u.s. strategy in a transitioning middle east: reviving ‘state responsibility’

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© 2014 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.

U.S. Strategy in a Transitioning Middle East: Reviving ‘State Responsibility’

February 18, 2014 By Barak Mendelsohn Barak Mendelsohn is Associate Professor of Political Science at Haverford College and an FPRI senior fellow. He is the author of Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and International Cooperation in the War on Terrorism (University of Chicago Press, 2009), and currently is writing a book on al Qaeda’s franchising strategy. Abstract: In light of the uncertainty surrounding the Middle East stemming from the Arab Awakening, and the inability of Washington to shape the process of transition, U.S. decision-makers must rethink their strategy for the region in general and for counterterrorism in particular. Reducing U.S. involvement in the region and letting the dust settle will serve American interests better and allow for building healthier relations with Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, since the risk of negative effects on neighboring states that accompany transition must be kept in check, the United States, together with other powers, should lead the international community in reviving the principle of “state responsibility” as a productive way to reduce spillover of conflicts and even provide incentives for actors in the region to limit violence.

hree years after the beginning of the Arab Awakening, popular perceptions of U.S. policy in the Middle East often reflect two negative, yet radically different, interpretations. U.S. actions appear either to be ad-hoc and

reactive on the one hand, or incoherent, and—based on a simplistic comparison between the intervention in Libya and the inaction surrounding events in Bahrain and Syria—even hypocritical on the other. In truth, the magnitude and complexity of the changes in the region would have made the wish to shape developments in alignment with U.S. interests unrealistic even during the heyday of the American imperium. The constraints that Washington faces are even more glaring at a time when its hegemonic status is diminishing. Decision-making challenges are compounded by strong anti-American attitudes throughout the Middle East, which have persisted even with the election of a president who embodied the American quest for an improved image.

The frustration of the Obama Administration is understandable. It seems that the United States simply cannot win: it rarely gets credit for policies designed to

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doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2014.02.008

© 2014 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.

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The Transitioning Middle East

benefit the region’s people, and it gets blamed for all it fails to do. It is criticized for meddling in the region, while simultaneously decried for doing too little to help the revolutionary forces that seek to topple ruling dictators, particularly in Syria. The sad reality is that in the near future, little good will come to the United States from the Middle East, and it is time that decision makers acknowledge this. They may believe that the United States is exceptional, required to lead and capable of shaping the world to reflect what it holds as universal values. But in the face of mounting evidence, it is time for greater realism, translated into a strategy, rather than half-hearted ad hoc actions, that will better serve American interests while reducing its footprint in the region.

The United States should not abandon its principles. In fact, at home, it should labor to revive the ideals that made it a source of inspiration to other nations. But at the same time, the United States should limit its proactive promotion abroad considerably. While each of the Middle East nations sorts out the solutions that work best for its unique conditions, the United States should revert to the fundamental principles on which the international society was founded. These principles prioritize the pursuit of order in the international system.

However, rather than simply promoting sovereignty and non-intervention, it should lead the international community in emphasizing the principle of “state responsibility” as a guide for the actions of states. This approach should also serve as a foundation for a more careful counterterrorism strategy. Emerging leaderships in the Middle East should know that state sovereignty will safeguard them from external intervention as long as they fulfill their obligations to the rest of the society of states. Indeed, even during transition, states have an obligation to prevent the use of their territories by terrorist groups. Responsible behavior also implies that Middle Eastern states must abandon the temptation to externalize threats for domestic short-term benefits. Failure to fulfill a state’s obligations, thus undermining regional and global security, should make it a pariah. The Middle East: Not Only a Problem of Terrorism

Three years after demonstrations in Tunisia ushered in a new era, the future of the Middle East is still muddled. While all eyes are currently focused on Syria and the regional conflict the civil war there stirred, the future of the region depends on the restructuring of domestic politics in all the region’s states. And although the brutal violence in Syria tends to overshadow developments elsewhere, the transition of the region is more comprehensive and will probably last longer than the Syrian conflict. Change has come, and in all likelihood will engulf even countries where regimes--the Saudi kingdom included--presently seem stable and with a strong grip on power.

The uncertainty surrounding the future of the Arab Awakening was captured well in the competing interpretations of the events’ meaning: soon after the Tunisian people toppled Ben Ali some observers depicted an Arab Spring that holds promise for the emergence of striving democracies, while others put forward an ominous view of an Islamist Winter represented by authoritarian states—intolerant domestically and belligerent externally. Although recent developments in

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the countries that have gone through regime change present some ominous signs, weakening the enthusiasm of the optimists, positive signs, from Yemen to Tunisia, still exist and show that the situation in the region is still in flux.

The Arab Awakening caught the United States by surprise. Unprepared, it nonetheless tried to find a response that would be compatible with its values and promote its strategic interests. When values and interests did not fully overlap, the United States struggled to balance these policy drivers. Its starting point was hardly ideal; U.S. policies over the past decade are strong evidence of the deficiencies in its understanding of the Middle East. The inclination to view the region through the simplistic lens of terrorism has resulted in poor policy choices. Skepticism about the preparedness of the United States to deal with challenges from a region that just became even more complex is therefore warranted.

As the administration’s security team correctly points out, over a decade after 9/11, terrorism is still a serious threat to the United States. In fact, to some extent the threat of terrorism may have increased due to the emerging uncertainty and disorder in the Middle East and the spread of lethal weapons. Despite remarkable success in killing or capturing most of al Qaeda’s central leadership and destroying its infrastructure in Afghanistan, the United States is still facing the group’s franchises. Moreover, with the rise of radical Salafis throughout the region, the United States confronts an environment that is more actively hostile. These salafi groups—empowered by the Arab Awakening and seeking to assert themselves and their agenda throughout the Muslim world—are distinct from al Qaeda, primarily in rejecting the need for a violent global revolution. They also do not see attacking the United States outside their countries as an imperative. But they share al Qaeda’s aspiration to see the implementation of Sharia in Muslim countries, and are increasingly willing to use force in pursuit of their objectives.

The actions of radical Islamists pose a serious dilemma for the United States. While al Qaeda was portrayed, correctly, as a fringe group that earned some sympathy from Muslims for what it opposed (U.S. penetration of the Middle East, oppressive and kleptocratic regimes) but which had little actual support beyond that, today’s assertive Salafi groups represent significantly large constituencies. Thus, while the al Qaeda challenge was primarily a question of how to confront a transnational, decentralized yet small terrorist group, the present challenge cannot be resolved (or blown away) by drones, the administration’s weapon of choice.

At the same time, the United States cannot count on a charm offensive, or even economic aid and debt relief programs to Middle Eastern states, to buy the goodwill of the region’s inhabitants. The optimistic belief that showing the nice face of the United States would be enough to bring about a deep and meaningful change in public attitudes toward it is unlikely to be realized. Moreover, the legacy of past American action and distorted narratives about the present role of the United States in the region are bound to undermine any U.S. intervention in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries, no matter how positive its intentions. In fact, even policies adopted for the purpose of assisting states in transitioning from authoritarian regimes to more open (and to some extent democratic) political

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systems will automatically trigger rejection by substantial alienated publics who oppose any U.S. intervention and view its action as inherently hostile, immoral, self-serving, and often designed to subvert efforts to implement Shariah law. Suspicion of U.S. objectives, whether described as anti-Islamic, supportive of corrupt pro-Western elites, or simply the reflection of American self-interest, will fuel considerable resentment of any U.S. policy. How should the United States respond to this conundrum?

The events of the past three years crystallize the understanding that the ability of the United States to shape developments in the Middle East is significantly limited. It cannot pick winners, and even rulers (or ruling groups) that are considered likely allies often fail to deliver the policies that Washington hopes for. The inability to achieve all its policy objectives need not result in complete disengagement. However, given the limitations of the United States, the locals’ negative view of the United States, as well as the uncertainty about the region’s future, the United States would be better off reducing its involvement and commitments in the region. It is time to let the dust settle. Yet, while the people of the Middle East (or the region’s most powerful groups) reconfigure their countries’ economic, social and political systems, the United States needs to lead the international community in an effort to limit the transition's negative effects from spilling over borders and to ensure that internal conflicts do not escalate to genocides. Thus, the United States should adopt a new strategy for dealing with these countries—one that starts with the sovereign rights of these states while emphasizing that membership in the international community does not imply rights only; states also assume certain obligations. State Sovereignty and the Legacy of Colonialism

The idea of state responsibility is not new: when the international society expanded from Europe to the rest of the world, its members demanded that candidates demonstrate aptitude and willingness to subscribe to “standards of civilization.”1 The concept of responsibility was associated with stability and predictability, all aimed at facilitating order in the international society. Tainted by racism and a sense of European moral and cultural superiority, this approach had serious flaws, but at least it underscored the obligations that nations assume when they become members of international society.

While at first limited to a very narrow set of actors, states’ path to avoiding direct foreign control was to adopt the Westphalian synthesis and Western norms and practices. Only by adopting the Western model were nations able to liberate themselves from European domination. However, until World War I, countries already under direct European control could hardly see a path to independence. This changed in the war’s aftermath and in tandem with the increased salience of the self-determination discourse. European powers had to go beyond their self-interest

1 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

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in justifying their colonial possessions. Thus the mandate system gained currency: colonialism was temporary and nations that demonstrated readiness to act as members of the international society—after benefiting from the mentorship of the colonial power “assigned”’ with the task and responsibility to prepare them would be free and gain independence.

The inability of the European powers to sustain their colonial possessions after the World War II, growing demand for independence in the Third World, and increased American support for realizing the rights of national movements (though not all) to self-determination accelerated decolonization. At the same time, the link between states’ independence and their ability to perform the roles of states domestically and in the international arena weakened considerably. The prerequisites for statehood and participation in the system became more normative than actual.2 Many new states received external recognition despite failing to demonstrate effective control over the territory under their authority, let alone show “good citizenship” in the society of states. In fact, in some cases the main feature of statehood was external recognition by other states, resulting in an international society in which many actors were no more than “quasi-states.”3

Statehood became associated with rights; discussion of responsibilities was largely abandoned in a world shaped by Cold War dynamics and hostile to any measure that would conjure the legacy of colonialism. The moderated concept of responsibility reflected the quest for restraint or inaction in international relations, rather than the prescription of actual steps for advancing the goals of the international society. The new system was satisfactory enough. As long as general peace within the international society was maintained, the members of the society of states tolerated minor violations of the society’s principles or handled them on an individual basis. Ignoring states’ domestic dysfunction was a small price to pay when the general objective of international order was essentially attained. But as the international system was released from the chains of Cold War dynamics, and the ability of non-state actors to inflict considerable damage even on the system’s strongest powers became apparent, avoiding harmful state action was no longer sufficient; states had to take positive action in defense of the system.4 ‘State Responsibility’ Re-emerges

The weak international response to situations in which states failed to act as responsible members of the international society reduced the costs associated with such behavior and encouraged some to rely on non-state actors to promote the sponsoring states’ objectives. The use of proxies seemed especially appealing to the 2 Barak Mendelsohn, Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 99-100. 3 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 4 Barak Mendelsohn, “Bolstering the State: A Different Perspective on the War on the Jihadi Movement,” International Studies Review 11:4, p. 672.

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weaker sides in international conflicts, providing a way to increase pressures on rivals while seemingly controlling the risk of escalation to a full-scale war.5 When the side that suffered the brunt of the non-state proxy’s violence chose to respond by force, it usually attacked the bases of that non-state actor in the neighboring country.6 But sometimes a state would take the fight directly to the host state in an effort to raise its costs enough to force it to restrain its protégé.7 Admittedly, success has been limited: while Turkey successfully compelled Syria to stop supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) under the threat of war, India’s efforts to coerce Pakistan to stop using jihadi proxies in Kashmir were considerably less fruitful. Israel’s efforts to pressure the weak Lebanese government to ask Syria to rein in Hezbollah crumbled twice during the 1990s under international pressure (and presumably because Israel hesitated to put direct pressure on Syria due to the risk of escalation). The situation changed somewhat when a major power, the United States, started addressing state responsibility and non-state violence in a more systematic way. Indeed, the designation of several states as sponsors of terrorism (and the resulting imposition of sanctions) marked a move toward the re-establishment of the principle of state responsibility. Given states’ status as the only actors imbued with the right to use force in an international conflict, and that even states are bound by the laws of war, states’ use of terrorism and support of terrorist entities are obvious violations of their obligations in international society. On its face, the list, maintained by the United States, signaled that states that violate the rules of the international society would be held accountable. But such U.S. actions were unilateral and despite its power, particularly after the Soviet demise, they gained little traction in the international community. Particular events, such as the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, led the Security Council to impose sanctions on countries involved in terrorism. But not all cases of states’ involvement in terrorism led to such an outcome. Moreover, the international community still preferred a case-by-case approach over stating clear normative and enforceable prohibition of such actions.8 Additionally, even American decision makers did not envision the principle of “state responsibility” reaching its logical conclusion, the denial of states’ rights, particularly for sovereignty. In fact, when Libya used terrorism against the United States, Washington responded with a

5 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Support Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups in Civil Wars,” World Politics, July 2009, p. 413. 6 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz, “Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52:4 (2008), pp. 479-506. 7 Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman, “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness,” Security Studies 21 (2012), pp. 301-335. 8 High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility (Geneva: United Nations, 2004), p. 48.

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retaliatory strike (1986), based on the right of self-defense rather than as a response to Libya’s violation of its obligations to other members of the international society.

It was the 9/11 attacks that created a markedly different international attitude. Under U.S. leadership, the UN Security Council declared the Taliban’s Afghanistan responsible for the actions of al Qaeda. Washington then launched a punishing campaign against the Taliban, leading to the regime’s collapse. Thus, through its determination to punish those responsible (directly and indirectly) for the attack, and its wish to deter future offenders, the United States revived the principle of state responsibility. While it avoided asking for international action, preferring to rely on its own forces, the United States did request, and receive, international legitimacy through the Security Council.9

Importantly, the Security Council finally specified standards for appropriate state behavior, at least with regard to terrorist entities. In Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the Council explicitly determined that states’ obligations to the society of states include the following requirements: first, a state must not cooperate or give sanctuary to terrorists. Second, a state needs to take effective action to prevent the use of its territory by terrorists, even when it is not the intended target of the attack. It is also obligated to prosecute terrorists or extradite them to other countries. Third, states are required to share information on planned schemes and to cooperate in investigations following terrorist attacks. States are also urged to share their experiences in order to allow other states to identify best practices and adopt them for the general good.10

American policymakers clarified how state responsibility qualifies states’ sovereignty rights. Sovereignty, explained American Under-Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, “means not just a country’s right to command respect for its independence, but also to take responsibility for what occurs on one’s territory, and in particular, to do what it takes to prevent one’s territory from being used as a base for attacks against others.”11 Note that this formula focuses on the threat of terrorism emanating from one country to attack another; but the principle can easily be applied to other obligations, such as the well-established responsibility of states to protect foreign embassies that are recognized under international law as extra-territorial and an extension of the foreign country’s sovereignty.

Although the United States asserted “state responsibility” by making the Taliban an example, it did not push to establish the principle beyond that war. In subsequent years, the United States continued to take action in violation of other states’ sovereignty when they refused to take action themselves. Yet it avoided pushing for the solidification of “state responsibility” as a universally recognized legitimating principle for isolating states who refused to assume their obligations in the fight against international terrorism. Moreover, while the United States regularly 9 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After 9/11, in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 158-161. 10 Security Council Resolution 1373, S/RES/1373, Nov. 28, 2001. 11 Douglas J. Feith, Speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, Feb. 17, 2005.

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violates Pakistani sovereignty by using drones to attack targets within Pakistan without the government’s permission, such actions usually have been limited to violations of Pakistan’s airspace; the U.S. is much more careful about violating sovereignty on the ground, with the raid to kill Osama bin Laden as the most important, though not the only, exception.

Whereas U.S. actions in violation of other states’ sovereignty have often been compatible with the principle of “state responsibility,” they have rarely contributed to its promotion as a norm. First, as with the George W. Bush Administration’s preemption doctrine, the United States never intended to universalize the right to take action against states that fail to fulfill their duties. Fearing possible abuse by other countries, which would undermine the international order, but seeing itself as exceptional, the United States viewed itself as deserving of greater rights to take such action.12 When the United States is not the side damaged by violation of the “state responsibility” principle, it expects action to be multilateral, normally preceded by Security Council authorization and focused on sanctions.

Second, even when its actions could be justified through the “state responsibility” argument, U.S. rhetoric emphasizes the threat to its national security. Thus, it justifies its actions as self-defense, rather than framing them as the price paid by states that do not meet their obligations. Therefore, while its actions often follow the principle, in the years since 9/11 the United States has retreated from explicitly promoting the “state responsibility” discourse. This is a mistake.

A Renewed Case for a ‘State Responsibility’ Doctrine

Although the recent revival of the “state responsibility” principle took place in the context of the threat of international terrorism, it could serve U.S. interests well beyond its struggle with jihadi terrorists. In fact, the promotion of “state responsibility” as a central tenet of international life could provide the United States with a more coherent strategy to deal with volatile regions under transition and the array of security threats that may emerge from them. While not intended as a prescription for dealing with traditional threats from state actors—such as the one posed by Iran’s hegemonic ambitions—such a doctrine would be valuable in reducing the risk of entanglement in domestic conflicts that the United States cannot resolve, but that are likely to have negative consequences. At the same time, the doctrine will enhance the United States’ ability to counter potential security threats using the international framework. Moreover, such a strategy would institutionalize the international response to security challenges in which states fail to realize their obligations to the international community in a manner that is likely to reduce the need for direct military intervention. The

12 Amitav Acharya, “State Sovereignty after 9/11: Disorganized Hypocrisy,” Political Studies 55 (2007), pp. 274-296; Gerry Simpson and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Preemption and Exception: International Law and the Revolutionary Power,” in Thomas J. Biersteker, Veronica Raffo, Peter Sprio, and Chandra Sriram, eds., International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 111-126.

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international society would first encourage states that lack the ability to exercise their authority to seek external help. And in the case of states that knowingly, and even intentionally, fail to meet their obligations, “state responsibility” could translate into diplomatic and economic isolation of offenders (rather than military action) until they prove themselves ready to reintegrate into the international community. The use of force is a low-priority option, intended for use only in rare occasions, in response to radical circumstances or when all other options have been exhausted.

The central logic behind the principle of “state responsibility” is that states prefer and are better equipped to deal with other states than with elusive non-state actors, as is evident from the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Israel’s military campaigns against Hizballah (2006) and Hamas (2009). In the American cases, the main challenges came after the United States gained military victory over the reigning regimes, leaving it with the fragmented map that followed the removal of central authority. These wars also demonstrate how difficult it is for a foreign power to engage in “political engineering.” It is no wonder that the lessons learned from these debacles were that any future domestic order must be led by local forces, consider domestic conditions, and be tailored to the particulars of the country’s traditions and culture.

These examples further attest to the usefulness of “state responsibility” as the primary principle for dealing with sub-state actors that harm other states. The international community would benefit from holding host countries responsible for the activities of their non-state protégés. If action is still required, it should take place with the assistance of the local regimes. If they refuse to cooperate, the international community should focus on isolating these countries in an attempt to compel them to assume their responsibilities. Ultimately, states are more likely to gain leverage and succeed when they face similar types of entities rather than violent non-state actors.

Obviously, the international community will be unable to rely on “state responsibility” in places where even rudimentary components of a state no longer exist. It will then have to contain the threat that the problems of the failed states do not lead to regional instability, though it should still prioritize containment over intervention. But often, a “state responsibility” doctrine will lead local actors vying for power and external legitimacy to establish their credentials as responsible actors who can be trusted with authority over territory and people. In this way the international community will be able to use the normative framework for appropriate behavior to encourage moderation in domestic conflicts. To make this approach viable and limit the destabilizing effects of spoilers, the international community will also have to hold accountable states who feed that instability. Illegitimate and unauthorized external intervention should be discouraged.

On its face, due to its deep roots in the fundamental principles of the Westphalian system (particularly its focus on sovereignty and non-intervention), “state responsibility” should have been promoted by the international community’s central actors. Its conservatism and emphasis on international action should make it a uniquely appealing approach even to actors such as Russia and China.

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Interestingly, the norm of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) has instead gained international approval, including within the United Nations.13 The severity of actions that would trigger the “responsibility to protect” makes its seeming popularity understandable, even though such cases are rarer than those in which states are required to fulfill their obligations to the international community.

Moreover, while the “responsibility to protect” should and may still be implemented in the worst cases of human rights abuses, the Arab Awakening events tested the willingness of the international community to back their declarations with actual actions. The intervention in Libya was understood by many as evidence that abusive state leaders will be held accountable immediately, not years after they committed their crimes; members of the international community will actively intervene to prevent and stop such crimes at the time they are committed. However, at least at this point, it appears that the Libya intervention did to R2P what the Iraq war did to the United States’ doctrine of preemption, considerably reducing the chances of a recurrence. The anti-Gaddafi international coalition went beyond protecting the people of Benghazi to assisting the rebels in toppling Gaddafi, provoking claims from Russia and other states that the coalition had exceeded the UN mandate and consequently diminishing their willingness to support the R2P doctrine in the future. U.S. reluctance to intervene in Syria, which goes beyond unwillingness to take action without Security Council authorization, demonstrates the difficulties of intervening in the name of human rights when such an intervention is expected to be complicated and costly. Thus, absent the will to commit resources to resolving internal conflicts and ensuring stability in troubled countries, a doctrine of “state responsibility” offers the best chance to present a coherent strategy that matches states’ will, rather than simply their rhetoric. Of course, a doctrine of “state responsibility” has its pitfalls too. It must not be abused to promote unilateral preventive action against potential (as opposed to proven) threats from state actors. For example, this was the way the United States justified the invasion of Iraq based on the risk that it would collude with al Qaeda. Another pitfall is that the doctrine could be understood as a setback for the pro-active promotion of democracy and human rights because it lets states choose for themselves how they will be run. In fact, in many cases, the way states will decide their path is likely to involve violence and possibly even atrocities, with the international community intervening militarily only in the most extreme cases of genocide. Yet, this downside must be judged less negatively given the way considerations of realpolitik expose much of the human rights and democracy promotion discourse as hollow anyway. (The discrepancy between the Obama Administration’s rhetoric and action on these issues renders this discourse even less credible.) In addition, individual states will still be able to condition offers of economic aid to states in transition by requiring adherence to basic human rights protections.

13 Office of the Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide, “The Responsibility to Protect,” http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml

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A doctrine of “state responsibility” also implies that the United States will end up having to deal with regimes it finds less than desirable. Indeed, left to their own devices, radical forces, including some with links to al Qaeda, may emerge the victors in places such as Yemen. The United States will have to accept them as legitimate so long as they stick to their obligations and do not undermine the international order. This will hardly be an ideal situation; but given the limited influence of external actors, the United States and its allies are unwilling to plunge into the Middle Eastern civil wars in the absence of a clear and relatively cheap path to success. The alternative proposed, therefore, is preferable to the present situation. As the poor people of Syria are learning on a daily basis with their blood, the quest for human rights is always qualified by numerous other considerations. The knights of human rights will still be able to comment upon and denounce violations in Middle Eastern countries, but a strategy of non-intervention, so long as states meet their fundamental obligations to the international order, will reduce the pressure for interference. International Responsibility in Practice

How would a strategy based on state responsibility work? The Security Council and the General Assembly would pass clear resolutions reiterating the importance of state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, and states’ obligations to the international community. The resolutions would not ostracize immediately any country whose territory had been used in an attack on another state or extraterritorial complexes (particularly embassies and consulates). Rather, given the state’s membership in the society of states, the international community would offer technical assistance and broader advice to improve its ability to confront those actors that violated its rights as a sovereign. However, while emphasizing the carrots of multilateral assistance, it would also carry a big stick. Indeed, a state that refuses to commit itself to expansive, rapid and effective pursuit of perpetrators that undermine its commitment to its peers would be isolated against a very demanding international community.

A refusal to collaborate with the international society, and to undertake strong measures against violent non-state actors, would lead to the designation of the country as non-cooperative. This would then begin a process of gradual turning of the screw. Certain violations of state responsibility, particularly those resulting in devastation of great magnitude (in human lives and financial costs) to its victim, may require the international community to consider harsher measures, including a military intervention to bring down the regime that had failed so badly in keeping its promises. But for most other states, the threat would be lower than war and the toppling of the ruling regimes.

These states would be asked to show tangible and comprehensive actions against the actor that had taken advantage of its territory to harm another nation state. UN organs, with the assistance of other states’ intelligence services, would assess the state’s action and get the mandate to declare a state who failed to realize

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its commitment to the international society as noncompliant and a supporter of international disorder. Such a determination would legitimize retaliatory measures by the injured country and the international community. These measures would focus on isolating the offending state. They may be very harsh (though in proportion to the offense) and include removal from international institutions, as well as various economic sanctions. Only as a last resort, and in response to a grave offense, would the international community turn to the use of force. Although such a measure could be justified as a logical extension of the previous measures suggested, it must not be taken lightly. After all, it could fuel widespread suspicion and increase states’ sense of threat, as they fear that the principles they signed up for would be interpreted much more broadly than the resolution originally intended. The pain inflicted on the offender is likely to suffice, forcing it to rethink its activity, and in most likelihood to change its ways.

State responsibility is of particular significance in the Middle East, where decades of experience with externalizing domestic discontent as a means to shield regimes from their people have not been erased by the Arab Awakening. Power holders may have changed in some countries, but as clearly shown by the now deposed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (and the Supreme Military Council before him), the temptation to deflect anger about one’s own performance by channeling it externally can be hard to resist, leading some rulers to play a double game. However, new beginnings also imply that state leaders will no longer be able to escape international accountability for such actions. Sovereignty, they should be reminded, involves not only rights but also obligations. Whoever assumes power must be made to understand that deals allowing radical local groups to take limited hostile action against foreign powers (their interests and their embassies) as long as they avoid attacking the regime will not be tolerated. Within the Middle East, this principle should not apply exclusively to Arab states. The United States must lead the international community in demanding that Israel, too, realize its obligations in thwarting terrorism by radical Jewish settlers in the West Bank and seriously punishing those who commit offenses against Palestinians. Otherwise, a double standard will undercut severely U.S. credibility and the viability of the proposed doctrine.

Note that although state responsibility doctrine puts the onus squarely with state actors, it does not relieve the United States and other states from the need also to deal directly with threats from terrorist groups—although it could significantly reduce their numbers and the severity of the threat they pose. Reduction of the American military presence in the Middle East will reduce the motivation to target it since, after all, the primary interest of most radical Islamist movements is affecting power and bringing about change within their own countries. Indeed, as some radical Islamist groups pose internal problems to their own countries but not to the United States, Washington, will have to learn to resist the temptation to see all Islamist violence as requiring U.S. involvement. For example, it would have been a stretch to view the carving out of Islamist-ruled territory in northern Mali as posing a direct threat to U.S. national security; the Obama Administration would be wise to settle for containing potential threats rather than creating self-fulfilling prophecies by overreacting.

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The few terrorist entities still seeking to attack the United States will face considerably fewer potential American targets in their operational arena, and will have to clear greater hurdles to attack the United States outside their countries.14 For the United States, then, the main line of defense will become its own borders. Reduced focus on counterterrorism abroad could free resources for a more effective homeland security if needed. Yet, in cases of clear and present danger of a terrorist attack on American targets, the United States will still be able to demand local government action to prevent the attack, clarifying that hosting regimes who fail to cooperate would risk punishment. In extreme cases, the United States will also be able to use force in a limited military action to thwart imminent attacks.

Time for Reckoning in Washington

Twelve seasons have come and gone since the events, prematurely called the Arab Spring, broke out. They still carry considerable promise for a better future to the region’s people, but their risks, short- and long-term, are evident as well. Also recognized, with great frustration in Washington and perhaps elsewhere as well, is the limited ability of external actors—even the strongest power—to direct the region’s states to democracy, prosperity, and regional stability. The United States also faces increased short-term threats as extremist forces obtain sophisticated weapons and in some areas take advantage of the chaos to consolidate control over swaths of territory. In parallel, some local regimes and sub-state actors direct public frustration externally, often against a maligned United States. Thus, the United States faces multiple challenges, confounded by the dissimilar conditions in each of the affected Middle Eastern countries; its instinct to promote democracy, personal freedoms, and minority (especially religious minorities’) rights; and the need to maintain stability, and in extreme cases even act to prevent civil wars that threaten to lead to full-scale regional war externally and war crimes internally. It is no wonder that U.S. policy appears uncertain, hesitant, reactive and incoherent.

The time for reckoning has arrived. The United States should not only accept its limitations but design and embrace a strategy to reflect them, while seeking to promote its vital interests in a coherent and a measured way. A great power in decline, facing enormous domestic challenges while witnessing shifts in the global balance of power, the United States should not and cannot maintain a façade of a global knight any longer. This is particularly the case, when it is unwilling and probably unable to back the portrayed image with action. The management of international instability would be pursued more effectively when other powers—primarily, China—accept the high stakes they have in the preservation of the system and assume their role in promoting state responsibility.

14 Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida: How Great is the Terrorism Threat to the West Now?” The Guardian, Jan. 28, 2013.

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The doctrine of state responsibility will allow the United States to step back and let the people of the Middle East find their voice and design their institutions and social, economic and political contracts independently for the first time in their history. At the same time, it will offer these states a yardstick for appropriate behavior as responsible and equal members of international society, holders of rights but also of important obligations. Together with other powers, the United States should lead the international community in encouraging the countries undergoing radical transformations to remember their responsibilities, give them space to grow but unite the international community in disciplining those abusing their rights.

When the states of the Middle East re-emerge from this transition, they will reflect their own particular processes. Even if their final shape may not seem appealing for those who have dreamed of Western-style democracies emerging in the Middle East, whatever domestic arrangements prevail, the region’s states will have to take ownership of them. Thus, the United States should focus on guaranteeing a space for these developments to take place, while leading the international community in guarding against local actors’ temptations to produce regional instability. The result would be more responsible state actors, a more modest United States and a promising potential for a stronger relationship between Middle Eastern states and the rest of the world.

u.s. strategy in a transitioning middle east: reviving ‘state responsibility’

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