Philosophy 522 Special Topics in the Philoso-phy of Science: Philosophy of Physics LEC 001 TR 2:00 – 3:15 CRT 607 Instructor: Stephen Leeds sleeds@uwm.edu Prereq: jr st.

Philosophy 535 Special Topics in Feminist Theory: Gender and Social Construction LEC 001 TR 3:30 – 4:45 CRT 607 Instructor: Andrea Westlund westlund@uwm.edu Prereq: jr st; a course in philos or women’s stds. Philos 535 & Wmns 535 are jointly of-fered; with same topic, they count as repeats of one another.

Philosophy 554 Special Topics in the History of Modern Philosophy: Reality and Representation LEC 001 M 3:30 – 6:10 CRT 607 Instructor: Miren Boehm boehmm@uwm.edu Prereq: jr st & 3 cr in philos; Philos 432(R); or cons instr.

The first part of the course will be on the Theory of Relativity, Special and General; the implications of these theories for our conceptions of Space and Time (and spacetime). The second part will be on Quantum Mechan-ics, particularly the Measurement problem. If there is time at the end, we may discuss some issues in Statistical Mechanics. No specific require-ments, but it would be helpful to know elementary calculus and some line-ar algebra. Many feminist philosophers have argued that gender is a social construct. In this course, we will explore this thesis in detail. What is a social construct? In what sense(s) might gender and other identity categories (race, disability, etc.) be social-ly constructed? How is gender related to sex? What is gender essentialism? What are the moral and political implications of our answers to these questions? Our focus will be on recent work in feminist metaphysics and gender theory, with some attention to related work in feminist epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics. Readings will include selections from philosophers such as Linda Al-coff, Miranda Fricker, Sally Haslanger, Jennifer Saul, Rae Langton, and Charlotte Witt, among others.

The central questions of this class concern our conception of the nature of objectivity and our conception of the nature of mind and experience. What is “reality as it exists in itself”? And is the mind an instrument for knowing reality that at the same time distorts our view of reality? Can we subtract the features the mind contributes to experience to get at as pris-tine a view of reality as possible? We consider the historical development of these ideas: Descartes, Locke, among others. And we also engage with more contemporary discussions: Hilary Putnam, Bernard Williams’ “Absolute conception of reality”, Thomas Nagel’s “View from nowhere” and Barry Stroud’s “Quest for reality” among others.

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Philosophy 681 Seminar in Advanced Topics: Desire, Well-Being, and Death SEM 001 MW 2:00—3:15 CRT 607 Instructor: Stan Husi husi@uwm.edu Prereq: sr st & 12 cr in philos at 300-level or above; or grad st.

Philosophy 758 Seminar in Major Philoso-phers: Berkeley’s Immaterial-ism SEM 001 T 11:00 – 1:40 CRT 607 Instructor: Margaret Atherton atherton@uwm.edu Prereq: grad st; cons instr. Retakable w/chg in topic to 9 cr max.

Philosophy 790 Advanced Topics in Philoso-phy: Graduate Student Writing Workshop LEC 001 MW 12:30 –1:45 CRT 607 Instructor: Joshua Spencer spence48@uwm.edu Prereq: grad st; add’l prereqs depending on topic.

Desire looms large in the theory of value. Many theories revolve entirely around it. In this class, we are going to investigate desire-based theories of value and well-being, assessing them in their diverse forms of involving various degrees of idealization, hierarchical levels of desire, coherent webs of desire, etc. The class’ first third will be devoted on the classical readings on this subject, by D. Lewis, D. Parfit, H. Frankfurt, M. Smith, J. Griffin, among others. After that, we are going to turn to recent work in moral psychology and the just released monograph ‘In Praise of Desire’ by N. Arpaly and T. Schroeder. In the final section, we are going to discuss vari-ous temporal aspects of desire and value, such as the question of whether factors occurring after death can contribute to people’s well-being in vir-tue of satisfying some of their lifetime desires. Answers to such questions have larger implications for desire-based theories, in addition to being fas-cinating in their own right. Ben Bradley’s superb recent monograph ‘Well-Being and Death’ shall be our guide for this last section. George Berkeley has had a long standing but ambiguous reputation. The poet, William Butler Yeats, said that Berkeley expressed the Irish tempera-ment when he “proved all things a dream” but Berkeley’s editor, A.A. Luce said that Berkeley aligned “we Irish” with common sense. Many have supposed that the claims Berkeley is most closely associated with—that there is no matter and that the only things that exist are ideas and minds that have them-- are totally ludicrous. But others are convinced that it is possible to find Berkeley siding with common sense. Still others question whether Berkeley ever intended to ally himself with common sense. At the heart of these disagreements is a central puzzle: What are the principles for which Berkeley is arguing? Is he an idealist? An imma-terialist? Or something else? Berkeley’s most famous claims appear only in two of his works, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. If the denial of matter constitutes the main tenet of Berkeleianism, why did Berkeley suppress all mention of it in his other works? We will try to gain answers to these questions by following Berke-ley’s own advice and reading through these two works in turn from begin-ning to end, although, as he also suggested, we will begin with the “non-immaterialist” work which he prepared at the same time as the later two, Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. In this workshop, graduate students will present their work in progress and receive peer comments on their work and writing. Students will have the opportunity to hone their presentation skills, sharpen their writing, and develop their philosophical ideas.

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Philosophy 960 Seminar in Metaphysics: Self, Time, and Narrative SEM 001 W 3:30 – 6:10 CRT 607 Instructor: Luca Ferrero ferrero@uwm.edu Prereq: grad st & cons instr.

In this seminar we discuss the relation between personal identity and nar-rative. Many contemporary philosophers have argued that the notion of a narrative helps explain both the nature and structure of our temporally extended existence and agency. We first discuss the nature of narrative descriptions and explanations. We will then consider in which ways they can bear on the understanding of the notion of 'self' and our identity over time. We will assess the debate between those philosophers who argue for the central role played by nar-rative (such as Dennett and Velleman) and those who resolutely deny it (such as Williams and Strawson). In the last portion of the seminar, we explore the implications that a narra-tive structure of identity and agency might have for diachronic rationality. How does the temporal structure of our existence bear on the norms of diachronic rationality, both in the cognitive and practical domains? For instance, could our epistemology just be of the 'time-slice' sort, in that it applies equally well to subjects with no temporal extension? Likewise, are there genuinely diachronic pressures of practical rationality? If so, how do they relate to the narrative structure of identity?

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