US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Aircraft Protection Programs Overview

James TuttleProgram ExecutiveAircraft Protection Programs703-235-0272james.tuttle@dhs.gov

2James Tuttle August 23, 2005

OutlineThrust Areas for Commercial Aircraft Protection

Counter-MANPADS Program

MANPADS Threat Summary

National Strategy

Counter-MANPADS Program Overview

Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability Reduction

Chemical/Biological/Explosive Countermeasures

Summary

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Commercial Aircraft Protection Thrust Areas

Counter-MANPADS

Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability ReductionLaser Eye Protection (LEP)/Adaptive Flight Controls/Propulsion Control Aircraft Recovery (PCAR)/ Hardening Aircraft Structure

Countermeasures – SabotageChemical/Biological/ExplosiveDetect, Contain, and Notify

Directed Energy and Directed Fire WeaponsRF/Laser-based and Kinetic Energy Weapons (e.g., High-Powered Rifles)

Communications/Navigation InfrastructureEmergency Notification/Secure CommunicationsAnti-Jamming/Spoofing

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MANPADS Threat SummaryMANPADS are readily available worldwide and capable of destroying any aircraft

Civilian aircraft are easy targets: slow, predictable, have large signatures

Aircraft are most susceptible near airfield and when traveling below 15,000 feet

Russian SA-18

Danger zone of MANPADS attack is large:Largely outside of airport boundaries (greater than 40 nm)Attack corridor may be up to 8 nm wide

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National Strategy A Multi-Layered Approach

Non-ProliferationDepartment of State

Tactical OperationsDHS TSA

Counter-MANPADS

Technical CountermeasuresDHS S&T

Re-engineer and demonstrate technologies to counter threat

CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI

Intelligence

National Airspace SystemFAA

Global weapons stockpileGlobal export controlsBuy-back program

Airport vulnerability assessments and mitigation plansGuidelines for identifying and reporting threatsElevated alert guidelines

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Program Description and ObjectivesAdapt CM to commercial aircraft for MANPADS protection

Continue to evaluate emerging Counter-MANPADS technologies

Multi-Phase Program

Provide analysis and data to support decision-making by the Administration and Congress on deployment and implementation

Balance costs, schedule, and performance

Gain support from aviation industry stakeholders

Interagency cooperation among DHS and Departments of Defense, Commerce, State, and Transportation

Phase II will result in two deployable Counter-MANPADS systems

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Schedule and Activities

Aircraft Component Testing

Phase I – Jan 04 to Jul 04

Establish a Preliminary Design, 6 Months (COMPLETED ON TIME)

Phase II – Aug 04 to Jan 06

Develop Prototypes for Test and Qualification, 18 months(On schedule, within budget, and meeting goals)

Phase III – Feb 06 to Dec 07

Perform Spiral Upgrades to Incorporate New Requirements

andPerform Operational Test and Evaluation(Designed to further reduce technical risk & cost)

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Key Challenges to be Addressed by SPOSystem Performance Requirements

False Alarm RatesMissile Warning SystemsCountermeasure EffectivenessOperations Concepts

Aircraft Integration and FAA Certification

Multiple aircraft types, models,and configurationsCost-benefit Weight / Space / PowerDrag and performanceSafety of flight / personnel safetySystem reliability

SupportabilityReliabilityMaintainabilityTraining

Test and EvaluationModeling & SimulationHardware in the LoopFlight TestingOperational Testing

Technology Protection Measures/ Security Management ConcernsNational Air Space Integration for Emergency Notification SystemCriteria for Potential Deployment Options (Civil Reserve Air Fleet; Overseas; Regional)

Life Cycle Cost Analysis

Concept of Operations

Program Faces Technical and Programmatic Challenges Ranging From Aircraft Structural Impacts

and Technology Protection to Supportability Costs

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Interagency and Stakeholder Interaction

DHSCounter-MANPADS

SPO

Requir

emen

ts, $,

Dire

ction

Design

and P

erform

ance

Commitment

Operational Requirements

Feedback

CommercialAviation

Community

SD&DContractors

Operational Insight

Aircraft Protection

DoS

DoD FAA TSA

International Aviation Community

FAM

FBI

Department of Defense Federal Aviation Administration Transportation Security Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Air Marshall Service

Department of State

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CONOPS: Detect and Counter-MANPADS

MANPADSMANPADS

Threat Limit

$$

Autonomous – No action required by aircrew

Missile Warning System (MWS)

Laser-Based Countermeasure

Provides protection for Commercial Aircraft againstMANPADS During Low Altitude Flight

• Counters Multiple, Simultaneous Threats

• Performs Emergency Ground Notification (EGN) and Cockpit Alert

• Minimizes Impact on Airline Operations

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Aircraft InstallationDesign Approaches

BAE Systems - Locates most system components inside the aircraft, with MWS and PTH external to aircraft

Northrop Grumman Corporation - Locates most system components are within the external pod, with MWS and PTH external to pod

Program involves two distinct design approaches that meet systeminstallation requirements

A300A310A318-A321A330A340

B727B737B747

B757B767B777

DC-9/10MD-10/11MD-80MD-90/95L1011

Phase II Aircraft List

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Counter-MANPADS Suite: BAE Systems

CargoBay

EE Bay

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Counter-MANPADS Suite: Northrop-GrummanFlight Deck

Indicator Unit for Emergency

Ground Notification

Pod with IRCM Equipment Set

Universal Aircraft Mounting Scheme Computational Fluid

Dynamics to Optimize Aerodynamics

Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation

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ITAR Compliance ApproachBoth Contractors (BAE and NGC) configured their Counter-MANPADS designs to separate the defense article from the structural supports and integration components

A-kit: primarily common structural materials and components to supportinterface for the DIRCM system to the aircraft

o Developed specifically for commercial aircraft

o Manage A-Kit as Commodity Jurisdiction

B-kit: defense article/DIRCM system (pointer-tracker head, sensors, and laser)o B-Kit Managed as USML

o Developing Security Management Plans to reflect

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Installation Progress Report

A-kit structural and electrical provisions are in placeB-kit fit checks completeCompany flight tests are in progressConduct FAA flight tests (Oct-Nov)

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Counter-MANPADS Phase II Master Schedule

CDR – Critical Design Review FAA – Federal Aviation Administration HITL – Hardware-In-The-Loop H/W – Hardware SPO – Special Program Office STC – Supplemental Type Certificate S/W – Software

J A S O N D

2004 2005

Hardware /Software Development

H/W Fabrication S/W Coding

Installation Kit

System Design

H/W and S/W Build

J F M A M J J A S O N D J

Aircraft Installation and Integration

H/W Install

Environmental Testing (Airworthiness/Performance)Environmental Testing

Flight Test

FAA Certification Ground and Flight Test

Counter-measure Effectiveness Testing

FAA Ground

Contractor HITL SPO HITL

FAA Flight

2006

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Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability Reduction

Programs to Reduce Susceptibility/VulnerabilityAircraft signature measurements

Hardware in-the-loop testing

Signature reduction (landing lights/auxiliary power unit)

Pilot vision protection

Aircraft structural hardening

Thrust-only control / propulsion controlled aircraft

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Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability ReductionPropulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery (PCAR)

PCAR Project Objective is to develop and demonstrate propulsion control technology for improved airliner security and safety

Throttle Only Control (Manual)

Propulsion Controlled Aircraft

Provide pilots with the ability to safely land an aircraft that has lost use of aerodynamic control surfaces

Software changes to existing systems; no added hardware

Focus on Existing Fleet

Threat independent solutions to increase commercial aircraft survivability

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Laser Vulnerability Analysis/Tech Demonstration

Measure actual COTS laser effects at cockpit

Evaluate Laser CountermeasuresEffectivenessHuman Factors

Evaluate supportability and cost impact to airlines

Evaluate ITAR considerations

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Sabotage CountermeasuresAddresses Chemical, Biological, and Explosive (CBE) threats onboard aircraft

Emphasizes materials likely to elude screening and greatest potential to do harm

Intelligence indicates greater terrorist interest, activity, and investment in chemical/biological weapons –particularly biological:

Chemical/Biological threats can be small

With biological agents, the victim may be contagious

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Sabotage Countermeasures (continued)

Desired Capability BenefitDetect/identify/contain chemical, biological, or explosive material onboard aircraft

Situational awareness to mitigate threats

Warn crew and passengers to take protective/precautionary measures

Knowledge of threat enables effective response

Neutralize the material Limit exposure

Record and communicate details of event to ground authorities

Reach back

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Sabotage Countermeasures Roadmap

Requirements Input to & Technology Deliveryfrom HSARPA

Requirements Definition

a priori Risk Assessment FAA

coordination on environmental

background

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

BAA, RFP

Chamber Test

Multiple Awards

Integrate Sensors

System Demo

Down Select

Supplemental Type Certificate

Operational Test

Initiate Spiral Development

Review of COTS/GOTS

detectors

Modeling & Simulation

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Commercial Aircraft Protection SummaryCounter-MANPADS is part of an overall DHS Aircraft Protection Strategy

Counter-MANPADS provides data on:Performance Cost-benefit trade-offsSupportability planTotal ownership cost

Laser vulnerability assessment underway

Other vulnerability work in progress

Developing a sabotage countermeasures roadmap

FAA-certified prototypes for test and integration are required