

implementing “affirmative action” policies, which entailed promoting minority languages and

182 S. L. Kuzmin, “The Activity of the 9th Panchen Lama in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria,” Far Eastern Affairs, no. 1 (2015): 124-25.183 Alexander Andreyev, “Agvan Dorjiev and the Buddhist Temple in Petrograd,” Cho-yang: The Voice of Tibetan Religion and Culture, Year of Tibet Edition 2 (1991): 221.184 V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950), 15.

culture as defined by the Soviets. They also coopted preexisting elites into the bureaucratic

framework.185

This approach resulted in Lenin declaring a Buryat-Mongolia Autonomous Soviet

Socialist Republic in 1922.186 Dorzhiev praised this measure as a first-step towards creating a

Pan-Mongol kingdom. That same year he declared Lenin Je Tsongkhapa’s newest incarnation,

and eulogized Communism as conducive to attaining nirvana by satisfying everyone’s material

necessities. Violence against lamas and monasteries, he claimed, did not come from Lenin, but,

rather, evil individuals dedicated to overthrowing Communism.187 He saw in the Panchen Lama

Lenin’s ecclesiastical counterpart, Maitreya, who would someday reside at the Saint Petersburg

(now Leningrad) Temple.188

Secular leaders in the MPR expressed interest in the Panchen Lama for more pragmatic

reasons. Being anti-clerical, though not anti-religious, in orientation, the MPR targeted

Buddhism’s organized bureaucracy, engendering considerable opposition from the da lamas.189

Jamyan Gung believed that the Panchen Lama’s influence could weaken these lamas’ prestige.190

Buyannemekh identified the Panchen Lama’s backing as a vital tool in amassing supporters for

the Inner Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Policy (IMPRP), founded in October 1925.191

Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948), the Christian warlord who had led a coup in late 1924 to

expel former Emperor Puyi (1906-67) and despised Buddhism, provided transportation for the

countless pilgrims wishing to pay homage to the hierarch. At the heart of this measure was the

185 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 9-15.186 Alexander Andreyev, Soviet Russia and Tibet: The Debacle of Secret Diplomacy, 1918-1930 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 89.187 Thupten J. Norbu and Dan Martin, “Dorjiev: Memoirs of a Tibetan Diplomat,” Hokke-Bunka Kenkyu (Journal of the Institute for the Comprehensive Study of the Lotus Sutra) 17 (1991), 43, 50. 188 Kuzmin, “The 9th Panchen Lama,” 124.189 Bawden, 266-67.190 Kuzmin, “9th Panchen Lama,” 124-25.191 Atwood, 318.

warlord’s desire to gain political capital in the MPR.192 He also asked Vandannima, one of the

founders of the IMPRP, to contact the Panchen Lama on his behalf, though a delay in leaving

Kalgan kept this intended meeting from happening.193 One last attempt at convincing the

Panchen Lama to leave Beijing happened that same year when he received delegates from the

MPR and a representative of the Soviet Comintern. Their visit, though, was primarily intended to

determine his attitudes towards the MPR. The Panchen Lama’s subsequent actions, therefore,

generated considerable alarm.

The Panchen Lama and the Republicans: The Republic as Shambhala

Upon his arrival, representatives of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Ministry (MTAM)

arranged for him living quarters at Zhongnanhai, the former imperial palace.194 Shortly

afterwards Duan and the lama met on March 11 to discuss future policies towards Outer

Mongolia following the Red Army’s withdrawal. The Panchen Lama suggested that they open

negotiations with the Russian Foreign Minister, Lev Karakhan, regarding Outer Mongolia’s

status as a Chinese province.195 On August 11 that same year Duan awarded him the title

“Propagator of Honesty, Savior of the World” (Ch. Xuancheng Jishi) inscribed in a gold leaf

album.196

Duan had previously sponsored a twenty-one day Golden Light Dharma ritual performed

by the Mongol lama Bai Puren at Yonghegong, the former imperial temple. Based on the Sutra

192 Feng Yuxiang, Wo de Shenguo (My Life) (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 423.193 Kuzmin, “9th Panchen Lama,” 126.194 Chen Wenjian, Banchan Dashi Donglai Shiwunian Dashiji (An Account of the Panchen Lama's Fifteen Years in the East) (Shanghai: Dafalun Shuju, 1948), 3-4.195 Han Xinfu and Jiang Kefu, eds., Zhonghua Minguo Dashiji (Annals of the Chinese Republic), vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe), 300.196 Li Pengnian and Wan Renyuan, eds., Jiushi banchan neidi huodong ji fanzang shouxian dang’an xuanbian (Selections from the Archives Regarding the Ninth Panchen’s Lamas Activities in Inland China and the Restrictions on his Return to Tibet) (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 1992), 5.

of Golden Light, this ritual brought the celestial kings of the four directions to protect the state

and other worldly interests.197 In sponsoring this ritual Duan hoped to affiliate himself with the

Shambhala myth. With the Panchan Lama already figuring prominent in the Kalachakra

traditions, practitioners increasingly considered him Maitreya, they would consider whomever he

backed to be Regdendagva.198 Therefore, Duan believed that through the Panchen Lama he could

garner support from the Mongols. Pan-Mongolism, though, did not serve as a feasible basis for

this support due to China’s Han majority. Instead, Duan revived notions of Pan-Buddhism to

justify laying claim to Mongol territories, dismantling restrictions on the Japanese-Chinese

Buddhist associations flourishing throughout China.199

Duan’s revived government, however, proved short-lived. By late-1926 Duan had been

ousted by the warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928). As the new President of the ROC, Zhang

prioritized recovering China’s Mongol territories. The Bogd Khan had previously suggested that

the Mongols give Zhang control over Outer Mongolia following Soviet occupation, an offer that

the MPR’s founding rendered invalid. Hosting the Panchen Lama at Mukden could have possibly

secured for him the recognition needed to accomplish this task.200 An opportunity presented itself

when the lama declined Japan’s request that he attend a Pan-Asian and Anti-Bolshevik assembly

in Nagasaki in September 1926. This news inspired Zhang to convene a similar conference at

Mukden later that year in conjunction with select noyons.201

Zhang’s announcement propitiously coincided with increased difficulties between the

Panchen Lama and MTAM. The Panchen Lama regularly complained that MTAM lacked

sufficient resources to provide adequate living conditions. Zhang’s subsequent reprimand of the

197 Tuttle, 81.198 Tsendiin Damdinsuren: k 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya (Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura Publishers, 2008), 35-39, cited in Kuzmin, 124, n. 4.199 Welch, 171.200 Lattimore and Nachukdorji, 171.201 Atwood, 599.

bureau head, Gung Wang (Prince Gunsennerov), exacerbated tensions. After receiving a steady

stream of requests from the hierarch asking that he be permitted residence, Zhang agreed to

“temporarily” house him at the Huangxi monastery for the conference. On April 11, 1927, Hong

Kong’s South China Morning Post reported that the Panchen Lama labelled “Bolshevism [an]

evil threatening the entire world.”202 Shortly following this speech countless adherents flocked to

Mukden to pay homage, among them were four Buryat lamas. The Panchen Lama additionally

opened contact with the Torghuts in Xinjiang.

During a subsequent meeting with Zhang Xueliang (1901-2001), who had assumed his

father’s position after his assassination by Japan, he again requested that the Chinese prevent

continued Soviet intervention in the MPR. Instead, Zhang sent him to meet with Prince

Demchugdongrub (1902-66), leader of Inner Mongolia’s Shilingol League, to discuss unifying

the aimags.203 While the lama travelled to Hohhot he performed several Kalacakra rituals.204

From the Soviet Comintern’s perspective these actions represented a Buddhist Pan-Mongol

conspiracy, and they soon ordered the MPR to take action.

The Panchen Lama and the Bolsheviks, Part II: Shambhala Lost

Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) considered Lenin’s gradual assimilation policies a threat to the

proletarian revolution, ordering agricultural collectivisation and the confiscation or religious

properties in the ethnic republics.205 The Comintern ordered the MPR to follow suit in 1927 on

the grounds that the lamas planned to form with “[Zhang] and the Japanese imperialism which

202 South China Morning Post, April 11, 1927.203 Kuzmin, “9th Panchen Lama,” 125-29.204 Burensain Borjigin, “Panchen Erdeni IX’s Visits to Eastern Inner Mongolia and the Fengtian Authorities’ Reception: A Case Study of the Relations between Mongolia, Tibet and China,” Bulletin for the Japan Association of Mongol Studies (2001): 45-67.205 J. V. Stalin, Joseph Stalin: Marxism and the National Question, Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: International Publishers, 1942), 211; Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 49, 128.

stands behind him…[the] counter-revolutionary forces of Mongolia...with the attraction of the

Panchen Lama.” 206 On August 2 M. Amagayev, a Buryat Comintern advisor from Russia,

publicly condemned the Buryat scholar-politician Ts. Jamtsarano for planning to use the

Shambhala myth to found a new khanate in conjunction with the Panchen Lama.207

In fact, Jamtsarano shared Dorzhiev’s belief that Buddhism and Communism were

synthesizable, encapsulated in the Shambhala myth:

The basic aims of [the] Party and Buddhism are both (sic) the welfare of the people, there is no conflict between the two of them. They are mutually compatible...It is a special case that in Russia religion is the opium of the people. What our lord Buddha taught cannot be equated with aggressive religions like Mohammedanism and Christianity, and though the [C]ommunist [P]arty rejects religion and the priesthood, this has nothing to do with out Buddhist Faith. Our Party wants to see the Buddhist Faith flourishing in a pure form, and approves of lamas who stay in their lamaseries, reciting scriptures and faithfully observing their vows.”208

He even suggested that the doctrines of Marxism and Leninism originated with Tsongkhapa.209

When the Diluv Khutughtu requested permission to pay the Panchen Lama in 1928, Jamtsarano

proposed turning this pilgrimage into a diplomatic embassy, resulting in his being labelled a

Rightest and expelled from the Party by the Seventh Congress.210 This same Congress outlawed

searching for a new Jebtsundama Khutughtu.

Prime Minister Peljidkiin Genden (1895-1937) reported to the Political Secretariat of the

Comintern on February 29, 1929, that the Japanese were using Chinese warlords, Mongol feudal

aristocrats, and the Panchen Lama to propagate their Pan-Asian ideology, which included Pan-

Mongolism as a sub-ideology. Genden further alleged that there existed pro-Japanese elements

among the MPR’s clergy and nobility.211 The Comintern’s resultant suppression of Buddhism

206 Rupen, Mongols, 201.207 Bulag, 30.208 Quoted in Bawden, 286.209 Ibid., 287.210 Lattimore Isono, 177.211 Bulag, 31.

sparked uprisings throughout the MPR from 1930 to 1932, causing the flight of more than

30,000 people from 7,542 families to Inner Mongolia, many of whom made pilgrimages to the

Panchen Lama’s Oboo Ceremony.212 Rebels additionally corresponded with the Panchen Lama,

believing that he was Maitreya.213

The Panchen Lama included in his entourage four representatives of Japan, who

maintained communication with the deposed Manchu Emperor Puyi (1906-67) and Grigory

Semyanov. They also purchased 1,300 rifles, 100 pistols, and four machine guns from Japanese

merchants in Tianjin for use by the Shilingol League against the MPR.214 On September 18,

1931, Japan’s Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria and established it as a Japanese protectorate,

renamed Manchukuo, with Puyi as Emperor.215 With Puyi’s backing Japan channeled an

additional 30,000 rifles to the Panchen Lama, 20,000 of which went to subordinate monasteries

in Qinghai and Tangut, the remaining 10,000 going to the Shilingol League.216 Japan’s efforts,

though, proved ineffective, for the Soviet Union had violently suppressed the rebellion by the

end of 1932.217

Although Stalin ordered the MPR to scale back collectivization that same year, this act

did little to reduce tensions. Beginning in 1933 Manchukuo gradually occupied Inner Mongolia

as a defense against the Soviets, establishing with Demchugdongrub the Mongolian Borderland

Coalition Autonomous Government (Mengjiang Lianhe Zizhi Zhengfu) in 1936.218 Mengjiang’s

Pan-Mongol ambitions theoretically received legitimacy from Puyi in a clear example of what

212 Baabar, 310; Owen Lattimore, Mongol Journeys (New York: AMS Press, 1975 [1941]), 243-71.213 Bawden, 317-18.214 Kuzmin, “9th Panchen Lama,” 133-34.215 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, State and Society in East Asia Series (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 65.216 Kuzmin, 9th Panchen Lama,” 132.217 Bulag, 33.218 Sechin Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchungdogrub, 1902-1966 (Bellingham, WA: Western Washington University, 1999), 60-92.

Prasenjit Duara calls the “superscribing of symbols” from the Qing era.219 Stalin used these

incursions as an excuse to occupy the MPR, which Prime Minister Genden condemned during a

private meeting with the General-Secretary in 1934. Genden’s intransigence resulted in his

execution during Stalin’s Great Purge (1936-38).220 On January 29, 1938, this same campaign

claimed Agvan Dorzhiev’s life. The Great Purge also witnessed the widespread confiscation of

Buddhist properties and suppression of the clergy.221

The Panchen Lama, meanwhile, turned to China’s new Guomindang (GMD) government

for support following the rebellion’s failure. Now led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-

1975), who became the nominal leaders of China following the Northern Expedition (1926-28),

the GMD was determined to maintain control over the Qing frontiers.222 The Panchen Lama first

contacted Chiang on September 2, 1928, offering congratulations to the new government, and

expressing hope that Tibet would someday come under GMD rule.223 Chiang, though, did not

take action following this communication, believing that the GMD should continue Yuan and

Duan’s secularization campaigns.224

The Panchen Lama, undeterred, began espousing anti-Japanese propaganda throughout

Inner Mongolia, garnering attention from the devoutly Buddhist President of the Examination

Commission (Kaoshi Yuan), Dai Jitao (1891-1949). Only at Dai’s insistence did the reorganized

Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (Meng Zang Weiyuanhui) grant him the title

219 Prasenjit Duara, “Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, Chinese God of War,” The Journal of Asian Studies 47, no. 4 (Nov. 1988): 778; Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, 64-65.220 Baabar, 99.221 Snelling, 252.222 Chiang Kai-shek, “Zhongguo zhi Bianjiang Wenti” (China’s Frontier Question), in Zongtong Jianggong Sixiang Yanlun Zongji (A Collection of President Chiang Kai-shek’s Thoughts and Speeches), ed. Qin Xiaoyi (Taipei: KMT, 1984), 107.223 Li and Wan, 6.224 Bulag, 39.

“Western Borderlands Propagation Commissioner” on April 14th, 1932.225 With the GMD’s

backing the Panchen Lama propagated the “five races” ideology throughout Inner Mongolia and

Kokonor, though this effort produced limited results.226 When the Dalai Lama died in 1933 he

sought re-entry into Tibet. In 1937, while negotiating in Gyegu, Qinghai, the Panchen Lama

died.

Only after the Allied victory during the Second World War was Inner Mongolia

integrated as a province, with Tibet being integrated following the plateau’s invasion by

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government in 1950.227 Outer Mongolia, on the

other hand, was granted independence on October 20, 1945. While technically illegal

under the new constitution, Tibetan Buddhism remained popular among individuals

wishing to express their “Mongol” identity over their “Soviet” citizenship. This face

became apparent following the 1990 Revolution ending Mongol communism and the

immediate increase in the number of professed Tibetan Buddhists.228

Conclusion

While material factors undoubtedly played a significant role in the Mongols’ political

ideology, describing Tibetan Buddhism’s role as simply an ideological construct justifying a

purely material interaction or a “drug of the people” masking exploitation glaringly overlooks

Tibetan Buddhism’s critical role in Mongol society. Prior to Gush Khan’s claimed descent from

Chinggis Khan via reincarnation, “bloody tanistry” was limited solely to khans sharing

biological ancestry with the revered khaghan. Gush’s actions not only opened rule to the Oirats,

225 Anzhu Dangban, Liwei Dalai Lama yu Banchan E’erdeni Nianpu (Account of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni’s Genealogies) (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1998), 643-44.226 For an overview of these campaigns, see Tuttle; Bulag.227 Fabienne Jagou, The Ninth Panchen Lama: Life at the Crossroads of Sino-Tibetan Relations (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2011), 270-88.228 Baabar, 243.

but also permitted the Qing, Russians, Soviets, and later Japanese to depict themselves as the true

heirs to the Chinggisid legacy.

This fact clearly presented itself during the conflict between China and Russia concerning

influence in Inner and Outer Mongolia. In order to counter the theocratic Bogd Khanate, Yuan

Shikai restored government patronage for Buddhist institutions under the guise of Pan-Buddhism

while simultaneously awarding titles to the Inner Mongolian noyons. The Bogd Khanate, having

fallen within the Russian sphere of influence, espoused a Pan-Mongol ideology that equated

Russia with the mythical kingdom Shambhala. Both states revived previous conceptions of the

“patron-priest” relationship.

Shortly after orchestrating Russian recognition for his claims over Inner and Outer

Mongolia, Yuan declared himself Emperor of a new Chinese Empire. This tactic aroused

considerably less controversy along the frontier compared to China Proper, since frontier

territories hoped to restore an imperial “patron-priest” relationship in some form. What did cause

uproar, however, was his decision to launch secularization campaigns against religious

institutions, and China soon lost influence in both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Even accounting

for the political and economic instability in China Proper brought about by Yuan’s decision,

Outer Mongolia’s hostility towards Xu Shuzheng shows that Tibetan Buddhism remained

influential within the government, to the point where the Soviet Union preserved the “patron-

priest” relationship during their initial forays into the region.

This policy changed with Joseph Stalin’s collectivization campaigns, though China, too,

failed to sway Mongol opinion in their favor. These policies, though, were not designed to

maintain control, but, rather, “prepare” Outer Mongolia for independence. Despite Duan Qirui’s

sponsorship of Kalacrakra rituals and patronage of the Panchen Lama, China’s continued

secularization policies rendered these acts invalid in the eyes of the noyons. Only after Zhang

Zuolin took Duan’s place did the Panchen Lama’s sermons prove effective at garnering prestige

in Inner Mongolia, a fact that benefitted Japan following Zhang Zuolin’s assassination and

replacement by Zhang Xueliang. Japan’s policies continued with the puppet Mengjiang

government, indirectly ruled through the puppet-state Manchukuo, in an effort to secure the

noyons’ loyalty through the Panchen Lama.

The Mongols’ repeated rejection of secular governments’ offering economic and political

stability shows that they displayed a comparable interest in religious affairs to their European

counterparts. In the same sense that religious and economic interests have fused throughout

European history, too, have these concerns influenced Mongol history. Unlike much of Europe,

though, Mongolia displayed less of an interest in secularizing religious institutions, as occurred

during the French Revolution. Instead, they gave religion a premier position within their

governments, accepting Russian, Soviet, and Japanese rule when their rule was deemed

amenable to preserving Tibetan Buddhist institutions, provided that these institutions remained

distinctly Mongol. Therefore, although rhetoric shifted to that of Pan-Mongolism, Tibetan

Buddhism remained inseparable from Mongol politics into the twentieth century.

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