•

EIGHTH A IR FORCE

TACTICAL ~ ..... -- .... ...-- .... -

14 APRIL 1945

1 7£ 1 It llbIB!I By ~tuthor ity of CG, VIII F)~~ter Cmd. Initials/'.' :·~-;J ~~~ . -n..te / 3 .S 1~ r /9;/..:>-~ . . . . ' . . . . .

COPY NO. 2 9 -----

REPORT ..,.. ....... -- ... __.. -

FIELD ORDER NO. TARGETS OPERATION NO.

1972 T~iEKTY ..,.T',iO ( 22) ENEMY DEFENSIVE 948 INSTJ~LLATIONS, CONSISTING OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS aND STROHGPO UTTS COVERiiJG THE GIRONDE ESTUARY IN SOUTHWEST FFAHCE.

~BLE 0 F COlJT'.8NTS

REPORT OF OPE..rl..aTIONS

Annexes

Routes A.nd Targets

Bombing

Weather

Statistics

•

EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

14 April 1945

l, IDENTIFICA.TION.

a. Operation No, 948 (Ce-deword: "Venerable"),

b. ~ssi{g'!ed Targets.

Twenty-two (22) enemy defensive installations. consisting of anti..aircraft and artillery posit.ions and strongpoints covering the Gironde estuary in southwest France. (See paragraph 3,b.(2) for specific targets.)

2. INTRODUCTION.

a. As part of the German plan to deny to the Allies port facili­ties in liberated countries. the enemy maintained a pocket of resistance at the mouth of the Gironda River, the entrance to the port of Bordeaux, long after substantially all of France had been reclaimed. In December 1944 an air'""'ground operation, entitled "Independence", was planned to eliminate this pocket. Three small-scale operations by the Eighth Air Force against a coa..stal battery in the Pointe de la Coubre and a large scale attack by BAF Bomber Command against Roya.n ~both localities in the Gironde estuary area - were undertaken under this plan. "Independence n was temporarily abandoned on 9 January 1945 but in early April this operation was revived and renamed "Venerable".

b. Operation "Venerable" was to combine the efforts of the First u.s. Tactical Air Force (specifically two of its four sub-forces, the 42nd Bomb Wing and the Western French Air Force), the Eighth Air Force, Sixth ~rmy Group (contributing a ground force of French troops referred to as the Army Detachment of the Atlantic) and some French naval units. The air forces were to attack strongpoints and artillery emplacements selected by the ground forces prior to, during, and after D-day, Meetings were held at the headquarters of First U.S. Tactical Air Force at which representa­tives of all the aforementioned commands participated in the overall plan-tiing. The ground attack was to be preceded by air assaults dejigned to soften the enemy defenses. The Western French Air Force was to commence operations on 13 April and the! Eighth Air Force a.nd the 42nd Bomb Wing were to begin their missions on 14 April. Since the ground attack was to be launched immediately after the second day of Eighth Air Force operations, D~a.y was to be determined by the Eighth Air Force based upon weather on or after 15 Apr!l,

· 3. EIGHTH AIR FORCE PI.ANNING.

a. \weather.

Although earlier forecasts indicated the possibility of visuals in southern Germany, the 2200-hour weather conference of 13 April forecast 5-9/10 low cloud and 3-9/10 middle cloud over all of Germany. In western France 2-5/10 small cumulus from 2000-6000 feet, 3-5/10 middle cloud from 15,000-18,000 feet, and 0-3/10 patchy cirrostratus from 22,000.24,ooo feet was indicated. Base weather conditions were forecast as satisfactory for take.,.off. There was a possibility that a front moving eastward might cause substantial middle cloud in the area of western FrRnce towards the afternoon.

. \ n ;· !-"':· '\, i

i:,

- l -

DEC~~,~;~:~:£~ ~· ~-U b. Target Selection and Force Assignment.

I

(l) On 13 April decision was ma.de to initiate the first ph"1se of the heavy bot'lbardmen t aspect of operation "Venerable 11 • At the 1600-hour conference of that day it was decided to employ the entire 2nd Air Divisicn and pa.rt of the Jrd Air Division in connection with "Venerable~ The balance of the Eighth Air Foree was to attack certain communication targets north of Regensb'l,l.rg as requested by SHA.EF through USSTAF ~ At 2200 hours 13 April. weather devolopments having precluded the possibility of visuals in so~thern Germany, the mission against these communication tar• gets was cancelled; to the units thus made a.vaila.ble other targets 1n the area of the Gironde estuary were assigned. Due to the late hour at which this decision was made and the special nature of the briefing material, these additional groups of the 1st and 3rd Air Divisions could not be readied in time to reach their targets as early as the units previously assigned. Consequently the attack was planned in two waves, with an inter­val of approx1roo.tely one hour between we.ves - this interval was subsequently reduced to one~he.lf hour due to necessity for delaying the first wave of bomber fo:rces to enable the 3rd Air Division units to travel the consider­able distance between their assembly area at Givet and the time control point at Orleans. Contemple.ting a. continuation of attacks on "Venerable" targets on 15 April, 3rd Air Division was requested to draw their first wave force from those units assigned to drop Napalm fire bombs on the follQwing da.y; this was to insure adequate time for loading this type of incendiary in its initial adaptation to heavy bomber use.

(2) The bombers were to operate in four forces. this being determined in a large measure by the revision in pl.ans to accommodate the units initially detailed to objectives in Germany, The lead force in the first wave (Forces l and II) had as its principal task the neutralization of the heavy anti~ircraft defenses in the area. The specific assignments were;

Target lifumber J~ecality

FIRST WAVE

Type of ~arget

Gr id Reference GSGS 4249, 6 M

Nwnber of Sgs

Force I - 3rd Air Division ~B~l7's) (Tactical Unit - group of tbTee 12....alrcr~ft or four 9-aircraft squadrons)

1 Roya:n/Vaux-sur­mer

Sub-Force Ia

3xl55 mm guns; 4 heavy AA guns.

137 Roya.n Heavy AA guns .

33 Rgyan (Fort de Royan)

3x75 mm AA guns; light AA positions; s trongpo int.

lA Roya.n/Poin te de 4x88 mm AA guns.

15

19

24

29

Vallieres

Po tn te de Grave

Pointe de Grave

Sub-Force lb

4x88 mm .A.A guns •

4x165 mm guns casemated; 2x77 mm guns casemated; 3x75 mm AA guns •

Pointe de ls. 2xl05 mm guns casemated. Cou.bre-Royan ( I.e Fort) ,

Pointe de la Coubre Heavy AA guns. . "

Pointe dlJ.·.t~.; t-G .. o~ .... te. lfx24o mm gun~ -o.~;?ed. 11 ·", . 'I I !M 111 ~D .Ji l~'-, ~; it·,~ ~, it:-~t ~ ~· i I ,-. (.;k . .

.; ~'l,, .. ' ') '1:'i'!; d tt ~ .,. ll:1l ..:-".,.., 2 - -

353771

302755

232843

239847

3

2

2

2

3

3

3

3 4

Target Number Locality

Type of Tar~t

Grid Reference GSGS 4249, 6 M

Number of Sgs

Force II - 2nd Air Division B-24 1s) (Tactical Unit - combat wing of ...:1g· sqs ea.ch con"'Sisting of 6-10 a~rcraft)

7 Royan/Vaux-sur-mer See Fcroe I

24 Royan/Pointe de la See Force I

32

11

33

17) 38)

19

18

28

Coubre (Le Fort)

B.oyan/Pointe de Susac

Reye.n /Va ux-s ur-me r

Royan (Fort de Roya.n)

Po in te de Grave (in close proximity)

Pointe de Grave

Pointe de Grave

Pointe de la Coubre

6x75 mm coastal guns; 2xl20 mm coastal guns; light AA guns

6xl55 mm guns, casemated; 3x75 mm AA guns : 4x37 mm guns; ammunition depot,

See Force I

4xl55 mm guns. casemated; 4xl05 mm guns, casemated.

See Force I

3x77 mm guns, casemated

2x220 mm coastal guns,

401699

344760

343693 340691

342628

214835 casemated; 4 medium AA guns.

27 Pointe de la Coubre 4xl50 mm guns, casemated. 229839

26 Pointe de la Coubre 4xl38 mm guns, casemated. 239840

SECOND WAVE

Force III ~ 2rd Air Division (B-11 1s) (Tactical Unit ..,. combat 1groupof three 12-aircraft or four 9..-e. ir era.ft

g Royan/Vaux-sur-mer S trongpo int . 349779

7 Ro yan /Va. ux~ ur-rpe r See Force I and Force II

10 Royan/Vaux-su:r:-mer Strongpoint. 348771

12 Ro yan /V H ux-sur-me r Strongpo int. 348767

11 noyan/Vaux-sur-mer See Force II

137 Rcyan See Force I

Foree IV - ls t Air Div is ion (B-lJ' s) (Tactical Unit - combat gro~p of three 12-aircraft squadrons)

4

4

6

6

6

4

3

3

3

3

3

sq_s)

3

5

2

4

4

2

33 Roynn (Fort de Royan) See Force l and Force II 9

l

338-

Ro ya.n-1"1e dis Royan

Strongpo1nt. 408755 Strongpoint: various 388754 batteries; possible headquarters building; railway AA guns.

D ,. ~ ~ ~ ~ ·~ ~ -.'<, ~ r' r'\ t,'~·. ';)r-f~~ ~c • .1 !til: C.:. iJ~ :,,;:.er; fL...J°

9 9

Ncte: a.

DE~... . . ~· "",.~rg ~j . . i, I !,, . I

·~ :, . ··' . . ' ' . ~·· f JI. [ . . .... ... . J ' .• fii •. ~ t . !; ; .·· ' f-;1 . - ... _'J kl , ...... t.~ ( • b ...:ii 1'' ·.

With the exception of three targets (lA; 27A, 338-) all target numbers refer to a target designati~n sheet submitted by the ] 1rench ground forces to all air forces involved in operation "Venerable"~

b. Targets numbered 7 and 33 were assigned to units of three separate forces; targets numbered 137, 19, 24 and 11 were assigned to units of two separate forces. Second priority targets for all forces were to be any objective assigned to other units as their first priority targets. A.ll bombing we.a to be accomplished iisutJ,lly and, therefore, no other priorities were es·~ablished.

c. Bonber Fli~ht Plan.

(1) The weather forecast indicated the possibility of a front moving eastward and threatening overcast conditions in the target areas where visUD,l conditions were prerequisites for bombing. Age.inst this con­tingency attacks were ple,nned as early as prBcticable and to facilitate this, aircraft of Forces I e..nd II, which constituted the first wave, were to be dispatched to buncher beacons nef',r Paris and Givet, respectively, where they would be able to assemble much closer to the target area under conditions of sufficient light (shortly after civil twilight at 0631 hours D.:B.S.T.). Forces III and IV, taking off later because of the ki.te decision as to their mission, were to assemble over England departing from Southwold (0724 hours) e.nd Beachy Head (0738 hours), respectively, It was planned, furthermore, to errrploy P-51 aircraft as weather scouts.

(2) Since routes were almost entirely over friendly territory, the principal considerations were requirements of approaches to and wit:µ .... drawals from the target area. After assembling, the various forces were to proceed to OrlAans, France. From this common point two slightly divergent south-southwesterly courses were to be followed, the more westerly of which, vie. control point 4502-0019 W, would position the bomber formations to attack from an initial point north of Bordeaux and southeast of the target area, while the other would carry the bombf:rs to control point 4433-0003 E a.nd south of Bordeaux to initial points west of Bordeaux and south oi~ southwest of the respective objectives. The order of the forces at the Orleans common point en route southward was to be: Force I - to split into two forr:ia. t ions which would follow separate routes, sub-]~orce Ia proceeding to control point 4502-0019 W, sub-Force Ib to control point 4433-0003 E; Force II, Force IV; and Force III. Due to the necessity for circuitous routings in a majority of cases to enable the most satisfactory bombing runs, the attack order wa.s to be: Sub-Force Ia followed at a considerable interval by sub-Force Ib; Force II, Force III and Force IV. The same sequence wa.s to be maintained on the withdrawal except in the case of Force IV which we,s to fly pe.ralle 1 to and west of the withdrawal route common to the other forces.

(3) The main factors in selection of the bombing runs and immediate 'Withdrawals to rally points were ease of target identification and, in the early stages of the operation, avoidance of winecessary exposure to anti-aircraft defenses. For planning purposes winds at altitude were pre­dicted from 210° at 25 knots, so light as to render them relatively unim­portant e,nd surface winds, which were significant in avoiding obscuration of a.iming points by bursts from preceding units, were expected to be from 180° at 10 knots. ':!:he sun position Wfl.s to averr.c-~ 120° azimuth at an elevi:i,tion of 36°. All bombing runs were to be generally awey from the sun to elimin­ate glare; other factors in determination of the specific lines of aµproach are as follows:

(a) Force I (3rd Air Division) had as its· principal assignment the neutralization of heavy anti-aircraft installations -fragmentation clusters were to be carried for this purpose - eight of its nine objectives being of that type, This force comprised two distinct

Df~t1~!1~'7j!D formations. Sub-Force Ia with its objectives situated in the immediate Royan sector was to make a southeast to northwest approach down the Gironde estuary from its initial point north of Bordeaux, avoiding the defenses on Pointe de Grave·; this bombin:,i: run, to be made at an altitude of 23,000-25 ,000 feet, was designed to facilitate identification of targets by refer­ence to coastal configuration and immediately after attacking (time over target 09 36 hours) the bombers were to turn northeast to avoid the Pointe de la Coubre defenses. Sub-Force Ib flying independently of suo~Force Ia from Orleans was to pass sout~ of Bordeaux and make its approach on a southwest to northeast heading from an initial point 20 miles off shore over the Bay of Biscay; the leading units were to attack batteric~s on Pointe de Grave and continue across the mouth of the estuary and just south of Royan whose anti­aircraft defenses were ·iio have been bombed by sub-Force Ia 37 minutes earlier; the following units were to proceed from the same initial point to its objective on the north side of the estuary generally in the Pointe de la Coubre area, and after attacking turn northeast for the purpose of avoiding concentrated a,n ti.aircraft defenses centering around la Rochelle. Altitude of attack was ret at 22,000 feet; times over target 1013-1016 hours; four chaff-dispensing Moequi toes were to precede this force.

(b) Force II (2nd Air Division) following the same route and closely behind sub-Force lb to their common control point 4433-0003 E was to utilize two initial µoints, both situated west of Bordeaux wherever south .... to-north bomb runs were to ·be initiated against assigned objectives in the Royan, Pointe de Grave and Pointe de la Coubre sectors (times over target 1019~1033 hours). In consideration of the efforts to neutralize anti­aircraft defenses in the immediate target areas by Force I units the approaches were designed to facilitate target identification and obtain the maximum advantage from bomb spillage; for the same reason it was practicable to stipulate a bombing altitude of 15,000 feet which would provide accurate sighting. All units were to veer east of the La Rochelle anti-aircr~ft installations after executing their attacks.

(e) Force III (3rd Air Division) was to reach the target area, (time over target 1057-1103 hours) approximately 25 minutes after Force II, using the initial point north of Bordeaux (same for sqb-Force Ia) to make southeast-to-northwest runs down the Gironde estuary to its objectives located in close proximity in the Royan sector. Ease of identification and utilization of bomb s-oillage were the principal factors in determining the approach. After bombing the force was to turn northeast away from the La Rochelle area. Bombing was to be performed at 23,000 feet~

(d) Force IV (lst Air Division), proceeding over the route passing south of Bordeaux, was to utilize the initial point approximately 20 miles off shore, common to sub-Force Ib. Making southwest-to-northeast bombing runs across the mouth of the Gironde, its targets in the Royan sector were to be attacked (time over target 1123-1135 hours) approximately 20 minutes after completion of the Force III bombing. The approaches afforded good check points for identification of the targets and after bomb releases, units were to continue on approximately the sR.me beadings until the defensive areas around La Rochelle bad been passed. Altitudes of attack were to be at 18,000 feet. Four Hosquitoes were to dispense chaff ahead of these bombers.

Note: See "Routes and Targets 11 Annex for Over-all Plan showing de tails of bomber routes and timings and Flak ~lap for relationship of routes to known enemy anti-aircraft defenses. Target Assignments (by units) and Flight Order and Interval are also found in this Annex.

d. Fighter Support.

. No enemy fighters were ba.sed in the Royan area and possibilities of interception wel"e practically nonMl'€xistent. None of the 15 Eighth Air Force fighter groups were required, therefore, to support the bomber forces.

DEC~71ED 4. EXECUTION.

a. Targets Bombed.

All twenty-two (22) designated first priority targets; three (3) of the first priority targets ~ere attacked by other than assigned units a.s second pr.iori ty and one unidentified battery we.s bombed as an opportunity target. (See paragraph 4.d.{6) for specific targets bombed).

b. Take-off and Aseembg.

(l) Pursuant to plans there were four bomber forces partici­pating in thi3 operation. Force I was comprised of seven B-17 groups ( 25 sque.drorn~) of Jrd Air Division: Force II of four B-24 combat wings (45 souadrona) of 2nd Air Division; Force III of six B-17 grou~s (20 sauadrons) of Jrd Air Division: and Force IV of nine B-17 groups (27 squadrons) of lst Air Division.

(2) Force I (3rd Air Division) and Force II (2nd Air Division) were dispatched to their Cont inen tnl ·assembly- areas where they were sched­uled to begin forming sho~tly after civil twilight (0631 hours, D.B.S.T .) • This involved t~lte-offs from home bases as early as 0440 hours. Force I units experienced some difficulty in picking up the bunchers in the Paris area but managed to accomplish forllfl.tions by using Gee pilotage and flares. Although this force was to fly as two formations. sub-Force Ia consisting of the first, second &id third groups and sub-Force Ib consisting of the fourth through the seventh groups, an over-all assembly was effected. Force II assemblCd in the Givet area appro~imately 125 miles northeast of Paris. One group of the third combat wing, delayed an hour on take.off by a runway accident, flew the mission independently and one group of the second combat Wing, which \•'B.s slow in forming. was out of position at the Division e.ssembly line and fell into the position of the group Which was delayed at be.se; otherwise assemblies were ma.de as planned.

(3) Force III (3rd Air Division) and Force IV (1st Air Division) were unable to truce off as early as the other two forces due to the change in -ple.ns Which rf~sulted in their participation in operation "Venerable". Using their normal assembly areas their r~spective units formed without difficulty a.nd depA.rted the English coast on time in generally good forma­tion.

(4) A total of 1161 heavy bombers sortied on this mission: 26u B-17 1 s in Force I (3rd Air Division) (111 in sub-Force Ia and 153 in sub-Force Ib); 336 3-24 1s in Force II (2nd Air Division); 220 B-l7's in Force III (3rd Air Division) and 341 B-17's in Fcrce IV (let . ..Air Division).

o. ( Pene tra ti on.

Briefed routes to the target areas were followed with only minor variations except in the case of the !-24 group of Force II which by-passed the Orleans common point in an attempt to make u~ time lost as a result of the del.Etyed take-off. Force I split up as planned into two formations, sub-Force Ia and sub-Force Ib, at the above common point. whence they proceeded over slightly divergent courses. Lead units of the various forces were generally ahead of schedule but forma.tions were so spread out tpa t trailing groups reached the various initial points at the briefed time,

d. Target area.

( l) General.

In the target area all forces reported n1l low and medium cloud with cirrus cloud (varying from 3-9/10) above bombing altitudes.

DE&UliSlf IED Downward v1s1b1li ty wns estimated as 20-35 miles and horizontal visibility was unlimited. These conditions were even more favorable than forecast. In general. the squa.drons of all forces attacked their a.ssigned primaries by the prescribed visual technique. ·There were some instances of single aircraft or SqUDdrons Visually bombing their second priority targets, ile. targets listed in the field order as first priority for other units. Such bombing was usually the result of misidentification or inability to identi~ fy smoke-obscured objeetives. In several cases, squadrons effected second runs in an effort to overcome difficulties in target identification or because of interference by other units during the bomb run.

(2) Force I (3rd J~ir Division).

(a) The pri~ary mission of .this lead force was the neutralization of anti-aircraft defenses in the area of the Girond.e estuary, fragmentation clusters being carried for all such targets. By virtue of the varying distances traversed by sub-Force Ia and sub-Force Ib between Orleans, the5r separation point. and their initial points north of Bordeaux and we st of :Sc.rdeau.x over the :Say of Biscay, respectively, the former began its bomb run approxi.me,tely 36 minutes before the latter,

(b) Sub-Force Ia, comprised of three B-17 groups total­ling nine squPdrons, bombed the four assigned anti-aircraft positions in the Royan sector, targets 7, 137, 33 and lA., without witoward incident • .l.i.ttacks were carried out from 21, 550-24, 880 feet (briefed 23, 000-25, 000 feet) at 0931-0945 hours (briefed for lead unit, 0936 hours).

(c) In sub-Force Ib, which consisted of four B-17 groups of ten sqUc~drons, the lead unit released on three nnti....aircraft positions, targets 15 and 19, on Pointe de Grave on the south side of the estuary; the following units proceeded over the estuary to attack an anti...a.ircraft position situated midway between !\oyan A.nd Pointe de la Coubre, target 24, and an anti-c"lircraft enplacement and a heavy coastal battery on Pointe de la Coubre • targets 27A end 29. A number of squadrons were forced to make additional bombing runs because of interference and difficulties of target identificatlon and one unit had its bombs strike a B-24 squadron assigned to the same target, No. 24, causing two losses, although prior to release the B-24's were observed off to the right. attacks were executed from 21,000~23,050 feet (briefed 22,000 feet) ~,t 1009-1024 hours (briefed 1{)13-1016 hours) except for a single squadron which released Pt 1041 hours after a second bombing run.

(d) In Force I there were 261 effective sorties. Two B-l7 1 s carried leaflets only and 259 B-l7 1 s participated in the attacks dropping 610.4 tons; 254 releasing 598.9 tons on first priority targets and 5 dropping 11.5 tons on second priority targets, i.e •• first priority objectives of other units.

(3) Fo~~e II (2nd Aii~Division).

(a) This force made up of four B-24 combat wings having an aggregate of 45 squadrons, followed closely behind sub-Force Ib to initial points west of Bordeaux. Foree I having made attacks to neutre.lbe the anti.aircraft insta.llations, this and the following formations ha.d as their tusk the reduction of the defenses directed against ground assault. The first and second combRt wings were to attack installations in the irunediate Royan sector, targets 7, 24, 11, 33 and 32; the third combat wing targets on Pointe de Grave, 17, 38, 19 and 18; and the fourth combat wing objectives on Pointe de l.a.Coubre, 28, 27 and 26. All units attacked their first priority targets with the exception of one squadron which bombed a gun position which was not assigned, an opportunity target, and another which was ineffective as a result of premature release caused by a radio bomb release malfunction, There was some interference as the numerous squadrons made separate sightings and as a consequence there was

DE;. C~'=i·En " L.~~'-i1 U. considerable maneuvering ~nd many deviations from the briefed altitude. AS previously relRted, aircraft of one squadron were hit by bombs from a B-17 unit~

(b) Force II units carried out their attacks from altitudes of 13,000-17,250 feet (briefed 15,000 feet) at 1018-1046 hours (briefed 1019~1033 hou~s} except for the three squadrons which were 50 minutes behind. schedule as a conseouence of delays on take-off. In this force there were 315 attacking B-241 s, the same number of effectiV'e sorties, dropping 1017.4 tons; 304 aircraft rele~sing 984,4 tons on first priority targets; 2 aircraft releasing 7.0 tons on second priority targets, end 9 aircraft relea.sing 26,0 tons on an opportunity target,

(4) Force lII {3rd Air Division).

(a) This force, the second provided by 3rd Air Division, comprised six :B-17 groUpA~ a totPl of CD squadrons, had as its objectives six closely grouped ground positions. targeis 8, 7, 10, 12, 11 end 137, constituting the ·core of the Roya.n defenses. Lead units of this formation which were flying ahead of schedule began their attack before the ma,in body of the preceding force had conpleted its withdrawal from the ~~neral target arefl. and consequently the planned 30.,.minute interval between the first wave I Forces I and II, f',nd the second wave. Forces III and IV. did not materialize, All units succeeded in bombing their assigned objectives although there were instances where two ~nd even three runs were required as e. result of interference, identification difficulties And personnel failures~

(b) Attacks by Force III were made from altitudes of 18,180-21,250 feet (oriefed 23.000 feet), the majority of units having descended to facilitate identification of targets which were becoming obscured by smoke developing in this area; bombing times were 1040~1138 hours (briefed 1057-1103 hours), the wide range being attributed to the lengthening. of the small form~1tion en route to the target area and mul­tiple bombing runs~ In this force there were 218 B-17 1 s completing effective sorties" Two dropped leP,.flets only and 216 released 645.3 tons, all on their destgnated first priority targets,

(5) Force IV (lst·Air Division).·

(a) The nine B-17 groups, totalling 27 sque.drons. ma.king up this force h.P.d for their objectives three strong defensive positions and emplace~ents in the immediate Royan sector, targets 33, land 33A. Meny units reported difficulty in identifying their assigned aiming points due to smoke fro~ bursts of preceding formations. Second runs were made in several cases to overcome the lirratation on visibility and one unit used H2X techniques to align its bonbing run where check points were not evident. ~here were several cases of faulty identification within the ir:lmediate target area but all first priority targets and one second priority target were attacked.

(b) Bombing was accomplished at 1102-1156 hours (briefed 1123-1135 hours), a majority of units attacking earlier than planned but others were behind schedule as a result of multiple bomb runs, In this 1st ~ir Division force there were 338 effective B-17 sorties, Three air­craft dropped leaflets only and 335 bombed with 1036. 7 tons; 323 releasing 1001.2 tons on first priority targets and 12 releasing 35,5 tons on a second priority target.

(6) .Bombing Results.

The assessment ofera1lable photographic cover of these attacks, which involved 1125 heavy bombers dropping a total of 3309.8 tons, reveals the following results, w1th Which are tabulated pertinent bombing da ta.i

DEC'~-,,.a ~ ;~1 ' ' 'i' • :•.' ..

Target .. ii -cU-fi llli j ~a · o tal Bombs

:Number S~r ties At tackint: i. . Dro;ei:>ed ·Results

FORCE I

7 37 35 1316xl20 Frag. Good 27A (Second Priority) l 38xl20

137 24 24 90lxl20 Fair

33 25 24 893xl20 Fair 27 (Second Priority) 1 38xl20

]A 25 24 876xl20 Good 19 (Second Priority) 1 38x120

15 29 27 1020xl20 Fair

19 28 27 1019xl20 Good

24 29 27 1026xl20 Good 137 (Second Priority) 1 38xl20

27A 30 29 1083xl20 Good 137 (Second Priority) 1 38xl20

29 37 37 74xl000 HE Fair-Good 74x2000 HE

264 259 74xl000 HE 74x2000 HE

8 324xl20 Frag.

FORCE II

7 33 32 78x2000 HE Good lOxlOOO 5x70 IB

24 (Second Priority) l 3x2000 HE

24 34 26 65x2000 HE Very Good 8xl000

32 32 29 84x2000 HE Very Good 14xl000 14x70 IB

27 (Second Priority) 1 L!-x2000 HE

11 37 37 118x2000 HE Fair 14x1000

19x70 IB

33 36 34 l05x2000 HE Good 24xl000

17 and 38 30 26 80x2000 Poor-Fair 12xl000

19 25 24 72x2000 Good 3xl000 2x500

o~c, ·~ ~ ---·.-a .. Ii' ,~ ci .-· .~ ~ ·, L; ii.. .. ,.~ _f,, · ·· . M Ii ii. '

- 9 -

Dr:-" ..J...IJl!' ~ r: 1 En L~\w~~ 1· U.

Target Number

18

Sorties

28

Unidentified Btry (T.O.)

28 27

27 27

26 27

8 28

7 48

10 20

12 48

11 50

137 26

220

33 113

1 109

33A 119 1 (Second Priority)

341

FORCE II (Continued)

Aircraft At tacking

17

9

27

315

FORCE III

28

47

19

48

49

25

216

FORCE IV

111

106

106 12

335

Total Bombs Dropned

56x2000 lOxlOOO

25x2000 2xl000

92x2000 12xlOOO

2x70 IB

8lx2000 HE 14xl000

82x2000 12xl000

2x500

945x2000 140xl000

4x500 40x70 IB

168xl000 HE

282xl000

226x500

150xl000 268x500

587x500

78xl000 144x200

678xlOOO 1225x500

1307x500 HE

214xl000 1017x500

l253x500 142x500

2l4xl000 3719x500

Results

Good

Very Good

Very Good

Fair-Good

Fair

Good

Good

Very Good

Good

Very Good

:Fair

Good

Good

Fair-Good

Note; See "Bombing" Annex for diagrammatic bomb plots and extracts of interpretation reportst

_,A·~,._...~~~

DEC~.,tu - 10 -

Df7~~ ~\~~ L~~jfi~~w· ~w.U_

(7) Enemy Opposition.

Meager• inaccurate predictor con trolled fire WA s encoun­tered over the Gironde e1tuar~ by units of Force I and Force II, but no effective opposition developed.

e. Withdrawal.

The briefed return routes were followed without important deviations, the main bodins of the respective forces flying in the order of attack, 1.e., sub•Foroe Ia, sub-Force Ib, Force II, Force III, Force IV. The necessity for multiple bomb runs in many instances together with the co.as id.era ble lengthening of several formations in the course of the flight to the target area, resulted in numerous units returning independently. With the exception .of Force III 1 which was considerably ahead of schedule at the target, the lead elements of the other forces were a few minutes late on arr ive.l at the English coast: straggling uni ts were in a number of eases far beh\nd their ma.in bodies.

f. -~orties, Losses, Battle Da.~8!• and Claims. I 1 I

( 1) Bombers.

A total of 1161 bombers sortied on this operation and made 1132 effective sorties, including ·7 aircraft dropping leaflets. A totA.l of 1125 bombers released 3309.8 tons; 1097 aircraft dropping 3229.8 tons on their first priority targets; 19 aircraft dropping 54 tons on second priority targets and 9 aircraft dropping 26 tons on a· target of opportunity. Two B-24 1 s of Foree II were loet as a result of being struck by the frag­mentation bombs of another unit. There were 5 cases (1 B-17 and 4 B-24) of category "E" (salvage) damage. and 8 cases of limited battle damage (5 category "A'•, l category 11AC" and 2 category "B"). For. the most pa.rt, the category 11E11 casualties arose out of take-off and landing accidents. Five of the 8 limited battle damage instances were occasioned by anti­aircraft fire; the remainder by other causes. Force I experienced one instance of category "AC" damage. Force II reported 5 ce,ses of cfl.tegory "A" and 2 cases of category "B": Forces III and IV gave negative reports.

( 2) Fighters.

Of the 29 P-51 sorties, 26 P-5l's were effective as weather scouts.

• \

• "''> ... 11 f ·-

'T""'- - _,

DE~--IED • '. . . # t.' • ...... 11.....,"" .... ···'

T!~GET L.SSIGNMENTS

14 Lpri 1 1945

CHI.RT PJ!:F •. ~ + T!Ji.G.ET FORGE ++ T.O. T,. JJ.,TITUDE

lST 1..IR DIVISION - FORCE IV

(33 Stre'ng point 35lst, 457th, 40lst 1123 18,000 ( Gps (9 Sqs)

J, ~ l Strong point 305th, 92nd, 306th 1129 18,000 I Gps (9 Sqs) \ ( (33a Various Batteries 384th, 303rd, 379th Gps 1135 18,000 ( & strong points (9 Sqs)

2ND JJR DIVISION - FORCE II --( 7 Case:nated Guns & 2nd CT!: 445th Gp (4 Sqs of )

I ( Heavy J).L .. 8 a/c) ) I

~ I \

(24 Case:nated Guns 389th Gp (4 Sqs of ( 8 a/c) ( )

B (11 Case:nated Guns & 14th CTl: 491st Gp (6 Sqs of ) 1019 15,000 ( Heavy LL 6 a/c) ) ( ) (33 Strong point 44th Gp (6 Sqs of ) ( 6 a/c) ) (

~ (32 Coaste:'l.l Guns 392nd Gp (6 Sqs of ( 6 a/c) )

(17 & Case::11a ted Guns 96th err: 458th Gp (l~ Sqs of ) (38 9 a/c) ) ( ) ( 19 Case:nated Guns 467th Gp (3 S/s of \

J c ( 9 a c) ) 1027 15,000 ( ) (18 Case:nated Guns & 466th Gp (3 Sqs of ) ( Heavy JJ .. 9 a/c) )

(28 Coastal Guns & 20th C'.7: 443th Gp (3 Sqs of ) ( 4 l'Eedicine 9 a/c) ) ( Flak Guns ) ( ) (27 Case:nated Guns 93rd Gp (3 Sqs of ~ D ( 9 a/c) 1033 15,000 ( ) (26 Co .. se::na tec1 Guns 446th Gp (3 Sqs of ) ( 9 a /c) )

3RD JJ:R DIVISION - FORCE I

Sub Force Ia

( 7 Heavy lJ~ Battery 96th Group (3 Sqs) 0936 25,000

E ~137 Heavy JJ~ Battery 388th Group ( 2 Sqs) 0936 23,500 (

(33 0936 23,500 ( 'lJ~ 0936 22,000

CHART REF. NO. +

(15 F

(

~ ( 19 I

\

(24

~ G (27a

( (29

( 8 H (

( 7 (

(10 ( (12 (

J ( (11 ( ( (137

14 Ap1..-j_l 1945

TARGET FORCE ++ T.O. T. ALTITUDE

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I (Continued)

Su'b Force Ib

Heavy AA Battery 94th Gp (3 Sqs) )

~- 1013 22,000 Heavy AA Battery 9Li-th Gp (1 Sq) & 447th Gp

(2 Sqs) )

Heavy AA Battery 447th Gp (2 Sqs) & 486th Gp ) (1 Sq) ~

Heavy AA Battery l1-86th Gp (3 Sqs) ) 1016 22,000 )

Case:nated Guns 487th Gp (4 Sqs) )

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE III

strong point 100th Gp (3 Sqs) )

lOOth Gp (l Sq) & 390th Gp )

1101 23,000 Heavy AA Battery j (4 Sqs)

Strong point 493rd Gp ( 2 Sqs) ~ Strong point 493rd Gp (l Sq) & 490th Gp )

(3 Sqs) ) ) 1107 23,000

Jmeavy AA Battery 34th Gp (3 Sqs) & 385th Gp ) (1 Sq) )

~ Heavy AA Ba tter:r 385th Gp (2 Sqs)

+ Letters refer to ti::ne control groupings.

++ Tactical Unit: 1st Air Division - Group of 36 B-17•s, of 3 sqs of 12 a/c.

2nd Air Division - Co:nbat Wing of 8 to 18 sqs of 6 to 9 B-24' s.

3rd Air Division - Group of 36 B-17's of 3 sqs of 12 a/c or 4 sqs of 9 a/c.

NOIB: See Flight Order and Interval.

•

•

14 April 1945.

No. 33 Strong Point 3x75 mm AA, l:tght AA :_)ositions and miscellaneous strong points.

No. 1 Strong Point

F. B. Various batteries and strong points.

No. 28 2x220 rnm Coastal Guns and 4 LI0dilui1 Flak Guns.

No. 27 4x150 nun Guns, Casemated.

No • 26 4xl38 l1ll!1 Guns, Casemated.

No. 24 2xl05 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 11 6x155 mm Guns, Casematod.

3x75 mm AA

4x37 mm AA

Ammo Depot

No. 33 Strong Point Jx75 mm .AA, Light M :Jositions and miscellaneous strong points.

No. 7 Jxl55 mm Guns, Casomated.

3x75 Heavy AA

No. 32 6x75 mm Coastal Guns

2xl20 mm Coastal Guns

Light AA

No. 17 & 4.."'Cl55 mm Guns j Caser.w.totl. No. 38

4xJ..05 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 19 4x165 mm Guns, Casemated,

2x77 mm Guns, Casemated.

3x75 nun Heavy AA

No. 18 3x77 mm Guns, Casemated.

Heavy A.h.

TARGET

No. 29

No. 24

No, 7

No. 137

No, 33

No. 19

No. 15

F. B.

No. 137

No. 11

No. 12

No. 10

No. 7

No, 8

~CRIPTION ,,QLJ.AR_QrETS (Continued)

Jil.]., A:I"R DTITISION ·~

4:x.240 mm Guns, Caser:ia~od

Heavy Flak Battery

Heavy Flak Battery

Heavy :nak Battery'

Heavy Flak Battery

Strong Point Heavy Flak Battery.

Heavy Flak Battery.

Heavy Flak Battery.

Flak Battery

4 - 88 AA Guns

Heavy Flak Battery

Strong Point

Strong Point

Heavy ./AA Battery

Strong Point

Noto~ Number of tar;.;ots rcl'ors only to general target areas and not to anJr spocific po:i.n\:i s.

DEC l...l.A.a" ,.IE r1 , ~······u FLIGHT ORDER AND INTERVAL

14 April 1945

Force I - .3rd Air Di vision - to Royan Area,

Ia - (T.O.T. 0936 hours) - using control point 4502~0019 w. 96th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 :ninutes; 338th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 :ninutes.

Ib - ( T. o. T. 1015-1016 hours) - using control point 4433-0003 E.

452nd Gp (3· Sqs): 3 :ninutes; 94th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 :ninutes; 447th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 :ninutes; 486th Gp (4 SqB): 2 :ninutes; 487th Gp (4 Sqs).

+ 7 :ninute inte:r-val before next following for:nation reaches co:n:non point at Orleans.

Force II - ( T, O, T. 1019-1033 hours) 2nd Air Di vision - to Royan Area.

2nd CW (8 Sqs of 8 a/c): 2 :ninutes; 14th CW (18 Sqs of 6 a/c): 6 :ninutes; 96th CF ( 10 Sqs of 9 a/c): 3 :ninutes; 20th CW (9 Sqs of 9 a/c ).

+ 27 :ninute interval before next following unit reaches co:xmon point at Orleans.

Force IV - (T.O .. T.1123-1135 hours) 1st .Air Division - to Royan Area.

35lst Gp (3 Sgs): 40lst Gp (3 Sqs):

92nd Gp (3 Sqs): 384th Gp (3 Sqs): 379th Gp (3 Sqs).

2 :ninutes; 457th Gp (3 Sqs~: 2 :ninutes; 2 :ninutes; 305th Gp (3 Sqs : 2 :ninutes; 2 :ninutes; 306th Gp (3 Sqs : 2 ~inutes; 2 ~inutes; 303rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 ~inutes;

+ 3 :ninute interval before next following unit reaches co:n:non point at Orleans.

Force III - (T.O.T. 1101-1107 hours) 3rd Air Division - to Royan li:ea.

lOOth Gp (li- Sqs): 3 :ninutes; 390th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 :ninutes; 493rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 :ninutes; 490th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 :ninutes; 34th Gp (3 Sqs).

+ NOTE: Forces I, II, III and IV are arranged in order of penetration at co:n:non point at Orleans, but due to varying approaches to target area the attack order was to be - Fo~e s I, II, III and IV.

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Target: RoyPn Area (First Priority).

Date: 14 April, 1945.

Number of Aircreft Att~cking: 1125.

Tons of Bombs Dropped: 3309~8.

1. Diagraum1a tic Bomb Plots.

2. Excerpts from Interpretation Report Nor B 571 (R), and Interprototion Report St.A. 3577.

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s. '· 3ffl TACTICAL TAlll!TS J11 RO!All AREA 14 APR 194S

DIAGR.dll!'IC BOMB PWl' WO. 2

1 /I I/, Area ot H.B. Barsta ·.:·;:~·Ana ot !Mpentation Bursts ~ Tar19t Area

~ I

EXCERPT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO~ B 571 (R)

TARGET: ROYAN AREA

DATE: 14 APRIL, 1945

A very heavy concent~ation or craters is spread over the entire target aree c.overing the whole area with a layer or send. The only remaining elements of the defended eree are a few sections· of trenches on the far south and one barely visible on the north. One building remains intact in the area.

,!arget No~ 7

The attack is concentrated on the center of the terget and extends to a highway to the north. All positions have received very near misses -end spoil has made it impossible to recognize all the positions. Two emplacements can be seen filled with sand.

Target No. 8

There are et leest four craters within this strongpoint though the main weight of the attack is 9oncentrated south of it in the adjacent town. Three weapons pits have been obliterated by spoil, and e neer miss hes prob8bly dameged the house and adjoining shed in the strongpoint area.

Target No. 10

The weight of the attack is concentrated directly upon this strongpoint in the center of the terget area. Five craters are visible around a possible underground shelter. Creters heve rendered the outline of the target unrecognizet le.

Tsrget No. 11

The main concentration of bombs fell directly in the target area extend­ing across the road to the northwest. Casemates ere still intact, but all heve suffered probable damage from near misses. The commend post received a direct hit erid a near miss. Of seven open emplacem~nts in front of the ce.semetes, only three, positions 1, 4, end 7, ere visible on these photographs. The wooded area to the rear of the battery con­taining ammunition storee end personnel housing hes been completely blanketed by craters which have obliterated all installations within the area •

. Target No, 12

The weight of the attack is· concentrated in the southern part of the target ere8. Two open emplacements in this southern area heve been demolished by hits. The:re are et leest four creters on the perimeter firing trench of a'smell st:rongpoint, Neer hits heve probably damaged a small shelter in the center of the ·target.

Target No. 15

No bomb craters cen be found in the terget eree. There is a large concentration of craters on the beech and in shallow water northeest of the target-,

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EXCERPT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B.571 (R) 14 April, 1945

Iarget No. 17

There are no creters in the target area. A small concentration of craters are 250 feet south of the battery and some 300 feet southwest of the beech.

I~rget No. ·18

At least 18 craters can be counted in the target area - a few craters are spreed out to the reer and in the water in front of the battery. Each casemate has suffered at ·1e~at one near miss - and only one support­ing flak gun cen be found after the bombing.

:target Noo 19

Target not covered.

Target No. 24

The weight of the attack is concentrated in the bettery area and extends southwest along the beach. Several near hits have probably dem~ged one of the two cesemates end one of four open emplacements in this battery. A concentre.tion of neer hits h0s severely damaged four houses, possibly quarters southwest of the target.

Target .No, 26

There is e fair concentration of crflters spre8d over e wide area on and 8bout tho target. No. 2 and 3 cesemates suffered three near misses each and one bomb landed et the reer of No. 4 position, removing the pro­tecting sand on that side of the casemate •. No structural damage can be seen on eny of the elements of the battery.

Terget No. 27

Tho weight of the attack is concentreted across the battery erea and extending north. One direct hit end two neer hits have severely damaged three CDsemetos. One near miss hes probebly damaged e blast walled shed to the reer of one casem~te.

Iarget No. 28

The w0ight of bombs fell in the battery eree and extending north into the fldjacent woods. Ji near miss hes probably demaged one of four open emplecements in the battery. There is elso a concentration of five emplacements in the e8stern half of the terget area-

TPrget No. 29

There is e good concentretion of cretere in the target ~ree. No. 1, 2 and 3 positions hBve several neer misses eech and there ere craters with­in 100 yards of No. 4 position. No. 2 and 3 positions mey be hee-vily deme ged. ·Spoil hes been deposited in he lf of ee ch emple cement. .All cornmunicetion lines between the positions have been broken.

Terget No. 32

The main wei'ght of bombs fell in the tBrget eree extending north along the beech. None of the six positions have been hit directly, but e neer miss slightly to the re£lr between positions 1 and 2 hes probably damaged these two positions. There is a lerge c~ater at the entrance to a large underground shelter in the rear of the battery area. A concentration of 15 craters is visible slightly southeast of the battery in an-aree of communicetion trenches end wespon pits.

r~ F ~!f i'~~~~ .~ ~~~ F~ LiJj i~:.,~ .;, ;w ~ ;" · ~ • ~ ti la!I U ... ..

EXCERPI' FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B 571 (R) 14 April, 1945

~rget No. 33

The terget is smothered with a he~vy concentration of craters - no erea being missed4 All emplacements lwve been destroyed or dame.ged. The roof of the large shelter in the ~enter of the fort hes been caved in. One, possibly two guns remain in open emplacements, but thetr condition cannot be determinedc The eree of creter concentretion extends north­eest blanket5.ng point 036030 where ell installations ere destroyed or heevily demaged.

Target No. 3§

There is a smell concentration of crsters in the target erea. One crater is within 50 feet of each of the No. 1, 2 end 3 cesemates. In the ree.r of the battery, two underground shelters are blenketed with cr~ters - several direct hits or near misses. No structurel damege csn be seen.

Target No~ 137

At leBst twenty cr~ters 8re visible in the target aree - the mein con­centretion near the northwest corner. No direct hits have been made on the four positions, but the northwest position hes been possibly demaged by a neer miss.

Target No. 23A

A very heevy concentrPtion of crPters is seen immedfotely eest end south of the te.rget. Some few cr~ters ere seen in the yard end there is damage to flnk w~gons, but the extent cannot be dete~ined from this cover.

Target No. 27A There ere several crAters south ~nd e~st of the b~ttery, but none cen be seen on the terget.~ No dFm~ ge c~n be found.

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3577.

TARGET: TACTIC.AL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA.

DATE: 14 APHIL, 1945.

I!rget No. l

Eight con~entrations totalling more than 600 H.E. bursts are seen blanket­ing the area of the strong point, with probable hits on six gun emplace­ments and a group of unidentified buildings to the southwest. One concen­tration of more than 50 bursts is seen blanketing a group of unidentified barracks type buildings and extending into adjacent open fields, 1500 yBrds southeaet of the strong point. In a lightly built-up area and open fields, 1200 yards west of the strong point, are seen et least 60 bursts.

TarP,et No<: 1-A .-Patterns of fragmentation bursts are seen covering the area of the pin­point and north of the point for a distance of 2000 yards.

Target }.To. 7

Patterns of fragmentation and H.E. bursts are visible completely blanketing the terget areas. Two w~ves of approximately 285 bursts are seen, of which 60 are on the strong point area and eight effect neer hits to the casem~ted guns. The small scele of the photographs does not permit an accurete statement on installations hit, but two probable hits on the gun berbettes in the strong point cen be seen. Approximat.ely 63 bursts sre visible in e wooded eree one end one•hEilf miles northeest or target No. '7.

Target No. S

Two groups totalling more then 100 H.E. bursts ere visible 8cross the target area, and through the central section of the village, south of the target aree. A group of at least seven H.E. bursts blanket the buildings within the strongpoint, scoring probable hits on ~11 the b~ildings. A cluster of five H.E. bursts is visible in e sm~ll settlement and road junction 400 y-Elrds north of the target.

Target No. 10

A pattern of fragmentation bursts end a heavy ooncentration of H.E. bursts totBlling ~pproximately 175 ere seen blanketing the strong point, with fifteen probeble hits on the installations in the target area •

.Iarget No. 11

At le~st JOO H,E. bursts Ere seen blanketing the target ares and extend north into open fields 8nd south into the· entrance of the ta Gironde River, with possible direct hits on all six 155 mm guns end near hits on the three 75 mm guns in casemates.

Target No. 12

Two concentretions of H.E. bursts, totalling approximately 200, and a string of fregment~tion bursts are seen covFring the target erea Bnd in· stallations, with probsble hits on an unidentified building in the center of the ~re8 and at leest one barbette.

[ ;n ~ o " , · . . 4~ •

~~, \r· ;;· hi_'-t.J (J~ n :11 .f' ~ f,"j. r :;-- i~ fill o· ' -" ~··· · ,. ,,,i · c,.;' L "ti 1! f,

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A• 3577 (Continued) 14 April, 1945

T~rget No. 15

Two strings of fragmentation bursts are seen extending from the weter ecross a jetty blanketing Target No. 40, then across a smell built-up area and into the target eree. Very few bursts fell in the target area with the greater pert landing in the water. Due to the poor quality of the photographs the bursts in the target area cannot be pinpointed.

iarget No. 18

Approximately 24 bursts are visible in and neer the target area, with at lea st 10 bursts on the target. More than 15 bursts are seen on the banks of the Gironde River, 6,750 yards southeast of the target.

Iarget No. 19

.Approximately 15 H~E. bursts are visible in the northeast and southeast terget eree, with possible hits seen on one or more cesemates, while frBgmentetion bursts are seen to blanket most of the target area. Strings of fragmentations Bre seen in the water to the northwest and in an open area to the east and northeast of the target.

Terget No. 24

A group of H.E. bursts is seen blank£ting the target aree and a second group is visible just to the eest with a few posa,ible bursts extending on the target but hits cannot be determined because of the scale of the photegraphs~ A large concentration of fregmcntation bursts is seen on e wooded ereP and the shore immediately eest of the target.

Target No • 26

The target area is blanketed by three groups or H.E. bursts scoring probable hits on all four casemetes~ Several bursts are scattered in the wooded area just north of the target area.

!arget No. 27

Two compact groups of H.E. bursts have blanketed the target eree. Early bursts or the first are seen scoring one direct and one neer hit·on one gun and one prob~ble hit on another. The second group of bursts, seen through thin smoke, can be plotted directly acro~s the target erea scoring probe.ble hits. A group of ebout 8 bursts is visible on the beach east­southeest of the t~rget.

Ierget No. 27A

A wide concentration of fragmentation burst~ is seen blanketing the target and adjacent woods and fields from the be8ch toe point-1500 yards in­land.

Target No. ~8

The target area is blanketed by at least 50 H.E. bursts with scattered bursts extending into immediately adjacent woods ~nd beaches.

Target No. 29

Four groups, totalling spproxirnstely 125 H.E. bursts, can be seen to blanket the southeastern three·-rourths of the target eree scoring many probable hits or nesr hits on the southern ~hree gun positions. The greeter portion of two groups of bursts fell into the wooded erea just east of the target.

n. . ~.· .· ·[j.'., .!'!! ·. ·~ .~,, .~.··, ........ ~.~ ~.·· f;a.·n ·.· .... ' "1 f~'• I f I I J · ~ f

, _,.,, ,:; r'' ~ · "'"' ., ... - ~ J' H ~ii ~;.;_,::,,.' k ~'.' . .I ;.,;.:1 £""' i.:~'(·;:' ',.r..,·· t,..; . . z ~;.: L~,"7 L: .. ]'

(, ~ - . l.~ ; :,~ .. · •· .... ,. J1 . ' .. ~~._.JI' . Dr.~, fir " """' - .. ~'ED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3577 (Continued) 14 April, 1945

Tergtl No. 32

Although at leest 35 bursts are visible in or very neer the target area, no direct hits on the guns themselves can oe seen. A total of et least seven very near hits to five of the guns are visible. One string of bombs is visible extending from the target across the beech and woods immediately to the northeast.

,I~rget No. 33

At leest eight concentretions of H.E. bursts are seen in and adjacent to the target area with at Jee st 95 hi.ts in the target ares end many hits on the residential buildings adjecent to the target eree. A large concen­tration of frBgmentetion is seen across the target area and extends north­west into open fiels, residential area, secondary roads and southeast into the water. Severa 1 strlngs of fre gmentation bursts and a l~rge concentration can be seen in the water approximately 500 yerds southeast of the target.

TJa i:get No , 3 3A

A string of fragmentation clusters and leter a group of HoE. bursts can be seen to blanket the terget area with one near H.F. hit on the building and many by frags.

Target No. 33B

Three concentretions totellints mor.e than 225 H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the pinpoint, adjacent industrial type buildings, rail sidings, business/ residential section and open fields. Two concentrations totalling more than 120 bursts are seen extending across a lightly built-up area just eest of the pinpoint. Extending ecross the road over rail bridge, woods, and open fields, 500 yards east of the pinpoint, is seen a concentration of more than 60 bursts Pnd 1000 yerds further eest a few scattered bursts are seen on open aree.

Target Nos. 38, 17

Two groups of H.E. bursts ere seen blanketing the western-most casemates with probPble hits on three of the four gun emplacements. These bursts extend across the target area from the water southward into a small built­up aree. A third grou pf .bursts is seen,· approximately 750 yards west of the terget blanketing the shore ~nd extending into the water, with pos­sible hits on two untargeted casemstes. A fourth group of bursts is seen, approxinretely 3000 yards west of the target, on B wooded area just south of the shore-line.

Iarget No. 132

A large concentration of frsgmentation bursts is seen across the target area end extending northwest into open fields and secondary roads and southeast into the water~ Nine H.E. bursts are seen in the target aree with neer hits on two of the four 88 mm. gun flak battery.

DEC,i ~ ~ t'\~" ... ,rn .·· · lLL:L·u,J~u

- 3 -

;1r~ · i t ' '.f J' ~~ ·i ' t.. ' -*""i ~,+ ~l t; ii;;! r~ ~..:.~~·~: E,:J~.f·' ii::~~'.~ ' ' .f!J : '

,;; i ! 11' i ' :;'.~( k'I -

.'i:f ;~~ ~ -.' ;:.!~ - "-'9_~

BOMBING Dii.TA. 14 April 1945

lS't l~IB. .P.JVISION

DlRECT. LENGTH TIME OF NUMBER OF :RANGE DROPPED GROUP OF RUN OF RUN ll.LTITUDE RELFJ~E 1FCE MANUAL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR

fioyan/Megis

351A 39 3 min 18,000 1102t x l4lx500HE 1 11

351D 42 3 min 17,400 1104 x 150x500HE 1 12

351C 40 3 min 18,600 1104 x 155x500HE 1 12

457A 30 3 min 18,000 ll06t x 142x500HE l 11

457B 57 3 min 17,300 1107 x 1Jlx500HE 1 10

457C 32 3 min 18,600 1107t x l55x500HE 1 12

40lJ~ 46 3 min 18,000 1114t x 25x500HE l 12 124x500HE

401B 44 3 min 17,400 1115 x 41x500 HE l 11 102x500HE

401c JO 3 min 18,700 1117 x 18x500 HE 1 11 123:x500HE

3051~ 40 2 min 18,200 11J5t x 160x500HE l 11

J05B 16 2 min 17,700 1114 x 153x500HE l 10

305C 25 2 min 18,750 1114:} x 161x500HE 1 11

92L. 17 3 min 18,400 1121 x 24x500 HE 1 11 72xlOOOHE

92B 28 3 min 17,150 1124 x 23x500 HE 1 11 72xlOOOHE

92C 39 3 min 19,000 1154 x 22x500 HE 1 11 70xlOOOHE

306il. 35 3 min 18,150 1127 x 16lx500HE 1 11

J06B 16 2 min 17,600 1129 x 159x500HE 1 11

J06C 35 ~min 19,200 112s x 154x500HE 1 10

384/l 39 2 min 18,100 1156 x l.42x500HE 1 12

384B 47 1 min 18,000 1132 x l53x500HE 1 12

384C 49 1 min 18,880 11.33 x 152x500HE 1 12

303A 40 30 sec 18,100 11.3~ x 156x500HE 1 12

JOJB 52 )0 sec 17,900 1137 x 142x500HE 1 ll

DE~~....--n~n .~ ·- .'~· ;' ·1,3 ', ·•. • .. ... 1 .. . .· ;·';;~ t. ' / ~ p ~ ,, ; ' • ~ i~ '

_· ~LJtii~""'l4~ ~~~i:Jf

QEG' ~....._ED BOMBING Dl~TA (Continu . :·· ~ i.J "' ~ ~ ill ..c ~ . . . 14 April 1945

DJRECT. LENGTH TIME OF NUMBER OF Rla.NGE DROPPED C110UP OF RUN OF RUN l~LTITUD~ REI&SE l~E Mia.NUl1L BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.

lS~:' .b.ffi DIVISIOiJ (Continued)

~: ~;~~~~;}/Medis (Continued)

;:o~:;c 45 1 min 19,075 1138 x 156x500HE 1 12

')?SA 52 90 sec 18;120 1140 x 164x500HE 1 13

.379B 46 90 sec 17,800 1139 x 166x500HE 1 13

379C 50 1 min 19,100 1141 x l64x500HE 1 13

~ND !IB_JPJ_~]:O~

La·:~Fort Gun Emplacement

445 05 12 min 15,000 1018 x 4xl000 HE 1 'l 18x2000HE 2'JtJ1147 IB

445 07 15 min 14,500 101~ x 2xl000 HE 1 15x2000HE l~7 IB

445 10 14 min 15,500 101et x 2xl000 HE l 7 2lx2000HE lxM47 IB

445 12 15 min 16,200 1020 x 2xl000 HE 1 8 24x2000HE lxM47 IB

389 06 9 min 15,900 1021-~- x 18x2000HE 1 7 4xl000 HE

389 05 6 min 15,550 1022 x 24x2000HE l 8 2xl000 HE

389 06 8 min 15,000 1024 x 18x2000HE l 6 2xl000 HE

Le Fort

491 10 5 min 15,000 1037 x 4:xl000 HE 1 6 16x2000HE 4:x].ft4 7 IB

491 05 6 min 15,500 1037 x 2xl000 HE 1 5 24x2000HE 3xM47 IB

491 13 5 min 14,500 1038 x 2xl000 HE 1 5 20x2000HE 3~7 IB

491 06 7 min 16,000 1037t x 2xl000 HE l 5 20x2000HE 3~7

DEC~ .¥!1 _0 1 _9;1FD wr.a ""'~ ~-1.,..J itii"-

ui:~~ ~~~,.. BOMBING D/,TA (Contirrued) .S.; ~" ~ ..:.~ ~ ~ '-~....: li ii•~ i!:. D 14 April 1945

DIBECT LENGTH TDIIE OF NUMBER OF RliNGE DROPPED GROUP OF RUN OF RUN l~LT.ITUDE REI.Eli.SE h.FCE M.la.NUla.L BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR

!-1 . .E?l-'t (Continued)

05 5 min 15,500

49l 350 6 m:in 15~000

~··crt De Royan

44 362 4 min 14,800

14 4 min 15,500

12 4 min 14,500

44 05 4 min 14,200

44 12 4 min 14,700

352 4 min 13,500

J'oint De Susac

392 08 4 min 15,000

392 356 2 min 15,500

392 0 2 min 16,600

392 10 3 min 16,400

Point De Grave

458 11 10 min 15,000

458 10 min 14,650

458 09

1039

lOLiJ.

1019

1019

1020

1020

1021

1033

io22t

1023

1024

1025

1029!-

2ND AIB D~I;?J:ON (continued)

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

2xl000 HE 1 20x2000 HE 3xML;.7 IB

2xl000 HE l 18x2000~ 3xM47 IB

6xlOOOHE 1 16x2000HE

4.xlOOO HE 1 15x2000HE

2xl000 HE 1 20x2000HE

4xJ_OOO HE 1 15x2000HE

4xl000 HE 1 l9x2000HE

4xJ.OOO HE 1 20x2000HE

12x2000HE 1 4xl000 HE 4xM47 IB

16x2000HE 1 2xl000 HE 2xM47 IB

20x2000HE 1 2x1000 HE 2xM47 IB

14x2000HE 1 2xl000 HE 2xM47 IB

4xl000 HE 1 l2x2000HE

4xl000 HE l 24x2000HE

2xl000 HE l 20x2000HE

5

5

5

4

5

4

5

5

4

4

5

4

4

7

/

DEClt:.;.;,Eo BOMBING DL.T ii. (Continued) 14 Lpril 1945

DIRECT. LENGTH TTI\.JIE OF NUMBER OF RJ~NGE DROPPED GROUP OF RUN OF RUN ALTITUDE RELEASE J~FC E MANU~L BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.

Po1.nt De Gra_E. (Continued)

4:j8 352 10 min 13~800 1029-3/4 x 2xl000 HE 1 6 24x2000HE

~.G7 10 3 min 15~800 1029-3/4 x 4xl000 HE 1 7 24x2000HE

467 353 3 min 15,300 1030 x 2xl000 HE 1 7 24x2000HE 2x500 IB

467 02 3t min 16,000 lOJot x 2xl000 HE 1 7 24x2000HE

466 360 5 min 13,000 lll?t x 4xl000 HE 1 7 24x2000HE

466 13 4 min 14,800 1116 x 2xl000 HE 1 8 25x2000HE

466 03 4 min 14,400 1117 x 6x1000 HE 1 8 32x2000HE

Point De la Coubre

448 08 17 min 15,000 10/;J. x 6x1000 HE .. 1 8 28x2000HE

448 13 17 min 15,350 10/,.2-} x 3xl000 HE 1 8 32x2000HE lxM47 IB

448 15 17 min 14,500 lOL~3 x JxlOOO HE 1 8 32x2000HE lxM47 IB

93 03 6 min 16,500 1042 x 4xl000 HE l 8 29x2000HE

93 .360 6 min 17,200 1046 x 8xl000 HE 1 8 26x2000HE

93 10 6 min 16,200 1045 x 2x1000 HE 1 8 30x2000HE

446 14 5 min 14,100 1046 x 6xlOOO HE 1 8 28x2000HE

446 08 4 min 14,500 l046t x JxlOOO HE 1 8 26x2000HE 2x500 IB

446 15 3 min 13,500 1046t x 3xl000 HE l 7 28x2000HE

n£· "' ~"',.lfn fJJQJt~· u BOMBING DATA (Continued) 14 11pril 1945

DIBECT LENGTH TDVIE OF NUMBER OF Rli.NGE DROPPED GROUP OF RUN OF RUN ALTITUDE RELELSE AFCE MANUAL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR

Turget No. 7

961J.

96B

96C

319

.314

320

lOOD 327

390A 330

J90B 331

J90C 317

390D 335

Target No, 137

3881l 331

388B 325

J85B 320

385C 328

Target No, '33 I

388C 325

452A 316

Target No. 1

452B 335

452C 327

Target No, 15

941~

9413

94c

048

046

048

Target No, 19

94D 030

447A 040

447B 045

Target No, 24

447C 030

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

5 min

5 min

5 min

5 min

6 min

6 min

8 min

8 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

7 min

7 min

~1~ DIVISION

23,430

24,080

22,750

0931

0931

0932

1:9,600 1044

21,110 104;

20,600 1045

20, 100 1104 '

20,070 1047

24,040

24,880

0934

0935

21,250 1105

20,no 1106

23,390

22,425

22,780

21,550

0938

0943

0945

0945

22,400 1009

23,050 1012

21,490 1013

21,365

22, 516

23,025

1012

1019

1019

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

456x120 l4''RAG 1

398x120 FRJ~G 1

462xl20 FRiiG 1

60xlOOO HE 1

54xlOOO HE 1

54xl.OOO HE 1

54xlE'.>OO HE 1

60x.1.000 HE l

454xl20 FRAG l

44 7x120 FRJ~G l

J.44x500 HE 1

78xl.OOO HE 1

442xl20 FRAG 1

45lxl20 PRAG 1

454xl20 FRl~G 1

422xl20 FRl'~G 1

340xl20 FR.AG 1

340xl20 FRi~G l

340xl20 FRJ~G 1

337xl20 FRAG 1

340xl20 FRJ~G 1

342xl20 FR.AG 1

J80xl20 FRAG 1

11

9

12

9

8

8

8

9

11

11

11

12

11

11

11

11

8

8

8

g

8

8

9

BOMBING DATA (Continued) 14 April 1945

DIBECT. LENGTH TIME OF NUMBER OF RANGE DROPPED GROUP OF RUN OF RUN ALTITUDE RELEI~SE 1Ji10E MABU.hL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.

447D -033

486A 030

Target No 2 731

486B 025

4860 030

486D 070

Tar get No. 42.

487b. 019

487B 016

4870 039

487D 010

Target No. 8

lOOA 333

lOOB 330

lOOC 330

493c 331

4901~ 320

490F 320

4900 330

Target No. 11

34li 327

34B 334

340 335

385A 327

Target No. 10

4931.. 022

49JB 012

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

6 min

9 min

21,516

22,510

22,366

22,015

21,000

22,450

22,500

21,950

21,450

20,450

20,900

20,100

18,700

20,500

20,800

19,925

20,050

20,600

19,900

20,350

18,180

18,330

3RD AIB DIVISION (Continued)

1022

1017

1018

1020

1020

1021

1022

1024

1022

1040

1041

1043

1052

1054

1055

1055

1057

1059

1105

1105

1138

1120

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

342xl20 FR11.G l

304xl20 FRl;l.G l

378xl20 FR.AG 1

380xl20 FR.AG 1

325xl20 FR.AG 1

18.xlOOO RE ... 1 18x2000 HE

18x1000 HE 1 18x2000 HE

20xlOOO HE 1 20x2000 HE

lBxlOOO HE 1 18x2000 HE

54xl000 HE

60xl000 HE

54xl000 HE

l20x500 HE

72xl000 HE

78xl000 HE

148x500 HE

144x500 HE

l55x500 HE

144x500 HE

144x500 HE

108x500 HE

ll8x500 HE

1

l

1

1

l

1

1

1

1

1

1

l

l

8

7

9

9

8

8

8

9

8

8

9

8

9

11

12

12

11

12

ll

11

8

9

J0.000

2.S 000

20.000

WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Roycu1) ao ... JQ~u.x: a ...-ea

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DATE ''+- A_.r. 45 06'30- 1'+5C HYS,

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l"c. Eu,,t1tn Air f ~· -~

0 ~-----

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WE AT HER ENC.C" ••. ON M1 ss10N r o . RoyC\"1 3ci Bf'1~BAROM(NT 0 1V1SK>N

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------

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(._ka z. cz) 2..

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'lis: u~w·esly\cted ~\oft

Ocw~ward: 2.0- 3S Mi.

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•

•

WE.ATimR OPERATIOrT .AL FORECAST - 14 APRIL 1945

l~ Base to Target. Scnttorcd clouds vd th light fog, locally fog in patches becoming scattered to brokGn clouds. 0-·.3/10 strntus or stratocuriulus be.so 3000-4000 feet, tops 5000 foot becoming 10/10 over channel b~so nil to 500 f oet, tops 2000 feet becoming patchy ground fog over assembly area. 2-5/10 snmll cumulus bo.se 2000 f oet, tops &JOO feot at to.rgot. Nil middle cloud becoming 2-4/10 altocumulus, base 14,000 foot, tops 15,000 foot over assembl7 aroa and 3-5/10 bo.so 15,000 feet, tops 18,000 feet o.t target. 4-6/10 cirrostra.tus bo.so 24.-26, 000 feet, tops 2e-30, 000 feet becoming 5-8/10 base 26, 000 feet, tops 28-30, 000 foot ·1r.i th 0-3/10 pntchy and be.so 22, 000 foot, tops 24,000 feet c..t k.rgct. Freezing lcvol 8000 foot, light to modor.:i.t'.J rime in mj.ddlo cloud. Visibili t7 unr·:-:strictod !\loft bocoming 5 miles plus at base •

2. Target to Base. Brokon clouds with haz·:·. 2-5/10 base 3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet becoming tops L~.-5000 feet ovor b1.sos. Middle and high cloud revorso of route out. Freezing level 8000 fo,:;t; light to modorato rimo in middle cloud. Visibility unrestricted aloft br)coming 5 miles plus at base.

.3.

4.

5.

W:i.nds •

Bnso to !J:8° Nor th 48° N orth .. .t.o_.'.t;.rgf!t Surf a co 160° · 10 Knots 180° 10 Knots

5,000 foot 160 10 190 10 10,000 170 10 200 15 15,000 170 10 200 20 20,000 180 10 210 25 25,000 180 10 220 25 30,000 180 10 220 25

Tomporntures

Surf n.ce 18 Deg. c 5,000 f eot 09

10,000 -01 15,000 -12 20,000 ..-·23 25,000 -36 30, 000 -l1-8

Indicated ~nd Truo Altitude, and Mean Temperature.

Indicnte-d Altit!&Q 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,ooo 18,000

. 20,000 22,000 24,000 26,000

28,000

3rd Div. 10-,189-12, 219 14,248 16,287 18,.325 20,365 22,366 ';.lt-,404 26,Mi.7. 28,436

True Altitudes 2nd Div. 10,0.39

. 12,069 14,098 16,137

' 18,i75. i

20,2.15 22, 216

1st Div. 10,339 12,369 14,398

'16,437 18,475 20 ,'515 22, 516 24,554 26,597

--·-- I . . 1'_ • -. ·· .. ~-.~. ~ 8 ........ 0 :, : . " .. ll '4 .,.P,~., '··· .. ·1" '· DEu :i...'11. ,\ii~~~ ........ ·

All Divisions M eo.n Temps.

09.0° c 07.0 05.0 03.0 OLO

-01.0 -03.5 -05.5 -07. 5 -10.0

14 April 1945

6. Remarks. Front located 40 miles w. of target vdth line of 8-10/10 lnrgo cumulus tops 8-10,000 feet. Risk of 10/10 in eastern bases on return 600-1000 feet, tops 3-4000 feet. Contrails moderate persistent above 2l,OOO feet. Dense persistent above 25,000 feet.

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ]llTCOUNTERED - 14 APRIL 1945

Tak a...O f±:

(0530-0630 Hours) Nil to 3/10 stratocmnulus base 4000 feet tops 5000 feet. N:tl to 3/10 cirrus, above 23,000 feet. Visibility 2-3 miles.

ftpute Out

3-5/10 stratocumulus base 4-5000 feet tops 6-7000 feet over England and channel, becoming 4-6/10 over France with one large 10/10 patch from 47° N. to 46° N. becoming closer in target area. Nil to 3/10 al tocumulus, 1.3,000 feet over England and channel, increasing to .3-5/10 at 15,000 feet ove:E Northern France, decreasing to nil over target. 0-.3/10 cirrus base above 23,000 feet increasing to 3-5/10 over France.

Royan (1130 Hours) No low or medium cloud. 3-5/10 cirTus base above 23,000 feet. Air to air visibility 1.mlimi ted. Air to ground visibi.li ty 20-30 miles

11E?~Ur11 Route

Nil low· cloud, becoming 3-5/10 stratocumulus base 3-4000 feet top 5-7000 feet over channel and England. Nil middle cloud, becoming 4-7 /10 al tocumulus base 10-12,000 feet north of 47° N. becoming 8-10/10, baso 8-10,000 over mid­channel and England. High cloud became unobserved north of 47° N. Rain over England on return. Vj_sibility in rain, 2 miles.

~ses on Re.:tym

(1.4.00-1450 Hours) 3-5/10 stratocumulus base 3-L .. OOO feet tcms 5000 feet. 7-10/10 al tocumulv.s, base 5-8000 feet with rain, but 4-6/10· base 10-12,000 feet in northmost ba:3es. 6-.-8/10 cirrus, base estimated 25,000 feet in nortbern bases, but unobserved otherwise. Raj_n - visibility 2-3 miles in rain.,

Light non-persistent con trails in middle cloud and above 21,000 feet. Winds more westerly than forecast. Temperatures warmer.

2J;JD AIR DIVISION

~~&,..~_qUak e-oJf

(0420-0646 Hours) Clear. Visibi.li ty 2 ... 3000 yards, lowering during take-off to 3-600 yards. Surface wind ESE-SE, ,3-8 mph.

'~ "'-~.-~--.. . . '.

i.Ji; . lll A flt ?' • ,: ·.: \ ~ r .~ . ·~ . -" .rJ ~.\.. .\;.··" .. ;: .·."·ii ..... · 'tl • .I Jj M1111illrif It u

SU~!il\JIARY OF ~;lEATH:2;R HlCOUN T:&uD (Continued) 14 April 1945

2FD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Route_Out

Nil low clouds becoming 10/10 stratus over the channel, tops 2-3000 feet becoming 2-5/10 stratocumulus at continental coast to assembly area, base 1-2000 feet, tops 3-4000 feet decreasing slowly along route to target to nil. Fil medium. clouds becoming nil-3/10 in patches, base lL:.,000 feet, tops 18,000 feet in assembly area becoming nil in target area. Nil high clouds becomin~ 2-4/10 in assembly area increasing slowly to 3-6/10 in the target area above 25,000 foot. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Hoav-:J gun emplacements near 4530 N. - 01 W. (1018-1116 Hours). Nil low clouds or medium clouds ~.-'Ji th 3.,.6/:0 cirrus above 25,000 foot. Dovmward visibility 20-.30 miles.

Return Rau~

Nil low clouds becoming 3-5/10 cumulus, baae 2-3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet over North France becoming l+-7 /10 stratocumulus and curnulus over England, base 3-4000 feat, tops 6-8000 fcot, ·:Vi th occasional patch of stratus between 500-1000 f eot in the base area. Nil medium clouds over Franco becoming 5-8/10, base 10,000 feet, tops unobsorvod, over England. 3-6/10 cirrus e.bovc 251 000 feet increasing to 6-9/10 above 20,000 feet over England. Visibility unrostricted aloft.

~as es on Re turn

(1255-14.30 Hours) 4-7/10 stratoc~ulus and cumulus, baso 2-3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet Pith an occasional patch of stratus between 500-1000 feet. 5-8/10 meditun cloud, baso 10,000 foot, tops unobserved. &-9/10 ciITus above 20,000 feet. Visibility .3-6 miles. Surface winds ESE-SE, 12-16 mph.

Remarks: Nil contrails. Temperatures as forecast. Winds 40-50° more westerly than forecast, but velocity as forecast.

)RD AIR DIVISION

:£ako-Off

(0420-0640 Hours) )-6/10 cirrus base 20,000-25,000 foet. Visibility 1600-3 500 yards.

floute Out

Nil-.3/10 strntocumulus tops 5000 f eot becoming ?-1ot10 tops 5000-6000 feet over channel end breaking inland to 2-4f10 p~tches to the target. Nil middle cloud oxcept 10/10 altostrntus tops 10-12,000 feot between 4800 N. -0000 and 4500 N. - 0000. Variable coverage cirrus generally J ... 6/10 in North becoming 6-9/10 b'lse 26,000 feet in southern France. Visibility 5-10 miles in haze over England and France becoming unrostr:i.cted aloft.

Taro et ···---·~

Royan (0935-1110 Hours) Nil loTI nnd medium cloud and 6-9/10 cirrus base 26,000 feet. Dov-Jmvnrd visibility 20-35 miles. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

- 2 -

DEC~-~-1':1£. ' ~Ill SUMlll.ARY OF ''IEATHER J!NCXJUNTERED ( Cont~ued) . D

3RD ~R .DIVI§IQ[ (Continued)

Rotu~ Route

14 April 1945

Similar to route out except over Northern France and England 11here high cloud became 6-8/10 cirrostratus base aJ-221 000 feet. Middle became 6-9/10 b~.so 9-10 1 000 feet and over the channel 5 .. 7/10 low cloud tops 5~8000 feet becoming patchy West of the bases.

Bases on Return

(1215-1345 Hours) Variable nil-3/10 stratocumulus base 5000 feet, tops 7000 feet. 5-8/10 al tocumuJ.u.s bnse 8-10, 000 feet, 8-9/10 cirrus base 20-22,000 feet. Visibility 2-4 milos in haze.

Remarks

l'/ioderc.t.o persistent contrails above 201 000 feet in W:i..c:.Sot 8.roc.. Winds reported slightly stronger and 40-60°0 more to northv7est than forecast. Hoa'V'J layer cloud 50-100 miles Wost of target.

- 3 -

BOMBER SUMMARY

14 April 1945

lST JJ:R DIVISION

ROYJJ\I JJJEJ. - FL.tX ROYJJI ROYJ.N Bl .. TTERY & STRONG TOTJJi

AREA NO. 1 JJJEA NO. 33 POINT NO. 33A lST :rn::v.

l/C Sorties 109 113 119 341 l/C Credited Sorties 108 112 119 339 l/C Effocti ve Sorties 107 a 112 a 119 a 3J8 1/C Bo:nbing 106 111 118 335

1st Fri ori ty 106 111 106 323 2nd Pr~ ori ty 0 0 12 b 12

Total Bo:Iibs (Tons) lst Priority (EE~ 361.3 326.7 313.2 1001.2 2nd Priority (HE 0 0 35.5 35.5

Nu:nber 1/C Lost 4 0 0 0 0

Co:nba.t Da:nage 0 0 0 0

Cause of Da:nage 0 0 0 0

Casualties 0 0 0 0

E/l .. Encounters 0 0 0 0

a One aircraft dropped leaflets only,

b 'l\1e lve aircraft - Royan L:rea Strong Points 030048 on Illus. 734.

BOMBER SUMi··.I.!..RY (Continued) 14 Jl.pri l 1945

2ND J.lR DIVISION

ROYJJ~ ROY JN ROYJJr ROY JN l:FJ~L. NO. 24 !Jillll. NO. 7 I.REA NO. 11 JJJE!i. NO. 33

1/C Sorties 34 33 37 36 1/C Credited Sorties 34 33 37 34 l/C Effectiv0 Sorties 26 33 37 34 l/C Bo:nbing 26 33 37 34

1st Priority . 26 32 37 34 2nd Priority 0 lo 0 0

Tot<.•.1 Bo:nbs (Tons) 1st Pr~ority (HE~ 69.0 83.0 125.0 117.0

. (IB 0 .2 .7 0 2nd Fri ori ty (HE) 0 3.0 0 0

Nu.11ber J/C Lost 2 0 0 0 UnknO\'m 2 0 0 0

Co:nbat Da:nage 2 0 0 0 Cat. "Jl." 1 0 0 0 Cat. 11B11 l 0 0 J

Cause of Da."llo.ge 2 0 0 0 JJl. 1 0 0 0 Other l 0 0 0

Casualties 17ounded 5 0 0 0 11J. I. J. .• 12 0 0 0

E/il. Encounters 0 0 0 0

c One aircraft - Royan /,.rea No. 24.

14 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Conti rued)

ROY.AN POINTE de La POINTE de La POINTE de J1a AREA NO. 32 COUBRE NO. 27 - COUBRE NO. 26 COUBRE NO. 28

.A/C Sorties 32 27 27 27 Pfc Credited Sorties 30 26 26 27 A/C Effective Sorties 30 26 26 27 A/C Bo:nbing 30 26 26 27

1st Priority 29 26 26 27 2nd Priority l d 0 0 0

Total Bo:nbs (Tons) lst Priority (BE) 91.0 88.0 88.5 98.0

(IB~ .4 0 0 .1 2nd Fri or:i. ty (HE 4.0 0 0 0

EU:nber A/C Lost 0 0 0 0

Co:nbat Da:na.ge 1 5 e See Tgt 27 See Tgt 27 Cat. "An 0 4 Cat. 19B" 0 l Cat. "E". 1 0

cause of Da:na.ge l 5 e See Tgt 27 See Tgt 27 AA 0 4 Other l 1

Casualties Killed 7 0 0 0 Wounded 1 0 0 0

E/ A. Encounters 0 0 0 0

d One aircraft - Pointe de La Coubre Tgt 27.

e This is the co:nbat da:nage for all Pointe de La Coubre targets •.

BOJ .. IBER SlJil,Il.I.ARY (Continued) 14 APri l 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

POINTE POINTE POINTE de GRAVE de GRAVE de GRAVE TOTAL

NO~ 17-38 r-:o. 18 NO. 19 2ND mv.

A/C Sor!;ies 30 28 25 336 .A/C Credited Sorties 26 26 24 323 f./C Effective Sorties 26 26 24 315 A/C Bo:nbing 26 26 24 315

lst Priority 26 17 24 304 2nd Priority 0 0 0 2 T.O. 0 9 0 9

Total Bo:nbs (Tons) lst Priority (HE) 86.o 61.0 76.5 983,,0

(IB) 0 0 0 1.4 2nd Priori t:T (HE) 0 0 0 7i0 T.O. (m) 0 26.0 0 26.0

Nu:nber l/C Lost 0 0 0 2 . Unknown 0 0 0 2

Co:Iibat Da..11age 2 l 0 11 Cat. "A" 0 0 0 5 Cat.. "B11 0 0 0 2 Cat. 11E 11 2 l 0 4

Cause of Da:nage 2 l 0 11 JJ .. 0 0 0 5 Other 2 l 0 ~

0

Casualties Killed 11 0 0 18 wounded 2 0 0 8 M.I •. Jl.. 0 0 0 12

E/A Encounters 0 0 0 0

14 J .. pril 1945

3RD .AIR DIVISION

TASK FORGE I

ROYJIJJ JJIEA FIJK Bll.T.

ROf.AN ROY!lT ROYJJJ 108005 POIN~

lJIBA AHEL JJfE]J. ILLUS. 728 de GRAVE NO. 7 NO. 137 NO. 33" NO. l J .. · NO. 29

1/0 Sorties 37 24 25 25 37 1/C Credited Sorties 37 24 25 25 37 L/0 Effective Sorties 37 24 25 f 25 37 1/C Bo:nbing 36 g 24 25 25 37

lst Priority 35 24 24 24 37 2nd Priori "bJ l 0 l h 1 i 0

Total Bo~bs (Tons) lst Priority (BE) 0 0 0 0 111.0

~Frog~ 79.0 54.0 53.5 52.6 0 0. n · • -ct 2.3 o. 2.3 2.3 0 '~ nd ;: rJ, or:i. ty .r: rag

Nu.11ber 1/C Lost 0 0 0 0 0

co:nbat Da:na.ge 0 2 0 0 0 Cat. "Jl.C" 0 l 0 0 0 Cat. 11E" 0 l 0 0 0

Cause of Da:i1ti.ge 0 2 0 0 0 Other 0 2 0 0 0

Casualties wounded 0 1 0 0 0

E/ A Encounters 0 0 0 0 0

f One aircraft dropped leaflets.

g One aircraft - Royan J .. rea Flak Bat. at 022034 on Illus. 731.

h One aircraft - Pointe de La Coubre No. 27.

i One aircraft - Pointe de Grave No. 19.

BOMBER sm:IMARY 14 April 1945

3RD .AIR DIVISION (Continued)

TASK FORCE I (Continued)

POINTE de GPJ"-VE

P/C Sorties A/C Credited Sorties A/C Effective Sorties .A/C·J3o:nbin~

1st Priority 2nc1.. ·_Priority

Total Bo:-"1bs (Tons) 1st Priority (m)

· (Frag) 2nd Priority (Frag)

C o:nbo. t Da :nage Cat. t:AC" Cat. "E"

Cause of Da:iia.ge Other

Casualties rtounded

E/1~ Encounters

NO. 1.2_

29 29 27 27 27

0

0 61.. 2 0

0

0 0 0

0 0

0

0

j One aircraft dropped leaf lets.

POINTE de GR~JlG

NO. 19

28 28 27 27 27 0

0 61.l

0

0

0 0 0

0 0

0

0

k One aircraft - Royan Area No. 137.

1 One aircraft - Royan J,_rea No. 137.

ROYAN AREA NO. 24

29 29 29 j 28 27 lk

0

0 0 0

0 0

0

0

ROY.Al"\J FLAK BAT. 108005 II.iliUS~ 731 NO. 27 A

30 30 30 30 29

1 1

0 65.0 2.3

0

0 0 0

0 0

0

0

TOTAL -TASK

FORGE I

264 264 261 259 254

5

111.0 487.9 1L5

0

2 l l

2 2

l

0

DECL.La.a ',.IEB L~f~· , BOEB8R SUi<MARY (Continued) 14 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

TLsr.i.Z FORCE II

ROYJ.N ROY JN ROYJ~T POINIB de .JJ.fF1=Ji. NO. 8 JMJJ. NO • 7 LJIBJJ. NO. 10 GR/J.VE NO. 12 -

1/0 Sorties 28 48 20 48 1/0 Credited Sorties 28 48 20 48 l/C Effeotiv~ Sorties 28 48 :n 19 48 1/0 Bo:nbi ng 28 47 19 48

1st Priority 28 47 19 48

Total Bo~bs (Tons) . lst Priority (IE) 84.0 141 .. 0 56.5 142.0

Nu:nber J/C Lost 0 0 0 0

Co:riba t Da:nage 0 0 0 0

Cause of Da:nage 0 0 0 0

Casualties 0 0 0 0

E/~ .. Encounters 0 0 0 0

~ One aircraft dropped leaflets.

- 7 -

EOMBEH SUlvIT!tIJ~Y (Continued) llr- Lpril 1945

3HD .L'JR DIVISION (Continued)

TI.SK FORCE II (Continued)

ROY/,N ROYJJ:T TOTAL -J.'MJ, /,J?BL TJ~SK TOTLL GRJJ\T]) NO. 11 po. 137 FORCE II 3RD DIV. TOTliL --

l./C So1··ties 50 26 220 484 1161 I/C Credited Sorties 50 26 220 484 1146 .t/C -Sffective Sorties 50 11 25 218 479 1132 1/C Bmibing 49 25 216 475 1125

1st Priority 49 25 216 470 1097 2nd Priority 0 0 0 5 19 T.O. 0 0 0 0 9

Total Bo:nbs (Tons) 1st Priority ( IB ~ 146.8 75.0 645.3 756.3 2740.5

(IB 0 0 0 0 1.4 ~1ilrag) 0 0 0 487.9 487.9

2nd Priority· 1,.HE) 0 0 0 0 42.5 (Frag) 0 0 0 11.5 11.5

T. O, ( ffi) 0 0 0 0 26.0

NtL11ber i/C Lost 0 0 0 0 2 Unknown 0 0 0 0 2

Co:nb[:;t.t Da-:nage 0 0 0 2 13 Oo.t. "J~ll 0 0 0 0 5 C8.t. n; ... c" 0 0 0 1 1 Cat. uBu 0 0 0 0 2 Co..t. 11E11 0 0 0 1 5

Cause of Da:nage 0 0 0 2 13 . , 0 0 0 0 5 .!>.LI.

Other 0 0 0 2 8

Casualties Ki 11.ccl 0 0 0 0 18 Ylounded 0 0 0 0 9 E. I. J,,. 0 0 0 0 12

E/ !~ nncountern 0 0 0 0 0

n One aircraft dropped leaflets.

0£C'.~ .. L~ur.,o· - 5J_a" IL