us army_fm 31-21 1961 guerilla warfare & special forces operations

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GUERILLA WARFARE

AND

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

H E A D Q U A RT E R S , D E PA RT M E N T O F T H E A R M Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL



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*FM 31-21F I E L D M ANUAL HEADQUARTERS,

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

N O . 31-21 W ASHINGTON 25, D .C., 29 Sept em ber 1961

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND SPECIAL FORCESOPERATIONS

Paragraphs Page

P ART O NE . INTRODUCTIONC HAPTER 1. FU ND AME NTALS ----------------------------------1-3 3

2. RE S IS TANC E AND G U E RRI LL A WAR-FAR E -------------------------------------------------4-8 5P ART T WO . ORG ANIZATION FOR THE SP E CI AL

FORCE S EF FORTC HAP TER 3. J OI NT U NC ONVE NTIO NAL WAR-

FARE TASK FOR C E (J U WTF) ------------- 9-12 144. AIRB ORNE SP EC IAL FORCES GROU P

S ect ion I . G en era l ----------------------------------------------13-18 18I I . The S pecia l Forces opera t iona l ba se -------19-21 26

I I I . C on t rol of oper a t ions-----------------------------22-27 29IV. Control of administra t ive a nd tra iningAct ivit ies -----------------------------------------28-32 39

C HAP TER 5. TH E ATE R SU P P ORTS ect ion I . Log ist ics ---------------------------------------------33-43 46

I I . In t el ligen ce -----------------------------------------44-46 54I I I . C om munica t ion s ----------------------------------47-52 58I V. In it ia l con t a ct --------------------------------------53-54 63

P ART T H R E E . OPERATIONS

C HAPTER 6. I NFI LTRATI ON ----------------------------------55-60 647. ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

OF TH E ARE A COMMAND.S ect ion I . Orga n iz a t ion a l con cept s ------------------------61-66 69

I I . Res is t a nce elem en t s -----------------------------67-72 79I I I . S ecu r it y ----------------------------------------------73-80 86IV. In telligence in guerrilla w a rfa re opera tiona l

a rea ------------------------------------------------81-83 93V. Commun ica tions in guerrilla w a rfa re opera -

t ion a l a rea s --------------------------------------84-87 93VI. Logistics in guerrilla wa rfa re opera tiona l

a rea s -----------------------------------------------88-94 95

* This manual supersedes FM 31-21, 8 May 1958.



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Paragraphs Page

C HAPTER 8. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT

S ect ion I . In t roduct ion -------------------------------------- 95-100 103

I I . Of fen sive comba t oper a t ion s ---------------101-116 107

I I I . In t er dict ion --------------------------------------117-126 130

I V. D efen siv e opera t ions -------------------------127-131 137

V. E mployment of unconvent iona l w a rfa re

forces to assist conventional forces' com-

ba t oper a t ion s -------------------------------132-139 145

VI. E mploym ent of U W forces a ft er link-up 140-147 164

C HAP TER 9. P SYCH OLOGI CAL OP E RATIONS IN

SU P P ORT OF U NCONVE NTIONAL

WARF ARE -----------------------------------148-152 169

10. D E MOB ILI ZATION --------------------------153-166 177

AP P E N D I X I . RE FE RE NC E S ------------------------------------------- 183

I I . C ATALOG U E S U P P LY S YS TE M ------------------ 188

I I I . ARE A S TU D Y G U I D E --------------------------------- 234

I V. ARE A AS S E S S ME NT---------------------------------- 244

V. G LOS S ARY OF TE RMS ------------------------------ 249

I NDEX ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 252



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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTALS

1. Purpose and Scopea. This manual provides guidance in Special Forces and

unconventional warfare operat ions for commanders and staffs at al llevels. The ba sic concepts of unconvent iona l w a rfa re a re presented ina manner designed to acquaint the reader with Special Forcesorga niza tion, concepts, a nd meth ods of opera tions t o fulfill the Army 'sresponsibility for t he conduct of unconvent iona l w a rfa re.

b. Thorough understanding of the ideas established within thisma nua l w ill prepare t he comma nder a nd st a ff off icers for subsequentdecisions and staff actions which affect special forces planning and

operations.c. Detailed methods and techniques of Special Forces operations

a re discussed below. C lassified informa tion perta ining t o all levels ofSpecial Forces operations is found in FM 31-21A.

2. Definition of Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields ofguerril la w a rfa re, evasion a nd esca pe, a nd subversion a ga inst h ost i lestates (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conductedin enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenouspersonnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by anexternal source.

3. Delineation of Responsibilities for Unconventional Warfarea. The responsibility for certain of these activities has been

delegated to th e service ha ving primary concern. G uerril la w a rfa re isth e responsibility of the U nited St a tes Army .

b. Within certain designated geographic areas—called guerrillaw a rfa re opera t iona l a reas—the U nited St a tes Army is responsible forthe conduct of all three interrelated fields of activity as they affectguerril la w a rfa re operat ions.



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c. The military operations of resistance movements arecustomarily supported and accompanied by political and economicactivities —both overt and clandestine —of individuals and groupsintegra ted, or a cting in conjunction w ith gu errilla s. The severa l typesof activities are interlocking. The term unconventional warfare is

used in this manual to denote al l of the United States Army'sassociated responsibilities in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Theterm guerri l la warfare is used to denote the primary overt mil i taryactivities of the guerrilla forces.



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CHAPTER 2RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

4. Resistance

a. General . Resistance is the cornerstone of guerrilla warfare.Underground and guerri l la warfare stem from a resistancemovement.

b. Definit ion . Resistance is defined as the act of opposition of oneindividual or group to another. A resistance movement is theorganized element of a disaffected population which resists agovernment or occupying power with means, varying from passive toviolently active. Resistance movements begin to form whendissatisfaction occurs among strongly motivated individuals whoca nnot furth er their ca use by peaceful an d lega l means.

c. T he N at u r e of Resi sta n ce .

(1) Resista nce, rebellion or civil wa r begins in a na tion w herepolitical, sociological, economic or religious division hasoccurred. Divisions of this nature are usually caused by aviola tion of righ t s or privileges, the oppression of one gr oupby t he domina nt or occupying force, or t he th rea t t o th e lifeand freedom of the populace. Resistance also may developin a nation where the once welcomed liberators have failedto improve an intolerable social or economic situation.Resistance can also be deliberately inspired from externalsources against an assumed grievance. Resistance can beactive or passive. Passive resistance may be in the form ofsmoldering resentment which needs only leadership or amea ns of expression to ma tur e to active resista nce.

(2) Some people join a resistance movement because of aninnate desire to survive. Others may join the resistanceforces because of deep ideological convictions. But all,regardless of initial motivation, are bound together to fighta ga inst a common enemy. P a rt of the popula t ion a ssists th eresista nce movement a s fight ers in t he guerrilla force; somea ssist a s par t-time guerrillas or in civilia n support a gencies

know as auxil iary units; while others are members of theunderground.



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d. I nfl uencing Factor s .

(1) Envi ronment .

(a) Ter r a in . The physical location of the resistancemovement has a great influence upon i ts organizationand tact ics. Because they provide suitable areas for the

security of operations, mountains, swamps, large forestsor jungles nurt ure overt or guerrilla ty pe resista nce. Flatplains areas and large towns or ci t ies are more apt tolead to underground resistance activities although thepossibility of organizing a guerrilla force in these areasshould not be overlooked.

(b) Cul tur al . A peoples' cultural environment also has itseffects on resista nce movements. The urge t o bea r a rms,esca pe, an d fight t he enemy is dependent on th e cultur a lbackground of the people. Men from rural or peasantenvironment, not subjected to tight governmentalcontrol, have more opportunity to show their hatred ofthe enemy occupation by overt and violent means suchas guerri l la warfare. People from an industr ial ized andhighly urbanized culture will resist with such activitiesa s sa bota ge, propaga nda , passive acts a nd espiona ge.

(c) Cont r ol of popu l ati on . When an occupying power is able

to exercise close and stringent control over thepopulation, the resistance movement is conductedprimarily in secrecy. When the police and military forcesof the occupying power are diverted or otherwiseineffectual, the resistance movement may be conductedw ith prima ri ly overt guerril la a ct ions.

(2) Motiva t ion . Besides the geographical and culturalenvironment influencing guerrilla warfare, the sociologicalcl imate produces many motivating factors which have a

profound effect upon the resistance movement. Strongindividual motivation is essential to the formation of aresistance force. Although some individual motives are notideal a nd, if openly expressed, may do har m t o th e guerrillaeffort, the following are examples of what some of the truemotives ma y be.

(a) I d eology . In guerri l la units some individuals havedeveloped strong ideological motives for taking up arms.These ideologies take root in two broad areas politicsand religion. The individual tends to subordinate hisown persona lity t o these ideologies a nd w orks consta nt lyand solely for the "cause." In some resistance fighters,th is motive is extr emely st rong.



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(b) E conom i c . Many individuals join resistance movementsto keep from starving or to keep from losing theirlivelihood. An organized resistance force may exerteconomic influence on individuals who fail to supportth eir m ovement .

(c) Per sonal ga i n . Personal gain is the motivating force ofsome volunteers. An individual, so motivated, maychange sides if he believes he can gain more by fightingfor the opposing force.

(d) H ate. People who have lost loved ones due to enemyact ions may f ight agains t that enemy as a resul t ofengendered hatred. Uncontrolled hatred can poseproblems for the sponsor because it is difficult to curbthe fanaticism of such individuals and properly directth eir effort s.

(e) Secu r i ty . If the resistance movement is strong or givesthe impression of being powerful, many individuals joinout of a feeling of persona l safety. U sua lly, th is situa tionoccurs only after the resistance movement is wellorganized and the enemy has been weakened by otheractions. Others join in order to escape recruitment intoth e service of th e enem y.

(f) E go. Personal motives such as power, pride, andadventure operate to some extent in all individuals.Depending upon the moral fiber of the individual, thesemotives may susta in him in t imes of great s tress.

(g) F ear . Some individuals become a part of the resistancemovement th rough n o persona l desire of th eir ow n. Theyjoin the movement out of fear of reprisals againstth emselves or t heir fa milies.

(3) Chance for success. In addit ion to motivation andcircumstances of environment, a population must feel thatthere is ultimately a chance for success or there can be noeffective resistance movement developed. Activeparticipation in any resistance movement is influenced byits cha nce for su ccess.

(4) Guidance. Resistance movements stand or fall on thecaliber of the leaders and other individuals in theorganization. An understanding of the environmental andindividual motivating factors wil l assist greatly those whodesire to obtain the optimum from a guerrilla organization.An analysis of these factors plays an important part inevalua ting potentia l resista nce forces.



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5. Guerrilla WarfareGuerrilla warfare comprises combat operations conducted in

enemy held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on amilitary or paramilitary basis to reduce the combat effectiveness,industr ial ca pacity, a nd morale of th e enemy. G ueril la opera tions a re

conducted by relatively small groups employing offensive tactics.G uerri lla w a rfa re supports other m ili ta ry opera tions.

6. Characteristics of Guerrilla Warfarea. General . Guerilla warfare is characterized by offensive action.

G uerrillas rely upon m obility, elusiveness an d surprise. In a ddition tothese tra i ts , there a re other cha ra cterist ics th a t should be mentioned:civilian support, outside sponsorship, political aspects, legal aspects,ta ctics, an d development a spects.

b. Suppor t Factor s .

(1) Civi l i an suppor t . The success of guerrilla movementsdepends upon continuous moral and material support fromthe civilian population. The local community usually isunder intense pressure from anti-guerrilla factions.Punitive measures such as reprisals, terrorism,deportation, restriction of movement and seizure of goodsand property are conducted against supporters of guerrilla

a ctivity, m a king t his support da ngerous a nd diff icult . If th elocal populace has a strong will to resist, enemy reprisalscause an increase in underground activities. The civiliancommunity may assist the guerri l la force by furnishingsupplies, recruits, information; by giving early warning; bysupporting evasion and escape; and other activities. Afterthe guerrilla force has established itself and is sufficientlystrong, it may need to exert force upon certain elements ofthe civilian population to command their support, e. g.:

coerce indifferent or unresponsive portions of thepopulation into supporting the guerrilla movement.Civilians participating in such support activities, asidefrom underground opera tions, comprise wha t a re know n a sth e auxiliar y forces.

(2) Outside sponsorship . Guerrilla operations are moreeffective when outside sponsorship is present. During awartime situation this support is political, psychologicaland logistical as well as tactical. A sponsoring powerdecides to support guerrilla forces when it feels that theguerri l las can make a significant contribution toward theachievement of national objectives.



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fr iendly mili tary forces and at tack the enemy at pointsmost disadvantageous to him. These at tacks are normallyconducted during periods of low visibility and are directedagainst isolated outposts, weakly defended locations or themoving enemy. By recognizing his own limitations and

weaknesses, the guerrilla can hope for survival andeventual success. Initially, he is usually inferior to theenemy in firepower, manpower, communications, logistics,and organization. He is equal , and often superior, to theenemy in the collection of intelligence information, covera nd d eception, a nd t he use of time.

(2) Off en si ve ta cti cs . The ba sis of successful guerr illa comba t isoffensive action combined with surprise. During periods oflow visibi l i ty, the guerri l la at tacks, t r ies to gain a

momentary advantage of firepower, executes his mission tocaptur e or destr oy personn el a nd equipment, a nd leaves thescene of action as rapidly as possible. Normally, theguerrilla does not consistently operate in one area butvaries his operations so that no pattern is evident. Ifpossible, he strikes two or three targets simultaneously todivide th e enemy pur suit a nd r einforcement effort .

(3) D efensive t acti cs . P rotective surveilla nce for t he guerrilla isusua lly very good; he ha s civilia n n on-combat a nt s providinghim with information on enemy garrisons, troopmovements, and counter, guerrilla activities. This advancewarning gives the guerrilla time for propercountermeasures. If, in any counter guerrilla move by asuperior enemy, the guerrillas are threatened or encircled,they do not meet him on a showdown basis , but withdraw,disperse or a t t empt a brea kout.

f. Development Aspects . To complete the picture of guerrillawarfare, a time-and-space frame of reference must be understood.That is, i t is not sufficient merely to state certain principles ofguerri l la warfare, but i t is necessary to qualify statements regardingguerril la a ct ions t o f ix th em w ith r egard t o t ime and space.

(1) T i m e el em en t . Guerrillas have proved themselves effectiveduring a ll sta ges of conflict from th e outbr eak of hostilitiesuntil the end of fighting. However, in the early stages ofguerrilla development, when the enemy is still strong,resistance operations normally tend to be conducted less

openly. During this period, security is a prime concern. Ifthe resistance movement is to survive and develop —whilesurrounded by strong enemy forces security is a primeconcern and precautions must be extensive and effective.Activity is generally limited to information —gathering,



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recruiting, training, organization, and small-scaleoperations.

(2) Si tua t ion . On the other hand, when the si tuation changesto favor the guerri l las ei ther through enemy weakness orresistance-created favorable circumstances, operations

become more overt making large-scale actions possible.When the situation permits, guerrilla forces expand andtend t o a dopt convent iona l organ izat ions.

(3) Location . Guerri l la warfare takes on different aspectsaccording to its geographic location. In some areas of theworld guerri l la warfare has preceded the entry of regulartroops; while in other areas, guerrilla movements havecome int o existence a fter t he forma l entry of regula r t roops.Additionally, in some areas the complex social structureand economic organizations are cogs in a vast system thatis relat ively ea sy t o disrupt. The higher t he degree to wh icha country has evolved industrially the more vulnerable it isto activities of the guerrillas. In less industrialized areas ofthe world, these complexities do not exist. The people areless dependent on one another for goods and services;disruption of one community does not necessarily causeextreme hardship in another. Thus, the impact of guerrillawarfare upon the populat ion is not as great and guerri l lafighting is likely to be more prevalent. In judging • thepotential for, and effects of, guerrilla warfare location is animportant consideration.

7. Special Forces OperationsThe value of coordinating guerrilla activities with conventional

mili ta ry opera tions a nd t he need for peacetime pla nning a nd t ra iningby the potential sponsor have been recognized by the United States.The unit organized and trained to implement the Army'sresponsibility in directing guerrilla opera tions is t he Airborne SpecialForces Group. Special forces units may be called upon to operateduring a genera l, l imited or cold wa r.

a. General War . The doctrine set forth in this manual isstructured around a general war si tuation. In a general war, SpecialForces organize guerrilla forces to support conventional militaryoperations under the direction of the theater commander. Theiroperations generally are conducted in denied (enemy controlled)

territory.b. L im it ed War . Limited war operations by Special Forces could

be of the general type with infiltration of Special Forces detachmentsor of a training nature conducted in a nondenied area withinfiltr a tion of indigenous units only.



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c. Cold War . Special forces units can assist in training mili tarypersonnel in combating guerrilla and terrorist activities andsubversion. In a ddit ion, t hey ma y t ra in foreign m ili ta ry personnel inthe techniques of guerri l la warfare, thus enhancing the defensecapability of the nation concerned. When so employed, Special Forces

units supplement the U.S. mil i tary assistance groups and armymissions.

8. Capabilities and Limitationsa. Capabilities. Special forces deployment gives reach to the

th eat er comm a nder's opera tions. It permits h im to influence a ctivitiesfar in advance of the f ield forces and beyond the range of army-controlled weapons systems. Special forces directed guerrilla units(called UW forces) conduct operations which are categorized as

follows:(1) M i ssi ons in support of t heater com m and er . These missions

include —

(a) Interdiction of lines of communications, key areas andmilita ry a nd industr ial insta l la t ions.

(b) P sychologica l opera tions.

(c) Special intelligence tasks such as target acquisition anddamage assessment.

(d) E va sion a nd esca pe opera tions.(e) Cover a nd deception opera tions.

(2) Missions to support comba t opera tions of t a cticalcommanders. In addit ion to an intensif icat ion of the taskslisted in (1) above, UW forces execute missions to directlyassist conventional forces engaged in combat operations.Su ch missions ma y include —

(a) Seizure of key terrain to faci l i tate airborne and

a mphibious opera tions.(b) E mployment a s a r econn a issan ce a nd security force.

(c) Seizure of key inst a llat ions t o prevent destruction by theenemy.

(d) Diversionary at tacks against enemy forces to supportcover and deception plans.

(e) Operations which isolate selected portions of the battlea rea , airborne objective ar ea or bea chh ead.

(3) Missions conducted aft er jun ctur e w ith friendly forces. Inth e event cont rol of guerrilla units is reta ined by th e U nitedSt a tes, the follow ing missions ma y be a ssigned:

(a) Reconna issan ce a nd security m issions.



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(b) When properly trained and supported, conventionalcombat opera tions.

(c) Rear a rea securi ty missions.

(d) Count er-guerrilla opera tions.

(e) Su pport of civil affa irs opera tions.

b. Limitat ions. I t must be realized that there are certainlimita tions in th e use of guerrilla forces. Some of th ese limita tions a re

(1) Limit ed capa bilities for st a tic defensive or holdingoperations.

(2) Initially, lack of formal training, equipment, weapons, andsupplies prohibit la rge-scale comba t opera tions.

(3) D epend ence upon t he loca l civilian popula tion a nd a noutside sponsoring pow er for supplies a nd equipment.

(4) Communications between the guerrilla warfare operationala rea a nd higher hea dqua rters in fr iendly terr i tory a re oftentenuous a nd fra ught w ith t echnica l problems.

(5) Decentralization of command and dispersion of forces forsecurity impedes rea ction t ime to orders from t hea ter level.

(6) Restr ictions on friend ly support ing fires int o t heopera tiona l a rea beca use of necessity for frequ ent m oves bythe guerri l las as well as the necessi ty far protecting thefriendly civilian population so far as possible.

(7) From initial contact until an operation is completed, theentire project is dependent upon precise, timely anda ccura te intelligence.



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PART TWOORGANIZATION FOR THE SPECIAL FORCES EFFORT

CHAPTER 3JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE

(JUWTF)

9. Generala. The theater commander is responsible for the conduct of

unconventiona l w a rfa re in his a rea of operat ions.b. As a part of this responsibility he designates guerrilla warfare

operational areas for the conduct of guerri l la warfare and relatedunconventiona l w a rfa re a ct ivi t ies.

10. Organization of the Joint Unconventional WarfareTask Force (JUWTF)

a. The theater commander has the authori ty to organize hiscommand for unconventional warfare in the manner best suited toa ccomplish h is mission.

b. The preferred organization is a joint subordinate headquartersfor unconventional warfare on the same level as other servicecomponent commands (fig. 1) .

This subordina te headqua rters, known a s a J oint U nconventiona lWa rfa re Ta sk F orce (J U WTF), is composed of representa tives fr omth e service component comma nds a nd a ppropriat e civilia n personnel.

c. *A second possible organization is an unconventional warfareplans section w ithin th e J 3 sta ff division of th e unified or specifiedcommand.

d . The interna l sta ff orga niza tion of th e J U WTF is joint , wit h t heprincipal st a ff officers being fr om a ny service, an d consisting of a J 1,J 2, J 3, J 4, J 6 divisions a nd a ny required specia l sta ff officers (fig. 2).In th e J U WTF t he pla ns a nd policy fun ctions of J 5 division a renorma lly a ccomplished by th e J 3 division.

e. Units and individuals from the service components are

a ssigned or a tt a ched for opera tiona l cont rol to th e J U WTF.

* Since an unconventional warfare plans section within the JS division performs essentially the samefunctions as a separate JUWTF, further discussion is limited to the separate JUWTF.



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f . The airborne special forces group, the principal army elementof t he J U WTF, esta blishes a specia l forces opera tiona l ba se (SF OB ) tocommand and support operational detachments before and aftercommitment in designat ed guerri l la w a rfa re opera tiona l area s.

11. Functions of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forcea. The J U WTF comma nder a nd his sta ff ma ke opera tiona l plans

for and direct the conduct of unconventional warfare. The principalfunctions of the J U WTF a re

(1) Recommend geographical areas to be designated guerrilla-wa rfare opera t iona l a reas .

(2) P rocure a nd ma inta in intelligence ma teria ls in support ofunconventiona l w a rfa re.



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(3) Develop operational, administrative and logistical plansand requirements for the support of unconventionalwar fa re .

(4) Coordinate with other theater agencies in planning for alltypes of operations.

(5) Develop communication procedures and requirements tosupport unconventiona l w a rfa re plans.

(6) Plan and conduct joint t raining of land, sea and air unitsdesignated to participate in or support unconventionalwar fa re .

(7) As directed, coordinate with allied military authorities forthe preparation and execution of unconventional warfareplans.

(8) Maint a in l ia ison w ith other unconventiona l w a rfa rea gencies or un its.

(9) R ecommend st reng th s of ind igenous forces to be support edfor unconventional warfare operations.

(10) Ma inta in liaison a t st a ff a nd opera tiona l level w itha ppropria te intelligence a gencies; coordina te requirement s,collection and communications with other activities indenied areas; plan intelligence operations in support ofconventional forces when directed by the theatercommander.

(11) Maint a in l iaison w ith thea ter civil a ffairs un its w ithrespect to civil affairs (CA) aspects of unconventionalwar fa re .

b. The sta ff opera tions of a J U WTF a re basically th e sam e as forother US milita ry sta ffs.

12. Operational Control of Unconventional Warfare Forces

a. Initially, operational control of US sponsored unconventionalwarfare forces is retained by the theater commander. Control isexercised th rough t he J U WTF a ssigning m issions t o the SpecialForces group, which in turn directs deployed operationaldetachments.

b. When guerri l la warfare operational areas fal l within the areaof influence of advancing tactical commands, operational control ofa ffected unconvent iona l wa rfa re forces usua lly is tr a nsferred from th eunified or specified command level through theater army to the fieldarmy concerned. In conjunction with this transfer, elements of theSpecial Forces group are at tached to the army headquarters toprovide contin uity of supervision.



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c. The field army commander in turn may assign operationalcontrol of the unconventional warfare force to any of his subordinatetactical units. Delegation of control generally is not made lower thandivision. See chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of utilization ofunconventiona l wa rfa re forces by ta ctical comma nds.



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CHAPTER 4AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

Section I. GENERAL

13. GeneralThe Airborne Special Forces Group is the United States Army's

organization trained to conduct guerri l la warfare and relatedunconventional warfare activities. Special forces are a strategic forceemployed under the direction of theater commanders. Deployment ofspecial, forces units allows the theater commander to conduct

offensive operations deep in enemy territory.

14. Mission and Concepta. M i ssi on . The mission of special forces is to develop, organize,

equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrillawarfare. Special forces may also advise, t rain and assist indigenousforces in coun ter -insur gency opera t ions.

b. Concept . Special forces are responsible for the conduct of allunconventional warfare act ivi t ies within guerri l la warfareoperational areas and may be called upon to perform other tasksa ssociat ed with or in support of guerril la w a rfa re.

15. Airborne Special Forces Groupa. Organization . The Airborne Special Forces Group consists of a

headquarters and headquarters company and four Special Forcescompa nies (fig. 3) .

b. Capabili t ies . The specia l forces group is capa ble of —

(1) D eploying its opera tiona l deta chment s by air, sea or lan dw hen provided w ith a ppropriat e tra nsporta t ion.

(2) Orga nizing, tra ining, an d directing a num ber of var ied sizeguerrilla units.

(3) Controlling, by long-range communications, the operationsof UW forces in enemy or enemy occupied territory toreduce his combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, andmorale.

(4) Performing specialized intelligence missions as directed byhigher commanders and when augmented by intel l igencespecialists a s required.

(5) P roviding tr a ining a nd a ssista nce to friendly foreigna rmies in guerrilla a nd count er guerrilla opera tions.



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(6) E sta blishing a Special Forces opera tiona l ba se w hena ugment ed by support a nd service units.

c. Ad di ti onal Consider ati ons .

(1) The Specia l Forces group requires a ugm ent a tion by supportand service units to conduct sustained operations from theSpecial Forces Operational Base (SFOB). For details of thesupport required, see par a gra ph 21.

(2) The reaction time of Special Forces detachments differsfrom that of conventional infantry units because ofcommunications l imitat ions and greater distances toopera tiona l a reas.

16. Headquarters and Headquarters Company (fig. 4)a. M i ssi on . To provide communications, administrative, training,

intelligence, and logistical support for assigned Special Forceselements prior t o and a fter deployment.

b. Capabili t ies . Headquar ters and headquar ters company of thespecia l forces group ha s th e follow ing capa bilities:

(1) P rovides comma nd a nd sta ff control an d plan ning forSpecial F orces element s prior t o an d a fter deploym ent.

(2) P rovides logist ical s upport (except d elivery ) t o Specia lForces opera tiona l elements on a continuing ba sis.



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(3) Provides long-range communication between an SFOB anda ssigned S pecial Forces opera tiona l element s.

(4) P rovides un it level medica l a nd dent a l service.

(5) Provides third echelon maintenance in radio and smallarms.

c. Organization . For detailed organization, see the current tablesof organiza tion a nd equipment.

17. Special Forces Company (fig. 5)a. Organization . The special forces company consists of an

administrat ive detachment, one operational detachment C, threeopera tiona l deta chm ents B , and 12 opera tiona l deta chment s A.

b. A dm i ni str ati ve Detachm ent . The administrat ive detachmentperforms the normal administrat ive functions of a company head-



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quarters. The detachment commander executes the directives andorders of the commanding officer of the operational detachment C,who is the commander of the Special Forces company. Duringoperations, the administrat ive detachment reverts to the group

commander's control when its operational detachments have beendeployed.

c. Oper ati ona l D etachm ent C (fig. 6). Operational detachment Cis the senior operational unit of the Special Forces company. It iscapa ble of —

(1) Cond ucting opera t ions wit h guerr illa forces.

(2) Exercising operational control over designated subordinatedetachments.

(3) P roviding t he nucleus of a lia ison deta chment to field a rmyor other tactical elements when the operational control ofSpecial Forces detachments is passed to tactical unitcommanders. When so employed, the detachment C isa t ta ched to the ta ct ica l uni t headqua r ters .

d. Oper ati onal Detachment B (fig. 7) . Opera tiona l deta chm ent B ,like the detachment C, conducts operations with guerrilla forces.When operating with other detachments, the B detachment exercisesopera tiona l cont rol over subordina te d eta chm ents a nd/or is

subordinated to a senior detachment. It also can provide the nucleusof a l ia ison detachment a t a t a ct ica l unit headq ua rters.

e. Oper ati ona l D etachm ent A (fig. 8). The opera tiona l deta chmentA conducts operations with guerrilla forces, either unilaterally or inconjunction with other detachments. When operating with otherdetachments, the A detachment is normally subordinated to a seniordetachment.

18. Augmentation Detachmenta. The augmentation detachment is identical in composition to

th e opera tiona l deta chment C (fig. 6).b. The a ugment a tion deta chm ent is ca pable of:

(1) Assist ing th e comm a nd er in the contr ol of opera tions.(2) Forming t he l ia ison detachment a t a ta ct ica l unit

headquarters when operational control of Special Forcesdetachments is passed to th e ta ct ica l unit .

(3) Forming t he n ucleus t o establish a n a l ternat e SF OBheadquar ters .

(4) Conducting opera tions in guerrilla w a rfa re opera tiona lareas .

c. For a detailed description of the employment of thea ugmenta tion deta chment, see para gra ph 21.



23



24



25



26

Section II. THE SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE

19. Generala. The S pecia l Forces opera tiona l ba se (SF OB ) is th e opera tiona l

a nd a dministra t ive foca l point for guerril la w a rfar e act ivi t ies with in a

U.S. theater of operations. It is located in territory under friendlycontrol, usually within the communications zone (CommZ). Theloca tion of the S FOB is designa ted by t he thea ter comma nder.

b. The Special Forces group, supported by elements within theCommZ, activates and operates the SFOB. Ideally, the SFOB isestablished and activated prior to the commencement of hostilities.However, since preemergency activation may not be authorized, thebase often is established on a standby basis to include long-rangecommunica tion facili t ies, intra thea ter a nd intra base communica tions,

and emergency stockpiles of equipment.c. The SFOB may be physically located at one installation or

dispersed among a number of small sites, usually in the vicinity ofother installations such as an air base or CommZ depot. Variousmodifica tions a re a dopted t o suit t he loca l situa tion.

20. MissionThe mission of the SF'OB is to prepare operational detachments

for deployment into guerri l la w a rfa re ar eas a nd, a fter deployment, t odirect, administer, and support guerrilla forces in furtherance of thetheater mission.

The functions performed a t the S FOB a re —

a. P lan ning a nd direction of opera tions.

b. Commun ica tions support.

c. Intelligence support.

d . Logistical support.

e. B rief ing a nd s ta ging.f . Infi l t rat ion.

g. Lia ison a nd coordina tion.

h . Training.

i . Administration.

21. Organization( fig. 9 )

a. General . The SF OB is orga nized a long functiona l lines int o tw omajor groups: the operational element. , ; and the administrat ive andtra ining elements.



27

b. Oper ati onal E l em ent s . The operational elements of the SFOBconsist of —

(1) Operations center . The operations center is the facilitywithin which are grouped representat ives of unit and

special staff sections and other commands concerned withcurrent operat ions in guerri lla w a rfa re area s. For a detai leddiscussion, see pa ra gra ph 23.

(2) B r i efi ng cent er . The briefing center is an isolation area orareas where Special Forces detachments receive theiroperational missions and conduct final preparation forinfiltra tion. For a det a iled discussion, see par a gra ph 24.

(3) Communications complex . The communications complexconsists of the communications facilities available tosupport the SFOB and guerri l la warfare operational areas.It includes the Special Forces group communicationsplatoon, plus at tached or support ing signal units andfacilities. The group signal officer is the staff supervisor.The communications platoon leader is normally theoperator and supervises the signal instal lat ions. For adeta iled discussion, see par a gra ph 25.

(4) T he Augm ent ati on detachm ent .

(a) When a ctivat ed, the a ugmenta tion detachment providesadditional flexibility to the Special Forces groupcommander.



28

(b) The augmentation detachment may be employed toa ssist t he comm a nder in t he cont rol of opera tions. Whenso employed the detachment commander becomes adeputy for operations and supervises the operationalelements of th e SFOB . Other deta chment personnel ar e

assigned duties to operate the briefing center andsupplement st a ff elements of the ba se.

(c) The detachment may form the Special Forces liaisondetachment w ith a f ield ar my or other ta ct ica l comma nd.In this si tuation the detachment is at tached to thetactical command and exercises operational control forthe tactical commander over designated guerrillaw a rfa re opera tion a rea s (ch. 8) .

(d) The detachment can establish an al ternate SFOBheadquarters. In this role addit ional personnel andequipment are provided from headquarters andheadq ua rters compan y a nd other sources as required.

(e) The detachment can be employed operationally toa ccomplish ta sks a ppropria te for a C d eta chm ent.

(f) More than one augmentation detachment may bea ctivat ed for employment a t t he SFOB .

c. Adminis t ra t ive and Training Elements . The administrative

a nd t ra ining elements of the SFOB consist of — (1) Administrative center . The administrative center is the

facility within which are grouped representatives of unitand special staff sections and other commands concernedwith current administrat ive support operations, basesecurity, and area damage control. For further discussions,see par a gra ph 29.

(2) L ogi sti cs su ppor t el em en t . This is a non-TOE grouping ofSpecial Forces and supporting technical service units fromCommZ formed to support the SFOB and guerri l la warfareoperational areas. The group S4 supervises operations ofthe logistics support element which includes

(a) Organic elements of the Special Forces group: SupplySection, Motor Section, Parachute Rigging Platoon, andthe Medical Section.

(b) Supporting elements as required: Transportation units,Engineer Utility Personnel, Ordnance 3d Echelon

Support, Civilian Labor, QM Aerial Supply Units,Medical U nits, a nd a Lia ison S ection from CommZ.



29

(3) Other suppor t i ng uni ts . Although the group has personnelto establish the SFOB, deploy detachments and providelimited logistical support, i t requires augmentation toconduct support activities on a sustained basis. CIC, basesecurity and logistical support elements are required to

support initial operations. As the number of operationalareas increases with the subsequent buildup in guerri l laforces, the administrative support operations expandcorrespondingly. Un its, such a s those outlined in para gra ph(2) above, are required to augment the SFOB. Militarypolice security units and counterintelligence corps teamsare included and operate under the headquarterscommandant and S2, respectively. An army aviat iondetachment may be at tached to the SFOB to provide army

aviation support. An Army Security Agency unit maymonitor communications for security. In some instancestechnica l service units or insta llat ions a re not loca ted a t t heSFOB but provide general or direct support as a part oftheir mission. In this situation, the SFOB exercises nooperational control over the units concerned but is servicedas a "customer" of the supporting unit or installation. Anexample is higher-echelon ordnance and engineer support.

(4) H eadqu ar ter s and h eadqu ar ter s com pany . The

headquar ters and headquar ters company, augmented bytechnical service and security units from CommZ, handleshousekeeping activities at the SFOB. The companycomma nder is the headq ua rters comma nda nt .

(5) Special forces companies (uncommitted units). Theuncommitted companies and detachments continue unitpreparation and training. These detachments are briefedfrequently on the situation in their projected operationalareas .

Section III. CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

22. GeneralThe Special Forces group organizes functionally to control

operations in guerrilla warfare operational areas. The elements usedin t he cont rol of opera tions a re —

(1) Opera tion cent er.(2) B riefing cent er.

(3) Commu nica t ions complex.



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23. Operations Centera. General . The opera tions cent er is a fun ctiona l grouping of TOE

personnel who coordinate and control operations for the commanderof the SFOB .

b. Functions .

(1) Detai led planning for guerri l la warfare operational areas,to include preparation of the operation plan for eachoperational detachment. This planning is based upon theU W pla ns of the t heat er comma nder.

(2) Conducting briefings a nd supervising oth er prepa ra tion bydeta chments a ssigned to th e briefing center.

(3) Coordina ting w ith other services an d a gencies as necessa ry.

(4) Exercising operational supervision over guerrilla war fare

opera tiona l a reas.(5) Ma king recomm enda tions concernin g employm ent of

guerrilla forces in support of military operations. Thisincludes reorga niza tion as necessa ry.

(6) Acting as the control and coordinating center for guerrillawa rfare opera t iona l a reas .

c. Composition (fig . 10).

(1) S 3. The S 3 exercises prim a ry st a ff r esponsibility for

opera tions center a nd is t he director.(2) Plans element . The operations center plans element

conducts plan ning for futur e opera tions. The plan s elementconsists of the assistant S2 and assistant S3 plus enlistedaugmentation. The assistant S3 is the officer-in-charge ofplans element. Once plans are approved they areimplement ed by the a ppropriat e a rea specialist tea m.

(3) S2 oper at i on s el em en t . The S2 operations element consists

of the S2, intelligence sergeant, intelligence editors,a na lysts, a nd order-of-ba tt le specialists. They a ssemble a ndevaluate intelligence information received from theoperational areas; prepare and disseminate intelligencereports based on evaluated information and intelligencereports from other headquarters; and conduct intelligencebriefings and debriefings. For a detailed discussion, seepara gra ph 27.

(4) Assistant S4 (plans). The Assistant .S4 (Plans) is thelogistical coordinator for the Operations Center. Heprocesses logistical requirements from the area specialistteams and is responsible for logistical activities in the



31

briefing center. He prepares the administrative annex tothe guerri l la w a rfa re area operat ion pla ns.

(5) Si gnal offi cer . The signa l officer is signa l coordin a tor for th eopera tions center. H e coordina tes signa l requirements fromarea specialist teams and is responsible for operationalsignal matters . He prepares the signal operatinginstructions and signal annex for guerri l la warfare areaopera tion pla ns.

(6) Ar ea speci al i st t eam s (AST s). The ASTs are the focal pointof the operations center. They assist in precommitmentplanning, coordinate activities of their assigneddetachments in the briefing center, and act as the parentsof t he comm itt ed deta chment s. The AS T consist s of th e a rea



32

specialist officer (assistant S3) and an area supervisor(senior NC O). This tea m mu st become expert on t he specificarea or country it will supervise during operations. TheAST a cts a s th e committ ed detachment 's rea r h eadqua rters,a nd is responsible for follow ing t hrough on a ll directives to

and messages from committed detachments. Duringpreinfiltration briefings, a close rapport is establishedbetween the detachment and the AST. The AST keeps thecomma nder a nd st a ff informed on the operat iona l si tuat ion.

(7) Communication center . The communications center,operated by the command operations center team of thecommunications platoon, is located in the vicinity of theoperations center since it provides the communications

cent er support for t he opera tions center a nd oth er elementsof the SFOB .

(8) Liaison officers . Although not an integral part of theoperations center, the liaison officers from the variousservices, field a rmies, an d a llied countries a re loca ted t here.They coordinate matters of common interest with theirservices and nations and arrange support when required.They keep the Special Forces group commander and staff

abreast of the situation of their respective organizations asthese organizations influence guerri l la warfare areas ofinterest.

24. Briefing Centera. General . The br iefing center provides for t he follow ing:

(1) Housing.

(2) Messing.

(3) B riefing a nd debriefing.(4) Det a chment stud y.

(5) D ispensa ry service.

(6) S pecia l tr a ining .

(7) St orage a nd pa cka ging of accompany ing supplies.

(8) L imit ed mora le serv ices.

(9) St a ging of deta chments to depart ure sites.

b. Operation . The entire area (areas) is a maximum-security siteaccessible only to those personnel who have a requirement to bethere. The operations of the center are supervised by the S3. Theheadquarters commandant is responsible for the administrat ivefunctioning and security of the area. Personnel from the



35



36

facility for the receiver and transmitter sites. The forwardreceiving center and the forward transmitt ing center teamsopera te th e receiver a nd t ra nsmit ter sites, respectively.

b. Capabili t ies .

(1) Operate telephone service within the SFOB. The platooninstal ls the telephones to be used within the SFOB andopera tes a telephone switchboard .

(2) Terminate lines from other headquarters. The primarymean s of communication to J U WTF a nd other th eatera gencies w ithin fr iendly t erritory is telephone a nd t eletype.Theater army signal troops install these long wire lines.The communications platoon terminates these lines intelety pe, on-line crypt o, cry pto, crypto speech eq uipment , ortelephone.

(3) Operate base receiver and transmitter sites. The SFOBreceiver and transmitter s i tes may be separated from thebase by a considerable distance. The base proper isconnected to th e receiver a nd t ra nsmit ter sites by la nd line,telephone and teletype. Such lines are provided by theatersigna l a gencies.

(4) P rovide ra dio telety pe ba ck-up. The comm un ica tionsplatoon provides radio teletype back-up to the land linesbetw een th e SFOB a nd th e receiver a nd tr a nsmitter s i tes.

(5) Operate the communications center. The communicationsplatoon, encrypts and decrypts messages and acts as acentral and clearing center for the remote transmitter andreceiver sit es.

c. Responsibi l i ti es of th e si gna l off i cer . The group signal officer is

responsible for — (1) Det ermining opera ting frequencies a nd communicat ion

security measures necessary to insure reliable radiocommunications w ith opera tiona l deta chments.

(2) Obtaining frequencies as necessary and coordinating theuse of a ll frequencies w ith th e support ing signa l officer.

(3) Signa l plann ing and publishing necessar y SOIs a nd SS Is.

(4) P lan ning, r equesting a nd coordina ting th e engineeringassistance necessary for the design of antenna farms andkeying lines.

(5) Requesting material necessary to instal l these antennafar ms a nd keying l ines.



37

(6) Requesting signal support necessary to install long andlocal wire lines, e.g., SFOB to installations of thecomm unica tion complex.

(7) Requesting the telephone and teletype trunks necessaryfor t he opera tion of the SF OB .

(8) Advising t he group S 4 on signa l supply ma tt ers.(9) Supervising training of the group communications section

and when directed training of all communication personnelin t he group.

d . S igna l P lann i ng .

(1) Adva nce pla nn ing is necessa ry to provide r elia blecommunications between the SFOB and guerri l la warfareoperational areas. The distances between the SFOB and

detachments, the communication security problemspresented by operating from within enemy terri tory, andthe low-power communication equipment used by thedetachments all present technical problems. Properfrequencies must be chosen arid the use of thesefrequencies coordinated with the theater signal officer ifcomm unicat ions a re t o be relia ble. For furt her discussion ofcomm unicat ions considera tions, see chapt ers 5 a nd 7.

(2) The gr oup signa l officer insur es tha t t he J U WTF sign a lofficer is aware of all aspects of his problem to include theextent of signa l support required.

(3) The planning must be done as far in advance as possible;the reliability of the communications will be directlyproport iona l to prior pla nn ing a nd supervision.

26. PlansPlanning, particularly prior to commitment of operational

detachments, is one of the major functions of the special forces group.The S 3 plan s gr oup is th e foca l point of plan nin g fun ctions. The AS Ts,supervised by the assistant .S3 (plans) and assisted by other staffofficers, accomplish operational planning. Considering the location,the mission and the ultimate developmental objectives, the ASTsprepare the operation plans for the guerri l la warfare operationala rea s. P lan ning is cont inuous a nd plan s ar e revised a s required. Widelatitude for the operational detachment is the rule for guerrillawarfare operation plans. The selection of a detachment for a

particular mission is based on several factors, chief of which are:training status of the detachment and the abil i ty and experience ofthe detachment commander. For securi ty reasons, detachments donot have access to operation plans until assigned to the briefingcenter. However, to facilitate area studies, geographical regions



39

and headquarters, and prepare and conduct briefings anddebriefings.

c. Attached or Supporting Intelligence Elements . The specialforces group operating from an SFOB requires addit ional mil i taryintelligence support than that which is organically available. The

group has no counterintelligence capability and requires CICaugmentation. Additional military intelligence specialists may bea tt a ched to assist in briefing deta chments.

Section IV. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ANDTRAINING ACTIVITIES

28. Generala. The special forces group establishes an administrative center

a t t he SFOB to contr ol administra t ive a nd tra ining activi t ies.

b. The special forces group executive officer supervises theadministrat ive center and other elements located at the SFOB thata re enga ged in adm inistra t ive a nd tra ining activi t ies.29. Administrative Center

(fig . 13)

a. Composition . The a dminist ra tive cent er consists of

(1) The execut ive officer w ho is t he dir ector.

(2) G roup S 1.

(3) G roup S 4.

(4) Tra inin g officer, S 2 S ection.

(5) Tra inin g officer, S 3 S ection.

(6) E nlist ed specia lists a s requ ired.

b. Funct ioning . The administrative center plans and controlsadminis t ra t ive and t ra in ing act iv i ty a t the base and di rects thevarious sections, units arid attached elements in execution of theirsupport tasks. Through coordinated planning the administrativecenter insures that guerri l la warfare operational areas and the SFOBreceive the administrat ive support they require and thatuncommit ted opera tiona l deta chments a re tra ined for th eir missions.

30. Training

Training at the SFOB is accomplished under two condit ions thatconducted prior to isolat ion in t he briefing center a nd t ha t conductedin the briefing center. Training prior to receipt of an operationalmission is intended to keep th e deta chm ent a t its peak, to teach



41

31. Administrationa. S1 . The functions of any unit S1 are applicable to the special

forces group S1; however, t hey mu st be modified to meet t he situa tionwhich exists after deployment of operational detachments. Obviouslythe actions which are normal in other mil i tary units are diff icult or

impossible to accomplish when dealing with committed special forcespersonnel. The S1 prepares SOP's to cover foreseeable contingenciesand takes steps to accomplish routine personnel matters prior tocommit ment . P ersonn el a ctions requiring a soldier 's a pproval a fter heis in the operational area should be prepared in brevity codes toreduce radio transmissions. The S1 conducts portions of thepredeployment briefing in t he briefing center. Cert a in functions of th especial forces group S1 are discussed wherein they are peculiar todeployed personnel.

(1) Strengths . Status of personnel is reported only when achange takes place, i .e. wounded, missing, captured, orkilled.

(2) Replacements . The provisions of replacements dependsupon t he ca pability of th e opera tiona l deta chm ent t o receivethem and theater service components to deliver them.Replacements are provided on an individual or detachmentbasis.

(3) Discipline, law and order . Commanders of committeddetachments are given a clear statement of theirdisciplinary authori ty as delegated by the highercommander.

(4) POWs . The handling of prisoners will depend upon theexigencies of the situation and is governed by the fact thatthe U .S. is f irmly committ ed to huma ne treat ment a nd careof P OWs.

(5) Bu r i al s and graves r egistr ati on . Theater army pre scribesguida nce for r eporting a nd/or m a rking gra ves with inguerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l areas.

(6) M or al e an d p er sonn el ser vi ces . Detachment commanders'recommendations for awards are processed promptly orauthori ty to award certain decorations is given thedetachment commanders. Mail is handled by apreestablished system; automatic answers are dispatchedwhen desired by individuals; periodic delivery may bepossible with resupply drops if security considerationspermit. Personal necessities are provided automaticallywith resupply. These normally are procured fromindigenous sources or specially packaged to preserve



42

securi ty a nd a re provided for both detachment a nd guerri l lapersonnel.

(7) Personnel procedures . Promotion recommendations areprepa red in a dva nce to be implement ed wh en recommendedby the detachment commander. Demotion authori ty

delegated to detachment commanders is outlined by thetheater army commander.

(8) M i scel l an eous . Policies covering pay or recognition forindigenous troops are outlined by the theater commander.When required, confidential funds are issued to thedetachment commander. Barter i tems, such as medicine,gold, or other scarce items, are issued or held for deliveryon order. Credit systems for services rendered may beestablished. The S1 insures that, prior to the departure ofdetachments for guerri l la warfare operational areas, eachman is given a complete personnel processing in accordancewi th the SOP .

b. Distribution center . The S1 establishes and supervises adistribution center for the orderly handling of correspondence into,within and out of the headquarters. This center controls all messagesexcept those originating. from committed detachments or TOC. Thecommunication center operated by the communications platooncontrols messa ges to a nd from commit ted deta chm ents.

32. Logisticsa. General . The logistical responsibilities of the SFOB are

twofold: first, support of the guerrilla warfare operational areas;second, support of the SFOB and other unconventional warfareelements as designated. To this end, the special forces grouporga nizes a logistica l support element.

The logistical support element includes organic special forces

group logistics sections plus any attached or supporting logisticalun its fr om other h ea dq ua rt ers a nd /or Comm Z. The specia l forcesgroup S4 normally controls the operations of the logistical supportelement. When the logistical support of the SFOB reaches suchmagnitude that numerous at tached or support ing service elementsare required, then a separate commander of the logistical supportelement is appointed from CommZ sources to assist the special forcesgroup S4.

b. Organization . For a typical logistical organization in theS FOB , see figur e 14.

c. Planning . The assistant S4 functions as the logistical plannerfor the S4 section. The assistant S4 prepares the administrativeannexes for the guerri l la warfare areas operation plans. He



43

coordinates with S3 plans group in the preparation of thesea dministra t ive an nexes. The a ssista nt S4 is th e S4 representa t ive inTOC.

d. Logistical Operations at the SFOB . The logistical supportelement coordina tes logistica l support for a ll element s of the ba se an dthe guerrilla warfare operational areas. The following are providedfor:

(1) Requirements . A continuing review of requirements and

submission of th ese requirement s to th e appropria te supplyagency.

(2) L im it ed stor age . The SFOB is prepared to provide shortterm storage for supplies. This storage is only temporaryuntil supplies are packaged and shipped to the delivery



44

agency. Large stocks of supplies are not desirable at theSFOB ; however, nonstandard or special i tems are storedth ere for longer periods of tim e.

(3) Pr epar ati on of suppl i es . Normally, supplies are speciallypackaged for aerial delivery. Packaging is initially

accomplished under the supervision of the parachute-rigging platoon assisted by uncommitted detachments. Assoon as possible, QM aerial supply units assumeresponsibility for packaging, taking advantage of depotcapabilities. Civilian labor may be employed in thisoperation. Packaging may expand to a sizeable operationand is accomplished in an area near the SFOB or adjacentto the departure installation. When air superiority isa chieved a nd regula r supply schedules for bulk supplies a re

established, the emphasis shifts from small, man-portablebundles to large packages which are heavy-dropped or air-landed. When the packaging capability exists in CommZdepots, the SFOB does not require an extensive packagingactivi ty.

(4) Coordinat ion . A liaison section attached to logisticalsupport element coordinates with theater logisticalagencies. This section, composed of CommZ and otherservices' logistical representatives, expedites logisticalma t ters for the SF OB.

(5) Support of oth er un convent i onal war far e un i ts and attachedsuppor t i ng un i t s . The SFOB supports addit ional units andelements designated in plans. This may include technicalservice and support elements at the base plus otherunconventiona l wa rfa re units such a s th e J U WTF.

(6) Shipment of supplies to the delivery agency . This isnormally the responsibility of the SFOB. Because of the

packaging required, it usually is not feasible to shipsupplies directly fr om depots t o depar tur e insta llat ions. If apackaging facility is located at the departure point, thensupplies may be delivered direct from depot to departureinstallation by CommZ. If packaging can be accomplishedat the depots, the flow of supplies to the departureinsta l la t ion bypasses the SFOB .



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46

CHAPTER 5THEATER SUPPORT

Section I. LOGISTICS

33. Generala. Su ppor t Aspects . Within a theater of operations one or more

special forces groups may be available to support the theatercommander's mission. Aside from the organization precepts whichwere set forth in chapters 3 and 4, there are certain support aspectswhich are discussed from the point of view of the theater and SFOBplanners. These support concepts are discussed under the generalheadings of logistics, intelligence, communications, and initialcontact.

b. Logistics . One of the primary means used by an outside powerto assist a guerrilla movement is logistical support. While guerrillaforces are expected to be able to provide a major portion of theirlogistical requirements from local sources, certain specializedequipment must be obtained from the sponsor. Numerous problems

may be encountered in providing adequate support to guerrilla unitswhich usually are located great distances from friendly supportinstallations. The physical problems of transporting and deliveringundetected, relatively large quantities of supplies increase inproportion to the distance into enemy-dominated territory. However,guerri l la logist ical requirements are smaller in quanti ty and lesscomplex t ha n th ose found in a convent iona l force of compa ra ble size.This tend s to offset some of the disad va nt a ges.

34. JUWTFThe J U WTF is responsible to the t hea ter comma nder for t he

conduct of unconventional warfare, but each component service isresponsible for the logistical support of its own forces assigned toJ U WTF. The J U WTF prepa res, or a ssists in prepa ring, t heunconvent ional warfare annex to theater war p lans , and plans andcoordinates all logistical support for unconventional warfareoperations in the theater. Service component commanders under theJ U WTF a re designat ed but a re not in th e cha in of comma nd unt i l the

J U WTF becomes opera tiona l. For th is reason, J U WTF h a s to w orkdirectly with the logistical headquarters of each theater servicecomponent a nd insure t he support of Arm y, Na vy, or Air F orce unitsth a t m a y be a tt a ched t o J U WTF. The specia l forces groupcommanding officer, as commander of the SFOB, is usually the Army



47

component comma nder. J U WTF h eadqua rters provides th eat er a rmycommunications zone (CommZ) with logistical estimates for supportof the SFOB, the committed special forces detachments and theguerrilla forces to be generated. This type of planning entails amyriad of detail and is made more complex by the many different

requirements resulting from the varied geographic locations ofguerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l area s a nd t he vary ing sizes of potentia lguerrilla forces.

35. J4Sin ce J U WTF ha s no subordina te head qua rt ers, tr oops, or

logistica l support ca pability unt il opera tions sta rt , the J U WTF J 4usually does not supervise the physical functions of logistical support,but he is the primary staff planner and coordinator who insure that

adequate means are provided. The recommendations and requests ofJ U WTF a re incorpora ted into th eater h eadqua rters ' pla ns ordirectives. This starts the physical process of providing the neededlogist ica l support .

36. Theater ArmyThe commander of the theater army CommZ is responsible for

providing a dminist ra tive a nd logistica l support to specia l forces unit slocated in the theater and to other theater unconventional warfare

forces as directed. The actual mechanics of procurement, receipt,storage, maintenance, distribution of supplies and equipment, andth e providing of services an d fa cilities th a t a re needed t o support th eArmy portion of unconventional warfare operations, differ little, ifany, from the mechanics of conventional unit logistical support. Anynecessary deviat ions are determined by direct planning andcoordina tion betw een C omm Z an d J U WTF or th e specia l forces group.

37. Special Forces Groupa. The special forces group or groups assigned to a theater are

responsible for planning logistical support for the commitment ofopera tiona l detachments a nd for a ssist ing J U WTF in plan ning for t heesta blishment of the S FOB . Before its a t t a chment t o J U WTF, thegroup is responsible for recomm ending t ha t specia l a nd n on-sta nda rdsupplies a nd equipment be included in un convent iona l wa rfa re plan s.

b. The closest possible lia ison betw een J U WTF a nd specia l forcesgroup is man da tory in th e follow ing a reas:

(1) Opera tiona l requ irement s for:(a) Qua nt ities of supplies a nd equipment .

(b) Medica l support .

(c) U nits a nd fa cili t ies for S FOB .



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(2) S ubmission of cross-servicing r equir ement s to J U WTF.

(3) Coordination of plans for delivery of the supplies andequipment into opera tiona l a reas.

38. Logistical Doctrine and Policies

a. General . The application of logistical operations in support ofunconventional warfare differs from that normally considered insupport of, other t hea ter forces.

b. Application .

(1) The five opera t ions of logist ics a re —

(a) Transportation.

(b) Eva cua tion a nd hospita l izat ion.

(c) Supply.

(d) Service.

(e) Management .

(f) Their special application to the unconventional warfaresitua tion is described in the follow ing para gra phs.

39. TransportationU nconventiona l w a rfa re opera tions can be supported by land, sea

or air t ransportat ion means. As a practical matter, however, themajority of operations and situations require support by air. Becauseof the depth of penetration, the cargo weight to be carried and thespeed with which the operation is to be executed, the Air Force hasthe greatest capabil i ty for this support . In certain si tuations, theNavy may possess a more appropriate capabil i ty for a part icularoperation, especially with carrier-based aircraft. This capability isutilized by the theater commander allocating the needed naval forcesto provide support requested. Successful sorties with special forcesdetachments or cargoes require night flights of long-range and at lowaltitudes (50-400 feet) in order to escape electronic detection.Training of aircrews in low-level flying and navigation techniquesjoint ly w ith special forces units is ma nda tory.

40. EvacuationEva cua tion for medica l a t t ention or other reasons from a guerril la

warfare operational area is considered only for key personnel. Evenfor this limited number the difficulties involved make such planningtenuous. The ability of the theater to provide transportation and thecapability of guerrillas to temporarily secure evacuation sites are thegoverning fa ctors.

41. Supply



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a. D eter m i nat i on of Requi r em ent s . Proper preparation forunconventional warfare operations places a responsibility on allheadquarters from special forces group level up. Initiative tocommence logistical planning must be exercised at every level. A freeflow of recommendations and planning guidance between all

interested commands and agencies must take place. The process ofdetermining requirements w ill begin w hen t w o fundam enta l decisionsa re m a de by t hea ter: (1) The designa tion of geogra phica l loca tions ofguerrilla warfare operational areas, and (2) the size of the guerrillaforce to be sponsored. Detailed requirements are based on theoperational war plans, current logist ical planning factors andmiscellaneous factors such as cultural, seasonal and climaticcondit ions, and logist ical support that may exist within guerri l law a rfa re opera tiona l ar eas. The special forces deta chm ent comm a nder,

group sta ff officers, a nd J U WTF st a ff officers in. part icula r m ust bealert to determine those items of standard or, non-standard suppliesor equipment needed to support operational missions. Oncerequirements have been determined and priorities established,requests a re processed in the norma l ma nner t hrough a rmy logist ica lchannels. Local purchase procedures can hasten the procurement ofnon-standard or substitute items. The determination of requirementsand their inclusion in appropriate war plans is a major step towardinsuring a dequa te logistica l support .

b. Stockpiling .(1) Stockpiling is the accumulation of mobilization reserve

stocks in support of strategic plans and contemplatedspecial forces operations in guerrilla warfare operationalareas. Except in unusual circumstances, items stockpiledfor unconventional warfare use are stored by theater armyfor n eeds expected during th e first sixty d a ys of opera tions.Accessible stockpiles in adequate amounts, content, andconvenient location result from thorough and detailedplanning commencing with the clear determination ofrequirements, inclusion of these requirements in approvedwar plans, and the availabil i ty of funds. The creation ofstockpiles for unconventional warfare operations isaccomplished through the same logistical process as forother army materiel requirements. Limited stockpiling ofobsolete supplies and equipment is considered appropriatefor the support of unconventional warfare. Such items'should receive minimum maintenance with the r isk thatonly a small percentage of the materiel will not beserviceable when needed. ZI stocks of obsolete equipmentshould be kept on the same basis. Parts resupply will bedependent upon stockpiling.



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(2) In genera l, unconventiona l w a rfa re st ockpiles a re n otsegregated, but the i tems are earmarked and stored indepots along with al l other similar i tems for theater army.Definite priorities ar e esta blished by th eat er J 4 for deliveryof materiel. The problems of in-storage maintenance and

inspection, as well as that of determining the best locationfor separate storage sites, make it a better practice to keepunconventional warfare stockpiles in CommZ depots.Logistical plans include the delivery schedule to specificlocations. For exceptions to stockpiling supplies in CommZdepots, see pa ra gra ph e below .

(3) While th e form a tion of such reserves is th e responsibility ofthe theater commander, the content of stockpiles from thestandpoints of quali ty and suitabil i ty must be determined

by personnel in the special forces group. Small stockpilescontaining only the materiel which will accompanydetachments on infiltration, or be included in the initialresupply, are maintained separately and are available foremergency use.

c. Prepackaging . Prepackaging for unconventional warfareoperations means that supplies and equipment destined for bothinitial and subsequent resupply loads are stockpiled in packages forfinal distribution. All of the standard supplies and equipmentdelivered to the operational area are packaged in one-man-portableloa ds of fifty pounds. E a ch pa cka ge should cont a in ba lan ced items, becomplete kits for immediate use (weapon with ammunition, etc.), besafe from ha za rds of wea ther, ha ndling, a nd deteriora t ion, an d ha ve apackboard or carrying straps. Skillful use of items, such as clothing,for internal packaging material wil l produce savings in weight andbulk. The goal is to have packages ready for delivery. As a practicalmatter, however, the greater the t ime between packaging and actualuse, the more uncertain it is that the contents will be serviceablew hen opened.

d . Pr eem er gen cy Cach es . The placement, timing, and location ofpreemergency caches of essential supplies to support projectedoperations are planned by the theater commander based upon therecomm enda tions of the J U WTF. These ca ches a re esta blished w hena particular need exists, adequate security can be, provided, and thepackagin g provides end-use serviceability of a rea sona ble percenta geof the supplies. The many variables, such as time of use, location,security, deterioration, and the initial expense, make theesta blishm ent of each ca che a m a tt er of individua l considera tion.

e. Accom pan yi ng Sup pl y L oad s . Accompa ny ing supply a nd init ia lresupply loads to 'support unconventional warfare operations areplanned on a basis of austerity. The loads consist of items in



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quanti t ies essential for combat operations and detachment survivalfor thirty days. Specific quantities of demolition materials, weapons,ammunition, and medical supplies are determined by special forcesgroup pla nners from a n exa mina tion of th e sta ted mission conta inedin approved war plans. Once the accompanying and initial resupply

equipment has been procured, it is packaged and prepared fordelivery. Such materiel should not be maintained as general stock inexisting CommZ depots, but located in the vicinity of departureinstal lat ions.

f . Accountabil i ty . Formal accountability for supplies andequipment a ccompa nies the ma teriel to the depar tur e inst a llat ion. Allsupplies and equipment leaving the departure installation foropera tiona l use ar e considered to be expend ed. No sa lva ge or recoveryoperations are considered in logistical planning. Although all

commanders concerned are responsible for the security and properuse of th e ma teriel, th e hea viest responsibility rests u pon th e specialforces detachment commanders. SFOB will keep informalaccountability for all materiel in order to report the amounts ofcri t ical i tems, such as weapons, committed to a guerri l la warfareoperational area. Supply and distribution of critical items arecontrolled to assist an orderly post-war transition to peacetimepursuits.

g. Resu ppl y T ech n i ques . To reduce th e impa ct of equipment losseswhich may occur during infi l t rat ion and subsequent operations, theSF OB schedules both a utoma tic resupply a nd emergency resupply.

(1) Automatic resupply. Automatic resupply is scheduled fordelivery shortly after the detachment has been committed.It is prearranged as to time, delivery site, and compositionof loa d. This resupply is delivered a ut oma tically unless thedetachment cancels or modifies the original plan.Automatic resupply is planned to replace lost or damageditems of equipment or to augment the detachment withequipment w hich could not be ca rried in on the infiltra tion.

(2) Emergency resupply. Emergency resupply is scheduled fordelivery after the detachment has been committed andprearranged as to time and composition of load. Thedelivery site is selected and reported by the detachmentafter infiltration. The delivery of emergency resupply iscontingent upon and initiated when communications fromthe operational detachment are interrupted for a

predetermined period of time. The content of emergencyresupply is normally communications and survivalequipment to restore the detachment operationalcapability.



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(3) Fr equen cy r a te of resupply. The nu mber of resupplymissions is limited until i t can be determined that thedetachment will not be compromised by flights over theguerril la w a rfa re operat iona l a rea, a nd/or unti l a irsuperiority can be established at a preselected time and

place. A minimum of one resupply mission per thirty daysper committed detachment is planned during this ini t ialperiod. The frequency of missions increases with the degreeof air superiority established by friendly forces, untilresupply missions a re flow n a s required.

(4) Catalogue supply system (app. II). In order to expediterequests, insure accuracy in identification of types andamounts of supplies and equipment, and to facilitatecommunications transmission security, special forces units

employ a brevity code system for requesting supplies. Thisbrevity code is known as a catalogue supply system ( CSS )and its preparation is the responsibility of the C0, SFOB.The CSS is applicable to all special forces and guerrillaun its. The CS S is us ed for t hr ee cat egories of supplies:

(a) Those critical items of supply essential to combatopera tions, e.g., a rms, a mmun ition, a nd demolitions;

(b) Those critical items of supply essential for individualsurviva l, e.g., ra tions, medicine a nd cloth ing;

(5) In crea sed a mounts of t he critical items cont a ined incategories (a) and (b), but packaged in bulk for use in arapid buildup phase of guerrilla force development.

(a) Supply bundles for categories (a) and (b) are deliveredprima rily dur ing th e init ia l phase of opera tions w herea scategory (c) bundles are delivered when the growingresistance force or tempo of combat requires increaseda mounts of essent ial comba t supplies.

(b) Characteristics of an efficient catalogue supply systemare critical items of supply packed in packages of fiftypounds or less; packages which are man-portable andprotected from handling and weather damage; packagesthe composition of which is such that in storagehandling and maintenance are simple; an identif icat ioncode designed for accuracy in transmission whenencrypted.

42. ServicesTheater army emergency and war plans clearly define the

responsibilities of specific CommZ service and support units inassisting the special forces group to establish the SFOB. These



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designat ed units ma y be at ta ched directly t o the SFOB or be assignedmissions in direct support of the SFOB. Examples of service supporttha t ma y be required by the SFOB a re

a. E ngineer ( inst a llat ion su pport ).

b. Ordnance (3d echelon).

c. Medica l (a bove dispensa ry level).

d . S igna l (3d echelon a nd insta llat ion su pport ).

e. Transportation.

f . Army a viat ion.

g. Coun ter int elligence corps.

h . Milita ry P olice (securit y).

i . Arm y S ecurit y Agency.

j . Civilia n labor.k . QM aerial supplies.

43. ManagementThe fun ctions of logistics ma na gement a re perform ed in genera lly

the same manner a t SFOB as in o ther mi l i tary uni ts . Managementincludes —

a. Supervision of the logistical operation.

b. Logist ica l est ima tes a nd pla ns.c. Administ ra tive an nexes to orders.

d . Logistica l records a nd report s.

e. Coordina tion with t hea ter logistica l agencies.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE

44. Generala. A thorough knowledge of the enemy, terrain and resistance

potentia l , coupled w ith a n int ima te understa nding of the indigenouspopulation within operational areas, is essential to the success ofunconventional warfare operations. Prior to deployment, specialforces operational detachments complete detailed area studies andreceive comprehensive intelligence briefings at the SFOB. Afterdeployment, the detachment continues to add to its backgroundknowledge by a thorough and continuing assessment of the area,

using intelligence developed within the area. Thus, armed withintelligence acquired before and after infiltration, the detachment isbetter able to weld elements of the area command into a coordinateda nd effective force ca pable of support ing t hea ter m ilita ry opera tions.



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b. Paragraphs 45 and 46 provide commanders with anunderstanding of the special forces intelligence requirements forunconventional warfare operations in general and guerri l la warfarein par t icular.

c. Details of procedures and techniques related to combat

intelligence which are contained in the 30-series and basic branchma nua ls a re omitted from this ma nua l .

45. Requirementsa. General .

(1) Intelligence requirements at all command levels concernedwith the conduct of unconventional warfare operationsencompass the entire spectrum of intelligence. Prior toopera tions, th e J U WTF a nd th e specia l forces group bothdepend on st ra tegic int elligence. As opera tions a re initia tedand special forces detachments are deployed into enemyoccupied territory, combat intelligence supplementsstrategic intelligence. Although the area command is moreoften the user of combat intelligence, the SFOB and theJ U WTF both u se comba t in telligence a pplica ble t o th eirlevel.

(2) In order to improve the chances for success in combat

opera tions, the specia l forces deta chment r equires a gr eat erdegree of preparation in predeployment intelligence thanarmy units of battle group or comparable size. It isdesirable for the detachment to acquire this intelligencebackground well in advance of operations by intensive areastud y of predesigna ted r egions of th e world.

(3) Coordina tion for int elligence a nd coun ter int elligencea ctivities in su pport of projected s pecia l forces opera tions isaccomplished in peacetime by the theater army commander

in accordance with joint unconventional warfare plans.During hostilities coordination for intelligence andcounterintelligence activities in support of guerrilla forcesis a ccomplished t hr ough th e J U WTF.

b. Pr e-In fi l tr at i on Requi r em ent s.

(1) Operational detachments . Special forces detachmentsrequire a thorough background knowledge of theiroperational area prior to deployment. This backgroundknowledge, accomplished through the medium of ariastud ies, is divided into tw o pha ses

(a) Gener al ar ea stu dy . This is the broad backgroundknowledge of an area, region or country. See appendixIII for a type genera l area st udy forma t.



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(b) Oper ati onal Ar ea I nt el l i gence . This is the detailedintelligence of a designated guerilla warfare operationalarea including that information necessary for thedeta chment t o

1. Infi l t ra te the opera tiona l a rea.

2. Conta ct resista nce elements.3. In itia te opera tions. S ee appendix III for a n

opera tiona l area in telligence forma t.

(2) Special forces group . The special forces group requirescurrent intelligence of its assigned guerrilla warfareoperational areas in order to conduct preemergencyplanning for the employment of the operationaldetachments. Although area studies are prepared and

provided by special research agencies, the detachmentstudies are reorganized into a more appropriate format foroperational use. The S2 section procures the necessaryintelligence document s from wh ich deta chment a rea st udiesare prepared. Coordination through prescribed channels iseffected with all appropriate theater intelligence agenciesfor. the continuous procurement of timely area andoperational intelligence. Several methods of area studyprepa ra tion ar e feasible.

(a) The deta chments prepa re the genera l ar ea study a nd a smuch of the operational area intelligence as iscompatible with security. From the point of view ofdetachment knowledge, this method is the mostadvantageous. Disadvantages are t ime, securi ty, andlack of sta bility in personn el a ssignment s.

(b) The group S2 section prepares the general area studya nd opera tiona l area in telligence.

(c) Area specialist teams (ASTs) prepare the general areastudy a nd opera tiona l a rea intell igence.

(d) Various combinations of the above methods. The S2section constantly revises area studies based upon thelatest intel l igence. In part icular, the S2 maintainsopera tiona l a rea intell igence a s a ccura tely a nd currentlya s possible.

(3) J oi nt u nconvent i onal w ar far e task for ce .

(a) The J U WTF requ ires area studies of th e ent ire thea terarea of operations. Material for these area studies isprovided by the theater commander. This intelligenceprovides th e J U WTF comma nder w ith a ba sis forrecommendations as to the selection of guerrilla warfare



56

operational areas that best support theater war plans.Once these areas have been approved by the theatercomma nder, the J U WTF a ssigns certa in a reas, basedupon priorities, to t he specia l forces group.

(b) The J U WTF coordina tes pr ocur ement of intelligence

material needed by the special forces group toa ccomplish its opera tion missions. I t r equests from othertheater component forces intelligence material andinsures th a t r equirements of th e special forces group ar esatisfied.

c. Post-I nfi l tr at i on Requi r em ent s .

(1) Speci al for ces oper at i onal base .

(a) The SFOB is primarily concerned with intelligence

which — 1. Su pports th e expa nsion of opera tions with in active

or potential operational areas.

2. Aids in determining current political trends inopera tiona l a reas.

3. Aids in determining major enemy activities whichinfluence operations within the area concerned andin oth er port ions of the th eat er.

4. Aids in determining weather conditions in or enroute to th e a rea w hich affects externa l support .

5. Su pport s guerrilla w a rfa re a rea psychologica lw a rfa re opera tions.

6. Aids in determining enemy ca pabilities w hichcould interfere wit h t he opera tions of the S FOB .

7. S upport cover a nd deception.

(b) The SFOB has a requirement for combat intelligence,

which i t reinterprets and reevaluates in l ight ofprojected th eat er opera tions.

(c) After deployment of special forces detachments intooperational areas, the SFOB becomes an intelligenceinformation collection agency available to all servicesa nd a gencies within t he theat er.

(d) The SFOB furnishes intelligence to committeddetachments as required. Much of this intelligence isprovided from other th eat er forces.

(2) J oi nt u nconvent i onal war far e task force .

(a) In telligence requirements of the J U WTF st em fromplanning and coordinating unconventional warfareactivities within the theater. Such requirements closely



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resemble th ose of th e thea ter comm a nder by being broa din scope an d h a ving long-ra nge a pplica tion.

(b) Much of the int elligence used by t he J U WTF is providedby other forces of th e thea ter. J U WTF, th rough itssubordinate units, is a major collection agency of

strategic intelligence for the theater. It coordinatesclosely with the theater intelligence division andappropriate intelligence agencies of other servicecomponents for an integrated collection effort withinenemy rear a reas.

46. Intelligence Activities Within Guerrilla Warfare OperationalArea

The deployed special forces detachment is ideally situated to

contribute to the theater intelligence plan. Utilizing indigenousa gencies a nd sources subordina te to the a rea comma nd, i t can gat hera nd rela y t o the SFOE intell igence informa tion of value to the thea terand component force commanders. However, certain practicallimitations exist as to the volume of transmission from withinguerri l la warfare operational areas to higher headquarters. Thesecurity of the special forces detachment and the resistance effortrestricts radio traffic and consequently the amount of intelligenceinformation which can be expected. Higher commanders prescribe

th ose elements of informa tion r equired of special forces deta chm entsand provide the necessary code systems to reduce the length ofintelligence reports transmitted by radio. EEI assigned to specialforces deta chm ents a re kept to the minimum .

Section III. COMMUNICATIONS

47. General

The communications system established for the support ofunconventional warfare within a theater is designed to provide thethea ter comma nder w ith m eans to contr ol w idesprea d un conventiona lwarfare forces located in denied areas. The system must also supportthe activities of the base elements of unconventional warfare unitslocat ed in friendly t errit ory. The J U WTF is responsible for pla nn inga nd coordina ting t he thea ter unconventiona l wa rfa re commun ica tionssystem. The special forces communications system, with its hublocated at the SFOB, provides communications for special forces

elements of the thea ter unconvent iona l w a rfa re effort .

48. Type Systemsa. SF OB : Theat er System.



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(1) The purpose of this system is to provide communicationsbetw een th e SF OB a nd other th eater a gencies, and betweenelements of the SFOB. Since the base is located in friendlyterritory, this communication system is comparable to thecommunication system of any conventional headquarters. A

telephone, an d teletype switchboar d is provided at th e ba se.This switchboard is connected to the area signal center andthrough the facil i t ies of area signal system to al l othertheater and army headquarters. The special forces grouphas the facilities to terminate these communication linesw ith both telephone or t eletype, either plain or encrypted.

(2) For both technica l a nd opera tiona l rea sons, t he r a diotransmitter and receiver si tes serving the base may belocated at considerable distances from the base proper.

Communications are provided between the operationscenter and the radio transmitters and receivers. Thefa cilities of the a rea sign a l system ma y be used for th is.

(3) Telephone service w ith in t he ba se proper is provided by th ecommunications platoon of headquarters company, specialforces group, but t he plat oon ha s neither t he personnel norfacilities to provide long distance wire communications. Thelong-line wire communications are provided by the areasigna l cent er. The comm unicat ions pla toon does h a ve ra dioand radio-teletype equipment to backup the long-line wirecomm unicat ions provided by th e area signa l system.

b. B ase Comm an d System . This sy stem furnishes commu nicat ionbetween the base and a detachment in an operational area. This isthe communications system through which the commandercoordinates and controls the guerrilla effort. It is, normally, the onlylink between a committed detachment and a regular mil i tary force.Sin ce th e commit ted det a chment s ma y be up to 2,500 miles from th ebase, this system must depend on radio. The radio at the SFOB canbe as elaborate and as powerful as necessary. The committeddetachments, however, have rigid restrictions on the size and weightof their radios. Because of this, and because of the extendeddista nces, successful comm unicat ions r equire more deta iled pla nnin gand a higher standard of operator training than is usually the case.Since the detachment is located within a denied area, greaterempha sis tha n norma l is placed on commu nicat ions security .

c. Ar ea I nt er na l System . This system provides the area

commander with communications to subordinate elements when(1) asingle special forces detachment is located in a guerrilla warfareoperational area, and (2) the special forces detachment involved is asector command subordinate to an area command. Communicationsin this system will initially depend on nontechnical techniques with



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electronic means used only in an emergency: As the area becomesmore secure, the use of electronic means of communicating may beincreased.

d. Ar ea Com m and System . This system is established betweenthe a rea comma nd a nd subordina te sector comma nds. When the a rea

and sector commands are separated so as to make the use of non-technical techniques impractical, radio is used. This system can beorga nized in a ny of th e follow ing w a ys:

(1) The sector command communicates only with the areacomma nd. The a rea comma nd t hen communicates w ith t heba se (1, fig. 16). E mergency comm unicat ion w ith th e ba se isstill ava ilable to th e sector comma nd.

(2) The a rea a nd sector comm a nd s ha ve n o directcommunications between them. Both transmit to the base.The base relays to the field all information necessary toeffect coord ina t ion (2, fig. 16).

(3) The a rea a nd sector comm a nds ha ve a directcommunications link on operational matters. The area andsector command both communicate directly with the baseon a dministr a tive ma tt ers (3, fig. 16).

e. Air-Ground System . The primary means of communicationbetw een a n operat iona l deta chment a nd support ing a ircra ft is visual .

Usually i t is by means of a prearranged system of marking the DZ.This visual system may be supplemented, however, by electronica nd /or other mea ns.

f. Special-Purpose Systems . A special-purpose system is anysystem of communications established to satisfy a particular need fora definite period of time. An example of this might be the radio netestablished between a committed detachment and a fr iendly tact icalunit prior to junctur e.

49. Means Availablea. Within the theater of operations the communication means

a va ilable to specia l forces a re those a va ilable to oth er milita ry un its.

b. Between the SFOB and committed operational detachmentsthe primary means is the ra dio. Other means a vailable might includemessengers, air drop of messages or a combination of messengers,and communications facilities locally available to the area ofoperations.

50. Factors Affecting CommunicationsThe communications systems established to satisfy special forces

requirement s m ust be flexible. Special forces r equirements ca n neverbe sat isfied by a rigidly fixed system. As th e opera tiona l deta chm ents



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are committed and as these detachments progress in their activities,the extent and type of communications necessarily will change.Fa ctors w hich must be considered a re

a. The na tur e an d extent of the resista nce movement .

b. Orga nizat ion of the guerri lla units .

c. The locat ion of the guerr illa un its.

d . Special forces organization of the guerrilla warfare operationalarea .

e. The need for comm unica tion security .

f . Seconda ry missions of t he special forces deta chm ent.

51. Communication Securitya. Commanders must learn and accept a concept of

communications based on securi ty and dependabil i ty, rather thanspeed and ease of communication. A detachment normally operatesunder a maximum-security type SOL This SOI does not provide forfull-time two-way communications between the detachments and theFOB. The SOI provides for periodic, scheduled contacts and blindtransmission broadcasts (BTBs) from the SFOB to detachments, andemergency contacts with the SFOB at any t ime. The enemy can beexpected to make every effort to intercept and analyze detachmentcommunications. The detachment must spend a minimum time onth e a ir. The S OI is designed to confuse enemy int ercept opera tors a ndma ke his intercept t a sk a s difficult a s possible.

52. Radio Operator TrainingThe problems fa ced by t he ra dio opera tor a ssigned t o specia l forces

are somewhat different than those faced by most mil i tary radioopera tors. A committ ed deta chment m ust send m essages from enemy-occupied territory. These messages travel long distances with only

low-powered equipment available to the detachment. If successfulcommunications are to be established and maintained, the radioopera tor must be well tr a ined. For a soldier w ith n o previous tr a iningas a radio operator, this training requires a long period of formalschooling. Ra dio opera tors sh ould h a ve th e follow ing ca pabilities:

a. A thorough knowledge of radio-telegraph procedures and themore comm only u sed opera ting signa ls.

b. A thorough knowledge of the operating procedures peculiar tospecial forces operations. Furthermore, he must understand how toprepa re a specia l forces SOI a nd h ow th is SOI differs from others.

c. Be capable of sending Morse Code at eighteen words perminute and receiving at twenty words per minute, using specialforces opera tin g procedur es.



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d . Understand the principles of cryptography and be capable ofdevising a relatively secure system for guerrilla use. He must beproficient in the use of the primary and alternate cryptographicsyst ems used by specia l forces.

e. Ha ve a ba sic understa nding of the theory of ra dio tra nsmitters

and receivers and be capable of making organizational maintenancety pe repairs.

f . U ndersta nd t he principles of ra dio tra nsmission in the HI P a ndUH F band .

g. Understand the construction and principles of operation offield ra dio a ntenna s.

h . Understand the need for communication securi ty. Know theprinciples of radio direction-finding traffic analysis and crypto

analysis .i . Have a sufficient understanding of other means of

communication to be able to advise the detachment commander inth eir employment .

Section IV. INITIAL CONTACT

53. Contact Prior to Infiltrationa. Prior to infi l t rat ion, contact should be made with the

resistance movement. It consists of the first contacts between thesponsoring power and the resistance forces. Initial contact may takeplace at any point in the development of the resistance force.However, to be most effective, infiltration should take place as soonas possible after the guerrilla nucleus is formed in order that specialforces personn el might exert a n ear ly influence over t he developmentof the orga niza tion.

b. The major purpose of initial contact is to arrange for

infiltration of special forces detachments and for cooperation of theresistance forces with the sponsor. It permits arrangements to bema de for such th ings a s ma rking drop zones or coast a l la nding sites.

54. Contact Coincident with InfiltrationWhen no contact can be made in advance of infiltration but where

there is evidence of guerrilla activity in an area, it may be necessaryto send a detachment in "blind." In such cases, there is no receptionparty on the drop zone and the detachment may have only the most

general idea of where to find the guerrillas. This method is the leastdesirable an d is only used w here no other a lterna tive exists.



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PART THREE

OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 6INFILTRATION

55. Generala. The active role of special forces in the development of a

guerri l la organization begins with infi l t rat ion. Infi l t rat ion is theentrance of personnel and supplies into a denied area makingmaximum use of deception to avoid detection. During this stage,special forces detachments leave the SFOB and are transported ormoved into the guerri l la warfare operational area. Infi l t rat ion is notcomplete until the special forces detachment establishescommunications with the SFOB from within the guerri l la warfareopera tiona l ar ea.

b. The four mea ns of infiltra tion for specia l forces a re — (1) Air.

(2) Water.

(3) Land.

(4) Stay-behind.

In filtr a tion opera tions ma y include combina tions of these mean s.

56. Aira. Air is usually the most practical and rapid means of

infi l t rat ion. Personnel and supplies can be air l i f ted to vir tually anypla ce in th e world.

b. The air force has the primary responsibility for providing airdelivery. In most cases standard troop carrier aircraft are used.Assault type aircraft , as well as amphibious types normallya ssociat ed w ith a ir-sea rescue opera tions, ma y be a vailable an d ha vethe capability of using relatively short, unprepared airstrips. Under

certa in circumsta nces, long-ra nge bomber a ircra ft is used.c. The army can provide both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft;

however, their opera ting ra nges as w ell as loa d ca pacities a re limited.



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c. D i sad van ta ges of Wat er .

(1) Tra nsshipment a nd offshore un loa ding a re fr equentlyrequired.

(2) P ossibility of th e loss of personnel a nd supplies during shipto shore movement.

(3) Movement of supplies from la nd ing site to fina l dest ina tionis subject t o limita tions of la nd infiltra tion.

(4) Additional packaging precautions are required to protectequipment from salt w a ter corrosion.

(5) S pecia l tr a ining is necessar y.

(6) Vulnera bility to enemy shore defenses during lan dingoperations.

58. Landa. General . Land is generally the least desirable means of

infiltration and is usually limited to short movements by individualsor small detachments. Land infiltration is best accomplished underconditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain. Land infiltrationhas its greatest chance of success when the enemy's lines are over-extended, the combat zone fluid, or portions of his country's bordersa re inadequa tely secured. On the other ha nd, a w ell orga nized, s ta blea nd closely-knit defense in depth ma y prohibit la nd infiltra tion.

b. Ad van tages of L and .

(1) Requ ires minim um of inter-service support.

(2) P rovides a n opport unity for concurrent ga th ering ofintelligence informa tion.

(3) P rovides the a bility t o cha nge routes frequent ly, consistentw ith t he loca l s i tuat ion.

c. D i sadv ant ages of L an d .

(1) Slown ess w ith w hich infiltra tion is a ccomplished.(2) Long exposure t o enemy a nd grea ter , probability of

capture.

(3) Limita tion on a mount of supplies a nd equipment tha t ca nbe carried.

59. Stay-Behinda. General . Stay-behind infiltration involves pre-positioning

special forces operational detachments within their proposedoperational areas and remaining hidden while the enemy advancesth rough a nd/or occupies t hese a rea s. S ta y-behind opera tions ma y beconsidered w hen th e enemy h a s th e ca pability of overrunn ing friendly



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areas and the attitude of the civil populace will support suchoperations.

b. Ad van tages of Stay-B ehi nd Oper ati ons .

(1) No infiltr a tion support required.

(2) Ma ximum securit y is obta ined.

(3) Civilia n conta cts ar e a lready esta blished.

(4) C a ches of supplies a nd equ ipment a re pre-placed.

(5) P ersonnel are familia r w ith opera tiona l area .

c. D i sad van tages of Stay-B ehi nd Oper ati ons .

(1) P roximity to enemy comba t tr oops during th eir initia loccupat ion of the opera tiona l ar ea.

(2) Freedom of movement and communications are initially

restricted.

60. Factors Influencing Choice of Meansa. M i ssi on . The mission is the first consideration in the selection

of infiltration means. A requirement for immediate interdiction willempha size the need for speed. On t he oth er ha nd, if a slow er, builduptype mission is ordered, a more deliberate means of infiltration maybe accepta ble.

b. E nem y Sit uat i on . The enemy situation affects the means usedfor infiltration. For example, a heavily-guarded border may nullifyland infiltration. Similarly, a strongly-defended and patrolledcoast line ma y elimina te w a ter a s a possible choice.

c. Weather . Adverse weather conditions seriously affect air andcertain phases of water operations. Conversely, bad weather mayfavor land infil t ra t ion.

d. Topography . Land formations must be considered in decidingon the means of infi l t rat ion to be used. Land infi l t rat ion wil l have a

better chance for success if the chosen routes pass throughmounta inous or heavily-forested a rea s; on t he oth er ha nd, th ese sa memountains could force aircraft to fly at higher altitudes resulting ingrea ter exposure t o enemy detection a nd a ir-defense syst ems.

e. Hydrography . Hydrographic factors — t ide data, depth ofoffshore wa ter, a nd t he loca tion of reefs a nd sa ndba rs — influence theselection of wa ter a s a mea ns of infiltr a tion.

f. Personnel . The number of personnel to infiltrate may be alimiting factor. The type training possessed by special forcespersonnel is a further consideration. In addition, if other individualsare to accompany the operational detachment, special training r-forth ese personnel ma y be necessar y prior t o infiltra tion.



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g. Distance . The distance to be covered during infiltration may,elimina te considera tion of certa in mean s ava ilable.

h . Equipm ent Ava i lab le . The operational capabilities of air andwater craft available for infi l t rat ion and the amount and types ofspecial equipment —waterproofing kits, aerial delivery containers,

etc. —are major factors to be considered. Limited availability in typesof air or water craft wil l l imit the number of personnel that can beinfi l t rated.



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CHAPTER 7ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA

COMMAND

Section 1. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

61. GeneralThe organization of a guerrilla warfare operational area involves

initial organization of the area and buildup of the resistance forces.Ini t ia l organiza tion includes esta blishing the required comma nd a nd

administrat ive structure, taking necessary securi ty precautions andtr a ining a nucleus of guerrilla personnel. Buildup is th e expan sion ofth e origina l nucleus into an opera tiona l unit capa ble of a ccomplishingthe assigned mission. Special forces detachments may infiltrate theopera tiona l a rea either before or a fter -ini t ial organiza tion h a s ta kenplace.

62. Areas of Responsibilitya. Guer r i l la Warfar e Oper at i onal Area .

(1) Designation . The plans for organization are started whenthe theater commander designates certain areas withindenied terr i tory a s guerri lla w a rfar e opera tiona l a reas. Theguerri l la warfare operational area is the name given to ageographic area in which the army, through Special Forces,is responsible for t he conduct of guerrilla w a rfa re a nd otherunconventiona l w a rfa re a ct ivi t ies.

(2) I n f i l t r a t i on . Any type of detachment A, B, or C may be

infiltrated first. Initially, one detachment is givenresponsibility for the entire guerrilla warfare operationalarea .

b. Guer r i l l a War far e Oper ati onal Sector . With th e development ofthe area and an increase in detachments, subdivision into sectors isnecessary. The sector has the same characteristics as an operationalarea but remains a subdivision of the area. An operationaldeta chment becomes responsible for ea ch sector.

63. Organization and Buildupa. Or gani zati ona l Objecti ves . . After infiltration, the major task is

to develop resistance elements into an effective force. To facilitateth is development, severa l ta sks must be performed including:



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(1) E sta blishm ent of a w orking comma nd relat ionsh ip betw eenthe various resistance elements and Special Forcespersonnel.

(2) E st a blishmen t of security , in telligence collection a ndcommunicat ions sy stems.

(3) Orga niza tion of a logistica l system.(4) P rovision for other ad min istr a t ive services.

(5) E sta blishm ent of a tra ining progra m.

(6) P lan ning a nd execution of ta ctica l opera tionscommensura te w ith t he sta te of tra ining of guerri l la units .

(7) Expansion of forces so they are able to support theaterobjectives.

(8) Civilia n support .

b. Ar ea Assessm en t . The Special Forces detachment commandercommences a n a rea a ssessment immedia tely on rea ching his a rea. Inverifying information acquired through previous area study andbriefings, he revises his plans as necessary to reflect the localsitua tion. The a rea a ssessment serves a s th e comm a nder's estima te ofthe si tuation and is the basis for plans to carry out his mission. I tconsiders all the major factors involved, including the enemysituation and security measures, the political background of theresistance movement, and the attitude of the civilian population.There are no rigid formulae for making area assessments; eachcommander has to decide for himself what should be included andw ha t conclusions m a y be dra w n from t he informa tion he collects. Theassessment is shaped by many variables including the detachment 'smission, the commander's personality, and the thoroughness of thepre-infiltration study. For some detailed considerations of an areaa ssessment, see a ppendix I V.

64. Command and Controla. Or gani zati on and Cont r ol .

(1) The Special Forces detachment's primary concern is thedevelopment and control of the guerrilla forces in an area.Because the guerrilla unit is only one part of the forcesgenerated by a resistance movement and, since the missionof Special Forces includes conduct of other unconventionalwarfare activities, other resistance forces —auxi l iary andunderground —must be considered. However, theorganization and control of a guerrilla force are theessential matters for Special Forces. The other aspects of



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the total resistance movement are brought in only as theybear upon th e S pecia l Forces m ission.

(2) In its early stages, a guerrilla movement often is highlyunorganized. Generally, the people who become guerrillashave suffered a reduction of their living standards. The

main concern is grouping together for food, shelter, andmutual protection. Oftentimes several groups beginindependent operations with very little concern forcoordination among them. Special forces may find thatguerril la s a re not coopera ting a nd ma y even be working a tcross purposes. The Special Forces detachment must obtaincontrol of the guerrilla groups and coordinate their actionsto insure tha t m issions a ssigned by the thea ter comma nderare accomplished. The degree of control varies in different

parts of the world and with the specific personalitiesinvolved. As the scope of operations increases, closercoordina tion betw een guerrilla u nits is requ ired.

b. Pr obl em s of Cont r ol .

(1) Alth ough t he milit a ry a dva nt a ges of close coopera tionbetween guerrilla units are obvious, a Special Forcescommander may find that guerri l las resist his efforts tounify them. This opposition may be based on personal

a nt a gonisms or politica l or eth nic differences.(2) A means available to the Special Forces commander to

persuade guerrillas to form a united force is control ofsupplies. A detachment commander can use the sponsorprovided supplies as a lever in convincing guerrillas tocooperate. The commander should not openly threaten touse this power, except as a last resort; but, since theguerrilla commanders are aware of its existence, it can

reinforce his suggestions for un ity.(3) In his conferences w ith th e resista nce leadership, a

deta chm ent comm a nder is car eful not to become involved intheir political differences. There is no surer way to lose therespect and cooperation of the guerrillas than to take sidesin their interna l disputes.

(4) Once guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages ofclose cooperation, the Special Forces commander mustdecide on a command structure. While he must adapt tolocal conditions, there are certain factors which heconsiders in any situation. He must have sufficient controlover the guerri l las to insure that they carry out assignedmissions. At the same time, the nature of guerrilla



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operations requires that individual units be given a largemea sure of freedom in ca rry ing out t heir missions.

(5) P erha ps t he m ost delica te par t of a deta chmentcomma nder's job is insur ing t ha t competent leaders occupycomma nd positions. I f lea ders of the origina l groups a re not

capable of filling the positions they hold, the detachmentcommander should arrange for their removal withoutcrea ting dissension w hich could enda nger t he success of hismission.

65. Area Commanda. General . The area command is the formal organization

integrating the Special Forces detachment(s) and the resistanceforces within a guerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l area . I t is esta blished a s

soon as the development process requires such a step. There can beno rigid pattern for the organization of an area command. I t mustcarry out the basic functions for which it is responsible, tailored instrength and composition to fit the situation and mission. When aguerrilla warfare operational area is subdivided, the subdivisions arecalled sector commands.

b. Composition . The area command basically is composed of acommand group and three types of resistance forces-guerrillas,a uxil ia ries, a nd underground.

(1) Comm and group . The command group is made up of theSpecial Forces detachment, the local resistance leader andrepresentatives from the resistance forces in the area. Itorganizes a staff as necessary. Normally, the commandgroup is loca ted w ith th e guerrilla force. It is loca ted w hereit can best control the resistance movement. See FM 31-21A.

(2) Resi stan ce F or ces . The three organizational divisions of anarea command are the guerri l la force, auxil iary andunderground. All three types may not be established in aguerrilla w a rfa re opera tiona l ar ea. The guerrilla force is theelement w ith w hich Special Forces ha s prima ry concern .

c. Concept .

(1) General . Special forces detachments may infi l t rate aguerri l la warfare operational area in different sequence to

establish an area command. The order and composition ofdetachment infiltration depend upon many factors, some ofthe more important of which are —characteristics of theresistance movement, capabilities of Special Forces andneeds of the theater commander. Listed below are some of



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the patterns that might be followed in establishing typea rea comma nds.

(2) I n i t i a l i n f i l t r a t i on .

(a) One deta ch m en t . One detachment-A, B, or C-may beinfi l t rated when the si tuation is not well known, theguerrilla movement is not extensive, or the guerrillaforce is so well organized that minimum coordination isneeded.

(b) M ul ti pl e detachm ent s . Another possible solution is fortw o or more deta chments t o infiltra te concurrent ly, ea chsetting up a separate sector command. This solution isadopted when topography, the enemy si tuation orproblems peculiar to the resistance movement, prohibitthe ini t ial establishment of an effective area command(fig . 17).

(3) Subsequent i nfi l tr at i on .

(a) E xpansion fr om one detachm ent . After a n a rea comma ndhas been established, other detachments can beinfi l t rated to set up sector commands within the area(fig. 18). Eit her a B or C deta chment is infiltr a ted or theinit ial A detachment is redesignated a B detachment.With a B or C detachment ini t ial ly in the area, Adetachments may be infi l t rated to establish the sectorcommands. Subsequent infiltration of other operationaldetachments takes place with the expansion of theguerrilla forces, increase in operations or for politicalreasons.

(b) E xpansion fr om sever al detachm ent s . After separatecommands have been established, a detachment B or Cmay be infi l t rated to establish an area command for thesa me rea sons a s (a ) a bove (fig. 19).

d. Contr ol Cri ter ia . Because of the nature of operations and thedistances involved, control measures are not as effective within anarea command as they are in a conventional mil i tary organization.Thus, certain criteria are established to increase effective control.

(1) Oper ati on ord er . Sufficient guida nce to subordina te unit s isoutlined in the operation order to cover extended periods oftime. This is especially true when operations precludefrequent and regular contact. Operation orders includelong-term guidance on such matters as psychologicalopera tions, int elligence, ta rget a tt a ck, a ir support , externa l



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74



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logistical support, evasion and escape, and political andmilita ry relat ionships vis-a -vis th e resista nce.

(2) SOP's . Another technique used to maintain control is theuse of Standing Operating Procedures. SOP's standardizerecurring procedures and al low the detachment and SFOBto anticipate prescribed actions when communications havebeen in terr upted.

66. Organization on the Grounda. General . The physical organization of the area, together with

the command structure, is a priority task of the special forcescommander after infi l t rat ion. In some si tuations the organization ofthe area is well established, but in others, organization is lacking or

incomplete. In a ll ca ses, however, some improvement in t he physicaldispositions probably are necessary. Organization is dictated by anumber of requirements and depends more on local conditions thanupon a ny fixed set of rules. Among t he fa ctors considered a re —degreeof guerrilla unit organization; extent of cooperation among resistanceforces, a mount of civilian support , enemy a ctivity , an d topogra phy. Inpractice, the detachment commander can expect to makecompromises in orga niza tion beca use it is difficult to bring t ogether inone a rea a n ideal set of circumsta nces.

b. Guer r i l l a Base (fig. 20). The basic establishment within theguerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l area is the guerri l la base.

(1) Defini t ion . A guerrilla base is a temporary site whereinsta l la t ions, hea dqua rters, a nd un its a re loca ted. There isusually more than one guerri l la base within an areacomplex.

(2) Characterist ics . From a base, lines of communicationstretch out connecting other bases and various elements ofthe area complex. Instal lat ions normally found at aguerri l la base are —command posts , t raining and bivouacareas, supply caches, communications and medicalfacilities. In spite of the impression of permanence of theinstal lat ions, a guerri l la base is considered temporary andtenant guerri l la units must be able to rapidly abandon thebase w hen required.

c. Ar ea Comp l ex .

(1) Definition. An area complex consists of guerrilla bases and

various supporting facilities and elements. The activitiesnormally included in the area complex are —securi ty andintelligence systems; communications systems; missionsupport sites; reception sites; supply installations; traininga rea s; an d oth er support ing facilities.



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(2) Characterist ics . The complex is not a continuous pattern oftangible instal lat ions, but may be visualized as a series ofintangible lines of communications, emanating fromguerrilla ba ses a nd connecting a ll resista nce element s. Themain guerrilla base is the hub of the spider web-like

complex. The complex is not static but is a constantlycha nging appara tus w i thin t he opera t iona l a rea .

(3) Location . By virtue of their knowledge of the terrain,guerrillas should be able to recommend the best areas forlocating installations. Whereas inaccessible areas are bestfor t he physical loca tion of guerrilla ca mps, th e lack of t heseremote areas does not preclude guerrilla operations. Forinstance, there may be t imes when guerri l las are able to

fight effectively in towns and on the plains. Approaches tothe base are well guarded and concealed. The locations ofguerrilla installations are disseminated on a need-to-knowbasis. Since guerrilla forces seldom defend fixed positionsfor extended periods of time, altern a te a rea s ar e esta blishedto which the guerri l las withdraw if their primary area isth rea tened or occupied by th e enemy .

Section II. RESISTANCE ELEMENTS

67. Guerrilla Force

a. General . Paragraph 65 refers to the three main resistanceelements —guerri l la force, auxil iary, and underground that a specialforces detachment will likely encounter or organize in a guerrilla.warfare operational area. The primary concern is the guerrilla force.The auxiliary and underground organizations, from the point of view

of th e guerrilla orga niza tion, ar e support element s. From th e point ofview of the total resistance movement, however, the guerrilla forcema y be support ing th e under ground. For the purpose of this ma nua l,th e guerrilla force is considered th e support ed element .

b. Or gani zati onal Goal . The ultimate organizational goal is tointegrat e the guerri lla . unit a nd t he deta chment into a unified force.The degree of unification depends upon many factors. Theorganization which combines the special forces detachment and the

guerrilla u nit, r egar dless of t he degree of cohesion, is called t he a reaor sector comma nd, herea fter referred to as a rea comma nd.

c. Definit ion . The guerr illa force is t he overt , milita rily orga nizedelement of th e ar ea comma nd.



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d. Establishment . The guerrilla force is established when theguerrilla commander agrees to accept United States sponsorship.Once the guerrilla force is officially recognized, it is the detachmentcommander's responsibility to unite and control it to the best of his

ability.

68. Auxiliary Fortes(1) Active support from some of the civilian population and

passive support from most of the remainder is essential toextended guerrilla operations. To insure that both activeand passive support is responsive to the area command,some form of organization and control is required. Controlof civilian support is accomplished primarily through theauxiliaries. Auxiliary forces compose that element of thearea command established to provide for and organizecivilia n su pport of the r esista nce movement.

(2) "Auxiliary" is a term used to denote people engaged in avariety of activities. It is applied to those people who arenot members of other resistance elements, but whoknowingly and willingly support the common cause. Itincludes the occasional supporter as well as the hard • coreleadership. Individuals or groups who furnish support,either unw itt ingly or a ga inst t heir w ill , are not consideredauxiliaries. Auxiliaries may be organized in. groups oropera te as individua ls.

69. Characteristics of AuxiliariesAuxiliary forces are characterized by location, organization and

method of operation.

a. Location . Auxiliary units are composed of local civilians

normally l iving in the sma ller towns, vi llages, and rura l ar eas. U nlikeguerrilla un its, t he a uxiliar ies a re not expected t o move from pla ce toplace to conduct operations. The fact that the auxiliary forces arelocal and static is highly desirable from the area command viewpointin t ha t it provides support for th e mobile guerrilla , forces thr oughoutmost of th e opera tiona l a rea.

b. Organization .

(1) Auxilia ry forces norm a lly orga nize t o coincide w ith orpar a llel th e existing politica l ad ministr a tive divisions of thecountry. This method of organization insures that eachcommunity and the surrounding countryside is theresponsibility of an auxiliary unit. It is relatively simple toinit iate since auxil iary commands may be established at



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each administrative level, for example — regional, county,district or local (communities and villages). Thisorganization varies from country to country dependingupon the existing political structure. Organization ofauxil iary units can commence at any level or at several

levels simultaneously and is either centralized (fig. 21) ordecentralized (fig. 22).

(2) The ba sic orga niza tion a t each level is th e comm a ndcommittee. This committee controls and coordinatesauxiliary activities within its area of responsibility. In thisrespect it resembles the command group and staff of amilita ry unit. Members of th e comma nd commit tee a reassigned specific duties such as —supply, recruiting,transportation, communications, security, intelligence, and

operations (fig. 23). At the lowest level, one individual mayperform t w o or t hr ee of these duties.



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(3) The comm a nd comm itt ee ma y orga nize civilia nsympathizers into subordinate elements or employ themindividually. When possible, these subordinate elementsa re organized functiona lly into a compar tmented st ructure.However, because of a shortage of loyal personnel, it isoften necessary for each subordinate auxiliary element toperform severa l fun ctions.

(4) The home guard is the paramilitary arm of the auxiliaryforce. Home guards are controlled by the various commandcommittees. All auxiliary elements do not necessarilyorganize home guards. Home guards perform manymissions for the local auxiliary force, such as — tact icalmissions, gua rding of caches, a nd t ra ining of recruits. Theirdegree of organization and training depends upon theextent of effective enemy cont rol in t he a rea .

c. M eth od of Oper ati on .

(1) Auxiliary units derive their protection in two principalw a y s—a compartmented structure and operating undercover. While enemy counter guerrilla activities often forcethe guerri l las to move temporari ly away from given areas,



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the auxiliaries survive by remaining in place andconducting their activities so as to avoid detection.Individual auxil iary members carry on their normal, day-to-day routine, while secretly carrying out the many facets

of , resista nce action.(2) Auxiliary units frequently utilize the passive or neutral

elements of the population to provide active support to thecommon cause. Usually this is done on a one-time basisbecause of the security risks involved in repeated use ofsuch people. The ability of auxiliary forces to manipulatelarge segments of the neutral population is furtherenha nced by th e demonst ra ted success of friendly forces.

70. Support Missions of AuxiliariesThe support missions discussed herein are the principal ones

performed by auxiliary forces to support the area command. Some ofthese tasks are coordinated directly with guerrilla units while othersa re contr olled by th eir own higher headq ua rters. Norma lly, a uxil ia ryunits are assigned direct support missions fox guerrilla units in theirareas .

a. Secur i ty and Warning . Auxiliary units provide a physical

security and warning system for guerrilla forces. They organizeextensive systems of civilian sympathizers who keep enemy forcesunder surveillance and who warn the guerrillas of enemy moves.These civilian s a re selected a s pa rt of t he security syst em beca use of



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their advantageous location which permits them to monitor enemymovement towa rds guerri lla bases.

b. Intelligence . Auxiliary units collect information to supporttheir own operations and those of the area command. The auxiliaryforce provides direct intelligence support to guerrilla units operating

w ithin t heir ar ea of responsibility.c. Counterintelligence . The auxil iary unit assists the area

command counterintelligence effort by maintaining watch overtransitory civilians, by screening recruits for guerrilla units, and bymonitoring refugees and other non-inhabitants of the area. Becauseof their intimate knowledge of local people, auxiliaries should be ableto report at tempts by enemy agents to infi l t rate the area, They cana lso na me those inha bita nt s w hose loya lty t o the resista nce might besuspect.

d. Logistics . The auxiliary unit supports guerrillas in all phasesof logistical opera tions. They pr ovide tr a nsport a tion a nd /or port ers forthe movement of supplies and equipment. Auxiliaries often care forsick and wounded guerrillas, provide medical supplies and arrangefor doctors and other medical personnel. They establish and securecaches. They collect food, clothing, and other supplies for guerrillaunits through a controlled system of levy, barter, ox contribution.Sometimes auxiliaries provide essential services to guerrillas sucha srepair of clothing, shoes, an d cert a in items of equipment . Auxiliar yunits furnish personnel to assist at drop and landing zones. Theydistribute supplies throughout the area. The extent of logisticalsupport furnished by the auxiliary force depends upon the resourcesof the area, the degree of influence the auxiliaries exert on thepopulat ion, a nd enemy a ctivities. For a furt her d iscussion of logistics,see sect ion VI.

e. Recruiting . The guerrilla units depend upon the localpopulation for recruits to replace operational losses and to expand

their forces. Auxiliaries spot, screen, and recruit personnel for activeguerrilla units. If recruits are provided through reliable auxiliaryelements, the enemy's chances. for placing agents in the guerrillaforce are greatly reduced. In some instances, auxiliary units providerudimenta ry t ra ining for guerri l la recruits .

f. Psychological Warfare . A very important mission in whichauxiliary units assist is psychological warfare. The spreading ofrumors, leaflets, and posters is timed with guerrilla tactical missionsto deceive the enemy. Leaflets can mislead the enemy as to guerrilla

intentions, capabilities, and location. The spreading of thispropaganda usually involves little risk to the disseminator and isvery difficult for th e enemy to contr ol.



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g. Civi l i an Contr ol . To control the population and give the enemyan impression of guerrilla power, the auxiliary units establish arudimentary legal control system. This system can control black-marketing and profiteering for the benefit of the guerrilla force.Collaborators may be terrorized or eliminated by the auxiliaries. In

addition, control of large numbers of refugees in the area is assumedfor t he guerrilla force by th e auxiliary unit s.

h. E vasi on and Escape . Auxiliary units are ideally suited for thesupport of evasion and escape mechanisms. Their contact with andcontrol over segments of • the civilian population provide the areacomma nder w ith a mean s of assist ing evader.

i . Oth er M i ssions . Auxilia ry un its ma y be ca lled upon t o per=form a num ber of other missions t o support guerrilla opera tion. Someof th ese a re

(1) Activity in conjunction with the guerrillas against othertargets. Cutting of telephone lines between an enemyinsta llat ion a nd its reserve force prior to a guerilla a tt a ck isa n example of such support .

(2) Opera tion of drop or la nd ing zones.

(3) Operation of courier systems between widely dispersedguerrilla units.

(4) Fur nishing guides to guerrilla units.

(5) Under some circumstances, they conduct active guerrillaoperations in their areas of responsibility on a part-timebasis.

71. The Undergrounda. E nemy security mea sures an d/or th e a nt ipa th y of certa in

segments of the population often deny selected portions of anoperational area to the guerrilla force or the auxiliaries. Since these

areas are usually essential to the support of enemy operations, theresistance force attempts to extend its influence into them. Theelement used t o conduct opera tions in such a rea s is the undergr ound.The underground, then, is that element of the resistance forceestablished to reach targets not vulnerable to other elements. Theunderground is employed to achieve objectives which would otherwisebe unattainable.

b. In many respects the underground closely resembles theauxiliary force. They conduct operations in a similar manner and

perform m a ny of the sa me functions. The ma jor differences, th en, a retwofold



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(1) The underground is tailored to conduct operations in areaswhich are normally denied to the auxil iary force andguerrillas.

(2) The underground is not as dependent upon control orinfluence over the civilian population for its success. The

degree to which the underground achieves this objective isa byproduct of oth er opera tions. Cont rol of t he populat ion isnot t he prima ry undergr ound objective.

c. For a detailed discussion of the characteristics, organizationa nd missions of th e und ergr ound, see FM 31-21A.

72. Command Groupa. The command group provides a means to control and

coordina te a l l resistan ce a ctivi t ies in a guerril la w a rfa re opera tiona larea. The group normally is located with the guerrilla force. In someinsta nces t he comma nd group ma y be loca ted w ith t he a uxil ia ries orth e undergr ound. F or exa mples of the ty pe comma nd g roups, see FM31-21A.

Section III. SECURITY

73. General

Coincident with establishing a command organization in theguerri l la warfare operational area is the organization of an adequatesecurity system. Security of all elements of the area command isbased upon the principle of preventing the enemy from eitherknowing of the existence of resistance forces or being able to locatethese forces when their existence is known. Security is achieved by acombina tion of a ctive a nd pa ssive mea ns t o include

a. The physica l security w a rnin g system.

b. Dispersion.c. Mobility of units a nd inst a llat ions.

d . Ca mouflage discipline.

e. Ma rch security .

f . Commun ica tion security.

g. Count erintelligence a ctivities.

h . Records securit y.

i . Cover a nd deception.

Since the underground and auxiliary forces achieve security byremaining undetected a nd thr ough t heir basic cellula r structure, this



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section deals only with the security measures applicable to theguerr illa force.

74. Bi-Zonal Security Systema. General . G uerrilla unit y norma lly employ a bi-zonal (inner a nd

outer zones) security system (fig. 24). There is necessarily an overlapw here securit y responsibility devolves to tw o or more element s.

b. I nn er Secur i ty Zone . This zone is t he responsibility of guerrillaunits . In this zone, the securi ty system depends upon standardmili ta ry t echniques such a s

(1) Patrols.

(2) Outgu a rds an d outposts.

(3) A sent inel sy st em.

(4) Wa rn ing devices.(5) Cover a nd deception.

c. Ou ter Secur i ty Zone . In this zone the auxil iary force and theunderground provide security for the guerrillas by furnishing timelyinforma tion of enemy a ctivity.

75. Principles of Securitya. Dispersion .

(1) Guerrilla forces avoid large concentrations of troops inca mps or bivoua cs. Even th ough the logistica l situa tion ma ypermit sizeable troop concentrations, commands aregenerally organized into smaller units and dispersed.Dispersion facilitates concealment, mobility, and secrecy.Large forces may be concentrated to perform a specificoperation but, upon completion of the operation, theyqu ickly disperse.

(2) The principle of dispersion is a pplied to both comm a nd a ndsupport installations. A large guerrilla headquarters, forexample, is divided into several echelons and deployed overa la rge a rea .

(3) In th e event of w ell-cond ucted, la rge scale enemyopera tions a ga inst t he guerri lla force, the a rea comma ndermay divide units into even smaller groups to achievegreater dispersion and facilitate escape from encirclement.

Splitting the guerrilla force into small groups is used onlywhen al l other means of evasive action are exhausted.E xtr eme dispersion r educes t he effectiveness of th e force fora considerable period of time. This action also lowers themora le of th e guerrillas, a nd w eakens th e will of the



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civilians to resist. To increase the probability of successfulrea ssembly of dispersed units, pla ns include alt erna te a ssemblyareas .

b . Mobi l i ty .

(1) G uerrilla insta llat ions a nd forces main ta in a high degree of

mobility. Evacuation plans for installations and forcesinclude elimina tion of all tr a ces of guerrilla a ctivity prior t oa ban donment of the a rea.

(2) Mobility for eva cua tion is a chieved by prepa ring equipm entto be moved in one-man loads, by caching less mobileequipment, by destroying or hiding material of intelligenceva lue to the enemy, by policing th e area , an d by elimina tingsigns of the route of w ithdra w a l.

c. Cover an d D ecept i on Oper at i on s . Anoth er pr inciple of providingsecurity is the use of deception operations. These operations areplanned to deceive the enemy as to location, intent or strength of theguerrilla force. They are conducted in conjunction with otherresistance operations in the area or with conventional forceoperations.

76. Security Disciplinea. Safeguar di ng Plan s and Recor ds .

(1) In forma tion concernin g guerr illa opera t ions isdissemina ted on a need-to-know ba sis. Minimum necessar ycopies of documents are made or maintained. Each personis given only that information he needs to accomplish histasks. Special efforts are made to restrict the amount ofinformation given to individuals who are exposed tocapture.

(2) Administ ra tive records a re kept to a m inimum a nd cachedso that the location is known only by a required few.U sua lly essentia l records are photogra phed.

(3) Whenever possible, reference to na mes a nd pla ces a re codeda nd t he key to th e code is given on a need-t o-know ba sis.

(4) Records wh ich a re of no further va lue ar e destr oyed.

(5) The guerrilla r elies on his, memory to a fa r grea ter extentthan the regular soldier. Instal lat ions are not marked onma ps or pa pers w hich a re ta ken out of the base. Guerri l la sha bitually memorize the loca tion of insta l la t ions a nd a reasto wh ich t hey ha ve access.

b. Secur i ty M easur es .

(1) S tr ict security mea sur es ar e enforced. These include

(a) Ca moufla ge discipline.



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(b) Isolat ion of units fr om each other.

(c) P roper selection a nd rigid supervision of courier routesbetw een headqua r ters an d uni ts .

(d) P olice of ca mp sites and in sta llat ions.

(e) Movement cont rol w ithin a nd betw een guerrilla ba ses.

(f) Isolation of guerrilla. units from the civilian populationat large. Any necessary contact with civilians isa ccomplished through a uxilia ry element s.

(g) Thorough indoctrination of all units in resistance tointerrogation.

(2) Security consciousness is impressed upon guerrilla. troopsfrom the inception of the force and continues throughoutoperations. Commanders at all levels constantly strive toimprove security measures. Particular attention is devotedto those units and elements that have recently beenina ctive or a re loca ted in rela tively safe ar eas.

77. March Security

a. Security on the march is based upon accurate knowledge of heenemy's location and strength. The intelligence section of the areacomma nd provides th is vita l informa tion for security of movement .

b. Once routes have been selected, units are briefed on enemyactivi ty, primary and al ternate routes, dispersal and reassemblya reas a long t he w a y, a nd securi ty measures to be observed en r oute.Auxiliary units in the route area assist by providing securityelements for t he guerrillas.

c. While on the move, the guerrilla forces employ march securitytechniques such as advance, rear and f lank guards. Pre-selectedbivoua cs ar e thoroughly screened by pat rols prior t o their occupa tion

by guerri l la units . Contact is established with local auxil iary unitsdesignated to support the guerrilla movement. The auxiliaries arethus able to furnish the latest enemy information to guerri l lacommanders.

78. Counterintelligence

a. Securi ty measures used by guerri llas to sa fegua rd informat ion,instal lat ions and communications, are supplemented by an activecounterintelligence program to neutralize the enemy's intelligencesystem and to prevent the penetration of guerrilla forces by enemyagents.



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b. Counterintelligence is a command responsibility under thestaff supervision of the intelligence section of the area command.Selected personnel, specially trained in counterintelligence, carefullyscreen all members of the guerrilla organization as a protectivemeasure a ga inst enemy infi lt ra t ion. They a lso pla n a nd supervise a n

active campaign of deception.(1) Counterintelligence personnel through the auxiliary forces

keep a consta nt check on th e civilia n popula tion of th e ar eato insure aga inst th e presence of enemy a gents w ithin t heirmidst. Civilians upon whom the guerrillas depend heavilyfor support may compromise the guerrilla warfare effort aseasi ly a s a disloya l guerril la .

(2) False rumors and false information concerning guerrillastrength, location, operations, t raining and equipment canbe dissemina ted by count erintelligence personnel. Fa cts a redistorted intentionally to minimize or exaggerate guerrillaca pabili t ies a t a ny given t ime.

(3) Active mea sures a re ta ken to determine enemy int entions,methods of operation, EEI, and to identify enemyintelligence personnel or loca l inha bita nt s w ho ma y be usedas enemy agents. These active measures include

penetration of enemy intelligence and counterintelligenceorganizations by selected personnel, and the manipulationof defectors a nd double a gents.

79. Security Role of the Auxiliary and Underground

Both the auxil iary forces and the underground contribute to thesecurity of the guerrilla force. Incidenta l to their everyd a y opera tions,they uncover enemy activity or indications which, when evaluated,

disclose pot ent ia l da nger t o the guerr illa force. They est a blish specificsystems designed to provide warning of the approach of enemy units.They intimidate any collaborators and attempt to elicit informationfrom enemy personnel, local officials and the police. They operate inw ha t is to the guerrilla s th e outer security zone.

80. Reaction to Enemy Operations

Premature or unnecessary movement caused by the presence of

the enemy may expose guerri l las to greater r isks than remainingconcealed. S uch moves disrupt opera tions a nd tend to reduce securit yby exposing guerrillas to enemy agents, informants, andcollaborators. The decision by the guerrilla commander to move isma de only a fter a ca reful est ima te of the si tua tion.



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Section IV. INTELLIGENCE IN GUERRILLA WARFAREOPERATIONAL AREAS

81. GeneralThe location of the area command in enemy-controlled territory

makes available to the theater commander an addit ional means ofdeveloping intelligence. The area command is able to exploit sourcesgenerally unavailable to other theater forces. However, the areacommand is not primarily an intelligence agency but a military forceresponsive to theater control. As such, they provide intelligenceinforma tion gat hered incident a l to th eir .primar y mission.

82. Agencies and Sourcesa. The area command has available three principal agencies to

assist in gathering intelligence information. They are the guerrillaforce, the a uxilia ry force a nd t he undergr ound.

b. For special intelligence collection missions, the special forcesdeta chm ent ma y be a ugment ed by tr a ined int elligence specia lists.

83. CapabilitiesThe a rea comma nd ha s t he follow ing int elligence ca pabilities:

a. I nt el l i gence to Support Th ei r Own Oper ati ons . The in t elligence

system of the operational area is primarily geared to support thecommand. It produces intelligence for the use of the guerrillas, theunderground, a nd the a uxil ia ries.

b. Intelligence Data to Support Theater Operations . The areacommand in the course of operations acquires intelligence data ofva lue to oth er thea ter forces. S ome exa mples a re

(1) Ord er-of-ba tt le int elligence da ta .

(2) In forma tion to support psychologica l wa rfa re activities.

(3) Ta rget informa tion for ta ctical a nd str a tegic a ir forces pluspost-strike information.

(4) I nforma t ion of polit ical, sociologica l, a nd economicint elligence va lue.

(5) In telligence dat a to support s pecific ta ctica l opera tionssuch as a irborne, a mphibious, or a rmored opera tions.

Section V. COMMUNICATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFAREOPERATIONAL AREAS

84. GeneralCommunications within an area or sector furnish the commander

the means to control his organization. Because it is located in enemy



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territory, the communication system will be slower. When a plan isformulated, more t ime must be al lowed for transmitt ing orders thanin convent iona l milita ry unit s.

85. Means Available

Communications within a sector or between the area and sectorcomma nds use nonelectr onic techn iques w herever pra ctical. U nt il th earea is relatively secure, electronic means should be used only whenabsolutely necessary. Since the area command is an integratedorganization consisting of the special forces detachment and theresistance forces, the same communications must satisfy therequirements of both. Special forces communications at thedeta chment level ca nn ot be divorced from g uerrilla communicat ions.

86. Communication Securitya. Communications are always vulnerable to interception.

Absolute security does not exist. Interception of communications is anexcellent means of gathering intelligence information. Special forcesradio operators normally operate with a maximum-securi ty SOI,designed to make interception of electronic communications difficult.If guerri l la radios are operated from the same general area as thespecia l forces ra dio, th ey opera te using t he sa me preca utions.

b. During the early phases of guerrilla development, messengersare the chief means of communication. Security is enhanced bycellular structure of the messenger organization, use of securecryptographic systems and proper authentication.

87. Factors Affecting CommunicationsRadio used between the area and sector commands is the radio

operated by trained special forces operators. Communications withina n a rea or a sector depend on t he opera tiona l situa tion, th e physica llocation of the area and sector commands, terrain barriers , thetraining of the resistance force, the enemy capability in electronicinterception, the security of the area and the communicationequipment available. The range of radios, which operate in the highfrequency band, is extremely difficult to predict. Under certainconditions these transmissions can be intercepted over greatdistances. The range of low-powered radios, operating in the VHFband, rarely exceeds line of sight. Until the area is secure, the use ofradios is restricted to those operational missions from which littleintelligence data will accrue to enemy interceptors. Enemy capabilityto intercept either electronic or nonelectronic communications andthe operational situation are the two primary factors to be consideredw hen pla nning commun ica tions w ithin a n operat iona l area .



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Section VI. LOGISTICS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONALAREAS

88. General

a. The logistical support for guerrilla forces is derived from twoprimary sources; the sponsor and the operational area. Logisticalpla nn ing of th e ar ea comm a nd is ba sed upon resources a va ilable fromboth of t hese sources.

b. The operational area is normally expected to provide the bulkof t he logistica l support r equired by t he a rea comma nd. This supportincludes local transportation, care of the sick and wounded, variousservices, and those items of supply necessary for day-to-day existence

such as food, clothing, and shelter. During the course of operations,the area may be able to provide a certain port ion of arms andequipment. This materiel is usually procured as a result of combataction against the enemy or security and police forces. In highlydeveloped a rea s of th e world, certa in a mounts of techn ica l equipment ,such a s ra dios, ca n be locally obta ined.

c. The sponsor provides those essential logistical services whichare not readily available within the operational area. Usually this

consists of arms, ammunition, demolitions, and communicationsequipment — the essentials to support combat operations. Undercertain conditions, sponsor logistical support is expanded. It thenincludes evacua tion of the sick a nd w ounded, food, cloth ing, a nd oth eressential surviva l i tems una vailable in t he a rea.

89. Logistical Requirements

Logist ica l requirements of the area comma nd a re rudimenta ry a nd

simple when compared to a conventional force of similar size. Theserequirement s, in genera l, consist of —

a. Necessities to enable guerrillas to live; such as food, clothinga nd sh oes, shelter, an d medica l equipment .

b. Combat equipment for the conduct of operations. Majorcategories are —arms and ammunit ion, demoli t ions andcommunicat ions equipment.

c. Sufficient transportation to enable guerrilla units to distribute

supplies.d . A medica l system to care for sick a nd w ounded.

e. Essential services, for example — the repair of shoes andclothing.



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(3) The situa tion ma y be such t ha t d irect delivery t o the user isnot desira ble or possible. In th is ca se, supplies a re deliveredto a designated location and their contents distributed tothe various users. Although this system takes much timeand effort, i t permits centralized control over sponsor-

provided supplies and is the preferred method when thesituation requires close supervision of subordinateelements.

b. I nter nal Supply . This syst em includes a ll the met hods used bythe a rea comma nd t o obta in supplies a nd equipment from w ithin th eoperational area. In dealing with the civil ian populat ion, theresistance elements must balance their requirement for suppliesagainst the need to maintain cooperation of their civilian supporters.

A procurement program designed without regard to the needs of thepopulat ion ma y impose such hea vy commitment s on t he civilian s tha tthey refuse to cooperate and thus limit the operations of theresista nce force a nd increa se the requirement for extern a l supply.

(1) Offensive Operations and Battlefield Recovery . Byconducting offensive operations against the enemy, theguerrilla force is able to satisfy many of its logisticalrequirements and at the same t ime deny the use of these

supplies to the enemy. Capturing supplies from the enemyhas the advantage of not al ienating civil ians. Withadequate intel l igence and proper planning, raids andambushes are conducted against instal lat ions and convoyscontaining the items needed by the guerrilla force. Prior toan operation, each guerrilla is instructed to secure thosepriori ty materials required by the guerri l la force. In areaswhere conventional operations have been conducted,

guerrillas can obtain certain quantities of supplies bycollecting a ba ndoned equipment .

(2) Levy . To ensure a n equ ita ble system for obta ining suppliesfrom th e loca l populat ion, a levy syst em ba sed on t he a bilityof each family or group of families to contribute may beorganized. This system is established and operated by thevarious auxil iary units . Such a system provides a meanswhereby the burden of supplying the guerrilla force isdistributed equitably throughout the civilian population.The population can be told that payment will eventually bemade for the supplies taken. Receipts may be given toindividuals or records of the transactions kept by the areacommand supply officer. In establishing the levy system,



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the commander must consider a number of obstacles whichmight affect procurement in his operational area. Amongthem —

(a) Ch ronic food shorta ges.

(b) E nem y int erference a nd /or competit ion for supplies.

(c) Possible impact of combat actions, such as "scorchedeart h" policies a nd ra dioa ctive conta mina tion.

(d) Competit ion from rival guerrilla ba nds.

(3) Barter . I t may not be desirable for the area command toengage in outright barter with the civil ian populat ionbecause of possible adverse effects upon the levy system.However, in some cases it is mutually beneficial to

exchange critical items, such as medical supplies, for food,clothin g or services.

(4) Purchase . Special forces detachments may be given acerta in a mount of negotiable curr ency in th e form of gold orpaper money. This money is for the purchase of criticalitems or services with in th e opera tiona l ar ea. There w ill notbe enough for purchases to meet all supply requirements.In addition, the uncontrolled injection of large amounts of

money may well disrupt the local economy. Purchases areused to supplement ra th er tha n repla ce the levy system.

(5) Confiscation . Confiscation is a method which may be usedto fulfill those requirements which cannot be met by theother methods of internal supply. Confiscation is oftenemployed in ca ses w here cert a in gr oups refuse to coopera teor are act ively collaborating with the enemy. Natural ly,confiscation tends to alienate the civilian population and

therefore should be used only in emergencies or to punishcollaborators. In all cases, confiscation must be strictlycontrolled to insure that it does not deteriorate intoindiscrimina te looting.

c. Storage

(1) The storage or caching of supplies and equipment plays animportant role in the area command logistical plan. Theuncertainties of the weather and enemy action prevent

timetable receipt of supplies from the sponsoring power.The area command, therefore, must be prepared to operatefor extended periods without external resupply. Thisnecessitates stockpiling supplies for later use. Guerrilla



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units do not maintain excess stocks of supplies since largequantities of equipment limit mobility without increasingcombat effectiveness. Supplies in excess of currentrequirements are cached in a number of isolated locationsto minimize the risk of discovery by the enemy. These

caches are established and secured by both guerrilla andauxiliary units in support of the guerrilla force. Items arecarefully packaged so that damage from weather andexposure is minimized. Specialized packaging of supplies isa ccomplished by th e sponsor.

(2) Caches may be located anywhere that material can behidden-caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries and lakes. Thecache should be readily accessible to the user. Dispersal of

caches throughout the operational area permits a highdegree of opera t iona l flexibility for th e guerrilla force.

(3) Generally there are two types of caches those containingitems used on a da y-to-da y ba sis an d th ose conta ining itemsto be used in the future. Each unit caches excess suppliesand equipment and draws upon these as needed. Only theunit commander and key personnel know the location ofcaches. In the same fashion, commanders establish cachescontaining supplies which represent a reserve for

emergency use t hroughout the a rea.

92. Transportationa. The tra nsporta t ion r equirements of the ar ea comma nd a re met

largely from within the area since i t is usually impractical for thesponsor to provide transportation support for operational use. Tofulfi ll i ts t ra nsporta t ion requirements, t he a rea comma nd ut i lizes a nymeans a vailable.

b. Movement by foot is usually the primary means, especially inthe initial stages of guerrilla development. In specific situations, thismay be supplemented by locally-procured motor vehicles or animals.The auxiliaries provide whatever local transportation is available toguerrilla units. This transportation is normally furnished on amission basis. However, in some instances, the guerrillasperma nently a cquire tra nsporta t ion a nd organize supply tra ins.

93. Medical Service

a. Ar ea Com m and M edi cal Requi r em ent s . The area commandmedical requirements vary widely between operational areas butusua lly differ from t he convent iona l medica l problem in t w o respects.First, due to the nature of guerrilla operations, battle casualties arenormally low er in guerri lla units t ha n in th eir infan try counterpart s .



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Second, the incidence of disease and sickness is often higher inguerrilla forces tha n in compa ra ble convent iona l units.

b. A r ea M edi cal Su pport System . The area medical supportsystem is based primarily upon local facilities supplemented bysponsor-provided medical supplies.

c. M edi cal System in th e Oper ati ona l Ar ea . The medica l syst em inthe operational area features both organized guerri l la medical unitsand auxiliary medical facilities for individuals and small groups. Theformer are located in guerri l la base areas and staffed by guerri l lamedica l deta chment s. The a uxilia ry fa cility is a loca tion in w hich oneor a sma ll number of pa tients a re held in a conva lescent sta tus.

d. Guer r i l la M edi cal Detachm ent .

(1) Rega rdless of th e va rying size of guerr illa unit s, th e

medical detachments retain essential ly the same structureand functions. Their duties are to maintain a high state ofhealth in the command, to render eff icient t reatment andevacuation of casualties, and to insure the earliest possiblereturn to duty of those who are sick or injured. Thedetachment may also provide treatment and drugs toa uxil ia ry a nd un derground elements.

(2) The orga niza tion of th e medical deta chment consist s

essentially of three sections — the aid stat ion, which ischarged with the immediate care and evacuation ofcasualties; the hospital, which performs defensivetreatments of casualties and coordinates medical resupplyand training; and last ly, the convalescent section, whichca res for pa tients w ho require rest a nd a minimum of act ivemedical attention before their return to duty. Theconva lescent section is not loca ted nea r t he hospita l ar ea a sthis increases the size of the instal lat ion and thus thesecurity risk. Instead, the patients are placed in homes ofloca l sym pat hizers or in isola ted conva lescent ca mps.

(3) Du ring th e ea rly sta ges of development, th e medica lorga nizat ion is small a nd proba bly combines th e aid st a t ionand the hospital into one installation. The use of auxiliaryconvalescent fa cilities is found a t a ll sta ges of development.

e. Evacuation .

(1) Every effort is made to evacuate wounded personnel fromthe scene of action. The condition of wounded guerrillasmay preclude movement with the unit to the base. In thisevent , the w ounded a re hidden in a covered loca tion a nd t he



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local auxiliary unit notified the local auxiliaries then carefor and hide the wounded unti l they can be returned totheir ow n organ izations.

(2) The evacuation of dead from the scene of action is mostimportant for security reasons. The identification of thedead by the enemy may jeopardize the safety of theirfamilies as well as that of their units. The bodies of thosekilled in action are evacuated, cached until they can berecovered for proper burial, or disposed of by whatevermeans is consistent with the customs of the localpopulation.

(3) As the operational area develops and the overall situationfavors the sponsor, evacuation of the sick and wounded tofriendly areas may be feasible. This lightens the burdenupon the meager faci l i t ies available to the area commandand provides a higher standard of medical care for thepatient .

f . E xpansi on of M edi cal Support .

(1) As th e ar ms, comm a nd expan ds, ft is more efficient from amedical standpoint to establish a centralized system toprovide ad va nced medica l ca re. Field hospita ls permit more

flexibility because of them wider selection of trainedpersonnel, equipment to provide special treatment, andthey relieve the aid stations oaf the responsibility forprolonged treatment of patients. Since this type ofinstal lat ion may be fair ly large and may have sizeableamounts of equipment, its mobility will suffer. For thatreason i t is located in a relat ively isolated area away fromtroop units , headquarters and other sensit ive areas but soa s to receive the ma ximum protection from guerrilla un its.

(2) To prevent the hospital from becoming so large that itat tracts undue at tention, certain act ions are taken. First ,as trained personnel, supplies and equipment becomeavailable, addit ional hospitals are established. Second, assoon as possible, a patient is transferred to a convalescenthome to complete his recovery, If the individual is placed ina civilian home, he is properly document ed.

(3) In some cases the local population may not be able to

support the area command With qualified medicalpersonnel. As the requirement for doctors and specializedpersonnel increases, the SFOB may have to provideadditional medical personnel over and above thedeta chm ent's orga nic medica l personnel.



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94. ServicesIn guerri l la warfare operational areas, services are primari ly

restricted to basic maintenance and repair of equipment. Thedifficulties in procuring supplies dictate the need for rigid supplydiscipline. All personnel must perform first-echelon maintenance.

Plans provide for the maximum utilization of available supplies andthe establishment of local repair facilities to prolong the life ofequipment. Necessary maintenance and repair i tems such asarmorers tools, small arms repair kits, sewing kits, oil and cleaningma teria ls a re included in sponsor-provided supply pa cka ges. Cloth inga nd footgea r a re repa ired loca lly.



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CHAPTER 8COMBAT EMPLOYMENT

Section I. INTRODUCTION

95. Generala. Although discussed separately from other operations, the

combat employment of guerrilla forces commences early andcontinues throughout the entire span of guerri l la warfaredevelopment. However, combat employment normally reaches itspeak just prior to. the juncture between unconventional andconvent iona l forces.

b. Control and coordination of guerrilla units. is assisted by thedesignation of guerrilla warfare operational areas. The subdivisionalconcept of th ese a rea s is explained in pa ra gra ph 62.

c. Guerrilla forces have a much greater chance for success andmost effectively support conventional military operations when theiractivities are coordinated with other theater forces. Coordination ofthe guerrilla effort with the service component commands' plans of

operations is executed through normal command channels-theatercomma nder, J U WTF, S FOB , an d operat iona l deta chment.

96. Area ControlGuerrilla forces are rarely concerned with seizing and holding

terrain. However, they are concerned with establishing area controlin order t o expedit e opera t ions. Area cont rol is cla ssified, accordin g todegree, as a rea superiori ty or a rea suprema cy.

a. Area Superiori ty . Temporary control of a specific area isattained through maximum use of the principles of surprise, mass,and maneuver. Area superiority is maintained only for the period oftime r equired t o a ccomplish m issions w ithout prohibitive interferenceby th e enemy.

b. Ar ea Supr em acy . Complete area control is attained wheneverthe enemy is incapable of effective interference with guerrillaoperations. Area supremacy is seldom achieved throughunconventional warfare efforts alone.

97. Nature of Guerrilla Warfarea. No word describes the nature of guerri l la warfare better than

"fluid." I n guerri lla w a rfa re the si tua tion is alwa ys f luid. B oth enemyand guerri l la units move and change their relat ive posit ions as the



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result of tactical maneuvers. The area of guerrilla activity is neverstat ic; the si tuation changes constantly as the enemy reacts toguerrilla a ctions.

b. Maximum effective results are attained through offensiveoperations of the guerrilla force. Normally, the guerrilla force is

primarily interested in the interdiction of lines of communicationsand destruction of critical enemy installations. Except in thoseinstances wherein the tact ical advantages are clearly with theguerrilla force, no effort is made to close with and destroy ail enemy.Conversely, the enemy force must provide security for his criticalinstallations and seek to contact and destroy the guerrilla force.These opposing courses of action create ail operational environmenttha t is f luid.

c. Guerrilla area superiority is more easily achieved in difficultterr a in th a t restr icts enemy observat ion a nd movement . These fa ctorsreduce th e enemy capa bility t o mount coordina ted opera tions quicklya ga inst t he guerril la s a nd a l low s sufficient t ime for guerri lla units t oavoid becoming involved in static defensive combat. The physicalcharacteristics of these so-called "redoubt areas" are usually suchthat cri t ical enemy targets are not located in areas of sustainedguerrilla superiority.

d . The enemy can achieve area superiority or supremacy of apart icular region at any t ime he is wil l ing and able to commitsufficient forces to do so. However, because the guerrilla force iscomparatively free to select the time and place of attack, successfuloperations are conducted against target systems despite enemysecurit y mea sures.

e. In between those areas of enemy control and temporaryguerrilla force control is an area or twilight zone subject toperma nent contr ol of neither. B eca use the a rea comma nd ca ll ini t ia teoffensive operations employing a variety of methods of attack against

widespread target systems, complete security of the twilight zone byth e enemy is virt ua lly impossible.

f . While guerrillas and the enemy compete for overt controlthroughout the twilight zone, guerrillas cannot hold any specific areaagainst determined enemy attack. The enemy holds localities whichhe occupies in force and the guerrillas conduct their operations inth ose regions w here the enemy is wea kest.

g. The auxiliary organization is more effective in the twilightzone than it is in enemy-dominated areas. The guerrilla capability ofconducting offensive operations coupled with other activities isincreased. Intelligence organizations report everything that theenemy does within the twilight zone. Throughout the twilight zone,the enemy is made to feel that lie is in hostile territory; he may



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control a small segment by force of arms, but lie can never relax hisgua rd lest lie be surprised by guerrilla s.

98. Effectsa. G uerril la opera tions w ear dow n a nd infl ict ca sua lt ies upon t he

enemy, cause da ma ge to supplies a nd facil it ies, a nti h inder a nd dela yenemy operations. The success of guerrilla operations —even the factthat tile guerrillas continue to exist — lowers enemy morale andprestige; disrupts t he economy, politics, a nd indust ry of the enemy orenemy occupied ar eas; a nd m a inta ins the morale a nd w ill to resist ofth e na tive populat ion.

b. Because guerri l la operations are primari ly directed againstlines of communications industrial facilities and key installations,they impede or interdict tile movement of men and materiel and

seriously affect the enemy's capability to supply, control, andcommunicate with his combat forces. In addition, the enemy iscompelled to divert manpower and equipment to combat guerrillaactivities.

99. Types of Operational MissionsOpera tiona l missions for guerrilla forces a re ca tegorized a s —

a. M i ssi ons i n Support of t he T heater Com m and er . Thesemissions have their greatest impact on theater level plans. Specialforces d eta chment s direct guerrilla forces loca ted ill enemy or enemyoccupied territory. Operational command of these unconventionalwarfare forces is retained by the theater commander and exercisedthr ough t he SF OB . For a further discussion see pa ra gra ph 100.

b. M i ssi ons to Assi st Convent i onal For ces E ngaged i n CombatOperations . These missions a re cond ucted t o assist service componenttactical commands engaged in combat operations, usually the fieldarmy and subordinate elements. Special forces detachments direct

guerrilla forces located in enemy occupied territory and operationalcontrol of t hese forces is exercised by th e ta ctical comm a nder t hrougha Special Forces liaison detachment. Logistical and administrativesupport of unconventional warfare forces remains with the theatercommander. For a further discussion see paragraphs 132 through139.

c. M i ssi ons Cond ucted A fter L i nk -Up Wi th F r i end ly F or ces .Missions may be assigned guerrilla forces after link-up with friendlyforces has been accomplished. Operational control may be exercisedby tact ical commanders or passed to other theater army commandssuch as Theater Army Logistical Command (TALOG) or TheaterArmy Civil Affairs Command (TACAComd). Special forcesdetachments may or may not direct the guerri l la force in the



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execution of these missions. For a further discussion see paragraphs140 th rough 147.

100. Missions in Support of the Theater Commandera. General . These missions may be either strategic or tactical in

na ture a nd h a ve both long-ra nge a nd immediat e effects on th e enemyand his military forces. They consist of — Interdiction of lines ofcommunica tions, key a reas, mil i tar y t a rgets , an d industr ia l facil it ies;psychological operations; special intelligence tasks; and evasion andescape operations.

b. Interdiction . Major emphasis is placed upon interdiction oflines of communications, key areas, industrial facilities, and militarytargets. Of all guerrilla operations, interdiction usually has thewidest impact on the enemy and his abil i ty to wage war and

consequently is considered the basic guerrilla warfare operationalmission. I nt erdiction hin ders or int errupts th e enemy's use of lines ofcommunications, denies him use of certain areas and destroysindustr ial faci l i t ies, mil i tary instal lat ions, and equipment.Interdict ion ranges from simple sabotage by an individual toconcerted a tt a cks by guerrilla forces. When properly coordina ted w ithother theater operations, interdiction can make a significantcontribution to the overall effectiveness of theater operations. For adiscussion of interdiction techniques see paragraphs 101 through 126

and FM 31-21A.c. Psychological Warfare . All operations are conducted in a

manner that will create a favorable environment for psychologicalcontrol of the indigenous population in keeping with announcedpostwar objectives. Often the psychological effects of guerrillaoperations far outweigh the tact ical results . In the operational area,psychological warfare is employed by the area command tocommunicat e w ith th e enemy forces, securit y forces, a ctive resista nceelements and segments of the civilian population supporting,opposing, or indifferent to the resistance movement. Normally,separate psychological operations conducted by guerrilla forces aredesigned to support the needs of the operational area, and aregoverned by overall theater objectives. The ability of guerrilla forcesto control the population and elicit civilian support is largelydependent upon th e psychologica l impa ct of the resista nce movementupon the populace. For a detailed discussion of psychologicalopera t ions in s upport of guerr illa forces, see cha pter 9.

d. Speci al I nt el l i gence T asks .(1) Although Special Forces detachments are not intelligence

organizations they have the capabil i ty through the use ofunconventional warfare resources to accomplish certaininformation gathering. tasks. Intensive intelligence and



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For details of psychological warfare, evasion and escape, andint elligence opera tions, see cha pter 9.

b. Raids and ambushes are the principal offensive techniques ofthe guerrilla force,, Raids and ambushes may be combined with otheraction, such as — mining and sniping or these lat ter act ions may be

conducted independently. When raids, ambushes, mining andsniping, are directed against enemy lines of communications, keyareas, mil i tary instal lat ions and industr ial faci l i t ies, the total resultis interdiction.

c. Detailed intelligence' of enemy dispositions, movements, andtactics; thorough planning and preparation; and knowledge of theterra in, a re prerequisites of guerrilla offensive opera tions.

102. Characteristics of Guerrilla Combat Operations

Combat operations of guerrilla forces take on certaincha ra cteristics w hich must be understood by Special F orces personnelwho direct and coordinate the resistance effort. These characteristicsare discussed below.

a . P lann ing . Careful and detai led planning is a prerequisi te forguerrilla combat operations. Plans provide for the attack of selectedta rgets a nd subsequent opera tions designed to exploit th e adva nta gegained. Addit ionally, al ternate targets are designated to al lowsubordinate units a degree of f lexibil i ty in taking advantage ofsudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed to anoperation the area command has l i t t le capabil i ty to rapidlymanipulate subordinate units to other missions, This lack ofimmediate response is due to the shortage or non-existence of radiocommunications equipment within smaller guerrilla units coupledwith relatively large zones of action. Thus, plans must be thoroughand flexible enough to allow commanders who are responsible for an

operation or series of operations to adopt alternate predeterminedcourses of action when contingencies arise.

b. Intelligence . The basis of planning is accurate and up-to-dateintelligence. Prior to initiating combat operations, a detailedintelligence collection effort is made in the projected objective area.This effort supplements the regular flow of intelligence. Provisionsare made for keeping the target or objective area under surveillanceup to the t ime of at ta ck.

c. D ecen tr al i zed E xecu ti on . Guerrilla combat operations featurecentralized planning and decentralized execution. Action of allresistance elements is directed and coordinated by the areacommand. However, within the guidance furnished by the area



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commander, subordinate units are allowed the widest possiblelat itude in t he conduct of opera tions.

d. Surpr ise . G uerrilla combat , opera tions stress surprise. Att a cksare executed at unexpected times and places. Set patterns of actionare avoided. Maximum advantage is gained by at tacking enemy

weaknesses. Low visibility and adverse weather are exploited byguerrilla forces. Surprise may also be enhanced by the conduct ofconcurrent diversiona ry a ctivities.

e. Short Du r ati on Acti on . Usually, combat operations of guerrillaforces are marked by action of short duration against the targetfollowed by a rapid withdrawal of the at tacking force. Prolongedcomba t a ction fr om fixed positions is a voided,

f . M ul t i ple At tacks (fig. 25). Another characteristic of guerrillacombat operations is the employment of multiple attacks over a widearea by small units tailored to the individual mission. This is notpiecemeal commitment of units against s ingle targets but a numberof at tacks directed against several targets or port ions of the targetsystem. Such action tends to deceive the enemy as to the actuallocation of guerrilla bases, causes him to over-estimate guerrillastrength a nd forces him t o disperse his rear a rea securi ty a nd counterguerrilla effort s.

103. Tactical Control Measuresa. General . The area commander utilizes tactical control

measures to aid him in directing and coordinating combat operations.Common ta ctical cont rol mea sures ar e —

(1) Ta rget s (objectives).

(2) Zones of a ction .

(3) Axis of a dva nce.

(4) Mission support sit es.

b. T ar get (Obj ect i ves) . The a rea comma nder designa tes ta rgets orobjectives for attack by subordinate units. These targets are usuallyl ines of communications, mil i tary instal lat ions and units andindustrial facilities. Normally, targets or objectives for guerrillaforces are not held for any length of time nor are they cleared ofdetermined enemy resista nce.

c. Z ones of Acti on (fig. 26). Zones of action are used to designatea rea s of responsibility for opera tions of subordina te un its. Within th ezone of action the subordinate commander exercises considerablefreedom in the conduct of operations. Movement of other guerrillaunits through an adjacent zone of act ion is coordinated by the areacommand. The auxiliary forces within a zone of action providesupport to the guerrilla un it responsible for t he a rea . B ounda ries of



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zones of action are changed by the commander who established thema s required.

d. Axi s of Ad vance . Guerrilla commanders may prescribe axes ofadvance for their unit or subordinate units in order to controlmovement to ta rgets. G uerrilla un its move to the objective ar ea either

by sing le or m ult iple rout es.e. M i ssi on Su pport Si tes (fig. 27). Mission support sites are

utilized by guerrilla units to add reach to their operations and enablethem to remain away from guerrilla bases for longer periods of time.The mission support site is a pre-selected area used as a temporarystopover point and is located in areas not controlled by the guerrillaforce. Mission support sit es a re ut ilized prior to a nd /or a fter a noperation. They are occupied for short periods of time, seldom longerthan a day. As in an assembly area, the using unit prepares forfurther operations and may be provided with supplies andintelligence by auxiliary forces.

f . Addi t ional Tact ical Control Measures . Additional controlmeasures may be employed by smaller guerrilla units such asrallying points, direction of attack, assault positions and lines ofdepa rt ure. These control measur es ar e employed in a ma nner simila rto their use by convent iona l milita ry un its.

104. Target Selectiona. The general mission assigned by the theater commander

determines the type target (objective) to be attacked, with the finalselection of the specific target usually made by the detachmentcommander. Occasionally, the SFOB may select the target. Theimportant factors related to the target which influence i ts f inalselect ion a re

(1) Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction ordamage will exercise a significant influence upon the

enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Suchtargets as bridges, tunnels, ravines, and mountain passesare critical to lines of communication; engines, tires, andPOL stores are cri t ical to transportat ion. Each target isconsidered in relationship to other elements of the targetsystem.

(2) Vulnerability. Vulnerability is a target's susceptibility toattack by means available to UW forces. Vulnerability isinfluenced by the nature of the target, i .e. , type, size,disposition a nd composition.

(3) Accessibility . Accessibilit y is m ea sur ed by t he a bility of th eat tacker to inf i l t ra te in to the target area . In s tudying ata rget for accessibility , security cont rols a round th e ta rget



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area, location of the target , and means of infi l t rat ion areconsidered.

(4) Recuperabil i ty . Recuperability is the enemy's ability torestore a damaged facil i ty to normal operating capacity. I tis affected by the enemy capability to repair and replace

da ma ged port ions of the ta rget .b. T h ese factor s ar e var i abl es . As such, each target is constantly

reevaluated for selection. The criticality of a target may change fromtime to time. A ra ilroa d bridge is less critical w hen t he enemy ha s fewlocomotives. The vulnerability of a target shifts with the meansavailable to attack it such as explosives, incendiaries and specialdevices. A power plant, command post, or supply depot is lessaccessible after the enemy has detailed additional security personnel

to guard it . Recuperation is more certain if reserve stocks areplentiful.

c. Each operation plan includes more than one target. Thisenables the commander to alter his plans to meet unforeseensituat ions tha t ma y preclude a t t a ck of the prima ry ta rget .

105. Raidsa. A raid is a surprise at tack against an enemy force or

instal lat ion. Such at tacks are characterized by secret movement tothe objective area; brief, violent combat; rapid disengagement froma ction; a nd sw ift , deceptive withdra w a l.

b. Raids are conducted by guerrilla units to —destroy or damagesupplies, equipment or installations such as command posts,communication facilities, depots, radar sites, etc.; capture supplies,equipment and key personnel; or cause casualties among the enemya nd his supporters. Other effects of ra ids are: to draw a tt ention a w a yfrom other operations; keep the enemy off balance and force him to

deploy addit iona l units to protect his rea r a rea s.

106. Organization of the Raid Force

a. General . The size of the raid force depends upon the mission,nature and location of the target and the enemy si tuation. The raidforce may vary from a squad attacking a police checkpoint orunprotected rail lines, to a battalion attacking a large supply depot.Regardless of size, the raid force consists of two basic elements;

a ssault a nd securi ty.b. Assau l t E l em ent . The a ssault element is orga nized a nd t ra ined

to accomplish the objectives of the raid. It consists of a main action



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group to execute t he ra id mission a nd ma y include personnel deta iledto execute specia l ta sks.

(1) The m a in a ction g roup execut es th e ma jor t a sk, th eaccomplishment of which insures the success of the raid.For instance, if the raid objective is to destroy a criticalinstal lat ion such as a rai lroad bridge or tunnel , the mainaction group emplaces and detonates the demolitioncharges. In the event that the target can be neutral ized byfire, such as enemy personnel, the main action groupconducts i ts at tack with a high proport ion of automaticweapons. In some instances the main action group movesphysically on or into the target; in others they are able toaccomplish their task at a distance from the target . The

efforts of other ,elements of the raid force are designed toallow the main action group access to the target for thetime requir ed to a ccomplish th e ra id mission.

(2) If required, special task details assist the main actiongroup to reach the target. They execute suchcomplementary tasks as • eliminating guards, breachingand removing obstacles, diversionary or holding tasks, andfire support. The special task details may precede, act

concurr ently w ith, or follow th e ma in a ction group.c. Secu r i ty E l em en t . The security element supports the raid by

prevent ing t he enemy from reinforcing or esca ping. Additiona lly, thesecuri ty element covers the withdrawal of the assault element andacts as a rear guard for the raid force. The size of the securityelement depends upon the enemy's, capability to intervene in theoperation.

107. Preparationa. Plan ni ng Consider ati ons .

(1) The first st ep is th e selection of a t a rget . In a ddit ion to th etarget selection factors mentioned in paragraph 104, otherimportant considerat ions are in the nature of the terraina nd th e combat efficiency of t he guerrilla force.

(2) Addit iona lly, t he U W force comma nd er m ust considerpossible adverse effects on his unit and the civilianpopulace. The guerrillas' objective is to diminish theenemy's military potential, but an improperly timedoperation may provoke counteraction which they areunprepared to meet. Successful operations increaseguerri l la prest ige with the civil ians and make them more



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willing to provide support. However, the guerrillas shouldtake every precaution to insure that civilians are notneedlessly subjected to harsh reprisals. Success alsoenha nces t he morale of th e guerril la unit a nd increa ses theprestige of its leaders. On the other hand, an unsuccessful

a tt a ck often ha s disast rous effects on guerrilla mora le.(3) Although detailed, the plan for a raid must be essentially

simple, and not depend on too many contingencies for itssuccess. Duplicate or al ternate arrangements are made forthe execution of key operations to increase the chances ofsuccess. Guerrilla activities in the area are planned so as togive the installation no indication of the pending attack;This may either be suspension, continuation or increase of

current activity. Time and space factors are carefullyconsidered when planning the operation. Sufficient time isal lowed for assembly and movement, part icularly duringdarkness; the require menu of the situation determinewhether movement and at tack should be made duringda ylight or darkness. Da rkness favors surprise a nd isusually t he best t ime wh en th e opera tion is s imple an d th ephysical arrangement of the instal lat ion is well known,

Early dawn or dusk is favored when inadequate knowledgeof the installation or other factors necessitate close controlof the operation. A withdrawal late in the day or at nightma kes close pursuit by th e enemy m ore difficult.

b. Intelligence . The raid force commander must have maximumavailable intelligence of — the target; enemy forces able to intervene;the civilian popula t ion in the vicinity of the ta rget; an d t he terra in tobe traversed en route to and returning from the objective area. An

intensive intelligence effort precedes the raid. guerrilla intelligenceand reconnaissance elements conduct reconnaissance of the routes tothe target and if possible of the target itself. Local auxiliary sourcesare exploited and the auxiliaries may be required to furnish guides.Surveillance of the target is continuous up to the time of the attack.The raid force commander exercises extreme caution to deny theenemy any indications of the impending operation through action ofeith er guerrilla reconna issan ce elements or th e auxiliar ies,

c. Rehear sal s of Par ti ci pan ts . All participants are rehearsed forth e opera tion. Rehear sa ls a x a conducted as realistically as possible.If available, terrain —similar to that found in the target area is used.The use of sand tables, sketches, photographs, and target mockupsa ssist in t he briefing of guerrilla tr oops. Cont ingency actions ay e also



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practiced. Final rehearsals are conducted under conditions ofvisibility like th ose expected in t he object ive ar ea .

d. Fi nal I nspecti on . The raid force commander conducts a finalinspection of personnel and equipment prior to movement to theobjective area. Weapons are test fired if possible, faulty equipment isreplaced and the condition of the men is checked, During thisinspection a counterintelligence check is made of each guerrilla'spersonal belongings to insure that no incriminating documents arecarried during the operation. This inspection assures the raid forcecommander that his unit is equipped and conditioned for theoperation.

108. Movement

(fig . 28 )Movement t o the objective a rea is pla nn ed a nd conducted t o a llow

the raid force to approach the target undetected. Movement may beover single or multiple routes. The preselected route or routesterminates in or near one or more mission support sites, Duringmovement every effort is ma de to avoid cont a ct w ith t he enemy, U ponreaching the mission support site, security groups are deployed andfinal coordination takes place prior to movement to the attackposition.

109. Action in the Objective Area(fig . 29 )

Special task details move to them positions and 'eliminatesentries, breach or remove obstacles and execute other assignedtasks. The main action group quickly Toll • ows the special taskdetails into the target area. Once the objective of the raid has beena ccomplished th e ma in a ction group w ithd ra w s covered by designa ted

fire support elemen ts a nd /or da rt of th e security force. In t he eventthe attack is unsuccessful the action is terminated to prevent undueloss. Special task details withdraw according to plan. The assaultelement may assemble; at one or more rallying points. The securityelements remain in position to cover ' the withdrawal of the assaultelements an d w i thdraw on s ignal or a t a prea rra nged t ime.

110. Withdrawal(fig . 30 )

a. Withdrawal is accomplished in a manner designed to achievemaximum deception of the enemy and to facilitate further action byth e ra id force: The va rious element s of th e ra iding force w ithd ra w , inorder, over predetermined r outes thr ough a series of ra llying points:



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119



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Sh ould th e enemy orga nize a close pursuit of th e a ssa ult element , thesecurity element assists by fire and movement, distracting the enemyand slowing him down. Elements of the raiding force which areclosely pursued by the enemy do not attempt to reach the initialral lying point , but on their own init iat ive lead the enemy away fromthe remainder of the force and attempt to lose him by evasive actionover diff icult t errain. If the si tua tion permits , an a t t empt is ma de toreestablish contact with the raid force at other rallying points or tocontinue to the base area as a separate group. When necessary, theraiding force, or elements of it , separate into small groups or evenindividua ls to wa de close pursuit by th e enemy.

b. Frequently, the raid force disperses into smaller units,

w ithdra w s in different directions a nd reassembles a t a lat er t ime a nda t a predesigna ted place to conduct other opera tions. Elements of theraid force may conduct further operations, such as an ambush of thepursuing enemy force, during the w ithdra w a l.

111. Large Raid

(fig , 31)

a. General . When a target is large, important to the enemy, andwell guarded, the size of the guerrilla force required to effectivelyattack it increases. Large raids involve the use of a battalion or moreof guerrilla s. Essent ially t he opera tion is conducted similar to sma llerra ids, however, ad ditiona l problems m ust be considered.

b. M ovem en t to Obj ecti ve Ar ea . Surprise is as desirable • in alarge as well as a smaller raid but is usually harder to achieve. Thenum bers of troops to be deployed requ ires a dditiona l mission supportsites. Again the size of the guerrilla force may require selection ofmission support sit es a t a grea ter dista nce from the ta rget t o preservesecrecy, thus requiring a longer move to the attack position. A largera id force usua lly moves by sma ll component s over m ultiple routes tothe objective area,

c. Control . Another problem inherent in a large raid is that ofcontrol. Guerrilla units without extensive radio communicationsequipment will find coordination of various widespread elements isdifficult to achieve. Pyrotechnics, audible signals, runners orpredesigna ted tim es ma y be used to coordina te a ction.

d . Tr a i n i n g . A high degree of training and discipline is requiredto execute a large raid. Extensive rehearsals assist in preparing theforce for t he mission. In part icular comma nders a nd st a ffs must lea rnto employ t he la rger n um ber of tr oops a s a cohesive force.



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e. Fi r e Sup por t . Additional fire support is usually a requirement.This ma y mea n secretly caching a mm unition in mission support sitesover a period of t ime prior to the raid. Guerri l las may each carry amortar or recoilless rifle round, rocket or box of machinegun

ammunit ion and leave them at a mission support s i te or f ir ingposition for fire support un its.

f . Ti m i n g . Timing is usually more difficult for a large raid. Thetime to move units and time the main action element needs toperform its mission are usually longer. This requires strongersecurity elements to isolate the objective area for longer periods. Thetiming of the ra id ta kes on increased import a nce beca use of th e la rgenumbers of guerrillas involved. Movement to the objective area isusually accomplished during periods of low visibility, howeverbecause of fire support coordination requirements and largernumbers of personnel, the action may take place during daylighthours.

g . Wi thdrawal . Withdrawal from a large raid is usually bysma ller groups over mult iple routes in order to deceive the enemy a nddissipate his pursuit . Dispersed withdrawal has the added advantageof not providing a lucrative target to enemy air and fire supportelements. However, the raid force commander must consider thepossibility of defeat in detail of his force by an alert and aggressiveenemy. The decision as to how to conduct the withdrawal must beba sed on a ca reful weighing of these fa ctors.

112. Ambushesa. An ambush is a surprise at tack used against moving or

temporari ly halted targets such as rai lroad trains, t ruck convoys,individual vehicles, and dismounted troops. In an ambush, the enemysets t he t ime an d th e at ta cker, the place.

b. Ambushes are conducted to destroy or capture personnel andsupplies; ha ra ss a nd d emora lize th e enemy; delay or block movementof personnel and supplies; and canalize enemy movement by makingcertain routes useless for traffic. The result usually is concentrationof the majority of movements to principal roads and railroads whereta rgets a re more vulnera ble to a t t a ck by other th eater forces.

c. Like the raid force, the ambush force is organized into assaultand security elements. The assault element conducts the main attacka ga inst t he a mbush t a rget w hich includes halt ing t he column, kil lingor capturing personnel, recovering supplies and equipment anddestroying unwanted vehicles or supplies which cannot be moved.The security force isolates the ambush site Using roadblocks, other



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ambushes and outposts , Securi ty elements cover the withdrawal ofthe a ssault element.

113. PreparationPreparation for an ambush is s imilar to that of a raid except that

selection of th e am bush site is an a dditiona l considera tion,a. Plan ni ng Consider ati ons . Begin preparing the ambush plan,

considera tion is liven to —

(1) The mission — this may be, a single ambush against onecolumn or a series of ambushes against one pr more routesof communication.

(2) The proba ble sizes st rengt h, end composition of the enemyforce that is to be ambushed; formations likely to be used,

a nd his reinforcement capa bility.(3) Terra in a long t he route favora ble for a n a mbush, including

unobserved routes, of a pproach a nd w ithdra w a l.

(4) Timin g of t he a mbu sh —ambushes conducted duringperiods of low visibility offer a w ider choir 2 of positions a ndbetter opportunities to surprise and confuse the enemythan daylight ambushes. However, control and movementto and during the night ambush is more diff icult . Nightambushes are more suitable when the mission can beaccomplished during or immediately following the initialburst of fire. They require a maxi, mum number ofautomatic weapons to be used at close range, Nightambushes are effective in hindering the enemy's use ofroutes of communication by night, while friendly aircraftat tack the same routes during the day. Daylight ambushesfacilitate control and permit offensive action for a longer

period of time. A day ambush also provides opportunity formore effective aimed fire of such weapons as rocketlaunchers and recoilless rifles.

b. Intelligence . Since the guerrillas are seldom able to ascertainin advance the exact composition, strength and time of movement ofconvoys, their intelligence effort should be directed towardsdetermining the convoy pattern of the enemy. Using this information,guerrilla commanders are able to decide on. type convoys to beattacked by ambush. In addition, intelligence considerationsdescribed in paragraph 107 for R raid are equally applicable to anambush.

c. Site Selection . In selecting the ambush site, the basicconsiderat ion is favorable terrain, al though l imitat ions which may



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exist such as deficiencies in the firepower of guerrillas and lack ofresupply during actions may govern the choice of ambush site. Thesite should have firing positions which offer concealment andfavorable fields of fire. Whenever possible, firing should be donethrough a screen of foliage. The terrain at the site should serve to

funnel the enemy into a killing zone. The entire killing zone iscovered by fire to avoid dead space that would allow the enemy toorganize resistance. The guerrilla force should take advantage ofnatural obstacles such as defiles, swamps, and cliffs which willrestr ict enemy maneuver against the ambush force. When naturalobstacles do not exist, mines and demolitions are employed toca na lize the enemy. S ecuri ty elements a re pla ced on r oa ds a nd t ra i lslea ding to the am bush si te to wa rn t he assa ult element of the enemyapproach. These security elements also assist in covering the

withdrawal of the assault element from the ambush si te . Theproximity of security to assault elements is dictated by the terrain. Inma ny insta nces, i t ma y be necessar y t o orga nize seconda ry a mbushesa nd r oa dblocks to int ercept a nd dela y enemy reinforcements.

114. Conduct of the Ambusha. M ovem en t . The guerrilla force moves over a, preselected route

or routes to the ambush site. One or more mission support sites areusually necessary along the route to the ambush si te . Last minute

intelligence is provided by reconnaissance elements and finalcoordina tion for t he a mbush is ma de at th e mission support site.

b. Acti on at th e Am bush Si te (fig . 32).

(1) Troops are moved to an assembly area near the ambushsite and security elements take their positions. As theapproaching enemy column is detected, or at apredesignated time, the ambush commander decideswhether or not to execute the ambush. This decision

depends on size of the column, guard and securitymeasures, and est ima ted w orth of the ta rget in l ight of themission. If a decision is ma de to execute th e a mbush,advance guards are al lowed to pass through the mainposition. When the head of th e ma in column rea ches apredetermined point, i t is halted by fire, demolitions, orobstacles, At this signal, the entire assault element opensfire, Designated detai ls engage the advance and rearguards to prevent reinforcement of the main column. Thevolume of fire is rapid and directed at enemy personnel,exist from vehicles, and automatic weapons. Anti-tankgrenades, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles are usedagainst armored vehicles. Machine-guns lay bands of fixed



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to derai l t rains so that the wreckage remains on the tracks to delaytraffic for longer periods of time. Fire is directed on the exits ofoverturned coaches and designated groups armed with automaticweapons rush forward to assault coaches which are st i l l s tanding.Other groups take supplies from freight cars and then set fire to the

train. Rails are removed from the track at some distance from theambush site in each direction to delay the arrival of reinforcementsby t ra in . In p lanning the ambush of . a t ra in , remember that theenemy may include armored rai lroad cars in the train for i tsprotection and that important trains may be preceded by advancegua rd locomotives or inspection car s to check th e tra ck.

c. Ambush of Waterway Traffic . Waterway traffic like barges,ships, and other craft may be ambushed in a manner similar to a

vehicular column. The ambush party may be able to mine thew a terw a y a nd thus stop tra ff ic. If m ining is not fea sible, f ire deliveredby recoilless weapons can damage or sink the craft. Fire should bedirected at engine room spaces, the waterline and the bridge.Recovery of supplies may be possible if the craft is beached on theban ks of the wa terw a y or grounded in sha llow w a ter.

116. Mining and Sniping

a . Min ing ( fig. 33 ) .(1) Mining a ffords th e a rea comma nder a m ean s of int erdicting

enemy routes of communication and key areas with littleexpenditure of manpower. Additionally, mines allow theuser to move away from the mined site before the enemya ctivat es them. The pla nn ed use of mines as a n int erdictiontechnique a lso ha s a demoralizing effect on enemy m orale.

(2) Mines ma y be employed in conjunction w ith other

operations, such as raids, ambushes and sniping, or usedalone. When utilized alone they are emplaced along routesof communication or known enemy approaches within anarea at a t ime when traff ic is l ight . This al lows personnelemplacing the mines to complete the task without undueinterference a nd t hen m a ke good t heir esca pe,

(3) The use of mines to' cover the withdrawal of a raiding orambush force slows enemy pursuit. Their utilization in

roadbeds of highways and rai lroads interferes withmovement. Mines may be emplaced around enemyinsta llat ions. These mines w ill ca use ca sua lties to sentinels



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and patrols and tend to limit movement outside of enemyinstal lat ions.

b. Sniping (fig. 34). Sniping is an interdiction technique. It iseconomical in the use of personnel and has a demoralizing effect onenemy forces. A few trained snipers can cause casualties among

enemy personnel, deny or .hinder his use of certain routes andrequire h im t o employ a disproport iona te n umber of tr oops t o drive offthe snipers. Snipers may operate to cover a mined area, as part of araiding or ambush force or by themselves. Snipers operate best inteams of two, al ternating the duties of observer and sniper betweenthemselves.

Section III. INTERDICTION

117. Generala. UW forces use interdiction as the primary means of

accomplishing operational objectives. Interdiction is designed toprevent or hinder, by any means, enemy use of an area or route.Interdiction is the cumulative effect of numerous smaller offensiveoperations such as raids, ambushes, mining, and sniping. Enemyareas or routes that offer the most vulnerable and lucrat ive targetsfor interdict ion are industr ial faci l i t ies, mil i tary instal lat ions, andlines of comm un ica tion.

b. The results of pla nn ed interdiction progra ms a re

(1) Effective interference with the movement of personnel,supplies, equipment a nd ra w ma terial .

(2) D estr uction of st ora ge a nd production fa cilities.

(3) Destruction of Military installations. For positive resultsa t tacks are d i rected agains t the pr imary and a l ternatecritica l element s of ea ch ta rget syst em.

c. Profitable secondary results can be obtained from interdictionoperations if they are conducted over a large area. When the UWforce employs units in rapid attacks in different and widely spacedplaces it:

(1) Ma kes it d ifficult for th e enemy t o accura tely loca teguerrilla bases by analyzing guerrilla operations.

(2) Ca uses th e enemy to over-estima te t he str ength a ndsupport of th e guerrilla force.

(3) Ma y tend t o demoralize him an d lessen his will to fight.d . Suitable targets for interdict ion are faci l i t ies and material

ut i l ized by an enemy to support his war effort . Major targetssusceptible to a tt a ck by U W forces include:



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(1) Transportation — ra i lroa d, h ighwa y, wa ter, a i r.

(2) Communication — telephone, telegraph, radio, television.

(3) Industry —manufacturing facil i t ies for weapons, aircraft ,vehicles, ammunition, shipping, etc.

(4) P ow er —electric, nuclear , chemical.

(5) Fuel —ga s, oil.

(6) Milita ry insta llat ions an d personn el.

118. Planninga. The UW force commander bases interdiction planning upon his

mission. The mission should specify the results desired by the highercommander in an operational area and prescribes priorities of attackagainst target systems. The result of interdiction by UW elements

combined with attacks conducted by other forces is designed toseriously h a mper or destroy th e enemy's ability t o support his comba tforces.

b. The area commander selects targets and designatessubordinate elements to attack them. Target selection is based uponthe mission and the criteria discussed in paragraph 104. Normally,opera tions a re directed a ga inst t a rgets on a s broad a sca le as possibleuti l izing al l a vailable UW elements w hich h a ve a capa bil ity to a t t a ck

the target . Guerri l la units conduct overt at tacks against the enemy,his supply aid production facilities and his lines of communication.Closely coordinated with these overt attacks — is a widespreadprogra m of sa bota ge, str ikes a nd disa ffection initia ted a nd directed bythe underground and auxiliary forces. Attacks are timed so as toachieve maximum results from surprise and confusion and oftencoincide with opera tions of oth er t hea ter forces.

c. The enemy reaction to wide scale UW operations is usually

violent, immediate and directed against the civilian population.Inevitably, losses among civilian support elements (auxiliaries andthe underground) may be high. Continued pressure by the areacommand may lessen or divert this reaction to other areas. Theeffects of enemy reaction on the UW force is an importantconsidera tion in plan ning int erdiction opera tions.

119. Railroad Systemsa. General . Railroads presents one of the most profitable and

easily accessible target systems for attack by guerrilla forces. Ingeneral, open stretches of track; switches, repair facilities, and coaland water supplies provide unlimited opportunities for attack. Onelectrified railroads, power, sub-stations, plants end lines offer



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result in captured supplies, kill and wound enemy personnel, orliberate prisoners. Trains moving through areas menaced byguerri l las move slowly and are guarded. Attacks on guarded trainsrequire well-trained and well-armed guerrillas. Rocket launchers orother weapons capable of firing large caliber AP ammunition are

usua lly necessary ; mines may a lso be used.e. Cr i t i cal Poi nt s . Br idges , tunnels , and narrow ra i lway passes

are usually well-guarded. Repair equipment and bridging equipmentare normally located in the vicinity, and should be at tackedconcurrently.

f . Effect of Railway Interdiction . Limited operations againsttracks and traff ic only cause harassment, therefore widespreadopera tions a re necessa ry before a ny severe effect is felt by th e enemy.Harassment of repair crews by snipers and ambushes is effective inreducing enemy morale and the willingness of his personnel topar ticipat e in repa ir work.

(1) U nderground a nd a uxil ia ry units interdict ra i lroa ds ina reas a w a y from guerri l la contr ol .

(2) In terdiction of ra il tr a ffic over a w ide a rea is usually moreeffective than attacks aimed at complete destruction of ashort str etch of ra ilroa d. Apar t from th e psychologica l effect

on the enemy forces and civilian population, interdictionover a wide area hampers enemy movement more thanlimited tota l destruction.

(3) The ear ly int erdiction of r a ilroa ds interferes w ith th eenemy's offensive momentum and may forestall largescaledeportation of civilian populations. The primary effect ofinterdiction of ra ilroa ds is disrupt ion of t he enemy's flow ofsupplies, movement of troops, and industrial production.Seconda ry effects a re —

(a) Disruption of the orderly processes of dispatching andcontrolling rail movements, which in turn may result inthe accumulation of sizeable targets at rai l terminals,junctions a nd ma rsha lling ya rds. These ta rgets ar e thensusceptible to at ta ck by oth er service componen ts.

(b) Depletion of reserves of repair materials which oftenresults in the dismantling of secondary rail lines for therepair of prima ry lines.

(c) Transfer of rai l t raff ic to primary roads and highways,w hich a re vulnerable to guerri l la a nd a ir at ta ck.

(d) Increasing the burden upon enemy security forces andrepair crews.



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120. Highway Systems

a. Highways are less vulnerable targets than ra i l roads . Damageinflicted is more easily repaired and repairs require fewer criticalma teria ls an d less skilled labor.

b. Bridges, underpasses, and tunnels are vulnerable points onroad networks. Sections of road which may be destroyed by floodingfrom adjacent rivers, canals or lakes are also vulnerable. In addition,a road ma y be interdicted by cau sing rock or la nd slides.

c. Since highways have fewer vulnerable spots, i t is l ikely thatthese points will be heavily defended. This requires a large guerrillaforce and the use of heavier weapons to neutralize protectingpillboxes a nd fort ifica tions. B eca use of th is, it is better t o concentr a teon a t t a cking enemy convoys a nd columns using the highw a ys. In t heinitial stages of hostilities, small bridges, tunnels, cuts, culverts andlevees may be insufficiently protected. As guerrilla attacks increasein frequency and effect, enemy security forces increase protection ofth ese likely guerrilla t a rgets.

d . Where the roads cannot be destroyed, traffic is interrupted byreal and dummy mines. Ambushes are conducted when suitableterrain is available. Long-range fires from positions away from roadsdisrupt enemy tr a ffic.

e. Points for interdiction are selected in areas where the enemyca nn ot ea sily re-esta blish movement by m a king a sh ort detour.

121. Waterway Systemsa. The vulnerable portions of waterway systems are electrical

instal lat ions, dams and locks which are usually well guarded. Thedestruction of these installations can disrupt traffic effectively forlong periods. other waterway instal lat ions such as signal l ights,

beacons and channel markers can be effectively attacked. Sinkingvessels in restricted cha nn els by floa ting mines, limpets, or fire fromhea vy ca liber wea pons ma y be effective in blocking wa terw a y tr a ffic.

b. Dropping bridges into the waterway, creating sl ides, anddestroying levees all hinder ship movement on w a terw a ys.

c. Personnel who operate the waterway facil i t ies such as pi lotsa nd lock opera tors ma y be elimina ted. These personn el ar e not ea silyrepla ced an d th eir loss w ill effect opera tion of the w a terw a y.

d . Mines and demolitions charges may be placed at strategicpoints on the waterway. If f loating mines are used the waterway isreconnoitered for possible anti-mine nets. Cables supporting thesenets a re a t t a ched to poles or t rees on both ban ks of the w a terw a y or



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are supported by boats in the stream and should be cut beforeemploying floa ting mines.

122. Airways Systemsa. Airways are interdicted by at tacking those facil i t ies that

support air movement. Air terminals, communications systems,navigational systems, POL dumps, maintenance facil i t ies and keypersonnel ar e ta rgets for a t t a ck.

b. S ince a ir tra ffic is dependent upon fuel, lubrica nt s, spare par tsand maintenance tools, lines of communications and installationsproviding these items a re at ta cked.

123. Communication Systemsa. Wire communications are vulnerable to guerrilla attack,

however, destruction of a single axis of a wire system seldom resultsin the complete loss of long distance telephone or teletypecommunications. Alternate routing is normally available, but thedestruction of any portion of the system tends to overload therema ining fa cilities.

(1) Long distance telephone and teletype communications usecable or a combination of cable and radio relay. The cablema y be a eria l or underground. In popula ted a reas t he ca blenorma lly follow s th e roa ds, wh erea s in unpopula ted a reas i tmay run cross country. Underground cable usually runscross country, but the route is marked for the convenienceof th e ma intena nce crews.

(2) Aerial cable can be destroyed by cutting the poles andcable. Underground cable often runs through concreteconduits a nd r equires more time to destr oy. Repair of ca blecan be delayed by removing a section of the cable.Destruction of telephone central offices and repeater

stat ions causes greater damage and takes longer to repairtha n cutt ing t he ca bles.

b. Radio stations may be located in well-protected areas anddiff icult to at tack. However, antenna si tes are often located aconsiderable distance away from the receiver and transmitter. Thesefacilities are interconnected by transmission lines. Destruction of thea nt enna site a nd/or the tr a nsm ission lines is usua lly ea sier t oa ccomplish tha n destruction of the receiver or tr a nsmit ter sta tion.

124. Power SystemsP ow er lines ar e vulnera ble to a t t a ck much in the same ma nner a s

wire communications. Large transmission towers often requiredemolitions for destruction. Critical points in any power system are



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the transformer stations. If these stations are not accessible toattacks by guerrilla units, long-range fire from small or large caliberweapons may disrupt their operations. Power producing plants andsteam generating plants may be too heavily guarded for raidoperations. To disable them, UW forces should concentrate on cutting

off the fu el supply.125. Water Supply Systems

The disruption of water lines supplying industries can often beprofitably accomplished; water supplies generally are conductedth rough un derground pipe lines, a nd m a y be destroyed wit h explosivecharges. Raids against reservoir facilities and purification plants alsoa re fea sible, but th e possible effects upon th e civilian populat ion mustbe considered.

126. Fuel Supply Systems

Petroleum and natura l gases for an indust r ia l area usual ly aresupplied by pipe lines; damage to lines inflicted by rupture andignition of fuel is considera bly great er tha n da ma ge inflicted on w a terlines. Large storage tanks at either end of a pipe line are highlyvulnerable to weapons fire, especially when using incendiaryprojectiles. Contaminating agents may be injected into pipe lines orfuel tanks.

Section IV. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

127. General

Guerri l la operations are primari ly offensive in nature. Guerri l launits w ith t heir relat ively l ight w eapons a nd equipment a re norma llyinferior in strength and firepower to organized enemy forces. They

should not, th erefore, un derta ke defensive opera tions un less forced t odo so or in support of special operations conducted by other theaterforces. When the enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves bymovement and dispersion, by withdrawals, or by creating diversions.Whenever possible, defensive operations are accompanied byoffensive a ctions a ga inst th e enemy's fla nks an d rear .

128. Preparation Against Enemy Offensives

a. Adequate intelligence measures normally provide advancewarning of impending large-scale counter guerrilla operations.G uerrilla comma nders m ust be cognizan t of the follow ing a ctivities or



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conditions which might indicate impending enemy offensives in theiropera tiona l area s

(1) Advent of suita ble w ea th er for extensive field opera tions.

(2) Arr iva l of new enem y comma nd ers.

(3) Any change in the conventional battle situation whichreleases additional troops for counter guerrilla operations.Such changes include enemy victories over alliedconventional forces, a lull in active operations, and areduction of the size of th e bat tle a rea .

(4) In crea se in t he size of loca l gar risons or t he a rriva l of newunits in the area, especially if these are combat troops ortroops with special counter guerrilla capabilities such asradio direction f inding units , CBR units , rotary winged

a ircraft , mount a in, airborne, or reconn a issan ce tr oops.(5) E xtension of enemy outposts, increa sed pa tr olling a nd

aerial reconnaissance.

(6) In crea sed enemy int elligence effort a ga inst t he guerrilla s.

b. Upon receiving information that indicates the enemy isplanning a counter guerri l la campaign, the commander shouldincrease his own intelligence effort, determine the disposition andpreparedness of his subordinate units and review plans to meet theanticipated enemy action.

129. Defensive Measures

a. To divert the enemy's attention the commander directs thatdiversionary activi t ies be ini t iated in other areas. Likewise he mayintensify his operations against enemy lines of communications andinstal lat ions. Full ut i l izat ion of underground and auxil iarycapabilities assists diversionary measures.

b. In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, key installationswithin a guerri l la base are moved to an al ternate base and essentialrecords and" supplies are transferred to new locations while thoseless essential are destroyed or cached in dispersed locations. In theevent that the commander receives positive intelligence about theenemy's plans for a major counter guerrilla operation, he may decideto evacuat e his ba ses w ithout dela y.

c. The comma nder ma y decide to delay a nd h a ra ss the adva ncingenemy. Here his object is to make the attack so expensive that theenemy will terminate operations and be, content with his originaldispositions. First, security activities on the periphery as well aswithin a, base are accelerated. Maximum uti l izat ion is made of thedefensive characteristics of the terrain; ambushes are positioned to



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on the remaining two sides are formed into mobile reserves to dealw ith a ny breakouts (fig. 36).

131. Defense Against Encirclement

a . I n i t i a l Act ions . A guerrilla commander must be constantly onthe alert for indications of an encirclement. When he receivesindications that an encircling movement is in progress such as thea ppear a nce of enemy forces from tw o or t hree directions, th e guerrillacomm a nder imm ediat ely m a neuvers his forces to esca pe w hile enemylines are still thin and spread out, and coordination betweenadvancing units is not yet well established. Records and surplusequipment are either cached or destroyed. Thus, the guerrilla forceeither escapes the encirclement or places itself in a more favorable

position to meet it . If for some reason, escape is not initiallyaccomplished, movement to a ridge line is recommended. The ridgeline affords observation, commanding ground, and allows movementin several directions. The guerrillas wait on this high ground untilperiods of low visibility or other favorable opportunity for a break-through attempt occurs.

b. Breakout (fig. 37). Tw o strong comba t d eta chment s precede th ema in body w hich is covered by f la nk a nd rea r gua rds. If gaps between

the enemy units exist, the combat detachments seize and hold theflanks of the escape route. When there are no gaps in the enemylines, these detachments at tack to create and protect an escapechannel. The break-through is timed to occur during periods of poorvisibility, free from enemy observation and accurate fire. During theattempt, guerrilla units not included in the enemy circle makeattacks against his rear to lure forces away from the main break-outa tt empt a nd h elp to crea te ga ps. After a successful break-th rough, theguerrilla force should increase the tempo of its operations wheneverpossible, thus raising guerri l la morale and making the enemyca utious in t he future a bout leaving his bases to at ta ck the guerril laareas .

c. Acti on If Br eakout Fai l s (fig. 38). If the breakout attempt isunsuccessful, the commander divides his force into small groups andinstructs them to infi l t rate through the enemy l ines at night or hidein the area until the enemy leaves. This action should be taken onlyas a last resort, as it means the force will be inoperative for a periodof time and the morale of the unit may be adversely affected.Reassembly inst ructions a re a nn ounced before th e groups disperse.



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Section V. EMPLOYMENT OF UNCONVENTIONALWARFARE FORCES TO ASSIST CONVENTIONAL

FORCES' COMBAT OPERATIONS

132. General

When t he a rea of influence of th e field a rm y (or oth er convent iona lforce command) overlaps a guerrilla warfare area, operational controlof the guerrilla forces concerned is passed to the field army (or otherconvent iona l force comm a nd) comm a nder. I nt erdiction opera tions a reof great er immedia te importa nce a nd a re pla nned to support ta ct ica lobjectives. Attacks against enemy supply depots, lines ofcommunications and other installations essential to support of histactical troops increase. The psychological impact of the success offriendly conventional forces is magnified by intensified UW activity.Psychological warfare efforts exploiting these conditions areexpanded. Enemy tactical targets are located and reported toconventional forces on an ever-mounting scale, thus supporting theincreased range of modern weapons. Evasion and escape operationsexpand to handle large numbers of friendly personnel who may findthemselves evaders. In addition to the aforementioned tasks,guerrilla forces can expect missions which directly assist combat

operations of friendly tactical units. Although primarily of value insupport of the tactical offense, guerrilla warfare can also assistfriendly forces enga ged in defensive opera tions. Dur ing t he period ofoperations to assist conventional forces, link-up between friendlyta ctical comma nds a nd guerrilla forces usually ta kes place.

133. Missions

In addit ion to an accelerat ion of act ivi ty discussed in paragraph

132, guerrilla forces can a ssist t he comba t opera tions of convent iona lforces engaged in envelopment or penetration operations. Examplesof missions appropriate for guerrilla forces to assist field army (oroth er convent iona l force comm a nds) a re

a. Seizure of hey terrain to faci l i tate airborne an u amphibiousoperations. This may include portions of the airhead or beachheadline, drop and lan ding zones or r econn a issan ce an d security positions.

b. E mployment a s a reconn a issan ce a nd security force.

c. Seizure of key installations to prevent destruction by theenemy. E xa mples a re bridges, defiles, tun nels, dar ns, etc.

d . Diversionary attacks to support friendly cover and deceptionoperations.



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e. Operations which isolate selected portions of the battle area,a irborn e objective a rea or bea chhead .

134. Special Considerations

a. Tactical commanders who employ guerrilla forces must

carefully consider their capabilities when assigning them operationaltasks. Guerri l la units are organized and trained to execute plannedoffensive opera tions in enemy cont rolled a rea s. The sust a ined comba tcapabilities of guerrilla units are affected by several variables suchas: size, organization, leadership, training, equipment, background ofpersonnel and extent of civilian support. These differences areusually more pronounced among guerrilla units than in conventionalorganizations of comparable strengths. Consequently, like-size

guerrilla units may not be capable of accomplishing comparablemissions. Assignment of missions to guerrilla units should takeadvantage of their l ight infantry characterist ics and area knowledge.Attached Special Forces liaison personnel recommend to the tacticalcomma nder a ppropria te t a sks for guerrilla forces.

b. Perhaps the severest limitation common to guerrilla forceswhen employed with friendly tactical units is their shortage ofadequate voice communications equipment and transportation. Thisis part icula rly tr ue wh en guerril la units a re opera ting w ith a mobileforce in a penetration, envelopment or exploitation. For this reasonguerril la units ha ve a slow er rea ction t ime in t errain fa voring a highdegree of mechanical mobility. Conventional commanders mayovercome this disadvantage by providing the necessary equipment orutilizing the guerrilla force on an area basis. For further discussion,see pa ra gra phs 136 thr ough 138.

c. Another special consideration is the requirement forrestr ict ions in the use of nuclear weapons and CBR agents by other

friendly forces. This is particularly true when a large segment of thecivilian population supports the resistance movement. Carefulcoordination of targets selected for nuclear and CBR attack isrequired betw een t he convent iona l force comma nder a nd t he guerrillaforce. Provisions must be made to provide adequate warning tofriendly element s of th e populat ion w ho ma y be /enda ngered bynuclea r a nd C B R w eapons .

135. Command Relationships

a. General (figs. 39 a nd 40). When opera tiona l cont rol of th e U Wforces is passed to the field army (or other conventional forcecommand) commander, administrative support of the guerrillawa rfare a rea is re ta ined by , the SFOB . Concurrent wi th the cha nge in



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operational control of the guerrilla force from theater to tacticalcommand level, the Special Forces group commander provides aliaison detachment to the headquarters of the command concerned.The Special F orces lia ison deta chment a ssists t he ta ctical comma nderin the direction and coordination of attached guerrilla forces.

Operational control of part of all of the guerrilla force may be passedto lower tactical echelons as required but is normally not delegatedbelow division level.

b. Speci al F orces L i ai son D eta ch m ent .

(1) Composition . The Special Forces liaison detachment is anon-TOE team which may vary from a minimum of oneliaison officer to a modified operational detachment C or B.The size and composition of the liaison detachment isdictated by the type headquarters having operationalcontrol; size, command structure, and disposition ofguerrilla forces concerned; and availability of requiredcommunicat ion equipment.

(2) Funct ions . The liaison detachment assists the tacticalcommander in the coordination of Special Forces directedadministrat ive operations and tact ical unit directed UWopera tions. The deta chm ent comm a nder

(a) P lan s a nd r ecommend s employment of guerrilla forces.

(b) E xercises opera tiona l cont rol over guerrilla forces w henthis a uthori ty is delegated by t he ta ct ica l comma nder.

(c) Maintains l iaison with subordinate tact ical headqua rters a s directed.

(d) Maintains liaison with Special Forces groupcommander.

c. Communications . Communications between the SF liaisondetachment a nd operat iona l area s ma y be esta blished in severa l wa ys

(1) The liaison detachment may have a direct link to theoperational area (1, fig. 41) . In this situation, additionalradio equipment is provided by the SFOB for the liaisondetachment base stat ion. The advantage is directcommunications. The disadvantage is that addit ionalequipment and personnel usually must be provided by

oth er thea ter signa l sources.(2) The SFOB ma y a ct a s the ra dio intermedia ry betw een th e

liaison det a chment a nd t he opera tiona l a rea (2, fig. 41).



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In this si tuation messages are relayed from the tact icalcommand headquarters via the SFOB to the operationaldetachment. Communications from the detachment ut i l ize thereverse sequence. This system has the advantage of utilizingestablished communication facilities and requires no additional

communication equipment and personnel with the SF liaisondetachment. However, the t ime lapse between ini t iat ion andreceipt of messa ges is increa sed.

(3) A variation of the solution cited in c(2) above may beadopted when both senior and subordinate tact icalcomma nds control different elements of the g uerrilla force.For example, both field army and corps control guerrillaforces, yet insufficient communications equipment is

available to provide both headquarters with a base stat ion.The SF liaison detachment locates its base station at fieldarmy headquarters and corps relays instructions toguerrilla unit s und er its cont rol via th e Special F orces ra diofacility at army. Special forces liaison detachmentpersonnel a re loca ted a t both hea d,/qua rt ers.

136. Support of Ground Offensive Operations

a. General . As th e convent iona l force comma nd 's a rea of influen ceoverlaps the guerri l la warfare operational area, guerri l la units shif tto opera tions plan ned t o produce immediat e effects on enemy comba tforces. Initially, these activities are directed against the enemycommunication zone and army support troops and installations. Asthe distance between guerrilla and conventional forces decreases,guerri l la at tacks have greater influence on the enemy combatcapability. Guerrilla operations support penetrations andenvelopments and are particularly effective during exploitation and

pursuitb. Guer r i l la Oper ati ons D ur i ng a Penetr ati on . Due to the high

density of enemy combat troops in the immediate battle area,guerrillas can give little direct assistance to friendly forces in initialphases of a penetration (rupture of the enemy defensive position orwidening the gap). Guerrilla forces can best support the attack byisola tin g, or a ssistin g in th e seizure, of th e decisive object ive (fig. 42).Guerrilla forces hinder or prevent movement of enemy reserves,interrupt supply of combat elements, and at tack his command and

communications facilities, fire support means and air fields.Locations of critical installations and units which the guerrillascannot effectively deal with are reported to the tactical commanderfor attack. As friendly forces near the decisive objective, guerrillaunits direct their operations toward isolating the objective from



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enemy reserves. In some instances guerrilla forces may be able toseize a nd hold th e objective or key a pproa ches to it for a limited timepending link-up w ith th e convent iona l force.

c. Guer r i l l a Oper ati ons Du r i ng An En vel opm ent .

(1) Guerrilla units assist the enveloping force in much the

same way as in a penetrat ion (f ig. 43). Guerri l las canconduct diversionary attacks to assist other forces' coverand deception plans. As in the penetration, guerrillashinder movement of reserves, disrupt supply, attackcomma nd a nd communications insta l la t ions a nd reduce theeffectiveness of enemy fire support. They may assist incontainment of. bypassed enemy units. They attempt toisola te t he objective of th e enveloping force. They ma y s eizeand hold critical terrain, such as bridges, defiles andtunnels, to prevent enemy destruction. They may performscreening missions to the front and flanks or be a securityelement to fill gaps between dispersed units of theenveloping force.

(2) If used in a reconn a issan ce or security role, guerrilla u nitsoperate on an area basis. That is, they perform theirsecurity or screening r ole with in a specified a rea durin g th etime the enveloping force passes through the area.G uerril la units usua lly do not possess the t ra nsporta t ion orcomm un ica tions t o a ccompan y mobile forces.

d. Guer r i l la Oper at ions Du r in g Exploi ta t i on . As friendly tacticalunits pass from a successful penetration or envelopment to theexploitation of their gains, guerrilla operations increase ineffectiveness. As the enemy attempts to reconstitute an organizeddefense or withdraw to new posit ions he is at tacked at everyopportunity by UW forces (fig. 44). Enemy troops, normally availablefor r ear a rea securi ty duties, a re committ ed to a t t empts t o restore his

defensive position, thus enabling guerrilla attacks to be increased inscope a nd ma gnitude aga inst rear a rea insta l la t ions wh ose ca pabili tyfor defense is reduced. Guerrilla forces assist in containing bypassedenemy units, rounding up stragglers and prisoners, seizing control ofa rea s not occupied by t he exploiting force, a tt a cking enemy unit s a ndinsta l la t ions a nd a dding to the genera l demoraliza t ion caused by th eexploitation and subsequent pursuit. As link-up with the exploitingforce is accomplished, guerrilla forces may be employed as discussedin pa ra gra phs 140 through 147.



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e. Command Relationships. Operational control of the guerrillaforce is reta ined a t th e level best a ble to coordina te t he a ctions of th eoperation. As link-up becomes imminent guerrilla units nearest theattacking force may be at tached to or placed under the operationalcontrol of that force. Concurrent with link-up, responsibility for

administrative support of the guerrilla force is passed to the tacticalcomma nd. When link-up ha s been effected t he ut iliza tion of guerrillaforces is in consonance with guidance provided by the theatercommander. See paragraphs 140 through 147 for post link-upemployment.

137. Support of Airborne Operationsa. General .

(1) G uerr illa forces, by vir t ue of th eir loca t ion in enemy

controlled areas, can materially assist conventional forcesengaged in airborne operations. They support airborneforces during t he a ssault phase a nd subsequent opera dons.They may also be employed in conjunction with airbornera ids an d a rea interdict ion operat ions.

(2) For d eta ils of link-up betw een a irborne a nd guerr illaforces, see pa ra gra ph 139.

b. Guer r i l l a Assi stan ce to an Ai r bor ne Assaul t (fig . 45).

(1) In itia lly, U W forces can provide selected currentintelligence of the objective area upon which the airborneforce commander bases his plans. Immediately prior to theassault , guerri l la units may be able to secure drop andlanding zones; seize objectives within the airhead line; andoccupy reconnaissance and security positions. Concurrentwith landing of the assault echelon, guerrillas can conductreconnaissance and security missions; provide guides andinformation; interdict approaches into the objective area;

control areas between separate airheads and dispersedunits; at tack enemy reserve units and instal lat ions; andconduct diversionary at tacks as a part of the cover anddeception plan. Additionally, UW forces may controlcivilian s w ithin th e objective a rea .

(2) Correct timing of guerrilla operations with the airborneassault is essential . If committed prematurely, guerri l laforces may nullify the surprise effect of the operation and,in turn, be destroyed by the enemy. Conversely, ifcommitted too late, the desired effects of the guerrilla forceemploym ent m a y n ever be rea lized.



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c. Gu er r i l l a Assi stan ce to Subsequent Oper ati ons . As the assaultphase of an airborne operation passes into the defensive or offensivephase, UW forces continue to exert pressure on the enemy forces inth e vicinit y of th e object ive a rea . G uerr illas cont inue to provide up-to-date information on enemy moves and disposition. Attacks are

directed against enemy units at tempting to contain or destroy thea irborne force, th us requirin g him t o fight in more tha n one direction.Airborne forces which have an exploitation mission may employrecovered guerrilla units in reconnaissance and security roles asguides and to assist in control of void areas between dispersed units.If the airborne force is to be withdrawn, the guerri l las can assist tocover the withdrawal by diversionary operations conducted in therea r of enemy forces.

d. Ai r bor ne Raid s . Guerri l la forces assist airborne raids in asimilar fashion a s th ey do the assa ult pha se of a n a irborne opera tion.They provide information and guides; perform reconnaissance andsecuri ty missions and divert enemy forces during the withdrawal ofthe raiding force. An additional factor to consider before usingguerrilla forces to support a n a irborne ra id is the un desirable effect ofenemy reaction on resistance organizations after withdrawal of thera iding force.

e. Area Interdiction Operations . Airborne units are seldomcommitted to guerrilla warfare areas to conduct interdictionoperations if the guerrilla force has the capability to conduct suchoperations. However, in areas where no effective resistance exists,a irborne forces m a y be comm itt ed to conduct interdiction opera tions.Whatever guerrilla forces are located in areas selected for airborneinterdiction, assist the airborne force to conduct their operations.They provide intelligence information and guides; conduct

reconn a issan ce a nd security missions; cont rol the civilian populat ion;assist in collecting supplies and generally aid the airborne forcecommander in making the transition from conventional operations to.guerrilla operations. Special forces detachments, if available, mayconduct special t raining within the operational area to increase theca pability of th e airborne force in guerrilla w a rfa re techn iques.

f . Com m and Rel ati onships .

(1) Operational control of guerrilla forces within the objective

area or influencing the mission of the airborne force isexercised by the airborne force commander. Control of otherguerrilla forces whose effect upon the airborne operation isindirect is initia lly reta ined by the comma nder directing t he



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airborne operation (joint airborne task force or theaterarmy commander).

(2) Concurrent with link-up, responsibility for administrativesupport of the guerrilla force is passed to the link-up force.For employment of guerrilla forces after link-up, seepar a gra phs 140 through 147.

138. Support of Amphibious Operations

(fig . 46)

a. General .

(1) G uerr illas support conven tiona l forces enga ged inamphibious operations, generally in one or more of thefollow ing w a ys (fig. 22)

(a) By conducting operations to hinder or deny the enemya pproach to th e bea chhea d.

(b) B y seizing a nd holding a ll or a port ion of the bea ch hea d.

(c) B y a ssist ing airborne opera tions which a re a pa rt of orcomplement t he am phibious a ssa ult.

(d) By conducting cover and deception operations to deceivethe enemy a s to th e loca tion of the a ctua l bea chhea d.

(2) G uerrilla forces opera ting w ithin th e objective a rea w ill beassigned to the operational control of the amphibious taskforce commander when he becomes responsible for theobjective area. Operational control of guerrilla forces isfurther assigned to the landing force commander when heassumes responsibility for operation ashore. Normally,operational control of guerrilla forces assisting amphibiousoperations is not passed below divisional level. Concurrent

with link-up, responsibility for administrative support ofth e guerrilla force is pass ed to th e link-up force.

b. Guer r i l l a Assi stan ce to an Am phi bious Assaul t .

(1) If t he selected bea chhea d is defended in st rengt h, guerrillaoperations are planned to hinder or deny the enemyapproaches into the beachhead area. By prearranged plan,guerri l la units interdict approaches into the area; at tackreserves; destroy command and communications facilities;logistical installations and airfields which can support theenemy defense forces in or near the beachhead. Firesupport elements within range of the beachhead are aprima ry guerril la t a rget .



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(2) If th e selected bea chhea d is light ly defended or und efended,guerrilla units may seize and hold portions of thebeachhea d. G uerrilla fa rces seize their objectives just priorto the initial assault. When required, landing force unittasks must provide for early relief of guerrilla units. Plans

for naval fire support to guerrilla forces must includeprovisions for the conduct and adjustment of fires. Navalliaison personnel, shore fire control pa rt ies, a nd t a ctica l a ircontrol parties will be attached when required. The size ofthe beachhead, enemy si tuation and size of the guerri l laforce govern the extent of the beachhead to be allotted toth e guerrilla s. For employment of guerrilla forces a fter link-up, see par a gra phs 140 thr ough 147.

(3) If are airborne operation is conducted as a part of or to

complement the amphibious operation, guerrillas can beemployed a s described in par a gra ph 137.

(4) G uerr illas m a y be employed in a cover a nd deception role t oassist amphibious assaults. Guerrilla forces intensifyoperations in selected areas to deceive the enemy as to theexact location of the main landings. Air defense radar andcoa sta l detection st a t ions a re ta rgets for guerri lla a t t a ck toreduce the enemy's early warning capability. Rumors as tot ime and place of landing may be spread among thepopulation. A sudden increase in, or cessation of resistanceactivities tends to keep the enemy on edge and uncertain.The employment of the guerrilla force in support of coverand deception is integrated into the overall amphibiousopera tion pla n.

(5) Guerrilla operations in support of the landing force aftercompletion of the assault phase and termination of theamphibious operation are as discussed in paragraphs 136

a nd 140 thr ough 147.(6) As in airborne operations, timing of the use of guerrilla

forces in relation to the amphibious operation is extremelyimportant , Premature commitment alerts the enemy andmay lead to the destruction of the guerrilla force.Conversely, late employment may not have the desiredeffect upon th e enemy .

139. Link-Up Operations

a. General .

(1) Most offensive opera tions in w hich guerr illa forces a ssisttactical commands involve a juncture between elements of



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the two forces. Normally during link-up operations, theguerrilla force is the stationary force, and the conventionalun it th e link-up force.

(2) Not a ll guerrilla forces in a n opera tiona l ar ea a re involvedin link-up with tactical units. Some guerrilla units may be

assigned missions assist ing tact ical commands where therequirements of the operation preclude physical juncture.For example, during a raid or area interdiction operationsby a irborne forces or w hen conducting opera tions a s par t ofa cover and deception plan for an amphibious force, it isoften undesirable to link-up all guerrilla units with theattacking units .

(3) Concurrent with link-up responsibility for administrativesupport of the guerrilla force passes from the SFOB to thelink-up force.

(4) Regardless of the conditions under which link-up occurs,th e follow ing considera tions govern pla nn ing:

(a) Comma nd rela t ionships.

(b) Liaison.

(c) Coordina tion of schemes of ma neuver.

(d) Fire coordina tion mea sures.

(e) Commun ica tions coordina tion.(f) E mployment follow ing link-up.

b. Command Relationships . Operational control of guerrillaforces is retained by the major link-up force until link-up is effected.For example, a division making an airborne assault exercisesoperational control of the guerrilla force. When link-up with guerrillaunits is accomplished, these units may then be employed underdivision cont rol or at ta ched to subordina te elements such a s a br iga deon an independent or semi-independent mission. For a detaileddiscussion of command relationships in various situations, seepa ra gra phs 136, 137, a nd 138.

c. Liaison .

(1) As opera tiona l cont rol of guerrilla w a rfa re a rea s a retransferred from theater level to tactical commands, liaisonpersonnel are exchanged between the SFOB and thetactical command concerned. The SFOB attaches a SpecialForces liaison detachment to the tactical command

headquarters. For composition and duties of this liaisondeta chment , see par a gra ph 135.

(2) As t he dist a nce betw een th e t a ctical comma nd a ndguerrilla forces decreases, operational control of the



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CHAPTER 9

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OFUNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

148. General

a. Unconventional warfare involves ideological, religious,political, and social factors which promote intense, emotionalpart isanship. Resista nce orga nizat ions tend t o at t ra ct personnel wh oaccept violent change as a means of social action; they are motivatedby hope for change. But, the fluid nature of resistance activity, the

alternate, periods of isolation and combat, the surreptitious lifemakes resistance personnel particularly susceptible to propagandaaffects.

b. The ideologica l a nd politica l fa ctors a ssocia ted w ith resista nceactivity create a fertile field for propaganda. Members of resistancemovements are active propagandists. Hence, we find paralleling theguerrilla military effort a propaganda effort conducted by allresista nce elements seeking t o ga in support for th eir movement . The

relat ive isolat ion and clandestine atmosphere associated withresistance activities creates a continuing need for propaganda tosupport t he effort .

c. In peace or war Special Forces units, by their very presence ina par ticula r count ry, ha ve a psychologica l impact on select milita ry orparamilitary elements and on informed elements of the population.The image created by Special Forces personnel is molded by amultitude of factors which bear heavily on the successful outcome ofthe operation. These factors include tangible evidence of UnitedStates interest and support of the people by the presence of SpecialForces personnel, the results of day-to-day, face-to-face meetings andan intelligent understanding of the objective and problems of theindigenous guerrilla force. The image is more favorable, however, ifpsychological operations techniques are used at all stages in theorganization of the guerrilla units, especially in the preinfiltrationsta ges, to prepa re th e potentia l guerrilla force a nd a uxiliar y forces forthe a rrival of Un ited St a tes personnel and, subsequently, in pointingup mut ua l effort s t o achieve common politica l a nd milita ry objectives.This new focus imposes additional burdens on the detachmentcommander, requiring him to have a detailed knowledge ofpsychologica l opera tions ca pabilities a nd t he ima gina tion to use th em



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w ithin t he peculiar opera tiona l environment in w hich he is immersed.The psychological implications of unconventional warfare make aknowledge of psychologica l opera tions import a nt . This is par ticula rlytr ue w hen S pecia l Forces opera tions a re predomina nt ly psychologica lopera tions, such a s in the initia l pha ses of forming guerrilla un its a nd

seeking to w in t he a ssista nce of support ing element s.d . This chapter outlines how psychological operations assist

Special Forces units in carrying out their missions, helping tomaximize the chances for success and thereby contributing to ashort ening of the conflict.

149. Concept and Organization

Planned psychological operations assist in the conduct of

unconventional warfare operations both before and during hostilitiesand through those cold war act ivi t ies in which the United StatesArm y m a y be enga ged. These psychological opera tions a re designed tocreate, reinforce or sustain those attitudes held by the populationwhich cause them to act in a manner beneficial to their own and toU nited S ta tes objectives.

a. N at ional Progr ams . The United States Information Agency(USIA) conducts psychological operations which have the broad

objective of generally defining American principles and aims andinterpreting America, and its people to other peoples. This includessupporting the right of all of the peoples of the world to choose theirown form of government. USIA programs can be used to preparepotential or designated Special Forces operational areas for thepsychological a ccepta nce of America n milit a ry personn el.

b. T heater an d Ser vi ce Com ponent Com m an ds . Armypsychologica l wa rfar e units a re ava ila ble with in th e overseas t heat er

or comma nd t o assist in a mplifying t he broa d policies a nd goa ls in t hepart icular a rea in w hich unconventiona l wa rfa re units are committ ed.During hostilities a psychological operations staff officer coordinatesw ith t he J oint U nconvent iona l Wa rfa re Ta sk Force (J U WTF) to a ssistSpecial Forces detachments in their respective areas of operations.Planning for Special Forces operations includes the use ofpsychological operations in all phases of the unconventional warfareoperation, from psychological preparation stage throughdemobilization.

150. Target Audiences

a. Enemy Target Audience . The enemy target audience mayconsist of severa l. element s:



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(1) E nemy Milita ry Forces.

(a) En emy milita ry forces may be of the sam e nat iona lity a sthe population or they may represent an occupyingforeign power. In either case the guerrilla force and theauxil iary personnel support ing them attempt to makeenemy soldiers feel isolated and under-supported bypointing up any inadequacies in their supplies andequipment, and the perennial danger of death. Byfocusing on the enemy soldier 's frustrations,psychological operations can lower his morale andreduce his effectiveness, pa rt icula rly in conjunction w iththe powerful pressures generated by continuous combataction. Ambushing supply columns, sniping, small scale

raids against isolated units , cutt ing enemycommunications lines and the destruction of vitalobjectives at night induce a basic feeling of inadequacy,insecurity a nd fear in t he enemy soldier. This feeling ofinadequa cy a nd fear permit ea sy a ccess to the mind w iththe several tools of psychological operations, and makethe enemy soldier vulnerable to appeals urgingsurrender, malingering, or desertion. The enemy

soldier's feeling of isolation and his receptivity to oura ppeals ar e furth er aided through lea flets a nd broa dca stmessages which stress the popular support of the aimsof the guerrillas.

(b) The psychological "isolation" campaign may besupplemented by a more positive technique designed toelicit more readily observable reactions. If the SpecialForces commander desires to induce enemy soldiers todefect or desert, satisfying and realistic goals must beintroduced to attract the target audience. The enemysoldier should be told wh y a nd h ow he should defect a ndgiven assurances concerning his safety and welcome bythe guerrilla force. When enemy soldiers are taken bythe guerrillas, promises of safety and good treatmentmust be kept. Proof of good treatment is passed on toenemy units by photogra phing th e soldier, ha ving himsign lea flets, or even ha ving him ma ke loudspeakerappeals to his former comrades. If these techniques areunfeasible, auxiliary personnel may inform enemy unitsby word of mouth of the well being of defected orcaptured personnel. Obviously, the defection of anenemy soldier is important news to his former



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colleagues, since it indicates to those remaining behindthat a defector 's safety is assured. This fact can have agreat psychological impact on the enemy and on theguerrillas themselves — the enemy is made to feel thathis ow n comra des, a re wa vering a nd do not support the

enemy goals; while the guerri l las learn that the enemyis weakening and their own chances for successincreasing.

(2) Civi l ian col laborators . Civil ians in the operational areamay be supporting a puppet form of government orotherwise collaborating with an enemy occupation force.Themes and appeals disseminated to this group varyaccordingly, but the psychological objectives are the sameas those for the enemy military. An isolation program

designed to inst i l l doubt a nd fear ma y be ca rried out a nd apositive political action program designed to elicit activesupport of the guerrillas also may be effected. If theseprograms fail, i t may become necessary to take moreaggressive action in the form of harsh treatment. Harshtreatment of key collaborators can weaken thecollaborators' belief in. the strength and power of theirmili tary forces. This approach, fraught with propagandadangers, should be used only after all other appeal means

ha ve fa i led. If used, they must be made to appea r a s thoughinitiated and effected by the guerrillas to reduce thepossibility of reprisals a ga inst civilia ns.

b. Civi l i an Popul at ion .

(1) No guerrilla movement can succeed without a majority ofthe population being favorably inclined toward it . Often,however, in the initial stage of hostilities, the population,because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of themovement, may be neutral or opposed to the guerrillas.This is understandable because the population is caughtbetween the demands and controls of the enemy force andthose of the guerrillas, In this instance, force and the mainobjective of psychological operations in guerrilla warfare isto persuade the ta rget group tha t t he guerri l la s ar e fightingfor t he w elfar e a nd goals of the popula t ion, th a t t hese goa lsa re a t ta inable an d tha t the Uni ted St a t es in suppor t ing theguerrilla force is pressing for the same political and socialgoa ls. Psychologica l progra ms a imed a t this t a rget a udiencestr ess a ppeals designed t o induce the populat ion t o supportand obey the guerrillas in achieving recognized commonobjectives.



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(2) By their presence in the operational area, Special Forcespersonnel are able to gather exploitable information on theimmediate si tuation and on the at t i tudes and behavior ofthe local population. The guerrilla force and its supportingelements are a valuable storehouse of information which

can be used to strengthen psychological operations plansdirected at civilian and enemy target audiences. Armedwith this information, the special forces commander canthen request support from the theater psychologicaloperations officer to assist in carrying out a predeterminedand coordinated psychological program. This support maytake the form of dropping newspapers and other,semiofficial media to the population, supplying the

guerri l las with material to produce printed Matter andproviding the special forces commander with additionala dvice an d t echniques to conduct a detai led a nd integra tedpsychological program to supplement the guerrillaoperation.

c. Guer r i l las and the Auxi l i ar ies . The th ird ma jor t a rget a udienceto be considered by the Special Forces commander comprises theguerrillas, the auxiliaries, and those underground elements assisting

the guerrillas. The guerrilla force has been given proof that theUnited States supports the general objectives of the guerrillamovement. But, as the representat ive of the United States theatercommander, the Special Forces detachment commander must insurethat specific goals for the guerrillas and its support elements arereinterpreted and reemphasized continually during the hostilitiesphase.

151. Types of Psychological Warfare Operations in GuerrillaWarfare Operational Areas

a. Action Operations . Action operations are those operationstaken by the Special Forces commander which are designed to have apsychological effect on any of the three major target audiences. Asindicated above, some combat actions may be initiated by the SpecialForces comma nd er purely for psy chologica l purposes, especially t hoserelated to raising the morale of the guerrilla fighters or to manifestguerrilla support of the people. The purpose of these actions is to

reinforce belief in the strength of the guerrilla force and in therightness of their goals. These beliefs when held by the populationopen up sources of food and information required for the survival ofthe guerrilla force. Enemy credence in the strength of the guerrilla



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force tends to lower his morale and weaken the efficiency of hisoperations. Examples of actions initiated primarily for psychologicalrea sons tha t can be ta ken by th e special forces comma nder a re:

(1) Assisting th e civilian populat ion by distribut ing a nda dministering medica l supplies;

(2) The rescue and evacuation of key civilians supporting theguerrilla cau se;

(3) Warning the civilian population of impending aircraft ormissile attacks in the local area. These warnings implyguerrilla cont rol over th e opera tion a nd furt her increa se thebelief in t he str ength of the guerrilla force;

(4) When a rea suprema cy is a chieved, encoura ging a nd

assisting the civilian population to resume their normalactivities. This may involve use of the guerrillas orauxiliary units in assisting the local population to repairbuildings, build needed structures, harvest crops, reopenschools and churches, organize social activity groups, etc.;

(5) The institution of honest and effective government in thea rea . These psychologica l progra ms must ca rry th e fullw eight of the prest ige a nd legali ty of the U nited Sta tes and

its allies. This is demonstrated by having appropriatedirectives emanate from United States authori t ies atth eat er level or high er. J oint directives issued by U nitedStates and indigenous guerrilla leaders or a crediblegovernment-in-exile give added force to the actionprograms.

(6) Meetin g civilia ns fa ce-t o-fa ce. Dur ing t hose periods ofoperations before the Special Forces commander cana ctively assist th e civilian populat ion t o resume a r ela tivelynormal life, the commander must reinforce written appealsby conducting meetings or discussions with the localcivilian s. These provide a ddit iona l ta ngible evidence to th epopula t ion tha t the guerri l la s are supported by th e U nitedStates and that both are working in the interests of thepopulation. Members of the Special Forces detachmentparticipate in such meetings to establish full rapport withthe population, thereby diminishing the "foreignness" ofS pecia l Forces personnel. These meetin gs help ident ify thegueril la s a nd U nited St a tes personnel with the popula t ion.

b. Pr in ted M edi a . The leaflet, poster or bulletin is the mostcommon and most effective type of printed material used by the



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Special Forces commander and the guerrillas in the operational area.Small printing presses and other simple types of reproducingmachines can be used to print leaflets and news communiqu é s. Thetechnical problems associated with printing may be considerable anddissemination of the leaflets difficult in those areas where the enemy

is able to maintain firm control. In the initial stages of hostilities,w hen psychologica l opera tions a re most vita l, guerrilla forces ma y notha ve the facilities to produce lar ge am ount s of printed ma teria l.

The t echn iques of leaflet w riting for un convent iona l opera tions a rethe sa me a s t hose for conventiona l progra ms. G uerril la s, aided by th eSpecia l Forces comma nder, can usua lly select t hemes w hich a re moretimely, more credible and more consistent than those which emanatefrom sources outside the operational area. The Special Forces

commander can augment the locally prepared program by having'small newspapers dropped into the area to supplement bulletinsissued through auxil iary unit channels. Printed material should beused to emphasize favorable aspects of civic action programs alreadyundertaken. War aims should be publicized as aspects of permanentnational aims and policies and disseminated as official lookingleaflets. Leaflets carrying the official text of joint communiqu é ssigned by the theater commander and known resistance leaders

should be official and formal in appearance when issued to the targetaudience.

c. Rumor . Rumor can be an effective propaganda device,especially when employed to disseminate black propaganda. TheSpecial Forces commander, using guerrillas and auxiliaryinformation channels, can ini t iate rumor campaigns in theoperational area, if the situation calls for them. Themes that theSpecial Forces commander would be reluctant to sanction as official

information can be spread through the medium of rumor. Althoughrumors are difficult to control and the target audience neverspecifically isolated, this medium does have the advantage of beingvirtually impossible to trace. Since this device is also exploitable bythe enemy, rumors which are detr imental to the guerri l la effortshould be countered by leaflet or face-to-face meetings with selectedmembers of the civilian population.

152. Psychological Operations to Support Demobilization

P sychologica l opera tions a re used to a ssist in t he demobiliza tion ofa guerrilla force. They consist of progra ms using a ll media t o expla into the guerrilla steps to be taken in the demobilization process. Ina ddit ion, reha bili ta t ion programs, sponsored by t he U nited St a tes or



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the national government concerned, are explained to the guerrillaswith emphasis on the guerrilla 's role in the future plans for theircountry. In general, psychological operations aid in the orderlytransition of the guerrilla force to more normal pursuits and prepareth e civilian populat ion for t he retur n of guerrilla elements.



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CHAPTER 10DEMOBILIZATION

153. General

When juncture between friendly conventional troops and the areacommand is completed, the ability of guerrilla forces to supportmili ta ry opera tions gr a dua lly diminishes. U nits reta ined beyond t heirperiod of usefulness may become a liability and a potential source oftrouble. Consideration is given to the demobilization of guerrilla

cont ingent s in sectors occupied by U .S . tr oops. The decision rega rdin gthe transfer of guerrilla forces and associated organizations to thenational government concerned is one which must be resolved at thetheater level. Problems of international relationships, attitudes of thecivil populat ion t ow a rd th ese forces, a nd vice versa , a nd t he politica l,economic and social implications of such a transfer are a paramountconsideration. In the event that no recognized national governmentexists, the decision to disband the forces, in part or in their entirety,likewise requires ca reful considera tion. D isban ding of guerrilla forceswhen composed of elements foreign to the area may be extremelydangerous. In any case, Special Forces units may be involved indemobilization procedures. Measures to achieve adequatecoordination between special forces, civil affairs (CA) and othera ppropriat e mil ita ry a nd polit ica l a uthori t ies a re inst i tuted t o insurea disposition of guerrilla forces in harmony with the long-rangepolitica l objectives of th e Un ited St a tes in th e ar ea.

154. Role of Sponsoring Powersa. When a theater command has completed combat operations

with a guerrilla force, it may release the force to the provisionalgovernment recognized by the U nited St a tes.

b. Although the responsibility for demobilization and utilizationof guerrilla forces belongs to the provisional government, the UnitedStates is responsible for restoring and maintaining public order, asfar a s possible, a nd m a y h a ve to assume th ese obliga tions tempora ri ly

unt il a n effective a dministr a tion ha s been esta blished.



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155. Planning

a . In i t i a t ion of P lans . Long-range planning for the eventualdisposition of the guerrilla force commences at theater level as soonas these forces have been organized. Planning is continuous and isrevised concurrently with operations to reflect the existing political

and military situation. Appropriate instructions are included inth eat er civil a ffa irs plans. D ecisions a ffecting th e eventua l dispositionof U.S. sponsored guerrilla and associated forces are made at thehighest politica l an d milita ry levels in th e th eat er.

b. Civi l Affai r s Role . Demobilization instructions are written intoCA annexes to theater plans. Also, CA teams may be provided toassist in demobilization procedures, particularly when no suitableprovisional government exists to assume control. CA personnel are

normally attached to Special Forces detachments prior to release offormer guerri l las to CA authori ty in order to maintain adequateliaison throughout th e tra nsition an d demobilizat ion period.

c. Speci al For ces Rol e . Commanders of Special Forces units thatha ve been sponsoring guerrilla u nits a nd comma nders of CA elementstha t a re a ssuming responsibil ity esta blish l ia ison t o assure turn overwithout loss of control or influence. SF commanders provide CAcomma nders w ith t he follow ing:

(1) All available lists of guerrillas, their supporters and otherkey inhabitants , together with any knowledge as to theirpolitical attitudes, their leadership or administrativepotential , and other information that might be helpful inopera tions subsequent t o the U W pha se.

(2) Area studies and intelligence not already available to CAelements.

156. Demobilization Courses of Actiona. Demobil izat ion by U.S. forces may take any one or a

combina tion of th e follow ing cours es:

(1) The guerrilla forte, with all arils and equipment, may berelea sed to t he recognized governm ent.

(2) The g uerrilla force, min us U .S. supplied a rm s a ndequipment, ma y be relea sed to the recognized government .

(3) The guerrilla force may be, demobilized and relocated by

the U. S .b. Demobilization is planned and conducted so as to include the

following:

(1) Assem bly of t he guerr illa force.



179

(2) Completion of a dm inist ra tive records .

(3) Set tlement of pay , a llow a nces, a nd benefits.

(4) S ett lement of cla ims.

(5) Aw a rd ing of decora tions.

(6) Collection of a rm s a nd equipment .(7) Ca re of sick a nd w ounded.

(8) Discharge.

(9) P rovision for th e r eha bilita tion a nd employment ofdischarged guerrillas. Prevention of bandit ora nt igovernment ba nds forming from guerrilla element s.

157. Assembly of the Guerrilla Forcea. The guerrilla force is gathered by units into assembly areas.

All records a nd equipment a re brought w ith t he units . Hospita ls an dconvalescent camps are centrally located. Training programs areconducted t o occupy a nd reorient th e men.

b. The guerrilla force, during demobilization, may represent apowerful political element in the liberated area. Support from itsmembers for va rious ca uses ca n be sought by fa ctions both w ithin a ndout side the guerr illa forces. In th e interest of orderly demobilizat ion,politica l a ctivity by or a mong t he, guerrilla s is closely supervised a nd

movement of the guerrillas is controlled to prevent desertions anda bsence with out lea ve.

158. Completion of Administrative RecordsAll elements of the guerrilla force complete the administrative

records of their units. Certificates are prepared to cover records thathave been lost or destroyed: Complete payrolls are prepared and arereconciled with authorized unit strength figures. Arms andequipment a re inventoried an d a ccount a bility is esta blished.

159. Settlement of Pay, Allowances and BenefitsMembers of the force are paid after previous partial payments

have been deducted. Authorized benefits are paid to legalsurvivors of men w ho ha ve died or w ere killed in a ction.

160. Settlement of ClaimsAdministrative delay in the settlement of claims arising from t he

activities of resistance forces is d, potential source of ill will and often

results in injustice. The method of settlement outlined belowelimina tes the need for a n elaborat e claims service by a headq ua rterswhich may be required to act without adequate information. I t alsomakes possible the prompt payment of claims and minimizes thepossibility of fraud.



180

a. A fixed sum is credited to the recognized local government forsettlement of a uth orized obligat ions incurred by guerrilla forces priorto their demobilization. Within that sum and prior to an announcedfuture date, claims may be approved and certified to CA; the CAcommander, after reviewing available records authorizes payment.

The above procedure does not apply in the case of claims madeaga inst the U ni ted Sta tes .

b. Claims teams are set up within each guerri l la unit havingauthority to issue receipts or otherwise incur financial obligation.Disbursing officers are attached to each claims team. Notices arepublished in th e a rea of opera tions a nnouncing tha t claims tea ms w illbe present on specified da tes t o receive a nd pay claim s.

c. The claims team establishes an office in the area and bringswith it the records pertaining to receipts and expenditures. Receiptsa re verif ied a nd a pproved by the guerri lla members of the tea m a ndpresented to the disbursing officer who makes immediate payment tothe claimant from funds credited to the unit. Claims for services orda ma ges not covered by receipts, if they a re below a specified a mount,are processed by the claims team based on information, available.La rger claims a re forw a rded to higher headq ua rters for a ct ion.

161. Awards and DecorationsPrompt action is taken on recommendations for decorations and

awards for deserving guerrillas and other resistance members. Thea w a rds a re ma de at loca l ceremonies a t t ended, when pra ctica l , by theguerrilla troops, the civilian population, high-ranking officers of theconventional forces and officials of the provisional government assoon a fter a n opera tion a s possible.

162. Collection of Arms and Equipment

a. If arms and equipment are to be collected, they are turned inby the guerrillas before the settlement of pay, allowances andbenefi ts . Care is taken that weapons are not hidden for later andunlawful use. Public announcement is made that weapons must beturned in and that, after a specified date, unlicensed Possession ofw eapons or mil ita ry equipment w ill be unla w ful.

b. In t he event t ha t t he guerri l la force, w ith a rms a nd equipment,

is to be turned over to a recognized national government, this phaseis omitted. Inventories of arms and equipment in hands of theguerrillas are conducted jointly by representatives of the localna tiona l government a nd U .S. forces.



181

163. Care of Sick and Wounded

G uerril la hospita ls a re kept in operat ion un ti l the pa tients can betaken over by military hospitals or by civilian institutions. Everyeffort is made to insure that wounded and sick guerrilla soldiers aregiven necessary care. Permanently disabled guerri l las may be

gra nt ed pensions by th e recognized govern ment .

164. Discharge

In the event that a person sworn in as a member of a guerri l laforce is to pass from control of the Special Forces detachment, thatperson is given a discharge and testimonial of his services. Thedischa rge provisions a pplica ble to milita ry personnel will be used a s aguide. Current Department of Army forms appropriately modified

ma y be used.

165. Rehabilitation and Employment of Discharged Guerrillas

a. Suitable measures are taken to assist discharged guerri l las ina ssuming th eir pla ces in civilia n life. Some may be given employmentby the conventional forces or by the newly constituted government.Individuals or entire units may be incorporated into the police orarmed forces of the new government. Where feasible, assistance in

rebuilding damaged houses or farms belonging to guerrillas may begranted. However, rehabilitation does not usually involve U.S. forcesw here a provisional govern ment capa ble of rendering a id exists.

b. Perhaps the greatest danger in any demobil izat ion program isthe possibility that former guerrillas will resort to dissidence,factional quarrels or even to banditry. Others may take advantage ofthe prevalent unstable conditions to organize quasi-military orpolitica l groups w hich w ill conflict w ith th e provisional government orU.S. authorities. It is vital, therefore, that demobilization procedures

be executed expeditiously and with foresight. Procedures which areinstituted will be an outgrowth of deliberations on a high level bymilita ry a nd politica l au th orities. In t he implementa tion of directives,maximum coordination between Special Forces, CA and otherappropriate elements is necessary. To preclude troublesomesituations from arising, tight control measures should be institutedand persons suspected of favoring action hostile to the establishedauthority are kept under surveillance. Every effort is made to fosteracceptance on their part of peaceful means to bring about arestorat ion of the governmental s tructure and assimilate thereadjustments in society which accompany a cessation of wartimepursuits. P sychologica l opera tions can be of considera ble assista nce inth ese activities.



182

166. Auxiliaries and the Underground

Demobilization procedures usually have little effect upon theauxiliaries and the underground. Where possible, the area commandfurnishes names of known active underground and auxil iarypersonnel to the new government. I t can be anticipated that these

personnel will receive less in the way of actual benefits than theguerrillas but they should receive some public recognition for theirservices.



183

APPENDIX IREFERENCES

1. GeneralJ CS P U B 1 Dict iona ry of U ni ted St a t es Mil ita ry Terms

for J oint U sage.AR 220-50 Regiment s, G enera l P rovisionsAR 320-5 D ictiona ry of U nit ed S ta tes Arm y TermsAR 320-50 Aut horized Abbrevia tions a nd B revity Codes

FM 21-5 Milita ry Tra iningFM 21-6 Techn iques of Milita ry In st ructionFM 21-30 Milita ry S ym bolsFM 21-50 Ra ng er Tra iningFM 21-75 Comba t Tra ining of th e In dividual Soldier a nd

Patroll ing.FM 21-76 S ur viva lFM 21-77 E va sion a nd E scapeFM 21-77A E va sion a nd E scape (U )FM 21-150 H a nd -to-H a nd Comba tFM 31-21A G uerr illa Wa rfa re a nd S pecia l Forces

Opera tions (U ) .FM 31-30 J un gle Opera tionsFM 31-40 Ta ctica l C over a nd D ecept ion (U )FM 31-70 B a sic Cold Wea th er Ma nu a lFM 31-71 Nort hern Opera t ionsFM 33-5 P sychological Wa rfa re Opera tionsFM 100-1 Field S ervice Regula tions D octr ina l G uid-

a nce (U )FM 100-5 Field S ervice Regula tions, Opera tionsFM 101-5 St a ff Officers' Field Ma nua l; St a ff Orga niza -

t ion a nd P rocedureFM 101-10 St a ff Officers' Field Ma nua l; Orga niza tion,

Technica l and Logist ica l Da ta , P a rt I .D A P a m 108-1 In dex of Army Motion P ictu res, Film S tr ips,

Slides a nd P hono-Recordings.



184

D A P a m 310- Milita ry P ublica tions In dexes (a s a pplica ble)series

NWP 43 E va sion a nd E sca pe (U )

2. Demolitions and MinesFM 5-25 E xplosives a nd D emolit ionsFM 5-31 U se a nd In sta llat ion of B oobytr a psFM 5-34 E ngineer Field Da taFM 9-40 E xplosive Ord na nce Reconna issa nce a nd

DisposalFM 20-32 La nd Mine Wa rfa reFM 31-10 B a rriers a nd D enial Opera tionsS M 9-5-1375 FS C G roup 13: Amm un ition a nd E xplosives;

Cla ss 1375: Explosives, Solid P ropella nt s,and Explosive Devices

TM 5-223 Foreign Mine Wa rfa re E qu ipmentTM 9-1910 Milit a ry E xplosivesTM 9-1940 La nd Min esTM 9-1946 D emolition Ma t eria ls

3. WeaponsFM 23-5 U .S . Rifle, Ca liber .30 M1FM 23-7 C a rbin e, C a liber .30 M1, M1A1 M2, M3FM 23-15 B row nin g Aut oma tic Rifle, Ca liber .30

M1918A2FM 23-25 B a yonetFM 23-30 G rena des a nd P yrotechnicsFM 23-32 3.5-inch Rocket La un cherFM 23-35 P istols a nd Revolvers

FM 23-41 S ubma chine G un s, Ca liber .45, M3 a nd M3A1FM 23-55 B row nin g Ma chinegun s, Ca liber .30

M1917A1, M1919A4, M1919A4E1,M1919A6, a nd M37

FM 23-85 60-mm Mort a r, M19FM 23-90 81-mm Mort a r a nd M29

4. CommunicationsFM 11-16 S igna l Ord ers, Records, a nd Report sFM 24-18 Field Ra dio Techniq uesTM 11-263 Ra dio S et , AN/G RC-9, AN/G RC-9A, AN/ G RC -9X, AN/G RC-9Y AN/G RC-9AX

AN/G RC-87, a nd AN/VRC -34



185

TM 11-296 Ra dio S et , AN/P RC -6TM 11-612 Ra dio S et s, AN/P RC -8 AN/P RC -8A, AN/

P RC -9, AN/P RC -9A a nd AN/P RC-10AN/P RC-10A, a nd AN/P RC-28

TM 11-666 Ant enna s a nd Ra dio P ropag a tionTM 11-486-6 E lectr ica l Comm unica tion S yst ems E ngin eer

ing, Ra dio.TM 11-5122 D irect Cu rr ent G enera t or, G • 43/GTM 32-220 B a sic C ry ptogr a phy (U )ACP 121 Commun ica tion In str uctions, G enera lACP 122 Commun ica tion In str uctions, SecurityACP 124 Commun ica tion In str uctions, Ra dio Telegra ph

ACP 131 Commun ica tion In str uctions, Opera tingSignals

5. MedicineFM 8-10 Medica l S ervice, Thea ter of Opera tionsFM 8-35 Tra nsport a tion of th e S ick a nd WoundedFM 8-50 B a nda ging a nd Splint ingFM 21-10 Milita ry Sa nita tionFM 21-11 Fir st Aid for S oldiersTM 8-230 Medica l Corpsm a n a nd Medica l S pecia list

6. Air and Amphibious Operationsa. Air Oper at i ons .

(1) J oin t Ai r Force/ Ar my Publ i ca t ions .U S CONARC TT 110-101-1 (TAC M 55-2) J oin t Air-

borne Opera tions.U S AFE S upplemen t t o U S CONARC TT 110-101-1

(TACM 55-2)(2) Ai r F or ce Publ i cati ons .

TACM 55-13 TAC S t a nd a rdiza tion Ma nu a l, TroopCa rrier Aircra ft .

U TS 120-4 Troop Ca rr ier U nit s (Medium ) (Assa ult )(3) Air N at iona l Guar d Publ i ca t ions .

CONAC Aircrew Training Handbook 200-4, AirNa tiona l G ua rd, Troop Ca rrier U nits , Medium,

S A-16, P a rt 2.(4) N aval Publ icat i ons.

LFM-24 Helicopter Operations (U)NWIP 41-6 H elicopter Opera tions



186

(5) Ar my Publ ica t ions .C5, TM 10-500 Air Delivery of Supplies and Equipment:

GeneralD A Logistics D irective No. 163-700 (U ) , da t ed 1 J un e

1959.

ST 57-150 Army P a th finder Opera tions, U S AISb. Am phi bious Oper ati ons .

(1) J oin t L andin g Force M anua ls .J LF M-15 (FM 110-115) Amph ibious Reconna issa nce

(2) M ari ne Cor ps L andi ng For ce M anual s .LFM-1 TrainingLFM-2 Terra in, Hy drogra phy a nd Weat herLF M-4 S hip to S hore Movement

LF M-19 S pecia l La nd ing Opera tions (U )(3) N aval Warfar e and War far e I nfor m at i on Publ i cat ions .

NWIP 1-1 Missions a nd Ca pabilities of U S Na vySh ips an d Aircraft (U ) .

NWP 22 Amphibious Opera tionsNWIP 22-4 U nd erw a t er D emolition Tea ms in Am

phibious Opera tionsNWIP 22-6 S hip to S hore Movement (U )NWP 23 Su bma rine Opera tions (U )NWP 37 Sea rch a nd Rescue

7. Intelligence and SecurityAR 380-5 Sa feguar ding Defense In forma tionAR 380-8 S ecurit y Cla ssificat ion —S pecia l Forces

Activities.AR 381-25 Arm y In t elligence C ollect ion Ins t ru ctions

AR 381-205 P rocedures Fa cilita tin g In telligence E xploitat ion of Ca ptured En emy P ersonnel

FM 19-40 H a nd ling P risoners of Wa rFM 30-5 Comba t In telligenceFM 30-7 Comba t In telligence-B a tt le G roup, Comba t

Command a nd Sma l ler U ni tsFM 30-9 Milita ry In telligence B a tt a lion, Field ArmyFM 30-15 In telligence In ter roga t ion (U )FM 30-16 Technica l I nt elligence (U )FM 30-19 Ord er of B a tt le In telligenceFM 30-28 Arm ed For ces Censor sh ip (Arm y)



187

FM 110-101 In telligence J oint La nding Force Ma nua lD A P a m 30- In telligence Collection G uide; Id ent ifica tion of

102 SMDD A P a m 21-81 In dividual Tra ining in Collecting a nd Reporting

Mili ta ry In forma tionD A P a m 30-26 A G uide to the Collection of Techn ica l Int elligenceD A P a m 30- In telligence Collection G uide,

100 Telecommunications



189

d . Separate clothing packages for Special Forces personnel areomitted. In general, Special Forces personnel draw clothing fromsupplies issued for guerrilla use. In the event that separate specialclothing packages are required for Special Forces personnel, thesema y be a dded to the cata logue in t he thea ter of opera tions.

e. The efficiency of the catalogue supply system is increased byuse of th e follow ing pr ocedures

(1) Packing, with all equipment, instructional material whichis printed in the appropriate language. Such material issimply written, confined to essentials, and makes thema ximum use of gra phics.

(2) Inclusion of an inventory list in each delivery container toa id in identifica tion of lost or da ma ged ma teria l.

(3) Maximum use of reusable items for packaging material.Examples are clothing and blankets as padding andponchos as w a terproofing.

(4) In clusion of mora le a nd ba rt er items w hich ma y be used topromote good w ill with th e indigenous populat ion or for th eprocurem ent of supplies an d services.

(5) Marking each individual bundle with luminous tape orpaint so that the contents are readily identif ied withoutopening th e package.

f . The prepara tion of equipment for t he va rious sized un its is th eresponsibility of the Special Forces operational base. The number ofdelivery containers is determined by the delivery means available.The 50-pound package is u tilized t o the m a ximum in th e prepa ra tionof th e individua l delivery cont a iners.

3. Request Procedurea. The code used in the catalogue supply system is a type code

only and should be changed and classified when used operationally.The coding system is not secure by itself, but will reduce messagelengt h w hen a va riety of supplies are ordered. For this exa mple, ea chgenera l type of supply is a ssigned lett er designa tions:

S ection Code Designa torsI —Chem ica l ALHPA ALPHA through DELTA ZULUII —D em oli t ion s/Mines ECHO ALPHA through HOTEL ZULUI I I —Medica l INDIA ALPHA through LIMA ZULU

IV —Wea pon s/Amm unit ion MIKE ALPHA through PAPA ZULU



190

Section Code Designa torsV —Qua rt erma st er QUEBEC ALPHA through TANGO

ZULUVI —S igna l UNIFORM ALPHA through WHISKEY

ZULU

VI I —S pecia l X-RAY ALPHA through ZULU ZULU

b. To reduce unreadable garbles when ordering supplies, usephonetic spelling. Some units and packages are followed by anumbered list showing the contents of the package or unit. For theseitems, th e unit or pa cka ge ca n be ordered complete, or a ny num bereditem ma y be ordered sepa ra tely. For exa mple cloth ing a nd equipmentfor 40 men is required. Determine the boot sizes needed and includein t he messa ge. Assume t ha t th e follow ing boot sizes a re desired: Ten

pa ir size 81/2W, six pa ir size 9M, t hr ee pa ir size 91/2N, four pa ir s ize10N, s ix pa ir s ize 10M, tw o pa ir s ize 10W, five pa ir s ize 10 1/2M, fourpa ir size 11M. The messa ge w ould rea d:

ONE QU EB EC ALP HA PD B OOTS TEN SIZE E IG HT P T FIVEWHISKEY SIX SIZE NINE MIKE THREE SIZE NINE PTFIVE NOVEMBER FOUR SIZE TEN NOVEMBER SIXSIZE TEN MIKE TWO SIZE TEN WHISKEY FIVE SIZETEN P T FIVE MIKE FOUR SIZE E LEVEN MIKE.

Clothing is packed to approximately match boot sizes (section V). Onthe other hand if only 40 ponchos were desired, the request wouldread —TWO ZE RO QUE B E C ALP HA S E VE N.

c. Items listed in each unit may be ordered separately ifnecessary. When practical order the complete unit.

d . For items not listed, order by name in sufficient detail toidentify th e item. For exam ple —TWO G AS OLI NE LANTE RNS .

Section I. CHEMICAL

Unit dataCode Unit

DesignationUnitwt No.

pkgs Contents

ALPHA ALPHA

ChemicalGrenade No. 1(16 rds).

46 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades, hand,smoke WP, M15packed in individual

con-tainers. ALPHABRAVO


47 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades, hand,incendiary, (TH) AN,M14 packed in indi-

vidual containers.



191

Unit dataCode Unit

DesignationUnitwt No.

pkgs Contents

ALPHACHARLIE

ChemicalGrenade No. 3

(16 rds).

34 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades,smoke, colored, M18

(Green, red, violet and yellow) packed inindividual containers.

ALPHADELTA


35 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades, hand,tear, CS, M7A1packed in individualcontainers.

ALPHAECHO

Detector kits (8). 43 lbs 1 Eight detector kits,chemical agent, M18.

ALPHAFOXTROT Food TestingKits (24). 45 lbs 1 Twenty-four food testingand screening kits,chemical agents, ABC-M3.

ALPHAGOLF

LeatherDressing (96).

43 lbs 1 Ninety-six cans leatherdressing, vesicant gasresistant, M2.

ALPHAHOTEL

Protection & Treatment Set

(70).

50 lbs 1 Seventy protection andtreatment sets, chemi-

cal warfare agents,M5AL

ALPHAINDIA

Water testingKits (24).

50 lbs 1 Twenty-four water test-ing kits chemicalagents, AN-M2.

ALPHA JULIET

DANC Unit (1). 59 lbs 1 DANC solution unit, 3gallon M4.

ALPHAKILO

Decontaminating Agent (1).

61 lbs 1 Decontaminating Agent,STB.

ALPHAMIKE

Protective Mask(10).

44 lbs 1 Ten masks, protective,field, M17.

ALPHANOVEMBER

ImpregnatingSet (1).

57 lbs 1 1. Impregnating set,clothing, field M3 (55lbs).

2. Kit. testing, impr-egnite in clothing, Ml(2 lbs).

ALPHAOSCAR

Napalm 42 lbs 1 Eight cans chemicalagent thickener 5¼ lbcan.



192

Section II. DEMOLITIONS AND MINES

Unit data

Code Unit

Designation Unitwt No

pkgs Contents

ECHO ALPHA

DemolitionsNo. 1(20 Blocks).

50 lbs 1 20 blocks, demolition,M5A1 (2 ½ lb compC-4)

ECHOBRAVO

DemolitionsNo. 2(2 assemblies).

44 lbs 1 Two assemblies, demoli-tion M37 (2 ½ lb compC-4) 8 blocks perassembly.

ECHOCHARLIE

DemolitionsNo. 3(45 blocks).

45 lbs 1 45 blocks, demolition, (1lb TNT).

ECHODELTA

Detonating Cord(6000 ft).Note 1

42 lbs 1 6000 ft cord, detonating,1000 ft per spool (6spools-42 lbs).

ECHOECHO

Detonators(150).

45 lbs 1 150 detonators, friction,8 second delay M2 and15 second delay Mlpacked 10 per box (15

boxes-45 lbs).

ECHOFOXTROT

Firing DeviceNo. 1 (200).

40 lbs 1 200 firing devices, set,demolition, delay type,Ml packed 10 per box,consisting of-

1. Two 15-minute delay.2. Three 1-hour delay.3. Three 2 ½ -hour delay.4. One 11 ½ -hour delay.

5. One 13 ½ -hour delay.(20 boxes-40 lbs).

ECHOHOTEL

Firing DeviceNo. 2 (116).

44 lbs 1 116 firing devices, de-molition, mixed,packed 29 per boxconsisting of —

1. Five pressure typeM1A1

2. Five release type M5.

3. Five pull friction typeM2.4. Five pull release type

M3.5. Five pull type M1.



194

Unit data

Code Unit


pkgs Contents

packed 5 per box (5 boxes-6 ¼ lbs).

7. 3000 ft fuze, blasting,time (1 can-5 lbs).8. 15 igniters, blasting,

fuze M2 packed 5 per box (3 boxes-3 lbs).

9. 1 roll insulation tape,electrical (1 lb).

FOXTROTDELTA

Non-electricDemolitionUnit No. 2.

745 lbs 15 1. One non-electric de-molition unit No. 1.

2. 250 caps, blasting,special, non – electric Type I J1 PETN packed50 per can.

3. One detonating cordunit.

4. One time fuze unit.5. Twelve demolition

units No. 1.

FOXTROTECHO

ElectricDemolitionsUnit No. 1.

93 lbs 2 1. 50 caps, electric (1lb).2. 1000 ft cord, detonat-

ing (7 lbs).3. 500 ft cable, power

electrical firing on reelRL39B (36 lbs).

4. One assembly, demoli-tion M37 (22 lbs).

5. 10 blocks, demolition1 lb TNT (10 lbs).

6. 25 destructors, explo-sive universal M10packed 5 per box (5

boxes-6 ¼ lbs).7. One galvanometer,

blasting (21bs).8. One machine, blast-

ing, 10 cap capacity (5½ lbs).

9. One pair pliers, line-man's (1 ¼ lbs).

10. 200 ft wire, electricalannunicator or reel (2¼ lbs).



195

Unit data

Code Unit


pkgs Contents

FOXTROTFOXTROT

ElectricDemolitionUnit No. 2.

740 lbs 14 1. One electric demoli-tion unit No. 1.

2. 250 caps, blasting,special, electric Type II

J2 PETN packed 50per box.

3. One detonating cordunit.

4. Twelve demolitionsunits No. 1.

GOLF ALPHA

Anti-tank MinesNo. 1.

Note 2

50 lbs 1 10 mines, light ATM7A2.

GOLFBRAVO

Anti-tank MinesNo. 2.

Note 2

56 lbs 1 2 mines, AT, M19.

GOLFCHARLIE

Anti-PersonnelMines, No. 1.

Note 2

40 lbs 1 128 mines, AP, M14.

GOLFDELTA


Note 2

47 lbs 1 6 mines, AP, M16, bounding.

GOLFECHO


Note 2

45 lbs 1 15 weapons, AP, M18,Claymore.

NOTES:1. Assembled in two packages due to bulk.2. Fuzes included in each package.3 General.

a. Accessory items such as priming adapters and detonating cord clips may be addedto the package as desired.

b. Peculiar non-standard items are added to the list in the theater of operations.

Section III. MEDICAL

Unit dataCode Unit

designationUnitwt No.

PkgsContents

INDIA

ALPHA

Combat

Aidman's Set.

48 lbs 1 Eight surg ical ins tru-

ment and supplyse ts , ind iv idua l (6lbs) s tandardmedica l supply se t



196

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

cons is t ing of — 1 . One bot t le of Acety l -

sa l icy l ic Acid

tab le t s , USP bot t le ,100 per bot t le .2 . F ive morphine in-

jec t ions , USP 16mg(¼ gr. ) pkg .

3 . One tube of Tec t ra -ca ine Ophtha lmicoin tment 1 /8 oztube .

4 . One packageBenzalkoniumChlor ide Tinc ture .

5 . Two bandages ,gauze , 3 inch .

6 . Two bandages ,musl in .

7 . Two dress ings , f i r s ta id , f ie ld , 7 ½” x 8" .

8 . E ight dress ings ,f i r s t a id , f ie ld , 4" x7" .

9 . One spool ofadhes ive p las te r,

surg ica l , 3" .10 . Two packages of bandages,absorbent , adhes ive ,18 per package .

11 . One pa i r sc i ssors , bandage , angular ,heavy.

12 . One tourn iquet .13 . One thermometer.14 . One card of p ins ,

safe ty, 12 per card .15 . One penci l .16 . One surg ica l

ins t ru-ment se t ,minor surgery :

a . Two needle holders . b . Two fo rceps.c . One b lade handle .d . Two packages of

b lades No. 10 , 6 pe rpackage .

e . Two packages of

b lades No. 11 , 6 pe rpackage .f . One probe .g . One pa i r sc i ssors .



197

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

wi th need le s .

INDIABRAVO

Field SurgerySet

Note 1

50 lbs 1 1. Two ba gs , can vas ,M-5 wi th shoulderstraps.

2 . Two holder, su tureneedle , 7" .

3 . Four forceps , he-mosta t , curved , 6¼ ".

4 . Four forceps , hemo-stat , s t raight , 6 ¼ ".

5 . Two forceps , hemo-stat , s t raight , 7 ¼ ".

6 . Two forceps ,Foers te r type .7 . Two forceps , t i s sue ,

tweezers , 5 ½ ".8 . Two handle , surg ica l

kni fe , No. 3 .9 . Two packages , sur-

g ica l kn i fe b ladeNo. 10 .

10 . Two packages , sur-g ica l kn i fe b lade ,No. 11 .

11 . Two sc issors , band-age , angu lar ,heavy,

12 . Two sc issors , band-age , angu larLis te r, 8

13 . Two sc issors , gen-era l surg ica lcurved , 7 ¼ ".

14 . Two sc issors , gen-era l surg ica l ,

s t ra ight , 7" .Ste r i l i za t ion andSurg ica l

P repa ra t ion15. Eight conta iners of

de tergent , surg ica l ,5 oz .

16 . Two razors , sa fe ty.17 . S ix packages of

b lades , sa fe tyrazor, 5 perpackage .

18 . S ix cakes ofsurg ica l soap 4 oz .cake .

19 . Two brushes ,scrub .



198

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

20. Two pa i rs ofg loves , surg ica l ,s ize 7 ½” .

21 . Two pa i rs ofg loves , surg ica l ,s ize 8 .

22 . One s te r i l izer, sur-g ica l ins t rument ,

bo i l ing type .28 . One hea ter,

surg ica l dress ing ,s te r i l izer.

24 . Four hand towels .S u t u r e M a t e r i a l

25. Two packages ofneedles , su ture ,ca t -gut , Mayo.

26 . Two packages ofneedles , su ture ,surgeon ' s regular,3 /8 c i rc le , cu t t ingedge , s ize 2 , 6 perpackage .

27 . Two packages ofneedles , su ture ,reg-u lar, %s c i rc le ,

cu t - t ing edge , s ize16 , 6 per package .28 . Two spools of su-

ture , non-absorbable ,surg ica l s i lk

bra ided , s ize 000 .29 . Two spools of su-


bra ided , s ize 00 .30 . Two spools of su-


bra ided , s ize 0 .31 . Two packages of

su ture , absorbable ,surg ica l , bo i lab le ,p la in s ize 000 ,s ingle a rmed, ½ c i rc le needle , 12

per pack-age .32 . Two packages ofsu ture , absorbable ,surg ica l , bo i lab le ,



200

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

50. Cathe ter, in t ra t ra -chea l , Magi l l , wi thrubber.

D i a g n o s t i c I n s t r u m e n t s51. Four

thermometers ,c l in ica l ora l .

52 . One s te thoscope ,combina t ion type .

53 . One o toscope ,opth lmoscope se t

wi th ba t te r ie s .54 . One b lood pressure

cuff , anero id .

B a n d a g e sA n d

D r e s s i n g s

55. Twenty-four band-ages,gauze, 3" x 6 yds,sterile.

56. Twelve bandages,muslin.

57. Two rolls, cottonpurified, 1 oz.

58. Two surgical dress-ing,field, large.59. Six surgical dress-ing,

field medium.60. Four packages,

petrolatum gauze, 3per package.

61. One package, gauzepad, 2 x 2", 199 perpackage.

62. One package, gauze

pad, 4 x 4", 200 perpackage.

63. Two boxes, bandage,absorbent, adhesive,100 per package.

Dru gs and Reagents

64. Two bottles, epine-phrine, injection 30 cc.

65. Six packages, mor-phine syrettes, 16 mg.,5 per package.

66. Two bottles, benzal-konium chloride, 4 oz.



201

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

thonium chloride, 250mg, 80 tablets per

bottle.

68. One can, benzointincture, 1 pint,

69. Four tubes bacitracinopthalmic ointment, 1/soz tube.

70. Four tubes, tetra-caineopthalmic oint-ment,1/8 oz tube.

71. Eight syrette, atro-pineinjection, 2 mg.

Miscellaneous

72. Two tourniquet, non-pneumatic, 1 ½ " x 42".

73. Two catheter, French,urethral, size 16.

74. Two catheter, Foley,urethral, indwellingsize 16.

75. Two tubes, Levin, K-10(Baxter).

76. Two adapters, Luersyringe for rubbertubing.

77. Two drains, Penrose,3/8" x 36".

78 . Four pencils, gra-phite, No. 2.

79. One book, record.80. Two books, emerg-ency

medical tag.

81. Four cards, pin, safety,orthopedic, medium,12 per card.

82. Fifty envelopes, drugdispensing.

83. One tube, lubricant,surgical, 4 oz.

84. Two cannulas, tra-cheotomy, nylon, size 5

INDIACHARLIE

Field SurgerySet Supple-ment.

45 lbs 1 Standard medical supplyset 6545-927-4400.

1. One bag, water proof,signal equipment with



202

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

x 18".2. Two bottles of Dex-tran

injection, 500 cc.3. Six packages of

Morphine injection USP16 mgm (¼ gr), 5 perpkg.

4. One bottle of Peni-cillinC tablets USP, 250,000units, 100 per bottle.

5. Five packages ofPenicillin injection in oil400,000 units cartridge-needle unit 1 cc, 10 perpackage.

6. Two syringes, car-tridge.7. Six bottles of Al-bumin,

normal hu-man serum,100 cc. Note 1.

8. One box of Nalor-phinehydrochloride injectionUSP, 5 mgm, (1/12 gr)per cc, 6 per box.

9. Six bandages, gauze,

camouflaged, 3 in x 6 yds.10. Four bandages,

muslin.11. Two dressings, first aid,

field, 11 ¾ " square-large.

12. 24 dressings, first aid,field medium.

13. 36 dressings, first aid,field small.

14. One spool of ad-hesiveplaster, surgi-cal, 3".

INDIADELTA

Medical Dis-pensary Set.

40 lbs( — )

1 1. One bottle of Chlor-pheniramine maleate(chlortrimenton) 4 mg,tablet. 1000 Per bottle.

2. One bottle of Terpinhydrate 1 lb bottle.

3. One box of Tetra-

hydrozoline hydro-chloride (Tyzine) nosedrops, 12 per box.

4. One bottle of APC,



203

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

bottle.5. Six bottles of Co-deine, ½

gr. tablet, 100 per bottle.

6. Six packages ofMorphine, syrette, 15mg, 5 per package.

7. One bottle of Acetyl-salicylic acid (aspi-rin),5 grain tablet, 1,000per bottle, 8. Six

bottles of Deca- vitamins, 100 per bottle.

9. Six bottles of Chlo-roquin, 500 mg tab-let,100 per bottle.

10. Six bottles ofPhenobarbital, 30 mgtablet, 100 per bottle.

11. Six bottles of Tetra-cycline, 250 mg tab-let,100 per bottle.

12. Six packages ofpenicillin, procaine,400,000 unit car-tridge,10 per pack-age.

13. Six cans of foot powder.14. 12 tubes of Unde-

cylenic acid ointment, 2oz tube.

15. Two boxes of Baci-tracinneomycin oint-ment, ½ oz tube, 6 perbox.

16. Sift tubes of Zinc oxide, 1oz tube.17. One bottle of Cala-mine

USP, 1 lb bottle (inpowder form).

18. Two bottles of Po-tass ium permanga-na te tab le t s , 5gra ins , 100 per

bo t t le .19 . One can of Methyl

sa l icy la te (o i l o f win te rgreen) , 1 lbcan .

20 . S ix bot t les of Bis -



204

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

5 gra in tab le t , 100per bot t le .

21 . One bot t le ofOpium, t inc ture ,USP ¼ pin t .

22 . One bot t le of Cas-cara sagrada , tab-le t s , 100 per bot t le .

23 . Two boxes ofa lumi-numhydroxide mag-nes ium t r ic i l ica tetab le t s , 100 per

box .

24 . Two bot t les of pro-panthe l ine bromide ,15 mg, 100 per bot -t le .

25 . S ix teen syre t tes , A trop ine in ject ion , 2mg.

M i s c e l l a n e o u s

26. Four p las t ic bo t t les o f Phisohex ,

5 oz .27 . One car t r idge sy-

r inge .28 . One package of

gauze pad , 4 x 4 .29 . One s te thescope ,

combina t ion type .30 . Two boxes of

absorbent -adhes ive bandage (bandaid) ,100 per box .

31 . One box of tonguedepressors , 100 per

box .32 . Four penci l s , g ra-

phi te , No. 2 .33 . Two packages of

en-ve lopes , d rugdis -pens ing , 100per package .

34 . One book, record ,ru led .

INDIAECHO

Dental Unit 21 lbs 1 Th re e de nt al ki ts ,emer-gency f ie ld(645-927-8440) .



205

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

INDIAFOXTROT

Splint Set 26 lbs 1 1. Sp li nt Se t co ns is tso f — a . One ro l l , sp l in t

se t , t e lescopicsp l in ts , empty.

b . 18 bandages ,musl in .

c . Three s t raps , l egt rac t ion .

d . Three sp l in ts , wood.

e . Three sp l in ts , l eg , Thomas , hal f r ing ,a luminum.

f . Three l i t t e r bars ,leg sp l in tsuppor t ing .

g . Three sp l in t sup-por t s and foot res t ,l eg .

h . Three sp l in ts , wi re , l adde r .

i . Three rods ,i r r iga tor

suppor t ing .2 . Two b lankets .3 . S ix dress ings , f ie ld ,

medium.4 . S ix dress ings , f ie ld ,

la rge .

INDIAGOLF

Water Pufifica-tion Unit

Note 2

23 lbs 1 300 bott les of wate rpur i f ica t ion tab le t s ,iod ine , 50 per bot t le .

INDIAHOTEL

Insect ControlUnit

Note 2

25 lbs 1 Inse ct rep ell ant,dre tnye to luamide .

INDIAINDIA

Surgical PrepSet

45 lbs 1 1. Twe lve ca ke s ofsoap , surg ica l , 4 ozcake .

2 . 24 conta iners of de-te rgent , surg ica l , 5oz . conta iner.

3 . S ix hand brushes ,surg ica l .

4 . Two bowls , a lumi-num.



207

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

cc .6 . Three boxes of

needles , gauge # 23 ,12 per box .

7 . Three boxes ofneedles , gauge #22,12 per box .

8 . One box of needles ,gauge #20, 12 per

box .9 . Two cans of a lcohol ,

USP, 1 p in t can .10 . S ix p las t ic conta in-

ers of ph isohex , 5 ozconta iner.

11 . One package ofcot - ton , ro l led .

INDIALIMA

Minor Burns Unit 40 lbs 1 1. Tw e lv e de te rg ent ,p las t ic conta iner,surg ica l .

2 . Two a luminum bowls .

3 . 30 packages of pe t -la tum gauze packs ,12 p e r package .

4 . Two packages ofgauze pads , 2 x 2 .

5 . Two packages ofgauze pads , . 4 x 4 .

6 . Two boxes of band-ages , gauze , s te r i le ,3 in , twelve per box .

7 . Two boxes of band-ages , gauze , s te r i le ,4 in . , twelve per box .

8 . Two boxes of e las t ic bandages , 3 in . , 12per box .

9 . One box of e las t ic bandages , 4 in : , 9per box .

16 . One ja r. o f Ni t rofu-azone , 1 lb ja r.

11 . S ix hand towels .

INDIAMIKE

Major Burns Unit 45 lbs 1 1 . S ix uni ts o fa lbumin , 100 ccuni t .



210

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

bo t t le .4 . Four bot t les of Dex-

t rose , 5%, 1000 cc bot t le .

5 . Ten in t ravenoustubing assembl ies .

6 . 24 packages of sodi -um chlor idebicar-

bonate mix , 2 perpackage .

7 . Twelve boxes of pro-ca ine penic i l l in 400 , -000 uni t s car t r idgef ie ld type , 10 per

box .8 . Two car t r idge syr-

inges .9 . Two Cathe ters , in -

dwel l ing , French ,s ize 16 .

10 . Two Cathe ters , in -dwel l ing , French ,s ize 18 .

11 . One Flu idca lcu la tor for burns(non-s tandard) .

12 . S ix packages ofMorphine in jec t ion15 mg, 6 perpackage .

13 . S ix cannulas , t ra -cheotomy, nylon , s ize5 .

INDIA

NOVEMBER

Shock Set No. 1.

Note 3

30 lbs 1 24 bot tle s of alb umi n,

normal humanserum, 100 cc bot t le with in ject ionassembly.

INDIAOSCAR

Shock Set No. 2. 24 lbs 1 12 bo tt le s of De xt ra n,500 cc bot t le wi th in-

je c t ion assembly .

INDIAPAPA

Shock Set No. 3. 25 lbs 1 1. Th re e bo tt le s of no r-mal sa l ine , 1 ,000 cc

bot t le .2 . Three bot t les of

Dext rose in water,5% , 1 ,000 cc bot t le .



211

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

in jec t ion assembl ies .4 . One spool of adhe-

s ive tape , 3 in .5 . Two boxes of Lev-

ar te renol ampule , 12per box .

6 . Two v ia l sEpinephr ine 1 :100030 cc v ia l .

INDIA.QUEBEC

IntravenousFluids No. 1.

25 lbs 1 1. Fou r bott les of De x-t rose in water 5% ,1000 cc bot t le .

2 . Two bot t les of Dex-t rose in water 10% ,100 cc bot t le .

3 . One spool of adhe-s ive tape , 3 in .

4 . E ight in t ravenoustubing assembl ies .

INDIAROMEO


25 lbs 1 1. Six bot tle s of norm alsa l ine , 1 ,000 cc

bot t le .


3 . One spool of adhe-s ive tape , 3 in .

4 . One box of Potas-s ium chlor ide 10 cc

v ia l , s ix pe r box .

INDIASIERRA


25 lb 1 1. Six bot tle s ofsodium lac ta te ,1 ,000 cc bot t le .


INDIA TANGO

Sterile DressingUnit

26 lbs 1 1. Twel ve dre ssi ngs,f ie ld , l a rge .

2 . 36 dress ings , f ie ld ,medium.

3 . 36 dress ings , f ie ld ,smal l .

4 . Two boxes of band-age , gauze , 3 in . , 12per box .

5 . Two boxes of band-



212

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

per box .

INDIAUNIFORM

Bandage Unit 22 lbs 1 1 . Si x pac ka ge s o fgauze pads 2 x 2 in .

2 . Four packages gauzepads 4 x 4 in .

3 . S ix packages band-ages , absorbent , ad-hes ive (bandaid) 100per package .

4 . S ix spools of adhe-s ive tape , 3 in .

5 . 12 packages of co t -

ton , s te r i le , 1 ozpackage .I 6 . Two boxes of ro l le r

gauze , 2 in . , 12 per box .

7 . Two boxes of ro l le rgauze , 3 In . , 12 per

box .8 . Two boxes of ro l le r

gauze , 4 in . , 12 per box .

9 . Two boxes of musl in bandage , 24 pe r box .

INDIA VICTOR

Elastic BandageUnit

25 lbs 1 1. One box of ban d-ages , co t ton , e las t ic2 in . , 12 per box .

2 . Two boxes of band-ages , co t ton , e las t ic3 in . , 12 per box .

3 . Four boxes of band-ages , co t ton , e las t ic4 in . , 12 per box .

4 . One box of band-ages , co t ton , e las t ic6 in . , 12 per box .

5 . Two spools of adhe-s ive tape , 3 in .

INDIA WHISKEY

Litter Set 46 lbs 1 1 . Two l i t t e rs , fo ld ing .2 . Two b lankets .

INDIA XRAY

Mountain LitterSet

44 lbs 1 1. One lit t er, rigi d,mounta in .

2 . Three b lankets .



213

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

INDIA YANKEE

Blanket Set 50 lbs 1 Ten b lankets .

INDIAZULU

Orthopedic CastSet No. 1.

50 lbs 1 1. One roll sto cki net, 3in . x 25 yds .

2 . One ro l l s tockine t , 4in . x 25 yds .

3 . One ro l l s tockine t , 6in . x 12 yds .

4 . One ro l l bandage ,fe l t , 3 in . ro l l .

5 . One ro l l bandage ,fe l t , 4 in . ro l l .

6 . One ro l l bandage ,fe l t , 6 in . ro l l .7 . Two boxes of band-

ages , co t ton , p las te rimpregnated 3 in . , 12per box .

8 . One box bandages ,co t ton , p las te r im-pregnated , 6 in . , 12per box .

9 . S ix hee ls ,

or thopedic cas t .10 . One pa i r shears ,

p las te r cas t , hand .11 . One saw, p las te r

cas t cu t t ing , hand .12 . Two p las t ic

bucke ts (non-s tandard) .

JULIET ALPHA

Orthopedic CastNo. 2.

50 lbs 1 1. Thre e box es ban d-ages , co t ton , p las te rimpregnated 3 in . , 12per box .

2 . Three boxes band-ages , co t ton , p las te rimpregnated 4 in . , 12per box .

3 . Three boxes band-ages , co t ton , p las te rimpregnated 6 in . , 12per box .

JULIETBRAVO

Eye, Ear, Nose, Throat Set.

25 lbs 1 1 . One nasa l speculum2. One myr ingotome.3 . One box of co t ton



214

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

per box .4 . One box tongue de-

pressors , 100 per box .

5 . Two bot t les Chlor-pheni ramine malea te(ch lor t r imeton) , 40mg, 1 ,000 per bot t le .

6 . Two boxes Tet ra -hydrozol ine hydro-chlor ide ( tyz ine) nosedrops , 12 per box .

7 . One bot t le APC,tab le t s , 1 ,000 per

bot t le .8 . One bot t le ASA, 5

gr. t ab le t , 1 ,000 per bot t le .

9 . S ix bot t les Codeine ,½ gr. t ab le t , 100 per

bot t le .10 . One box MBA ear-

drops , 12 per box .11 . Two bot t les Terp in

hydra te , 1 lb bot t le .12 . One bot t le Bor icac id , 1 lb bot t le .

13 . S ix tubesPolymixin i B-Baci t rac in-Neomycinophtha lmic o in tment ,½ oz tube .

14 . Three tubes cor t i -sone optha lmic o in t -ment , ½ oz tube .

15 . One mir ror, l a ryn-gea l .

JULIETCHARLIE

Skin Disease Unit 25 lbs 1 1. 24 tubes undecylenicacid ointment, 2 oz tube.

2. Twelve cans of footpowder.

3. Three boxes of bacitracin-neomycinointment, ½ oz tube, 6per box.

4. Four tubes of dibucaineointment, 1 oz tube.

5. One jar of wool fat. 1 lb jar.



216

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

box .7 . Ten bot t les of dex-

t roamphetamine , 5 .0mg tab le t , 100 per

bot t le .

JULIETECHO

GastrointestinalDiseases Unit.

20 lbs(-)

1 1. Two bott les ofKaol in , 1 lb bot t le(powder) .

2 . One bot t le of pec t in ,l lb bot t le (powder) .

3 . F ive boxes of a lum-inum hydroxide ge l ,and magnes ium t r i -s i l i ca te tab le t , 100per box .

4 . One bot t le oft inc ture be l ladonna ,1 p in t bo t t le .

5 . S ix bot t les ofcascara sagradatab le t s , 100 per

bot t le .6 . Two bot t les of

opium, t inc ture , USP¼ pin t .

7 . S ix bot t les propan-the l ine , b romide , 15mg, 100 per bot t le .

8 . Twelve bot t les phe-nobarb i ta l , 30 mgtable t , 100 per

bot t le .9 . Three bot t les of

ch loramphenicol , 250

mg tab le t , 100 per bot t le .10 . Three bot t les te t ra -

cyc l ine , 250 mgtable t , 100 per

bot t le .11 . S ix bot t les of neo-

mycin su l fa te , 500mg tab le t , 20 per

bot t le .12 . S ix bot t les of

ch lor-promazine , 25mg, 50 per bot t le13 . S ix bot t les of Bis -

muth subcarbonate 5



217

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

bo t t le .14 . Four tubes of d ibu-

ca ine o in tment , 1 oztube

JULIETFOXTROT

Tropical DiseaseUnit

20 lbs 1. Six bot tle s of tetr a-cyc l ine , 250 mg tab-le t s , 100 per bot t le .

2 . 48 bot t les of hexyl -resorc inol , 200 mg, 5per bot t le .

3 . 24 bot t les of carba-sone , 250 mg tab le t s ,20 per bot t le .

4 . S ix boxes ofs t ibophen, in jec t ion ,64 mg. , 5 cc , 10 per

box .5 . Twelve bot t les of

d ie thylcarbamazine ,50 mg tab le t , 100 per


ch loro-quin , 500 mgtable t , 100 per

bot t le .7 . S ix bot t les of pr ima-

quine , 25 mg tab le t .

JULIETGOLF

Malnutrition Unit 25 lbs 1 1 . 36 bo tt le s of de ca vi -tamins , 100 per

bot t le .2 . One bot t le of fe r rous

su l fa te , 5 gra intab le t s , 1 ,000 per

bot t le .3 . Twelve bot t les ofmenadione , 2 .0 mgtable t s , 50 per


ascorb ic ac id , 50 mgtable t s , 100 per

bot t le .5 . S ix bot t les of r ibo-

f lav in , 1 .0 mg

table t s , 100 per bot t le .6 . S ix bot t les of Thia-

min , 5 .0 mg tab le t s ,100 per bot t le .



220

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

needles , gauge # 23 ,12 per box .

20 . Twelve boxesneedles , gauge # 22 ,12 per box .

21 . Three boxesneedles , gauge # 20 ,12 per box .

22 . Three boxesneedles , gauge # 18 ,12 per box .

JULIETMIKE

Diphtheria Im-munization.

Notes 4 and 5

20 lbs 1 Dip hthe ria- pe rtus sis-te tanus vacc ine , 300

amplues .

JULIETNOVEMBER

Tetanus Immuni-zation.Notes 4 and 5

20 lbs 1 300 amp ule s of teta nustoxoid , 5 cc ampule .

JULIETOSCAR

Typhoid Immuni-zation.Notes 4 and 5

18 lbs 1 50 vial s of typh oid -para typhoid vacc ine ,50 cc v ia l .

JULIETPAPA

SmallpoxImmunizationNotes 4 and 5

11 lbs 1 150 box es of smal lpo x vaccine , 10 pe r box .

JULIETQUEBEC

Typhus Immuni-zation.Notes 4 and 5

30 lbs 1 150 vial s of typh us vac-c ine 20 cc v ia l .

JULIETROMEO

Cholera Immuni-zation.Notes 4 and 5

26 lbs 1 Cho ler a vacc ine , 20 cc via l .

JULIETSIERRA

PoliomyelitisImmunizationNotes 4 and 5

30 lbs 1 30 0 bo ttl es ofPol iomye- l i t i s

vacc ine , 9 .0 cc bo t t le .

JULIET TANGO

Yellow FeverImmunizationNotes 4 and 5

11 lbs 1 75 amp ule s of yel lowfever vacc ine , 20-dose ampule .

JULIET

UNIFORM

Plague Immuni-

zation.Notes 4 and 5

22 lbs 1 150 vial s of pla gue

vac-cine USP , 20 cc via l .

JULIET VICTOR

Rabies Kit.Notes 4 and 5

18 lbs 1 1. 20 pa ck ag es of



221

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

14-dose package .2 . 80 ampules of an t i -

rab ies serum, 1 ,000uni t s ampule .

JULIET WHISKEY

Tetanus Anti-toxin.Notes 4 a nd 5

11 lbs 1 1. 10 0 bo ttl es ofte tanus an t i tox in ,1 ,500 uni t s per

bo t t le .2 . 20 bot t les of te tanus

ant i tox in , 20 ,000uni t s per bo t t le .

JULIET XRAY

Gamma Globulin.Notes 4 and 5

10 1 Ten bottles of globulin,immune serum, 10 cc

bottle.

NOTES:1. The field surgery set may be augmented with:

a. Medical dispensary set. b. Supplemental supply set.

2. Quartermaster items.3. Albumin does not withstand freezing.4. Immunizations for 1,f>00 personnel.

5. Vaccine requires refrigeration.6. Many medical packages weigh considerably less than 60 lbs. The supply agency adds

items which are in constant demand to fill out lighter medical packages. Examplesare-blankets, extra bandages, and dressings.

7. Chloroquine is deleted from packages used in non-malaria areas.

Section IV. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Unit dataCode

Unit

designation

Unit

wt No.Pkgs Contents

MIKE ALPHA

Automatic Rifle(3).

250 lbs 3 1. One rifl e, auto mati c,ca l . .30 , M1918A2(20 lbs) .

2 . Thi r teen magazines , AR (6 lbs) .

3 . One be l t , ammuni-t ion , AR (2 lbs ) .

4 . 480 rds , car t r idge ,

AP ca l . .30 , 20 rdcar tons , packed inammuni t ion can M8(2 cans , 32 lbs ) .



222

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

accessory packet (2lbs) N o t e 1 .

1 960 rds, car tr idge , AP,ca l . .30 , 20 rdcar tons , packed inammuni t ion can M8(4 cans , 64 lbs ) .

MIKEBRAVO

Carbine (20). 240 lbs 4 1. Fi ve ca rb in es , ca l..30 , M-2 (30 lbs) .

2 . F i f teen magazines ,carb ine , 30 rdcapac- i ty (4 lbs ) .

3 . 800 rds car t r idge , bal l , carb ine cal ..30 M-1, packed inam-muni t ion can M6(1 can , 25 lbs ) .

MIKECHARLIE

Light Machine-gun (2).

484 lbs 2 1. On e mac hin e gu n,ca l . .30 , M1919A6

w/sholde r s tock and b ipod (37 lbs) .

2 . 275 rds , car t r idge ,l inked , ca l . .30 4AP-1TR, packed in am-muni t ion box M1A1(1 box, 22 lbs ) .

3 . One spare par t s andaccessory packet (2lbs) . N o t e 1 .

8 550 rds, car tr idge ,l inked , ca l . .30 ,4AP-1TR, packed inammu-ni t ion boxM1A1 (2 boxes , 44lbs) .

MIKEDELTA

Mortar (1). 320 lbs 1 1. One mo rt ar , 60 mm ,comple te wi th basepla te , mount and 1s ight (46 lbs ) .

2 . One base p la te , Ml(4 .5 lbs ) .


5



223

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

HE, 60mm mor tar,M49A2 packed inindiv idual

conta iners (53 lbs ) .

MIKEECHO

Pistol (12). 90 lbs 2 1. Si x pi st ol s, au to -mat ic , ca l . .45M1911Al (15 lbs ) .

2 . E ighteen magazines ,p is to l , ca l . .45 (5lbs) .

3 . 800 rds , car t r idge , ba l l , ca l . .45 packedin ammuni t ion boxM5 (1 box , 29 lbs ) .

4 . S ix shoulder s tocks ,p is to l (6 lbs ) .

MIKEFOXTROT

Recoilless Rifle(2).

406 lbs 2 1. On e rif le , 57 mm , re -co i l less , T15E13 orM18, comple te forshoulder f i r ing , in -c luding te lescopes ight M86C (45 lbs) .

2 . One cover, overa l l ,M123 (3 lbs ) .


6 Eight rds , car tr idge ,HEAT, 57mm RR,M307, packed inindi -v idua lconta iners (50 lbs ) .

MIKEGOLF

Rocket Launcher(3).

330lbs

3 1. One launche r, Rock-e t , 3 .5 inch , M20A1or M20A1B1 (14lbs) .

2 . Four rds , -A-f ,HEAT, 3 .5 inchM28A2 packed inindiv idualconta iners (38 lbs ) .

3 Six rds, rocket , HEAT,3 .5 in . , M28A2,packed in ind iv idua lconta iners (57 lbs ) .



224

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

MIKEHOTEL

Sniper Rifle (6). 165lbs

3 1. Two r if les , cal . .30,M1C, comple te (23lbs) .

2 . 480 rds , car t r idge , AP, cal . .30 , 8 rdc l ips in bandoleers ,packed inammuni t ion can M-8(2 cans , 32 lbs ) .

MIKEINDIA

Submachine Gun(9).

175lbs

3 1 . Three submachineguns , ca l . .45 , M3A1(21 Ibs) .

2 . Nine magazines ,submachine gun ,30- rd capac i ty (7lbs) .

3 . 600 rds , car t r idge , ba l l , ca l . .45 packedin ammuni t ion boxM5 (1 box , 29 lbs ) .

MIKE JULIET

General Unit.Note 2

2560lbs

46 1. One automati c r i f leuni t , 3 ARS.

2 . One carb ine uni t , 20carb ines .

3 . One l igh t machine-gun uni t , 2 LMGs.

4 . One mor tar un i t , 1mortar.

5 . One p is to l un i t , 12pis to ls .

6 . One recoi l less r i f leuni t , 2 RRS.

7 . One rocket launcher

uni t , 3 RLS.8 . One sn iper r i f le

uni t , 6 r i f les .9 . One submachine

gun uni t , 9 SMGS.

NOVEMBER ALPHA

Carbine AmmunitionNo. 1 (6400rds).

200lbs

4 1600 rds, car tr idge ,car-b ine , ba l l , ca l ..30 , 50 rd car tons ,packed inammuni t ion can M6(2 cans , 50 Ibs) .

NOVEMBERBRAVO

Carbine Ammunition

200lbs

3 1600 rds, car tr idge ,car-b ine , ba l l , ca l .



225

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

rds). pa ck ed inammuni t ion can M6(2 cans , 50 lbs ) .

200lbs

1 1. 800 rds, car tr idge ,carb ine , ba l l , ca l ..30 , 50 rd car tons ,packed inammuni t ion can M6(25 lbs) .

2 . 800 rds , car t r idge ,carb ine , t racer, ca l.30 , 50 rd car tons ,packed in ammuni-

t ion can M6 (25lbs) .

NOVEMBERCHARLIE

Rifle AmmunitionNo. 1(2880 rds).

192lbs

3 960 rds, car tr idge , AP,ca l . .30 , 20 rdcar tons , packed inammuni t ion can M8(4 cans , 64 lbs ) .

NOVEMBERDELTA

Rifle AmmunitionNo. 2

(2880 rds).

192lbs

2 960 rds, car tr idge , AP,ca l . .30 , 20 rd

car tons , packed inammuni t ion can M8(4 cans , 64) .

1 1. 240 rds, car tr idge , AP , ca l . .30 , 20 rdcar tons , packed inammuni t ion can M8(1 can , 16 lbs ) .

2 . 720 rds , car t r idge ,t racer, ca l . .30 , 20

rd car tons , packedin ammuni t ion canM8 (3 cans , 48 lbs ) .

NOVEMBERECHO

Rifle AmmunitionNo. 3(1920 rds).

128lbs

2 960 rds, car tr idge , AP,ca l . .30 , 8 rd c l ipsin bandoleerspacked inammuni t ion can M8(4 cans , 64 lbs ) .

NOVEMBERFOXTROT

Machinegun AmmunitionNo. 1(2200 rds).

176lbs

4 550 rds, car tr idge ,l inked , ca l . .30 ,4AP-1TR, packed inammu-ni t ion box Ml

A1 (2 boxes, 44 lbs )



227

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

NOVEMBERQUEBEC

Grenade No. 2(50 rds).

45 lbs 1 50 gre nad es, han d,i l luminat ing , MK1,packed indiv idua l

conta iner (45 lbs ) .

NOVEMBERROMEO

PyrotechnicSignal No. 1(60 rds).

15 lbs 1 1. Twenty signal, red star,ground, red star,parachute, M126(T72),packed in individualcontainer (5 lbs).

2. Twenty signal, ground, white star, parachute,M127(T73), packed inindividual container (5

lbs).3. Twenty signal, ground,

green star, cluster M127(T71), packed inindividual container (5lbs).

4. One projector,pyrotechnic.

NOVEMBER TANGO

PyrotechnicSignal No. 2(60 rds).

15 lbs 1 1. Twenty signal, greensmoke, parachuteM128(T74), packed inindividual container (5lbs).

2. Twenty signal, redsmoke, parachuteM129(T75), packed inindividual container (5Ibs).

3. Twenty signal, yellowsmoke, streamer M139(T76), packed inindividual container (5lbs).

4. One projector,pyrotechnic.

NOTES:1. The spare parts and accessory packet includes items most subject to damage or wear

and tools required for the care and maintenance of the weapon.2. The general unit contains the basic weapons for a type guerrilla platoon plus weapons

peculiar to weapons platoons.3. General —

a. Weapons units contain cleaning and preserving material such as rods, lubricantsand patches.

b. Ammunition is stripped of its outer shipping containers and delivered in its inner weatherproof container.



229

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

ROMEOBRAVO

Rations, Indig-enousPersonnel — 500

men.Note 3

85001bs 170 Hi gh fat co nte nt me ator canned f i sh ,poul t ry, sugar,

tobacco , sa l t , coffeeor tea , g ra in , f lour orr ice , accessory i temsand water pur i f i -ca t ion tab le t s (50lbs) .

ROMEOCHARLIE

Special Rations-96 men.Note 4

136 lbs 4 24 foo d pa ck et s,surv iva l , (a rc t ic ort ropic) (34 lbs ) .

ROMEODELTA

Special Rations-96 men.

192 lbs 8 12 ind ivid ual com batmeals (24 lbs ) .

ROMEOECHO

Packet, barter.Note 5

500 lbs 10 50 lbs packages.

NOTES:1. Items vary with the climatic zone and season. This package is based on the temperate

zone for spring, summer, and fall seasons. For winter, add gloves and 1 extra blanketper individual.

2. Clothing sizes are issued as small, medium, and large. Clothing is matched to size of boots. Boot size is included in the message requesting the clothing package. The

packaging agency dictates matching of boot and clothing sizes based upon experiencefactors applicable to the operational area.3. Special rations for indigenous personnel are determined by the area of operations.

Allotment is 15 lbs per individual per month.4. The food packet varies with the climatic zone.5. Contents to be determined by the area of operations.

Section VI. SIGNALUnit data

Code Unitdesignation

Unitwt No.

Pkgs Contents

UNIFORM ALPHA

Batteries No. 1. 48 lbs 1 6 BA 279/U fo r AN/PRC-10 .

UNIFORMBRAVO

Batteries No. 2. 50 lbs 1 20 BA 270 /U fo r AN, /PRC-6.

UNIFORMCHARLIE

Batteries No. 3. 53 lbs 1 1 . 15 BA 31 7 /& (1 5lbs) .

2 . 100 BA 32 (25 lbs) .3 . F ive BA 1264/U (10

lbs) .4 . Two BA 58/U (1 lbs ) .5 . Two 13A 261/U (2

lbs) .



230

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

UNIFORMDELTA

Field Wire(1 mile).

56 lbs 1 1. One mil e wire WD-1in d ispensers , MX306- two d ispensers ,

to ta l (52 lbs ) .2 . One tool equipment

se t TE-33, (2 lbs ) .3 . Tape , f r ic t ion , 2

ro l l s , (1 lb) .4 . Tape , rubber, 1 ro l l

(1 lb) .

UNIFORMECHO

Flashlights (20). 45 lbs 1 1. 20 Fl as hl ig ht s (1 5lbs) .

2 . 120 Bat te r ies , BA 30(30 lbs) .

UNIFORMFOXTROT

Power Unit UGP-12 (1).

60 lbs 1 1. On e en gi negenera tor (15 lbs ) .

2 . 5 ga ls gaso l ine (42lbs) .

3 . One q t o i l , SAE 10or 30 (3 lbs ) .

UNIFORMGOLF

Radio Set AN/PRC-10 (1).

42 lbs 1 1. On e AN /P RC -1 0comple te (18 lbs ) .

2 . Three ba t te r ies BA279/U (24 lbs) .

UNIFORMHOTEL

Radio Set AN/PRC-6 (2).Note d

43 lbs 1 1. Two AN /P RC- 6,comple te (8 lbs ) .

2 . 14 ba t te r ies , BA270/U (35 lbs) .

UNIFORM

INDIA

Telephones (4). 42 lbs 1 1 . Four te lephones,

ba t te ry powered (38lbs) .2 . 16 ba t te r ies , BA 30

(4 lbs ) .

UNIFORM JULIET

Switchboard (1). 1134 lbs 28 1 . On e sw it ch bo ar d ,SB 22 , comple te (40Ibs) .

2 . E ight ba t te r ies , BA30, (2 lbs ) .

UNIFORMKILO

Signal EquipmentBattalion. (90lbs). Note 1

42 lbs 1 1 . Two f lash l ight un i t s2 . E ight rad io se t

uni t s , AN/PR-6 (344lbs) .



231

Unit dataCode Unit


Pkgs Contents

AN/PRC-10 (210lbs) .

4 . 200 Bat te r ies , BA30 (50 lbs) .

5 . Seven ba t te ry uni t s ,BA 270/U (250 lbs) .

6 . F ive ba t te ry uni t s ,BA 279/U (240 lbs) .

UNIFORMLIMA

Signal Equipment AreaCommand, HQand HQCompany.

1599lbs

31 1. One f lashl ig ht uni t .(45 Ibs) .

2 . Two rad io se t u n i t s , AN/PRC-10 (84 lbs) .

3 . One swi tchboarduni t , SB-22 (42 lbs) .4 . Three te lephone

uni t s (126 lbs) .5 . 20 wire uni t s (1120

lbs) .6 . 150 ba t te r ies , BA-30

(38 lbs) .7 . Three ba t te ry uni t s ,

BA 279 (144 lbs) .

UNIFORMMIKE

Radio Set AN/GRC-109(1)

92 lbs 1 1. Radi o Tran smit ter,RT-3 (9 lbs ) .

2 . Radio rece iver, RR-2(10 lbs) .

3 . Power supply, RP-1(25 lbs) .

4 . Opera t ing snaresand accessor ies (6lbs) .

1 5 . Genera tor, G-43/G,comple te , (22 lbs ) .

6 . Adapter, RA-2 (4lbs) .


UNIFORMNOVEMBER

Radio Set AN/GRC-9 (1).

99 lbs 1 1. Re ce iv er -t ransmi t te r, RT-77(32 lbs) .


1 3 . Genera tor, G-43/G,comple te (22 lbs ) .



233

Section VII. SPECIAL

Unit dataCode Unit

designationUnit wt No.

Pkgs Contents

XRAY ALP HA

River CrossingUnit No. 1.

50 lbs 1 1. Five life rafts, in-flatable, one personcapacity with CO2cylinder and acces-sory kit.

2. Five life preservers, yok e wi th gas cy lin-der.

3. Five paddles, boat,five feet long.

XRAYBRAVO

River CrossingUnit No. 2.

90 lbs 2 1. One life raft, in-flatable, seven per-son capacity, withCO2 cylinder andaccessory kit.

2. Seven life preservers yok e wi th gascylinders.

3. Four paddles, boat,five feet long.



234

APPENDIX III

AREA STUDY GUIDE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4. GeneralThis appendix is an area study outline for Special Forces

personnel. Sections II a nd I II a re to be used for st udy of the region ofexpected wart ime assignment and as a guide for a more detai ledevaluation of a selected country. The outline provides a systematicconsideration of the principal factors which influence Special Forcesoperational planning.

5. PurposeThe purpose of the area study guide is to provide a means for

acquiring and retaining essential information to support operations.Although the basic outline is general in nature, it provides adequatecoverage when time is limited. As more time is made available forstudy, various subjects should be divided and further subdivided to

produce a more deta iled a na lysis of the a rea .

6. Technique of PreparationThe ma ximum u se of gra phics a nd overlay s is encoura ged. Most of

th e subsections lend t hemselves t o production in gra phica l or overla yform.

Section II. GENERAL AREA STUDY

7. Generala. Poli t ical .

(1) G overnment , int erna tiona l politica l orienta tion, a nd degreeof popula r su pport .

(2) Att itudes of identifia ble segments of the populat ion t o wa rdthe U nited Sta tes, i ts al l ies a nd th e enemy.

(3) Na tiona l historica l ba ckground.

(4) Foreign dependence a nd /or a llia nces.

(5) Na tiona l ca pitol a nd significa nt politica l, milita ry a ndeconomic concent ra tions.

b. Geogra ph i c Posi ti ons .

(1) Area s a nd dimensions.



235

(2) La tit ude a nd climat e.

(3) G enera lized physiogra phy.

(4) G enera lized lan d utilizat ion.

(5) S tr a t egic locat ion.

(a) Neighboring count ries an d bounda ries.(b) Na tur a l defenses including frontiers.

(c) P oints of entr y a nd st ra tegic routes.

c. Population .

(1) Tota l a nd densit y.

(2) B rea kdow n into significa nt eth nic a nd religious groups.

(3) D ivision betw een urba n, rur a l, a nd /or noma dic groups.

(a) La rge cities a nd popula tion cent ers.

(b) Rura l set t lement pat terns.

(c) Areas a nd m ovement pa tt erns of nomads.

d. N at ional Econom y .

(1) Techn ologica l sta nd a rds .

(2) Na tu ra l resour ces a nd degr ee of self-sufficiency.

(3) Fina ncial stru cture an d dependence upon foreign a id.

(4) Agr icultu re a nd domest ic food supply .

(5) In dust ry a nd level of production.

(6) Ma nufa cture an d dema nd for consum er goods.

(7) Foreign a nd domestic tr a de an d fa cilities.

(8) Fu els a nd pow er.

(9) Telecomm un ica tions an d ra dio syst ems.

(10) Tra nsporta tion-U .S. sta nda rds a nd a dequa cy.

(a) Railroads.

(b) Highways.(c) Waterways.

(d) Commercial a ir insta l la t ions.

e. N ati onal Secur i ty .

(1) Center of political power and the organization for nationdefense.

(2) Military forces (Army, Navy and Air Force): summary oforder of ba tt le.

(3) In tern a l security forces-summa ry of orga niza tion a ndstrength.

(4) P a ra mili ta ry forces: summa ry of orga nizat ion a nd strength .



236

8. Geographya . Cl imate . General classif icat ion of the country as a whole with

normal tempera tures, rainfa l l, etc., an d a vera ge sea sona l varia t ions.

b. Terra in . General classification of the country notingoutstanding features, i .e. , coasts, plains, deserts, mountains, hills and

plat eaus, r ivers, la kes, etc.c. M aj or Geogr aph i c Subd i vi si ons. Divide the: country into its

various definable subdivisions, each with generally predominanttopographical characteristics, i .e. , coastal plains, mountainousplateau, rolling, heavily forested hills, etc. For each subdivision usethe following outline in a more specific analysis o1.' the basicgeography

(1) Temperature . Variat ions front normal and, noting t ire.

months in which they may occur, any extremes that woulda ffect opera tions.

(2) Rainfa l l and Snow . S a me a s c(1), a bove.

(3) Win d and Vi sib i l i t y . S a me a s c (l) , a bove.

(4) Relief .

(a) General direction of mountain ranges or ridge lines andw heth er hills a nd ridges ar e dissected.

(b) G enera l degree of slope.

(c) Cha ra cterist ics of valleys a nd pla ins.(d) Natural routes for and natural obstacles to cross-

count ry movement .

(5) Land u t i l i z a t i on . Note any peculiarities, especially thefollowing:

(a) Former heavily forested areas subjected to widespreadcutt ing or dissected by paths and roads; also, thereverse, i .e. , pasture or waste land which has been

reforested.(b) Former waste or pasture land that has been resett led

a nd cult ivated —now being fa nn ed or t he reverse (formerrural countryside that has been depopulated anda llow ed to return to wa ste land).

(c) Former swamp or marsh land that has been dra ined;former desert or waste land now irr igated andcultiva ted; a nd lakes creat ed by post-1945 da rns.

(d) Whenever not coincidental with c(5) (a), (b), or (c),above, any considerable change in rural populationdensit y s ince 1945 is noted.

(6) Dra inage . G enera l pat tern.



237

(a) Ma in rivers, direction of flow .

(b) Characterist ics of r ivers and streams such as current ,ba nks, depths, t ype of bott om a nd obsta cles, etc.

(c) Sea sona l varia t ion, such a s dry beds a nd flash f loods.

(d) La rge lakes or a rea s of ma rry ponds a nd/or swa mps,(potent ia l LZs for a mphibious a ircra ft).

(7) Coast . Examine primari ly for infi l t rat ion, exfi l t rat ion andresupply point s.

(a) Tides a nd w a ves: winds a nd current .

(b) B each footing a nd covered exit r outes.

(c) Quiet coves ar id sha llow inlets or estua ries.

(8) Geol ogi cal basics . Types of soil a nd rock forma tions (include

a reas for potentia l Us for light a ircra ft .(9) F or ests and Ot h er Vegeta ti on . Nat ura l or cult ivat ed.

(a) Type, cha ra cteristics and sign ifica nt va ria tions from t irenorm a nd a t t he different elevat ions.

(b) Cover or concea lment-density, sea sona l va ria tion.

(10) Water . Gr ound, surfa ce, seasona l and pota ble.

(11) Subsistence . Noting w heth er sea sona l or yea r-round.

(a) Cult ivat ed-vegeta bles, gra ins, fruits, nut s, etc.

(b) Na tur a l-berries, fruits, nut s, herbs, etc.

(c) Wild life-a nim a ls, fish a nd fow l.

9. PeopleTire following suboutline should be used for an analysis of the

population in any given region or country or as the basis for artexamination of the people within a subdivision as suggested in 5c. Ina ll events pa rt icula r a t t ention should be given t o those areas w ithin a

country where the local inhabitants have peculiari t ies and arc atconsiderable variance in one or more ways from the normal, nationalw a y of life.

a. B asi c Raci al Stock and Physi cal Char acter i st i cs .

(1) Types, fea tu res, dr ess a nd ha bits.

(2) Sign ifica nt va ria tions from th e norm.

b. Standar d of L ivi ng and Cul tur al (Ed ucat ion) L evels .

(1) P rima ri ly note the extremes aw a y from a vera ge.

(2) Class structure. (Degree of established social stratificationa nd percent a ge of populat ion in ea ch cla ss.)

c. H eal th and M edi cal Standar ds .

(1) C ommon D isea ses.



238

(2) St a nda rds of P ublic Hea lth.

(3) Medica l Fa cilities a nd P ersonnel.

(4) P ota ble w a ter supply.

(5) S ufficiency of medica l supplies an d equipment .

d. Et hn i c Com ponent s . This should be analyzed only if of suffi-cient size, strength and established bonds to constitute a dissidentmin ority of some conseq uence.

(1) Loca tion or concent ra tion.

(2) B a sis for discont ent a nd motiva tion for cha nge.

(3) Opposition to ma jorit y a nd /or to t he politica l reg ime.

(4) Any ext erna l or foreign ties of significan ce.

e. Religion .

(1) Note wherein the national religion definitely shapes thea ctions a nd a t t i tudes of the individua l .

(2) Religious divisions. Major and minor religious groups ofconsequ ence. See d(1) t hr ough (4) a bove.

f . T r adi t i ons and Custom s . (P a rt icula rly t a boos.) Note wh ere theyare sufficiently strong and established that they may influence anindividual 's a ct ions or a t t i tude even dur ing a tea r si tua tion.

g. Rur al Coun tr ysid e .

(1) P eculiar or different customs, dress a nd ha bits.(2) Villag e a nd fa rm buildings —construction materials.

h. Pol i t i cal Par ti es or Factions .

(1) If formed a round individua l lead ers or ba sed on esta blishedorganizations.

(2) If a single domina nt pa rt y exists, is it na tiona listic in originor does it h a ve foreign t ies?

(3) Ma jor lega l pa rt ies w ith t heir policies a nd goa ls.

(4) Illegal or underground par ties a nd th eir motivat ion.

(5) Violent opposition factions within major political organ-izations.

i . Dissidence . General active or passive potential, noting ifdissidence is loca lized or relat ed t o extern a l movement s.

j . Resi st an ce . (Identified movements.) Areas and nature ofactivities, strength, motivation, leadership, reliability, possibleconta cts a nd externa l direction or support .

k . Guer r i l l a Groups . Areas and nature of operations, s trength,equipment, leaders reliability, contacts and external direction orsupport.



239

10. Enemya. Poli t ical .

(1) Outside power . (Number and status of nonnationalpersonnel, their influence, organization and mechanism ofcontrol.)

(2) Domi nan t N a t i ona l Par t y . Dependence upon and ties withan outside power; s trength, organization, and apparatus;evidences of dissension at any level in the party; and theloca tion of those a reas w ithin the countr y th a t a re under a nespecially st rong or w eak n onn a tiona l cont rol.

b. Convent i onal M i l i tar y Forces . (Arm y, N a vy, Air Force.)

(1) Nonna tiona l or occupyin g forces in th e coun tr y.

(a) Morale, discipline, and political reliability.

(b) P ersonnel , s trength.(c) Orga nizat ion a nd basic deployment.

(d) U niforms a nd unit designat ions.

(e) Ordinar y a nd special insignia .

(f) Lea der sh ip (officer corps ).

(g) Tra ining a nd doctr ine.

(h) Eq uipment a nd facil it ies.

(i) Logistics.(j) E ffectiveness (a ny unusua l ca pabilities or w eak n esses).

(2) National (indigenous) forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). See(a) through (j ) a bove.

c. I nt er nal Secur it y Forces (in cl ud in g bor der guar ds).

(1) Strength and general organization, distinguishing betweennonna tiona l and na tiona l elements.

(a) Overall cont rol mecha nism.

(b) Special units a nd dist inguishing insignia .

(c) Morale, discipline and relative loyalty of native per-sonn el to th e occupying or n a tiona l regime.

(d) Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenoussecurit y forces.

(e) Vulnera bilities in t he interna l security sy stem.

(2) D eployment a nd disposition of security element s.

(a) Exa ct loca tion dow n t o th e smallest unit or post.(b) Cha in of comma nd a nd communication.

(c) Eq uipment, t ra nsporta t ion a nd degree of mobil ity.

(d) Ta ctics (seasona l an d terra in va ria tions).



240

(e) Methods of pa tr ol, supply a nd reinforcement s.

(3) The location of all known guardposts or expected wartimesecurity coverage for all types of installations, particularlyalong main LOCs (rai lroads, highways, andtelecommunication lines) and along electrical power and

P OL lines.(4) E xa ct locat ion a nd description of th e physica l arr a ngement

and part icularly of the securi ty arrangements of al l forcedlabor or concentration camps and any potential POWinclosures.

(5) All possible deta ils, prefera bly by loca lities, of th e types a ndeffectiveness of internal security controls, including checkpoints, identifica tion ca rds, passports a nd t ra vel permit s.

11. TargetsThe objective in t a rget selection is t o inflict ma ximum d a ma ge on

the enemy w ith m inimum expenditure of men a nd m a teriel . Ini t ial ly,the operational capabilities of a guerrilla force may be limited in theinterdiction or destruction of enemy targets. The target area and thespecific points of attack must be studied, carefully planned andpriorities established. In general, targets are listed in order ofpriority.

a. Rai l roads .(1) Consid era t ions in t he selection of a pa rt icula r line

(a) Importa nce, both loca lly an d genera lly.

(b) B ypa ss possibilities.

(c) Number of tra cks a nd electr ificat ion.

(2) Location of maintenance crews, reserve repair rails andequipment.

(3) Type of signa l a nd sw itch equipment .

(4) Vulner a ble point s.

(a) U ngua rded sma ll bridges or culverts.

(b) Cut s, fills, overha nging cliffs or und ercutt ing str eam s.

(c) Key junctions or sw itching points.

(d) Tunnels.

(5) S ecur ity syst em.

b. Telecommunications .

c. POL .

d . E l ectr i c Power .

e. M il i t ar y Stor age and Supply .



241

f . M il i t ar y H eadquar ter s and I nsta l l a t ions.

g. Rad ar and E l ectr oni c D evi ces.

h . Highways .

i . I n l and Water ways-Canal s .

j . Seapor t sk. N atu r al and synth eti c gas l i nes .

l . I n dust r i a l p l an t s .Note. Ta rgets listed in b th rough l a re divided a subsections genera lly a s shown

in a a bove. Differences in subsections a re based upon th e peculia rit ies of the pa rt icula rta rget system.

Section III. OPERATIONAL AREA INTELLIGENCE

12. GeneralThis is a guide for operational area intelligence. The attached

outline serves to bring the essentials into focus. It is built uponsection 11, G enera l Area St udy G uide, but na rrows th e fa ctors so tha tthey apply to a relatively small and specific area. It refines thecritical elements and puts them into the perspective of an actualopera tion a t a given t ime.

13. PurposeTo outline the development of detailed intelligence on an assigned

guerri l la warfare operational area to support the commitment of aspecial forces detachment.

14. Formata. Select those elements that are applicable to the si tuation and

the assigned guerri l la warfare operational area for the t ime of the

yea r fr om section I I. U se a ppropria te sections of pa ra gra phs 5-8.b. Cull al l nonessentials and prepare a straightforward

summ a tion of basic fa cts.

c. Note serious gaps in data as processed in b above and takeimmediate action to fill them with the most current reliableinformation.

d . Prepare or request graphics; large-scale sheets and specialmaps covering the assigned area; the latest photography and

il lustrat ion or information sheets on targets within the area; townplans, sketches of instal lat ions, air and hydrographic charts relatedto the area .



242

e. Within the time limits permitted, assemble the material forrea dy reference. Then proceed to plot on ma ps a nd /or overla ys,w herever feasible, the following:

(1) Recommend ed initia l guerrilla bases an d alt erna te bases.

(2) Primary and alternate DZs, LZs, or points for other forms

of infiltra tion.(3) Possible direction and orientation points for infiltration

vehicles (a ircraft , boa t), la ndm a rks, etc.

(4) Routes from infiltration point to likely guerrilla base withst opover s ites.

(5) Points for arranged or anticipated contacts with friendlyelements.

(6) Enemy forces known or anticipated-location, strength andcapabilities.

(7) Estimate of enemy operations or movements during theinfiltra tion period.

(8) S ett lement s a nd /or sca tt ered fa rm s in th e vicinit y of th einfil t ra t ion point a nd t enta t ive guerri l la bases.

(9) All railroads, highways, telecommunications, etc., in theguerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l a rea.

(10) All import a nt inst a llat ions a nd fa cilities.

(11) Sign ifica nt terra in feat ures.

(12) Off-road routes and conditions for movement in all direc-tions.

(13) D ista nces betw een key point s.

(14) Recomm ended point of a tt a ck on assigned ta rget sys t emsa nd selection of other potentia l ta rget a reas.

f . As time permits, continue to collect information and reviseestimates in keeping with more current intelligence. Developincrea sing det a il on (1) th rough (14) a bove w ith specia l empha sis

(1) On th e local indigenous inha bita nt s

(a) E th nic origins a nd r eligion.

(b) Loca l tra ditions, customs a nd dress.

(c) Food, r a tioning, currency, etc.

(d) Atti tudes toward the regime, the United States, for oragainst existing political ideologies.

(e) Any peculiarities, or variances among individuals orsma ll groups.

(2) E nemy, milita ry forces a nd insta llat ions.

(3) In ter na l secur ity forces an d police.



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(a) Organ ization, loca tions a nd st rengths.

(b) U nit designat ions, insignia a nd un iforms.

(c) Area s covered a nd un it responsibilities.

(d) Ch eck points, cont rols a nd current document a tion.

(e) P a trols and mobile units .(4) G eogra phic feat ures in great er deta il.

(5) Approaching seasonal climatic changes and their effectupon w ea ther a nd ter ra in .

(6) Ta rget ca tegories a nd ta rget a rea s in great er deta il.



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APPENDIX IV

AREA ASSESSMENT

Section I. GENERAL AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT

15. Generala. In order to plan and direct operations, Special Forces

detachment commanders need certain basic information about theoperational area. This information, when gathered or confirmed inthe operat iona l ar ea, is ca l led an a rea a ssessment,

b. An a rea a ssessment is th e immedia te a nd cont inuing collectionof information started after infi l t rat ion in a guerri l la warfareopera tiona l a rea. I t ha s t he follow ing chara cterist ics:

(1) It confir ms, corr ect s, or refut es previous in t elligence of thearea acquired as a result of area studies and other sourcesprior t o infiltra tion.

(2) It is a contin uing process.

(3) It forms t he basis for opera tiona l an d logistica l plan ning forthe area .

(4) In addition to information of the enemy, weather, andterrain, it needs information on the differently motivatedsegments of the civil populat ion a nd t he a rea of opera tions.

c. The information developed as a result of the area assessmentshould be transmitted to the SFOB only when there is sufficientdeviation from previous intelligence and the information would havean impact on the plans of higher headquarters. The SFOB prescribesin a ppropria te SOP 's a nd a nn exes th ose items t o be report ed.

d . The following outline, containing the major items of interest tothe a rea comma nd, is an exa mple of how such a n a ssessment ma y beaccomplished.

e. Emphasis and priority on specific items fluctuates with thesi tuation.

f . This outline is designed to facilitate the collection processing,a nd colla t ion of the required ma terial a nd m a y be considered to ha vetw o degrees of urgency.

(1) Im media te. In itia l a ssessment includes th ose itemsdeemed essential to the operational detachmentimmediately following infiltration. These requirementsmust be satisfied as soon as possible after the detachmenta rrives in the opera tiona l ar ea.



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(2) Subsequent. Principal assessment, a continuous operation,includes those collection efforts which support thecontinued planning and conduct of operations. It forms theba sis for a ll of th e deta chm ent's subsequent a ctivities in theopera tiona l ar ea.

16. Initial Assessmenta. Loca tion a nd orienta t ion.

b. D eta chment physical condit ion.

c. Overa ll security ,

(1) Im mediat e a rea .

(2) Att itud e of th e local popula tion.

(3) Loca l enemy situa tion.

d . S ta tus of the loca l resista nce elements.

Section II. PRINCIPAL ASSESSMENT

17. The Enemya. Disposition.

b. Composition, ident ifica tion, and st rengt h.

c. Organization, armament, and equipment.

d . D egree of tr a ining, mora le, a nd comba t effectiveness.

e. Operations.

(1) Recent a nd current a ctivities of the unit .

(2) C ount er guerrilla activities a nd ca pabilities w ith par ticula ra tt ention to: reconn a issan ce units, special t roops (a irborne,mounta in, ra nger type), rota ry w ing or vert ica l li f t a via t ionunits , counterintel l igence units , and units having a massCBR delivery capability.

f . U nit a rea s of responsibility.

g. Da ily routin e of th e units.

h . Logistica l support to include

(1) In sta llat ions a nd facilities.

(2) S upply rout es.

(3) Meth od of t roop movem ent .

i . P a st a nd current reprisal a ct ions.

18. Security and Police Unitsa. D ependa bility a nd r elia bility t o the existing regime an d/or t he

occupying pow er.



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b. Disposition.

c. Composition, ident ifica tion, and st rengt h.

d . Organization, armament, and equipment.

e. Degree of tr a ining, mora le, a nd efficiency.

f . U tilizat ion a nd effectiveness of informers.g. In fluence on a nd r ela tions wit h t he local populat ion.

h . Security measures over public utilities and governmentinstal lat ions.

19. Civil Governmenta. Contr ols an d restrictions, such a s:

(1) Documentation.

(2) Rationing.(3) Tra vel a nd movement rest rictions.

(4) B lackouts a nd curfew s.

b. Cu rrent va lue of money, w a ge sca les.

c. The extent a nd effect of the black ma rket.

d . P olitica l r estrictions.

e. Religious rest rictions.

f . The cont rol an d opera tion of indust ry, ut ilities, agr icultur e, an dtransportat ion.

20. Civilian Populationa. At tit udes t owa rd t he existing r egime an d/or occupyin g pow er.

b. Att i tudes towa rd the r esista nce movement.

c. Reaction to U nited S ta tes support of the resista nce.

d . Reaction to enemy activi t ies within the country and,

specifically, that portion which is included in guerrilla warfareopera tiona l a reas.

e. G enera l health a nd w ell-being.

21. Potential Targetsa. Railroads.

b. Telecommunications.

c. POL.

d . E lect ric power..e. Milita ry st ora ge an d supply.

f . Milita ry headqua r ters a nd ins ta l la t ions .

g. Ra da r a nd electr onic devices.



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h . Highways.

i . In land wa te rwa ys and cana ls .

j . Seaports .

k . Na tura l a nd synth etic ga s lines.

l . Industr ial plants.m . Key persona lities.

22. Weathera. Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature and visibility, seasonal

changes.

b. Wind speed a nd direction.

c. Light data (BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and

moonset.)23. Terrain

a. Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and otherinstal lat ions.

b. P otentia l lan ding zones, drop zones a nd oth er reception sites.

c. Routes suita ble for

(1) Guerrillas.

(2) E nem y forces.d . B a rriers to movement.

e. The seasona l effect of the w eat her on terra in a nd visibility.

24. Resistance Movementa . Guer r i l l a s .

(1) D isposition, st reng th , a nd composition.

(2) Organ izat ion, arma ment, and equipment.

(3) St a tus of tr a ining, mora le, and comba t effectiveness.(4) Opera tions to da te.

(5) Coopera tion a nd coordina tion betw een va rious existinggroups.

(6) General at t i tude towards the United States, the enemya nd va rious element s of the civilia n popula tion.

(7) Motiva tion of the var ious groups.

(8) Ca liber of senior an d subordina te lea dership.

(9) H ea lth of th e guerr illas.

b . Auxi l i a r ies and / or the U nder ground .

(1) Disposition, strengt h, a nd degree of orga niza tion.



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(2) Mora le, genera l effectiveness a nd t ype of support .

(3) Motiva t ion a nd relia bility.

(4) Responsiveness t o guerr illa a nd /or resista nce lead ers.

(5) General at t i tude towards the United States, the enemy,a nd va rious guerrilla gr oups.

25. Logistics Capability of the Areaa. Ava ilability of food stocks a nd w a ter t o include a ny restrictions

for rea sons of hea lth.

b. Agricultur e ca pability.

c. Type an d a va ilability of tra nsporta tion of all ca tegories.

d . Types and location of civilian services available forma nufa cture a nd r epa ir of equipment a nd clothing.

e. Su pplies loca lly ava ilable to include type an d a mount.

f . Medical facilities to include personnel, medical supplies, andequipment.

g. E nemy supply sources a ccessible to t he r esista nce.



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APPENDIX V

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

26. Generala. This glossary of terms is provided to enable the user to have

readily available terms unique to unconventional warfare found inthis ma nua l . Although some terms a re conta ined in J CS P ub 1 a ndAR 320-5 they are reproduced here for the benefit of personnel nothaving ready access to those publications. Other terms are not foundelsewhere but are in common image in Special Forces units and aremore descriptive than other presently accepted terms or fill a gap in

the absence of a term. Where differences exist between army termsa nd J CS terms, the J CS term is used beca use of i ts joint a ccepta nce.

27. Termsa. Ar ea Com m and . The organization composed of Special Forces

and resistance elements (guerrilla forces, auxiliaries and theunderground) located within a guerri l la warfare operational area forthe purpose of directing all area operations. Also called sectorcommand when a subdivision of an area command. Seeunconventiona l wa rfa re forces.

b. Ar ea, Comp l ex . An a rea complex consists of guerrilla ba ses an dvarious supporting facilities and elements. The activities normallyincluded in the area complex are: security and intelligence systems,communications systems, mission support sites, reception sites,supply insta l la t ions, t ra ining a reas, a nd other support ing facili t ies.

c. Auxi l i ary For ce . Tha t element of the a rea comm a nd esta blishedto provide for an organized civilian support of the resistance

movementd. D eni ed Ar ea . Comprises the enemy homeland, enemy occupied

territory and other areas in which the government or people aresubject to th e direct or indirect cont rol of t he enemy. B y virt ue of th isenemy cont rol, th ese a rea s a re norma lly denied t o friendly forces.

e. Evasion and Escape . That part of unconventional warfarewhereby friendly military personnel and other selected individualsare enabled to emerge from enemy-held or unfriendly areas to areasunder friendly cont rol (J CS P ub 1).

f . Guer r i l l a . An armed combatant who engages in guerri l lawarfare. A guerrilla belongs to a unit organized along military linesa nd ma y or ma y not be a member of a mil ita ry force.



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g. Gu er r i l la Base . A guerrilla base is a temporary site whereinstal lat ions, headquarters and units are located. There is usuallymore than one guerri l la base within an area complex. From a base,lines of communications stretch out connecting other bases andvarious elements of the area complex. Installations normally found at

a guerri l la base are: command posts , t raining and bivouac areas,supply caches, communications and medical facilities. In spite of theimpression of permanence of tile installations, a guerrilla base isconsidered temporary and tenant guerri l la units must be able tora pidly aba ndon the base when required.

h. Guer r i l la Force . The overt , milita rily orga nized element of thearea command.

i . Guer r i l l a Warfa re . Comba t opera tions conducted in enemy heldterritory by predominantly indigenous forces on a military orparamilitary basis, to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrialcapa cit y a nd mora le of t he enem y (AR 320-5).

j . Gu er r i l l a War far e Oper at i on al Ar ea (Guerrilla Warfare Area,Operational Area). A geographical area in which the organization,development, conduct and supervision of guerrilla warfare andassociated activities by special forces detachments assists theaccomplishment of the theater mission. The terms operational areaa nd guerri l la w a rfa re area a re used synonymously.

k. Guerri l la Warfare Operational Sector . A subdivision of aguerril la w a rfa re opera tiona l a rea w ithin w hich a single special forcesdeta chment is responsible for t he orga niza tion, development, conduct,a nd supervision of guerri lla w a rfar e a nd a ssociat ed a ctivi t ies.

l . Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF). Anorganization composed of elements of two or more services which isconst itut ed a nd d esigna ted by t he comma nder of a unified or specifiedcomma nd t o plan for a nd direct unconventiona l w a rfa re.

m . M ission Suppor t Si te . A relatively secure site, utilized by aguerrilla force as a temporary stopover point. It adds reach toguerri l la operations by enabling units to stay away from and gofarther from bases for a longer period of time. Food, ammunition andthe la test intel ligence informa tion m a y be ma de ava ila ble at th is site .

n . Speci al F orces Oper at i on al B ase (SFO B ).

(1) An orga niza tion w hich is composed of a s pecia l forces groupand attached or supporting units to provide command,administration, training, operational supervision, logistical

support and intelligence for committed special forcesdetachments.

(2) The locat ion of th e Specia l Forces group dur ing opera tions.



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INDEX

P a r a g r a p h Page

Airborne special forces group: Additional considerations -------------------------------- 15 18 Administration detachment ----------------------------- 14 18 Augmentation detachment ------------------------------ 17, 21b 21, 27Capabilities ------------------------------------------------ 15 18Communications platoon ------------------------------- 25a 34Concept ---------------------------------------------------- 14 18General ----------------------------------------------------- 13 18Headquarters and headquarters company ----------- 45b 55Intelligence requirements ------------------------------- 16, 21c 19, 28Intelligence section --------------------------------------- 27 38Logistical responsibility ---------------------------------- 37 47Mission ----------------------------------------------------- 14 18Operational detachment A ------------------------------ 17 21Operational detachment B ------------------------------ 17 21Operational detachment C ------------------------------ 17 21Organization ----------------------------------------------- 15 18Special forces company ---------------------------------- 17, 21c 21, 28

Area assessment ---------------------------------------------- 63b,app.IV 70, 244

Area command:

Command group ------------------------------------------ 65b,72 72, 86Composition ----------------------------------------------- 65b 72Concept ---------------------------------------------------- 65c 72General ----------------------------------------------------- 65a 72

Area study guide ---------------------------------------------- app.III 234

Auxiliary forces:

Characteristics -------------------------------------------- 69 80Location ---------------------------------------------------- 69a 80Method of operation -------------------------------------- 69c 82Organization ----------------------------------------------- 69b 80Definition -------------------------------------------------- 68b 80Missions:

Civilian control --------------------------------------- 70g 85Counterintelligence ---------------------------------- 70c 84Evasion and escape ---------------------------------- 70h 85Intelligence -------------------------------------------- 70b 84Logistics ----------------------------------------------- 70d, 90c 84, 96Other --------------------------------------------------- 70i 85Psychological warfare -------------------------------- 70f 84Recruiting --------------------------------------------- 70e 84Security and warning -------------------------------- 70a, 79 83, 92

Catalogue supply system ------------------------------------ app.II 188



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Combat employment::

After linkup:

Civil affairs assistance ------------------------------- 147 166Command relationships ----------------------------- 142 165Conventional combat operations ------------------- 143 165Counter guerrilla operations ----------------------- 146 166General ------------------------------------------------ 140 164Missions ----------------------------------------------- 141 164Rear area security ------------------------------------ 145 166Reconnaissance and security missions ----------- 144 165

General ----------------------------------------------------- 95 103

To assist conventional forces:Command relationships ----------------------------- 135 146General ------------------------------------------------ 132 145Linkup operations ------------------------------------ 139 161Missions ----------------------------------------------- 133 145Special considerations ------------------------------- 134 146Support of airborne operations -------------------- 137 156Support of amphibious operations ---------------- 138 1 59Support of ground offensive operations ----------- 136 1 51

Communications:

Air-ground system --------------------------------------- 48c 59

Area command system ---------------------------------- 48d 59 Area internal system ------------------------------------- 48c 59Base command system ---------------------------------- 48b 59General ---------------------------------------------------- 47, 84 58Influencing factors --------------------------------------- 50, 87 61, 94Means available ------------------------------------------ 49, 85 61, 94Radio operator training ---------------------------------- 52 62Security ---------------------------------------------------- 51, 86 61, 94SFOB theater system ------------------------------------ 48a 58Special purpose systems -------------------------------- 48f 61

Demobilization

Assembly of the guerrilla force ------------------------- 157 179

Awards and decorations --------------------------------- 161 180Collection of arms and equipment ---------------------Completion of administrative records ----------------- 162 180Courses of action ----------------------------------------- 158 179Cure of sick and wounded ------------------------------ 156 178Discharge -------------------------------------------------- 163 181General ---------------------------------------------------- 164 181

Planning: 153 177

Civil affairs role ---------------------------------------Special forces role ------------------------------------ 155 178

Rehabilitation and employment ------------------------ 155 178Role of the sponsor --------------------------------------- 165 181Settlement of claims ------------------------------------- 154 177Settlement of pay, allowances and benefits ---------- 160 179

Auxiliary and the underground ------------------------ 159 179



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Evasion and escape:

Definition -------------------------------------------------- app.V 249General ----------------------------------------------------- 2, 36, 8a 3, 12

Mission: Auxiliaries --------------------------------------------- 70 83Guerrillas ---------------------------------------------- 100e, 132 107, 145

Glossary of terms --------------------------------------------- app.V 249

Guerrilla forces:

Combat employment, general -------------------------- 95 103

Defensive operations:Defense against encirclement ---------------------- 131 140Encirclement ------------------------------------------ 130 139Measures ---------------------------------------------- 129 138Partridge drive ---------------------------------------- 130 139Preparation against enemy offensives ------------- 128 137

Definition -------------------------------------------------- 67c 80Demobilization -------------------------------------------- 153-166 177Establishment -------------------------------------------- 67d 80Evasion and escape -------------------------------------- 100e 107General ----------------------------------------------------- 67a 79Logistics ---------------------------------------------------- 88-94 95

Missions:

Assist conventional forces engaged in CombatOperations ---------------------------------------- 99 105

Interdiction -------------------------------------------- 100b 106Psychological warfare -------------------------------- 100c 106Support the theater commander ------------------- 99, 100 105, 106

Organizational goal --------------------------------------- 67b 79Special intelligence tasks ------------------------------- 100d 106

Guerrilla warfare:

Characteristics -------------------------------------------- 6 8Definition -------------------------------------------------- 5 8Effects ------------------------------------------------------ 98 105Forces:

Capabilities -------------------------------------------- 8a 12Limitations -------------------------------------------- 8b 13

Nature ------------------------------------------------------ 97 103Responsibility --------------------------------------------- 3 3

Guerrilla warfare operational areas:

Area control ----------------------------------------------- 96 103 Area command -------------------------------------------- 65 72 Area superiority ------------------------------------------- 96a 103 Area supremacy ------------------------------------------ 96b 103

Command and control ----------------------------------- 64 70Command group ------------------------------------------ 72 86Communications ----------------------------------------- 84-87 93Control criteria -------------------------------------------- 65d 73Designation ------------------------------------------------ 9b, 62a 14, 69General ----------------------------------------------------- 95 103



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Guerrilla warfare operational areas — Continued

Infiltration of detachment::

Expansion from One Detachment ----------------- 65C 72Expansion from Several Detachments ------------ 65C 72Multiple Detachments ------------------------------- 65c 72One Detachment ------------------------------------- 65C 72

Intelligence ------------------------------------------------ 81-83 93Logistics --------------------------------------------------- 88-94 95

Organization: Area assessment ------------------------------------- 63a 70 Area complex ----------------------------------------- 66b 77General ------------------------------------------------ 66a 77Guerrilla base ----------------------------------------- 66b 77Objectives --------------------------------------------- 63a 69

Responsibility --------------------------------------------- 3b 3

Sectors ----------------------------------------------------- 62b 69Infiltration:

Air: Advantages -------------------------------------------- 56 64Characteristics of aircraft --------------------------- 56 64Disadvantages ---------------------------------------- 56 64Responsibility ----------------------------------------- 56 64

Definition -------------------------------------------------- 55 64Influencing factors --------------------------------------- 60 67Land:

Advantages -------------------------------------------- 58 66Disadvantages ---------------------------------------- 58 66

Means ------------------------------------------------------ 55 64Stay behind:

Advantages -------------------------------------------- 59 66Disadvantages ---------------------------------------- 59 66

Water: Advantages -------------------------------------------- 57 65Disadvantages ---------------------------------------- 57 65

Initial contact:

Coincident with infiltration ----------------------------- 54 63Prior to infiltration --------------------------------------- 53 63

Intelligence:

General ---------------------------------------------------- 4d 54 JUWTF ----------------------------------------------------- 45 54

Operational area: Agencies and sources -------------------------------- 82 93Capabilities ------------------------------------------- 83 93General ------------------------------------------------ 81 93

Guerrilla warfare ------------------------------------- 46 57Operational detachment -------------------------------- 45 54Post infiltration ------------------------------------------- 45 54Pre-infiltration -------------------------------------------- 45 54Requirements --------------------------------------------- 45 54Special forces group ------------------------------------- 45 54



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Intelligence — Continued

Special forces operational base ------------------------ 45 54Special intelligence tasks ------------------------------- 100d 106

Interdiction

Airway systems ------------------------------------------- 122 136Communications systems ------------------------------- 123 136Fuel supply systems ------------------------------------ 126 137General ----------------------------------------------------- 117 130Highway systems ----------------------------------------- 120 135Planning --------------------------------------------------- 118 132Power systems -------------------------------------------- 124 136Railroad systems ------------------------------------------ 119 132

Water supply systems ----------------------------------- 125 137 Waterway systems ---------------------------------------- 121 135

Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force:Functions -------------------------------------------------- 11 15Intelligence requirements ------------------------------- 45b, 45c 55, 56Logistical support ---------------------------------------- 33b 46Operational control of UW forces ----------------------- 12 16Organization ----------------------------------------------- 10 14

Logistics:

Doctrine and Policies ------------------------------------ 38 48Evacuation ------------------------------------------------ 40 48General ----------------------------------------------------- 88 95 J4 ---------------------------------------------------------- 35 47

JUWTF Responsibility ----------------------------------- 34 46Management ---------------------------------------------- 43 53

Medical Service:Evacuation -------------------------------------------- 93e 100Expansion of medical support ---------------------- 93f 101General ------------------------------------------------ 93a, b, c, 99, 100Guerrilla medical detachment ---------------------- 93d 100

Organization ----------------------------------------------- 90 96Services ---------------------------------------------------- 42, 94 53, 102

Special forces group -------------------------------------- 37 47Special forces operational base ------------------------ 32 42Storage ----------------------------------------------------- 91C 98

Supply: Accompanying supply loads ------------------------ I 41 I 49 Accountability ---------------------------------------- 41 49 Automatic resupply ---------------------------------- 41 49Caches ------------------------------------------------- 41 49Catalogue supply system --------------------------- 41, app.II 49, 234Emergency resupply --------------------------------- 41 49External supply --------------------------------------- 91a 96Frequency rate ---------------------------------------- 41 49Internal supply --------------------------------------- 91b 97Prepackaging ------------------------------------------ 41 49Requirements ----------------------------------------- 41, 89 49, 95Stock piling -------------------------------------------- 41 49



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Logistics — Continued Theater army ---------------------------------------------- 36 47 Transportation -------------------------------------------- 39, 92 48, 99

OperationsDefensive:

Defense against encirclement ---------------------- 131 140Defensive measures --------------------------------- 129 138Encirclement ------------------------------------------ 130 139General ------------------------------------------------ 127 137Preparation against enemy offensives ------------- 128 137

Offensive: Action in the objective area ------------------------- 109 117 Ambushes --------------------------------------------- 112 123Characteristics --------------------------------------- 102 108Conduct of the ambush ----------------------------- 114 125

General ------------------------------------------------ 101 107Large raids -------------------------------------------- 111 121Mining and sniping ---------------------------------- 116 128Movement --------------------------------------------- 108 117Organization of the raid force ---------------------- 106 114Preparation for an ambush ------------------------- 113 124Preparation for a raid -------------------------------- 107 115Raids --------------------------------------------------- 105 114Special ambush situations ------------------------- 115 126

Tactical control measures --------------------------- 103 109 Target selection --------------------------------------- 104 111

Withdrawal -------------------------------------------- 110 117Psychological Operations:

Concept ---------------------------------------------------- 148, 149 169, 170Mission for guerrillas and auxiliaries ----------------- 70f, 100c 84, 106Organization:

National level ------------------------------------------ 149 170 Theater level ------------------------------------------ 149 170

Target audiences:Civilian collaborators -------------------------------- 150a 172Civilian population ----------------------------------- 150b 172

Enemy military --------------------------------------- 150a 170Guerrillas and auxiliaries --------------------------- 150c 173 Types of Psychological Operations:

Action operations ------------------------------------- 151 173Printed media------------------------------------------ 151Rumor -------------------------------------------------- 151 173

References app. I 183

Resistance:Definition -------------------------------------------------- 4b 5Influencing Factors -------------------------------------- 4d 6Nature ------------------------------------------------------ 4c 5

Security:Bizonal system:

Inner zone --------------------------------------------- 74b 87Outer zone -------------------------------------------- 74c 87



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Unconventional Warfare Forces:

Operational control: Tactical commands ---------------------------------- 12b, c 16 Theater ------------------------------------------------- 12a 16

Underground:Comparison with auxiliaries --------------------------- 71b 85Definition -------------------------------------------------- 71a 85General ---------------------------------------------------- 71a 85Logistical role --------------------------------------------- 90d 96Security role ----------------------------------------------- 79 92

B Y ORDER OF T HE S ECRETARY OF T HE A RMY

G. H. DECKER,General , Uni ted States Ar my ,

Off icia l : Chief of Staf f .

R. V. LEE,Major General , Uni ted States Ar my ,

The Adjutan t General .

Distribution:

Active Arm y: LOGCOMD (1)DCSPER (2) Armies (25)

ACSI (2) Corps (3)DCSOPS (10) Div (2) exceptDCSLOG (2) Armor Div (5)

ACSRC (2) Div Arty (2)CRD (1) Bde (1)COA (1) Regt/Gp (1) exceptCINFO (1) TOE 33105 (20)

TIG (1) Inf Bg (1) TJAG (1) Bn (1) TPMG (1) Co/Btry (1) Tech Stf, DA (1) Br Svc Sch (5) exceptUSCONARC (10) USAIS (2530)

ARADCOM (2) USASWS (1500) ARADCOM Rgn (1) USACGSC (5550)OS Maj Comd (5) USAINTC (415)

NG: State AG (3); Units organized under following TOE: 33106,33107(1).

USAR: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 32050.

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961610531/13028

us army_fm 31-21 1961 guerilla warfare & special forces operations

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