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Myrna Barrera

History 269

Professor Gildner

27 November 2012

Securing U.S. Interests in Latin America during the Cold War

Countries in Latin America have faced decades of political instability since colonial

powers formally granted them independence in 1825. Dictatorships and military regimes have

come and gone, leaving a brutal scar on the people of the region. The U.S. had a significant role

in the rise to power of military regimes during the Cold War; such is the case with Chiles

military coup in 1970 and Argentinas coup in 1976. Despite the U.S. ideals of freedom and

democracy, Washington policy makers supported dictatorships, disregarding human right

violations that the governments were committing. Why would the U.S., who claims itself an

advocate of democratic ideals, support dictatorships that were committing such atrocities?

Following U.S. foreign policy principles, Washington supported South American dictatorships to

protect the national security of the U.S.

Washingtons support for military dictatorships began with the Eisenhower

administration in 1955. The National Security Doctrine (NSC 1290-d) was a pragmatic effort to

support dictatorships and by doing so it would secure the national interest and national security

of the U.S.1 In the doctrine it is stated that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to support internal

security forces to prevent Communist subversion. The doctrine sought to fight communism

1 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19551957, Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Document 2( Washington, February 16, 1955).

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through containment. It was under the National Security Doctrine that military assistance

programs was able to continue in Latin America

U.S policymakers continued to support military dictatorships under Kennedys Military

Assistance Program. As part of the modernization theory and under Kennedys Alliance for

Progress the U.S. implemented the Military Assistance Program to assist Latin American

countries. Under the military program officers were trained abroad and returned to their home

countries with new military tactics. Many of the officers that were in power in Argentina

received their training from the U.S. Army School of the Americas which was founded in 1947

in the Panama Canal Zone. Pentagon itself finally admitted that its students were taught torture,

murder, sabotage, bribery, blackmail and extortion for the achievement of political aims.2 The

U.S. gained leverage over many of these dictatorships by giving them aid and creating more

allies.

Despite his goal to promote democratic governments, Kennedy actually expanded the

ideas of the National Security Doctrine. Due to national security issues that increased, he was

forced to support military dictatorships throughout Latin America. Kennedy was very pragmatic

and he ultimately failed with the Alliance for Progress. He believed that by pumping enough

money into development programs, countries in Latin America would modernize. Through the

Military Assistance Program Latin American countries saw a shift from external defense to

internal defense; it was because of this that Latin America saw more military coups arise

throughout the 1960s. Thus, this demonstrates how the Alliance for Progress failed and

Kennedy was put under the pressure to prioritize the national security of the United States.

2 Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 10

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The U.S. policy makers continued their support for military dictatorships under the

Johnson Administration. As Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,

Thomas C. Mann was not willing to give dictatorships the cold shoulder. The U.S. adopted a

non-intervention foreign policy that was proposed by Mann. It was behind the Mann Doctrine of

1964 that the U.S. supported dictatorships in the name of communism as long as they let U.S.

investors come in and the military opposed the Soviet Union.3 Mann was more interested on how

countries could further American interest. Manns policy of non-intervention was distinct from

Franklin Roosevelts policy of the Good Neighbor Policy. The Good Neighbor Policy

emphasized a much friendlier U.S. and stepped away from military interventions.4 Mann on the

other hand was willing to not intervene in the affairs of another country only if they proved to

not be socialist and demonstrate anti-communism sentiment. After being elected into Presidency,

Nixon followed Manns policy in his approach to Latin American affairs.

It was during the Nixon administration that the NSC reached its greatest potential. The

Nixon administration was much more pragmatic on how they approached socialist governments

in Latin America. Nixon preferred having a military dictatorship regime in Latin America than a

socialist government that would be too weak to resist communism. National Security Advisor

Henry Kissinger was supportive of the non-intervention policy of Mann and was Nixons

wingman in CIA covert tasks. The Rockefeller brothers were also extremely influential in the

decisions being made on foreign affairs. It was in the Rockefellers best interest to ensure that

Latin American countries had a pro-U.S. government, this would secure U.S. investors. Nixon

was quick to place national security of the United States above the principles of democracy. The

distinct example of Nixons pragmatism was the case of Chile with socialist Salvador Allende.

3 Matthew Gildner, National Security Doctrine (class lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA November 14, 2012). 4 Matthew Gildner, The Good Neighbor Policy (class lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA October 17, 2012).

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The clearest case of how the Nixon Administration was strongly against socialism is

Nixons response to rise to power of Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular. Kissinger and

President Nixon plotted against Allende and they separated their plan into two tracks. Track One

was a plan to turn Chilean Congress against Allende and diminish his political power. Track

Two, Project FUBELT, was a CIA plot to create the conditions that would initiate a coup and

find military leaders that could lead the coup.5 Allende was a socialist that was elected as Chiles

president with a little over thirty six percent of the vote in 1970.6 He immediately set out to pass

agrarian reform and nationalize U.S. companies; however, he was not thought to be affiliated

with the communist party. Nixon and Kissinger feared that Allende would prove to be

uncooperative with the U.S. interests and open the door to communism.

Nixons administration felt it was in best interest of the U.S. national security to eliminate

Allende from office and support a military coup. In a conversation with Secretary of State

William Rogers, Kissinger tells him The presidents view is to do the maximum possible to

prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.7 The CIA

initiated Project FUBELT helped start a transportation strike, raise food prices, and polarize the

country. The last thing Nixons administration wanted is for news to spread that the U.S. was

removing a democratically elected president. President Nixon said We dont want a big story

leaking out that we are trying to overthrow the Govt. We want his judgment on the possibility of

a run-off election.8 CIA contracted people to encourage a military coup of their own and on

September 11, 1973 Allende was murdered. After the military coup General Augusto Pinochet

5 Matthew Gildner, National Security Doctrine (class lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA November 14, 2012). 6 CIA, Library, General Reports, Chile, CIA Activities in Chile, April 24, 2007 7 National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 14, 1970, Telcon,

Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger, Page 2 8 National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 12, 1970, Telcon,

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Page 2

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came into power and he became the United States puppet who would prevent communism from

growing in Chile and support U.S. interests.

In accordance with the national security doctrine, Kissinger and his followers continued

to support Pinochets regimes despite the continuous pressure from human rights advocates.

Pinochets regime became dangerous to the people in Chile, he exiled thousands of people and

military men surgically tortured people. In the declassified notes from Kissingers Secretarys

Staff Meeting he was told by Mr. Kubisch about the questions that were being asked in

Washington and Kissinger response was "But I think we should understand our policy--that

however unpleasant they act, the [military] government is better for us than Allende wasI

think the consequences could be very serious, if we cut them off from military aid."9 The U.S.

was inclined to stick to any government that would avoid the growth of communism. From the

perspective of the Nixon White House, despite the atrocities that were being committed, it was in

their best interest to have a government that would support the United States.

Argentina is a striking case study that reveals Washingtons continued support for the

non-intervention policy. On March 24, 1976 the Argentine military commenced a coup dtat on

the Government of Argentina, which took Isabel Peron out of power. Nixons administration had

no opposition to the coup and supported the military dictatorship that attained power in

Argentina. The three commanders were Rafael Videla, Eduardo Massera, and Ramon Agosti;

they called the new era The Process of National Reorganization, which would entail the

immediate dissolution of all republican institutionsto ensure the eventual restoration of

democracy.10 Senior Commander Rafael Videla was appointed the President of Argentina

following the coup dtat and the military maintained power until 1983. Under the military junta

9 National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, October 1, 1973, Staff Meeting

Notes, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Mr. Kubisch, Page 26-27 10 Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 24

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that was in power for seven years, thirty thousand people disappeared.11 A desaparecido was

someone who was taken by the military and never seen again or most likely killed.12 Diplomats

like Kissinger and Williams Rogers were aware that after the coup a lot of blood would be shed

and regression would fall on people outside the Montoneros (Argentine communist party

members).

Washington policy makers were committed to continue their support for military

dictatorships but their support was to be kept top secret. One may argue that the U.S. may have

supported the military coup of Argentina in 1976 without knowledge of the lives that it would

cost. In some declassified documentation on 19 October 1976, Ambassador Robert Hill wrote

"a sour note" from Buenos Aires complaining that he could hardly carry human rights demarches

if the Argentine Foreign Minister did not hear the same message from the Secretary of State.13

However they were clearly aware that human lives were at stake and even Missera warned the

U.S. Ambassador that they would have to eliminate some people. Policy makers were not doing

anything to explicitly put a stop to the human rights violations, by not putting a stop to it

Washington definitely was at some fault here.

Despite of Nixons knowledge of the human rights violations that were being committed,

he was intent on supporting the military for the security of the U.S. Kissinger was extremely

supportive of Videla and his policies, Videla even encouraged the notion that Washington aide

the Argentina military program. the US very much sympathizes with the moderate policies

announced by President Videla and had hoped to be helpful to Argentina in her process of

national reconstruction and reconiliation. We fully understand that Argentina is involved in an all

11 Matthew Gildner, National Security Doctrine (class lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA November 14, 2012). 12 Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 59 13 National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, October 19, 1976, Telegram,

Foreign Minister Guzetti Euphoric Over Visit To United States

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out struggle against subversion.14 Military officers in Argentina were determined to create fear

for the people of Argentina. Kidnappings occurred often during the day or night time, family

members of the kidnaped would sometimes be killed or threatened. The biggest target for the

military were often most the thinkers, someone who questioned the regime and demonstrated

more socialist viewpoints. Clearly the military was definitely out place here, many of the people

captured were not terrorists and thousands of innocent lives were lost. The military dictatorship

ended in 1983 and some of the officers that were involved with the kidnapping of thousands of

people were put to trial. Many of the soldiers were not accused of crimes they committed, based

on the new law that freed them from charges founded on the idea that they were just following

orders.

The United States foreign policy throughout history has been motivated by national

security and during the Cold War era Washington policy makers followed the same path. The

U.S. was by far the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere and having a socialist

government in Latin America would not physically harm the security of the U.S. A big issue was

that socialist leaders demonstrated nationalist views and were less willing to let U.S. investors

enter their country. One of the first things Salvador Allende did when elected president was

nationalize private U.S. companies; this raised a red flag for policy makers in Washington. As a

nation state it was in the best interest of Washington to secure U.S. private companies abroad.

Private companies have a tremendous impact of the economy of the U.S. and to not secure the

U.S. market would ultimately bring a big about a larger problem for policy makers.

However, securing the U.S. market does not require for corruption to partake. There are

other forms of securing the market in a more correct and ethical way. The U.S. did not explicitly

14 National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 24, 1976, Memorandum, From Embassy in Argentina to Secretary of State in Washington D.C., Page 3

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partake in these military coups and killings; but by supporting these regimes Washington

definitely knew the great influence it would have. The United States is a great power in the

Western Hemisphere and without the aid that the U.S. provided many of these coups could have

been avoided. The consequence of supporting military dictatorships for U.S. interest cannot

justify the thousands of human lives that were lost throughout Latin America. Is there any excuse

that can validate U.S. support for military dictatorships in spite of human rights violations?

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Works Cited

CIA, Library, General Reports, Chile, CIA Activities in Chile, April 24, 2007

Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 10

Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 24

Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror (New York: Oxford Press, 1998), 59

Matthew Gildner, National Security Doctrine (class lecture, Washington and Lee University,

Lexington, VA November 14, 2012).

Matthew Gildner, The Good Neighbor Policy (class lecture, Washington and Lee University,

Lexington, VA October 17, 2012).

National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 24,

1976, Memorandum, From Embassy in Argentina to Secretary of State in Washington D.C.,

Page 3

National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, October 1,

1973, Staff Meeting Notes, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Mr. Kubisch, Page 26-27

National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 14,

1970, Telcon, Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger, Page 2

National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, September 12,

1970, Telcon, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Page 2

National Security Archive, Washington D.C. (NSA), Latin American Collection, October 19,

1976, Telegram, Foreign Minister Guzetti Euphoric Over Visit To United States

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United

States, 19551957, Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Document 2(

Washington, February 16, 1955).