United States Foreign Policy and Crisis:

Presidential Peril or Opportunity?

Marcus P. Williamson May 2009

I will end this war in Iraq responsibly, and finish the fight against al Qaeda and

the Taliban in Afghanistan. I will rebuild our military to meet future conflicts. But

I will also renew the tough, direct diplomacy that can prevent Iran from obtaining

nuclear weapons and curb Russian aggression. I will build new partnerships to

defeat the threats of the 21st century: terrorism and nuclear proliferation;

poverty and genocide; climate change and disease. And I will restore our moral

standing, so that America is once again that last, best hope for all who are called

to the cause of freedom, who long for lives of peace, and who yearn for a better

future.

-Presidential Candidate Barack Obama

28 August 2008

Section One: Introduction

Understanding the origins of United States foreign policy can be an intimidating

investigation into the complex web of institutions that establish the colossal assortment of

Washington and outside actors. While the influence of Cabinet officers, Congressional

Committees, NGOs, and other actors play an instrumental role in executing foreign policy, it is

ultimately the agenda established by the president that determines the course of action taken by

the collective of United States foreign affairs institutions. As important as traditional policies

established by these different agencies and groups that surround the president are in establishing

long term policy, the signature of the president lies at the end of every road of action. In spite of

this ultimate authority in government, the ease of establishing new policy to be implemented is

more difficult than is portrayed by candidates running for office in their series of stump speeches

to the citizenry.

As the newly elected president assumes office, the assumption of instant change is

expected by all people within the United States, and indeed the public at large around the world.

Despite the new agenda that is set out by the President during their campaign for office and the

people whom they appoint to serve in their administration, the true determining factor in

understanding the monumental policies established by the United States is found in their reaction

to crisis once they have assumed office, and not necessarily the rhetoric they displayed during

the election cycle. While the foundation of US foreign policy has been established by

institutions in Washington, D.C., it is ultimately the course of response in reaction to potential

unknown crises that determines the level of positive policy that comes out of a president’s tenure

as Commander-in-Chief. The response to these actions may be laid out in previously developed

contingency plans issued by various actors and groups within the bureaucracy of the United

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States Federal Government from prior administrations, but the course followed is ultimately

determined by the person in the Oval Office at the time of implementation.

This has been the point early in the administration of a new president that outlines how

they will serve during their term in office. With the Bush Doctrine emerging as a consequence

of the 9/11 attacks, the Clinton Doctrine lack of will to act as the lone superpower following the

Battle of Mogadishu, and the Bush 41 Doctrine falling on the heels of the fall of the Berlin Wall

in November 1989, it has been these early events that have shifted the intent of US foreign for

the remainder of their terms. As such, the premise of this paper is as follows: The significance of

Presidential leadership in the formulation and execution of US military foreign policy is directly

revealed by their reaction to early crises encountered in their administration. The ability to

correctly execute a measured plan in the wake of these events helps to determine wither the

success of a presidency will be seen by their constituency at home and allies and foes alike

abroad.

This essay will investigate the development of foreign policy by the US President,

starting with the occurrence of planned foreign policy. Discussing the background inherited

from previous administrations, the conception of new policy based on campaign promises and

public opinion will be developed. The second section moves on to the idea of ‘dealing with the

unpredictable’, and measuring the impact of the unknown upon the new president. The third

section looks at how these early policies mandated by crisis define the remainder of the

president’s administration. In a crisis, it is essential that a president sell the shift in policy to the

people of the US and to the rest of the world. Enacting such a shift is not done on a whim, and

the consideration of saving as much political capital for the remainder of the president’s agenda

is essential supported by the ‘rally ‘round the flag effect’. The concluding section of this paper

will investigate the success of various presidential administrations in measuring their ability to

execute policy effectively in the face of crisis to benefit the US domestically and the world

globally.

Section Two: Developing Planned Foreign Policy

When investigating the foreign policy established by the President of the United States, it

is essential to understand the climate and traditions that they inherit as established by previous

administrations. The basis for US foreign policy is not one that can survive if it drastically

changes with every new president that occupies the Oval Office. In fact, the general principals

and policies that the United States devotes to specific situations change very little with new

presidents. The ability for the nation to maintain a consistent policy enables for a stronger

relationship with individual nations, as well as the world at large. Where specific policy was

weak, there may be definite changes, as was seen in the 2008 election towards Iraq, or the 1992

election towards NAFTA1, but traditionally very little is changed in an instant.

With the direct mandate of providing stable security to the US, the inability for massive

change to occur apart from this solely at the personal discretion of the president is a

1 The establishment of new policies is evident in all levels of transition between presidents, not solely in foreign

policy. The repeal of many executive orders is a long standing tradition of sorts when the president who represents

one party is replaced by a member of the opposition (Davies and de Rugy 2008).

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consideration of establishing new foreign policy by the United States. While specific treaties

and agreements may be amended with relative ease, the complete overhauling of international

policy traditionally take agreements by two or more nations, and not unilaterally from the US

itself in terms of soft power. One major contradiction to this concept is military power, which

has been demonstrated through the Bush Doctrine as defined by the National Security Strategy of

the United States (White House 2002) as a potential asset to be used to enact unilateral action

towards specific international groups and states. Even with regard to the onset of the Bush

Doctrine and the US’s willingness to act unilaterally following the events of 9/11, this affect still

takes time to establish. With the massive bureaucracy, the sluggish movement of a military still

working from Cold War principals of slow movement and permanence, the ability to act

militarily still requires months of preparation and movement before a significant action can be

taken.

While there are changes that are determined by the public at large to be important to

change regarding US foreign policy, the abilities of the president to acknowledge them is

relatively limited. While stump speeches across the nation given between the Iowa Caucasus in

January to the General Election in November typically ring out a different strategy to be

implemented by the United States, the reality is that little can be done. With an entire policy

devoted to change, there typically is little unification behind a plan without a dramatic event to

sway a ‘rally ‘round the flag’ effect by the US people. Indeed, the only times that the US has

been fundamentally shifted is after an attacking crisis that leads to feelings of nationalism and

security. Since 1945, the US has never declared war and obtained congressional approval only

seven times, each of which followed an attack on American Soldiers or citizens2.

With the perceptions of the person holding the White House vary from president to

president, the ability to provide a 180 degree turn in policy requires a massive amount of will,

popularity, and ability. These factors are very difficult to achieve independently, and typically

only develop at the same time in times of crisis. Using this combined strength to shift the old

guard institutions that have existed in Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Department

of State that have worked throughout many administrations dealing with specific nations and

regions with a Realist theoretical perspective in mind requires this incredible and unique ability.

That is, these institutions are prone to think about the safety of the state first, and all others

second. Providing a pro-active foreign policy that, such as the ones candidates promise in a

campaign speech, shifts this effect to include beneficial policies to include other nations around

the world with a negative gain in cost-benefit analysis is unrealistic and does not happen. With

the best laid plans of a president developed through campaign promises, the institution is likely

to only see major change in the aftermath of crisis.

Section Three: Dealing with the Unpredictable

Since the abilities of a president to drastically change foreign policy without a crisis is

limited, the important factor is to determine how a president uses these times of trouble to

effectively make the most of a situation. The history of surprises that comes from the natural

2 Elsea and Grimmett (2007) identify these as the actions in Formosa/Taiwan (H.J. Res. 159, 1955), the Middle East

(S.J. Res. 19, 1957), Vietnam (H.J. Res. 1145, 1964), Lebanon (S.J. Res. 159, 1984), Iraq, (H.J. Res. 77, 1991), the

Global War on Terror (S.J. Res. 23, 2001), Iraq (H.J. Res. 114, 2002).

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evolution of global affairs, the need to predict the reaction of the lone remaining superpower is

essential. Indeed, it was mentioned by Vice-President Biden that the onset of a crisis to occur

within the first six months of the new presidency were imminent (Biden 2009). The crises that

affect the US affect the world in our ever growing interconnected present. While the

development of Cold War policies has created a world that is dependent on the US for business,

economy, and military, the response of the US to these crises have global implications. The

affects of the US trickle down to the rest of the world, with modern blowback3 developing from

situations that began decades ago. The impact of these past events still lies with all of us to this

day, and will continue to affect us in the future.

The level of reaction to these emergencies is of monumental importance to determining

the intensity of the foreign policy agenda of the president. The increasing involvement of the US

throughout the 20th

Century has made the level of reaction to these vital to the ability of the US

in the eyes of the world. With 9/11, the impact of the massive reaction of the US was felt not

only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by all members of the international community. The Bush

Doctrine has established a negative perception around the world, threatened by the ability of

unilateral action taken by the single most influential state on the planet today.

The lack of reaction taken by a president can have just as significant of a reaction as one

that was an over-impulse. Following the execution of Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993, the

UNITAF forces led by the US in Somalia encountered significant negative perceptions at home

as the Battle of Mogadishu resulted in 19 American military fatalities (O’Leary 2002). The

impact of this operation was a catastrophe at home, responded to by the Clinton Administration

with the onset of Presidential Decision Directive #25 (White House 1994). Following the ‘End

of History’, the US became quiet for many years as different situations developed. There was no

direct response in Africa to Rwanda, Congo, or any other sad development in Africa’s Great

Lakes region as they endured their ‘First World War’. It was only with the growing crisis in the

Balkans that developed over 6 years, with pressure from the European Community to act, that

the US decided to act on the world stage again.

The other massive under-reaction by the Clinton Administration was the response to the

threat posed by terrorism. While the 9/11 attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia are

imbedded in the minds of people all over the world, the attacks of 23 February 1993 are not. The

terrorism experienced at the World Trade Center on that day did little to quiet the rising

aggression of groups determined to injure the US, and allowed for their strength to develop by

the 9/11 attacks and engage the US in a Global War on Terror that is now entering its eighth

year. The unknown is difficult in responding to in the fact that its impacts cannot be assessed4.

While this reasoning may sound elementary, it is an essential fact that must be realized by new

administrations. There are faults to be found with both ‘Cowboy Diplomacy’ and ‘the Silent

Majority’5. The balanced and appropriate response to situations must be dealt with properly,

3 Chalmers Johnson discusses the effects of US foreign policy and it’s unpredicted consequences at length in his

book Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (2000).

4 See footnote 3 for more on this situation.

5 ‘Cowboy Diplomacy’ was a widely used term to describe the unilateral foreign policy actions undertaken by the

US under the Bush 43 Administration, while ‘The Silent Majority’ is a term coined by President Nixon (1969) to

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despite the fact that the long term impacts cannot be measured. Allowing for the unknown to be

a constant is a measured fact that should be ingrained in the minds of new presidents, and one

that only seems to be considered after experience as ‘leader of the free world’ is developed.

These shifting strategies in the face of emergency are the defining moments of the

administration. How they are perceived by the public, and by the world at large, is essential.

Promoting these policies are the difficulty that is presented, and interpreting the level of response

at home to ensure political safety is an important factor to take into consideration when assessing

the level of response to crisis. A deeper look at how these developments in foreign policy are

interpreted by the people of the US and the larger world is the topic of the next section.

Section Four: Defining the Administration

It is often said that ‘adversity displays character’. The same is true with the presidency.

Standing in the face of adversarial situations, reaction defines the legacy of the president. With

the dominating role that the United States plays in modern international relations, there will

always come about a situation that will bring about crisis and the need for a clear and absolute

response. The action decided upon the administration and the nation as a whole must be made

clear not only to the American public, but to the world at large. Implementing such a media task

is an essential part of maintaining positive relations both at home and abroad. Indeed, in the

yearly assessment reports issued by the US Department of State the act of ‘public diplomacy and

public affairs’ is listed as one of the regular goals of the Department (United States Department

of State 2007).

While the reaction to crisis within the term of president may be responsible or extreme,

the message that is put out must include the shift in policy as being a necessary means to

ensuring a positive future for everyone involved. Selling that policy to the nation and the world

is a public relations dilemma, and one that has not been particularly positive in recent memory.

The perceptions brought about by the Clinton and Bush 43 administrations have been direct and

deliberate. With support initially from nations around the globe following 9/11, those supportive

issuances have fallen by the wayside as the focus of the goal has been lost. Maintaining support

is essential to continuing the relationship that the United States has established with all elements

of the international community.

While during the course of a presidential term, there is a high likelihood that an event of

foreign policy will demand attention from the US, this crisis may not be a direct action against

the US but the leadership role that the American Nation now finds itself in comes with

responsibilities. Calls for action will come from all fora of interested parties, i.e.: media,

domestic citizenry, international organizations, foreign leaders, and others. The determination of

reaction, or passive silence, will have lasting effects and signpost the style of presidency that the

world can expect for the remainder of their time in office.

Gauging the level of this reaction was the focus of John D. Barber and his work The

Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (1985). By investigating

define the large population of American citizens who do not voice their political opinions publically, which he used

to help define his mandate regarding actions with the Vietnam Conflict.

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the actions of US presidents over the 20th

Century, he classified their behaviors into two main

categories: passive and active. Through determining the course of action perused by presidents

in response to initial situations, Barber argues that the entire scope of a president’s tenure can be

determined. Barber goes further to designate sub-groupings of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’,

determinant that the situation may have positive and negative aspects to it when handled either

passively or actively. The presidency of Jimmy Carter may be seen as ‘passive-negative’, while

the Coolidge administration may be seen as ‘passive-positive’. By contrast, the G.W. Bush

Administration may be perceived as ‘active-negative’, while Nixon’s may be ‘active-positive’.

While it is difficult to judge entire presidencies alike due to the nature of individual

situations that arise while one person is in office, the active and passive groupings typically hold

true throughout a particular administration. The Clinton Administration was relative passive,

with the exception of engagements following 23 February 1993 and 2/3 October 1993, both of

which were instigated by previous presidents. As a contrast, the G.W. Bush Administration was

one of the most active of recent memory, engaging not only in the Global War on Terror, but in

economic, political, diplomatic, and even humanitarian efforts around the world. While most of

these have been reviewed to date as negative, the level of activity cannot be disputed.

Using the guiding principles of the G.W. Bush Administration as a template, it is clear to

see the steps necessary in establishing a major active shift in US foreign policy in order to make

it viable to both domestic interests as well as international actors. This five step process

involves:

Establishing a mandate for action, typically as a result of crisis

Setting the mandate as policy

Selling the new policy to the people of the United States

Selling the accepted American policy to the world

Execution of the policy itself effectively By looking at each of these activities in turn, it is clear that this method was used repeatedly to

define the aims of the past eight years of US foreign policy. While the limitations of this paper

do not allow for a more intense review of each of these actions in turn with respect to individual

measures taken by the administration, the obvious example of military action in Iraq is the case

study to be applied to all other situations, both military and otherwise.

The outlining of US action in Iraq began long before 2003, with interests and activities

taking place there since the end of the Hashemite Monarchy in 1958 as a result of the 14 July

revolution. The current activity did not begin on 18 March either, but was merely a step in the

development listed above. As noted by many, Iraq had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks,

although that event did help to establish the mandate for action there. By asserting that the US

was at risk from foreign terrorist attacks, the president established a mandate to the American

public. That necessary action of organization was needed to take away the threat of future

violence against the nation. Given the ‘rally ‘round the flag effect’ (Gowa 1999) that was

occurring at that time, President Bush’s approval ratings rose to nearly 90% (Gallup 2001), and

was determined by the American people that his mandate was valid. This was also reciprocated

by S.J.R. 23 (2001), which was passed nearly unanimously, and gave the Executive power to use

military force against the undefined perpetrators of 9/11.

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The 2002 State of the Union Address outlined this mandate further, presenting the ‘Axis

of Evil’ that defined nations which housed foreign terror threats and successfully persuaded the

American people that this mandate for protection had aims. There were identifiable situations

around the world that could be directly and militarily addressed, and that this mandate of military

protectionism would be exercised in such a fashion.

The step of formalizing the mandate into a policy came in September 2002 with the

National Security Council Strategy (ibid.). Outlining the main tenants that would come to be

known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’, this policy had determined that the mandate established by the

9/11 crisis could include not only groups of independent actors, but the sovereignty of entire

states. This determination was proposed to the US Congress, who passed HJR 114 (2002) in

October 2002, some 2 weeks before the first midterm election of the G.W. Bush administration.

With the historical precedence of first midterms ending with members of the president’s party

losing seats in Congress every time in the last 70 years (Rove 2008), the vote to allow action was

surely no coincidence given the public perception toward Republican Party values towards

national security issues. The resolution was passed, and the White House had the domestic legal

authority to exercise military force in Iraq, as well as retaining the majority in both houses of the

US Congress.

The threat of invasion by the US militarily in a unilateral action upon sovereign states

was seen by most around the world as a massive threat. The ability of the US to ‘sell’ the world

on their right to take such action was the next step in the process. The issuance of statements

made publically by Secretary of State Colin Powell (2003) and President Bush (2002b) before

the United Nations pushed the agenda of policy to the world and tried to make the case known

that the US would take an active, unilateral approach to the future of US foreign policy. While

supported by some and disapproved by others around the world, the actions beginning 18 March

2003 began the execution of an active policy, established by mandate, and legally defined by the

United States.

This scenario was repeated with actions towards, Iran, North Korea, states in Africa, and

others on a myriad of policy issues. The ability for an active president is not universal however.

The determining factors present themselves as the personality of the individual in office is

defined, and also checked by the amount of political capital available to the president at the time

of action. Aggressive action with little political leverage or public support determines negative

resolution at election, and lessens the viability of future potential powers to be executed by the

Oval Office (Brule and Mintz 2005).

Section Five: Conclusion

The president plays the single most influential role in defining the foreign policy of the

US. Through personal standing and the actors that they surround themselves with in key

positions of foreign policy decision making, they can define the ability of the US in the global

arena. While influenced by partisan pressures and other NGO groups, the ultimate decision is

left with this single person to determine the course of action. This role includes authority over

Congress as well. While it has never happened, Congressional declarations of war and military

action can be vetoed by the president, only enforceable if the presence of a veto override is

8

available to Congress. If that were to ever happen, it would still fall on the shoulders of the

president in their role of ‘Commander in Chief’ to outline the actions taken by the military (The

Constitution of the United States of America 1787)6.

The true ‘x-factor’ in determining the formulation of US foreign policy is the president

themselves. Wither they take the active ore passive position to issues, particularly those

demanded in reactionary crisis situation, formulate the establishment of doctrine that will

influence the nation for the remainder of their administration and beyond. The positive or

negative implications of these acts influence future president to come, particularly if the

successor to the office is of the rival political party, or has a more passive approach to crisis

following an active leadership situation.

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