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Towards a discussion of support to

Urban Transport development in India

支持印度城市交通发展讨论

Energy & Infrastructure UnitSouth Asia Region南亚地区能源和基础设施单元

March 20052005年 3月

Document of the World Bank世界银行文件This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

本文件发行范围有限，收件人只在执行公务时才能使用。未经过世界银行同意，不得对外公开文件内容。

ACRONYMS

BDA Bangalore Development Authority

BMC Bangalore Municipal Corporation

BMTC Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation

BMRTL Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd

CMA Chennai Metropolitan Area

CMDA Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority

CMC Chennai Municipal Corporation

CMTC Chennai Metropolitan Transport Corporation

CTTS Chennai Traffic and Transport Study (1995)

KRDCL Karnataka Road Development Corporation Ltd

KUIFDC Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation

LRT Light-rail Transit

MTC Metropolitan Transport Corporation

MRTS Mass Rapid Transit System (Chennai urban railway)

TM Traffic Management

T&PM Traffic and Parking Management

TNUDF Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund

UTP Urban Public Transport

首字母缩写词

BDA 班加罗尔发展局

BMC 班加罗尔市BMTC 班加罗尔都市交通公司BMRTL 班加罗尔捷运有限公司CMA 钦奈都市区CMDA 钦奈都市发展局CMC 钦奈市CMTC 钦奈都市交通公司CTTS 钦奈交通和运输研究 (1995)

KRDCL 卡纳塔克邦公路发展有限公司KUIFDC 卡纳塔克邦城市基础设施发展公司LRT 轻轨交通MTC 都市交通公司MRTS 捷运系统（钦奈市内铁路）TM 交通管理T&PM 交通和停车管理TNUDF 泰米尔纳德邦城市发展基金

UTP 市内公共交通

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE................................................................................................................................i

How significant is the urban transport problem in India?...................................................1

What is the Government of India policy response to the Urban Transport problem?.........3

What is currently being implemented to address the Urban Transport problem?...............6

Putting policy into practice – the case of Chennai and Bangalore......................................9

A Way Forward.................................................................................................................12

A Potential Role of the World Bank..................................................................................15

ATTACHMENT I.............................................................................................................20

URBAN TRANSPORT IN BANGALORE AND CHENNAI.........................................20

1. OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT OF THE REPORT.........................................................20

2. THE BACKGROUND.................................................................................................21

3. URBAN TRANSPORT ISSUES...................................................................................32

4. THE WAY FORWARD..............................................................................................48

5. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK.......................................................51

ATTACHMENT I-A: URBAN TRANSPORT IN CHENNAI.......................................................58

ATTACHMENT II-B: URBAN TRANSPORT IN BANGALORE................................................91

ATTACHMENT III: URBAN TRANSPORT IN INDIA – BIBLIOGRAPHY................................109

ATTACHMENT IV: CITIES ON THE MOVE – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...............................115

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目录页码

序言....................................................................................................................................iii

印度城市交通问题有多重要？.........................................................................................3

印度政府对城市交通的对应政策是什么？.....................................................................3

目前针对城市交通问题采取了什么措施？.....................................................................3

——将政策付诸实践钦奈和班加罗尔案例....................................................................3

出路.....................................................................................................................................3

世界银行的潜在角色.........................................................................................................3

附件 I：班加罗尔和钦奈城市交通...................................................................................3

1. 报告目标和内容.....................................................................................................3

2. 背景.........................................................................................................................3

3. 城市交通问题.........................................................................................................3

4. 出路.........................................................................................................................3

5. 世界银行的潜在角色.............................................................................................3

附件 I-A：钦奈城市交通...................................................................................................3

附件 II-B：班加罗尔城市交通..........................................................................................3

附件 III ——：印度城市交通参考书目.............................................................................3

附件 IV ——：前进中的城市执行情况总结....................................................................3

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Towards a discussion of support to Urban Transport development in India支持印度城市交通发展讨论PREFACE序言The purpose of this policy note is to respond to the request from the Government of India for the World Bank to provide support to the development of the urban transport agenda in India and to provide lending support. During the discussions between the World Bank and the Government of India represented by the Ministry of Finance, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) agreed on a three year program of support 2005-2008 reflected in the World Bank’s Country Strategy for India September 15, 2004 (Report No. 29374-IN). Support is currently reflected in the Operations Program as an Urban Transport project under consideration and as a policy note as part of the non-lending services. In conjunction with these operations support to urban roads are included in Chennai under the proposed Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project III and in Bangalore under the proposed Karnataka Municipal Reform Project. 本政策报告旨在回应印度政府向世界银行提出的支持其城市交通发展并提供贷款资助的要求。印度财政部和经济事务部（DEA）代表印度政府与世界银行进行了谈判，就一项 2005-2008年间的三年期支持项目达成协议，该协议收录在世行 2004年 9月 15日发布的《印度的国家战略》（第 29374-IN号报告）中。支持体现在运行项目中，该项目是正在考虑中的城市交通项目以及非贷款服务的一部分。除了这些支持之外，泰米尔纳德邦发展计划 III提出支持钦奈城市公路交通，卡纳塔克邦市政改革计划提出支持班加罗尔城市公路交通。This report was written by Slobodan Mitric, Urban Transport Specialist (consultant). Isabel Chatterton, Financial Specialist (SASEI) contributed to the Chennai case study. The task leadership was shared by A.K. Swaminathan, Zhi Liu, and Sally Burningham (SASEI). Guang Zhe Chen is the Transport Sector Manager in SASEI and Vincent Gouarne is the SASEI Director.本报告由城市交通专家（咨询师）Slobodan Mitric编写。财政专家 Isabel Chatterton （SASEI）负责钦奈案例研究。项目领导为 A.K. Swaminathan、Zhi Liu及 Sally Burningham （SASEI）。Guang Zhe Chen 是 SASEI 的交通部门经理，Vincent Gouarne是 SASEI的董事。

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Towards a discussion of support to Urban Transport development in India支持印度城市交通发展讨论How significant is the urban transport problem in India?印度城市交通问题有多重要？

1. Efficient and reliable urban transport systems are crucial for India to sustain a high growth rate and alleviate poverty. Indeed, the significance of urban transport in India stems from the role that it plays in the reduction of poverty, both through its indirect effects as a stimulator of poverty reducing growth and through its direct effects on the quality of life of people1.

1．印度要维持高经济增长率、摆脱贫困，有效可靠的城市交通体系至关重要。确实，印度城市交通的重要性源自其在减少贫困问题上的角色。城市交通可以间接刺激脱贫速率，对人民的生活质量提高则有直接效果 1。2. Services and manufacturing industries particularly concentrate around major urban areas, and require efficient and reliable urban transport systems to move workers and connect production facilities to the logistics chain. In China for instance, service industries as well as manufacturing and labor-intensive industries have developed in economic centers endowed with good transport systems that could efficiently handle mobility needs of millions of workers and facilitate the movement of goods. India’s economy is currently more service-oriented than China, with only about one million people employed in the IT industry—the mainstay of the tertiary sector2. But growth in

1 The importance of growth to poverty reduction can be demonstrated by comparing the performance of the Indian and Chinese economies over the last two decades. Over that period the GDP growth rate in India has been around 5.5% with the economy growing about 2.6 times reaching a level of about US$510 billion in 2002. In China the GDP has been growing at about 9.5 % over the same period with the economy growing more than five fold between 1982 and 2002 reaching a level of about US$ 1,232 billion in 2002. In terms of impact of the economic growth on poverty reduction, by 2002 China had lifted 400 million people out of poverty and its poverty rate had declined to 4.6%. In India over the same period the poverty rate only declined from 36% to 29%. 1 通过比较在过去 20年中印度和中国的经济发展，就可以看出脱贫速率的重要性。在此期间，印度GDP增长率约为 5.5% ，而经济总量增长 2.6倍，2002年达到 5100亿美元。同期，中国的 GDP增长率约为 9.5%，1982年到 2002年的经济总量翻了五番，2002年达到 12320亿美元。在经济增长对减少贫困的影响方面，中国使 4亿人口脱离了贫困，贫困率降低到 4.6%。而印度同期的贫困率仅从36%降低到 29%。2 The Indian and Chinese economies have evolved differently in the past two decades, with the share of the agriculture sector declining more sharply in China – to less than 15% of GDP in 2002 – while in India it was nearly 23%. In India the contribution of services to GDP grew to above 50%; in China services contributed 33.7 %. In India, industry share of GDP is about 27% and in China it is 52%. Moreover, by 2002/2003, the amount of foreign direct investment and volume of trade in China have reached a level that is many times of those in India.2 在过去 20年中，中国和印度的经济发展道路颇为不同。中国的农业在经济发展中占据的份额急剧下降，2002年时仅占 GDP 不到 15%，而印度的农业则占经济的 23%。在印度，服务业占GDP50%，而在中国服务业占 33.7%. 印度的工业占 GDP27%，而中国工业占 52%。而且，到

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the services sector and development of Indian manufacturing industries will put more pressure on already saturated urban transport systems. Many Indian cities such as Bangalore and Chennai have attracted significant investments in high-technology industries thanks to a competitive and highly qualified workforce. In the past few years however, urban infrastructure, and transport systems in particular, have been struggling to keep up with the growing number of firms moving into these cities. Local and international media have been continuously reporting the cities’ difficulty in coping with growing demand for efficient transport systems3. The financial press has been describing Bangalore for example as a city of 60,000 unfilled potholes and where software workers’ morning commute to work can take up to two hours. Developing an efficient urban transport system should be part of the broad Government policy aimed at improving the attractiveness and competitiveness of Indian cities.

2．服务业和制造业多数集中在主要城市区域，这就要求有效可靠的城市交通系统来运送工人，并将生产企业和物流链连接起来。如在中国，服务业、制造业以及劳动密集型企业主要集中在经济中心区，附近有良好的交通体系可以满足数百万工人的流动性需求，推动商品流通。印度目前经济发展比中国更加侧重服务业，只有约100万人从事 IT行业，这是第三产业的支柱行业 2。但是印度服务行业的增长以及制造业的发展对已经饱和的城市交通系统带来了更大的压力。很多印度城市，如班加罗尔和钦奈，因其强竞争力和高素质的劳动力，吸引了大量高技术产业的投资。然而在过去几年，城市基础设施，尤其是交通系统，难以满足涌入这些城市的公司数量增长。地方和国际媒体不断报道这些城市难以满足人们有效交通体系的需求3。金融媒体将班加罗尔描述成一个路面坑洼处达到 60000处的城市，软件业者们每天早上要花 2个小时用于通勤。整体政府政策若要改善印度城市的吸引力和竞争力，发展有效的城市交通系统应该是其中的一部分。3. Responding to the needs of the economy is not just a matter of the cost of transport, but also of the quality of service provided. A 2003 Confederation of Indian Industry survey of urban populations in Southern India showed 90% dissatisfied with roads, and 58% dissatisfied with public transport services. Interestingly, the same survey showed that 89% were willing to pay for good-quality toll roads and 65% are willing to pay higher public transport fares to get more comfort and frequency. A survey of the business community recorded similar answers. Developing a degree of flexibility in public transport supply so that differentiated services may be tailored to the needs of

2002/2003年，中国收到的国外直接投资数额和贸易额是印度的好几倍。3 See for example: The Economist, March 3, 2005: A Survey on India and China. The Guardian, September 24, 2004: India’s silicon city booms to busting. Business Week, November 1, 2004: Bangalore: Tech Eden No More; India’s IT center has exploded – and so have its infrastructure problems.3 参见如： 2005 年 3 月 3 日《经济学人》中《印度和中国调查》（ A Survey on India and China）。2004年 9月 25日《卫报》上《印度的硅谷从繁荣到萧条》（ India’s silicon city booms to busting）。 2004年 11月 1日《商业周刊》中《班加罗尔：不再是高科技的伊甸园》（Bangalore: Tech Eden No More）、《印度的 IT中心爆发——基础设施问题也猛增》（ India’s IT center has exploded – and so have its infrastructure problems）。

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different groups of the population is thus an important requirement of a future urban transport policy.

3．对经济需求做出反应，不仅仅要求降低交通成本，也包括提高服务质量。2003年印度工业联盟对印度南部的城市居民的一份调查表明，90%的人对公路情况不满意，58%的人对公共交通服务不满意。有意思的是，该调查还表明 89%的人愿意为高质量的收费公路买单，65%的人则愿意支付更高的交通票价以获得更舒适快捷的服务。对商务人士的一份调查也显示了类似的结果。因此，发展适合于不同人群要求的灵活公共交通服务，是未来城市交通政策的重要要求。4. The impacts of transport on the quality of urban life go even further than that. In the 1990s, as India experienced a period of economic and urban growth, air pollution in its major cities became a cause of national concern and generated worldwide attention. The levels of airborne suspended particulate matter recorded in largest metro-cities far exceeded the ambient air quality standards adopted by India and many other countries. As manufacturing and power sectors are progressively cleaned up the relative importance of the urban transport sector to air pollution increases. There is much current discussion about the development of Mumbai as a “world class city” rivaling Shanghai. For the Indian cities to retain their attractiveness to international capital, and to compete with other international centers, they must be livable. The environment is important to the economic health of the cities as well as the medical health.

4．交通对城市生活质量的影响还不止于此。在上世纪 90年代，随着印度经济的增长和城市化进程的推进，大城市的空气污染成为国家的一大问题，也引起了世界的关注。在最大的各地铁城市中，空气中悬浮颗粒物的水平远远超过了印度和其他很多国家采用的环境空气质量标准。随着制造业和电力企业逐渐撤离城市中心，城市交通在空气污染问题上的重要性增加了。目前有很多讨论，要将孟买建设成一个可以与上海竞争的“世界级城市”。印度要吸引国际资本，并与其他国际中心抗衡，其城市必须适宜居住。环境对城市的经济健康和医学健康同样重要。5. In parallel with the growth related impacts of urban transport on poverty are the direct impacts of urban transport on the life of the poor. The worst off in urban transport may be the pedestrians, whose mobility and safety are hindered by non-existent, broken-down, and/or obstructed sidewalks; difficult street crossings; and flooding in monsoon seasons. The bicycle riders, once a major urban transport mode in India, are gradually being pushed off busy roads by motor vehicles. These two groups account for half of all traffic fatalities. Secondary and tertiary road networks appear to have received little attention or funding, especially in low-income areas.

5．城市交通对贫困问题有经济增长的相关间接作用，对贫困人口的生活则有直接影响。城市交通中情况最糟的要数行人。要么没有人行道，或破旧、阻塞的人行道；难走的人行横道；雨季的洪水，都阻碍了行人的通行和安全。骑自行车曾经是印度一种主要的城市交通模式，现在却逐渐被机动车挤出了繁忙的马路。这两个群体占

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所有交通事故死亡人数的一半。二级和三级公路网络很少受到注意，缺乏资金，在低收入地区尤其如此。What is the Government of India policy response to the Urban Transport problem?印度政府对城市交通的对应政策是什么？6. The Government of India is addressing these issues. The Ministry of Urban Development, has recently issued a draft National Urban Transport Policy for consultation which can be found on their web site. They recognize the increasing urban road congestion and its associated air pollution. Their strategy puts primary emphasis on the need to increase the efficiency of use of road space by favoring public transport and by the use of traffic management instruments to improve traffic performance and by restraining the growth of private vehicular traffic. Complementing this is a strategy to reduce vehicle emissions by technological improvements in vehicles and fuels. Key instruments identified for support of this strategy are highlighted in Box 1.

6．印度政府正在处理这些问题。城市发展部最近其网站上发表了一份草案《国家城市交通政策》，以征求意见。他们认识到城市道路拥堵问题，以及相关的空气污染日益加剧。他们的战略是将主要侧重点放在增加道路空间使用效率上。通过鼓励公共交通、使用交通管理设备来改善交通性能，并控制私家车交通增长。除此之外，政府还出台政策，通过改进车辆和燃油，降低车辆污染物排放。在表 1中也强调了支持这一战略的关键设备。

Box 1: A selection of key points from the draft National Urban Transport Policy表 1：《国家城市交通政策》主要观点节选Public vs personal transport – modal split公共交通对个人交通——模式分化

Encourage and support investments in facilities which would wean people away from the use of personal vehicles rather than build facilities which would encourage greater use of personal motor vehicles. This would imply the need for investments in improving public transport.

鼓励并支持投资设施，使人们愿意放弃个人交通工具，而不是建立鼓励人们使用个人机动车的设施。这也表明有必要投资改善公共交通。

In–street traffic and parking路上交通及停车 Adoption of mechanisms to restrain the use of private motors vehicles through the market mechanisms such

as higher fuel taxes, higher parking fees, reduced availability of parking spaces 采用限制私家机动车使用的市场机制，如提高燃油税、提高停车费、减少停车空间等 Address safety concerns of pedestrians and cyclists by providing segregated right of ways though

construction of cycle tracks and sidewalks 通过建造分隔的自行车道和人行道，处理行人和骑自行车的人的安全问题 Develop a public bicycle program 发展公共自行车项目 Develop creative facilities like shade giving landscaping 发展创意设施，如景观美化遮荫处

Public transport services公共交通服务 Provide differentially priced services, with cheaper fares for those who cannot afford higher prices and

premiums and premium services for those who would shift from personal vehicles if they get quality services.

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提供价位不同的服务，较低的票价主要针对那些不能支付高票价和额外费用的群体，而较高票价的服务则针对私家车使用者，鼓励他们转向高质量的公共交通服务。

Services to be provided by the private sector by removing barriers to entry. 消除入市障碍，由私营部门提供服务。 Greater involvement of the private sector in public bus transport, where competition is possible, under close

regulation and with well structured contracts 让私营部门更多参与到公交服务运营，通过详细规定和完善合同保持行业竞争。 Where bus-based systems can serve the expected demand to opt for this first before considering rail based

systems. 当公交系统能够满足预期的需求时，在考虑铁路系统前优先选择公交系统。

Vehicular technologies车辆技术 Develop a strategy to introduce 4-stroke motorcycles. 发展策略，引入四冲程摩托车。 Develop a pricing strategy to prevent the use of diesel vehicles for personal use – this could be by way of a

much higher registration fee. 发展定价策略，防止个人使用柴油车——可以大幅提高登记费用。 Consider imposing a “vintage” tax for vehicles over 15 years old which are typically more polluting than

newer vehicles. 考虑对 15年以上的车辆征收“过时”税，此类车辆往往比新车污染多。

Metro systems 地铁系统 The Ministry to whom the subject of rail-based urban transport is allocated should come out with a paper

clearly laying down a national policy. Provision to cities of more than 5 million through the public sector is proposed.

分管铁路城市交通的政府部门应该提出文件，清楚规定国家政策。建议在人口超过 500万的城市，由公有部门提供服务。

Coordination协调 The current structure of governance for the urban transport sector note really equipped to deal with the

problems of urban transport. Unified Metropolitan Transport Authorities are recommended. 目前城市交通部门的管理结构还不具备真正应对城市交通问题的能力。推荐联合都市交通当局。

7. The Government of India’s proposed strategy is in many respects along the lines of international thinking on the approach to the urban transport problem. For example, the World Bank completed an Urban Transport Strategy review, Cities on The Move4, in 2002, after consultation with major stakeholders in client countries, including governments, transport operators, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as with representatives of other international institutions. That review linked urban development and transport sector strategies with a strong poverty focus. It noted that sprawling cities are making the journey to work excessively long and costly and that throughout the per capita motor vehicle ownership continues to grow with adverse impacts on traffic congestion and air pollution. Public transport is being stifled by this congestion and its relative performance tends to decline in comparison with the private modes. So the vicious circle of congestion and the decline of public transport is perpetuated. The safety and security of urban travelers are also emerging problems worldwide.

4 An Executive Summary of Cities on The Move can be found in Attachment III and the full report on request. 4 《前进中的城市》执行总结可以参见附件 III。完整报告承索。

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7．印度政府提出的政策在很多方面都符合国际上处理城市交通问题的常规思维方式。例如，经过与客户国家的主要股东，包括政府、交通运营商以及非政府组织商谈后，世界银行于 2002年完成了城市交通战略回顾《前进中的城市》4。该报告通过关注贫困问题，将城市发展和交通部门的战略紧密联系在一起。报告表明，不断扩张的城市使得上下班的旅程十分漫长、花费昂贵，而人均机动车拥有数量不断上升则更加剧了交通拥堵和空气污染的问题。道路拥堵抑制了公共交通发展，与私家车交通模式相比，公共交通性能下降。因此，拥堵问题和公共交通衰落构成了恶性循环。城市旅行者们的安全也是世界各地出现的问题。8. The key policy recommendations of the Cities on The Move review are not dissimilar to those of the Government of India policy paper. The review emphasizes better maintenance of road facilities and improved traffic management, and gives pride of place to the importance of public transport in addressing the burgeoning demand for movement in urban areas. Improved public transport and allocation of road space has been shown to also lead to an improved level of service for those in private vehicles (examples of Santiago and London). This requires improvement in the efficiency of operations (to be achieved through progressive involvement of the private sector in supply under strictly regulated contracts with the public authorities), priority use of existing infrastructure (including fully segregated bus rapid transit systems as well as more modest bus priorities), and efficient use of funds in the investment in new infrastructure. In this latter context it is noted that metro-rail systems while potentially having a role to play address only a small proportion of transport demands, at a very high cost premium, and in any case do not remove the requirement for a city to provide efficient on-street public transport. Cities such as New York, London, Paris, Rio, Sao Paulo and others which have high capacity metro systems also have high capacity bus services with priority on facilities. The need to tap the efficiency of the private sector has been demonstrated. The social dimension of urban transport was addressed both through a concern with the affordability of public transport and through a concern for non-motorized transport and walking.

8．《前进中的城市》回顾报告中推荐的关键政策与印度政府的政策文件并没有多大区别。报告强调通过维护公路设施、改善交通管理、提升公共交通的重要性来应对城市地区不断发展的流动性需求。报告显示，公共交通以及道路空间分配改善，可以使私家车运行水平也得到改善（以圣地亚哥和伦敦为例）。这要求提高运营效率（通过与公共当局签订严格规定的合同，扩大引入私营资本实现）、现有基础设施的优先使用权（包括完全分隔的快速公交车道系统以及更多的适度公交优先权）以及对新基础设施投资资金的有效使用。要注意到地铁-铁路系统只能满足小部分的交通需求，而且费用较高，因此在任何情况下城市仍然有提供有效路上公共交通的要求。像纽约、伦敦、巴黎、里约热内卢、圣保罗以及其他拥有高载客量地铁的城市，它们同样拥有高容量的公交系统，且享有设施的优先使用权。这体现了开发私营资本效率的需求。通过考虑人们对公共交通的承担能力以及对非机动车行程和步行的关注，来处理城市交通的社会性问题。

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9. That summary of the declared positions of the Government of India and the World Bank discloses a degree of agreement in principle, which should be the basis for a very fruitful collaboration in assisting the development of urban transport in India.

9．上述对印度政府和世界银行的公开立场的总结说明，两者在一定程度上原则一致，这也是世界银行协助印度发展城市交通，双方进行富有成效协作的基础。

What is currently being implemented to address the Urban Transport problem?目前针对城市交通问题采取了什么措施？

10. The Government of India and many city authorities are dealing with the urban transport issue on many fronts. In Delhi, they are undertaking a major investment in the new Delhi metro system (with funding support from the JBIC). Several new flyovers have been constructed in recent years. Public transport vehicles have been converted to CNG. In Mumbai, the government is investing in a number of urban roads and suburban rail projects. The Mumbai government is also considering implementation of metro system. In Chennai, there has been recent development of a section of elevated MRT system which is a continuation of the suburban rail system, ring roads have been completed and urban expressway construction planned. In Bangalore, there has been extensive discussion of the severe urban traffic congestion problem and urgent measures need to be taken to address this. The city has been discussing metro options.

10．印度政府和很多城市当局在很多方面处理城市交通问题。在德里，目前主要投资新的德里地铁系统（由日本 JBIC银行提供资金支持）。最近几年建起了一些新的立交桥。公共交通车辆都转而使用 CNG燃气。在孟买，政府投资了许多城市公路和郊区铁路项目。孟买政府还在考虑补充地铁系统。在钦奈，延续之前的郊区铁路系统，最近开发了一部分捷运系统，完成了环线建设，并计划建造城市高速公路。在班加罗尔，城市交通拥堵问题严重，需要采取紧急措施处理。该市正在讨论选择地铁。11. On the environmental front several measures have been taken to mitigate adverse effects of urban transport on air quality. India now has switched to unleaded fuel. In Mumbai at least the sulfur content of diesel has been reduced to levels at which Euro 3 standards for vehicle emissions can be set. Delhi set an example by undertaking a comprehensive and far-reaching program of measures, of which the most publicized is the mandatory conversion of city’s public transport to compressed natural gas (CNG) in 2000-2002. This clearly reduced the visual impact of “black smoke” in the major public transport corridors. The Supreme Court has now directed a number of other highly polluted cities in India to prepare “action plans” for addressing urban air pollution, incorporating many of the measures adopted by Delhi. But much remains to be done. There remains a need to address the content of sulfur in diesel more generally. With the dramatic increase in use of two-wheelers (especially for example in Chennai), there is a need to introduce measures to ensure the switch of motorcycles from two-stoke to four-stroke. One consequence of opening up of the automobile market to international competition coupled with the introduction of increasingly tighter emission standards has

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been a shift from two-stroke to four-stroke engines among two- and three-wheelers. According to the new vehicle sale figures, the sale of four-stroke engine two-wheelers increased from 21 percent in 1997-1998 to 79 percent in 2000-2004, with a corresponding decrease in the sale of two-stroke engine two-wheelers (SIAM 2004). There is a need to speed this up to only four-stoke being sold in India and to introduce measures to switch older in-use vehicles to four-stroke5.

11．在环保方面，采取了一些措施来降低城市交通对空气质量的负面影响。印度已经改使用无铅燃油。在孟买，至少柴油的含硫量降低到一定水平，使得车辆污染物排放能够达到欧三标准。德里在环保方面做出了榜样，采取了综合长远的措施项目，其中最引人注意的是其在 2000-2002 年强制城市公共交通改使用压缩天然气（CNG）。这明显改善了人们在主要公共交通路线上看到的“黑烟”的视觉印象。最高法院已经要求其他一些污染严重的城市提交处理城市空气污染问题的“行动计划”，可以借鉴德里采用的多项措施。但还有很多事情要做。要更广泛地规定柴油含硫量标准。随着两轮车使用的急剧增加（尤其是在钦奈），有必要引入措施保证摩托车从两冲程替换到四冲程。随着引入更高要求的排放标准，开放汽车市场引入国际竞争，两轮和三轮车从两冲程替换为四冲程引擎将是必然结果。新的汽车销售数据表明，四冲程引擎的两轮车销售从 1997-1998年的 21%上升到 2000-2004年的79%，同时两冲程引擎的两轮车销售下降（SIAM 2004）。有必要加快这一进程，只允许四冲程车辆在印度销售，并引入措施使之前售出的车辆改为四冲程 5。12. So far the World Bank contribution to urban transport in India has been relatively limited, despite the very large commitment to inter-urban road development. The Bank is currently providing funding support to the US$945 million equivalent Mumbai Urban Transport Project (Cr. 3662-IN/Ln. 4665-IN) which supports expansion of the suburban rail system, development of key connecting roads, and pedestrian facilities. In Chennai a further US$150 million equivalent of urban roads are proposed for development under funding of the proposed Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project III. Urban road

5 In parallel to this policy note, the Bank is preparing for “A breath of Fresh Air: Ten Years of Progress and challenges in urban air quality management in India 1993-2002”. This report, prepared in collaboration with the Central Pollution Control Board, is a contribution to the on-going efforts to assist cities with developing or updating their air quality management strategies. The study objective was to assess the impacts of ten years of actions and interventions in five metro-cities, so as to assist these and other cities in India in designing better-informed strategies and action plans to combat urban air pollution. The report presents a retrospective analysis of urban air pollution data with a focus on particulate air pollution from 1993 to 2002 in Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Chennai.5 除了这份政策文件，世行正在编写《呼吸新鲜空气：1993-2002印度城市空气质量管理的十年进步和挑战》（“A breath of Fresh Air: Ten Years of Progress and challenges in urban air quality management in India 1993-2002”）。这份报告是与印度中央污染控制委员会合作编写，对帮助城市开发或更新其空气质量管理战略有很大意义。报告旨在评价十年中各项行动和干预对五大地铁城市的影响，从而帮助这些城市和印度其他城市设计更好的战略的行动计划，以应对城市空气污染问题。报告对城市空气污染数据作了回顾分析，主要关注了 1993年到 2002年间德里、加尔各答、孟买、海德拉巴和钦奈的空气污染情况。

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construction in Bangalore will be included in the proposed Karnataka Municipal Development Project.

12．尽管对市间公路发展承担了大量义务，到目前为止，世界银行对印度城市交通的贡献还是相对有限的。世行目前对价值 9.45亿美元的孟买城市交通项目（Cr. 3662-IN/Ln. 4665-IN）提供资金支持，协助其扩展郊区铁路系统、发展主要连接公路及行人设施。在钦奈，泰米尔纳德邦城市发展项目 III中又提出追加价值 1.5亿美元的城市公路计划。班加罗尔的城市公路建设则包括在卡纳塔克邦市政发展项目中。

Putting policy into practice – the case of Chennai and Bangalore将政策付诸实践—— 钦奈和班加罗尔案例13. Given the extreme need for immediate infrastructure investments there has been an ongoing investment in urban roads. In moving forward these type of investments will need to give greater support to the implementation of the urban transport policy. While Indian cities have developed comprehensive urban transport strategies which highlight the decline in public transport due to lack of attention to provision of facilities for public transport, there is little on street attention to the need for public transport priority in any of the urban road projects. Similarly, despite the discussion of non-motorized transport, there is little attention to the needs of the walking public through proper sidewalk provision (for example, in Mumbai 40% of commuter trips are by walking).

13．直接基础设施投资是迫切需要，而城市公路投资则是正在进行的。在前进中，这些类型的投资要给城市交通政策执行更有力的支持。印度城市发展的全面城市交通策略，突显了因为缺少公共交通设施而造成的公共交通衰败局面，却没有在任何城市公路项目中体现出对公共交通优先权的注意。同样，尽管考虑到非机动车交通，很少注意为行人提供恰当的人行道设施（如在孟买，40%的通勤行程是步行方式）。14. With the intent of moving forward on the discussions on possible further World Bank support to Urban Transport the Bank undertook a review of the urban transport situation in two cities, namely Chennai and Bangalore. The reason for the focus on these two cities was that there is ongoing discussion of support to urban development projects namely the proposed Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project III and the proposed Karnataka Municipal Reform Project which could provide a forum for discussion of development of urban transport projects and policy reforms.

14．世行对钦奈和班加罗尔城市交通情况作了研究，意在推动讨论，可能追加世界银行对城市交通的支持。选择这两个城市是因为，目前正在讨论支持其城市发展项目，即提出的泰米尔纳德邦城市发展项目 III以及卡纳塔克邦市政改革项目，由此可以讨论城市交通项目发展和政策改革。

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15. In the past 15 years, both cities have experienced a combination of population, economic and spatial growth that is placing a tremendous strain on their public infrastructure and services. Bangalore metropolitan area has a population of 5.7 million and is growing at 4.9% per annum, while Chennai area has a population of 7.5 million, with a slower growth rate, just under 1%. Motor vehicle ownership is increasing very rapidly; Chennai already has 324 vehicles per 1,000 people and Bangalore has 298 vehicles per 1,000 people. Motorized 2-wheelers are the main growth category, with more than one million registered in each city compared with about a quarter million cars. Despite this overall mobility rates are low, just above 1 trip per capita per day, and the passenger markets are highly heterogeneous, reflecting great inequality of income and wealth. Walking and cycling account for 44% trips in Chennai and 17% in Bangalore, and more than 40% of daily trips take place on public transport services. Chennai’s public transport system is dominated by street-based buses (38% of trips), but it also has three commuter rail lines and one urban rail rapid transit line in the making. Bangalore relies on street buses only, though for some years it also has been trying to acquire some form of higher-capacity, rapid transit system. All operators are public sector owned. Due to modal shifts to 2-wheelers, the trend for the usage of public transport services has not risen in the past decade, despite population increases and (suspected) higher travel rates.

15．在过去 15年里，两个城市都经历了人口、经济和地域空间的增长，其公共基础设施和服务承担了巨大压力。班加罗尔都市地区拥有 5700万人口，年均人口增长率为 4.9%；而钦奈地区有 7500万人口，人口年增长率相对较低，不到 1%。机动车拥有率急速增长，钦奈每千人机动车占有数量为 324辆，班加罗尔则为每千人298辆。机动两轮车是主要增长部分，每个城市的登记数量都超过百万，而汽车登记数量则不足 25万。尽管如此，城市总体流动性不高，仅超过每人每天一趟行程，乘客市场各群体也有很大不同，体现了收入和财富的极大差距。步行和自行车占钦奈旅程的 44%，在班加罗尔则占 17%，超过 40%的日常旅行都是由公共交通服务完成的。钦奈的公共交通系统主要由路上公交控制（总行程的 38%），但还有三条通勤铁路和一条正在建设中的城市捷运轨道线。班加罗尔则完全依赖路上公交，尽管该市好些年来都想要建立某种形式的高容量捷运系统。所有运营商都是公有资本所有。尽管人口增长，（预期）有更高的出行率，但因为两轮车改进替换，过去十年中使用公共交通的趋势并没有增加。16. Beyond the sheer scale and diversity of the demands posed by the growth in population and incomes would have proved taxing for most world cities, there are some local factors, all interconnected, that explain this unsatisfactory state of affairs:

16．除了纯粹由人口和收入增长体现的需求规模和差异——这对很多世界城市都是很繁杂的问题，还有一些互相联系的地方因素，解释了目前不令人满意的现状： On the institutional side, the transfer of powers and resources from states to local

governments has been slow. The political constituencies of state and local institutions being different, the continuing dominance by the state produces

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transport policies and investments not well aligned with local interests. Large-scale investments (elevated highways, ring roads) tend to get more attention than street maintenance.

在制度方面，从邦到地方政府的权力和资源转移缓慢。邦和地方机构的政治支持者不同，一直由邦主导提出的交通政策和投资不能完全符合地方利益。大型投资（高架公路、环线）比道路维护更受注意。

The proliferation of state and local institutions and parastatals is unusually high, resulting in diluted regulatory and funding authority, and accountability for urban transport matters. Neither city has developed capacity for public transport regulation.

邦和地方机构以及半国营企业扩张很快，削弱了规范和资金当局的力量及其对城市交通问题的责任。两个城市都没有发展制定公共交通规定的能力。

The urban transport sector does not generate any revenue surpluses directly available at the local level. National and state taxes on fuel and motor vehicles are substantial, but only a fraction (25% nationally) is returned to the sector, and then in a circuitous way. Public transport has traditionally been a subsidized sector. The bus operator in Bangalore has in recent years turned an operating profit, but not yet in Chennai, where cost recovery is about 90%. Commuter lines in Chennai are deep in the red, with 50% recovery of direct operating costs. Funds for current and capital spending come from state budgets (under severe pressure in both states), and from the central government, via Central Road Fund, the Ministry of Railways, and city-bound programs like the Megacities Scheme. Together with other factors cited here, this way of funding biases spending in favor of large investment projects, some with dubious rationale, while leaving large urban and social segments poorly served.

在地方层面，城市交通部门没有产生任何可直接获得的收入盈余。国家和邦对燃油和机动车征收的税费是一项主要收入，但只有小部分（国家的25%）归还给交通部门，如此循环。公共交通一向都是接受政府补贴的行业。班加罗尔的公交运营商近几年在运营中获得了一些盈利，但钦奈还没有，成本收回率约为 90%。钦奈的通勤铁路则严重亏损，直接运营成本只能收回50%。目前资本支出主要来自邦预算（两个邦都有很大压力）以及中央政府，通过中央公路基金、铁路部及绑定城市项目，如大城市计划。除了刚才提到的其他因素，这种对大型项目的投资偏好，使得大量城市和社会层面服务很差，而一些投资连基本原理都有问题。

The use of competitive mechanisms is underdeveloped, as is the reliance on private sector funding and the know-how. In fact, it is limited to outsourcing of bus services in Bangalore, contract-based street maintenance, and a budding effort to charge for on-street parking in both cities.

没有发达的竞争机制，缺乏私有资本投入，也不知道操作方法。实际上，班加罗尔公交服务、两个城市的合同街道维护、路上停车收费等的外部采购都很有限。

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A laissez-faire approach has been taken with regard to the allocation of street space between competing uses. The losers of this are: (a) pedestrians; (b) bicyclists; and (c) public transport vehicles.

对路上空间使用竞争采取放任的态度。其中的失败者则是 a) 行人，b) 骑自行车的人，c) 公共交通车辆。

17. Both cities appear to have formulated the urban transport problem as that of street congestion and low safety, to be addressed in four dimensions. The first is to improve traffic flow by intensifying traffic police activities in traffic management and law enforcement, linked with some corridor and intersection improvements. The second is to take strong steps to improve the supply-side of public transport services, though largely staying within the public monopoly paradigm. Both of these efforts were necessary and the results achieved are impressive, especially on reducing traffic accidents in Chennai and improving bus operations in Bangalore. The third policy instrument is the addition of massive new road capacity in the form of multi-grade interchanges, elevated radial roads, and ring roads. The fourth, similarly capital hungry, is to move public transport development off-street onto the rail tracks.

17．两个城市都阐明城市交通问题主要是道路拥堵和安全性的问题，并着手从四个方面来解决。第一，通过加强交通警察交通管理和执法来改善车流，并改善一些交通路线和十字路口情况。第二，采取有力措施改善公共交通服务供应方，尽管大部分仍然是公有垄断企业。这些努力都很有必要，也取得了让人印象深刻的成果，尤其是钦奈降低了交通事故数量，班加罗尔改善了公交运营。第三项政策是通过建设多级立交桥、高架环网式道路提高新公路的通行能力。第四，在路上交通之外发展轨道公共交通，同样急需资金投入。18. Strategically, this approach is supply-oriented, and traffic growth-biased. It conflicts with the principles outlined in the government urban transport policy statement in a number of ways. In the short term it neglects the mobility of low-income and poor travelers, especially the non-motorized ones. It does not involve any use of traffic restraint tools and hence leaves street-based public transport services (the work horse of the transport system) to the mercy of unrestrained competition from individual motor vehicles. Moreover, it favors the most capital-intensive public transport modes (metros and other urban railways) which may not be warranted by either traffic density and passengers’ ability to pay, or their budget capacity to pay subsidies in perpetuity. In the longer term the emphasis on increasing road capacity encourages car-based urban development patterns. The actual policies, as opposed to the statements in principle, thus appear to be both socially regressive, and financially unsustainable.

18．战略上说，这一方法只面向供应，但忽略了交通增长。这与政府城市交通政策所提出的原则在很多方面都有矛盾。就眼前来说，它忽视了低收入者和贫困人口的流动性需求，尤其是不乘坐机动车的人群。该方法没有包括任何交通限制手段，从而在个人机动车毫无限制的竞争下，路上公共交通服务（交通系统中的主要动力）

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只能受其摆布。而且，该方法倾向于资本密集型的公共交通模式（地铁和其他城市铁路），但这些模式可能乘坐人数并不多，人们也可能承受不起，而政府也没有能力永远靠预算支付补贴。从长远来看，强调增加道路通行能力鼓励轿车模式的城市发展。实际政策与提出的原则相悖，因此在社会性方面是倒退，在财政方面也是不可行的。

A Way Forward出路19. To conform more closely with the strategic directions, the two study cities in particular, and Indian cities more generally, need a demand-segmented, service-oriented urban transport strategy, which would balance growth with equity concerns, with a strong but cost-conscious orientation in favor of public transport modes. Practically, this would involve a progression of steps from simple to the more difficult:

19．为了更契合战略导向，这两个研究城市，或者说所有的印度城市，都需要按需求区分、面向服务的城市交通策略，从而平衡增长与平等，偏向公共交通模式，同时也充分考虑成本。在实践中，这包括从易到难的逐级步骤： Measure and evaluate the performance of the transport system, regularly, from the

point of view of different groups; 从不同人群的观点，定期衡量并评价交通系统性能； Introduce road and street design standards and practices that are walk-and

bicycle-friendly; 引入公路和街道设计标准，使其方便行人和自行车通行； Re-allocate the existing road space to provide substantial exclusivity and priority

of use to public transport vehicles on arterial streets. The corollary of this is that general traffic would be restrained. It also implies a great intensification of traffic and parking management activities;

充新分配现有道路空间，在主干道上为公共交通车辆提供实质性的排他性和优先权。这一措施的必然结果是限制总体交通。这也表明极大增强交通和停车管理行为；

shift attention and resources to repairing and/or constructing anew secondary and tertiary urban road networks within low-income and poor areas, and connecting them to the arterial network;

将注意和资源转移到维修和/或重建低收入和贫困地区的二级和三级城市公路网络，并将这些道路与主干道网络连接起来；

address squarely the issue of public transport fares, subsidies and service levels, balancing social protection and modal split concerns;

公平处理公共交通票价、补贴及服务水平问题，平衡社会保护和模式分化； implement a regulatory reform aimed at getting substantially higher-quality

services and/or lower production costs (internal incentives for MTCs, a gradual move to competition; new organizational form for commuter rail);

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执行规范改革，旨在获得高质量服务和/或低成本生产（MTC内部动机、逐渐引入竞争、通勤铁路新组织形式）；

develop a market for public transport modes suitable to serve travel demands at the low end of the income distribution (this also may involve breaking the monopoly of MTCs);

发展满足低收入群体的公共交通模式市场（这也包括打破MTC的垄断）； introduce rigorous project evaluation for large, risky projects; 对规模较大风险较高的项目引入严格项目评价制度； focus on at-grade, bus-based rapid transit lines, with publicly-owned

infrastructure and competitively awarded service concessions,(inclusive of feeder/distributor networks); and

关注平面公交捷运路线，采取公有基础设施，竞争获得运营权方式（包括供应者/分配者网络）；及

ensure that new primary roads include a provision for rapid public transport modes.

保证新的主要公路能够提供快速公共交通方式。20. To move in this direction three ingredients are essential. First is the political agreement with the strategy, difficult because the proposals run counter to pro-growth forces, unions, motor-vehicle owners and the formidable urban rail lobby. Second is a streamlined and strengthened institutional setting, e.g. lead institution appointed in Bangalore, critical mass of regulatory skills created in both cities, and moving traffic management functions into municipalities.

20．要朝这一方向努力，有三个基本因素。第一，这一策略要获得政府同意。这很困难，因为这一提议违反了倾向经济增长的力量、联盟、机动车所有者以及强大的城市铁路系统的利益。第二，要有新型有力的机构建设，如班加罗尔指派的领导机构、两个城市的关键规范技能，将交通管理功能转移到市。21. The third aspect is financial. The problem is to reduce the overlong agency chain between what is paid by local road users (a growth sector in two well-off cities) and the funds brought back to bear on the local transport system. There are several ways to do this. The most common way is to escape budget funding and create a closed loop from road user fees via dedicated funds to cities. A less common way, highly successful where it has been implemented, is to introduce local road charging systems, aiming for both revenue generation as well as demand management. Either way, the challenge is to create not merely urban road funds, but urban transport funds. Private sector funding has a potential as a complement, but the prime source of funds should be local.

21．第三方面是财政。问题是要减少从当地公路使用者（在两个繁华城市中都是不断增长的群体）付费到返回地方交通系统的资金这一过程中过长的委托代理链。有多种方法。最常用的方法是避开预算资金，通过将公路使用者收费直接交给城市形成闭环。还有一种不常使用，但执行结果都很成功的方法。即引入地方公路收费系

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统，旨在创收和需求管理。不管哪种方法，挑战在于不仅仅要建立城市公路基金，而且要建立城市交通基金。私有资本可以作为补充，但主要资金来源仍应是地方。

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A Potential Role of the World Bank世界银行的潜在角色22. The Bank’s Country Strategy6 recognizes that in India, urban transport is a high-risk sub-sector with fragmented responsibilities, weak fiscal and implementation capacity of local bodies, and complex safeguard issues. It is also potential high-return, especially if an emphasis on management improvements and traffic engineering helps defer high cost investments in mass transit and flyovers. Given the risks and competing demands on Bank resources, Bank lending support will be through pilots incorporated into operations to support broader municipal reforms. This engagement will be selective, focusing first on investments that have short paybacks, such as traffic engineering and management, bus ways, and slum accessibility. Drawing lessons from these pilot engagements, the Bank will thereafter seek opportunities for scaling up, IFC may also provide support in the area by investing in infrastructure development companies that are constructing and operating urban transport infrastructure.

22．世行的《国家战略》6指出，在印度，城市交通是风险很高的小类行业，责任分化、地方机构缺乏财政基金和执行能力、安全问题复杂。但也有潜力发展成高回报行业，如果着重改善管理和交通工程能帮助延迟捷运和立交桥的高成本投资。考虑到风险和世行资源的竞争需求，世行的贷款支持必须通过运营试验，然后才支持更广泛的市政改革。这将是有选择性的，首先关注有短期回报的投资，如交通工程和管理、公交路线以及贫民区接近程度。从这些实验投资中总结经验，世行将据此寻求按比例增加投资的机会，国际金融公司 IFC也会在这一地区提供支持，投资基础设施发展公司，建设并运营城市交通基础设施。23. Reflected in the Country Strategy are agreed “Guidelines for Bank Lending in Key Sectors”, including in Urban Transport where instruments would include Analytical, and Advisory services (AAA) and investment lending limited to a few major urban centers and contingent on:

23．《国家战略》中收录了协议的“世行对关键部门贷款指导方针”，包括城市交通中含有分析和咨询服务（AAA）的手段，以及投资贷款限于少数主要城市中心，视下列情况而定： Existence of a statewide urban policy aiming to clarify roles in urban

development (including transport) and to enable ULBs to become financially viable;

是否存在邦范围内的城市政策，明确城市发展（包括交通）的角色，并使ULB财政方面可行；

Quality of municipal management, including capital planning and budgeting, financial management, revenue administration, and financial performance;

6 India Country Assistance Strategy, September 14, 2004 (Report No. 29374-IN).6 印度国家援助战略，2004年 9月 14日（报告第 29374-IN号）

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市政管理的质量，包括资金规划和预算、财政管理、收入管理以及财政表现；

Willingness to prioritize investment using economic criteria; development of a sound urban transport development strategy and investment program, commitment to the introduction of modern traffic management and enforcement; and

主动采用经济指标优化投资，发展合理的城市交通发展战略和投资项目，承诺引入现代交通管理和执行；及

Commitment to institutional reforms required for citywide transport management.

承诺城市范围内交通管理所要求的制度改革。24. The involvement of the World Bank has several beneficial prospects. First, its direct engagement in the growth-equity rebalancing will provide an added weight to the equity camp, much needed in these growth-dominated cities. Second, Bank loans can fund the planning effort for strategy development, and –through stringent engagement and selection criteria—ensure that some of the more difficult policy and investment shifts are tried, evaluated and refined. Third, the implementation of thus selected projects would re-direct immediate benefits to social sectors hitherto neglected in the current transport strategy. Fourth, given its urban and transport operations in the two states, a program approach is feasible.

24．世界银行的参与有一些有利前景。首先，世行直接参与平衡经济增长和公平问题，会给公平一方增强力量，这在经济增长占主导的城市里尤其需要。其次，世行贷款能够为战略发展执行提供资金，而且，通过严格许可和选择标准，保证一些较困难的政策和投资得以尝试、评价和提炼。第三，执行经过选择的项目能够将直接利益转向在现有交通战略下忽视的社会部门。第四，考虑到现在两个邦的城市和交通运营，项目手段是可行的。25. The table below shows a hierarchy of 8 project types defining an exhaustive agenda of policy initiatives and investments. The current series of Bank-funded urban and transport projects in both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, with their adaptive design and stress on local institutions and finance, provides a ready vehicle to test the three lower-rung projects/policy couplings. If these work well, free-standing urban transport projects in Chennai and Bangalore could aim at one of the higher-rung operations. A project to finance a rapid busway corridor (even a network) would be of highest priority in either city, because of its truly strategic investment and regulatory aspects. Proposals for bus-based rapid transit, in the form of sketch plans and outline cost estimates, are said to have been tabled in both Bangalore and Chennai, and could be built on readily and rapidly.

25．下表显示了 8种项目类型层次，确定了详尽的政策和投资议程。目前世行在泰米尔纳德邦和卡纳塔克邦投资的城市和交通项目，以其适应性设计和对地方机构和财政的压力，是检验三项低层项目/政策联合的试金石。如果这些行之有效，钦奈

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和班加罗尔的独立城市交通项目将针对高层运营。筹资建立快速公交车道（或网络）因其战略投资和规范方面，应该是两个城市的最优先项目。据说班加罗尔和钦奈都提出了公交捷运的提议，包括草案和成本预算，因此应该能容易快速地建立起来。26. The next three rungs (primary roads, commuter rail upgrading, and a metro line or metro access facilities) are project possibilities for the medium-to-long term, to be considered only if the strategic change has occurred.

26．接下来的三层（主要公路、通勤铁路更新、地铁线或地铁乘坐设施）是中期或长期的可能项目，只有战略改变发生后才能考虑。27. The table does not show any policy/investment couplings that would address the funding constraint cited above (the investment box in the last row is left blank). The introduction of a national system of road user charges with an urban transport provision could only be leveraged through a national transport project or a structural adjustment operation. The Bank is working with the Government of India on the reform of road user charges. This effort should take into account the urban transport dimension before some other arrangement is firmed up. Regarding a possible system of locally based user charges, it is premature to think of an urban transport investment in either city which would have the scale sufficient to leverage such a major policy innovation. Keeping the subject on the agenda, however, is not premature, and could be further advanced through technical assistance.

27．该表没有显示任何应对上述提及的资金限制的政策 /投资联合（最后一行的投资一栏是空白）。引入公路使用者收费并包含城市交通规范的国家系统，只有通过国家交通项目或结构调整操作才能起到杠杆作用。世行正与印度政府一起着手改革公路使用者收费。在确定其他安排之前，应该在城市交通维度上考虑这一问题。至于地方使用收费系统，考虑在这两个城市进行足以影响如此大的政策创新的城市交通投资还为时过早。但是在议程中讨论这一主题却并不早，而且技术辅助可以推动。

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MENU OF POSSIBLE BANK-FUNDED PROJECTSInvestments Policy/institutional aspects Project type

Traffic & parking control, road and area at-grade improvements

Re-allocation of street space to serve NMT modes; intensification of T&PM

Current state-based urban projects 当前邦范围内城市项目

Area-wide road maintenance and/or road improvements on secondary/tertiary network;

Intro of demand-based resource allocation; shifting funds to benefit low-income communities, local economies

Free-standing UT project or component in a state road project

Multi-grade intersections; rail-bus interchange facilities

Re-allocation of at-grade street space to serve NMT and UPT modes

Current state-based urban projects and/or free-standing UT project

Infrastructure for bus-based rapid mass transit

Introduction of concession-based operations; creation of a regulatory authority

Free-standing UT project

New primary roads Re-allocation of at-grade street space to serve NMT and UPT modes; provision for rapid transit lanes

Free-standing urban transport project

Upgrade fleet, facilities of commuter rail lines and rail-bus interchanges (Chennai only)

Creation of Chennai Metro Commuter Rail Corporation; creation of a regulatory authority


Metro-related investment (Bangalore only)s

Tandem with financing bus rapid transit; test case for rigorous project preparation


None Introduce urban-friendly road use charging system

National transport project; structural adjustment loan

NMT=non-motorized; UPT=urban public transport; T&PM= traffic and parking management

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世行可能筹资的项目名单投资政策/制度方面项目类型

交通及停车控制，公路和所在地区改善

重新分配道路空间，满足NMT模式，增强 T&PM

当前邦范围内城市项目地区范围公路维护和/或改善二级/三级网络

引入以需求为导向的资源分配，将资金转向有利于低收入群体、地方经济

独立城市交通项目或邦公路项目的组成部分

多级立交桥；轨道-公交换乘设施

重新分配同级道路空间，满足NMT和UPT模式

当前邦范围内城市项目和/或独立城市交通项目

公交捷运基础设施引入许可经营权的运营，建立规范当局

独立城市交通项目新的主要公路重新分配同级道路空间，

满足NMT和UPT模式，提供快速车道

独立城市交通项目

更新车队、通勤火车路线和轨道-公交换乘设施（仅钦奈）

建立钦奈地铁通勤轨道公司，建立规范当局


地铁相关投资（仅班加罗尔）

在支持快速公交建设之后投资地铁，用测试案例来严格规范项目准备


无引入城市友好型公路使用收费系统

国家交通项目；结构调整贷款

NMT=非机动车； UPT=城市公共交通； T&PM=交通和停车管理

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ATTACHMENT I URBAN TRANSPORT IN BANGALORE AND CHENNAI附件 I

班加罗尔和钦奈城市交通1. OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT OF THE REPORT

1．报告目标和内容1.1. The cities of Chennai (Tamil Nadu) and Bangalore (Karnataka) are mounting major efforts to deal with urban transport problems generated by exceptional rates of demographic, spatial and economic growth experienced therein over the last decade. The World Bank has a long history and a current presence as a partner in development endeavors of these cities and states. The areas of the current Bank activity include both urban and transport projects, but not specifically focused on urban transport.7 Given the perception of a growing importance of urban transport activities in both growth and poverty dimensions, an expansion of the Bank’s assistance into this field, in the form of advisory and lending activities, is now being considered by all concerned parties. The report in hand is intended to facilitate the discussions in this context, by providing an external angle of the urban transport problems, prospects and possible ways forward.1.1. 钦奈（泰米尔纳德邦）和班加罗尔（卡纳塔克邦）正着手处理过去十年内因为人口、空间和经济高速增长而产生的城市交通问题。世界银行长久以来，目前也作为这些城市和邦的合作伙伴协助其发展。目前世行的行动包括城市和交通项目，但并没有明确关注城市交通。7 考虑到城市交通活动在经济增长和脱贫方面日益增加的重要性，所有参与方面都在考虑世行在这一领域扩大帮助，以提供建议和贷款的形式。这份报告就是为了促进这一背景下的进一步讨论，提供城市交通问题的外部视角、前景和可能的出路。1.2. The main body of this report: (i) provides a brief diagnostic of the urban transport infrastructure and services in Chennai and Bangalore; (ii) identifies the underlying strategic issues; (iii) proposes an amended strategy, and (iv) outlines an agenda for the involvement of the World Bank in the short-to-medium term. The case studies of urban transport in Chennai and Bangalore, on which the main report is based, as well as a bibliography, are provided as attachments.1.2. 本报告主要内容有：(i) 对钦奈和班加罗尔的城市交通基础设施和服务做出了简要诊断；(ii) 确定了根本性的战略问题；(iii) 提出了改进策略；(iv) 列出了世界银7 In Tamil Nadu, Urban Development II (TNUDII) is nearing completion and TNUDIII is being prepared. Tamil Nadu Road Sector Project is under implementation since 2003. In Karnataka, an Urban Reform Project is under preparation and Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project is under implementation since 2001.7 在泰米尔纳德邦，城市发展 II（TNUDII）已接近完成，TNUDIII 正在着手准备中。泰米尔纳德邦公路部门项目从 2003年起开始实施，城市改革项目正在准备；卡纳塔克邦高速公路改进项目从2001年起开始实施。

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行在短中期阶段参与的议程。作为报告主要内容基础的钦奈和班加罗尔案例研究，以及参考书目，收录在附件中。1.3. The report is a first-cut attempt to understand and address a complex subject. It is based on a brief field visit and desk research, both of which have disclosed serious lacunae in data. Other limitations have to do with a narrow focus on urban transport, adopted to make this initial attempt doable. For example, the report does not touch on the environmental aspects of urban transport, even though vehicle-produced air pollution is a major and increasing problem in both Chennai and Bangalore, indeed in all urban India. This omission is not likely to invalidate the proposals made herein, since they focus on potential increases in public transport patronage and on traffic restraint, both of which are unequivocally beneficial with regard to emissions. Conversely, the most important decision variables from environmental point of view (re vehicle emissions and fuel prices) apply at any level of modal split.8 A more serious limitation is that the report stays away from urban planning, land markets and municipal funding issues. Major analytical work is being done by the Bank in these areas, and its results are being incorporated into the design of lending operations. In the next stage of the work on urban transport, stronger links will need to be established between this subject and that of local government organization, funding and planning processes.1.3. 本报告旨在初步了解和处理一个复杂的主题。报告基于简要的实地考察和案头研究，在数据方面都还有一些缺陷。其他的局限在于本报告仅仅关注城市交通，是为了使这一初衷可行。例如，报告没有涉及到城市交通的环保方面，尽管车辆排放造成的空气污染在钦奈和班加罗尔都是日益严重的主要问题，或者说是所有印度城市的主要问题。尽管忽略了这一方面，本报告所提出的建议仍然是有意义的，因为报告关注了公共交通乘客的潜在增长力以及交通限制，而这两者对减排的积极作用是显而易见的。相反，在任何层次的模式分化上最重要的决定都采用了环保观点。8 本报告更严重的一个缺陷在于报告没有提到城市规划、土地市场以及市政资金等问题。世行在这些方面做了主要的分析工作，其结果将整合到贷款操作设计。城市交通的下一步工作，是和地方政府组织、资金和规划过程建立起更加紧密的联系。

2. THE BACKGROUND

2．背景A. Transport Demand CharacteristicsA．交通需求特征8 Environmental aspects of urban transport were addressed in J. Shah and T. Nagpal, ed., Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia – Greater Mumbai Report, The World Bank Technical Paper No. 381, 1997. See also A. Bertaud, Urban Planning and Air Quality, South Asia Urban Air Quality Management Briefing Note No. 6, The World Bank, April 2002.8 城市交通的环境方面问题，参见 J. Shah和 T. Nagpal编写的《亚洲城市空气质量管理策略——大孟买地区报告》（Urban Air Quality Management Strategy in Asia – Greater Mumbai Report），世界银行技术文件 1997年第 381号。以及 A. Bertaud著《城市规划和空气质量》（Urban Planning and Air Quality），世界银行 2002年 4月南亚城市空气质量管理简报第 6号。

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2.1. The main features of Bangalore and Chennai are shown in the following boxes. The two cities have similar population “masses,” just above 4 million within city boundaries and about 7.-7.5 million in the urbanized area. Chennai is much more dense, but Bangalore is growing at a much greater rate (4.9% per annum in the 1990s). Chennai is a long-established port city, with two adjacent centers also of older vintage - the traditional commercial hub next to a pre-independence administrative and military complex. Development spread from these centers and the port along a few major road and rail radials. Its industries include petrochemicals, machine manufacture, and automotive equipment (both cars and rail rolling stock). Bangalore is land-locked, but at an important cross-roads of state/national roads and rail lines. Better known in the past as a city of gardens and lakes, whose moderate climate attracted pensioners and vacationers in large numbers, it has become a world-known center of information (software) technology, a synonym for outsourcing services for the U.S. and Western European countries. Bangalore’s economy is much broader than its international image: most employment is in fact provided by trade and commerce (60% in 1995), and manufacturing (37%). Traditional activities like silk weaving and garments are also vibrant. Though Bangalore also has inherited two strong centers, it is much more poly-nuclear than Chennai and its road system is more diffuse and complicated. This is in tandem with the fact that rail lines entering Bangalore were neither designed nor operated to cater for urban and regional traffic, so the city’s growth and mobility patterns have been very much road-dependent. Chennai’s transport system, though greatly road dependent, also leans heavily on its commuter rail services and (soon) on its first urban rail line, now only open on a short link. 2.1. 下表中列举了钦奈和班加罗尔的主要特征。两个城市都有大量人口，市内人口超过 400万，整个城市化区域人口约为 700到 750万。钦奈人口密度大得多，但班加罗尔人口增长率快得多（上世纪 90年代每年 4.9%）。钦奈是一个久负盛名的港口城市，之前也一直是印度的两个中心——传统的商业中心，独立之前的行政和军事中心。沿着少数主要公路和铁路环线，这些中心和港口发展起来。该地区工业包括炼油、机械制造、机动车设备（汽车和火车车辆）。班加罗尔是内陆城市，是重要的邦/国家公路和铁路交通枢纽。班加罗尔过去被称为花园和湖泊城市，适宜的气候吸引了大量的退休者和休假者。目前班加罗尔成为了世界著名的信息技术（软件）中心，是美国和西欧国家外包服务的代名词。班加罗尔的经济比其国际形象更广泛：实际上大部分人从事贸易和商业（1995年 60%）以及制造业（37%）。传统产业如丝绸编织和制衣业也很有活力。班加罗尔之前也曾是两大中心，却比钦奈更多样化，其公路系统散布更广也更复杂。班加罗尔的铁路线路的设计和操作都没有迎合城市和区域间交通，所以城市的经济增长和流动性模式基本都靠公路。尽管钦奈的交通模式也很依赖公路，但其通勤火车服务也起到了很大作用，及其刚开始动工，（很快）将建成的第一条城市铁路线路。

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Chennai at a glance钦奈概览 2003 population 4.2 million (city), 7.5 million (metropolitan area) 2003年人口：420万（城市），750万（都市区） port city, major industrial and commercial center 港口城市，主要工业和商业中心 population growth in the 1990s: 0.9% per annum; 20世纪 90年代人口增长率：每年 0.9% density in Chennai City: 250 people/hectare, double in sub-areas 钦奈城市人口密度：250人/公顷，某些分区部分翻倍 urban pattern: higher-density historical center with developments along major radials 城市模式：高人口密度的历史中心，沿主要辐射线路发展 economic growth (Tamil Nadu state) 6.1% per annum (1997-01); 经济增长率（泰米尔纳德邦）：每年 6.1%（1997-2001） 60% households have incomes under Rs.5,200/month, 37% under Rs.3,100/month (1998); 60%的家庭收入低于 5200卢比/月，37%的不足 3100卢比/月（1998） one million people live in slums (city only) 100万人口居住在贫民区（仅城市） informal employment dominant; 非正规雇佣占主导地位 transport system: road-based but with strong commuter rail network 交通系统：以公路为基础，但有强大通勤铁路网络 travel by mode (adjusted data from early 1990s): walking (30%), bikes (14%), MTC buses (38%), urban &

suburban rail (4%), motorized 2-wheelers (7%), cars (2.5%); 交通模式（根据 90年代初修正数据）：步行（30%），自行车（14%），MTC公交车（38%），城市和郊区铁路（4%），机动两轮车（7%），轿车（2.5%）

motorization: 1.5 million vehicles of which 1.1 million 2-wheelers, 250,000 cars; 机动化：150万辆车，其中 110万辆两轮车，25万辆汽车 main public transport providers: CMTC (2,400 buses in peak service at 16 km/h, 3.5 million daily

passengers); Southern Railway (3 commuter rail lines carrying 643,000 psgrs/day and 1 short urban metro rail line, 9,000 psgrs/day ).

主要公共交通提供商：CMTC（高峰服务中 2400辆公交车，时速 16公里，日乘客人次 350万）；南部铁路（3条通勤铁路线，日运送乘客 64.3万人次，一条短途市内地铁轨道线，日运送乘客 9000人次）

2.2. Both cities have in the last 20 years experienced a combination of demographic, spatial and economic growth that has catapulted them into the forefront of India’s great jump forward. These same processes have placed a tremendous strain on their public infrastructure and services. For transport management and planning purposes, it is of essence to understand the divergent patterns in population, location and income changes.2.2. 两个城市在过去 20年里都经历了人口、空间和经济的快速增长，使其成为印度飞跃发展的前沿。但这一过程也为城市的公共基础设施和服务带来了巨大压力。为了管理和规划交通，有必要了解其人口、位置和收入变化的不同模式。

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Bangalore at a glance班加罗尔概览 2001 population: 4.1 million (city), 5.7 million (metropolitan area) + floating population of about 1 million; 2001年人口：410万（城市），570万（都市区）+约 100万流动人口 population growth in 1990s: 4.9% per annum, expected to reach 10 million by 2011; 20世纪 90年代人口增长率：每年 4.9%，预计 2011年总人口达到 1000万 poly-centric, land-locked city, major cross-roads in Southern India, 多中心的内陆城市，印度南部的交通枢纽 gross residential density in the city of Bangalore: 113 people/hectare; 班加罗尔城市总居住人口密度：113 人/公顷 economic growth (Karnataka state): 7.5% per annum (1990s); 经济增长率（卡纳塔克邦）：每年 7.5% （90年代） leader in India’s information technology, electronics, consumer goods; 印度信息技术、电子和消费品产业的领头 multi-ethnic, multi-layered urban society 多民族、多层次的城市化社会 median monthly income (1998): Rs 5,200 per household; 28% have income less than Rs 3,100/month; 中等月收入（1998）：每个家庭 5200卢比，28%的家庭收入低于 3100卢比/月 2.2 million people live in about 750 slums (1998-99 data), sharply up from 1991 (estimates vary in scale); 220万人口居住在约 750个贫困区（1998-1999年数据），比 1991年有较大增加（数量估计不同） motorization: city 1.6 million of which 1.2 million 2-wheelers and 279,000 cars; agglomeration 2 million

vehicles, of which 1.6 million 2-wheelers; 机动化：城市 160万车辆中，120万为两轮车，27.9万辆轿车，大都市区内 200万车辆，其中 160万辆两轮车

transport system: road based; major railway network is in place but not significant for urban/regional travel; 交通系统：依赖公路，也有主要铁路网络，但并不针对城市/区域行程 main public transport providers: BMTC (2,200 buses in peak service, 675 buses sub-contracted to BMTC),

carry 2.6 million trips per day; plus company buses; 主要公共交通提供商：BMTC（高峰服务时 2200辆公交车， 675辆转包给 BMTC），每天乘坐人次

260万，加上公司班车 modal split: walk and bike 17%; BMTC buses 41%; other buses 3%; auto-rickshaws 4%; cars and 2-wheelers

38%. 模式分化：步行和自行车 17%，BMTC公交车 41%，其他公交车 3%，机动三轮车 4%，汽车和两轮车 38%

2.3. Economic growth has raised incomes of a large number of people and their expectations as to the services they deem essential. In the transport dimension, the most visible impact of rising incomes is accelerated motorization (vehicle ownership and use), accompanied by a shift from public transport services to individually or company owned vehicles. In the spatial dimension, this means an increase in the degrees of freedom to locate residences. At higher income brackets, this typically means a choice of more distant spots of greater environmental and other types of amenity.2.3. 经济增长使很多人收入提高，也是他们对必要服务的期望值提高了。在交通方面，收入增加带来的最显而易见的影响就是机动化进程加快（机动车拥有量和使用），以及从选择公共交通服务转向使用个体或公司拥有的车辆。在空间方面，这意味着人群居住位置的自由度增加了。对高收入群体而言，这就意味着他们可以选择较远的地方，享受更好的环境和其他生活福利设施。2.4. Motor vehicle ownership in Bangalore and Chennai has been increasing at unprecedented rates, between 10 and 20% per annum. The current ownership level is

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about 324 individual passenger vehicles per 1,000 population in Chennai, and 298 in Bangalore. These are high rates, similar to those in the wealthiest cities of Eastern Europe and common in Western Europe, but at vastly lower level of incomes than in Europe. The explanation for this seeming anomaly lies in the structure of the passenger vehicle fleet. Motorized 2-wheelers are the main growth category, with about 1.1 million registered in Chennai and 1.2 million in Bangalore.9 Cars are a distant second: about 250,000 are registered in Chennai and 267,000 in Bangalore. This motorization pattern is similar to that experienced elsewhere in South and East Asia, e.g. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam; Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. The consequences of 2-wheeler primacy, while a boon for the mobility of many people, are unfortunately quite negative for traffic flow, safety and air pollution. In terms of relations between motorization and incomes, car-based motorization is linked to higher and high-middle income households (in addition to business owners). Motorcycles, on the other hand, are bought by low-middle and low-income households. From transport planning point of view, they are bought by households who are “normally” major users of public transport services. Just how deep down the income ladder is motorcycle ownership was illustrated 10 years ago in a survey of bus passengers in Bangalore: 27% of households with monthly income of Rs.500 or less owned a motorcycle (71% owned a bike).10 For monthly incomes in the range Rs.500-1,500, 47% owned a motorcycle. These numbers must have changed significantly since 1993, but the main point has not: many bus users are not captive and make their modal choice on the basis of some s of price, travel time, comfort, convenience, etc.2.4. 班加罗尔和钦奈的机动车拥有量都以空前的速度增长，每年在 10%到 20%之间。目前的拥有量为钦奈每千人 324辆个人乘用车，而班加罗尔则为 298。这是很高的比例，类似于东欧国家中最富庶的城市，以及西欧的中等城市，但其收入水平却比欧洲低很多。这一异常现象的解释在于乘用车的结构。机动两轮车是增长最快的类别，其登记数量在钦奈为 110万辆，班加罗尔则为 120万辆。9 轿车虽然是第二位，但数量上却远远落后：钦奈登记轿车数量约为 25万辆，班加罗尔则为 26.7万辆。这一机动化进程类似于南亚和东亚的其他一些地方，如越南的河内和胡志明市；马来西亚的吉隆坡。两轮车占首位而人口流动性激增的结果却给交通流、安全和空气污染带来负面影响。在机动化和收入的关系方面，轿车类的机动化主要是与高收入或中高收入家庭（除企业主外）相关联的。而摩托者的主要购买者是中低收入及低9 Two-wheeler group includes scooters, motorcycles and mopeds. Indian two-wheeler industry took off after the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1985, when restrictions on production capacity were reduced and foreign investment was allowed. Another growth spurt occurred after macro-economic reforms in the early 1990s. The subsequent rise in India’s GDP (5.5% per annum) fed the demand for two-wheelers. The annual production towards the end of the 1990s was 3 million vehicles (George et al, 2002).9 两轮车包括小轮摩托车、摩托车和机动脚踏两用车。自从 1985年引入新经济政策，减少了生产能力限制，允许国外资本投资，印度的两轮车工业有了飞速发展。另一次高速增长是在 90年初实行整体经济改革之后。随后印度的 GDP增长（每年 5.5%）满足了两轮车的需求。到 90年代末两轮车的年生产量达到 300万辆（George等，2002）。10 Source: Impact of road transportation systems on energy and environment – an analysis of metropolitan cities of India, Tata Energy Research Group, 1993.10 资料来源：公路交通系统对能源和环境的影响——印度都市分析，Tata能源研究集团，1993。

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收入家庭。从交通规划的角度来看，它们的购买者“通常”是公共交通服务的主要使用者。10年前班加罗尔公交乘客的调查说明了摩托车拥有者的收入层级到底有多低：27%的月收入不超过 500卢比的家庭拥有一辆摩托车（71%的拥有一辆自行车）。10 月收入在 500-1500卢比之间的家庭，47%拥有摩托车。这一数据从 1993年起应该有了很大变化，但主要观点仍然不变：很多公交使用者并不受约束，他们可以综合考虑价格、行程时间、舒适度、方便性来选择交通模式。2.5. This said, the split of daily travel by mode is still not dominated by motorcycles and cars, but by public transport services, walking and biking. According to admittedly aged surveys in Chennai (probably 1992, with modifications based on more recent small-scale surveys), walking and biking accounted for 44% of all trips, and public transport modes carried 42%. The share of cars (2.5%) is downright minor in comparison. In Bangalore, where data are even weaker but of more recent vintage, walking and bikes carry about 17% of all trips, and public transport carried about 41% (up to 60% of all trips longer than 1 km), and individual motor vehicles carry 38%.11 Even after newer and better data adjust these numbers downward, the visual evidence of unrestrained dominance of 2-wheelers, 3-wheelers and cars on the traffic scene in these two cities is misleading. The bias comes from focusing the visits and surveys on major street traffic. Urban transport also takes place elsewhere.2.5. 这说明，日常通行的模式分化并没有完全由摩托车和轿车主导，而主要是公共交通服务、步行和自行车。根据一份钦奈以前的调查（约在 1992年，并根据最近的小规模调查数据进行了修改），步行和自行车占所有行程的 44%，而公共交通则运送了 42%的乘客。相比之下轿车的份额（2.5%）明显少得多。尽管班加罗尔的数据更加不确信，但时间比较接近，该数据表明步行和自行车占所有行程的17%，公共交通占 41%（超过 1公里的行程则占 60%），个人机动车占 38%。11 即使更准确的新数据会调整这一数据，但仍然明显看出，人们印象中道路上都是不受限制的两轮车、三轮车以及轿车主导交通的现象其实是误导。这一偏见源自考察和调查都集中在主要道路交通上。城市交通在其他地方同样存在。2.6. One of the reasons for the importance of non-motorized and public transport modes in Chennai, and somewhat less in Bangalore, is that economic growth has left many people behind. The new wealth is in sharp contrast to concurrent poverty, with inherited inequalities deepened by the growth processes, or new ones generated by them as the migrants from the countryside pour into cities. The population growth has taken place largely at the low-income end of the economic spectrum. In spatial terms, many of the lowest income people live in informal settlements in peri-urban areas, in older city

11 Company-owned buses and mini-buses are said to play a major role in employee transport in Bangalore. According to some statistics, there may be as many as 35,000 private buses (all sizes) and vans in Bangalore used for private mass transport. Compare to 2,200 buses operated by BMTC.11 在班加罗尔，据说公司所有的公交车和小型公交车在员工接送上起主要作用。根据一些统计数据，班加罗尔可能有 35000辆私人公交车（所有型号）以及厢式汽车用于私人大量运输。比较，BMTC仅拥有 2200辆公交。

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slums, or encroach any place where development by leapfrogging has left some land unused. It is not that lower-income groups have not benefited from economic growth. Many did, but growth for this stratum of urban residents is in the informal sector, low-paid and unstable jobs held by unskilled workers in construction, diverse services, and informal manufacture.2.6. 钦奈非机动车以及公共交通非常重要，而班加罗尔重要性相比较低的原因在于经济增长仍然让很多人处于贫困之中。新兴的富裕阶层与同时产生的贫困人口产生了强烈对比，经济增长过程加剧了家庭出身的不平等，随着大量农村人口涌入城市则产生了新的不平等。人口增长主要集中在低收入群体中。在空间方面，很多低收入人口生活在非正式的定居点，如城乡结合区、旧城市贫民区，或占据跃进式发展中没有使用的某些土地。并不是说低收入群体就没有从经济增长中获利。很多人受益，但是对这一阶层的城市居民而言，增长是在非正式行业，缺乏技能的工人只能在建筑、不同服务和非正式制造业中得到收入低且不稳定的工作。2.7. Different income strata have different expectations of the urban transport system. Those owning individual motor vehicles, be they households or businesses (the latter including freight vehicles) expect a good road system: well-maintained pavements, efficient traffic control, high travel speeds, easily available parking. Rising incomes have also increased service expectations of some public transport passengers, especially if they own or aspire to own a motor vehicle. They expect higher-quality services: easy access, a seat, high travel speed, air conditioning (especially in Chennai with its humid and hot climate). Since the majority of public transport services in both cities operate on city streets, public transport passengers are also interested in the performance of the road system, as are public transport operators. Finally, and certainly not the least important aspect, a good-quality road system and good-quality public transport services are essential parts of a “package” that Chennai and Bangalore offer to potential investors from outside, in competition with other cities in India and elsewhere. 2.7. 不同收入的群体对城市交通系统也有不同的期望。拥有私人机动车的家庭或企业（企业车辆包括运货车）期望良好的公路系统：维护良好的公路、有效的交通控制、行程速度加快、停车场所方便。收入增加也提高了一些公共交通乘客对服务的期望，尤其是那些拥有或希望拥有机动车的人。他们期望高质量服务：乘坐方便、有座位、速度快、空调（尤其在钦奈潮湿炎热的气候条件下）。因为两个城市主要的公共交通服务都是在城市道路上行驶，公共交通乘客和运营商都很关注公路性能。最后，也是很重要的一点，钦奈和班加罗尔要想与印度其他城市以及世界其他地方竞争，吸引外界投资者，高质量的公路系统和高质量的公共交通服务是需要提供的必要部分。2.8. Transport expectations of people at the low end of the income distribution are very different from those holding formal and/or better paid jobs: they rely on walking, some in addition have bicycles, and those holding or seeking distant jobs rely also on public transport services. This implies, first, the demand for a basic network of all-

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weather roads in the secondary and tertiary category, linked to the arterial road system. Second, it implies minimally-priced and easily accessible public transport services.2.8. 处于收入分配低端的人群对交通的期望与拥有正式和 /或待遇好的工作的人群期望是大不相同的：低收入人群依靠步行，一些也有自行车，在较远处工作或打算在较远处找工作的人也会乘坐公共交通工具。首先，这说明在二级和三级路段上需要全天候公路的基本网络，且与主干道系统连接。其次，这也要求票价低廉和便捷的公共交通服务。2.9. This simple 3-way segmentation of the travel market in Bangalore and Chennai does not capture the richness of what takes place on the ground. For example, the high-tech and engineering businesses of Bangalore have quite different transport habits and requirements than those than the traditional businesses, e.g. small-scale manufacture, silk weaving, commerce and services. The former are highly motorized, their job and familial networks are spread widely (well beyond Bangalore, in fact). As a caricature, it is this group that is conscious of traffic speeds and delays, and seeks flyovers, urban expressways and multi-level garages. The traditional businesses are more location-bound, with kin businesses locating in close proximity, and walking retaining importance for interaction between partners and with clients. These businesses may also be concerned for the ease and cost of longer-distance urban transport by motor vehicles, but within their large activity areas they do not seek to “reduce congestion” but thrive on it.12

2.9. 班加罗尔和钦奈这种三级分割的交通市场不能吸引富裕阶层。例如，与传统产业者如小规模制造业、丝绸编织、商业和服务业相比，班加罗尔的高科技和工程企业从业者在交通习惯和要求上都有很大区别。技术工程业人员流动性很高，他们的工作地点和家庭地点相隔很远（实际上可能超过班加罗尔）。讽刺的是，倒是这一群体对交通速度和延迟很敏感，希望建设立交桥、城市高速公路和多层车库。传统业者一般居住在当地，以家族企业的形式聚集在一起，伙伴和客户之间的联系往往以步行为主。这些企业也可能考虑使用机动车进行较长距离市内交通的方便性和成本，但在他们的主要活动区域内，不寻求“缓解拥堵”，反而依靠拥堵繁荣。12

The travel markets in Bangalore and Chennai are heterogeneous: car owners are at one end of the spectrum, and slum dwellers are at the other. Between these extremes are two partially overlapping groups which use public transport services and/or own motorized 2-wheelers. This is where the battle for modal dominance is being fought and where a strategic approach is called for.班加罗尔和钦奈的交通市场是类型多样的：轿车使用者在一各极端，而贫民窟居住者在另一极端。在这两个极端之间，有两个部分重合的群体，他们使用公共交通工具和/或拥有机动两轮车。这是交通模式争夺支配地位的战场，也是要求战略方法处理的群体。12 See S. Benjamin “Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore”, Environment and Urbanization, April 2000.12 参见 2000年 4月《环境和城市化》（Environment and Urbanization ）中 S. Benjamin的《班加罗尔的政府管理、经济背景和贫困》（“Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore”）。

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B. The Performance of Urban Transport SystemsB．城市交通系统表现2.10. How well are the transport systems of Chennai and Bangalore serving their diverse client populations? Answers should be sought both from the service providers (the supply side) as well as those for whom the services are provided (the demand side). 2.10. 钦奈和班加罗尔的交通系统对不同的乘客群体提供的服务怎样？应该从服务提供者（供应方）以及服务对象（需求方）双方寻找答案。2.11. A comprehensive and rigorous evaluation from the supply side is not available. The urban transport institutions in Chennai and Bangalore have not yet focused on the question of service to citizens in a systematic manner.13 The following evaluation is culled from various technical studies consulted for this report, complemented by visual evidence from a recent, but all-too-brief exposure to on-street conditions in the two cities. The overall conclusion is that the performance of urban transport systems in Bangalore and Chennai leaves much to be desired across all economic and spatial strata.2.11. 缺乏来自供应方的全面严格评价。钦奈和班加罗尔的城市交通机构还没有采取系统方式来关注对市民的服务问题。13 下列评价精选自本报告参考的很多技术研究；另外还有一份最近的可视性依据，但是对两个城市的路上情况说明太过于简单。总体结论是，班加罗尔和钦奈的城市交通系统在经济和空间层面的表现还有很多有待提高。2.12. The worst off are the pedestrians in all parts of the urban areas, due to non-existent, broken-down, and/or obstructed sidewalks; large height differences between sidewalks and frequent driveways/alleyways; danger at street crossings and distance between crosswalk locations; and flooding in monsoon seasons. The next on the list of poorly-served travelers are by bicycle riders, who have few exclusive-use lanes while gradually being pushed out of busy roads by motor vehicles, be these 2- or 3-wheelers, buses or cars. Traffic accident data from Chennai show that pedestrians and bike riders are second- and third-highest group among those killed in traffic accidents, with 190 and 126 killed in 2001, respectively (topped only by 208 dead riders/passengers of 2-wheelers).2.12. 城市区域中在所有方面得到服务条件最糟糕的就是行人。因为没有人行道，破烂和/或阻塞的人行道；人行道和常用车道/小巷之间高度相差太大；十字路口以13 There are exceptions to this statement. Chennai Traffic Police, for example, has done a very good job of collecting and analyzing traffic accident data. There was also a passenger opinion survey in Chennai done within a MTC Route Rationalization Study (Pallavan Consultants, 2001). Generally, there is a visible effort to improve accountability of the local government and allow the voice of the public to be heard, e.g. the report card for public services in Bangalore. Web sites have been set in both cities to provide the public an easy opportunity to record their views.13 这一说明也有例外。如，钦奈交通警察局非常出色地完成了交通事故数据的整理和分析工作。MTC路线合理化研究（Pallavan咨询，2001年）也在钦奈进行了乘客观点调查。一般来说，能够看到当地政府的职责改进，也能够听取大众的意见。如，班加罗尔的公共服务报告卡。两个城市都建立了网站，方便市民留言发表观点。

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及人行横道位置之间距离存在危险；雨季会发洪水。其次是骑自行车的人。他们很少有专用的自行车道，逐渐被两轮或三轮机动车、公交车和轿车挤出繁忙的公路。钦奈的交通事故数据表明，行人和骑车人位居交通事故死亡人群的第二位和第三位，2001年死亡人数分别为 190人和 126人（仅次于两轮车驾驶者/乘客，死亡人数为208）。2.13. Traffic studies cite poor condition of pavements (30% of Bangalore’s road network is in that shape), low travel speeds (down to 10-12 km/h), high intersection delays, and poor or non-existent parking facilities. Traffic accidents are high at about 50 and 40 per 10,000 registered vehicles in Bangalore and Chennai, respectively, with about 700-800 fatalities (Bangalore is responsible for the upper range).2.13. 交通研究引证了人行道的糟糕情况（班加罗尔 30%的公路网络都是如此）、交通速度低（时速低至 10-12公里）、十字路口处延迟、缺乏停车设施或条件很差。交通事故发生频率很高，班加罗尔和钦奈的数据分别为每 10000辆登记车辆 50和40车次，其中死亡人数为 700-800人（班加罗尔达到 800人）。2.14. Bus services are infrequent and slow moving; buses are hard to get on/off, overcrowded (up to 150% of the nominal capacity), with uncomfortable ride, and polluting. Suburban rail services have low frequencies, and difficult access to/from stations. These generalizations apart, a 1997 survey of MTC passengers in Chennai found 75% satisfied with service frequency, 80% satisfied with punctuality, 89% satisfied with reliability, 93% satisfied with safety, and 89% satisfied with vehicle condition. The lowest score (48%) was on “route condition” which probably refers to the road condition and possibly traffic delays. The same survey covered some potential and/or ex-passengers. The ranking of “push-away” factors was as follows: low travel speed, lack of punctuality, poor connectivity and low frequency.2.14. 公交服务频率很低，速度也很慢。公交车总是很难上下车、车内拥挤（约正常载客量的 150%），乘坐不舒适，造成污染。郊区铁路服务频率也很低，来回车站也不方便。这些概括与 1997年的一项调查结果很不同，当时钦奈的MTC乘客中有 75%对服务频率表示满意，80%满意其准时性，89%满意其可靠性，93%认为很安全，89%对车况表示满意。最低分数（48%）为 “路线状况”一项，可能是指道路状况及其造成的延迟。这次调查也询问了一些潜在乘客和 /或以往的乘客。“推开”公共交通服务的原因依次如下：速度慢、不准时、连接性不好、频率低。2.15. Are public transport services affordable? A simple analysis of travel fares and passenger incomes for CMTC (Attachment I), based on the price of the monthly fare, concluded that bus fares were onerous at monthly household incomes of less than Rs.1,000 (roughly 10-13% of passengers). At an income of exactly Rs.1,000, a monthly bus pass accounts for 14% of the household income for a 10-km trip by one person, and 26% for a 30-km commute. Commuter rail monthly passes were significantly more affordable. At Rs.2,500 a month per household, a monthly bus pass for one person would

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be under 10% for most distances, and rail passes were half that.14 The conclusion is that fares are set at levels acceptable for a majority of passengers.2.15. 人们能承担得起公共交通服务么？根据 CMTC对票价（每月交通费用）和乘客收入的简单分析（附件 I），家庭月收入低于 1000卢比的人群（约占乘客的 10-13%）难以承受目前的交通票价。若月收入正好为 1000卢比，10公里内旅程每人每月公交支出占家庭收入的 14%，30公里通勤则占 26%。通勤铁路每月支出则要便宜很多。对月收入为 2500卢比的家庭，若乘坐公交，大多数距离的行程，每人每月支出少于 10%，而铁路交通费用只需要一半。14 结论认为，大多数乘客能接受目前的票价水平。The worst-served by the transport systems in Chennai and Bangalore are people who walk or ride bikes, who account for more than 40% of all trips, and come mainly but not entirely from lower-income and poor strata. The best served are bus system captives, since the level of service is reasonable and fares are low.钦奈和班加罗尔交通系统服务最差的就是行人和骑自行车的人，他们占所有行程的40%，主要来自低收入和贫困人群，但也不全是如此。服务最好的是公交乘客，服务水平还可以，票价低廉。2.16. Answers from the demand side come from two recent surveys. These covered several cities, including both Bangalore and Chennai. A 2003 Confederation of Indian Industry survey of urban populations in Southern India showed 90% dissatisfied with roads, and 58% dissatisfied with public transport services. It is noteworthy that 65% of the respondents were willing to pay higher public transport fares to get more comfort and frequency, and 89% of the respondents were willing to pay for good-quality toll roads.15

A 2003 study by the National Association of Software and Service Companies, done to evaluate the relative attractiveness of major Indian cities from IT business point of view, cited Bangalore’s ”weak public transport infrastructure (that) resulted in many people buying their own vehicle” and generally low infrastructure availability.16 The same study also cited Chennai as lacking in infrastructure. In other words, the dissatisfaction with infrastructure in Bangalore and Chennai is shared between the population and the business community. The evidence of merely two surveys cannot be taken as conclusive. Still, this is a serious situation since both cities perceive their chances of continued

14 32% of CMTC passengers reported household incomes between Rs.1,000 and Rs.2,500.14 32%的 CMTC乘客家庭收入在 1000到 2500卢比之间。15 Source: “Urban populace unhappy with infrastructure: Study” The Hindu, 12 March 200315 来源：印度《徒报》（The Hindu ）2003年 3月 12日文《城市人口不满基础设施：研究》（“Urban populace unhappy with infrastructure: Study”）。16 Source: “At your IT service, India’s Hyderabad”, Asia Times (on-line), January 7, 2004. The study covered nine cities: Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Kochi, Mumbai, Pune and Delhi (National Capital Region).16 来源：2004年 1月 7日《亚洲时报》（在线版）《印度的海德拉巴，为您提供 IT服务》。研究覆盖了九个城市：艾哈迈达巴德、班加罗尔、钦奈、海德拉巴、加尔各答、科钦、孟买、普纳和德里（国家首都地区）。

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economic growth hinges on having much better infrastructure and services then at present, not to mention the satisfaction of their own citizens.2.16. 需求方的答案来自两份最近的调查。调查覆盖了很多城市，包括班加罗尔和钦奈。2003年印度工业联盟对印度南部城市人口的调查表明，90%的人对公路不满意，58%对公共交通服务不满意。值得注意的是，65%的受调查者愿意为更加舒适便捷的服务支付更高的公共交通票价，89%的受调查者愿意为高质量的收费公路付费。15国家软件和服务公司协会 2003年的一份研究，从 IT企业的观点评价了主要印度城市的相对吸引力。报告称班加罗尔的“糟糕公共交通基础设施使得很多人自己买车”，并指出其基础设施利用率普遍较低。16 同一份报告也指出钦奈缺乏基础设施。换言之，班加罗尔和钦奈的市民和商业团体都对基础设施表示不满意。仅仅两份报告的证明并不能作为最后结论。但是，这仍然是严重问题，且不说市民的满意程度，两个城市都认识到只有比现在更好的基础设施和服务才能维持经济增长。

3. URBAN TRANSPORT ISSUES

3．城市交通问题3.1. The unfavorable evaluation of urban transport performance in the preceding section may be seen as unfair by those actively involved in the operations and planning of transport systems in Bangalore and Chennai. After all, major efforts have been made in both cities. In Bangalore, the last 6 years have seen an impressive revival of BMTC, including fleet renewal, increased punctuality, and lower number of breakdowns. All productivity indicators are up and the company has been making a profit for several years in a row. As for traffic congestion, there have been major road improvements, including an Outer Ring Road, the gigantic 5-km Hebbal flyover (the largest in India), and other smaller flyovers and underpasses at worst-congested intersections. More multi-grade projects are under construction and/or being tendered. The work on building the new international airport has started, and its road connections will be much better than is the case with the current airport. Chennai has constructed an Inner Ring Road and started on the Outer Ring. The most important radial roads in the city have been widened, and some have included pedestrian underpasses, and separate lanes for pedestrians and bicycles. Many intersections have been improved. A major effort was put in traffic law enforcement, lowering traffic accidents from a high of 5,280 in 2001 to 3,680 in 2002, and traffic deaths from 680 to 485 in the same period. New bus and truck terminals have been constructed. Phase I of the rail-based Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) was placed in operation in the late 1990s, and a gradual progress of gauge conversion has already made possible serving cross-radial trip ends without transfers. The completion of Phase II of the MRTS is imminent, creating a rapid urban railway of about 20 km which complements the existing suburban rail system.17

17 A generic term “rapid urban railway” is used here because the MRTS defies an easy classification. Its location and station spacing suggest a metro, but its tracks, the rolling stock and frequency of service suggest a commuter (suburban) railway. It was reported recently that the Government of Tamil Nadu will commission a feasibility study for a (yet another?) metro line in Chennai. In the Indian urban transport context, names given to various transport modes are not based on rigorous definitions, adding confusion to a taxonomy already made fuzzy by a lack of an internationally recognized terminology. Only 3 other cities

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3.1. 上文中提到的对城市交通表现的负面评价，在那些积极参与班加罗尔和钦奈交通系统操作和规划的人看来也许有点不公平。毕竟，这两个城市都做出了很大努力。在班加罗尔，BMTC在过去 6年得到复兴，更新车队、增强准时性、降低了故障频率。所有生产力指数都上升了，公司连续几年来都获得盈利。至于交通拥堵问题，也进行了主要公路改善，包括外环线，建立了巨大的 5公里赫保尔立交桥（印度最大）以及在最拥挤的交叉路口其他较小的立交桥和地下通道。更多的多级项目正在建设和/或正在招标。开始建设新的国际机场，新机场的道路交通情况会比目前好的多。钦奈建设了内环线，并开始着手外环建设。城市内最重要的辐射线路扩建，一些也包括了行人地下通道以及行人和自行车专用通道。很多十字路口都有改善。交通法律执行方面也做出了很大努力，使交通事故从 2001年的 5280起降低到 2002年 3680起，同期交通事故死亡人数也从 680人下降到 485人。建设了新的公交和卡车终点站。快速轨道系统（MRTS）第一阶段在上世纪 90年代投入使用，不断扩建也使跨辐射线路行程不需换乘就能实现。MRTS第二阶段即将完成，约 20公里的快速城市铁路是现有郊区铁路系统的补充。17

3.2. While acknowledging that valiant efforts have been made in both cities, and real improvements have been achieved, it is clear that the efforts have not sufficed to keep up with loads and expectations generated by the demographic and economic growth. Neither financial nor institutional capacity of state and local governments were up to the task. In addition, some questionable policy and investment choices have been made, and others were left untouched. The rest of this section brings out the major among these factors, choices and underlying issues. Since all these are strongly interconnected, the order of presentation is to start from the most general factors. The working hypothesis is that the ensemble of state/city institutions in charge of the urban transport systems (with links to national institutions) are supply-focused rather than demand-focused. The resulting policy orientations and decisions on how to spend available funds have left large economic and spatial segments poorly served, and have not been as effective as they could have to make these cities competitive.3.2. 尽管承认两个城市都做出了勇敢的努力，也的确取得了一些进展，但很显然这些努力仍然不足以满足人口和经济增长所产生的负荷和期望。邦和地方政府的财政和制度能力都无法胜任这一任务。此外，选择了一些有问题的政策和投资，而另一些则没有触及。下文中说明了这些因素、选择和潜在问题的主要内容。因为这些都是紧密相关的，说明是从最基本的因素开始。研究假说负责城市交通系统的邦 /城市机构（与国家机构联系）更关注供应而非需求。由此产生的政策导向和怎样使用in India have rail-based systems: Mumbai has a major network of suburban rail lines, whereas Kolkata and Delhi have short metros (the latter is expanding). 17 这里使用通称“快速城市铁路”是因为MRTS不容易区别。地理位置和车站空间像地铁，但轨道、车辆和服务频率像通勤（郊区）铁路。最近报道称泰米尔纳德邦政府将着手钦奈地铁线路的可行性研究（是另一项么？）。在印度城市交通背景下，各种交通模式的名称并不是依照严格定义，使得本身缺乏国际认可术语的分类法更加混乱。印度只有其他 3个城市有铁路系统：孟买有主要的郊区铁路线网络，加尔各答和德里有短途地铁（德里的正在延伸扩建）。

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可用资金的决定使得大部分经济和空间部门得到的服务很差，而且也没有达到原本提高这些城市竞争力的作用。A. FinancesA．财政3.3. The structural problem with urban transport funding, which Bangalore and Chennai share with other Indian cities, in fact with many cities the world over, is that the sector does not generate any surplus revenue directly available to those who regulate, operate the transport systems and plan their development. Thus a growth sector (e.g. demand for roads) in an economically strong local environment (cities that are their states’ and the country’s leaders) cannot get an adequate supply response.3.3. 班加罗尔、钦奈和其他印度城市，实际上是和世界上很多城市都共同面对城市交通资金的结构问题，因为这一行业不产生任何直接交给规范、操作交通系统以及规划交通发展等机构的剩余收入。因此经济力量强大的地方政府（处于邦或国家领先地位的城市）的一个增长部门（如公路需求）不能得到足够的供应。3.4. In public transport services, the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Company (BMTC) has started to generate revenue surpluses, but this has yet to be enough to upgrade the company’s fleet for a visible rise in the quality of service. In Chennai, both the MTC and the commuter rail lines generate losses, cited above as Rs.1,347 million (US$ 28 million) in last year, and the prospect is that these losses will increase considerably when the MRTS Phase II becomes operational. The chances that fares could be raised in a significant way are not high (more on this subject below).3.4. 在公共交通服务中，班加罗尔都市交通公司（BMTC）开始获得盈利，但这还不足以更新公司的车队，使得服务质量有明显改善。在钦奈，MTC和通勤火车都是亏损的，去年亏损达到 13.47亿卢比（2800万美元），而且预计MRTS第二阶段投入使用之后，亏损还会增加很多。票价大幅上涨的可能性也很小（下文将具体讨论）。3.5. On the road side, vehicle owners generate large revenues, through a state and national system of vehicle and fuel taxation. The states’ taxes focus more on vehicle ownership, while the national tax is somewhat more use oriented. Most of the proceeds, however, are treated as general taxes: road sector expenditures are only 25% of the total amount collected in road user taxes. 18 The stress on vehicle taxation rather than fuel taxation is unfortunate, since it tends to reduce the potential of road use fees as an

18 Source: “Public Finance of Highways in India” Policy note (work in progress), the World Bank, January 2004. As of 2000, India has a Central Road Fund fed by a fuel cess. The fund has a formula for allocating the proceeds between national, state, rural and urban roads, but the total available is not based on any use-related criteria.18 来源：世界银行 2004年 1月《印度高速公路公共财政》（“Public Finance of Highways in India”）政策（在进行中）。2000年，印度建立了由燃油税支持的中央公路基金。该基金根据规则将收益分配给国家、邦、城乡公路，但是可用总值并不是根据任何使用相关的标准。

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instrument for demand management. Moreover, the agency chain between what a vehicle owner in Chennai pays in vehicle and fuel taxes and what comes back to bear on road maintenance, traffic control, road rehabilitation and expansion in Chennai is quite long and indirect. In short, there is no close correspondence between increased demand for road space by motor vehicles and resources available to respond to that demand.3.5. 在公路方面，通过邦和国家的车辆和燃油税收体系，从车辆所有者处获得了较多收入。邦税收更关注车辆所有者，而国家税收则更针对使用。但这些收益的大部分都看作一般税收待：公路部门支出仅占公路使用者税收收入的 25%。18 车辆税而非燃油税的压力是不合适的，因为这可能降低公路使用收费作为需求管理手段的潜力。而且，从钦奈车辆使用者对车辆和燃油支付的税费到返还使用到钦奈公路维护、交通控制、公路修复和扩建，这是一个漫长而且间接的过程。简而言之，机动车对道路空间需求的增加与回应需求可用的资源之间没有密切的联系。3.6. Funds come to the urban transport sector in a variety of ways, from the state budget, from the Ministry of Railways budget (Chennai only) and through various national programs like the Megacities Scheme and the Urban Challenge Fund.19 While this is not an uncommon approach to urban transport funding, it is not well suited for a situation where an urban economy is stronger than its state’s and its country’s.

19 The Scheme was set up in 1993-94, to benefit urban infrastructure in 5 of the largest cities in India, including both Bangalore and Chennai. The funding comes 25% from the national government, 25% from the states, and the balance is to be borrowed. Some aspects of this Scheme’s design are salutary. For example, the participating cities should prepare development plans, and prepare their funding propositions using a package approach in conformity with the plan. When it comes to eligible project types, however, the Scheme lists “city transport networks,” but specifically precludes “buses and trams, …., mass rapid transit or light rail transit system projects, projects that are highly capital intensive and of long duration; or long term studies.” It does allow “laying of ring roads and outer ring roads and bypasses around megacities provided … tolls are built into the scheme” and “laying, improving and widening of arterial and subarterial roads … to remove transport bottlenecks.” These stipulations appear at least contradictory, since the development plan in any given city could include priorities for exactly those types of projects which are precluded by the Scheme. In practice, the stipulation on having a development plan and following a consistent package approach appears not to have been followed. As far as urban transport is concerned, the Scheme provided partial funding for ring roads and numerous multi-grade intersections in Bangalore and Chennai, but had no broader strategic impacts. The quotes are from C. Ramachandran, “Case Study of Partnerships in Infrastructure Financing: A Study of India’s Megacity Scheme” (1995).19 大城市计划于 1993-1994年提出，帮助印度最大的 5个城市的基础设施建设，包括班加罗尔和钦奈。25%的资金来自国家政府，25%来自邦，剩余则是借款。这一计划的某些方面是有益的。例如，参与城市必须提出发展计划，并提出与其计划相符合的资金主张。但是当谈到合格的项目类型时，该计划列出“城市交通网络”，尤其排除“公交车和有轨电车…捷运系统或轻轨系统项目，这些需要大量资金，期限长，或者需要长期研究的项目。”该计划的确允许“在大城市周边建设环线、外环线和支线…计划中包括收费”以及“建设、改造和拓宽主干道和次干道…来消除交通瓶颈。”这些规定看起来就自相矛盾，因为在任何一个给定的城市，发展计划应该包括大城市计划所排除的那些项目类型及其应享有的优先权。在实际中，提出发展计划以及相应措施的规定好像并没有执行。至于城市交通，计划对班加罗尔和钦奈提供了部分资金，帮助其修建环线和许多多层立交桥，但没有其他更多战略影响。引文出自 C. Ramachandran1995年编写的《基础设施资金合作案例研究：印度大城市计划研究》（“Case Study of Partnerships in Infrastructure Financing: A Study of India’s Megacity Scheme”）。

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Illuminating examples of a different approach, where locally generated funds are at immediate disposal of local institutions, accountable to local constituencies, include that of urban roads in Oslo and Bergen (Norway) and public transport systems in French cities outside Paris.20

3.7. 城市交通资金有几个来源，邦预算、铁路部预算（仅钦奈）以及多个国家项目如大城市计划和城市挑战基金。19 这在城市交通基金中不算少见，但这并不适合城市经济超过邦和国家平均经济水平的情况。另一种方法是地方所得资金可由地方机构直接使用分配，对地方乘客负责，例子有（挪威）奥斯陆和卑尔根的城市公路以及法国巴黎外一些城市的公共交通系统。20

B. InstitutionsB．机构3.7. The process of transferring the jurisdiction and resources from state to local governments, in line with constitutional reforms of 1992, has been slow, though accelerating in recent years.21 Municipal Corporations in Bangalore and Chennai are incomparably weaker in both authority and staff capacity. Their resource generating capacity is quite limited, the majority of funds coming in as transfers from their states. The capacity of smaller local bodies, outside the city limits but within the metropolitan area, is correspondingly lower. Given the joint nature of much of the transport infrastructure and services, the State Governments are de facto metropolitan governments. This would not be necessarily problematic if the distribution of political power (and therefore accountability) in state legislatures reflected the weight of large cities, their population and economic output. This has not been the case in either Karnataka or Tamil Nadu, at least not as far as the number of deputies in state assemblies is concerned.22

3.7. 按照 1992年的制度改革，权限和资源应从邦转移到地方政府，但这一过程很缓慢，尽管最近几年有所加快。21 班加罗尔和钦奈市在当局和人员能力方面都惊很弱。他们的资源生成能力有限，资金主要来自邦政府。在城市范围之外的都市区域的较小地方机构，能力就相应更弱。考虑到很多交通基础设施和服务的联合性质，邦政府实际上就是都市政府。如果邦立法中的政治权利（以及职责）分配反映了大20 These examples are not meant to invite an exact emulation, especially not the employment tax used in France.20 这些例子并不是为了让印度城市依样效仿，尤其是法国采用的税收政策。21 Until the 74th Constitutional Amendment (74th CA) introduced in 1992, local government institutions in India were merely outposts of the state governments. The intent of the 74 th CA is that cities should be managed by locally elected municipal governments and corresponding administrations, rooted in financial independence, and accepting accountability to the local constituency.21 在 1992年第 74次宪法修正案（74th CA）出台之前，印度的地方政府机构仅仅是邦政府的前哨。74th CA的目的是让城市由当地选举的市政府和相应的行政机关管理，经济独立，对地方选民负责。22 Bangalore has 6 deputies in the 220-strong state parliament.22 班加罗尔在 220席位的邦议会中有 6位代表。

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城市的重要性、人口和经济产出，那么这也并没有什么问题。但在卡纳塔克邦或泰米尔纳德邦还没有这种现象，至少从邦议会的代表人数上来看还没有如此。22

3.8. There are several essential aspects in which the distribution of power and accountability between state and local government institutions affect urban transport matters. Risking a broad generalization, state transport agencies have an “aggregate” approach to the sector and ally themselves with big actors in the road and/or rial construction industry and others. This tends to lead to a preference for larger-scale investment projects, such as fly-overs and elevated roads in Bangalore, or even the MRTS in Chennai. City governments, council members as well as the bureaucrats, tend to be more responsive to local economic interests and local voters (including low-income populations). Whether this would also make them follow equitable and efficient urban transport policies has yet to be tested.3.8. 邦和地方政府机构的权力和职责分配在一些主要方面影响城市交通问题。冒着过度管辖的风险，邦交通机构对行业采取“聚合”方法，与公路和 /或铁路建设行业及其他大参与者结盟。这可能导致偏向大规模的投资项目，如班加罗尔的立交桥和高架公路，或甚至钦奈的MRTS。城市政府、委员会成员以及官员，则更对地方经济利益和地方选民（包括低收入人口）负责。这是否会让他们选择更公平有效城市交通政策还有待验证。3.9. Reflecting the state/local split, neither city has vested the prime responsibility for all aspects of urban/metropolitan transport in one institution. Pieces of decision authority, control over resources and accountability are spread widely between state governments, local governments, and state and national parastatals. It is readily acknowledged that some fragmentation is both necessary and unavoidable. But, at any given level of fragmentation, there should be stable umbrella arrangements to coordinate various institutions. This is not the case here. In Bangalore, the fragmentation is truly extreme: in addition to state and city governments, plus local bodies outside Bangalore Corporation limits, plus two metropolitan area development authorities, the State has set up special-purpose parastatals (Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd., Karnataka Road Development Corporation, Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation, this last a nodal agency for the Megacities Scheme) all of whom pursue some urban transport activities. The State has attempted to overcome the fragmentation by creating ad hoc bodies, such as Agenda for Bangalore, Transport Advisory Forum, and Task Force for Traffic and Transport, but these appear also to hold merely pieces of the pie. Bangalore Development Authority has no transport group, apparently no transport professionals at all. Indeed, its charter does not include transport planning. The last study with a comprehensive coverage was done long ago.23 In this forest of institutions, no single body appears to make comprehensive policy or medium-to-long term investment plans.24 23 A study focusing on road corridors was carried out in 1999 by a team of consultants led by Central Road Research Institute (New Delhi).23 中央公路研究院（新德里）于 1999年带领一组咨询专家进行了公路路线的研究。24 This is not to say that a fragmented institutional setup cannot produce good results. A remarkable turnaround of Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation since 1997 is a case in point. What a

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3.9. 两个城市都没有将城市/都市交通的全面职责赋予任何一个机构，这也体现了邦/地方分化。决策当局也有多个，资源和职责控制则属于邦政府、地方政府、邦和国家半国营企业共同管理。要承认，一定程度上的分化是必要的，也是不可避免的。但是，在分化的任何层面，必须要有稳定的庇护安排以协调各个机构。但在这里却不是如此。在班加罗尔，分化是很极端的：除了邦和城市政府，还有班加罗尔市范围外的地方机构，还有两个都市区发展当局，邦还建立了特别目的的半国营企业（班加罗尔捷运有限公司，卡纳塔克邦公路发展公司，卡纳塔克城市基础设施发展和金融有限公司，最后这个是大城市计划的下属机构），所有这些机构都从事一些城市交通活动。邦打算通过建立特别机构如班加罗尔议程、交通咨询论坛以及交通和运输特别工作组来克服分化问题，但这些好像也仅仅只分得了小部分份额。班加罗尔发展局没有交通部门，也应该没有任何交通专家。实际上，它的章程也不包括交通规划。上次进行覆盖较广的研究是很早以前了。 23 在如此众多的机构中，没有哪一个提出过全面的政策或中长期的投资计划。24

3.10. In Chennai, the situation is somewhat better. The charter of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) includes transport planning and the institution has a history of involvement with this subject, a team of experts and a well-developed network of local consultants. What Chennai lacks, and CMDA is not authorized to do, is public transport regulation. This subject may not have mattered in the past, but it does now.3.10. 在钦奈，情况稍好一些。钦奈都市发展当局（CMDA）的章程中包括交通规划，该机构也有参与这一行业的历史，有一组专家和发展完善的地方咨询专家网络。钦奈缺乏的，而也是 CMDA没有权限去做的，是公共交通规范。这在过去可能不重要，但现在却成为问题。3.11. The complicating aspect in Chennai is that the commuter rail services provided by Southern Railway network of Indian Railways play such a vital role in metropolitan transport. Service levels, prices and expansion plans of the commuter rail lines and the new urban railway (MRTS) are decided by different people than those for the bus system. This situation has multiple aspects. For the State of Tamil Nadu and the local governments in the Chennai metropolitan area it is advantageous that Indian Railways provide commuter rail services without any financial input from the state/local level. The gap between fare revenues and direct operating costs of these lines is about 50%, amounting in 2001-02 to Rs.834 million (US$17.4 million). This compares to Rs.512.7 million (US$ 10.7 million) received in the same year by the CMTC, as a compensation for non-economic fares and services. On the negative side, the state and local governments have little leverage in situations where the interest of Indian Railways’ main lines of business diverges from that of the area’s population. This works in the opposite

fragmented approach probably cannot produce is a network of exclusive bus lanes on the streets of Bangalore.24 这并不是说分化的机构设置就没有任何好处。1997年起班加罗尔都市交通公司的巨大转变就是个例子。分化方式无法产生的，是班加罗尔街道上公交专用车道网络。

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direction as well, in that local government have had little incentive to organize things so as to maximize the ridership on commuter rail lines. In fact, some important decisions may have gone awry because the costs and benefits fell on different parties. The MRTS is a case in point. Phase I of the system was built with the federal funds (the State of Tamil Nadu contributed some land) and its large operating deficit has been met from the Railways budget. It is evident that Phase I has been nothing short of a functional and financial failure (carrying 9,000 passengers per day), made even worse by the CMTC running competitive bus lines. Had the funds used for the MRTS been available to spend locally, with operating subsidy also being a local responsibility, would the MRTS have been built? This said, MRTS Phase II is being built with 2/3 state participation, already a discipline-imposing move. The next step in this process is likely to be a transfer of the operating subsidy load onto the state government.3.11. 钦奈问题的复杂性在于，印度铁路的南部铁路网络提供的通勤铁路服务在都市交通中起到至关重要的作用。通勤铁路线路以及新的城市铁路（MRTS）的服务水平、价格和扩展计划的决策者并不是公交系统的决策者。这一情况有多面影响。对于泰米尔纳德邦和钦奈都市区的地方政府来说，这是有益的，因为印度铁路提供的通勤火车服务不需要邦/地方层面的任何财政支持。票价收入和直接运营成本之间的差距达到 50%，2001-2002年亏损达到 8.34亿卢比（1740万美元）。比较CMTC同年收到的 5.127亿卢比（1070万美元），是作为非盈利的票价和服务的补偿。但相反，当印度铁路的主要商业路线利益与该地区人口利益不一致时，邦和地方政府对此无能为力。同样，地方政府没有动力采取行动鼓励人们乘坐通勤铁路。实际上，因为成本和利益由不同群体获得，一些重要决定在执行中可能会被歪曲。MRTS就是个恰当的例子。这一系统的第一阶段完全是个功能和财政的失败案例（每天运送乘客 9000人次），CMTC运营的竞争公交线路使之情况更加糟糕。如果用于MRTS的资金可以由当地负责使用，而地方需要负责支付运营补贴的话，还会建造MRTS么？据说，MRTS的第二阶段建设中邦政府参与 2/3。这一过程的下一步很可能是将补贴责任转移到邦政府。C. Regulatory Policies in Urban Public Transport C．城市公共交通的规范政策3.12. Historically, state transport undertakings (bus companies) have been the prime providers of public transport services in most Indian cities, including Bangalore and Chennai. Fares have traditionally been set low by state authorities to permit travel by low-income citizens, especially those covering long distances. The inability of the state to pay fair and regular compensation, interacting with inefficiencies on the supply side stemming from the nature of public monopolies, chained public transport services to a low-service, low-priced equilibrium. A traditional and entrenched focus on production rather than service, rigidities regarding staff levels and remuneration, and low financial capacity combined to create a formidable barrier to change. With its ups and downs, this approach was acceptable while a great majority of passengers were captives, interested mainly in low fares. Greater incomes in the 1990s and an increased affordability of

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motorized 2-wheelers resulted in a large loss of public transport passengers, a process which is still underway and may acquire crisis proportions. In Bangalore, there was a rise in private buses, as businesses moved to ensure that their employees came in on time and in comfort. Raising the level of public transport services therefore became essential. Since the public sector alone was not seen up to the task, the 1988 liberal legislation opened the door to private transport operators. What the legislation failed to do was to create a regulatory apparatus on each of the three levels of government, capable of dealing with a mixed public/private market so that the ensemble would evolve in the public interest. Very high levels of traffic congestion, pollution and safety hazards experienced in cities like Kolkata have demonstrated the dangers of un-restructured public sector combined with un-regulated private providers of public transport services.3.12. 历史上，邦交通企业（公交公司）是多数印度城市的主要公共交通服务提供商，包括班加罗尔和钦奈。邦当局一向将票价定得很低，使得低收入市民，尤其是那些需要通行较长距离的人可以承担交通费用。由于邦政府无力定期支付公平的补偿，而提供商往往是公有垄断企业，效率较低，这都让公共交通服务停滞在低服务、低价格的状态。关注生产而不是服务的长期固定传统，员工水平和报酬的僵化体制，缺乏财政能力，都是改变的阻碍。在多年的盛衰演变中，这一方法是可以接受的，当大多数乘客不得不选择乘坐公共交通工具时，他们最关心的是低票价。上世纪90年代的收入大幅增长，人们可以承担购买两轮机动车的费用，使得公共交通乘客大量流失。这一过程仍在进行，可能会达到危险的比例。在班加罗尔，出现了私人公交车，因为企业要保证员工能够舒适准时到达。因此，提升公共交通服务是必要的。既然公有部门无法单独胜任，1988年的自由法律对私营运营商敞开了大门。立法没有做到的是在三级政府的任何一层建立协调机构，能够处理混合的公有 /私营市场，使得这一组合发展能够满足公众利益。加尔各答出现的严重交通拥堵、污染和安全问题表明，没有重组的公有部门和没有规范的私营资本组合提供公共交通服务是有危险的。3.13. The response to these changes in Bangalore, where the level of services by Karnataka State Road Undertaking had hit the bottom, was not to deregulate but to “cure” the public monopoly.25 This was done through a combination of actions, some on the relation state-company, others company internal. In 1997, Bangalore MTC was separated out of the state-wide company, and its organization re-structured, removing one layer of management. A fare adjustment formula, based on major input costs, was introduced, putting an end to the previous practice of fare approvals arbitrary in both scale and timing. An internal improvement program, focusing on both staff and management

25 This paragraph draws on annual reports from BMTC and CMTC, and on Pradeep Singh Kharola, “Reforms in the public transport – a systems approach”, in X. Godard and I. Fatonzoun, ed., Urban Mobility for All, Proceedings of CODATU X Conference, Lomé (Togo), 12-15 November 2002.25 这一段引用了 BMTC和 CMTC的年报，以及 X. Godard 和 I. Fatonzoun Pradeep编辑的 2002年 11月 12-15日多哥洛美 CODATU X会议记录《所有人的城市流通》（Urban Mobility for All）中收录的 Singh Kharola《公共交通改革——系统方式》（“Reforms in the public transport – a systems approach”）。

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conduct, was implemented. The use of information technology was increased. The last but not the least is that BMTC opened the door to the private sector through outsourcing, even in its main business line – transport services. This consists of a “kilometer scheme” whereby private operators compete on gross cost basis to serve specific routes. In 2001-2002, close to 300 private buses were in operation, equivalent to about13% of the BMTC’s fleet. The sum of these efforts is evident in all technical performance indicators (fleet availability and utilization, passengers carried per vehicle, number of breakdowns, etc). It is also evident in its financial performance: the loss of Rs.78.2 million (about US$ 2 million) in 1997-98 turned to a small surplus of Rs.39.6 million in 1998-99, rising to Rs.267 million (US$ 5.6 million) in 2001-2002. The situation in Chennai had not been as dramatically bad as in Bangalore, so changes have also been less striking. CMTC has increased its cost recovery to 80% in 2001-2002 and 90% in 2002-2003, and the compensation payments have visibly increased over the last 5-year period, greatly improving the company’s financial position. CMTC also is trying to introduce outsourcing of transport services to transport operators, but this has been challenged by the unions and the matter is in courts.3.13. 卡纳塔克邦公路企业的服务水平达到最低点的班加罗尔，对这些变化的反应不是解除而是“治疗”公有垄断。25 这通过一系列组合行动达成，一些处理邦和公司关系，另一些则是公司内部。在 1997年，班加罗尔MTC 从邦范围公司中独立出来，重组其组织结构，简化了一层管理。引入了基于主要投入成本的票价调整规则，终结了之前随时随意批准票价的行为。执行了内部改善项目，主要针对员工和管理层行为。增加了信息技术的使用。BMTC通过外包向私营资本开放市场，甚至包括其主要业务部门——交通服务。这包括“公里计划”，私营运营商对特定路线上总成本展开竞争。在 2001-2002年间，约有 300辆私营公交车投入运营，约占BMTC车辆总数的 13%。这些努力在技术性能方面的提高是明显的（车辆可用率和使用、每车载客人数、故障次数等）。在财政表现方面也很明显：1997-1998年亏损 7820万卢比（约合 200万美元），到 1998-1999年转化为 3960万卢比的微薄利润，2001-2002年盈利上升到 2.67亿卢比（约 560万美元）。钦奈的情况没有班加罗尔糟糕，因此改变也没有那么惊人。CMTC增加了成本回收比例，2001-2002年为 80%，2002-2003年为 90%。过去 5年的补偿支付也明显增加了，极大地改善了公司的财政状况。CMTC也试图引入交通服务外包，但受到联盟的反对，问题还有待法律解决。3.14. Missing from the above account are two essential variables. First, are MTCs in Bangalore and Chennai cost efficient? This question, politically very sensitive, has yet to be tackled. By international standards, both companies are overstaffed (more than 6 staff per vehicle in service). The average staff cost per month (about Rs.10,000) is in excess of what the majority of MTC’s passengers receive. Second, what has been the impact of changes in the companies’ performance on the service quality offered to passengers? Annual reports of both companies reflect very little interest in this subject. The performance indicators, other than the total number of passengers, are all supply-related. This may have been a normal and acceptable approach when most passengers were

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captives, but not when more than a half of them already own 2-wheelers, not to mention those who have already given up on bus services. 3.14. 上述描述没有提到两个必要的变量。首先，班加罗尔和钦奈的MTC是否有成本效益？这个问题有一定政治敏感性，但仍然需要考虑。根据国际标准，两个公司都超员了（服务中平均每辆车 6个员工）。每月平均员工成本（约 10000卢比）超过了大部分MTC乘客所得。其次，这些改变对公司为乘客提供服务的质量有什么影响？两个公司的年报在这方面都很少提及。除了乘客总人数外，所有性能指标都是与供应相关的。如果大多数乘客都只能选择公共交通时，这种方式还算正常可以接受。且不提那些已经放弃乘坐公交的人，但当半数以上的人群都已经拥有自己的两轮车时，就要考虑改变策略了。3.15. The essential remaining question is this: can the current regulatory arrangement, a public-sector monopoly, with an outsourcing complement, produce the cost efficiency and service levels to make this mode competitive with individually owned motor vehicles? A clear and promising option is to move toward a market-based arrangement, by separating regulatory and service planning functions from the provision of operations, organizing the latter through the medium of competitively awarded service contracts. 3.15. 剩下的本质问题是：目前公有部门垄断加上外包补充这样的规范安排，能否产生足够的成本效益和提供足够的服务水平，使得公共交通与私人拥有的机动车相比仍然有竞争力？明显而可行的选择是向市场基础的安排转变。将规范和服务规划功能从运营提供商处分离出来，通过公开招标，签订服务合同组织运营。3.16. A similar dilemma has to do with the organizational status of commuter rail lines in Chennai, with the added complication that the current public sector owner is not the State of Tamil Nadu but the nation (through Ministry of Railways). While the nature of competition available to with rail-based lines is much more limited than with street-based buses, the potential of service concessions is real.3.16. 钦奈的通勤火车路线组织情况也面临同样的两难局面。而且其目前的公有部门所有者不是泰米尔纳德邦而是国家（铁路部），这使问题更加复杂。尽管铁路路线的竞争比路上公交车运营竞争要小得多，仍然有特许经营的潜力。D. The Fare/Quality NexusD．票价/质量关系3.17. The co-existence of large “captive” and “choice” markets for passenger transport services, and the growth of the latter in proportion to the economic growth in cities places urban transport regulators in a dilemma. Keeping the fares low to assist low-income and poor travelers creates pressure on the budgets available for subsidies and involves a leakage of benefits to better off passengers. The lower the fare, for a given level of service, the higher the subsidy load becomes and so does the leakage. Conversely, for a given fare, increasing the level of services will also increase the subsidy load. Rail-based

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modes are especially sensitive to this, due to rigidities of large fixed costs. This in part explains exceptionally low fares on Chennai commuter rail lines. 3.17. 客运服务中同时存在大量不得不乘坐公交车的人群以及“选择”市场，而且经济发展使得自由选择交通模式的人群比例不断上升，使得这些城市的城市交通规范部门面临两难困境。保持适应低收入人群和贫困人口的低票价给补贴预算带来很大压力，而且对收入较高的乘客带来利益缺口。对于某一服务水平来说，票价越低，补贴负担越重，缺口越大。相反，对某一票价水平而言，要提高服务质量也意味着加重补贴负担。铁路模式因为其高额固定成本对此尤其敏感。这也部分解释了钦奈通勤火车路线票价太低的原因。3.18. The practice in both Chennai and Bangalore, low fare and a low level of service, has produced a flight to 2-wheelers. This in turn has produced a very heavy load on the road system. Both companies have introduced differentiated services (e.g. express and skip stop), and commuter rail in Chennai has different classes, to try to capture the quality-seeking passengers. Still, the flight continues and it will intensify if the current pace of motorization continues. The fare/quality issue has yet to be tackled as a strategic matter in either city. Proposals to increase fares have been made, but arguments for doing so were limited to the finances of public transport operators. A full argument would include the predicament of lower-income and poor travelers. This would allow a full range of options to be considered, not just in the fare and service quality dimension, but also regarding the regulatory framework and the approach to social assistance. In other words, certain “informal” public transport modes may be better suited to serve low-density, low-income communities than the conventional ones. Also, direct financial assistance to poor travelers may be “cheaper” than keeping fares low. At this point, it would be difficult to have such a consideration, since demand-related data are so inadequate and the relevant technical skills are in short supply in the state and local institutions.3.18. 钦奈和班加罗尔低票价同时服务水平低的公共交通服务，催生了大量的两轮机动车使用。这又给公路系统带来巨大负荷。两个公司都引入了不同级别的服务（如，直达车和跳站运行），钦奈的通勤火车也有不同等级的车厢，试图吸引对质量要求高的乘客。但是，两轮车数量增长仍在继续，如果继续维持目前机动化的速率，问题将会更严重。票价/质量问题在两个城市都应作为战略问题处理。有人提议提高票价，但支持的论点仅限于公共交通运营商的财政层面。全面的论述必须考虑到低收入和贫困乘客的困难。这就要考虑全面选择，不仅仅是在票价和服务质量方面，而且包括规范框架和社会援助措施。换言之，比起传统模式，某种“非正式”的公共交通模式也许更能适应为低密度低收入社区提供服务。而且，对贫困乘客的直接经济支援也许比保持低票价更“便宜”。在这一点上，也许很难做出这一考虑，因为需求相关数据太少，而邦和地方机构内相关技术技能供应不足。E. The allocation of road spaceE．道路空间分配

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3.19. The subject of road space is a frequently visited one in the Indian urban transport context. It is most often argued that the available street space is much too low in all large cities except Delhi. This position is then used to argue not only for widening and building more (elevated) roads, but also for the construction of off-road public transport systems, be these metros, sky buses, etc. Other authors argue that the road space is not a problem, but its management is.26 In all likelihood, both parties are right. The street space needs to be managed much better, and building new roads and exclusive-track public transport system is warranted in cities which are coping with traffic loads for which their networks certainly were not designed. The essential questions are, of course, who is going to get the street space available at present, how much new road space is to be provided and which off-street systems are going to be built.3.19. 公路空间问题是印度城市交通背景下常常提到的主题。常常说印度除了德里，其他大城市可用的道路空间太小了。这一观点不仅被作为扩建和新建（高架）公路的依据，也支持建设其他非公路的公共交通系统，如地铁、空中巴士等。还有一些作者认为道路空间本身并不是问题，其管理才是。 26 很可能双方都是对的。道路空间需要更好管理，城市本身网络设计显然不能满足交通负荷，因此需要建设新道路和专用公共交通车道。关键问题当然是，目前谁能让道路空间得到利用，要提供多少新建道路，要建设哪一种非公路系统。3.20. The way this subject is approached in both Bangalore and Chennai has been to: widen the existing roads to a maximum possible, leaving a meager sidewalk width for pedestrians; and apply a laissez-faire attitude to what happens in traffic lanes. What happens is of course that (a) motor vehicles push off the bicycles, and (b) public transport vehicles lose the battle with more nimble 2-wheelers and cars. In addition, parked vehicles generally are allowed to obstruct the moving lanes. Save for some prohibitions against the use of goods vehicles in certain hours, there is no policy of traffic restraint. This omission is deleterious from both fairness and efficiency point of view.3.20. 班加罗尔和钦奈过去处理这一问题的方法是：将现有道路尽可能拓宽，只给行人留下狭窄的人行道；对车道使用采取放任态度。结果当然是(a) 机动车挤走自行车； (b) 公交车比不过敏捷的两轮车和轿车。而且，通常允许停靠的车辆阻挡住行车道。除了在特定时间段内禁止货车使用之外，没有任何交通限制规定。从公平和效率的角度来看，这都是很有害的。3.21. A special case of traffic restraint has to do with public transport services. No matter how excellent the supply side of public transport operations may be, the service will only have as much quality as the traffic conditions will allow. In both Chennai and

26 Most recently Geetam Tiwari, “Urban Transport Priorities – Meeting the Challenge of Socio-Economic Diversity in Cities, a Case Study of Delhi, India”, Cities, Vol. 19. No. 2, pp. 95-103, 2002; see also A. Bertaud, “Land Management in Bangalore” (2003).26 最近的是 Geetam Tiwari于 2002年发表在《城市》（Cities）第 19 卷第 2期 95-103页上的文章《城市交通优先权——面对城市社会-经济多元化的挑战，印度德里案例研究》（“Urban Transport Priorities – Meeting the Challenge of Socio-Economic Diversity in Cities, a Case Study of Delhi, India”）。以及A. Bertaud 《班加罗尔土地管理》（2003）。

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Bangalore, this is truly a strategic issue. Neither city has introduced public transport priority measures on city streets, not to mention the creation of at-grade, exclusive-use corridors and networks for bus services. This is not for the want of trying by planners. In Chennai, a busway on Anna Salai was designed and made ready for inclusion under one of Bank-funded urban development projects, but was withdrawn. Only a short exclusive bus lane remains from this scheme. The 10-year investment plan for Chennai contains an elevated highway along Anna Salai, but not an elevated busway. In Bangalore, BMTC commissioned a feasibility study for a bus-based mass rapid transit system. The study, completed in 1999, identified a promising network of 20 bus routes, composed of a Syamese-twin central rings intersected by 8 radial routes. A pilot 12-km line from Jayanagar in the south to Shivajinagar in the north, was estimated to cost Rs 394.9 million (US$ 8.6 million). This includes the corridor and depot infrastructure and 35 special-purpose buses.27 So far, there is no move from the authorities. 3.21. 交通限制的一个特例是公共交通服务。不管公共交通运营的供应方有多好，服务只能达到交通情况允许的质量。在钦奈和班加罗尔，这的确是战略问题。两个城市都没有引入公共交通优先措施，更不要说建立公交服务的平面专用车道和网络了。这并不是因为规划者没有尝试。在钦奈，本来设计在安纳萨莱（Anna Salai）建造一条公交车道，并作为世行投资的城市发展项目的一部分，但后来取消了。这一计划中仅保留了一条短的公交专用车道。这项对钦奈的 10年投资计划包括沿安纳萨莱的高架高速公路，而不是高架公交车道。在班加罗尔，BMTC进行了快速公交系统的可行性研究。1999年完成的这项研究明确了包含 20条公交路线的网络，由 8条辐射线路分割的中央双环线。从南部 Jayanagar到北部 Shivajinagar的 12公里试验线路预计需要成本 3.949亿卢比（860万美元）。这包括路线、停车场基础设施以及 35辆特别用途公交车。27 到目前为止，当局还没有任何行动。3.22. The consequences of this approach are negative for both street-based bus operations and for chances to acquire an off-street public transport system. When low-cost options for the latter are neglected or rejected, only the expensive ones stay on the table. At the very least, this means that fewer corridors can be provided with off-street public transport modes. The best available advice, based on comparative studies of strategic responses to motorization in many Asian countries, is that the provision of separate space for public transport vehicles and private vehicle restraint are crucial at an early stage of motorization.28

27 Source: Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, Annual Administrative Report 2002-2002. The feasibility study was partially funded by Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. It was carried out by Contrans (Sweden) and Central Institute of Road Transport (Pune). An executive summary is on www.sida.se/articles.27 来源：班加罗尔都市交通公司，2002-2002年度行政报告。可行性研究部分由瑞典国际发展合作机构资助。由（瑞典）Contrans和（普纳）中央公路交通机构共同完成。执行情况总结参考www.sida.se/articles28 See Barter et al., “Lessons from Asia on Sustainable Urban Transport” (2003).28 参见 Barter 等《可持续城市交通的亚洲经验》（“Lessons from Asia on Sustainable Urban Transport”）（2003）。

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3.22. 这一策略的结果对路上公交运营和非公路公共交通系统建设都是负面的。后者低成本的选择都被忽视或拒绝，只留下昂贵的继续讨论。至少，这意味着更少的路线可以用于提供非公路公共交通模式。根据很多亚洲国家对机动车化的战略反应的比较研究，最好的建议是为公共交通车辆提供单独空间，在机动化初期限制私家车辆是很必要的。28

F. MetrosF．地铁3.23. The neglect of bus-based rapid transit modes in Chennai and Bangalore, indeed in India generally, is proportional to the affection for rail-based modes, especially metros. Rare is an account of urban transport in India which does not mention the Kolkata Metro and the Chennai MRTS, or more recently the Delhi Metro.29 This may have to do with the larger-than-life role that railways played in Indian history and a common association of metros with great cities of the world.30 The resulting bias has an operational form in the view that railways belong to the exclusive tracks and buses belong on the street, or to connect villages.3.23. 钦奈和班加罗尔，实际上是整个印度，对快速公交系统的忽视，一部分是因为对铁路模式的热情，尤其是地铁。印度城市交通报告很少有不提及加尔各答地铁、钦奈MRTS或者是最近的德里地铁。29 这可能与铁路在印度历史上传奇色彩的角色有关，而且人们往往将地铁和世界级的大城市联想到一起。 30 这种偏见的结果体现在操作观点上，就是铁路有专用轨道，而公交车属于街道，或者只是连接乡村的工具。3.24. The history and the present of transport planning in both Chennai and Bangalore is replete with plans to build a metro or some kin form of urban rail. Chennai actually went ahead and built the first short section of the MRTS and is about to complete the second (a combined length of about 20 km). In addition, the city plans to continue the

29 It is noted that it took 23 years to build 16.5 km of metro in Kolkata. Its current traffic is 55.8 million per annum (compare to the forecast of 630.1 million made in 1971) and the cost recovery is 38% of working expenses. Source: Y.P. Singh, “Peformance of the Kolkata Metro” 2002). Similarly, it took 15 years to build the first 8.6 km of the MRTS in Chennai and that it carries 9,000 passengers per day (3.3 million annually) with very low cost recovery.29 要注意到加尔各答花了 23年时间建造了一条 16.5公里长的地铁。目前交通是每年 5580万人（而 1971年时预期为 6.301亿），而其成本回收率仅为运行费用的 38%。来源：Y.P. Singh《加尔各答地铁表现》（“Peformance of the Kolkata Metro”）2002。同样，钦奈的第一段 8.6公里MRTS建设花了 15年，日载客人数仅为 9000人（每年 330万人），成本回收率很低。30 It may also have to do with the importance of Indian Railways and the fact that their consulting wing (RITES) has a leading role in city studies. This is also true of bus rapid transit. The Bangalore study cited above was commissioned by BMTC (a bus company) and linked to Swedish bus industry. This is said without any reference to the technical quality of these studies.30 这也可能与印度铁路的重要性以及他们的咨询方（RITES）是城市研究的领头有关。公交捷运也是如此。上述提到的班加罗尔研究由 BMTC（公交公司）委托瑞典公交行业完成。与这些研究的技术质量无关。

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MRTS (in the circumferential direction), and place a rapid railway line in the middle of the Outer Ring Road. A metro in Bangalore was recommended as early as 1982, then again in 1983 when Southern Railway produced a comprehensive commuter rail development plan. Another study in 1988 (funded by the World Bank) focused on the commuter rail, whereas the next one in 1993 returned the focus to a 2-line metro. In 1994, the attention shifted to a light-rail-based, 6-route, partially elevated network. This was to be developed as a private-public partnership, and operated on a concession basis. This project proceeded beyond a mere proposal, but stopped when the private partner (after more detailed demand studies) asked for a much higher public participation than initially proposed.31 Finally, in 2003, a new feasibility study proposed a 2-line metro (18 and 15 km), a cross-shaped system designed to connect all major rail and bus terminals, and most activity centers. It is estimated to cost Rs.49.89 billion (roughly $1 billion) in 2003 terms. The financial engineering would follow a successful approach used to build the Delhi metro, i.e. 33% the state of Karnataka, 22% national government, the rest to be borrowed long term from both domestic and external sources. In the fall of 2003, a feasibility study for another metro in Chennai, using the Delhi and Bangalore approach, was being considered by the Government of Tamil Nadu. 3.24. 钦奈和班加罗尔之前和现在的交通规划都包括建造地铁或某种形式的城市轨道交通的计划。实际上，钦奈已经建造了一段较短的MRTS，而且即将完成第二段的建设（两个阶段总长约 20公里）。此外，该市计划继续建设MRTS（圆环方向），并且在外环线中间建设一段快速铁路。班加罗尔早在 1982年就提出修建地铁的建议，1983年南部铁路提出了全面的通勤铁路发展计划。1988年的另一份研究（由世界银行资助）关注通勤火车，随后 1993年的研究则又转回关注双线地铁。1994年，提出建设以轻轨为基础的 6条路线网络，其中部分高架。这计划是私营-公有合资建设，并按照许可经营权的方式运营。这一项目没有只停留在建议层面，但是当私营合伙人（在更仔细的需求研究后）要求大幅增加公有资本参与后项目就停止了。31 最后，到 2003年，一份新的可行性报告建议修建双线地铁（分别为 18公里和 15公里），采用双线交叉的形式，连结所有主要的铁路的公交终点站和大部分活动中心。按照 2003年的水平，预期成本为 498.9亿卢比（约 10亿美元）。财政工程将按照建造德里地铁的成功模式，即卡纳塔克邦 33%，国家政府 22%，剩余部分则依靠国内外的长期贷款。2003年秋，借鉴德里和班加罗尔方式，对钦奈另一条地铁线进行了可行性研究，泰米尔纳德邦正在考虑之中。3.25. Without prejudice to any of the past or current metro proposals, two general issues are involved here. The first is that the attention to metros may be an obstacle to doing something tangible to improve the position of street-based bus lines, i.e. some combination of exclusive lanes with priority of passage at signals, and constructing bus-based rapid transit lines in one of many candidate corridors. The second is the approach to doing feasibility studies. Investments estimated to cost billions of rupees tend to be put

31 The private group was headed by United Breweries. Studies related to this proposal have not been made public.31 私营资本主要是United Breweries（联合啤酒）。对这一提议的相关研究没有公开。

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forward with single-valued outcomes of major items, i.e. construction and operating costs, passenger volumes and revenues. The notion of risk is absent.32 This is troublesome, especially given the abysmal record on cost, construction period length and traffic forecasts in Kolkata and Chennai urban rail projects. Also, the studies do not focus on alternatives to the proposed system. This may have to do with a trend that all feasibility studies for large rapid transit investments (rail or bus) are done by promoters of various systems, rather than commissioned by the transport planning authorities from independent consultants, with safeguards written into the terms of reference.3.25. 不偏见任何过去或目前的地铁建议，这里有两个问题。首先，对地铁的关注可能会是采取切实行动来改善路上公交路线情况的阻碍，如，专用车道和信号时优先通过，在多条候选路线中选择一条建设快速公交车道。其次，做可行性研究的方法。仅考虑主要项目的单一值结果就提出预计成本高达数十亿卢比的投资，如，建设和运营成本、乘客数量和收入。缺乏风险意识。32 这是很麻烦的，尤其是考虑到加尔各答和钦奈城市铁路项目在成本、建设周期和交通预计的前车之鉴。而且，研究也没有关注建议系统之外的其他选择。这可能是因为所有大型捷运项目投资（铁路或公交）的可行性研究是由不同系统的推动者进行的，而不是公正独立的咨询机构为交通规划当局在明确受托范围内进行的研究。Painful decisions to be faced:面临的痛苦抉择： allocation of street space between pedestrians, NMT modes, PT vehicles and individual vehicles 行人，非机动车（NMT）模式，公共交通（PT）车辆和私家车之间的道路空间分配 fare/quality and subsidy policy: social protection vs. modal split 票价/质量和补贴政策：社会保护对模式分化 maintaining the monopoly in the provision of public transport services 维持提供公共交通服务的垄断 type of mass rapid transit systems: which combination of bus and rail 捷运系统类型：公交和轨道的哪种组合G. The underlying strategyG．根本战略3.26. Neither city has formalized a comprehensive urban transport strategy, linked to an urban development strategy.33 What underlies the ensemble of actions, plans and

32 There are exceptions, including the Bangalore LRT study cited here. See Anantharamaiah and Raman “A probabilistic revenue estimation model for providing a mass rapid transit system” (2002).32 也有例外，包括这里引用的班加罗尔轻轨研究。参见 Anantharamaiah 和 Raman著《捷运系统的可能收入估算模式》（“A probabilistic revenue estimation model for providing a mass rapid transit system”）（2002）。33 CMDA has at least attempted to do so, though the result is far from comprehensive. In Bangalore, the severe fragmentisation of institutions is a formidable obstacle to both developing a strategy and implementing it.33 CMDA至少尝试这样做，尽管结果远不全面。在班加罗尔，机构的极度分化是发展和执行战略的巨大障碍。

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proposals cited in this report appears to be: negligent of pedestrians, non-motorized and local area travel; (engineering) supply-driven; overly accommodating to individual motor vehicles; conservative in public transport regulation; non-protective of street-based public transport modes; and overly focused on large-scale investments, rail-based public transport investments and primary roads, in apparent belief that these visible structures will increase the image of competitiveness of their city.3.26. 两个城市都没有形成与城市发展战略相联系的全面城市交通战略。33 本报告中引用的行动、计划和提议都基于：忽视行人、非机动车和地方区域行程；（工程）供应驱动；对私人机动车管理过于宽松；公共交通规范保守；不保护路上公共交通模式；过分关注大型投资、铁路交通投资和主要道路。显然他们相信，这些明显的结构能够提升城市的形象和竞争力。A supply-driven approach is focused on input features of infrastructure and services. For roads, these are: road lengths, cross-section, network structure, volume/capacity ratios; spot speeds, etc. For public transport, the common ones are ratios between fleet in service and total fleet, vehicle-km and passenger-km per vehicle, commercial speed, etc.

供应驱动的方式关注基础设施和服务的投入。对道路而言，即：道路长度、截面、网络结构、车辆数量/负荷能力比、瞬时速率等。对公共交通而言，最普遍的是服务车辆与总车辆比、每车的车辆公里数和乘客公里数以及旅行速度等。A demand-driven approach focuses on the passenger and community point of view, in total and disaggregated by income, location, age, gender, transport mode, etc. Typical measures are time and cost of access to public transport lines, employment, and various services, travel speed, safety, comfort, pollution, etc. It 需求驱动的方式关注乘客和社会的观点，乘客总体以及按照收入、地理位置、年龄、性别、交通模式等分化的不同群体。主要的衡量标准有乘坐公共交通路线的时间和成本、工作、不同服务、旅行速度、安全、舒适、污染等。

4. THE WAY FORWARD

4．出路4.1. The two cities need a demand-segmented, service-oriented urban transport strategy, which would balance growth with equity concerns, with a strong but cost-conscious orientation in favor of public transport modes. The demand segmentation is meant to re-direct the attention to low-income groups and sub-areas, but it is equally warranted in public transport regulatory matters because of the increasing size of the “choice” market. Practically, this strategy would involve making the following progression of steps, from simple to the more difficult:4.1. 两个城市都需要按照需求区分，以服务为导向的城市交通战略，平衡经济增长和平等问题，偏向公共交通模式，也关注成本。需求分化意味着将注意力转向低收入群体和分区，但也有必要调整公共交通，因为“选择”市场的不断扩大。实际上，这一战略包括下列步骤，从易到难：1. Measure and evaluate the performance of the transport system, regularly, from

the point of view of different groups. This would require a primary effort by the lead urban transport agency, to design the data requirements for different sub-

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sectors and agencies, commission an initial data collection effort, and maintain a data bank in perpetuity.

1．从不同人群的角度，定期衡量和评价交通系统表现。这要求领导的城市交通机构做出努力，对不同分区和机构设计数据要求，委托初步数据收集，并永久保存数据库。2. Introduce road and street design standards and practices that are walk-and

bicycle-friendly. This should start by including detailed instructions in the terms of reference for planning and design studies.

2．引入公路和街道设计标准，方便行人和自行车通行。这可以从规划和设计研究的授权调查范围中包括详细说明开始。 3. Re-allocate the existing road space to provide substantial exclusivity and priority

of use to public transport vehicles on arterial streets. The corollary of this is that general traffic would be restrained and parking would be controlled/priced. This would start by a pilot study focusing on selected corridors and/or areas, to be followed by implementation and scaling up of the effort. Both design and implementing stages would involve the local government, traffic police, the transport operators, and the metropolitan planning agency. A substantial intensification of traffic and parking management activities would be required, which may lead to a re-allocation of traffic management functions between the traffic police and municipal administrations. The formation of strong traffic management units in the latter group will be necessary.

3．重新分配现有道路空间，让公共交通车辆在主干道上享有专有权和优先权。这一做法的必然结果是必须限制整体交通，并控制停车或收费。这可以从选择路线和/或地区试验研究开始，并根据结果执行或扩展计划。设计和执行阶段都必须有地方政府、交通警察、交通运营商和都市规划机构参与。要求实质性增强交通和停车管理，使得交通警察和市行政机关之间重新分配交通管理功能。市行政机关形成有力的交通管理部门是必要的。4. Shift attention and resources to repairing and/or constructing anew secondary

and tertiary urban road networks within low-income and poor areas, and connecting them to the arterial network. This requires a policy shift, to be reflected in the normal budgeting process. A link to items 2 and 3 above is needed.

4．将注意和资源转向在低收入和贫困地区维修和/或新建二级和三级城市公路，并与主干道网络连接起来。这要求改变政策，在正常预算过程中就能够体现。与上述第 2点和第 3点联系也是必要的。5. Address squarely the issue of public transport fares, subsidies and service levels,

balancing social protection and modal split concerns, for all transport modes. This is a major lacuna in the present strategy. Corrective actions will require the setting up of a metropolitan transport regulatory authority, with a small professional support group, aided by external consultants.

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5．全面处理公共交通票价、补贴和服务水平的问题，平衡所有交通模式的社会保护和模式分化。目前的策略还有很大空白。修正行动包括建立都市交通规范当局，并且要有外部咨询专家组成专业支持团队。6. Implement a regulatory reform aimed at getting substantially higher-quality

services and/or lower production costs (internal incentives for MTCs, a gradual move to competition; new organizational form for commuter rail and MRTS in Chennai). The cited regulatory group is a pre-requisite for considering options and implementing changes.

6．执行规范改革，旨在切实提高服务质量和/或降低生产成本（MTCs的内部动机，逐渐转向竞争；钦奈通勤铁路和 MRTS的新型组织形式）。提到的规范团队是考虑选择并执行改变的前提条件。7. Develop a market for public transport modes suitable to serve travel demands at

the low end of the income distribution (this also may involve breaking the monopoly of MTCs). The cited regulatory authority is essential for this task.

7. 发展市场，使公共交通模式适应收入分配低端乘客的旅行需求（这也可能包括打破MTCs的垄断）。提到的规范当局是执行这一任务的关键。8. Introduce rigorous project evaluation for large projects, inclusive of mandatory

options and risk-conscious analysis. This can start by carefully designed terms of reference and short-listing criteria requiring a much greater involvement of independent consultants.

8．对大型项目引入严格项目评价，包括强制选择和风险分析。这可以从详细设计的授权调查范围以及简化的标准开始，这要求独立咨询专家的更多参与。9. Focus on at-grade, bus-based rapid transit lines, with publicly-owned

infrastructure and competitively awarded service concessions, (inclusive of feeder/distributor networks). A pilot project will be necessary to break through the long-held biases.

9．关注平面快速公交系统路线，基础设施公有，而服务公开竞争招标（包括供应者/分配者网络）。有必要实行试验项目以打破长期以来的偏见。10. Ensure that new primary roads include a provision for rapid public transport

modes (no reference to a specific vehicle technology). This is already a part of some road projects (in Chennai), but so far has been biased in favor of rail-based systems.

10．保证新的主要道路能够提供快速交通模式（不涉及特定车辆技术）。这已经是某些道路项目的一部分（在钦奈），但是目前还是更偏向快速铁路系统。4.2. How to move in this direction? The transition from a narrow, supply-oriented approach to a demand-oriented one is a formidable task. Three ingredients are essential. First is the political agreement with the strategy, difficult because the proposals run counter to pro-growth forces, unions, motor-vehicle owners and the formidable urban rail lobby. Second is a streamlined and strengthened institutional setting. For a start, this would involve the appointment of a lead urban transport institution in Bangalore and strengthening of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority. Next, it would involve the creation of a public transport regulatory authority, a policy making body

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whose technical support can be provided by a separate unit (as in Step #5 above), or by the lead transport planning institution. Also, as noted in Step #3 above, creating a strong traffic management focus group in the municipal engineering structure will be needed, with some realignment of functions of the Traffic Police.4.2. 怎样向这个方向前进呢？从狭隘的以供应为导向的方式转向以需求为导向是一项艰巨的任务。有三个基本因素。第一，这一策略要获得政府同意。这很困难，因为这一提议违反了倾向经济增长的力量、联盟、机动车所有者以及强大的城市铁路系统的利益。第二，要有新型有力的制度建设。要开始，可以在班加罗尔建立一个领导的城市交通机构，加强钦奈都市发展局的权力。其次，可以建立公共交通规范当局，作为决策机构，由单独部门提供技术支持（如上面提到的第 5步），或者建立领导交通规划计划。而且，如上面第 3步提到的，有必要在市政工程结构建立有力的交通管理团队，与交通警察局在某些职能上合作。4.3. The third ingredient is financial. In addition to current efforts to improve funding, budgeting and expenditure management of local governments, there is a systemic problem that transcends Chennai and Bangalore, indeed their states also. It has to do with the national approach to road user pricing and revenue allocation. The problem is to reduce the overlong agency chain between what is paid by local road users (a growth sector in two well-off cities) and the funds brought back to bear on the local transport system. There are several ways to do this. The most common way is to escape funding from general (national, state or city) budgets, by creating a closed loop from road user fees via dedicated funds to cities. A less common way, highly successful where it has been implemented, is to introduce local road charging systems, aiming for both revenue generation as well as demand management. Either way, the challenge is to create not merely urban road funds, but urban transport funds, open to all modes. Private sector funding has a potential as a complement, but the prime source of funds should be user-based and locally linked. This subject is currently beyond the decision making reach of cities, but it needs to enter the discussion agendas at all levels of government.4.3. 第三个要素是财政。除了目前地方政府对改善筹资、预算和支出管理的努力，钦奈和班加罗尔，实际上是它们所在的邦，面临一个系统问题。这与国家对公路使用者收费和收入分配有关。问题在于缩短从当地公路使用者（在这两个富裕城市该群体是不断扩大的）付费到返还使用到当地交通系统的委托链。有多种方法。最常用的方法是避开整体预算（国家、邦或城市）资金，通过将公路使用者收费直接交给城市形成闭环。还有一种不常使用，但执行结果都很成功的方法。即引入地方公路收费系统，旨在创收和需求管理。不管哪种方法，挑战在于不仅仅要建立城市公路基金，而且要建立城市交通基金，对所有交通模式敞开。私有资本可以作为补充，但主要资金来源仍应是地方。目前城市的决策范围还没有涉及到这一问题，但在所有层面的政府讨论中都应该纳入讨论。

5. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 5．世界银行的潜在角色

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5.1. The involvement of the World Bank may increase the chances for the development, formal adoption and implementation of the above strategy. First, its direct engagement in the politically difficult growth-equity rebalancing will provide an added weight to the equity camp, much needed in these growth-dominated cities. Second, Bank loans can fund the whole sequence from the design of new type of planning and investment studies, through project selection using stringent engagement and selection criteria, all the way to implementation and evaluation. The Bank’s presence would ensure that some of the more difficult policy and investment shifts are tried, evaluated and refined. The implementation of thus selected projects would re-direct immediate benefits to social sectors hitherto neglected in the current transport strategy, which is one of the Bank’s primary objectives. Fourth, given the Bank’s long history of involvement and its continuing urban and transport projects in the two states, a program approach is feasible.5.1. 世界银行的参与可能增加发展、正式采取既执行上述战略的机会。首先，世行直接参与平衡经济增长和公平问题，会给公平一方增强力量，这在经济增长占主导的城市里尤其需要。其次，世行贷款能够为一系列活动提供资金，从设计新型规划和投资研究，到采用严格标准进行项目选择，直到执行和评价过程。世行的参与可以保证一些较困难的政策和投资得以尝试、评价和提炼。执行经过选择的项目能够将直接利益转向在现有交通战略下忽视的社会部门，这是世行的一个主要目标。第四，考虑到世行的长期参与及其在两个邦的持续城市和交通项目，项目手段是可行的。5.2. The tables below shows a hierarchy of 8 project types defining an exhaustive agenda of policy initiatives and investments, based on the preceding list of strategic moves. Lower-rung options represent small-scale departures from the current practice in the Bank-funded urban and transport projects in both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. The follow-up projects, now under preparation, with their adaptive design and stress on local institutions and finance, provide ready vehicles to introduce and test policy “turns” in favor of pedestrians, NMTs, public transport modes, and low-income areas. If these policies take root, free-standing urban transport projects in Chennai and Bangalore could aim at one of the higher-rung operations. The highest-rung options are provided to illustrate what may be doable (and will become necessary) in the longer term.5.2. 下表显示了 8种项目类型层次，在之前提到的战略步骤基础上，确定了详尽的政策和投资议程。低层次选择代表了对目前世行在泰米尔纳德邦和卡纳塔克邦投资的城市和交通项目的小规模偏离。目前正在筹备的跟进项目，以其适应性设计和对地方机构和财政的压力，为引入和检验政策向行人、NMT、公共交通模式和低收入地区“转变”做好了准备。如果这些政策扎根，钦奈和班加罗尔的独立城市交通项目将针对高层运营。高层选择是说明哪些在长期来看是可行的（且会成为必要的）。5.3. A project to finance a rapid busway corridor (even a network) is deemed to be of highest strategic priority in either city, as a vehicle to tackle and resolve the underlying

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conceptual, funding, and regulatory issues.34 Proposals for bus-based rapid transit, in the form of feasibility or at least pre-feasibility-level sketch plans and outline cost estimates, have existed for some time in both Chennai and Bangalore. These require capital investments of under $10 million for pilot projects in single corridors. Such proposals could be developed and implemented readily and rapidly.35

5.3. 一项资助快速公交车道（乃至网络）的项目被认为是两个城市最应优先考虑的战略，以处理并解决潜在的观念、资金和规范问题。34 建造快速公交系统的提议，以可行性报告的形式，或至少以初步可行性草拟计划及成本预算的形式，在钦奈和班加罗尔都已经存在一段时间了。这些要求在单独路线上投资不到 1000万美元进行项目试验。这些提议将会容易迅速地发展并执行。35

5.4. The next three rungs (primary roads, commuter rail upgrading, and a metro line or metro access facilities) are project possibilities for the medium-to-long term, to be considered only if the strategic change has occurred. 5.4. 接下来的三层（主要公路、通勤铁路更新、地铁线或地铁乘坐设施）是中期或长期的可能项目，只有战略改变发生后才能考虑。5.5. The table does not show any policy/investment couplings that would address the funding constraint cited above (the investment box in the last row is left blank). The introduction of a national system of road user charges with an urban transport provision could only be leveraged through a national transport project or a structural adjustment operation. The Bank is working with the Government of India on the reform of road user charges. This effort should take into account the urban transport dimension before some other arrangement is firmed up. Regarding a possible system of locally based user charges, it is premature to think of an urban transport investment in either city which would have the scale sufficient to leverage such a major policy innovation. Keeping the subject on the agenda, however, is not premature, and could be further advanced through technical assistance.5.5. 该表没有显示任何应对上述提及的资金限制的政策/投资联合（最后一行的投资一栏是空白）。引入公路使用者收费并包含城市交通规范的国家系统，只有通过国家交通项目或结构调整操作才能起到杠杆作用。世行正与印度政府一起着手改革公路使用者收费。在确定其他安排之前，应该在城市交通维度上考虑这一问题。至

34 The term “funding” refers to the techno-political process in which investment options are generated and evaluated as an input to decision making.34 “资金”一词是指技术-行政过程，产生并评估投资选择以辅助决策。35 The existing proposals are based on operation by MTCs. The strategy proposed in this report would involve a public-private partnership, with a service concession. The project would include a feeder distributor systems. The model for this approach is Transmilenio in Bogota (Colombia).35 现有提议是根据MTCs的运营提出的。本报告中提出的战略包括公有-私营合资，服务许可权。项目包括供应商、分配上体系。这一方法的典型是（哥伦比亚）波哥大的快速公交（Transmilenio）。

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于地方使用收费系统，考虑在这两个城市进行足以影响如此大的政策创新的城市交通投资还为时过早。但是在议程中讨论这一主题却并不早，而且技术辅助可以推动。

FIRST LEVEL第一级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Sidewalk networks

人行道网络 Traffic control

(intersections, corridors, areas)

交通控制（交叉路口、路线、地区）

Intersection improvements (at-grade)

交叉路口改进（同平面）

Corridor improvements

路线改进 Pedestrian-only

areas 行人专用区域 Parking control 停车控制 Traffic police

equipment 交通警察设备 Training 培训 Studies 研究

Setting up of traffic management cells in municipalities, complementing Traffic Police; may require re-alignment

建立市交通管理部门，作为交通警察局的补充，可能要求重新排列

Design& implement a program of transport studies

涉及并执行交通研究项目 Improve traffic fine

structure 改进交通维系结构 Introduction of parking

charges on corridor/area basis 根据路线/地区，引入停车收费

Adoption of road design standards to ensure ample space for sidewalks, crosswalks

采用路线设计标准，保证人行道和人行横道的足够空间

reserved lanes for bikes and buses

自行车和公交车专用车道 traffic restraint 交通限制

Within current urban projects, e.g. Tamil Nadu UDIII or Karnataka Urban Reform Project

在目前城市项目范围内，如泰米尔纳德邦UDIII或卡纳塔克邦城市改革项目

Free-standing UT project 独立UT项目

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SECOND LEVEL第二级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Road improvements in low-income urban and peri-urban areas (both internal and access roads)

低收入城市地区和城乡结合区域道路改进（内部和连接道路）

Area-wide road maintenance

区域范围内道路维护

Introduction of design standards to serve pedestrians, bikers

引入设计标准，方便行人、自行车

Introduction of road inventory and pavement management system

引入公路数量和人行道管理体系

Linkage of road maintenance with social surveys

将公路维护与社会调查联系起来



Within the current state road projects

在目前邦公路项目范围内 Free-standing urban

transport project 独立城市交通项目

THIRD LEVEL第三级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Multi-grade intersections

多级立交桥 Rail-bus

interchange facilities 铁路-公交换乘设施

Re-allocation of at-grade street space to serve NMT and UPT transport modes

平面道路空间分配，满足NMT和UPT交通模式




FOURTH LEVEL第四级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Infrastructure for bus rapid transit line(s)

快速公交车道基础设施

Technical assistance for introducing regulatory arrangement

引入规范安排的技术支持

Service provision by concession on gross-cost basis (low-floor, low-emission vehicles)

以总成本基础许可经营权服务供应（低地板、低排放车辆）

Concessions on feeder/distributor networks

许可供应商/分配商网络 Setting up of an UT

Free-standing UT Project 独立UT项目

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Regulatory Authority 建立UT规范当局 Turning some MTC depots

into separate companies and allowing them to bid for service

将部分MTC停车场转给单独公司使用，并允许他们参与服务竞标

FIFTH LEVEL第五级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Major new roads 主要新公路 Re-allocation of street space

on existing, parallel streets to serve NMT and UPT modes

现有平行道路空间重新分配，供NMT和UPT模式使用

Provision of space for rapid transit lines

提供快速车道空间


SIXTH LEVEL第六级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Upgrading commuter rail infrastructure, rolling stock and interchange facilities (Chennai)

更新通勤铁路基础设施、车辆和换乘设施（钦奈）

Setting up of an independent Chennai MA Rail Corporation (as in Mumbai)

建立独立的钦奈MA铁路公司（像孟买一样）

Creation of UT regulatory authority

建立UT规范当局


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SEVENTH LEVEL第七级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

Co-finance a metro line in Bangalore

班加罗尔地铁线路的共同投资

Tandem operation with a bus-based rapid transit line

继快速公交车道之后的操作

Introduction of a risk-oriented project evaluation and alternatives analysis

引入项目风险评估，即其他选择分析


EIGHTH LEVEL第八级Investments投资 Policy/institutional goals政策/制度目标 Type of project项目类型

None (state/city based project not appropriate)无（邦/城市项目不合适）

Introduce city-friendly road use charging system引入城市友好型公路使用收费制度

National transport project or structural adjustment loan国家交通项目或结构调整贷款

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ATTACHMENT I-A: URBAN TRANSPORT IN CHENNAI 附件 I-A ：钦奈城市交通 A. The State36

A．所在邦 36

1. The State of Tamil Nadu, with a population of 62 million, growing at 1.1% per annum, is among the leading Indian states in terms of human development and poverty reduction. It is also among the most urbanized (55%), educated, and industrialized states. Gross Domestic Product rose from Rs.14,520 per capita in 1993 to Rs.36,138 per capita in 1998.37 Economic growth has slowed down somewhat since the mid-1990s, falling to 3-4%, and unemployment rates are second-highest in India. Also in the late 1990s, the financial position of the Tamil Nadu government deteriorated, due to a sharp rises in wages and benefits to its civil service, interest payments on loans, and payments for food subsidies. The fiscal deficit for 2002-3 was forecast at 5.7% of the Gross Domestic Product.38 This has had a negative impact on the ability of the state to invest in infrastructure and basic services, and to improve the social safety net. Priority directions seen on the critical path to accelerating economic growth include the reform of the state administration (reduce its scope and improve performance, especially on the revenue generation and budget expenditure practices), improving the overall investment climate, and attracting private capital into infrastructure and services. A reform program along these lines is underway.1．泰米尔纳德邦，人口 6200万，年人口增长率为 1.1%，在人类发展和脱贫方面都走在印度各地的前列。这是印度城市化水平最高（55%）、教育水平最高、工业化发展最深的一个邦。国内生产总值从 1993年人均 14520卢比增长到 1998年人均36138卢比。37 上世纪 90年代中期经济增长速度有所减缓，降低到 3-4%，失业率也是印度第二高的邦。同样在 90年代末，因其行政服务和利益工资水平大幅提高、贷款利息支付以及食品补贴付款，泰米尔纳德邦政府的财政情况恶化。估计 2002-2003年的财政赤字达到国内生产总值的 5.7%。38 这对邦投资基础设施和基本服务以及改善社会安全网的能力产生负面影响。加快经济增长的关键途径的优先考虑包括改革邦行政管理（缩小范围，改善性能，尤其是收入获得和预算支出方面）、改善整体投资环境，吸引私营资本投入基础设施和服务。相应的改革项目正在进行。36 Data on Tamil Nadu are drawn from an internal Bank paper ,Tamil Nadu Policy Notes – Concept Paper April 10, 200336 泰米尔纳德邦的数据引用自世行的一份内部文件，泰米尔纳德政策——观念报告，2003年 4月10日。37 Source: Wilbur Smith, Study on Parking Requirements for Chennai Metropolitan Area, Interim Report, August 2003.37 来源：Wilbur Smith著《钦奈都市区停车要求研究》临时报告，2003年 8月。38 Source: Tamil Nadu Road Sector Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report 25056-IN, The World Bank, May 20, 200338 来源：泰米尔纳德邦公路部门项目，项目评估文件，世行 2003年 5月 20日报告 25056-IN。

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B. The City, Its People and Economy B．城市，人口和经济2. The City of Chennai (until 1996 referred to as Madras) has an estimated 2001 population of about 4.2 million on an area of 172 sq km.39 The wider metropolitan area has a population of 7.5 million on 1,167 sq km.40 In the 1990s, the area growth rate averaged 0.9% per annum.41 The forecast for 2011 is for 6 million people in the city and 9.5 million in the metropolitan area, but the growth appears to have slowed down since this forecast was made. 2．钦奈市（1996年前叫做马德拉斯），面积为 172平方公里，2001年约有人口420万。39 整个都市区面积为 1167平方公里，人口为 750万。40在 90年代，区域内年均人口增长率约为 0.9%。 41 预计 2001年市内人口达到 600万，整个都市区人口将达到 950万，但是做出这一预计后人口增长率好像放缓了。3. The city is located on level terrain on the Bay of Bengal, traversed in the west-east direction by several rivers and in the north-south direction by the man-made Buckingham Canal. It started in the early 17th century as a trading post on the Bay of Bengal, rising during the British rule to become a regional capital and an important export outlet. The construction of the port at the end of the 19 th century and later on railways gave a strong push to shipping, insurance, banking and other trade related services. This pattern has been sustained ever since and the 23-berth port is now the third largest port in the country, with some 2,500 vessels calling annually. On the industry side, the city had textile mills, tanneries and leather processing, locomotive and coach manufacture, and some machine works. After independence, the industrial base was strengthened, especially in rail and automotive vehicle manufacture and complementary activities, while adding petrochemicals, power, electrical machinery and, more recently, electronics. Major industrial estates are located in the north, e.g. petrochemicals in the vicinity of the port, and along the west and south-west railway corridors (automotive industry). In the past decade, the growth has been more in small-scale industries,

39 This refers to the area within the boundary of Chennai Municipal Corporation. Most population and area citations are from Master Plan for Madras Metropolitan Area – 2011, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, July 1995, with newer numbers culled from diverse documents. The sources often confuse estimates from various censuses and sample surveys with forecasts made at different times from these estimates. An update of travel information is currently underway. 39 这是指钦奈市范围内的区域。大多数人口和面积数据引用自马德拉斯都市发展局 1995年 7月《马德拉斯都市区总体规划——2011》，并精选不同文件更新了数据。这些来源的估计往往与其它各种人口普查和抽样调查的预计不同，因为这些预计出自不同的时间。目前正在着手更新旅行信息。40 The web site (http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm) maintained by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, cites a population of 6.42 million, based on the 2001 census, but it does not say exactly which boundary this number refers to.40 城市发展和脱贫部的网站（http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm）上说 2001年人口为 642万，但没有说明其对应的地域范围。41 This is based on the decade growth rate of 9.76% (1991-2001) reported in SBI report on Bangalore.41 这是根据班加罗尔 STB报告中说明的十年（1991-2001）增长率 9.76% 。

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http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm


engineering, wholesale and retail services, banking, and diverse personal services. A “cyber-corridor” is emerging in the south (Adyar).3．钦奈市位于孟加拉湾的平原上，多条河流贯穿其东西方向，南北方向则流淌着人工开凿的白金汉运河。早在 17世纪初，这里就是孟加拉湾的贸易重地，在英国殖民统治期间成为地方首都和重要的商品出口地。19世纪末港口建造以及随后的铁路建设极大地推动了航运、保险、银行和其他贸易相关服务的发展。从此这一模式保留下来，拥有 23个停泊处的钦奈港口现在是印度第三大港口，每年有 2500 艘船只停泊。在工业方面，钦奈有纺织厂、制革厂和皮革加工厂、机车和汽车制造以及一些机械厂。独立之后，钦奈的工业基础增强了，尤其是火车和汽车制造和补充活动，加上石化、电力、电子机械以及最新的电子产业。主要工业区集中在北部，如石化在港口附近，沿西部和西南铁路线（汽车工业）。在过去十年，小规模产业得到很大发展，如工程、批发和零售服务、银行以及个人服务。南部（Adyar）则出现了一条“计算机线路”。4. The settlement structure of Chennai is common to many large South-Asian conurbations, reflecting various economic and political eras (Tiwari, 2003; Misra and Misra, 1998). The oldest areas are the closest to the port – Georgetown, the traditional commercial center, and the Fort area, once housing the British administrative and military headquarters. The modern business and commercial developments are farther south-west, e.g., T. Nagar and Nungambakkam, along major streets such as Anna Salai, and in the south (Adyar). There are other identifiable patches of higher density throughout the area: some correspond to the original townships, gradually absorbed by the city, and others have developed around large industrial estates. The city has large slum areas, especially but not only in peri-urban locations, in the south, and in the vicinity of industrial estates. The slums are the way stations for the rural poor seeking or holding informal jobs, but not just that; some of the slum dwellers have been there for several generations.4．钦奈的居住结构与其它很多大的南亚大都市类似，反映了多个经济和政治时代（Tiwari, 2003; Misra and Misra, 1998)。最古老的地区是最接近港口的地方——乔治敦（Georgetown），是传统的贸易中心，也是要塞，曾经是英国殖民者的行政和军事总部。现代的经济和商业发展则在西南部，如 T. Nagar和Nungambakkam，沿主要道路如安纳萨莱，以及南部（Adyar）。在钦奈都市区域内还有一些人口非常密集的地方：一些是原来的城镇，逐渐融入到城市；还有一些是在大型工业区周围发展起来的。城市有大量贫困区，尤其是在城乡结合处，但不完全如此；在南部以及工业区附近也有。这些贫民区是那些寻找或拥有非正式工作的乡村贫困人口的短暂停留处，但不仅如此；有些贫民区居民已经在那里居住了好几代了。5. The average gross residential density in the city is high, about 250 people per hectare in the city.42 Peak densities reach twice that high in Georgetown, and somewhat

42 Compare this to Bangalore at 113 people/ha, Moscow at 169, Paris at 85 and Shanghai at 303. The last three use consistent measurement criteria, which is not the case with Chennai and Bangalore data. Source: Alain Bertaud, “Metropolis: A Measure of the Spatial Organization of 7 Large Cities”, unpublished

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less in Purasawakkam and Triplicane. The density pattern is poly-nuclear, but differing sharply from poly-nuclear cities with well-developed land markets. Urban planners in Chennai followed a practice common in Indian cities since independence whereby relatively low floor space indices were applied in central areas and more relaxed indices were applied in the outer areas. This also meant that the municipal infrastructure in place was designed for the perpetuation of these densities. The construction of higher-rise buildings, allowed since the mid-1980s, placed a considerable pressure on roads and other utilities, to which the rise of motorization added pollution and accidents.5．城市的平均总居民密度很高，市内约为每公顷 250人。42 人口最密集的区域Georgetown人口密度达到此数据的两倍，在 Purasawakkam和 Triplicane稍少一点。人口密集模式是多样化的，但是与土地市场发展完善的多样化城市则有很大不同。钦奈的城市规划者仿效独立后其他印度城市普遍采用的方法，在市中心区域房屋面积指数低，而外围区域则较宽松。这也意味着这些地方的市政基础设施是为了维持高密度设计的。自从 80年中期允许开始建造的高层住宅，对公路和其他效用带来了很大压力，机动化增长也增加了污染和事故。6. The city has been plagued by a low overall employment rate and a slow growth of employment in the formal sector. Informal employment is estimated to account for as much as 58% of all jobs. This includes such low-wage jobs as self-employed traders, street vendors, rickshaw pullers, and bicycle repairmen but also somewhat better paid jobs in construction, manufacture and repair. The household income distribution in 1998 was reported as follows:6．钦奈一直受到低就业率和正式行业就业率增长缓慢的困扰。据估计，非正常就业占到所有工作岗位的 58%。这包括低工资的工作，如自己经营的小店主、街头小贩、人力车夫、自行车修理工；也有一些待遇稍好的工作，在建筑、制造和修理业。1998年的家庭收入分配如下：

Annual Income (Rs) No.of hh (000) %Less than 37,500 565 37.4Rs 37,500-50,000 187 12.4Rs 50,000-62,500 143 9.5Rs 62,500-75,000 143 9.5Rs 75,000-87,500 120 8.0Rs 87,500-100,000 79 5.2Rs 100,000-112,500 78 5.2Rs 112,500-125,000 79 5.2Above 125,000 115 7.6Total number of households 1,509,00043

年收入（卢比）家庭数（千） %

manuscript, 21 April 200142 比较班加罗尔 113人/公顷，莫斯科 169，巴黎 85，上海 303。后三个城市都是使用一致的测量标准，而钦奈和班加罗尔则不是如此。数据来源：Alain Bertaud未发表的手稿《大都市：7大城市空间管理衡量》，2001年 4月 21日。

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少于 37,500 565 37.437,500-50,000 187 12.450,000-62,500 143 9.562,500-75,000 143 9.575,000-87,500 120 8.087,500-100,000 79 5.2100,000-112,500 78 5.2112,500-125,000 79 5.2超过 125,000 115 7.6总家庭数 1,509,00043

7. These data show that the majority of the residents of Chennai (60%) have low incomes, less than (roughly) Rs.5,000 a month. Close to 40% of the population have very low incomes, less than (roughly) Rs.3,000 a month. About 24% of the population is estimated to fall under the poverty line and most (about 1 million) live in slums.44 Even recognizing that the survey is more than 5 years old, and incomes have moved upwards since, these numbers are sobering. This state of affairs is in sharp contrast to the visible signs of new wealth – the high-rise buildings and motor vehicles.7．这些数据表明大多数的钦奈居民（60%）属于低收入人群，月收入不足（约）5000卢比。接近 40%的人口收入非常低，月收入低于（约）3000卢比。约有 24%的人口处于贫困线以下，大部分（约 100万）居住在贫民区。44 尽管调查是5年以前作的，几年间收入水平也在提高，但这些数字并非言过其实。贫困情况与新兴财富标志——高耸的大楼和机动车形成了鲜明对比。C. Transport Demand: Modal Split and MotorizationC. 交通需求：模式分化和机动化8. The Chennai Metropolitan Area (CMA) is served by both road and rail networks. 45The road system is based on 3-4 major radial roads, and an inner ring road. Secondary and tertiary networks are not well developed. Radial roads converge on the traditional center around Georgetown, roughly in the same corridors as the rail lines of the Indian

43 Source: www.BombayFirst.org. Lall et al in “Diversity Matters“ (2003) cite a nationwide average annual wage of Rs.60,000, but Rs.74,000 for urban areas in 1998-99. The range was from Rs.41,000 in the leather industry to Rs.110,000 in electronics and computers.43 来源：www.BombayFirst.org. Lall等在《分化问题》（“Diversity Matters” ）（2003）中提到，1998-1999年全国平均年收入为 60000卢比，但城市地区达到 74000卢比。范围从皮革业的 41000卢比到电子和计算机行业的 110000卢比不等。44 The poverty rate of 24.4% is an aggregate estimate for all urban areas in Tamil Nadu, and is used here as an approximation for Chennai.44 24.4%的贫困率是泰米尔纳德邦所有城市地区的总体水平，这里约看成钦奈贫困率的近似值。45 A more detailed description is given below. This paragraph provides only the bare essentials needed to understand the demand (modal split and motorization) aspects covered in this section.45 下文给出了更详细的说明。这一段只选择了本部分中理解需求的要点方面（模式分化和机动化）。

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http://www.BombayFirst.org/

Railways. Vehicular traffic is quite heterogeneous, with non-motorized modes (bicycles and bicycle rickshaws) being squeezed out by motorized 2-wheelers and motorized 3-wheleer rickshaws. Main public transport services are provided by Chennai Metropolitan Transport Corporation (CMTC), a public-sector monopoly. CMTC operates a fleet of about 2,800 buses in street traffic, employs some 18,400 staff, and carries about 3.5 million passenger trips a day. The Indian Railways (specifically the Southern Railway, the zonal department of the IR) operates commuter rail services on 3 lines, all electrified. They converge on Georgetown, carrying about 645,000 passengers a day. An 8.6 km urban railway, the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) has been in operation since 1997. MRTS was constructed on a mostly elevated right-of-way due south from Georgetown, and represents Phase I of a larger project (Phase II is under construction). It carries an insignificant number of passengers, about 9,000 per day.8．钦奈都市区（CMA）拥有公路和铁路网络。45 公路系统的基础是 3-4条主要辐射式公路和一条内环线。二级和三级网络发展较差。辐射式道路主要集中在传统中心 Georgetown一带，基本和印度铁路的轨道线路一致。交通模式多样化，非机动模式（自行车和人力车）被机动化的两轮车和三轮车排挤。钦奈都市交通公司（CMTC）是一家公有垄断企业，提供主要的公共交通服务。CMTC拥有约 2800公交车，员工约 18400人，每天乘坐人次达 350万。印度铁路（明确的说，是印度铁路下属的南部铁路）运行三条通勤火车路线，都是电气化铁路。铁路集中在Georgetown，每天约运送乘客 645000人。1997年开始，钦奈的 8.6公里长市内铁路，捷运系统（MRTS）投入运营。MRTS大部分建在Georgetown南部的高架上，是大项目的第一阶段（第二阶段正在建设中）。MRTS每天运送乘客并不多，仅为每天 9000人。9. Daily per capita trip rates in Chennai increased from 0.87 in 1971 to 1.28 in 1991 (0.73 for motorized trips), with an average trip length of 10.1 km. Trip rates are forecast to increase to about 1.50 in 2011 (0.93 for motorized trips).46 Over the same period, the overall modal split (in %) changed as follows:9．钦奈的每天人均旅程次数从 1971年的 0.87上升到了 1991年的 1.28（其中 0.73是机动车模式通行），平均行程长度为 10.1公里。预计到 2011年行程次数将会增加到 1.50（其中 0.93是机动车模式通行）。46 同期，总模式分化（按百分比%）变化如下：

1970 1984 1992

46 Source: “Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Study for Madras Metropolitan Area” RITES, Pallavan and Kirloskar Consultants for Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, September 1995. Household survey data appear to have been collected in 1992. Sea also Rajan et al, “Joint Venture of State and National Governments in Developing Rail Facilities: a Case Study of Chennai, India”, 199846 来源：1995年 9月 Pallavan和 Kirloskar 咨询为马德拉斯都市发展局作的《马德拉斯都市区全面交通和运输研究》（“ Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Study for Madras Metropolitan Area”）。家庭调查数据约在 1992年收集。参见 Rajan等《发展铁路设施中邦和国家政府合作：印度钦奈案例研究》（“Joint Venture of State and National Governments in Developing Rail Facilities: a Case Study of Chennai, India”），1998。

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walk 20.70 28.07 29.50bicycle 21.30 10.70 14.20public bus 41.50 45.53 37.90commuter rail 11.50 9.03 4.102-wheel motorized 1.70 3.24 7.00car 3.20 1.45 2.50other 0.10 1.98 4.80

1970 1984 1992步行 20.70 28.07 29.50自行车 21.30 10.70 14.20公交车 41.50 45.53 37.90通勤铁路 11.50 9.03 4.10机动两轮车 1.70 3.24 7.00轿车 3.20 1.45 2.50其他 0.10 1.98 4.80

10. These numbers are likely to have changed since the mid-1990s in favor of individual motor vehicles, especially motorized 2-wheelers.47 10．这些数字可能从上世纪 90年中期开始有所改变，个人机动车尤其是机动两轮车比例可能增加。47

11. Since economic growth picked up in the last decade, the city has been under the onslaught of increased individual motorization. Motor vehicles in total have been growing at about 10-12% per annum in the past decade, with the highest rates recorded for 2-wheelers and motorized rickshaws. In 2003, there were about 1.5 million motor vehicles registered in the City of Chennai, and 1.8 million in the metropolitan area. 48

There also some 1.4 million bicycles. Of the motorized vehicles, more than a million are 2-wheelers and a quarter million are passenger cars. The breakdown by vehicle categories is as follows:

47 In addition, modal splits in Chennai are distorted by both MTC and commuter rail lines having to operate under strong capacity constraints and non-existent coordination in terms of fare and access arrangements. CMDA sources cite the modal share of “private modes” as being 58% in 2002, without stating the source or providing the definition of private modes.47 此外，因为MTC和通勤铁路运营能力受到限制，两者之间没有任何票价和换乘等合作安排，钦奈的模式分化更加严重。CMDA来源中引用“私人模式”的比例在 2002年占 58%，没有指明来源也没有明确私人模式的具体内容。48 Source of data for Chennai City and the state: courtesy Transport Department, Government of Tamil Nadu. In the same year (2003), there were 6.2 million vehicles registered in the state, of which about 5.1 million 2-wheelers and 0.6 million passenger cars. A full time series 1995-2003 is available for the state. 48 钦奈市和邦的数据来源：泰米尔纳德邦政府交通部。同年（2003），邦登记车辆为 620万辆，其中约 510万辆两轮车，60万辆桥车。该邦 1995-2003年车辆数量的完整数据可知。

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11．自从过去十年中经济增长加快，钦奈就受到私家车数量不断增加的冲击。在过去十年，机动车总量增加了 10-12%，主要是两轮车和机动三轮车。在 2003年，钦奈市登记机动车数量为 150万辆，都市区则达到 180万辆。48约有 140万辆自行车。在机动车中，两轮车超过 100万辆，而轿车为 25万辆。车辆类型具体分类如下：

Private use vehicles2-wheelers 1,099,950tricycle autos 2,5593-wheelers 4,781cars, station wagons and jeeps 262,023other 8,695sub-total 1,378,008

私人使用车辆两轮车 1,099,950三轮汽车 2,559三轮车 4,781轿车、旅行车和吉普车 262,023其他 8,695小计 1,378,008

For hire vehiclesCMTC buses 3,673Schoolbuses 740autorickshaws 39,782taxis, cabs omni buses 12,007freight vehicles 28,726other 1,399sub-total 86,327

Total 1,464,33549

营运车辆CMTC 公交车 3,673校车 740机动人力车 39,782出租车、出租小型公交 12,007货车 28,726其他 1,399小计 86,327

49 The web site of India Petroleum Institute cites the following motorization levels in Chennai, drawn from a study by the Central Road Research Institute 238,000 cars, 949,000 motorized 2-wheelers, and 5,000 buses. The year is not given.49 印度石油研究所的网站上引用了钦奈的机动化水平如下，引自钦奈公路研究院的研究：23.8万辆轿车，94.9万辆机动两轮车，5000辆公交车。但没有说明年份。

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总计 1,464,33549

12. The corresponding motorization rates are 62 cars per 1,000 population, but 324 cars and motorized 2-wheelers per 1,000 population. This is a high rate, exceeding that of many cities in Western Europe.12．相应的机动化率为平均每千人拥有 62 辆轿车，但平均每千人拥有 324 辆轿车和机动两轮车。这一比例是很高的，超过了西欧很多城市。13. Notwithstanding rapid motorization, the above data on modal split show that walking and biking accounted for about 44% of all trips. Already this simple information is important for policy making, since the lowest-income groups and school children and students tend to be captives of walking and biking modes. Bus transport, though in apparent decline, still accounted for 38% of all trips. Together, non-motorized and public transport modes accounted for nearly 82% of all trips.13．尽管机动车进程很快，上述模式分化的数据表明步行和自行车占所有旅程的44%。这一简单信息对决策很重要，因为低收入人群、中小学生可能只能选择步行或自行车模式。公交车交通，尽管明显衰落，仍然占到总旅程的 38%。总的来说，非机动和公共交通模式将近占所有行程的 82%。14. Bus passengers tend to come from the lower income strata. A survey of CMTC bus passengers in 1997 disclosed the following income distribution for households:50

14．公交乘客大部分来自低收入群体。根据 1997年对 CMTC公交乘客的调查，家庭收入分配如下：50

Monthly income Rs/HH % of sampleNo inc. reported 3.0less than 1,000 10.41001-2500 32.02501-5000 34.55001-7500 16.0more than 7,500 4.0

月收入（卢比）/家庭占调查比例%未告知收入 3.0少于 1,000 10.41001-2500 32.02501-5000 34.55001-7500 16.0

50 Source: Annex 6B, Route Rationalization Study for Metropolitan Transport Corporation, Chennai Metropolitan Area, Draft Final Report, Pallavan Consultancy Services, September 2001. The survey covered 18,300 passengers, but only 2,033 answered the income-related questions.50 来源：2001年 9月 Pallavan咨询服务所做的最后报告草案《钦奈都市交通公司路线合理化研究》附录 6B。该调查询问了 18300名乘客，但只有 2033名回答了与收入有关的问题。

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超过 7,500 4.0

When this information is cross-referenced with the income distribution data cited above (acknowledging one-year difference in survey dates), it would appear that about 80% of CMTC passengers belong to low-income category and about 45% of these are in a very low income category. It would be of essence to know also how many bus passengers are “captives” and how many have access to a motorized 2-wheelers. Data from 1993 surveys in major Indian cities disclosed that households across all income groups owned motorized 2-wheelers, though in varying proportions.51

这一信息与上文引用的收入分配数据前后照应（注意调查时间相差一年）。从中看出约有 80%的 CMTC乘客属于低收入人群，而其中 45%收入非常低。有必要了解有多少公交乘客只能选择公交，还有多少可以选择机动两轮车。1993年对主要印度城市的调查数据表明，所有收入群体中都有购买机动两轮车的家庭，只是比例不同。51

15. Service schedules and fares for bus and commuter rail services are decided by different authorities, state and federal government, respectively. Altogether, there is no coordination between bus and rail services. This is best seen in the existence of bus lines parallel to commuter rail and MRTS lines (both running losses) and in different fare structures. Basic bus fares and 2nd class rail fares are shown in the box below. The average fare paid on the bus system is Rs 3.4/trip. The sharp decline of fares per km of distance reflects the State policy of helping distant regional populations get jobs in the city. Limited-stop, express and de luxe services cost more, up to Rs 500 for a 4-km trip to Rs 1,500 for a 46-km trip. Monthly passes are offered at a 30% discount and school children have a 50% discount. For occasional users, bus travel is significantly cheaper, with the difference increasing as trips become longer. Monthly tickets for buses, however, are much more expensive than for the commuter rail.15．公交和通勤火车的服务时刻表和票价由不同当局确定，分别是邦和联邦政府。总的来说，公交和铁路服务之间没有合作。从公交线路与通勤铁路以及 MRTS路线（两者都处于亏损状态）基本平行但票价不同，就可以看出这一点。基本公交票51 Source: Impact of road transportation systems on energy and environment – an analysis of metropolitan cities of India, Tata Energy Research Group, 1993. For Bangalore, this study gives the following data: households with monthly incomes up to Rs.500, 29% owned motorized 2-wheelers, and 71% owned bicycles; for incomes between 500 and 1,500 Rs. 47% owned a bike, another 47% owned a motorized 2-wheeler and 7% owned a car; in the group earning Rs.1,500-3,000, 31% owned a bike only, 60% owned a motorized 2-wheeler, and 9% owned a car. Over Rs.3,000, 37% owned a car, 45% owned a motorized 2-wheeler, and 18% owned a bike only. Given rapid growth of the economy of Bangalore, the absolute values of these income brackets are not comparable with those cited in the text.51 来源：1993年 Tata 能源研究集团《道路交通系统对能源和环境和影响——印度大都市分析》。研究中提到班加罗尔如下数据：月收入不超过 500卢比的家庭，29%拥有机动两轮车，71%拥有自行车；收入介于 500到 1500卢比之间的，47%有自行车，47%拥有机动两轮车，7%拥有轿车；收入为 1500-3000卢比的家庭，31%只拥有自行车，60%拥有机动两轮车，9%拥有轿车；收入超过3000卢比的，37%拥有轿车，45%拥有机动两轮车，18%只有自行车。考虑到班加罗尔的快速经济增长，这些收入范围的绝对值不能和文中引用的数据相比较。

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价和二等车厢火车票如下表所示。公交系统的平均单程票价为 3.4卢比。随着公里数增加，票价相应增加的比例急剧下降，这说明了邦的政策是帮助较远地区的人口在城市中找到工作。停站数较少的路线、快速直达车和豪华服务则收费较高，从 4公里 500卢比到 46公里 1500卢比不等。月票可以打七折，学生则是半票。对于不经常乘坐公交的乘客来说，公交行程是非常便宜的，旅程越长票价增加幅度不同。但是，公交月票比通勤火车月票要贵的多。

PUBLIC TRANSPORT FARES IN CHENNAI – 2003钦奈公共交通票价——2003

Distance路程 Single journey (Rs)单程（卢比） Monthly ticket (Rs)月票（卢比）(km) （公里） Bus公交 Train铁路 Bus公交 Train铁路

2 2.00 5.00 140.00 70.005 3.00 5.00 140.00 70.0010 3.50 5.00 140.00 70.0015 4.50 6.00 200.00 85.0020 5.00 7.00 220.00 100.0025 5.50 8.00 240.00 115.0030 6.00 8.00 260.00 115.0035 6.50 9.00 280.00 130.0040 7.00 10.00 300.00 145.00

Train fares are for 2nd class commuter rail. Fares for MRTS are higher due to a surcharge of Rs 1.00 for a single journey and Rs 20.00 for monthly tickets for all distances. 铁路票价是通勤铁路的二等车厢票价。MRTS票价较高，因为每次单程要多收 1卢比，所有路程的月票要多收 20卢比。Sources: the bus fares, courtesy K. Kumar, CMDA; the commuter rail fares, courtesy Neenu Ittyerah, Southern Railway 来源：公交票价CMDA 的 K. Kumar，通勤铁路票价，南部铁路Neenu Ittyerah。

16. How large are public transport fares relative to low incomes? At Rs 140, a monthly bus pass for one person for a 10-km trip (roughly the average trip length) represents 14% of a Rs.1,000 household income; this becomes 26% for a 30-km trip. A commuter rail monthly pass for a 10-km trip or less represents 7% of the income, and a pass for a 30-km trip would take 12%. For a monthly income of Rs.2,500, these percentages would be 6% and 10% for a 10-km and 35-km trips by bus, respectively. Equivalent monthly passes for the commuter rail would take 3% and 5%, respectively. In 1997, 13% of the surveyed CMTC bus passengers had household incomes of Rs.1,000 or less, and about 45% had household incomes of Rs.2,500 or less. Incomes are likely to have risen since 1997, so these percentages will be smaller. The conclusion is that for very low-income people, these fares may be onerous.

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16．公共交通票价与低收入有多大关系？ 10公里行程（大约平均旅程长度）的单人每月公交票价为 140卢比，占到一个月收入 1000卢比家庭 14%的收入，若路程长度为 30公里，这一比例增加到 26%。10公里行程的通勤铁路月度支出占该收入的 7%，30公里的路程则每月支出 12%。对于一个月收入为 2500卢比的家庭来说，若乘坐公交车，10公里行程占 6%，35公里行程占 10%。通勤铁路的相应比例则分别为 3%和 5%。1997年，13%的 CMTC乘客家庭月收入不超过 1000卢比，45%的家庭不超过 2500卢比。1997年后收入应该会继续增加，因此这些比例可能会缩小。结论是，对于收入非常低的人群来说，票价负担是比较沉重的。D. Roads, Traffic and ParkingD．公路、交通和停车17. The road network is a patchwork reflecting the city’s development along national roads and railways, well before the advent of individual motor vehicles. The network between the high-density corridors is poorly developed, since in-fill construction has often been done illegally. Even major roads exhibit variable widths, different cross-section design standards, and are rarely protected from adjacent land uses. Only short segments, constructed and/or improved over the last 10-15 years introduce a functional specialization and use different road design standards, suitable for urban traffic stream with a great heterogeneity of vehicle types. There are about 2,500 km of roads, of which about 1,000 are said to matter for motor vehicle traffic. Of these, 300 km carry bus lines, which can be taken as an indicator of importance.17．公路网络是拼凑而成，反映了在个人机动车出现之前，城市沿着国家公路和铁路发展的轨迹。在人口密度高的路线之间的网络服务很差，因为填补空隙的建设往往是不合法的。即使是主要道路，宽度、十字路口设计标准也不尽相同，也没有注意在周边土地使用时保护道路。只有最近 10-15年内新建或修复的很短的部分道路，引入了功能专门化，并使用不同的道路设计标准，使之符合多种车辆类型汇集的城市交通流。总共约有 2500公里的公路，其中 1000公里声称适合机动车通行。其中，300公里有公交线路，这一数字也可以作为公交重要性的指针。18. The network is dominated by three major roads, all radial, really urban sections of state roads leading to the traditional city center in Georgetown: the south-westerly Anna Salai (Mount Road, 128,000 vehicles per day) continuing as Grand Southern Trunk Road (NH45 towards Trichy); the westerly Perlyar E.V.R. High Road (144,000 vehicles per day), becoming NH4 going toward Bangalore; and the north-westerly Erukkancheri High Road becoming the Northern Trunk Road (NH5 toward Calcutta). Other important roads include the westerly Thiruvallur Road (#205) and Kamarajar Salai (South Beach Road) from Georgetwon southwards. The Inner Ring Road (Jawaharlal Nehru Salai) Road is located some 8-10 km west of the Bay, at the city limits, and carries about 110,000 vehicles per day.52

52 Source of vehicles per day cited in this paragraph is the CMDA document entitled “Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA” (undated, circa March 2003).

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18．整个网络由三条主要公路支配。三条路线都是辐射式路线，实际上是国道的城市部分，通向传统城市中心Georgetown：西南方向的Anna Salai（Mount Road公路，每天 128000辆车通行）是南部大干道的延伸（NH45 往 Trichy）；西方的 Perlyar E.V.R.高速公路（每天 144000辆车通行）是通往班加罗尔的 NH4。西北方向的Erukkancheri高速公路是北部干道（通往 Calcutta的 NH5）。其他重要公路包括西方的 Thiruvallur 公路（#205）和 Georgetown 往南的 Kamarajar Salai（南部海滩路）。内环公路（Jawaharlal Nehru Salai）位于海湾西部约 8-10公里处的城市边缘，每天通行车辆约为 110000辆。52

19. The traffic control system in Chennai is rudimentary as regards traffic signs, road markings and intersection channelization. Fixed-time traffic signals exist at 115 intersections, without any interconnection. Another 20-30 will come on line soon. Video cameras were installed at 8 intersections. Other intersections are managed by traffic policemen.19．钦奈的交通控制系统在交通信号、公路标志和交叉路口渠化方面没有充分发展。在 115个交叉路口设置了定时交通信号，但互相没有什么联系。其他 20-30个将会很快建立。8个交叉路口安装了视频摄像头。其他交叉路口则由交通警察管理。20. Traffic safety has been a sore point, with accidents peaking in 2001 at 5,280, of which 708 deaths and 3,800 injuries.53 The corresponding rates are 40 accidents and 5.3 deaths per 10,000 registered vehicles. Most of the people killed were 2-wheeler riders/passengers (208), pedestrians (190), and cyclists (126). Galvanized into action, the Chennai Traffic Police spearheaded in 2002 a multi-faceted Project Safe Roads. It combined classic law enforcement actions (control and ticketing) with corrective engineering measures, and a large-scale public campaign based on networking with schools, media, civic associations and neighbourhood groups. The accident trend has been reversed, the total reducing to about 3,700 in 2002-2003, with about 400 fatalities and 2,800 injured. The Chennai City Traffic Police, with its 47 traffic police stations and 2,000 staff, are becoming a strong institution. They are continuing their activist stand, their thinking going well beyond traffic safety and traffic management concerns into the domain of medium-to-long term transport (infrastructure) investment program.20．交通安全一直是个痛处，2001年交通事故数量达到最多的 5280次，其中 708人死亡，3800人受伤。53 相应地，平均每一万辆登记车辆 40次事故，死亡 5.3人。大部分事故死亡者是两轮车驾驶者 /乘坐者（208），行人（190）及骑车人（126）。钦奈交通警察局率先采取了行动，于 2002年发起了安全道路的多面项目。该项目结合传统执法行为（控制和开罚单）和修正工程措施，并且与学校、媒体、市民协会和邻近团体组合形成大规模公众运动。事故数量有所减少，2002-2003年52 这一段中引用的每天通行车辆数据引自 CMDA文件《CMA交通基础设施的投资计划》（“Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA”）（未标日期，约为 2003年 3月）。53 Source: Chennai Traffic Police, “Steps taken …”, July 2003.53 来源：钦奈交通警察局，《采取的步骤…》， 2003年 7月。

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间下降到 3700次，其中约 400人死亡，2800人受伤。钦奈城市交通警察局，下属47个警察所和 2000警察，成为一个强有力的机构。他们保持了积极行动性，不仅仅考虑交通安全和交通管理，而且关心中长期的交通（基础设施）投资项目。21. Parking provision and management are in infancy, but the subject has made it to the political agenda.54 Most vehicles park without any control, on pavements and/or sidewalks. In Chennai City, there are some 160 street “stretches” with authorized parking, with fees charged at 69 of them. There are no meters. The Chennai Municipal Corporation leases the collection of parking fees to the private sector, with an annual revenue of about Rs 30 million (US$0.63 million). Cars pay Rs 2 for short-term parking and Rs 20 for the whole day. Two-wheelers pay about half that, and bikes are free. This initiative suffers from numerous problems: poor markings and information boards, encroachment by street traders, and overcharging and pilferage by fee collectors. Off street parking for general public use is available only at the railway stations, the airport and in the beach area.21．停车提供和管理也处于起步阶段，但是问题本身却属于政治议程。54 很多车辆没有限制地在路上和/或人行道上停车。在钦奈城市，约有 160条街道是授权停车的，每处收费 69卢比。没有收费计。钦奈市将停车收费租给私营资本操作，年收入约为 3000万卢比（63万美元）。轿车为短时间停车支付 2卢比，一整天则需要20卢比。两轮车收费半价，自行车免费。这一行动产生了很多问题：记号和信号牌很差、街头小贩占道、收费者随意乱收费和偷盗。大众使用的路外停车只在铁路车站、机场和海滩区域才有。E. Chennai Metropolitan Transport Corporation (CMTC)E. 钦奈都市交通公司（CMTC）22. CMTC was created in 1972, under Companies Act of 1956, in a wave of nationalization of the then private operators, whose performance had become unacceptable. It is owned by the State of Tamil Nadu, which appoints all members of its Board of Directors. CMTC operates conventional, scheduled bus services, with a staff of about 18,000 and a fleet of about 2,780 buses (2,200-2,400 in peak service).55 Most buses are single-deck Ashok-Leylands built on a truck chassis. The average fleet age as of the end-2003 is 6.2 years; 950 buses are older than 8 years and would be replaced if the company’s finances allowed it. The two tables on the following page provide the main

54 A comprehensive study of parking in Chennai Metropolitan Area, including the development of standards, policies and regulative framework, is being carried out by Wilbur Smith Associates. Numbers cited in this paragraph come from early reports from the study team.54 Wilbur Smith协会正在对钦奈都市区停车进行全面研究，包括标准开发、政策和规范框架。这一段引用的数据都来自这一研究团队的早期报告。55 This is comparable to 2,103 buses that CMTC had in 1982-83, and about twice the fleet at the founding. The population of Chennai increased 29% between 1981 and 2001. Source: Pallavan Transport Consultants, Route Rationalization Study, MTC Chennai, 2001.55 比较 CMTC在 1982-1983年间的 2103辆公交车，并且约有两倍数量的车辆在造。1981年到 2001年间，钦奈人口增加了 29%。来源：Pallavan交通咨询，钦奈MTC路线合理化研究，2001年。

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operating and financial statistics of the company for the last two years, including performance indicators. 22．CMTC于 1972年按照 1956年公司法案成立，当时因为私营运营商业绩太差，兴起了国有化的风潮。公司由泰米尔纳德邦所有，由其指定董事会所有成员。CMTC运营常规的定期公交服务，约有员工 18000人，公交车 2780辆（高峰服务时 2200-2400辆）。55 大多数公交车都是单层车，由Ashok-Leylands在载重汽车底盘上建造。到 2003年底，平均车辆使用年限为 6.2年；其中 950辆车年限超过 8年，如果公司财政允许的话会考虑更换新车辆。下一页的两个表格列出了公司过去两年内主要的运营和财政统计数据，包括性能指标。

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Metropolitan Transport Corporation LTD – Chennai都市交通有限公司——钦奈Selected operational and financial statistics选择运营和财政统计数据

2001-02 2002-03Staff 员工 18859 18391Operable fleet (vehicles) 可运营车辆 2834 2773Fleet in service (vehicles) 服务车辆 2213 2248Average fleet age (years) 平均使用年限 5.8 6.14Gross bus-km (million) 总公交公里行程（百万） 205.8 213.5Passengers (million) 乘客（百万） 1311.4 1280.7Passengers per day (million) 每天乘客（百万） 3.6 3.5

Costs (Rs million)成本（百万卢比） Wages 工资 2093.4 2249.6 Fuel 燃油 1040.7 1190.5 Materials 材料 287.1 269.4 Taxes 税 49.1 50.8 Other 其他 146.5 207.1 Financial charges 财政收费 170.9 166.3 Depreciation 折旧 180.4 134.2 sub-total costs 成本小计 3968.2 4267.8

Revenues (Rs million) 收入（百万卢比） fare sales 车票出售 3223.7 3830.5 other income 其他收入 135.3 72.4 profit on sale of assets 资产出售利润 0.7 4.1 Compensation 补偿 512.7 738.9 sub-total revenues 收入小计 3872.3 4645.9

Result (Rs million) before tax 税前结果（百万卢比） -95.8 378.2

Metropolitan Transport Corporation LTD – Chennai都市交通有限公司——钦奈Selected performance indicators选择性能指标

2001-02 2002-03Fleet utilization (%) 车队利用率（%） 78.1 81.1Average daily km per bus 每辆车日均公里数 248 250

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Staff per bus 平均每车员工 6.7 6.6Average monthly wage (Rs) 平均月工资（卢比） 9250 10193Wage bill (% of total costs)工资总额（占总成本比例%） 53 53Breakdowns per 10,000 km每 1万公里故障次数 2.34 2.05Accidents per 100,000 km每 1万公里事故次数 0.18 0.14Cost recovery from fares车票所得成本回收率 % of direct op. costs直接运营成本% 89 97 % of total costs 总成本% 81 90

23. In addition to ordinary services (60% of bus-km), CMTC operates, limited-stop and express services (30% of total bus-km) and de luxe services (10%). It carries an estimated 3.5-3.8 million passenger trips per day, which is in decline in spite of the population growth and increasing mobility rates. Buses run in mixed traffic, with exception of Anna Salai, where there is an exclusive bus lane provided along about 2.5 km on each side of the road.56 Average peak service headways are 15 min on arterial roads and 30 min on less important roads. The average commercial speed is 16 km/h.23．除了常规服务（60%的公交公里数）之外，CMTC还运营停靠站数较少和直达车服务（总公交公里数的 30%）以及豪华服务（10%）。估计每天运营乘客人次达到 350-380万，尽管人口增长、流动性增强，公交服务却在衰落。公交车混在车流中运营，只有在安纳萨莱是例外，在约 2.5公里长的道路两侧有专用公交车道。56

平均高峰服务间隔为主干道 15分钟，次要道路上 30分钟。平均运营速度为 16公里/时。24. CMTC has always been considered as one of the best-run urban public transport companies in India (together with BEST-Mumbai and Bangalore MTC in recent years). Performance indicators show reasonable levels of fleet utilization, maintenance and safety, though with much room for improvement. The weakest part of the performance profile is staffing which, at 6.6 staff per bus, is twice the efficient European levels and approaches that of Chinese, public-owned urban bus companies. In addition, the average expenditure of Rs.9,000-10,000 places CMTC employees in a significantly higher

56 This is a residual of a Rs.1,540 million (about US$40 million at that time) project for a 6.5 km rapid busway on the same street, which was developed to the stage of detailed design in the late 1990s, but was stopped before tendering because the funding agreement broke down. See V. Thamizh Arasan (2000) for additional details.56 这是一个 15.4亿卢比（当时约合 4000万美元）项目的剩余部分。该项目计划在同一条道路建设一条 6.5公里的快速公交车道，在 90年代末发展到详细设计阶段，但在公开招标前因为融资协议破裂而停止。更多细节参见V. Thamizh Arasan（2000）。

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income category than the majority of its passengers. The wage bill is a high proportion of total costs for a country with high levels of unemployment and informal employment.24．CMTC一向被认为是印度运营最好的城市公共交通公司之一（最近几年还有孟买 BEST和班加罗尔MTC）。性能指标表明，车队利用率、维护和安全性还可以，尽管还有很大提高空间。性能指标中最差的一项是员工，平均每辆车达到 6.6名员工，这一数字是有效欧洲水平的两倍，接近中国公有城市公交公司的水平。而且，9000-10000卢比的平均支出让 CMTC员工收入比大多数乘客要高得多。在印度这样一个失业率和非正规就业率很高的国家，公司工资总额占总成本的很高比例。25. The financial situation of CMTC, as reflected in its balance sheet, is not good: its working capital is negative, accounts payable are high and growing, and more than half of the company’s debt is short-term. The finances of CMTC have been subject to vagaries of fare policies dictated by the state government, the scale and timing of compensation payments for discount tickets and uneconomical routes, as well as the relations between the state and the organized labor. The state policy generally has been to keep the fares low on the account of low incomes of the population, make up the gap in the operating income through compensation payments, and the capital budget through subsidies. This has ensured that the services remained at a very basic level, acceptable to the majority of passengers while the level of motorization was low. This position of course is in the process of rapid change. In the last two years, following some much-needed fare increases, CMTC has come close to breaking even with revenue derived from fares at traditional levels of service. The gap of 10% could be closed even within the present regulatory arrangement with twin actions on the cost side and revenue side. If, however, CMTC tried to raise its level of service, a major restructuring effort would be necessary in several dimensions.25．如收支平衡表所示，CMTC的财政情况并不好：其运营资本为负值，应付款数额很高而且在不断增加，公司半数以上的债务都是短期的。CMTC的财政情况主要是因为邦政府的反复票价政策，对打折车票以及不盈利路线的补偿支付规模和时间，以及邦和工会工人之间的关系。邦政策一向为了低收入人口而保持低票价，通过补偿支付弥补运营收入的差距，以及给予补贴弥补资本预算。这使服务仅停留在基本水平，在机动化水平较低的时候大多数乘客还认为可以接受。这一立场显然经历了快速的变化。在过去 2年，在必要的票价增加之后，在传统的服务水平基础上，CMTC基本可以从车票收入中保持收支平衡。在目前的规范安排内，在成本和收入方面采取相应行动就可以缩小这 10%的差距。然而，如果 CMTC想要改善服务水平，在多方面都要进行较大的调整努力。26. The CMTC has had a monopoly position, which is now under question. A wave to bring the private sector back into public transport services started in 2002 and was immediately opposed by the unions, who are arguing for an increased public investment in the sector. The specific proposal in this instance is the introduction of out-sourcing bus services to private operators using a “kilometer scheme” (gross cost contract) as in Bangalore. The matter is now in courts, with a State High Court ruling expected within

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months (early in 2004). As an interim relief measure, some 250 minibuses have been licensed to provide services in peripheral areas of the CMA.26．CMTC处于垄断地位，这是个问题。2002年开始兴起了将私营资本重新引入公共交通服务的浪潮；而这立即遭到了工会的反对，并争论要在行业内增加公有投资。此时具体提出向私营运营商外包公交服务，像班加罗尔一样采用“公里计划”（总成本合同）。这一目前正在法庭讨论，预计几个月内（2004年初）邦高等法院就会宣判。作为临时过渡措施，约 250辆小型公交获得许可在 CMA外围区域运营。F. Commuter Rail ServicesF．通勤火车服务27. The Indian Railways enters the city along three lines, all converging on the Georgetown area. Their combined corridor length is 117.8 km. The broad-gauge north-bound line from Chennai Central to Ennore and Gummidipoondi (46.8 km, 13 stations) has double tracks dedicated to suburban operations. The west-bound line, also broad-gauge, from Chennai central to Tiruvallur (42 km away, 17 stations), has 4 lines for about 15 km and 3 lines thence to Tiruvallur. The third line, in the south-western alignment, from Chennai Beach to Tambaram is 29 km long (18 stations) and has a mixture of meter-gauge and broad-gauge lines, two dedicated to suburban operations and one for all trains. The process of conversion to broad gauge is underway. In the outer parts of the metropolitan area, some rail stations have become industrial and/or residential sub-centers, demonstrating the potential of this mode to become a backbone of the regional and urban transport network. At present, however, rail lines carry only an estimated 643,000 passengers per day.57 This passenger density (1.9 million passengers/km/annum) is comparable to that of the Kolkata Metro, but it could be much higher. It is being held back by the competition from parallel bus lines; unsuitability of services and fares for urban travel patterns, fleet size constraints (themselves imposed by poor financial results) and absence of complementary land use developments.58

27．印度铁路有三条铁路线穿过城市，都集中在 Georgetown区域。总路线长度为117.8公里。宽轨的北行路线从钦奈中部到 Ennore 和Gummidipoondi（长 46.8公里，共 13 站），双轨道适合郊区运行。西行路线，也是宽轨，从钦奈中部到Tiruvallur（长 42公里，17站），前面 15公里是四轨道，然后变成三条轨道。第三条路线沿西南方向，从钦奈海滩到 Tambaram，全长 29公里（18站），既有米轨也有宽轨，两条适合郊区运行，一条能够通行所有火车。正在着手全部改建成宽57 Source for this number is direct communication with Southern Railway. Their web site cites a 2002-2003 traffic of 223.6 million per year, which is the number used to calculate the passenger density/km.57 这一数字直接来源于南部铁路。他们的网站上引用的数字为 2002-2003年间年度运送乘客 2.236亿，该数字用于计算每公里的乘客密度。58 The fact that two transport organizations, both public-owned and both subsidized, compete for passengers, is indicative of weak metropolitan-level transport institutions.58 两个交通企业都是公有且都有补贴，互相竞争乘客，这表明都市层面交通机构的无力。

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轨。在都市区外围，一些铁路车站附近已经成为工业和 /或住宅中心，体现了这种模式作为区域和城市交通网络骨干的潜力。但是在目前，铁路路线每天仅运送约643000名乘客。57 这一乘客密度（190万乘客/公里/年）可以与加尔各答地铁相比，但是本来可以更高。因为平行的公交路线竞争使乘客分流，城市交通方式的服务和票价不相称，车队规模有限（因为财政情况较差），缺乏补充的土地使用发展。58

28. The following table shows partial financial results of these services. The rubric “expenditures” consists of direct operating costs only. Cost recovery has hovered between 50 and 60% of direct operating costs.59

28．下表列举了这些服务的部分财政情况。红色标注的“支出”仅包括直接运营成本。成本回收率一直在直接运营成本的 50%到 60%之间。59

59 Direct operating costs include all wages, energy, parts and services, but do not include depreciation and financial costs. Cost recovery of total operating costs could be of the order of 30% or less.59 直接运营成本包括所有工资、能源、配件和服务，但是不包括折旧和财务成本。总运营成本的成本回收率还不到 30%。

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SOUTHERN RAILWAY南部铁路EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES OF COMMUTER RAIL LINES IN CHENNAI钦奈通勤铁路支出和收入

1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02(in Rs million) （百万卢比）

Broad gauge lines宽轨铁路Expenditures 支出 635.6 721.2 791.5 976.5 998.4Earnings 收入 348.6 370.8 410.3 419.3 482.8Meter gauge line米轨铁路Expenditures 支出 482.4 567.3 641.7 671.7 694.9Earnings 收入 321.3 341.6 379.9 366.6 376.8All lines所有铁路Expenditures 收入 1118 1288.5 1433.2 1648.2 1693.3Earnings 收入 669.9 712.4 790.2 785.9 859.6

Cost recovery (%)成本回收率（%） 59.9 55.3 55.1 47.7 50.8Earnings gap (Rs mn)收入差距（百万卢比） 448.1 576.1 643 862.3 833.7

Source: Southern Railway, 5 Dec 2003来源：南部铁路，2003年 12月 5日Because of the strong pressure to keep monthly fares low, especially for long-distance commuting, to assist workers seeking jobs in the informal sector but unable to move residence, the Railway tried increasing tickets for single fares only to see its traffic erode to cheaper bus lines. Over years, the Railway subsidized these losses, and made direct investments in electrification, gauge conversion, double-tracking, extension, rolling stock replacement, and other improvements on these lines. This policy has been discontinued in part; new co-financing arrangements with the State of Tamil Nadu are sought for all extensions as it is being done with the Phase II of the MRTS in Chennai (see below).因为面临控制月度票价低廉的强大压力，尤其是降低长距离通勤票价，帮助在城市非正规就业但无力搬家的工人，增加单程铁路票价的铁路发现乘客流失向更便宜的公交路线。这些年来，铁路部补贴损失，并直接投资电气化、宽轨改造、双轨道、延伸、车辆替换以及其他改进。这一政策部分停止了，正在寻求与泰米尔纳德邦的合作投资安排，如钦奈MRTS第二阶段一样（见下文）。G. The Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS)G．捷运系统（MRTS）

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29. The MRTS as it is today is considered to be Phase I of a larger, 4-phase project. If and when completed, the line would make a ring around the city, with interchanges with south-west and west bound commuter rail lines.29．MRTS是一个大型四阶段项目的第一阶段。完成之后，整个路线将环绕城市周围，可与西南方向和西行通勤火车换乘。30. The present 8.6 km, 1,676 mm gauge, double-track line, was conceived in 1970’s, when Chennai’s population grew at exceptionally high rates. It was approved by the Planning Commission and the Railway Board in 1983-84, as a fully-funded investment of the Government of India, to be implemented and eventually operated by the Southern Railway department of Indian Railways. The Ministry of Railways provided all technical support. The cars were constructed by Integral Coach Factory (Chennai based). The construction (including rolling stock) cost was forecast at Rs.535 million (in 1980 terms). When Phase I was completed in 1997, 20 years after its conception, the total cost came to Rs.2,690 million60. Government of Tamil Nadu contributed about 20 hectares of land, including 0.5 ha of private land. Land acquisition problems were formidable though the alignment was chosen to minimize this.61 About 3,500 families were affected by the project and received a total Rs.60 million in compensation.30．上世纪 70年代，钦奈的人口增长率非常快，当时就有了建造目前这条 8.6公里长 1676毫米宽的宽轨双轨道铁路的设想。1983-1984年获得铁路规划委员会批准，印度政府全面投资，由印度铁路的南部铁路部执行并负责建成后运营。铁路部提供所有技术支持。车厢由 Integral Coach Factory公司（位于钦奈）负责建造。建造（包括车辆）成本预计为 5.35亿卢比（1980年水平）。当 1997年第一阶段完成时，距设想提出已经过去了 20年，总成本也达到 26.90亿卢比。60 泰米尔纳德邦拿出了20公顷土地，包括 0.5公顷私人土地。尽管尽量减少土地征用，这一问题仍然非常棘手。61 约有 3500个家庭受到项目影响，并受到了总额 6000万卢比的补偿。31. The line is partly elevated (5.8 km out of 8.6 km total) and has 8 stations, 5 of which are elevated. It starts at the Chennai beach, near Fort St. George and Chennai Central stations (without a direct interchange), and goes straight south till Thirumylai, literally perched on the banks of the Buckingham Canal, and in the walking distance from the Bay. MRTS runs 90 trains per day, with 15 min headways in the peak and 30 min off peak. It was designed for a maximum load of 600,000 passengers per day, but carries only about 9,000.62 This is due to its poor location relative to sources and destinations of

60 Source: Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Draft Annual Report 2000-2001, p. 36-37. The source states only the aggregate nominal construction cost. Since exchange rates varied significantly over this long construction period, it is necessary to have the exact expenditure pattern (e.g. semi-annual or annual payments) to recalculate the total in constant 1980 terms.60 来源：钦奈都市发展局，2000-2001年报草案，36-37页。来源中仅仅说明了总建造成本。因为在如此长期的建造过程中汇率改变了很多，有必要根据准确的支出方式（如，半年或年度支付）来按照 1980年的水平重新计算总额。61 Source: Rajan et al, Joint Venture of State and National Governments …” p. 32661 来源：Rajan等《邦和国家政府合资…》，326页。

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passengers, especially the low-density area between the line and the Bay, the proximity of parallel and fare-competitive bus lines, and poor feeder/interchange facilities.63

31．路线上部分是高架（总长 8.6公里中 5.8公里长的部分），共有 8站，其中 5个站是高架。路线开端位于圣乔治要塞和钦奈中央车站（没有直接换乘）附近的钦奈海滩，向正南方到 Thirumylai，基本沿白金汉运河堤岸，离孟加拉湾也只是走路的距离。MRTS每天有 90辆火车运行，高峰时段间隔 15分钟，非高峰时段间隔 30分钟。路线设计最大载客量为每天 600000人次，但是实际每天仅运送 9000人次。62这是因为与资源和乘客目的地相关的地段不佳，尤其是在路线和海湾之间的低人口密度区域；与接近的公交路线票价竞争；以及提供者/分配者设施不好。63

32. Separate financial data for the MRTS could not be obtained for this report. Fares (cited above) are marginally higher than for other commuter rail lines. The fare revenue is said to cover the cost of energy and materials. The cost recovery is likely to be significantly lower than that shown above for the aggregate rail operation. 32．这份报告中没有MRTS的单独财政数据。车票（上文引用）比其他通勤火车稍微高一点。据说车票收入能够平衡能源和材料的成本。成本回收率可能比上文提到的总体铁路运营要低得多。 33. Phase II, to the industrial estate at Velacheri in the south-west, has been under construction since 1998. It will be elevated along 7.9 km, out of its 11.2 km total and have 7 elevated and 2 at-grade stations. Its construction costs are forecast at Rs.6.05 billion rupees (about US$126 million at end-2003 exchange rates), of which the Government of India will contribute one-third and Tamil Nadu two-thirds.64 The latter will also contribute 100 ha of state-owned land and about 9 ha of private land. The compensation, expected to involve about 2,500 households, will be about Rs.250 million (US$5.2 million). Expectations are that the complete Phase I and II sections will carry 29,600 passengers per hour per direction (during peak periods) in 122 trains, and carry an average daily total of 424,000 passengers. This corresponds to a passenger density of 6.4

62 These are 2002-2003 data obtained directly from the Southern Railway. Other sources cited 7,000 passengers per day in 2001, with subsequent increases of as much as 50% on monthly basis, in late 2002, due to bus strikes and fare hikes, reflecting a high price elasticity of demand.62 这是从南部铁路直接获得的 2002-2003年数据。其他来源引用称 2001年日均 7000人次，随后因为公交罢工和车票涨价，在 2002年末每月增加 50%，反映了价格弹性需求。63 Source: “On the wrong track”, The Hindu, 28 September 2003. In 2002, CMDA commissioned a study addressing the potential for densification of the MRTS Phase I corridor: L&T Ramboll Consulting Engineers, Final Report for the Densification Study, July 2003.63 来源：《徒报》2003年 9月 28日《在错误的轨道上》（“On the wrong track”）。在 2002年，CMDA进行了一项研究，关注MRTS第一阶段路线乘客密度增加的潜力：L&T Ramboll咨询工程，稠化研究最终报告，2003年 7月。64 Another CMDA brochure cites a higher construction cost forecast for Phase II, Rs.6.89 billion (US$143.5 million; $12.82 million per route-km).64 另一份 CMDA手册中提到第二阶段的建设成本预计更高，达到 68.9亿卢比（1.435亿美元，每公里 1282万美元）。

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million per line km per year, close to that of the Beijing Metro and somewhat higher than that of the Paris Metro (network-wide). This appears less than likely.33．通往西南部工业区 Velacheri的第二阶段从 1998年开始建设。总长 11.2公里，其中 7.9公里高架，有 7个高架车站和 2个平面车站。预计建设成本为 60.5亿卢比（按 2003年底汇率约合 1.26亿美元），印度政府支付 1/3，泰米尔纳德邦支付2/3。64 泰米尔纳德邦还贡献了 100公顷的国有土地以及 9公顷的私有土地。这将影响约 2500个家庭，预计补偿为 2.5亿卢比（520万美元）。预计第一阶段和第二阶段一共能运营 122辆火车，（高峰时段）每小时每个方向运送 29600名乘客，每天运送乘客 424000人次。这就意味着每年每条路线上每公里乘客密度为 640万，接近北京地铁，比巴黎地铁（整个网络）稍高一点。这不太可能。34. Phase III, just 5 km long, would connect the MRTS with the south-west commuter rail line at St. Thomas Mount station. This is expected to cost Rs.3.78 billion (US$78.8 million). The Government of Tamil Nadu is seeking a participation from the Government of India for this phase, using the same formula as for Phase II. 34．第三阶段仅长 5公里，将在 St. Thomas Mount 车站将MRTS与西南方向的通勤火车路线连接起来。预计成本 37.8亿卢比（7880万美元）。泰米尔纳德邦寻求印度政府参与这一阶段，采用和第二阶段一样的模式。H. InstitutionsH．机构35. The key state-level transport institutions active in Chennai, and their subordinate city institutions, are as follows:35．钦奈主要的邦层次交通机构及其下属城市机构，如下： Department of Highways and Rural Works, responsible for state roads located in

Chennai, essentially the three main radial roads plus the Inner Ring; 高速公路和农村工作部，负责钦奈内的国道，实际上就是三条主要辐射路线

加内环； Municipal Administration and Water Supply, responsible for Chennai Municipal

Corporation (CMC), including the activities of its Commissioner related to roads, waste collection, etc. (and for corresponding departments in municipalities and town panchayats outside Chennai City). CMC is responsible for all non-state roads in the city. In addition, through an agreement with the State Department of Highways, CMC takes care of maintenance of stet roads.

市政行政和供水，负责钦奈市（ CMC ），包括公路、垃圾收集等专门活动（以及钦奈市外的都市和城镇村务委员会中相应的部）。CMC负责城市内所有非国道的公路。此外，通过与邦高速公路部协议，CMC也管理国道维护。

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Transport Department, responsible for Chennai Metropolitan Transport Corporation, and for setting government policy in the urban public transport sector;

交通部，负责钦奈都市交通公司，制定城市公共交通的政府政策； Home Department, responsible (through Commissioner, Transport) for transport

regulation and motor vehicle regulation, and (through Traffic Police) for traffic control, traffic management and law enforcement; Chennai City Traffic Police works within the Corporation boundary, while District Police work in the metropolitan area;

内政部，负责（通过交通专员）交通规范和机动车规范，并（通过交通警察局）负责交通控制、交通管理和执法；钦奈城市交通警察局在市范围内工作，而地区警察局负责都市区；

Housing and Urban Development Department, through Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA), responsible for all transport planning and programming; also, through Town and Country Planning Department, responsible for urban and transport planning outside Chennai Metropolitan Area;

住宅和城市发展部，通过钦奈都市发展局（ CMDA ），负责所有交通规划和设计，通过城乡规划部，负责钦奈都市区外的城市和交通规划；

Tamil Nadu Urban Finance and Infrastructure Development Corporation , a parastatal owned by the state government, functions as a transitional bank for local governments, with funds drawn from various national funds (see below), international financial institutions (including the World Bank), and private sources.

泰米尔纳部城市财政和基础设施发展公司，是邦政府所有的半国营企业，类似地方政府的过渡银行，其资金来自不同国家基金（见下文）、国际财政机构（包括世界银行）以及私营资本。

36. The key planning institution is CMDA, the statutory planning body for the entire metropolitan area, acting under the authority of Town and Country Planning Act 1971. It is responsible for: (i) preparing the master plan (land use and supporting infrastructure) (ii) preparing detailed plans and investment projects in housing, sites and services, transport and other urban sectors; (iii) project implementation and/or coordination; (iv) overseeing private investments to ensure consistency with the master plan; (v) commissioning diverse studies; and (vi) acting as nodal agency for national funding institutions, such as Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) and Megacities Scheme. CMDA has a staff of about 900 arranged into units according to broad planning and development functions. Some units are spatially defined (e.g. area plans), others by sector (e.g. infrastructure planning unit, covering roads and public transport), or by output (e.g. a master planning unit. Committees are used to deal with focus subjects, e.g. Traffic Improvement Committee, set up in 1996 to deal with the acute traffic congestion. The first Master Plan was completed in 1975 (horizon 1991) and approved by the state government. The Second Master Plan (horizon 2011) was completed and approved by CMDA in 1994-95, and released in printed form, but the

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subsequent debate involving all levels of government, NGOs and others has lasted years, delaying the final state government approval.36．CMDA是主要规划机构，也是整个都市区的法定规划机构，根据 1971年城乡规划法令行动。主要负责：(i) 编写总体规划（土地使用和支持基础设施）；(ii) 编写住宅建设、场所和服务、交通和其他城市部门的详细计划和投资项目； (iii) 项目执行和/或协调；(iv) 监查私营投资保证总体规划的一致性；(v) 进行不同研究；及(vi) 作为国家资金机构的下属机构，如住宅和城市发展公司（HUDCO）和大城市计划。CMDA约有员工 900名员工工作在根据主要规划和发展职责的部门。一些部门是由空间确定（如区域计划），一些是根据部门划分（如基础设施规划部门、涵盖公路和公共交通）；或者根据产出划分（如总体规划部）。委员会负责处理焦点问题，如 1996年成立的交通改进委员会，处理敏感的交通拥堵问题。第一份总体规划于 1975年完成（眼界 1991）并得到邦政府批准。CMDA于 1994-1995年完成并通过了第二份总体规划（眼界 2011），并发表了印刷版本，但是随后各级政府、非政府组织和其他的辩论持续了好几年，延迟了邦政府的批准。37. CMDA has been the most active local institution in the field of urban transport. In 1991 it commissioned what would prove to be the most important transport planning study, Chennai Comprehensive Transport and Traffic Study (finished in 1995, see below). Later on, it produced a Traffic Action Plan for Chennai, which has been the basis for much of the work done with the World Bank and proposed for the future.37．CMDA是城市交通领域内最活跃的地方机构。1991年，它进行了随后被认为是最重要的交通规划研究——钦奈全面运输和交通研究（1995年完成，见下文）。后来，它编写了钦奈交通行动计划，是与世行很多相关工作和未来提议的基础。38. Major urban transport projects in which CMDA was involved with World Bank finance (through a sequence of 2 Madras Urban Development Projects, then 2 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Projects) include:38．CMDA参与的由世界银行投资的主要城市交通项目（通过连续 2个马德拉斯城市发展项目，2个泰米尔纳德邦城市发展项目）包括： the 11.7 km Inner Ring Road; 11.7公里的内环公路； at-grade and multi-grade interchanges between state roads such as Anna Salai

with non-state roads and railways; 国道如安纳萨莱和非国道及铁路的平面和多级立交桥； pedestrian subways; 人行地道； widening 21 km of national highways (inclusive of separate bike lanes and

pedestrian platforms); 拓宽 21公里的国家高速公路（包括单独的自行车道和人行道）； 3 major and 7 smaller river bridges;

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3条主要和 7条较小的跨河桥； fleet augmentation for MTC, involving 1,170 buses. MTC车辆增加，包括 1170辆公交。39. In addition, CMDA contributed to planning and executing the MRTS project Phase I, and the bus-and-truck terminal at Madhavaram. Its work on MRTS is continuing during Phase II and III, including also efforts to increase the land use density in the Phase I and II corridors so as to increase the patronage of the system (study completed in 2003). CMDA also pilots the effort to construct an Outer Ring Road in Chennai, apparently including a provision for a rail rapid transit line (see below).39．此外，CMDA也参与了MRTS项目第一阶段的规划和执行，以及Madhavaram的公交卡车终点站建设。它还继续参与MRTS的第二阶段和第三阶段建设，包括增加第一阶段和第二阶段路线的土地使用密度，以及增加系统乘客人数（2003年完成研究）。CMDA也率先在钦奈建设了外环公路，包括提供快速铁路路线（见下文）。40. The most important national institution active in CMA’s transport matters is Southern Railway, a zonal department of India Railways, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Railways.65 Southern Railway operates the commuter rail lines as well as Chennai MRTS, including decisions on service parameters and fares, and all maintenance. It is also responsible for replacement and expansion investments for the entire rail system.40．处理 CMA交通问题的最重要国家机构是南部铁路，属于印度铁路的下属部门，由铁路部管辖。65 南部铁路运营通勤火车路线以及钦奈MRTS，包括决定服务参数和票价及所有维护。它也负责全部铁路系统的替换和扩展投资。41. The Government of India has set up several instruments to participate in funding urban projects, including urban transport projects. The longest-established approach has been to provide funding for large individual projects through the Planning Commission. Chennai MRTS Phase I was funded in this manner. A more recent approach, conceived in the wake of adopting the 74th CA, has been to finance urban expenditures by state or local governments through a plethora of funds, such as Megacity Scheme, Urban Reform Incentive Fund, and City Challenge Fund and Pool Financing. All of these are active in Chennai.41．印度政府采取了一些方法参与投资城市项目，包括城市交通项目。最长久的方式就是通过规划委员会对大型单个项目提供资金。钦奈 MRTS第一阶段就是以这种方式投资的。最近的方式是仿效 74th CA，由邦或地方政府通过过多资金投资65 Ministry of Railways is by law responsible for all rail based systems, national and metropolitan. The budget for the MRTS in Chennai was not processed as a separate project but as a part of the Ministry of Railway’s budget. See Rajan et al (1998), p. 323.65 根据法律，铁路部负责国家和都市所有的铁路系统。钦奈MRTS预算不是作为单独项目处理的，而是作为铁路部预算的一部分。参见 Rajan等（1998），323页。

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城市支出，如大城市计划，城市改革动机基金，城市挑战基金和基金联营。钦奈采取了所有这些方式。I. Transport Planning and StrategyI．交通规划和战略42. The first Comprehensive Transport and Traffic Study for the city was done in1970-74 (by MATSU Consultants). This was the era when motorization levels were low and public transport modes were predominant. Its most visible recommendations therefore included improvements of the three suburban rail lines, and the construction of the MRTS, this last meant to grow into an orbital railway, plus an augmentation of the bus fleet. The MATSU study’s road recommendations included an Inner Ring Road and a package of (road) corridor improvements. These propositions were afterward taken up in greater detail and implemented to the degree allowed by the available funds. The Inner Ring road was constructed with part-financing from the World Bank, the commuter rail lines were upgraded, but only a fragment of the MRTS (Phase I) could be built.42．钦奈的第一份全面运输和交通研究于 1970-1974年完成（由MATSU咨询进行）。当时机动化水平还很低，公共交通模式占主导地位。因此最明显的建议包括改进三条郊区铁路路线，建设 MRTS，建成环形铁路，加上增加公交车辆。MATSU研究的公路建议包括内环公路和一系列（公路）路线改进。随后，这些建议更加细化，并在经费允许的条件下执行了相应的部分。内环公路的建设资金部分来自世界银行，通勤火车路线更新了，但MRTS只建设了一部分（第一阶段）。43. The next and the latest transport development (master) plan was produced during 1991-1995 under the Chennai Comprehensive Transport and Traffic Study (CTTS), by RITES, Pallavan and Kirloskar Consultants (CTTS Final Report, September 1995). The study combined investment, policy and institutional recommendations at varying levels of detail. Its key tangible output was a 10-year program of 25 schemes consisting of road and intersections improvements, costing about Rs 1.01 billion in 1995 terms (US$ 32.2 at the then exchange rate). The program was divided into 6 groups: flyovers; rail crossings; pedestrian subways; road widening; traffic management schemes; and parking schemes. Pre-feasibility analyses were carried out for most large items from this list. Since many, if not most, of these investment have not been implemented, due to a lack of funds, an effort is underway to update demand and modal split estimates from the CTTS and re-check the attractiveness of the recommended investments.43．下一步，也是最近的一步交通发展（总体）规划，是 1991-1995 年由RITES，Pallavan 和 Kirloskar 咨询进行的钦奈全面运输和交通研究（CTTS）（CTTS最终报告，1995年 9月）。研究综合了不同详细程度的投资、政资和制度建议。主要的切实产出是一项 10年项目，包括 25项改进公路和交叉路口的计划，按 1995年水平成本为 10.1 亿卢比（按当时汇率为 3220万美元）。项目分为 6组：立交桥、铁路道口、人行地道、道路拓宽、交通管理计划以及停车计划。这一列表上很多大项都进行过初步可行性分析。即使其中没有大多数，也有很多投资因为缺

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乏资金还没有执行，目前正在努力更新 CTTS的需求和模式分化估计，重新审核这些推荐投资的吸引力。44. The CTTS also tested some longer-term investment scenarios, essentially large-scale road, busway and rail projects. The recommended variant included the following: (i) extension of the MRTS (Phase II), to Taramani (or Velacheri); (ii) an exclusive busway on Anna Salai; (iii) a third commuter rail track on the North line up to Minjur; (iv) a National Highway Bypass (Outer Ring Road); and (v) rail ring road from Vilivakkam (on the Western line) to Taramani.66 The package was to be implemented by 2011 and estimated to cost Rs 9.3 billion (US$297 million), excluding rail vehicles. 67 Of these, MRTS Phase II is under construction. The Outer Ring Road, 62 km long, from Valadur in the south to Minjur in the north, is now estimated to cost Rs.4.5 billion (about US$ 94 million).68 Phase I, from Vandalur on the Grand Southern Trunk to Tiruvallur Road (29.2 km), is being designed and works are expected commence in the nearest future. Anna Salai Busway and the rail ring were not done, and appear abandoned.69

44．CTTS也测验过一些长期投资项目的设想，实际上是大规模公路、公交车道和铁路项目。推荐选择包括如下： (i) 扩展 MRTS（第二阶段）到 Taramani（或Velacheri）；(ii) Anna Salai专用公交车道；(iii) 在北部修建第三条通勤火车轨道到Minjur； (iv) 国家高速公路旁路（外环公路）；和 (v) 从 Vilivakkam（西线）Taramani的铁路环线。66 这些将计划在 2011前执行，估计成本为 93亿卢比（2.97亿美元），不包括火车车辆。67 其中，MRTS的第二阶段正在建设中。外环公路长 62公里，从南边 Valadur到北部Minjur，现在估计需要成本 45亿卢比（约9400万美元）。68 第一阶段，从南部大干道 Vandalur到 Tiruvallur公路（29.2公66 Elsewhere in recommendations (CTTS, Final Report, p. 171), busways were proposed not only on Anna Salai, but also on Inner Ring Road between St. Thomas Mount and Koyambedu/Anna Nagar, and on EVR Periyar Salai. For reasons not explained in the text, only Anna Salai busway was tested as part of five alternative long-term packages.66 建议的其他部分（CTTS，最终报告，171页）中，不仅在 Anna Salai，在 St. Thomas Mount和Koyambedu/Anna Nagar之间的内环公路，EVR Periyar Salai也提议建设公交车道。文中没有说明原因，但在 5条其他长期选择中，只测验了Anna Salai公交车道。67 MRTS Phase I had not yet been completed when these recommendations were made. The Final Report does not cite any standard economic indicators.67 在提出这些建议时，MRTS第一阶段还没有建成。最终报告没有引用任何标准经济指标。68 The conversion of current rupees into US$ is done uniformly using an exchange rate of Rs.48 per dollar.68 目前卢比和美元的转换使用的汇率是 48卢比对 1美元。69 The most recent development, not a part of CTTS recommendations, is a proposal to construct a metro roughly in the Anna Salai corridor. This is a part of the forward wave spreading from an apparently successful financial arrangement to construct the Delhi metro. The same venture produced a proposal for a metro in Bangalore, and is now reported to be in negotiations with the state government to carry out a feasibility study for Chennai.69 最近的发展是提议在 Anna Salai附近建设一条地铁。这并不属于 CTTS建议。在见证德里地铁的成功财政情况后，全国掀起了兴建地铁的热潮。同一家公司提议在班加罗尔建造地铁，目前据说正在谈判中。邦政府将则进行钦奈地铁可行性研究。

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里），正在设计之中，预计近期会动工。Anna Salai公交车和铁路环线没有开始建设，好像是放弃了。69

45. In 2003, CMDA produced an update of the investment program put forward in the CTTS and stated the underlying transport strategy.70 The strategy first makes references to a continuing urban planning approach to decongest the city-core, directing urban development along main transport corridors, and moving certain traffic intensive activities away from the central business district. A more flexible zoning regulation is aimed to bring residences, jobs and educational institutions closer. Turning to transport matters, the strategy expresses a preference for: (i) moving people rather than vehicles (with a 70% public transport modal share as a target); and (ii) maximizing the use of the present transport infrastructure. The tangible orientations include the following:45．2003年，CMDA对 CTTS中提出的投资项目做出了更新改进，并说明了根本交通战略。70 战略首先提到了持续的城市规划方法来缓解市中心拥堵，沿主要交通路线进行城市发展，并将某些可能增加交通的行为从中央商业区转移走。采取更灵活的分区规划，旨在让居民区、工作和教育机构更接近。说到交通问题，该战略偏向如下：(i) 让人口流动而不是让车辆流动（目标是公共交通模式占 70%的份额）；(ii)最大化目前交通基础设施使用。可行方法如下： urban rail network will be strengthened and expanded; 加强并扩展城市铁路网络； on the three major radial roads (Anna Salai, Periyar, and Nehru Salai), capacity

will be expanded using area traffic control, promoting bus lanes, and constructing elevated highways in their median;

在三条主要辐射路线上（Anna Salai， Periyar，和 Nehru Salai），通过区域交通控制、推广公交车道并在其中建设高架高速来扩大道路容量；

city roads will be concreted; 用混凝土修筑城市公路； road density in peri-urban areas will be increased “to match the spatial strategy

pursued”; 增加城乡结合区域的公路密度，“与追求的空间战略相匹配”； major bottlenecks in road and rail corridors, such as narrow bridges and at-grade

rail crossings, will be removed; 移除主要的公路和铁路路线瓶颈，如狭窄的桥和平面铁路交叉路口； the role of bus routes as feeders to rail stations, and generally inter-modal

facilities, will be strengthened; and 加强公交路线作为铁路车站乘客供应者的角色，以及普遍各交通模式间换乘

设施70 CMDA’s document Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA is unpublished and undated.70 CMDA文件《CMA交通基础设施投资计划》没有正式发表也没有说明日期。

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new public transport options (LRT, skybus) will be considered in selected corridors.

将考虑在选择路线上新的公共交通选择（轻轨、空中巴士）。46. A few comments on this strategy are in order:46．对这一战略的评论如下： except for the exclusive bus lanes, there is no mention of traffic restraint, e.g. by

using parking charges; this may be an omission by chance, since CMDA has commissioned a comprehensive parking study and there appears much interest in intensifying parking management and charging program;

除了公交专用车道，没有提及交通限制方式，如通过使用停车收费等；这可能是偶然忽略，因为 CMDA已经进行了一次全面的停车研究，并且表现出对加强停车管理和收费项目的极大兴趣；

in spite of the declaration of preference for people (not vehicles) and for non-motorized modes, there are no specific provisions for these modes;

除了表明对行人（非车辆）和非机动车模式的偏向之外，没有对这些模式的具体规定；

bus lanes and the role of buses as feeders are the only mentions of the street-bus mode: is there nothing to be done to improve street-bus services, which carry on the order of 90% of all public transport trips in Chennai;

公交车道和公交作为供应者的角色仅提及路上公交模式：没有提到改善路上公交服务，而这占钦奈所有公共交通行程的 90%；

bus rapid transit, a major urban public transport mode in many mega-cities, is not included as a possibility.

公交捷运系统是很多大城市采用的主要城市公共交通模式，但在这里却没有列入考虑。

47. A summary of the investment program is shown on the table below. It is recognized that the first-year (2003-04) element is largely committed, the three year program (2004-07) is also reasonably firm, while the longer-term element is still in sketch-plan stage. Also, it is noted that the program does not include any investments for the Chennai Metropolitan Transport Corporation. With these qualifications in mind, the following observations can be made:47．下表中列举了投资项目。可以看出，一年（2003-2004年）项目基本完成，三年项目（2004-2007年）也比较稳定，但是长期项目仍处在概图阶段。而且，项目不包括任何对钦奈都市交通公司的投资。考虑到这些条件，可以做出如下结论： the underlying strategic preference is for major rail projects: of the total amount

of US$1,976 million, $762 million (39%) is for the MRTS and $168 million (9%) is for commuter rail lines; combined, this is 48%; if $112.5 million (6%) for the LRT/skybus (both rail-based) is included, the sum is just above one billion dollars (54% of the total);

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潜在的战略是偏向主要铁路项目的：在总额 19.76亿美元的投资中，7.62亿美元（39%）是投向MRTS，1.68亿美元（9%）投向通勤铁路路线，这两项加在一起就占到 48%，如果也包括 1.125亿美元投资的轻轨/空中巴士（都是铁路）项目，总额超过十亿美元（总额的 54%）；

the next preference is for large-scale road projects: US$875 (44%) million is for radial and ring corridors and major interchanges;

第二偏好是大型公路项目：8.75亿美元投资建造辐射和环形路线以及主要换乘点；

everything else gets 4%; roads in peri-urban areas get US$ 4.7 million (compare to $16.7 million for 2 truck terminals);

其他所有项目都得到 4%的投资，城乡结合区域的公路项目投资为 470万美元（而 2个卡车终点站得到投资 1670万美元）；

since it is not likely that Chennai Metropolitan Area would be able to mobilize the resources for a US$2 billion program over the next 10 years, it would be prudent to attach some measure of “attraction” to each element, an economic rate of return or present worth. An investment for which an evaluation was not done, even at a sketch-planning level, should not be included on the list.

钦奈都市区不太可能在未来 10年中动员 20亿美元项目的资源，因此让每个项目都带有一些“吸引力”措施——目前价值的经济回报率，是很明智的。即使是在概图阶段，没有评估过的项目投资都不应该包括在列表上。

48. In sum, the strategy appears to rest on two poles. The first is accommodation with the current and expected motorization in the classic “predict and provide” mode. This is counterbalanced by major capital funds for urban rail -- the most capital-intensive and most risky form of urban public transport. The risk is high enough for the construction cost side of these projects, but is even higher for the operational stage. Both of these should be of particular relevance in Chennai, given the history of long construction periods and relatively low passenger traffic on the commuter rail lines and practically zero traffic on the MRTS Phase I.48．总的来说，这一战略主要有两个支柱点。第一是在经典的“预见和提供”模式下根据目前和未来机动化进行调整。城市铁路主要资本资金平衡了这一点。城市铁路是资金最密集也是风险性最高的城市公共交通形势。这些项目的建设成本就有很高风险，运营阶段则风险更高。考虑到通勤铁路很长的建设阶段和相对少的乘客，以及MRTS第一阶段的几乎零交通，钦奈尤其要考虑这些方面。

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SHORT-TO-MEDIUM INVESTMENT PROGRAM FOR CHENNAI METROPOLITAN AREALength (km) Rs (crore) US$ mn

A. One-year program (2003) MRTS Comm R Prim RdsA.1 Urban rail

Construction Phase II MRTS 11 85.00 17.71 17.71Gauge conversion of suburban rail lines 56 100.00 20.83 20.83

A.2 River bridgesBridge widening across Cooum on P. EVR Salai 3.00 0.63

A.3 Traffic management program 39 11.94 2.49A.4 Widening & strengthening major city roads 32 42.00 8.75 A.5 Strengthening roads in peri-urban areas 57 4.54 0.95 8.75A.6 Detailed design for elevated roads on Anna 0.20 0.04

Salai, Periyar EVR Salai and Nehru Salai Total for 1-year program 246.68 51.39 17.71 20.83 8.75

B. Three-year program (2004-2007)B.1 Urban rail projects

Completion of Phase II MRTS 11 144.00 30.00 30.00Gauge conversion of suburban rail lines 56 355.24 74.01 74.01

B.2 Traffic management program 27 3.00 0.63 B.3 Strengthening roads in peri-urban areas 171 13.62 2.84B.4 Outer Ring Road

Constructing 4-lane rd between NH45 andNH205 29 250.00 52.08 52.08B.5 Widening and strengthening primary roads 901 1711.68 356.60 356.60B.6 Cement concreting of Anna Salai 12 101.32 21.11 B.7 Over and underpasses (37 of them) 817.93 170.40 170.40B.8 River bridges (2 of them) 7.00 1.46B.9 Bus terminal at Tambaram 6.00 1.25B.10 Multistorey garage at T. Nagar (BOT) 48.00 10.00B.11 Study for 2-level elevated roads (A.6 cont'd) 2.80 0.58Total for the 3-year program 1207 3460.59 720.96 30.00 74.01 579.08

C. Long-term measures (5-10 years from 2007)C.1 Strengthen roads in peri-urban areas 56 4.56 0.95C.2 Urban rail projects

Phase II MRTS ext (Velachery to St. Thomas Mount) 5 378.00 78.75 78.75'3rd and4th line between Beach and Ennore 100.00 20.83 20.83Quadrupling between Patabiram & Tiruvalur 250.00 52.08 52.08Phase III MRTS (St. Thomas to Villivakkam) 20 1200.00 250.00 250.00

Phase IV MRTS from Villivakkam to Ennore 20 1800.00 375.00 375.00Phase II MRTS station area development 50.00 10.42

C.3 Elevated urban road projects 44 1126.00 234.58 234.58C.4 Outer Ring Road (4-lane betw NH205 and TPP Road) 33 250.00 52.08 52.08C.5 LRT/Skybus along Periyar EVR Salai 12 540.00 112.50C.6 Truck terminals (1 in Western, 1 in Eastern corridor) 80.00 16.67Total for the 5-10 year program 183 5778.56 1203.87 714.17 72.91 286.66

GRAND TOTAL 9485.83 1976.21 761.88 167.75 874.49

Source: CMDA, Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA, March 2003

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钦奈都市区短中期投资项目长度 (km) 卢比 (千万) 美元（百万）

A. 一年项目 (2003) MRTS 通勤铁路主要公路A.1 城市铁路

MRTS建设第二阶段 11 85.00 17.71 17.71郊区铁路路线宽轨转换 56 100.00 20.83 20.83

A.2 跨河桥P. EVR Salai 上跨Cooum 桥拓宽 3.00 0.63

A.3 交通管理项目 39 11.94 2.49A.4 拓宽和加强主要城市公路 32 42.00 8.75 A.5 加强城乡结合区公路 57 4.54 0.95 8.75A.6 AnnSalai, Periyar EVR Salai和Nehru Salai 0.20 0.04高架公路详细计划

一年项目总计 246.68 51.39 17.71 20.83 8.75

B. 三年项目 (2004-2007)B.1 城市铁路项目完成MRTS第二阶段 11 144.00 30.00 30.00郊区铁路路线宽轨转换 56 355.24 74.01 74.01

B.2交通管理项目 27 3.00 0.63 B.3加强城乡结合区公路 171 13.62 2.84B.4 外环公路在NH45和NH205 建设 4车道公路 29 250.00 52.08 52.08

B.5拓宽和加强主要公路 901 1711.68 356.60 356.60B.6 Anna Salai水泥浇筑 12 101.32 21.11 B.7 过街天桥和人行地道（其中 37处） 817.93 170.40 170.40B.8 跨河桥（其中 2处） 7.00 1.46B.9 Tambaram 公交总站 6.00 1.25B.10 T. Nagar多层车库（BOT模式） 48.00 10.00B.11 2层高架公路研究（续 A6） 2.80 0.58三年项目总计 1207 3460.59 720.96 30.00 74.01 579.08

C. 长期措施 (2007 年起 5-10 年)C.1加强城乡结合区公路 56 4.56 0.95C.2 城市铁路项目

MRTS第二阶段部分 5 378.00 78.75 78.75（Velachery到 St. Thomas Mount）海滩到 Ennore第三和第四条路线 100.00 20.83 20.83Patabiram 和 Tiruvalur 间四倍 250.00 52.08 52.08MRTS第三阶段 (St. Thomas 到 Villivakkam) 20 1200.00 250.00 250.00

MRTS第四阶段从 Villivakkam 到 Ennore 20 1800.00 375.00 375.00MRTS第二阶段车站区域发展 50.00 10.42

C.3 高架城市公路项目 44 1126.00 234.58 234.58C.4外环公路（4-lane NH205和 TPP公路间四车道）33 250.00 52.08 52.08C.5 沿 Periyar EVR Salai 轻轨/空中巴士 12 540.00 112.50C.6 卡车总站 (1处在西部，1处在东部) 80.00 16.675-10 年项目总计 183 5778.56 1203.87 714.17 72.91 286.66

总计 9485.83 1976.21 761.88 167.75 874.49

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来源： CMDA，CMA交通基础设施投资计划，2003年 3月

ATTACHMENT II-B: URBAN TRANSPORT IN BANGALORE 附件 II-B ：班加罗尔城市交通 A. The StateA．所在邦1. The State of Karnataka has a population of 53 million, 33% urban, growing at 1.59% per annum (1991-2001). Its economy grew at 7.5% per annum in the 1990s and is expected to continue at that pace.71 Services as percent of Karnataka’s GDP grew from 40.1% in 1990-91 to 47% in 2000-01.72 The state was ranked second out of a sample of 10 Indian states with regard to the investment climate. In late 1990s, it experienced a fiscal crunch, due to a combination of a recession in the economy, large losses in the power sector (leakage, theft, subsidies to agriculture), a generous settlement of civil service wages; and a peak in debt servicing. A reform program was undertaken aiming to gradually reduce energy subsidies, improve budgetary processes, and a restructuring program for the public administration. 1．卡纳塔克邦拥有 5300 万人口，其中 33%城市人口，年均人口增长率为1.59%（1991-2001年）。上世纪 90年代初经济增长率达到年均 7.5%，预计经济增速会保持这一水平。71 服务业占卡纳塔克邦 GDP的比例从 1990-1991年的 40.1%增长到 2000-2001年的 47%。72 在选取的 10个印度邦中，卡纳塔克邦位居投资环境的第二位。在 90年代末，因为经济衰退、电力部门巨额亏损（泄漏、偷窃、对农业补贴），公务员工资大幅提高、大量贷款偿还，该邦经济情况出现危机。采取了改革项目，旨在逐渐降低能源补贴，改善预算程序，并推行公共行政重建项目。2. Karnataka has a pioneering program to improve the delivery of services to the public, based on public dissemination of charters for public agencies, adopting service standards and targets, and grievance procedures, and arranging for citizen surveys published as “report cards” for agencies.

71 Source for this growth rate: Karnataka Economic Restructuring Loan, Aide-Mémoire of the Appraisal Mission, The World Bank, April 23, 2001 (p.5).71 该经济增长率来源：世界银行评估委员会 Aide-Mémoire卡纳塔克邦经济重建贷款，2001年 4月23日（第 5页）。72 Source: Mathew Joseph, “Performance of the Southern States – A Comparative Study”, Economic and Political Weekly, September 13, 2003.72 来源：《经济和政治周刊》（Economic and Political Weekly ）2003年 9月 13日Mathew Joseph《南部各州表现——比较研究》（“Performance of the Southern States – A Comparative Study”）。

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2．卡纳塔克邦率先推行项目，改善对大众提供的服务质量。主要通过对公众分发公共机构章程，采用服务标准、目标和申诉程序，并将公共调查发表在机构的“报告卡”上。B. The City, Its People and EconomyB．城市、人口和经济3. Bangalore is the capital of the State of Karnataka. The city itself has 4.1 million people and 930,000 households (2001 data), on an area of 224 square km.73 The corresponding average residential density is 183 people per sq km. The agglomeration has 5.7 million people on 530 sq km.74 Another million people visit the area on daily basis. The population growth rate was the highest in the 1970s (7.6% per annum), but it is still quite high, 4.9% per annum, the fastest in India. The growth is due to a combination of high fertility and massive in-migration. The latter is linked to Bangalore’s rise as the center of India’s electronics and information technology, but also engineering, defense, higher education, consumer goods, and silk weaving. Migrants are a combination of highly skilled workers drawn from all over India and abroad, but also job-seeking rural poor from inside the state as well as the neighbor states. The forecast population for the year 2011 is 10 million.3．班加罗尔是卡纳塔克邦的首都。城市内面积为 224平方公里，拥有 410万人口，930000家庭（2001年数据）。73 相应平均居住密度为每平方公里 183人。都市区面积 530平方公里，人口 570万。74 还有 100万每天往返的流动人口。上世纪 70年代人口增长率最高（每年 7.6%），现在也仍然很高（4.9%），是印度人口增长最快的地区。如此高的增长率主要是因为生育率很高，而且大量人口迁居到此。班加罗尔不仅是印度的电子和信息技术中心，也是工程、国防、高等教育、消费品和丝绸编制中心，因此吸引了大量的移民。这些移民及包括印度各地及国外的高级技术工人，也包括邦内和邻近邦来寻找工作的乡村贫民。预计 2011年人口将达到10000万。4. City spatial structure is polycentric, growing at the fringes more in the inner areas. This is due in part to low floor area ratios enforced by BMC in the city center, therefore

73 A report from Karnataka road Development Corporation cites 4.3 million.73 卡纳塔克邦公路发展公司的一份报告中引用数据为 430万。74 The web site (http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm) maintained by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, cites a population of 5.7 million, based on the 2001 census, but it does not say exactly which boundary this number refers to. Another source (unpublished SBI report Sept 2002) cites 6.5 million taken from the site censusindia.net. The implication is that this is the population within BMDA’s jurisdiction.74 城市发展和脱贫部的网站（http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm）上，根据2001年人口普查，人口为 570万，但是没有准确说明这一数据所指的具体范围区域。另一来源（SBI2002年 9月未发表的报告）从网站 censusindia.net上引用的数据为 650万，是 BMDA范围内人口数。

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also higher prices.75 Vacant land and structures needing re-development are leapfrogged. The resulting “many-to-many” travel pattern tends to increase trip lengths, while reducing volumes on major corridors. When this is coupled by transfer avoidance by passengers, the public transport system tends to evolve in the direction of increasing the number of direct routes, while decreasing frequency. High corridor volumes represent the sum of many lower-volume lines. 4．城市空间结构是多中心的，增长更多在周边地区而不是中心区域。这部分是因为 BMC在市中心强制的低房屋面积比例限制以及因此的较高价格。 75 空地和需要重新发展的建筑是跳跃式的。因此“很多到很多”的旅行方式往往旅行路程较长，而主要路线数量渐少。因为乘客尽量避免换乘，公共交通体系倾向于分化方向，增加直接路线的数量，减少运行频率。高数量路线是很多低数量路线的总和。5. The city has a large and growing middle class, the tops of which live in planned residential layouts. Most households live in rental housing (74% in the mid-1990s). There is also considerable poverty, including both those whom economic growth has left behind and fresh migrants from the countryside. Bangalore’s income groups are generally mixed throughout the area, but there is some clustering of low-income groups at west, south-west and north-east peri-urban areas. During the peak of the growth boom (late 1980’s, early 1990’s), rising land prices pushed a lot of low-income people to farther-out locations.76 According to a 1999 survey, 2.2 million people live in about 750 slums, sharply up from 1991.77 5．城市中产阶级较多且不断增长，最富有的居住在规划居民区。大多数家庭是租借住宅（上世纪 90年代中期 74%）。贫困人口也很多，包括经济增长下落后的人群以及从乡村迁来的新移民。班加罗尔收入群体是混居的，但是低收入群体多集中在西部、西南部和东北部的城乡结合区。在经济增长最快的时期（上世纪 80年代末，90年代初），地价上涨迫使很多低收入人口迁移到更远的地方。76 根据 1999年调查，220万人口居住在约 750个贫民区，比 1991年增长很多。77

75 Alain Bertaud, “Bangalore Land Management”, 1993. Still, the last traffic study estimated that the central area attracted 50% of all trips in 1998 (CRRI et al, 1999).75 Alain Bertaud《班加罗尔土地管理》，1993。但是，最近的交通研究估计 1998年中心区域仍然占所有旅程的 50%。76 Source: Benjamin, “Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore”, p. 36.76 来源：Benjamin《班加罗尔行政管理、经济背景和贫困》，36页。77 Source: Suprya Roy Chowdhury, Old Classes and New Spaces: Urban Poverty, Unorganised Labour and New Unions”, Economic and Political Weekly, December 13, 2003. Anther source cites an older estimate by Karnataka Slum Clearance Board of about 400 slums and 0.5 million slum dwellers. See Vagale “Bangalore: A Garden City in Distress” (1998).77 来源：《经济和政治周刊》2003年 12月 13日 Suprya Roy Chowdhury《旧阶级和新空间：城市贫困，无组织劳动力和新联盟》（Old Classes and New Spaces: Urban Poverty, Unorganised Labour and New Unions）。另一来源引用卡纳塔克邦贫民窟清除委员会之前的估算，约有 400个贫民区，居民为 50 万。参见 Vagale《班加罗尔：贫困中的花园城市》（“Bangalore: A Garden City in Distress”）1998年。

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6. The following household income data are for 1998, when the median annual income was Rs 62,500 (Rs 5,208/month):6．下列为 1998年家庭收入数据，中等年收入为 62500卢比（5208卢比/月）：

Annual Income (Rs) No.of hh (000) %Less than 37,500 308 28.1Rs 37,500-50,000 121 11.0Rs 50,000-62,500 122 11.1Rs 62,500-75,000 104 9.5Rs 75,000-87,500 105 9.6Rs 87,500-100,000 88 8.0Rs 100,000-112,500 64 5.8Rs 112,500-125,000 63 5.7Above 125,000 122 11.1

Total number of households 1,097,00078

年收入（卢比）家庭数量（千） % 少于 37,500 308 28.137,500-50,000卢比 121 11.050,000-62,500卢比 122 11.162,500-75,000卢比 104 9.575,000-87,500卢比 105 9.687,500-100,000卢比 88 8.0100,000-112,500卢比 64 5.8112,500-125,000卢比 63 5.7超过 125,000 122 11.1

家庭总数 1,097,00078

78 Source: www.bombayfirst.org. Compare to the 2002 average annual consumption of Rs 30,735 (about US$640 per capita) cited in: Somik Lall et al (2002) and Uwe Deichmann et al (2003). The median annual consumption was lower, 20,867 rupees ($435) per capita. The tails of the distribution were at 4,000 rupees and 140,000 rupees. Bertaud and Brueckner (April 2003) report a 1999 per capita income in Bangalore of Rs 28,300. They also cite an average household consumption level of Rs 46,400 for urban India in 1999-2000.78 来源：www.bombayfirst.org. 2002年平均年消费额为 30735卢比（约人均 640美元）。引用自Somik Lall等（2002）和 Uwe Deichmann 等（2003）。中等年消费额较低，为人均 20867卢比（435美元）。在分配的两端分别为 4000卢比和 140000卢比。Bertaud 和 Brueckner（2003年 4月）报告称 1999年班加罗尔人均收入为 28300卢比。报告中还引用称 1999-2000年印度城市平均家庭消费水平为 46400卢比。

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http://www.bombayfirst.org/

http://www.bombayfirst.org/

C. Transport Demand: Modal Split and MotorizationC．交通需求：模式分化和机动化7. Urban transport in Bangalore is essentially road based, since the national rail lines were neither designed nor operated with regard to urban and regional traffic (infrequent stations, no pass-through lines, low service frequency). Traffic is dominated by motorized 2-wheelers and 3-wheel rickshaws. Conventional public transport services are provided by Bangalore Metropolitan Corporation (BMTC). Its 2,200 buses operate in mixed traffic, without any privileges like exclusive lanes or priority of passage at signalized intersections. In addition, many companies arrange for transport of their employees, using own minibus fleets or contracting out. BMTC network is diffuse, trying to connect the maximum number of origins and destinations, to avoid transfers (implies low frequency of service on individual lines). The intercity bus terminal was recently re-located to the city fringe, but most freight terminals are still in the central city.7．班加罗尔交通模式主要是路上交通，城市和区域交通都没有国家铁路路线设计或运营（车站很少，没有通过路线，服务频率低）。由两轮机动车和三轮机动人力车主导交通。传统公共交通服务由班加罗尔都市交通公司（BMTC）提供。公司的2200辆公交车在混合车流中运行，没有任何特权如专用车道或信号路口优先通过权力。此外，很多公司使用自己的小型车队或外包形式安排员工上下班班车。BMTC网络辐射范围很广，想要连接最多的起点和终点站来避免乘客换乘（这意味着单条路线服务频率低）。最近，城际公交总站改到了城市边缘，但大多数货运总站仍然在市中心。8. The most recent available estimate of modal split, in Bangalore, for all trips, for early 2000’s, is as follows:79

8．2000年初班加罗尔所有行程模式分化比例如下：79

walk and bike 17%BMTC buses 38%other buses 3%cars & 2-wheelers 38%3-wheelers 4%

步行和自行车 17%BMTC 公交 38%其他公交 3%

79 Source: Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd, presentation to the World Bank, November 2003. The total estimated number of daily trips was 5,852,000 indicating very low mobility. Some other sources cite the bus share to be 55-60% of all trips longer than 1 km. There have been no large-scale household travel surveys in Bangalore for many years, so all demand estimates are weak.79 来源：班加罗尔捷运公司对世界银行的报告，2003年 11月。总估算日行程为 5852000次，流动性很低。其他来源称超过 1公里的行程中，公交车比例为 55-60%。多年来班加罗尔都没有进行大规模的家庭旅行调查，因此所有需求估计都是不太可靠的。

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轿车和两轮公交 38%三轮车 4%

9. About 1.6 million motor vehicles ply the roads and streets of Bangalore, and about 2 million in the metropolitan area. The breakdown by main vehicle categories is as follows:9．约 160万机动车穿行于班加罗尔的大街小巷，整个都市区则达到 200万辆。主要车辆类别分类如下所示：

Private use motor vehicles2-wheelers 1,220,000cars, station wagons and jeeps 279,000sub-total 1,499,000私人使用机动车两轮车 1,220,000轿车、旅行车和吉普车 279,000小计 1,499,000

For hire motor vehiclesMTC buses 2,200private buses 675other buses and vans 16,000auto-rickshaws 74,000taxis, cabs 27,000freight vehicles 42,000other 17,125sub-total 179,000

Total 1,678,00080

营运机动车MTC公交 2,200私人公交 675其他公交和厢式客车 16,000

80 Sources disagree on those numbers and use different categories. This table is based mostly on numbers provided by Bangalore Mass Rapd Transit Ltd., dated November 2003. The web site of India Petroleum Institute cites the following motorization levels in Bangalore, drawn from a study by the Central Road Research Institute 234,000 cars, 1,162,000 motorized 2-wheelers, and 35,000 buses. The year is not given. Bangalore City Traffic Police cites a number of 1,750,000 motor vehicles in 2002. They forecast that this will double by year 2011. Karnataka Road Development Corporation cites 993,250 vehicles in 1996 and 1,438,057 vehicles in 2000, implying a growth rate of 9.7% per annum.80 不同来源中数据不同，分类也不尽相同。本表基本根据 2003年 11月班加罗尔捷运公司的数据。印度石油研究院网站引用自中央公路研究院的班加罗尔机动化水平如下：234000辆轿车，1162000辆机动两轮车，35000辆公交，但没有说明年份。班加罗尔城市交通局引用数据为 2002年 1750000辆机动车。预计到 2011年这一数据会翻一倍。卡纳塔克邦公路发展公司引用 1996年数据为 993250辆车辆，2000年为 1438057辆，表明年均增长率为 9.7%。

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机动人力车 74,000出租车 27,000运货车 42,000其他 17,125小计 179,000

总计 1,678,00080

10. The motorization rates are 68 (=279000/4100) passenger cars per 1,000 population and, when 2-wheelers are added to cars, 298 (=1220000/4100) passenger vehicles per 1,000 population. The forecast for year 2011 is 4.2 million vehicles, of which 2.9 million 2-wheelers and 610,000 cars.10．机动化比例为每千人 68辆乘用车（=279000/4100），如果在轿车基础上加上两轮车，则为每千人 298辆（=1220000/4100）。预计 2011年达到 420万辆机动车，其中 290辆两轮机动车，610000辆轿车。11. Traffic composition in 1999 was 50% 2-wheelers, 20% auto-rickshaws and 20% cars. This is very different from the mid-1960s, when bicycles accounted for 70% of traffic.81

11．1999年交通组成为 50%的两轮车，20%的机动人力车，20%的轿车。这与 60年代中期有了很大改变，当时自行车占所有交通的 70%。81

D. Roads, Traffic and Parking ControlD．公路、交通和停车控制12. The primary network, 500-600 km out of the total road length of 3,000 km, includes 10 state and/or national roads, most of them radial. An Outer Ring Road (62 km, completed in 2002) plays little role in urban transport, carrying mainly the long-distance through traffic. An Intermediate Ring has been constructed in fragments (e.g. south-east between Koramangala and Airport Road). Generally, the road network is underdeveloped in terms of size, structure, continuity and connectivity. The city roads were laid out in the 1940s, when Bangalore had a population of less than half a million. The land development process preceded motorization, and in fact inhibited it later on. The primary roads (Outer Ring Road and Bangalore-Mysore Toll Road excepted) are merely 25 m wide, or less. Traffic control is by about 110 fixed-time signals and/or manual. Traffic Police estimate that 35% of the road network is in poor condition. Traffic safety situation in Bangalore is dismal. In 2002, there were 8,320 accidents, and about 800 deaths, a fatality rate of about 5.3 per 10,000 vehicles. Pedestrians account for 40% of fatalities.82 81 Source: CRRI et al, Traffic and Transportation Improvement Priorities for Road Corridors of Bangalore, 199981 来源：CRRI 等《班加罗尔公路路线交通和运输改进优先权》（Traffic and Transportation Improvement Priorities for Road Corridors of Bangalore,），1999年。82 Source: presentation by Bangalore Rapid Transit LTD, November 2003. The number of fatalities, cited elsewhere, is a coarse estimate. The proportion of pedestrians as victims of fatal accidents is from Reddy and Ramakrishna “Individual modes: efficiency or illusion, A Case of Bangalore City” (2002). For the

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12．总公路长度为 3000公里，其中主要网络为 500-600公里长，包括 10条邦级和/或国道，大部分是辐射道路。一条外环线（62公里，2002年建成）在城市交通中起的作用很小，主要承载长途交通。中环线建设了一些部分（如 Koramangala和机场路之间东南方向）。一般来说，公路网络在规模、结构、连续性和连接性方面都不发达。城市公路是上世纪 40年代建成，当时班加罗尔人口还不到 50万。土地发展过程先于机动化进程，实际上后来抑制了机动化发展。主要公路（除外环线和班加罗尔到Mysore收费公路）仅为 25米宽，甚至更窄。交通控制主要有 110个定时信号灯和/或人工管理。交通警察局估计 35%的公路网络情况很差。班加罗尔交通安全问题很差。2002年共发生交通事故 8320起，死亡约 800人，死亡率为每万辆车辆 5.3人。行人占所与死亡人数的 40%。82

13. A traffic study carried out in 1999 proposed a large and varied road improvements program, including 45 multi-grade intersections (mainly flyovers), 25 pedestrian underpasses, and various corridor improvements, including widening, at-grade intersection improvements, one-way schemes, and traffic signals. In the next step of the planning process, the number of multi-grade intersections was reduced to 19, with 9 to be done in the first phase. Some of these were undertaken in the intervening years.83

13．1999年进行的交通研究提出了一项大型的不同公路改进项目，包括 45处多级交叉路口（主要是立交桥）；25处行人地下通道；不同路线改革，包括扩展、平面交叉路口改善，单向计划及交通信号。在规划过程的下一步，多级交叉口数量减少到 19处，其中 9个进行第一阶段。一些是在此期间建设。83

14. Street stretches designated for on-street parking by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation are rented out to private persons who collect fees and enforce compliance with time limits and other regulations. Fees are set by BMC and the revenue goes to BMC. In 2003, fees for cars were Rs for first 2 hours, Rs 10 for up to 6 hours, and Rs 15

State of Karnataka, the number of fatalites is about 18 people per 10,000 vehicles registered, which is very high (compare US at 3.2; Malaysia at 5.5; Lao PDR at 15). Source: PAD, Karnataka State Highway Improvement Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 21850-IN, The World Bank, April 23, 2001.82 来源：搬家罗尔捷运公司报告，2003年 11月。其他地方引用的设施数量是粗略估计。行人占交通事故死亡人数的比例引用自 Reddy和 Ramakrishna《个体模式：效率和幻觉，班加罗尔城市案例》（“Individual modes: efficiency or illusion, A Case of Bangalore City”）2002年。在卡纳塔克邦，交通事故死亡比率为每万辆登记车辆 18人，这是很高的（比较美国为 3.2，马来西亚 5.5，老挝15）。来源：PAD，世界银行报告第 21850-IN号，卡纳塔克邦高速公路改进项目，项目评估文件，2001年 4月 23日。83 In the course of writing this report, no document was found which summarizes what has been done since 1999. In one unpublished source dated 2002, it was reported that HUDCO was planning to lend to Bangalore for another 28 flyovers. Bangalore Municipal Corporation was planning in 1999 to float a bond to finance road improvements. No mention of this bond was found in later years.83 在写作这份报告的时候，没有找到 1999年后的总结文件。在一处未发表的 2002年来源中，据报告HUDCO计划为班加罗尔另外 28处立交桥提供贷款。班加罗尔市计划在 1999年发行公债为公路改进项目筹资。没有找到后来提及这一公债的内容。

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beyond 6 hours. Equivalent fees for 2-wheelers were Rs 1.5, 4.0 and 8.0, respectively. A rudimentary program of meter-based charges has started on Brigade Road. BMC has constructed 2-3 multi-storey parking structure “where it had land available” so some unusual locations (e.g. t an intersection. There are also some private at-grade car parks.14．班价罗尔市将指定路上停车的道路处租借给私人，收取费用并可以规定时间限制和其他规定。收费标准由 BMC规定，收入交给 BMC。2003年，轿车收费为前两小时卢比，6小时内 10卢比，超过 6小时 15卢比。两轮车收费相应分别为 1.5卢比、4.0卢比和 8.0卢比。Brigade路上开始进行按米收费的初步项目。BMC在“土地可用处”建设了 2-3处多层停车结构，一些不寻常的位置（如在交叉路口处。）也有一些私人平面轿车停车处。E. InstitutionsE．机构15. Bangalore has a more fragmented institutional network for urban transport than is found in most places. The following institutions are, or could be, the most important for urban transport matters (state ministries excepted):15．与大多数地方相比，班加罗尔城市交通机构网络非常分散。下列机构是，或可能是，城市交通问题中最重要的（不包括国家部门）： Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BMC), specifically its Department of Public

Works is responsible for the maintenance and rehabilitation (including widening) of local roads (secondary and tertiary network); in addition, the national/state roads on the territory of the City are handed over to BMC for maintenance, traffic and parking management, and law enforcement.

班加罗尔市（BMC），具体是公共工程部负责地方公路（二级和三级网络）的维护和修复（包括扩建）；此外，城市范围内的国家 /邦公路也由BMC负责维护、交通和停车管理及执法。

Bangalore City Traffic Police: 班加罗尔城市交通警察局； Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), set up in 1976, to do both planning

and development functions focused on real estate. Its jurisdiction is 1,279 sq km, including the Bangalore City, the surrounding urbanized area plus rural area, . It is responsible for: (i) preparation of comprehensive land use plans, including zoning and major infrastructure plans (updated every 10 years by Karnataka’s Town and Country Planning Act); (ii) layout planning; (iii) approval of development plans and building proposals (including land use changes) for private residential and commercial clients; and (iv) issuing trade licenses. It is also authorized to develop land, i.e. it buys and develops land for residential layouts and infrastructure schemes. BDA does not do sectoral project and policy planning, nor does it have an integrating role for these (no other agency does). It therefore has no capacity for traffic& transport planning, much less public transport regulation. Still, the BDA’s brief has a reference to being responsible

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for “specific scheme plans.” In this last capacity, apparently, BDA has had a hand in several large road construction projects (flyovers, elevated sections). It is in effect a land development agency. In recent years, it has become self-financing; its revenues include the vacant land tax (but not the property tax) and tax on land sales ($88 million in 2001-2002).

班加罗尔发展局（BDA）于 1976年成立，负责地产的规划和发展功能。其管辖范围为 1279平方公里，包括班加罗尔市、周围城市化区域和农村地区。负责：(i) 编写全面土地使用计划，包括分区和主要基础设施计划（卡纳塔克邦城乡发展法令每 10年更新）；(ii) 布局规划；(iii) 批准发展计划和私人住宅和商业客户的建筑提议（包括土地使用改变）；及(iv) 颁发交易执照。它也有权开发土地，如购买和开发土地用于居住布局和基础设施计划。BDA不负责部门项目和政策制定，也不参与这些活动（其他机构也没有）。因此它没有能力负责交通和运输规划，在公共交通规范上更没有权利。然而，BDA大纲提到负责“特定计划”。在这一项上，目前 BDA参与了一些大型公路建设项目（立交桥、高架部分）。它实际上是一个土地发展机构。最近几年，该局自负盈亏，收入包括空置土地税收（不是不动产税）和土地出售税收（2001-2002年 8800万美元）。

Bangalore Region Development Authority has jurisdiction over the next ring beyond that under BDA’s jurisdiction. Its initial raison d’etre was to be an over-arching agency for coordinating planning and development, but it never took off. Its current functions are not clear, and its staff of a few people is too small to count.

班加罗尔地区发展局负责 BDA辖区的下一环范围。最初是打算作为上层机构协调规划和发展，但是从未广泛行使过职责。目前的职责不清楚，员工人数非常少。

Karnataka Road Development Corporation Ltd., founded in 1999, registered under the Companies Act, fully owned by the Government of Karnataka. Its original mission is to mobilize private sector funds for the construction and operation of roads and bridges where tolls can be charged. As of May 2001, it has been given the task of developing and implementing (road) traffic infrastructure schemes in Bangalore.

卡纳塔克邦公路发展有限公司于 1999年成立，符合公司法登记，属卡纳塔克邦政府所有。最初任务是动员私有资本投资收费公路和桥的建设和运营。从 2001年 5月起，该公司被赋予了开发和执行班加罗尔（公路)交通基础设施计划的任务。

Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd (BMRTL) was set up in 1994 to play a role for rapid transit projects equivalent to KRDCL plays for roads.

班加罗尔捷运公司（BMRTL）与 1994年成立，在捷运项目中起的作用类似于KRDCL在公路上的角色。

Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC), registered under the Companies Act, fully owned by the Government

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of Karnataka. The role: interaction with the private sector; nodal agency for Megacities Fund, also for implementing WB and ADB loans.

卡纳塔克城市基础设施和发展金融公司（KUIDFC），符合公司法登记，由卡纳塔克邦政府所有。角色：与私营成本交流；大城市基金下属机构，也负责执行世行和亚洲开发银行贷款。

Agenda for Bangalore, a high-level, high-visibility body set up by the Prime Minister to ….

班加罗尔议程，是由总理建立的高级别的显著机构… Other ad hoc bodies like the Transport Advisory Forum and Task Force on Traffic

and Transport (for operational matters) 其他特别机构如交通咨询论坛、交通和运输特别委员会（运营问题）F. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC)F．班加罗尔都市交通公司（BMTC）16. BMTC is an independent company, registered under the Companies act, fully owned by the State of Karnataka, and governed by a Board of Directors, all appointed by the State. It consists of a central corporate body, 19 depots and 1 workshop. It operates conventional, street-based, scheduled bus services on 1,212 routes, with a fleet of 2,200 buses and a staff of 13,830. Average daily passengers carried amount to 2.6 million. The tables below provide the basic operational and financial statistics, performance indicators, and the fare structure. The company recovers its costs and makes a profit, with only a small-scale contractual compensation.16．BMTC是独立公司，符合公司法令登记，由卡纳塔克邦所有，并由邦指定的董事会管理。公司包括一个中央法人团体，19个场站和 1个车间。公司提供传统的路上定时公交运营，共有 1212条路线，2200辆公交车和 13830名员工。日均承载乘客 260万人次。下表提供了基本运营和财政数据、业绩指标和车票结构。公司在仅有小规模合同补贴的基础上收回了成本并盈利。17. The story of BMTC is that of a resurrection. It was formed in 1997, when the Bangalore depots of the troubled Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) were separated from the mother company. Like other state transport undertakings in India, KSRTC had been buffeted from all sides:17．BMTC是复苏的典型例子。1997年成立，当时处境苦难的卡纳塔克邦公路交通公司（KSRTC）的班加罗尔场站从其母公司中分离出来。与印度其他邦交通企业一样，KSRTC各个方面都受到打击： The state had loaded gradually more and more social obligations on the company

without corresponding compensation (e.g. passengers who had a right to some type of discount fare, or a lightly traveled route);

邦逐渐将越来越多的社会义务交付给公司，但没有相应补偿（如乘客有权享受某种打折票价，或轻松旅行路线）；

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Taxation policy of the state were harsher on buses than on private vehicles; 与私人车辆相比，邦的税收政策对公交车更为严苛； Passenger demand was falling, especially in the wake of the 1988 Motor Vehicle

Act, which opened the sector to a variety of informal transport arrangements; 乘客需求下降，尤其在 1988年机动车法令对多种非正规交通安排开放后； Requests for fare increases in line with inflation were approved sporadically and

unsystematically; revenues were always chasing costs; 对通胀提高票价的要求，很少批准，也没有系统性；收入往往跟不上成本； Staff discipline had broken down, with revenue pilferage estimated at 10% of

total fare revenue. 员工纪律无效，估计收入偷窃达到总票价收入的 10%； The management yielded to union pressures for increased wages in spite of fallen

productivity. 尽管生产力下降，管理层屈从于工会压力提高工资。18. In addition to creating BMTC, the state also gave it a right to adjust fares based on an agreed formula and input cost tracking. A full scale internal restructuring program was conceived and implemented. It focused on staff and management conduct, work procedures, uses of IT in various functions like ticketing, stores, accounting, scheduling and schedule monitoring. The last but not the least is that BMTC opened the door to the private sector through outsourcing, even in its main business line – transport services. This consists of a “kilometer scheme” whereby private operators compete on gross cost basis to serve specific routes. In 2001-2002, close to 300 private buses were in operation, equivalent to about13% of the BMTC’s fleet. The sum of these efforts is evident in its financial performance: the loss of Rs 78.2 million (about US$ 2 million) in 1997-98 turned to a small surplus of Rs 39.6 million in 1998-99, rising to Rs 267 million (US$ 5.6 million) in 2001-2002. It also shows in all technical performance indicators, which place BMTC among the top 2-3 urban transport companies in India:18．除了创建 BMTC，邦还赋予了公司根据协议模式和投资成本调整票价的权利。提出并执行了全面的内部重组项目。项目主要关注员工和管理层行为、工作程序、在售票、存储、计算和安排时刻表及时刻表监控等时 IT设备使用。BMTC还对私营资本开放外包，甚至是在其主要业务部门——交通服务。这包括“公里计划”，私营运营商根据总成本提供特定路线上的服务。2001-2002年间，有接近 300辆私营公交投入运营，约占 BMTC车辆的 13%。这些努力在财政表现方面成果显著：1997-1998年亏损 7820万卢比（约 200万美元），到 1998-1999年转变成微薄利润3960万美元，2001-2002年增加到 2.67亿卢比（560万美元）。在所有技术业绩方面也有表现，使得 BMTC成为印度前 2-3位的城市交通公司： Cancellation rate decreased from14.8% in 1996-97 to 2.6% in 2001-02; 服务取消率从 1996-1997年的 14.8%下降到 2001-2002年的 2.6%； Distance covered increased from 193.9 km per bus per day in 1996-97 to

227.2 km in 2001-02;

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覆盖距离从 1996-1997年每辆车日均 193.9公里到 2001-2002年的 227.2公里

The rate of breakdowns decreased from 0.55 per 10,000 km in 1996-97 to 0.19 in 2001-02;

故障率从 1996-1997年每 10000公里 0.55下降到 2001-2002年的 0.19； Accidents per 100,000 decreased from0.26 per 100,000 km in 1996-97 to

0.22 in 2001-02. 每 100000辆事故数从 1996-1997年的每 100000公里 0.26下降到 2001-

2002年的 0.22。

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Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation LTD 班加罗尔都市交通有限公司Selected operational and financial statistics选择运营和财政数据

2000-01 2001-02Staff 员工 13657 13832Operable fleet (vehicles) 可运营车辆 2287 2376Outsourced fleet 外包车辆 186 282Own fleet in service (vehicles) 自由服务车辆 2190 2253Private fleet in service (vehicles)私营服务车辆 186 282Average fleet age (in 100,000km)平均车辆年限（100000公里） 4.34 4.02Gross bus-km (million)总公交公里数（百万） 180.8 205.5Passengers (million)乘客（百万） 939.9 958.1Passengers per day (million)日均乘客（百万） 2.6 2.6Costs (Rs million)成本（百万卢比）

Wages 工资 1203.8 1270.8Fuel 燃油 740.1 803.7Materials 材料 177.9 158.7Taxes 税收 77.8 92.4payments to private contr.私营承包合同支付 87.1 243.4Other其他 127.3 136.2financial charges财政收费 52.8 61.0Depreciation折旧 163.3 189.9sub-total costs成本小计 2630.1 2956.2

Revenues (Rs million)收入（百万卢比）fare sales 2567.8 3012.0

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车票出售Other income其他收入 26.4 53.3profit on sale of assets资产出售利润 23.1 16.8Compensation补偿 144.0 141.1sub-total revenues收入小计 2761.3 3223.2

Result (Rs million) before tax税前结果（百万卢比） 131.2 267.0

Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation LTD班加罗尔都市交通有限公司Selected performance indicators选择业绩指标

2002-03 2001-02Fleet utilization (%)车队利用率（%） 96 95Average daily km per bus每车日均公里数 220.1 227.2Staff per bus in service每辆服务车辆员工数 6.24 6.14Average monthly wage (Rs)平均月工资（卢比） 7345 7656Wage bill (% of total costs)工资总额（占总成本比例%） 0.46 0.43Breakdowns per 10,000 km每 10000公里故障数 0.36 0.19Accidents per 100,000 km每 10000公里事故数 0.26 0.22Cost recovery from fares车票成本回收率 % of direct op. costs直接运营成本比例% 108 114 % of total costs 总成本比例% 100 104

2003 FARE SCHEDULE OF BMTC – BANGALORE班加罗尔——BMTC2003 年车票表Distance距离 Single ticket单程票(km)公里 Rs. 卢比

2 2.00

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5 4.0010 5.0015 5.0020 6.0025 7.0030 7.0035 8.0040 8.00

Monthly pass (Rs)月票（卢比）City Service (Black Board) : Rs.200/- per month城市服务（黑板）：200卢比/月

City Sub-urban Service (Red Board) : Rs.385/- per month城市郊区服务（红板）：385卢比/月City Sub-urban / Pushpak / Janpriya : Rs.425/- per month城市郊区/ Pushpak / Janpriya：425卢比/月

G. Land Use and Transport PlanningG．土地使用和交通规划19. The statutory Comprehensive (Land Use) Development Plan was made and approved in 1984, then revised 10 years later and approved in 1995. This plan is merely a zoning document with rough location of the road network. It is currently being updated by the BDA and its consultants, for the first time using satellites to create digital area maps. It has no bearing on transport matters.19．法定综合（土地使用）发展计划于 1984年制定并获得批准，10年后修改于1995年批准。计划只是一份分区文件，指出公路网络的大概位置。目前 BDA和其咨询师们正在更新，第一次使用卫星来制作数字区域图。这与交通问题无关。20. What emerges from the review of literature is a sequence of studies, but relatively little action. The first comprehensive traffic and transport planning study was carried out in 1963-64 by the Central Road Research Institute (New Delhi). In spite of the term “comprehensive” the study apparently focused on the road system, proposing the construction of 138 km of ring roads, 77.5 km arterial roads and various grade separators, pedestrian subways and truck terminals. An effort to refresh the data and update the proposals was made by the State Department of Town Planning in 1977. One of its recommendations was to look into a mass rapid transit project, i.e. a metro for Bangalore The recommendations of this work were taken up by the high-level Lynne Committee in 1981. The Lynne Committee agreed that a metro study was warranted, and a team from Southern Railway (Chennai) was commissioned to do this. The Southern Railway team recommended a 2-corridor metro (24 km, estimated at Rs. 3,300 million in1983 terms, about US$320 million at that time), but also investments in 3 commuter rail lines, and a 58-km ring railway (echoes of the Chennai case). The whole package was estimated to cost Rs.6,500 million in1983 terms (US$628.6 million) and scheduled over a 25-year period. No action followed this proposal. In 1988, in the course of preparing a project to

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be proposed for World Bank funding, RITES was commissioned to do another transport study, with a broad coverage of roads, traffic and mass transit. The study was completed, proposing various road and traffic improvements, and also improvements on commuter rail lines, but again without much follow-up (no Bank project was agreed). In 1993, the State of Karnataka established another committee to look into mass rapid transit. This committee recommended essentially the same metro project put forward by Southern Railway in 1983 and the same circular railway. Again, no follow up action.20．文献回顾发现只有一系列研究，但相对较少行动。中央公路研究院（新德里）于 1963-1964年间进行了第一份全面交通和运输规划研究。尽管称“全面”，研究主要关注了公路系统，提议修建 138公里环线，77.5公里一级公路和不同层级分离、行人地下通道和卡车总站。城镇规划部于 1977年更新了数据和提议。其中一项建议是调查捷运项目，如班加罗尔地铁。1981年，这一建议的工作由高级 Lynne委员会接管。Lynne委员会批准进行地铁研究，南部铁路（钦奈）派出一组团队来操作。南部铁路建议两条路线地铁（24公里，1983年时估计 33亿卢比，当时约合3.2亿美元），但也投资 3条通勤铁路路线及一条 58公里的环形铁路（与钦奈情况类似）。根据 1983年水平，所有总预计花费为 65亿卢比（6.286亿美元），建设周期为 25年。这一提议没有引发任何行动。1988年，在编写申请世界银行投资的项目书时，推荐 RITES进行另一次交通研究，包括公路、交通和公共交通。研究完成后提出了不同公路和交通改善建议，通勤铁路项目改善，但是仍然没有什么跟进行动（世行项目都没有同意）。1993年，卡纳塔克邦成了另一个委员会来关注捷运项目。这一委员会提出的地铁项目和环形铁路与南部铁路 1983年提出的建议一样。但是仍然没有跟进行动。21. In 1994, the state created Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd., with terms of reference to seek a public/private partnership for a mass rapid transit project, on a 25/75 funding formula. The government immediately introduced a special city cess, with proceeds expected at Rs 550 million (US$ 11.5 million) per annum, dedicated to the anticipated mass rapid transit project.84 BMRTL commissioned a feasibility study, which pointed in the direction of an elevated, LRT-based, 96-km long network on 6 routes. The alignment was on major radial roads. The design capacity was about 25,000 passengers per hour per direction. When the full system was built over a 7.5 year period, the forecast was that it would attract 40% of road based traffic in its corridors, half of this coming from street buses. For once, action followed. A private consortium led by United Breweries Group undertook further development of the project on a BOT basis. After more detailed studies of costs and demand were made by the consortium, they asked for a 94/6 funding formula, reflecting an increase in realism gained in the second stage of studies.85 The matter stopped there.

84 The amount accumulated by the end of 2002-2003 fiscal year was about Rs 4 billion (US$ 83 million).84 2002-2003年财政年度末的积累总值约为 40亿卢比（8300万美元）。85 See footnote re inclusion of risk in the section on metros in the main report.85 参见报告正文部分提到地铁风险部分的脚注。

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21．1994年，邦成立了班加罗尔捷运公司，有权按照 25/75的投资比例寻求公有/私营合作捷运项目。政府立刻引入了特殊城市税，预期年度收益为 5.5亿卢比（1150万美元），投入捷运项目。84 BMRTL对高架轻轨模式的 96公里的 6条路线网络进行了可行性研究。与主要辐射路线连接。设计容量为每个方向每小时 25000名乘客。当全部项目在 7.5年后建成后，预计将会吸引路线上 40%的路上交通乘客，半数来自公交。这一次，有后续行动。联合酿酒集团为首的私营资本联盟采用BOT模式进一步发展了项目。在该联盟进行更详细的成本和需求研究后，他们要求 94/6的投资比例，体现出研究第二阶段更现实。85 这一项目就此停止了。22. In 1999, BMTC commissioned a feasibility study for a bus-based mass rapid transit system. The study, completed in 1999, identified a network of 20 bus routes, composed of a Siamese-twin central rings intersected by 8 radial routes. A pilot 12-km line from Jayanagar in the south to Shivajinagar in the north, was estimated to cost Rs 394.9 million (US$ 8.6 million). This includes the corridor and depot infrastructure and 35 special-purpose buses. This proposal has not been rejected, nor has it been accepted. 22．1999年，BMTC进行了公交捷运系统可行性研究。1999年完成的这份研究确定了 20条公交路线构成网络，包括 8条辐射路线分割的 Siamese双中央环线。从南部 Jayanagar到北部 Shivajinagar的 12公里试验路线预计花费 3.949亿卢比（860万美元）。这包括路线和场站基础设施以及 35辆特殊用途车辆。这一提议既没有被否决，也没有接受。23. In 2003, the Government of Karnataka commissioned the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, which had developed successfully the Delhi Metro (one section in operation, others under construction), to carry out a detailed preparation study for a metro in Bangalore, to be done emulating the technical and financial aspects of the approach used in Delhi. This entails a 25/25 contribution from the State and the City of Bangalore, the rest to be borrowed from domestic and international sources (specifically Japan bank for International Cooperation). The study was a combination of feasibility with an environmental impact analysis. The study came out with a 2-line metro, 18 km and 15 km in length, cross shaped. The middle of the cross is at the Central Railway Station in Bangalore. Station spacing would be 1 km on average (32 stations of which 7 underground). The alignment will be 20% underground (in the central zone), the rest being elevated. Total costs were forecast at Rs. 39.7 billion (US$0.83 billion) in 2003 terms. With escalation and interest during a 5-year construction period, the total outlay was estimated at Rs. 49.9 billion (US$ 1.04 billion). In the opening year (assumed to be 2008), the system would carry 820,000 passengers per day, and 1.02 million per day by 2011, at fares ranging from Rs. 4 for up to 2 km to Rs 9 for an 18 km trip (compare to BMTC fares of Rs. 2 for a 2-km trip and Rs. 6 for a 20-km trip; the metro fare is about 50% higher). The economic rate-of-return was forecast at 22.3% against a “business as usual” reference option. The financial forecast assumes a government subsidy for interest payments and some depreciation, i.e. fare revenue will cover somewhat more than direct

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operating costs.86 The Government is said to have accepted this option and is involved in discussion with the national government. If an agreement is struck, BMRTL will cease to exist, to be replaced by a Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Ltd, as was done in Delhi,23．2003年，卡纳塔克邦委托成功运营德里地铁（一部分投入运营，其他部分在建）的德里地铁轨道公司，对班加罗尔地铁进行编写研究报告，仿效德里采用的技术和财政方式。这意味着邦和班加罗尔市各支付 25%，剩余部分则是国内和国际来源贷款（尤其是日本国际合作银行）。该可行性研究也包括环境影响分析。研究提出双线地铁，分别为 18公里和 15公里，双线交叉形式。交叉点在班加罗尔中央铁路车站。车站之间的距离平均为 1公里（32个车站，其中 7个地下车站）。安排20%为地下（在中心区），剩下部分是高架。根据 2003年的水平，总成本为 397亿卢比（8.3亿美元）。随着 5年建设期间的利率增加，估计总费用为 499亿卢比（10.4亿美元）。在开通年份（预计为 2008年），该系统每天将运送乘客 820000人次，2011年达到日均 102万人。车票价格从 2公里 4卢比到 18公里 9卢比不等（比较 BMTC票价为 2公里 2卢比到 20公里 6卢比，地铁票价约高出 50%）。预计经济回报率为 22.3%，与“老样子经济”不同。财政预计政府补贴利息支付和一些折旧，如，车票收入可能会稍微超过直接运营成本。86 据说政府同意了这一方式，并与国家政府参与讨论。如果达成协议，BMRTL将停止存在，由班加罗尔地铁轨道公司取代，如德里一样。

86 The financial report was not available for this report, so the degree of coverage of depreciation by fare revenue is not available.86 本报告没有得到财政报告，因此票价收入涵盖折旧的程度无法得知。

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ATTACHMENT III: URBAN TRANSPORT IN INDIA – BIBLIOGRAPHY 附件 III ：印度城市交通——参考文献 A. Published SourcesA．发表文献K.M. Anantharamaiah and Vijay Raman, “A probabilistic revenue estimation model for providing a mass rapid transit system”, in X. Godard and I. Fatonzoun, ed., Urban Mobility for All, Procedings of CODATU X Conference, Lomé (Togo), 12-15 November 2002, A.A. Balkema Publishers, Lisse, 2002.

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Ralph Gakenheimer, “Planning Transportation and Land Use for Cities in India”, paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Transportation, Land Use and the Environment at ASCI The Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad, December 2-4, 2002.

Gakenheimer, R. and Zegras, C. “Travel Demand Drivers: Chennai, India.” Geneva, Switzerland: World Business Council for Sustainable Development, June 2003.

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http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/w-new

http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/w-new

ATTACHMENT IV: CITIES ON THE MOVE – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 附件 IV ：前进中的城市——执行情况总结 A previous World Bank urban transport strategy paper concentrated on economic and financial viability. “Urban Transport” (World Bank 1986) emphasized efficient management of existing transport capacity, good traffic management, and efficient pricing. It discouraged subsidies, recommended competition and minimal regulation, and questioned the value to the urban poor of capital intensive projects that might not be cost effective in countries with limited resources.世界银行之前的一份城市交通战略报告关注经济和财政生存能力。《城市交通》（世界银行1986）强调现有交通能力的有效管理、良好交通管理和有效定价。报告阻止补贴；推荐竞争和最小规范；质疑对城市贫困人口而言资本密集型项目的价值，认为在资源有限的国家不一定经济有效。Subsequent sector strategy papers have taken a broader view. The transport sector strategy paper “Sustainable Transport” (World Bank 1996) emphasized the integrity of economic, social, and environmental dimensions of a sustainable transport policy. The urban development strategy paper “Cities in Transition” (World Bank 2000a) stressed that the livability of cities depends on their being economically competitive, financially sustainable, well governed, and well managed.后来的部门战略报告视野更广阔。交通部门战略报告《可持续交通》（世界银行1996）强调在可持续的交通政策中融合经济、社会和环境因素。城市发展战略报告《转变中的城市》（世界银行2000a）强调，城市的生命力取决于其经济竞争力、财政可持续性、良好的行政和管理。This volume links the urban development and transport sector strategies with a strong poverty focus. Its objectives are (a) to develop a better understanding of urban transport problems in developing and transitional economies, (b) to articulate an urban transport strategy framework for national and city governments, and (c) to identify the role of the World Bank in supporting governments. It concentrates on the problems of people who are very poor, not only in terms of income but also in terms of the broader dimensions of social exclusion associated with inaccessibility: inaccessibility to jobs, schools, health facilities, and social activities.通过关注贫困问题，这一册将城市发展和交通部门战略联系起来。目的是(a)在正在发展和转变的经济中更好地了解城市交通问题， (b)阐明国家和城市政府的城市交通战略框架，并(c)明确世界银行在支持政府中的角色。关注贫困人口的问题，不仅仅是他们的收入，而是更宽泛的被社会排除在外的问题：无法享受工作、学校、健康设施和社会活动。Some well-established urban trends continue. Urban population continues to expand at more than 6 percent per year in many developing countries. The number of megacities—cities with over 10 million inhabitants—is expected to double within a generation. More than one-half of the developing world’s population, and between one-third and one-half

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of its poor, will then live in cities. Per capita motor vehicle ownership and use continue to grow by up to 15 to 20 percent per year in some countries. Traffic congestion and air pollution continue to increase. Pedestrian and other nonmotorized transport (NMT) continue to be poorly served. Increased use of private vehicles has resulted in falling demand for public transport and a consequent decline in service levels. Sprawling cities are making the journey to work excessively long and costly for some of the very poor. 一些已接受的城市趋势延续。在很多发展中国家，城市人口继续以每年超过6%的速度增长。预计在下一代，大城市数量——超过1000万常住人口的城市——将会翻一倍。到时，发展中国家超过半数的人口，且其1/3到1/2之间的贫困人口将会居住在城市。在一些国家，人均机动车拥有和使用量将会以每年15%到20%的速度递增。交通拥堵和空气污染也不断增加。行人和其他非机动车化的交通模式（NMT）继续得到糟糕的服务。私家车使用增加导致公共交通需求下降，随后服务水平下降。在不断扩张的城市中，对那些十分贫困的人口来说，上下班的旅程太长且太贵。The context has changed in some significant respects since 1986. Cities are increasingly involved in trading patterns on a global scale, which makes the efficiency of their transport systems more critical. At the same time, responsibility for urban transport is being decentralized to the cities, which are often strapped for cash and are institutionally ill prepared for the new challenges. Under these conditions the financial state of public transport has deteriorated drastically in many countries. The safety and security of urban travelers are emerging problems, particularly in Latin America.1986年起这一情况在很多方面发生了巨大的改变。城市逐渐参与全球化的贸易模式，使得城市的交通体系效率尤其关键。同时，城市交通的职责逐渐下放到城市，但城市缺乏资金和机构能力来应对新挑战。在这些情况下，很多国家的公共交通财政情况急剧恶化。城市交通安全问题日益突显，尤其是在拉美国家。

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THE FUNDAMENTAL PARADOX OF URBAN TRANSPORT STRATEGY城市交通战略的根本矛盾Urban transport can contribute to poverty reduction both indirectly, through its impact on the city economy and hence on economic growth, and directly, through its impact on the daily needs of poor people. However, urban transport exhibits a fundamental paradox. How can a sector with such an obvious excess of demand over supply and with such a heavy involvement of private suppliers of service fail so completely to meet the aspirations of both politicians and citizens? Why has it not been possible to mobilize commercial initiative to yield the kind of revolution in service quality and cost that has been achieved in the telecommunications, water, and energy sectors? Finally, why does increasing affluence seem to have the effect of reducing the quality of travel, at least for poor people?城市交通既可以通过其对城市经济和经济增展的影响间接减少贫困，也可以通过其对贫困人口日常需求的影响直接减少贫困。然而，城市交通存在基本矛盾。这样一个明显需求大于供给，私营服务提供者参与如此多的行业，怎么会如此彻底地让政治家们和民众都感到失望呢？为什么不可能动员商业联盟来进行像电信、水利和能源部门那样改进服务质量和成本的革新？为什么富裕增加反而降低了旅行质量，至少是贫困人口的旅行质量？Urban growth increases transport costs. From the viewpoint of efficiency and growth, it is not too difficult to characterize the central problem. Economies of agglomeration generate the growth of cities. As cities grow and become richer, vehicle ownership and use grow more rapidly than the available road space, resulting in increased congestion and traffic-generated air pollution.城市增长提高了交通成本。从效率和增长的角度来看，要明确中心问题并不难。经济促进了城市增长。随着城市不断发展和富裕，车辆拥有和使用量增加比可用道路空间快得多，导致拥堵加剧，交通产生的空气污染增多。Urban growth often has perverse distributional effects. As cities expand, the price of more accessible land increases. Poor people are forced to live on less-expensive land, either in inner-city slums or on city peripheries. As average incomes grow and car ownership increases, the patronage, financial viability, and eventually quality and quantity of public transport diminishes. Motorization, which is permitted by the growth process, may thus also make some poor people even poorer. In particular, in the absence of efficient congestion pricing for road use, piecemeal investment to eliminate bottlenecks will almost certainly benefit the relatively wealthy at the expense of the poor.城市增长往往有不正当的分配效应。随着城市扩张，可用土地价格上升。贫困人口被迫居住在较便宜的地段，要么是市中心的贫困区，要么是城市外围。随着平均收入增加，轿车拥有量增加，公共交通乘客人数、财政能力以及服务的质量和数量都下降。经济增长所推动的机动化进程使一些穷人更穷了。尤其，在缺乏道路使用的

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有效拥堵收费情况下，减少瓶颈的零散投资只会在牺牲贫困人口的条件下对那些相对富裕阶层有利。An eclectic strategy is proposed. The strategy includes four main ways to address these problems: (a) structural change, (b) improved operational efficiency of the transport modes, (c) better focusing of interventions to assist the poor, and (d) policy and institutional reform.提议折衷战略。战略包括四种主要方式来处理这些问题：(a)结构改变，(b)改进交通模式的运营效率，(c)采取更多干预手段来帮助贫困人口，及(d)政策和机构改革。STRUCTURAL CHANGE结构改变Deconcentration has a limited role to play. The most fundamental structural response is to try to shift activity away from megacities, concentrating new development in medium-size cities. Unfortunately, it is not clear at what city size the economies of agglomeration run out or how a policy of deconcentration can be effectively implemented. Nevertheless, central governments can encourage the development of smaller regional hubs by eliminating fiscal and public expenditure distortions, including elimination of price distortions in land and transport markets, such as the underpricing of congested road space and the absence of full-cost connection charges and impact fees for land development. They can also lead by the location of their own activities.分散可以起到有限的作用。最基本的结构反应是从大城市转移活动，关注中型城市的新发展。不幸的是，不清楚在多大的城市聚集经济无效，或分散政策能够执行。但是，中央政府可以鼓励小地区的发展。通过排除财政和公共支出扭曲，包括取消土地和交通市场的价格扭曲，如拥挤路段定价过低，在土地开发上缺乏全面成本联系收费和影响费用。也可以通过确定他们自身活动位置。Improved structure within cities can contribute greatly. A less-radical approach emphasizes coordination of land use and transport infrastructure and service planning, to ensure provision of adequate and well-structured road space as the city grows. This requires improved development control skills and practices at the city level. Critics of this approach argue that such an emphasis on road capacity fosters a level of motorization that will create dependence on the automobile, and will eventually overtake space availability. In any case, it is unlikely to be socially or environmentally acceptable to balance supply and demand solely by increasing road capacity in larger cities.城市内部改善的结构有很大作用。另一种不太激进的方法强调协调土地使用、交通基础设施和服务规划，来保证为城市发展提供充分和结构良好的道路空间。这要求改进城市层面的发展控制技能和实践操作。这一方式的批评者认为对道路能力的如此强调将会鼓励机动化，增加人们对汽车的依赖性，并最终超过可用空间。在任何情况下，在较大的城市都不可能仅通过提高道路容量来平衡需求和供给，这在社会和环境方面都是不能接受的。

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Good road infrastructure does not necessarily mean total auto dependence. Indeed, it is the combination of land-use and transport planning that has made it possible for some cities to reconcile high mobility with high quality of urban life. In order to achieve that reconciliation, traffic has been restrained (as in Singapore, by road pricing) and has been managed to maintain safe, efficient, and environmentally acceptable movement of people, not just of vehicles. This implies prioritization of infrastructure to protect movements of public transport and NMT against unrestricted expansion of private motorized trips (as in Bogotá, Colombia, and Curitiba, Brazil, through busway systems). In these more constrained circumstances, rigorous appraisal of investments in road capacity needs to take into account (a) the effects of induced traffic on benefits; (b) the benefits to, and disbenefits of, NMT; and (c) the environmental impacts.好的道路基础设施并不一定就意味着完全依赖汽车。实际上，结合土地使用和交通规划才使一些城市同时满足了高流动性和高质量的城市生活。为了达到这一目标，交通受到限制（像新加坡，公路收费），并通过交通管理来维持人口流动的安全、效率和环保，并不仅限于车辆。这表明保护公共交通和NMT流动的基础设施优先权，而不是无限制的私人机动车扩张（如波哥大、哥伦比亚、巴西库里提巴通过公交车道系统）。在这些限制条件下，需要考虑对公路能力投资项目进行严格评估：(a) 随之产生的交通的好处；(b)对NMT的好处和坏处；及(c)对环境的影响。IMPROVING THE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF TRANSPORT改善交通运营效率To improve the efficiency of transport, the needs of each mode must be addressed—the road system, NMT, public passenger transport, and mass transit. In addition, the role of the private sector as a means of promoting efficiency deserves special attention.要改进交通效率，必须考虑每一种模式的需要——公路系统、NMT、公共客运和轨道交通。此外，也要特别关注私营部门在推动效率中的作用。THE ROAD SYSTEM公路系统Even in highly congested cities, urban road transport efficiency can be improved through better system management. Although rapid development of technology has reduced the cost—as well as the maintenance and operational skill requirements—of modern traffic management techniques, many cities are still too poorly organized and inadequately staffed to make effective use of this development. Both technical assistance and investment are capable of yielding high returns in this field, as long as fundamental institutional and human resource problems are addressed.即使是在非常拥堵的城市，也可以通过改进系统管理提高城市公路交通效率。尽管技术的快速发展降低了现代交通管理技术的成本，及维护和操作技能要求，很多城市仍然组织混乱，缺乏人手来有效使用这一发展。只要处理基本的机构和人力资源问题，在这一领域技术支持和投资都能够得到很高回报。

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Urban road decay is a serious problem in many countries. Road decay contributes to congestion and increasing operating costs. It often arises from jurisdictional conflicts—such as conflicts over which authority is responsible for which roads, lack of clear ownership of neighborhood roads, or inadequate allocation for urban roads from the national road funds through which road funding is channeled.城市公路破烂是很多国家的严重问题。道路破烂加剧了拥堵、增加了运行成本。这往往源自管辖权限冲突——如哪一当局负责那些道路，相邻道路没有明确所有权，国家公路资金对城市公路分配不足。NONMOTORIZED TRANSPORT非机动车交通NMT is systematically underrecognized. Walking still accounts for the largest proportion of trips taken, although not of distance traveled, in most low- and middle-income countries. All income groups are involved. Despite this fact the welfare of pedestrians, and particularly the welfare of mobility-impaired pedestrians, is frequently sacrificed in planning to increase the speed of the flow of vehicles. Cycling is similarly disadvantaged. Without a continuous network of secure infrastructure, people will not risk bicycle travel. Without users, investment in infrastructure for cycling may appear wasteful.NMT一向不受重视。在很多中低收入国家，步行仍然占短途旅程的最大比例。这一模式包括所有收入群体。但在计划增加车流速度时，往往牺牲行人、尤其是行动不便的行人的福利。自行车也同样处于劣势。没有连续安全基础设施网络，人们不敢冒险骑车出行。若没有使用者，投资建设自行车基础设施就显得浪费了。A comprehensive vision and action plan for NMT is required. In the planning and management of infrastructure, the excessive emphasis on motorized transport may be redressed by (a) clear provision for the rights as well as responsibilities of pedestrians and bicyclists in traffic law; (b) formulation of a national strategy for NMT as a facilitating framework for local plans; (c) explicit formulation of a local plan for NMT as part of the planning procedures of municipal authorities; (d) provision of separate infrastructure where appropriate (such as for safe movement and secure parking of vehicles); and (e) incorporation of standards of provision for bicyclists and pedestrians in new road infrastructure design. Incorporation of responsibilities for provision for NMT should also be included in road fund statutes and procedures.要求对NMT的全面理解和行动计划。在基础设施规划和管理中，要通过以下方法来纠正对机动化交通的过度强调：(a)在交通法规中明确规定行人和骑车人的权利和责任；(b) 明确NMT的国家战略，作为地方规划的推动框架；(c)明确NMT地方规划作为市政当局规划过程的一部分；(d)在合适的地方提供单独基础设施（如车辆的安全行动和安全停车）；及(e)在新公路基础设施设计中整合骑车人和行人的规范标准。在公路资金法令和程序中也应该包括提供NMT的责任。

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Traffic management should be focused on improving the movement of people rather than on improving the movement of motorized vehicles. In order to achieve that goal, police need to be trained to enforce the rights of NMT in traffic priorities as well as in recording and preventing accidents. Furthermore, the development in poor countries of small-scale credit mechanisms to finance bicycles, credit mechanisms that are increasingly successful in rural areas, might also be developed in urban areas.交通管理应该更关注改善人的流动，而不是改进机动车的流动。为了达到这一目标，警察需要经过训练来强制执行NMT在交通中的优先权利，及记录和阻止事故。而且，贫困国家在农村区域成功发展的小规模信贷资助自行车的机制，也可以在城市区域发展。PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT公共客运Public transport is for all. Concentrating on the transport modes of poor people in middle-income countries essentially means the provision of affordable forms of public transport, both formal and informal. But it should not be viewed as only for the poor, as the importance of public transport to all income groups in many rich European cities demonstrates. Improving efficiency in public transport must be concerned not only with keeping costs down but also with providing a flexible framework within which the less poor as well as the very poor can use public transport with confidence and comfort.公共交通是针对所有人的。在中等收入国家关注贫困人口交通模式，在本质上意味着提供人们都能承受的正式和非正式的公共交通。但是这不应该仅仅针对穷人，正如很多富裕的欧洲城市所表现的公共交通对所有收入群体的重要性。改进公共交通效率不仅仅是要保持成本低廉，也要提供灵活的服务框架，使穷人和富人都能自信舒适地享受公共交通。Most urban public transport is road based. Bus lanes and automatic priority at intersections can improve public transport performance significantly, but these solutions tend to suffer from inadequate enforcement by police, who are untrained in traffic planning and management. In contrast, exclusive busways in developing countries have proved to be capable, except in very high traffic volume corridors, of performance nearly equivalent to rail-based systems but at much lower cost.大多数城市公共交通是基于路上的。公交路线和交叉路口处的自动优先权可以极大地改进公共交通表现，但是这些办法往往因为缺乏交通规划和管理训练的警察执法不力而难以执行。相反，在发展中国家，除了在车流量非常大的区域，专用公交车道业绩可以与铁路系统相比，而且成本低很多。Pricing and financing issues are at the heart of public transport problems. Formal bus operations face financial collapse in many countries, partly as an unintended consequence of goodhearted but wrong-headed fare and service controls. Some prescriptions can easily be made to forestall this. General fare controls should be determined as part of a comprehensive city transport financing plan, and their effect on the expected quality and quantity of service carefully considered. Fare reductions or exemptions should be

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financed on the budget of the relevant line agency responsible for the categories (health, social sector, education, interior, and so on) of the affected person. Modally integrated fare schemes should be assessed for their impacts on poor people. It is in the interests of poor people for sustainable financing and efficient targeting of public transport subsidies to be paramount.收费和资金问题是公共交通问题的核心。很多国家的正规公交运营都面临财政危机，部分是因为好心但方向错误的票价和服务控制所带来的结果。很容易制定一些规定来阻止。总体票价控制应该作为全面城市交通规划的一部分，并仔细考虑其对服务质量和数量的影响。车票降价或免票，应该获得负责该享受人群类别（健康、社会部门、教育、内部等）的相关主管机构的预算支持。应该评估综合模式票价计划对贫困人口的影响。对贫困人口来说，公共交通补贴的可持续财政和有效目标是很重要的。There is a rich agenda of urban public transport policies that is both pro-growth and propoor. The recent decline in both the quality and quantity of public transport has resulted partly from the absence or disappearance of a secure fiscal basis for support. Public transport, however, can be improved in many ways that are consistent with the fiscal capabilities of even the poorest countries. Giving priority to public transport in the use of road space makes public transport faster and more financially viable.很多城市公共交通政策既推动经济发展，也对穷人有利。最近公共交通质量和数量下降，部分是因为缺乏或失去稳固的财政支持基础。但是，即使是在最贫困的国家，也有很多符合当地财政条件的方法来改进公共交通。公共交通在道路使用上的优先权可以使公共交通更快速，财政方面也更可行。Competition is pro-poor. Supply costs can be reduced through competition between private sector suppliers. In Buenos Aires the urban rail system has been revolutionized through concessioning. Regulated competition in the bus market has also worked well in cities such as Buenos Aires and Santiago—but care is needed in system design. Total deregulation in Lima, although it has increased supply, has worsened road congestion, the urban environment, and user safety and security. The lesson is that it is not privatization or deregulation per se that improves public transport, but rather the introduction of carefully managed competition, in which the role of the public sector as regulator complements that of the private sector as service supplier.竞争对贫困人口有益。通过私营部门供应商参与竞争，可以减少成本。在布宜诺斯艾利斯，城市铁路系统通过特许经营权进行了彻底变革。在一些城市，如布宜诺斯艾利斯和圣地亚哥，公交市场规范竞争也行之有效——但是要注意系统设计。利马的完全放松管制，尽管增加了供应，但进一步加剧了道路拥堵、城市环境、使用这安全性的问题。这说明私有化或解除管制本身并不能改进公共交通，而是通过引入仔细管理的竞争，私有部门作为服务提供商，而公有部门作为规范者补充。Cities should strive to mobilize the potential of the informal sector. Informally supplied small vehicle paratransit (publicly available passenger transport service that is outside the

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traditional public transport regulatory system) is often dominant in providing for dispersed trip patterns and in flexibly addressing the demands of poor people, particularly in low-income countries, but it is typically viewed as part of the problem of public transport and not part of the solution. Certainly, anticompetitive or antisocial behavior should be controlled through quality controls and enforcement, but its potential can be better mobilized through legalizing associations and through structuring franchising arrangements to give the small operator an opportunity to participate in competitive processes. 城市应该努力动员非正规部门的潜力。非正规的小型车辆辅助客运系统（传统公共交通规范体系之下的公共客运交通服务）在分散旅程中占主导地位，灵活满足贫困人口的需求，尤其是在低收入国家。但这往往被看作是公共交通的问题，而不是解决办法。当然，反竞争和反社会行为要通过质量控制和强制管理，但可以通过合法化协会和阻止经营权安排动员其潜力，给小规模运营商参与竞争的机会。MASS TRANSIT轨道交通Rail-based mass transit systems have a role to play in very large cities. Rail-based mass transit systems are less congesting than are road-based systems and can be very important for those who are peripherally located and have long journeys to access employment in the cities. In Latin America, in particular, rail-based systems carry significant numbers of very poor people. The Bank has financed several major urban rail developments in the past decade, typically in metros and existing suburban railway refurbishment but occasionally in new construction. Often the restructuring of bus services, which eliminates direct competition and can harm the interests of poor bus-users unless skillfully planned, supports the rail-based systems. The position that has been adopted is that such developments must be integrated into a comprehensive urban transport strategy and that arrangements should include physical and fare integration between modes, to ensure that the poor are not excluded from or disadvantaged by the Bank’s investments.在大城市轨道交通有用武之地。比起路上系统，轨道交通没有那么拥挤，对居住在城市外围，但需要长途旅行到市中心工作的人来说十分重要。尤其在拉美国家，轨道交通运送了大量的贫困人口。过去十年，世行投资了一些主要城市的轨道发展，尤其是地铁和现有郊区铁路修复，但很少新建。公交服务改组常常排除直接竞争，除非精心规划，否则可能损害贫困公交乘客的利益，支持了铁路系统。采取的立场是这些发展必须融入到整体城市交通战略中，这些安排要包括不同模式间物质和票价整合，保证世行投资没有排除贫困人口，或让他们处于弱势地位。Urban rail-based systems should be cautiously appraised. Urban rail-based systems are costly to build and operate, are more expensive for the passenger to use than road-based modes, and can impose a large burden on the city budget. It remains appropriate, therefore, to advise cautious examination of the fiscal sustainability of rail investments and their impact on poor people before making expensive commitments. The most critical lesson the Bank has learned is that mass transit investment decisions should be

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driven by a thorough examination of strategic objectives of technological alternatives, and financial implications, and not by short-term political or commercial opportunism.城市铁路系统应该谨慎评估。建设和运营城市铁路系统成本昂贵，对乘客而言，票价也比路上模式贵，对城市预算也带来很大负担。因此，在建造之前，应该谨慎地调查铁路投资的财政可持续性及其对贫困人口的影响。世行学到的最重要的经验是，轨道交通投资决定应该由彻底的技术选择的战略目标和财政情况决定，不能只看短期的政治或商业投机。THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR私营部门的角色Private financing of urban transport infrastructure is possible. Recognizing the burden of investments in major roads and metros on municipal budgets, cities such as Bangkok,Buenos Aires, and Kuala Lumpur have already managed to secure private capital finance for them. Experience so far has shown that this requires very high demand for faster movement in the affected corridor and a realistic stance by government on the relationship between price controls and commercial profitability. Experience has also shown opportunistic development on an ad hoc basis to be damaging, and usually costly to the public purse. Mass transit systems, in particular, appear to yield greatest benefit when they are incorporated into a citywide price-level and structure plan in which the full cost of new mass transit investments on the municipal budgets, on fares, and on poor people has been estimated in advance.私人投资城市交通基础设施是可能的。认识到投资主要公路和地铁给市政预算带来的负担，一些城市如曼谷、布宜诺斯艾利斯和吉隆坡已经成功寻求到私营资本。目前的经验表明这要求相应路线上有较高需求，政府在价格控制和商业利润关系上立场现实。经验还表明特别机会下投机式的发展是有害的，耗费国库大量资金。尤其是轨道交通，如果整合到整个城市的票价水平和结构规划中，预先估计新的轨道交通投资成本对市政预算票价和对贫困人口的影响，将会带来最大效应。Planning and regulatory arrangements for private participation in urban transport are fundamental. The interaction of transport with land use requires its careful integration into the planning of metropolitan structure and finance within a comprehensive long-term plan for the city. The public sector must set a strategy; identify infrastructure projects and describe them in some detail; and confirm the acceptability of environmental consequences, tariffs, and any contingent changes to the existing transport system. It must acquire the necessary land and rights-of-way, ensure development permissions, commit funding, and provide some necessary guarantees. Physical coordination (to achieve convenient modal interchange) and fares coordination (to keep public transport attractive and to protect poor people) need to be embodied in a comprehensive transport strategy plan that recognizes the relationships between modes of transport.规划和调节私营资本参与城市交通是基本的。交通和土地使用的互相作用要求其整合到都市结构规划和投资的长期全面城市计划中。公有部门必须制定政策，确定基础设施项目，并详细描述；确认对环境影响结果的接受程度，票价以及对现有交通

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系统的可能改变。必须获得必须的土地和通行权利、保证开发许可、提交资金并提供必要担保。物质协调（达到方便模式换乘）和车票协调（保持公共交通的吸引力，保护贫困人口）需要体现在全面的交通战略计划中，清楚认识到各种交通模式的关系。BETTER FOCUSING OF INTERVENTIONS TO ASSIST THE POOR采取更多干预手段帮助贫困人口There are two possible approaches when designing poverty-targeted transport interventions—directly serving the locations where poor people live and work, and targeting disadvantaged groups. In addition, institutions must address two issues that have a particular impact on the poor—the polluted urban environment, and safety and security.设计针对贫困人口的交通干预手段时有两种可行方式——直接服务贫困人口居住和工作的地点，针对弱势群体。此外，机构还必须处理对贫困人口尤其有影响的两个问题——污染的城市环境和安全。

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SERVING THE LOCATIONS WHERE POOR PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK服务贫困人口居住和工作地点Transport improvements can be focused on where poor people live and work. These improvements may involve concentrated efforts to improve access to slum areas or to improve public transport to peripheral locations. The Bank-supported Pavement Program in Low-Income Areas (Programa de Pavimentacao de Baixo Custo em Areas de Baixa Renda—PROPAV) in Brazil proved highly successful, and was extended throughout the country, as well as to other Latin American countries. 交通改进可以针对贫困人口的居住地和工作地。这些改进包括集中改善贫民区附近交通或改善城市外围区域公共交通。世行支持的巴西低收入地区人行道项目(Programa de Pavimentacao de Baixo Custo em Areas de Baixa Renda—PROPAV) 非常成功，并推广到巴西全国范围乃至其他拉美国家。Leakage through land rent changes must be taken into account. Transport investments or service improvements change the structure of land values. If there is strong competition for the use of land and highly concentrated ownership of land, rents increase in improved areas and the benefits of transport improvements accrue to rich landowners rather than to poor land occupants. Some investments—such as improvements in bus or NMT systems—are less likely to drive poor people out to more distant, less-expensive locations than are others—such as primary roads or more highly priced, mass transit systems. This finding further emphasizes the need for transport to be part of a comprehensive urban development strategy.必须考虑土地租金改变的损失。交通投资或服务改进改变了土地价值的结构。如果土地使用有激烈竞争，且土地所有权高度集中，在改进的地区土地租金提高，交通改进的利润都归富有的土地所有者所有，而不是贫困的该地区居住者。与其他投资相比，如主要公路或更高价的轨道交通系统，一些投资，如改善公交或NMT系统的投资不太可能将贫困人口赶到更偏远更便宜的地段。TARGETING DISADVANTAGED GROUPS针对弱势群体Transport provision can be part of a social safety net. A complementary approach is to focus on the specific categories of disadvantaged people. Given the overwhelming importance of the ability to access employment, the work journeys of poor people may be a prime target for support. The cost of ensuring that these trips are affordable may be shifted to the employer (as with the “vale-transporte” in Brazil) or the state (as with the commuter subsidy system of South Africa). Although they may be less-than-perfectly targeted (for example, the vale-transporte misses very poor informal workers), may distort residential location incentives, and are inferior to direct income transfers, targeted transport subsidy arrangements may be the best practicable safety net for poor workers.提供交通可以是社会安全网的一部分。补充方式是关注弱势群体的具体分类。考虑到方便工作的绝对重要性，贫困人口的上下班行程是支持的主要目标。这些行程的

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成本可以转移给雇主（如巴西的“交通费”）或国家（如南非的通勤补贴系统）。尽管这些措施针对群体可能还不完善（如，交通费没有包括非常贫困的非正规工人），可能扭曲居住地动机，不如直接收入转移，但对于贫困工人来说，针对性的交通补贴是最实际的安全网。Low income is not the only form of deprivation. Gender confers some particular disadvantages in terms of diffused trip patterns and timings, as well as particular vulnerability to safety and security problems. Age and infirmity pose rather different problems, calling for sensitive “inclusive” design of physical facilities. Both locational resettlement and occupational redeployment impinge in a particularly harsh way on poor people, requiring adequate safety nets.低收入不是唯一的贫困形式。在散布的通行方式和时间选择上，性别产生一些特定弱势，在安全问题上也有特别弱点。年龄和疾病则有不同的问题，要求敏感地“包括”物质设施设计。居住地重新安置和重新寻找工作对贫困人口尤其是巨大冲击，要求充分的社会安全网络。Fare controls can do more harm than good. Experience teaches two important lessons about what not to do with respect to fare controls. First, controlling fares in the absence of realistic analysis of, and provision for, the resource needs of that social strategy actually destroys public transport service and may cause serious harm to some poor people. Second, cross-subsidy within public sector monopolies does not eliminate the fundamental resource problem, and instead adds some extra burden of inefficiencies in supply.票价控制弊大于利。经验得出两个重要教训，在票价控制方面哪些不应该做。首先，在缺乏现实分析和提供社会战略的资源需要时，控制票价实际上破坏了公共交通服务，对一些穷人来说可能带来严重危害。其次，公有部门垄断的交叉补贴并不能根治资源问题，反而加剧了供应的无效率。

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POVERTY OF “LIFE QUALITY”: TRANSPORT AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT“生活质量”的贫困：交通和城市环境Poor people tend also to be the most vulnerable to environmental pollution. The most damaging pollutants are lead, small suspended particulate matter, and in some cities, ozone. Local air pollution from transport in developing countries contributes to the premature deaths of over 500,000 people per year, and imposes an economic cost of up to 2 percent of gross domestic project (GDP) in many countries. A strategy for improvement of the effects that urban transport has on the environment is thus not a luxury to be afforded at the expense of poor people, but an important element of an urban transport strategy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also forecast that developing countries will suffer disproportionate costs of from 5 to 9 percent of their GDP should the global level of carbon dioxide double (IPCC 1996).贫困人口往往是环境污染的最大受害者。最具危害性的污染物是铅、悬浮颗粒物，在一些城市则是臭氧。在发展中国家，交通所造成的当地空气污染每年使超过500000人过早死亡，在很多国家带来的经济损失则占国内生产总值（GDP）的2%。改进城市交通对环境影响的战略因此并不是以牺牲贫困人口为代价的奢侈品，而是城市交通战略中的重要组成部分。政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）预计如果全球二氧化碳含量翻倍，发展中国家将承受高昂成本，可能占国家GDP的5%-9%（IPCC 1996）。Understanding of the environmental impacts of urban transport remains deficient. There are some clear technological priorities. While it is generally preferable to concentrate on performance standards, rather than on specific technology preference, there are also some relatively clear technological priorities for the sector. These include the elimination of lead from gasoline, the replacement of two-stroke motorcycles with four-stroke motorcycles, and the elimination or cleaning up of high-mileage, heavily polluting vehicles. The Bank can help with technical assistance in these fields and, in some cases, with the financing of infrastructure and incentive mechanisms to stimulate change.对城市交通对环境影响的理解仍然不足。有一些明显的优先考虑的技术。尽管一般偏向于关注业绩标准，而不是具体技术偏好，在这一行业仍然有一些相对明显的优先技术。这些包括使用无铅汽油，将两冲程摩托车全部转化为四冲程，消除或整理高里程数、高污染车辆。世行可以在这些方面提供技术支持，而且，在某些情况下，投资基础设施和动机机制来激发改变。There is no quick technological fix for developing countries. Local air quality can be improved in the long run by new fuel and vehicle technologies. In the short run, however, the vehicle stock is dominated by an older generation of technology, which is often badly maintained. In some countries the emphasis on identifying and acting to improve the worst, highest-mileage polluters—often buses, taxis, and some trucks—has helped. Inspection and maintenance programs, if undertaken by technologically efficient

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instruments in a corruption free context, can have great impacts. At the extreme there are assisted, or forced, scrappage schemes. 对发展中国家而言，没有快捷的技术固定模式。使用新型燃油和车辆技术，长期来看，这将改进地方空气质量。但是在短期，目前的使用车辆都是老一代的技术，维护很差。在一些国家，强调明确并采取行动来改善最差的高里程高污染车辆——常常是公交车、出租车和一些卡车——是有帮助的。如果采用有效的技术手段检查和维护项目，将会有巨大影响。极端情况下，可以辅助或强制报废计划。Some robust “win-win” environmental strategies exist for the urban transport sector . Good traffic management can reduce environmental impact as well as congestion. Tax structure reform can encourage the use of cleaner fuels and stimulate better vehicle maintenance. This reform, however, requires the design of fiscal measures to handle problems associated with the use of fuels (for example, kerosene, which is used in several sectors), and to handle the associated conflicting policy objectives, such as those associated with the taxation of diesel fuel (see the more detailed discussion in the main text of the report). The integration of transport interventions in general municipal development packages may offer better leverage in this respect than the integration of transport-specific projects.对城市交通部门，存在一些有力的“双赢”环保战略。好的交通管理可以降低环境污染和拥堵问题。税收结构改革可以鼓励使用清洁能源，促进车辆维护改善。但是这一改革要求设计财政手段来处理燃料使用产生的问题（如某些部门使用的煤油）、相关的冲突政策目标，如柴油税收（参见报告正文部分的详细讨论）。在市政发展中融入交通干预手段比仅仅使用具体交通项目更能起到杠杆作用。SAFETY AND SECURITY安全和保障Road accidents are a global pandemic. Nearly 0.5 million people die and up to 15 million people are injured in urban road accidents in developing countries each year, at a direct economic cost of between 1 and 2 percent of GDP in many countries. Accidents occur widely on roads between intersections rather than being concentrated at intersections, as is the case in industrialized countries, and the majority of victims are poor pedestrians and bicyclists.道路事故是世界通病。在发展中国家每年有50万人死于城市交通事故，受伤人数达到150万，很多国家的直接经济损失达到GDP的1%到2%。事故往往多发于交叉路口之间的路上，而不是交叉路口，这与工业国家情况相符，主要的受害者是行人和骑自行车的人。Adequate data are the basis for policy formulation and implementation. The first steps to improve traffic safety are the development of national road accident data collection and analysis capability, and the formation of institutional arrangements to ensure that the data are transmitted to those who need them for policy purposes. Accident frequency and severity can be reduced by improved road design and traffic management policies. While

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some infrastructure investment is specifically safety oriented (such as infrastructure for NMT in Lima, or grade-separated railway crossings in Buenos Aires), there is a strong case for mandatory safety audits in the design process for all transport infrastructure. Improved medical response can be achieved by some relatively inexpensive and simple institutional innovations. Increasing safety awareness to change traffic patterns and pedestrian behavior requires development and training of staff for specific road-safety coordinating agencies or councils, at both the national and municipal levels.充分数据是制定和执行政策的基础。改善交通安全的第一步是发展国家的道路事故数据收集和分析能力，形成制度来保证需要的决策者能够得到这些数据。通过改进道路设计和交通管理设计就可以降低事故频率和严重性。一些基础设施投资是明确针对安全性的（如利马的NMT基础设施，或布宜诺斯艾利斯的分层铁路交叉口），所有交通基础设施的设计过程都要强制安全审查。一些相对便宜简单的机构革新就能达到改进医院反应的目的。要增加安全意识来改变交通模式和行人行为，就要求对国家和市政层面具体道路安全协调机构或理事会的员工进行发展和培训。Personal security is a growing social problem in many countries. While this problem encompasses much more than the transport sector, it is important to analyze the nature and significance of insecurity in the urban transport sector and to devise policy instruments to counter it. That might include collection and analysis of data on personal security in the transport sector to enhance official awareness of the problem, and might include commitment of police authorities to arrest and the courts to appropriately penalize offenders. Strengthening public participation in projects, particularly at the neighborhood level, is important. Some transport policy initiatives can contribute directly to better personal security. For example, street lighting—designed to improve pedestrian security—can be included in street improvement, and particularly in slum-upgrading, projects. Franchise conditions for public transport can give incentives for improved attention to security by public transport operators. 在很多国家个人安全是日益加剧的社会问题。尽管这一问题并不局限在交通部门，分析城市交通部门不安全问题的性质和重要性仍然有必要，并制定政策手段来应对。这可能包括收集和分析交通部门的个人安全数据，增加当局对这一问题的认识；也可能包括委任警察当局逮捕，法庭对违法者做出恰当处罚。加强公众参与是很重要的，尤其是在社区层面。例如：路灯是为了改善行人安全，可以包括在道路改进内，尤其是贫民区改进项目。公共交通特许经营权可以促进运营商提高对安全问题的意识。POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS政策和机构改革Technical measures alone are unlikely to resolve the fundamental paradox of a sector’s combining excess demand with inadequately financed supply. Improvements in the efficiency of roads, vehicles, public transport operations, and traffic management can undoubtedly improve the efficiency of urban transport. This will not be enough, however, because of three structural characteristics that distinguish urban transport from most other

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urban service sectors. These characteristics are (a) the separation of infrastructure from operations, (b) the separation of interacting modes of transport, and (c) the separation of infrastructure finance from infrastructure pricing. What is required, therefore, is an integrated package of strategies for infrastructure pricing, service pricing, and urban transport system financing, founded in well designed institutions within an appropriate political framework.仅凭技术手段不可能解决交通行业供不应求的根本矛盾。改进道路、车辆、公共交通运营和交通管理效率无疑能够提高城市交通效率。然而这还不够，因为三个结构特征使得城市交通与大多数其它城市服务行业有所不同。这些特征是(a)基础设施和运行分离，(b)交通模式互相作用分离，及(c)基础设施投资与基础设施定价分离。因此，需要整合基础设施定价、服务定价和城市交通能够系统筹资，由合适行政框架下的良好机构提出。

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SEPARATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE FROM OPERATIONS基础设施与运行分离Charging for road infrastructure is the core of a strategy for both efficient allocation of resources and sustainable finance. Congestion increases private transport costs and contributes to the decline of public transport service. While these two phenomena are logically connected, in most cities they are institutionally and financially separated. In principle, vehicular users of congested urban road space should be charged a price at least equal to the short-run marginal cost of use, including congestion, road wear and tear, and environmental impacts.公路基础设施收费是有效资源配置和可持续财政战略的核心。拥堵增加了私人交通成本，降低了公共交通服务。这两种现象在逻辑上是联系在一起的，但是很多城市却在制度和财政上分离。原则上，应该对拥堵的城市公路使用者收取一定费用，至少等于短期使用的边际成本，包括拥堵、道路磨损和环境影响。In the absence of direct charging, fuel taxation should be structured concurrent with vehicle license duties to give a proxy charge for road use and its external impacts . In practice, a range of direct and indirect mechanisms is used to charge for road use. The most common of these mechanisms—the fuel tax—reflects global warming impacts well, but is a poor surrogate for either congestion or road-maintenance impact pricing. Nevertheless, if it is the best proxy there is, the fuel tax should be structured to reflect its relative contributions to urban air pollution, again in conjunction with the structuring of vehicle license duties.若没有直接收费，燃油税结构应该与车辆许可税一致，替代公路使用和其对外影响的收费。实践中，有一系列直接和间接机制用于公路使用收费。最普通的是燃油税，反映了全球变暖的影响，但这并不能完全替代拥堵或道路维护影响的定价。然而，如果这是最好的替换方式，燃油税必须能够反映出相应的城市空气污染，同样与车辆许可税相符合。Parking charges should be related to an overall infrastructure pricing strategy . Although they are also a poor proxy for congestion charges, parking charges should, in any case, always cover the full opportunity-cost of land used for parking. Where parking policy is the only available proxy for congestion, pricing controls need to cover all forms of parking space (including that provided privately by employers for their employees).停车收费应该与整体基础设施定价战略相关。尽管这也不能替代拥堵费，在任何情况下，停车费都应该涵盖停车使用土地的全部机会成本。如果停车收费是唯一的替代拥堵收费政策，定价控制应该要涵盖所有形式的停车空间（包括有雇主私人给员工提供的空间）。Direct charging for roads requires careful political and administrative preparation. Although cordon pricing and tolling of specific roads is a step in the right direction, the long term solution lies in more systematic congestion charges. Of course, it is not easy to raise prices or taxes, particularly for goods that have traditionally been viewed as free.

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For instance, resistance to increased fuel prices in the República Bolivariana de Venezuela in the late-1980s was very violent. Riots following an increase in public transport fares in Guatemala in 2000 cost five lives. This suggests that such increases in charges must be linked with a perceptible improvement in provision of services. There would remain a large education requirement to explain the link between the increased cost and the improvement of services, and to offer realistic choices of alternatives. The second part of the integrated solution thus refers to service provision and pricing.公路直接收费要求仔细的行政管理准备。尽管周界定价和特定公路收费是正确的方向，长期的解决办法还在于更系统化的拥堵收费。当然，提高价格和税收是不容易的，尤其是那些传统上被看作是免费的商品。例如，上世纪80年代末委内瑞拉对燃油价格提高的抗议是很激烈的。2000年危地马拉公共交通票价上涨导致的骚乱使5人死亡。这表明这些费用提高必须和明显的服务改进联系起来。仍然需要告诉民众成本提高和服务改善之间的联系，并给出实际的其他选择。因此整体解决办法的第二步是服务提供和定价。SERVICE PROVISION AND PRICING服务提供和定价Pricing principles for public transport modes should be determined within an integrated urban strategy. This means that they should reflect the extent to which road infrastructure is adequately charged. Given the high level of interaction among modes, and the prevalent undercharging of road use, financial transfers between roads and public transport services—and between modes of public transport—are potentially consistent with optimal pricing strategy.公共交通模式的定价原则应该由政体城市战略来决定。这意味着必须反映公路基础设施充分收费的程度。考虑到模式间大量交互，及公路使用普遍收费过低，公路和公共交通服务之间——以及各种公共交通模式之间的财政转移——潜在地与优化定价策略相符合。Subsidies or compensation payments do not mean that there should be a monopoly supplier of transport services. In the interests of efficient service supply, transport operators should operate competitively, with purely commercial objectives, and with financial transfers achieved through contracts between municipal authorities and operators for the supply of services. Any noncommercial objectives imposed on operators should be compensated directly and transparently, where appropriate, by the non-transport line agencies in whose interests they are imposed. Above all, in the absence of appropriate contracting or other support mechanisms, the sustainability of public transport service should be paramount, and should generally have precedence over traditional price regulation arrangements. The completion of an integrated policy thus requires an integrated urban transport financing system.补贴或补偿付款并不意味着应该由垄断供应商来提供交通服务。为了提供有效服务，交通运营商应该以纯商业目标竞争运营，通过服务提供商与市政当局签订合同来达到财政转移。任何加于运营商的非商业性目标应该得到直接和公正的补偿，合适的

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话，由施加该目标的相关非交通机构支付。总之，缺乏合适合同或其他支持机制时，公共交通服务的可持续性是至关重要的，而且应该优先于传统的价格规范。因此，完整的政策要求整合城市交通融资系统。URBAN TRANSPORT SYSTEM FINANCING城市交通系统融资Urban transport financing should be fungible. Given the interaction among modes, there is a strong case for treating the urban transport system as an integrated whole. Because neither congestion nor environmental impacts are currently subject to direct charges in many countries, optimizing the performance of the sector as a whole might justify using revenues raised from private automobile users to fund improvements in public transport. Private sector financing for transport infrastructure, raised through competitive tendering of concessions, may be supported by public contributions as long as these have been subject to proper cost-benefit analysis.城市交通融资应该是可替换的。考虑到模式间互动，有必要将城市交通体系看成一个整体。因为在很多国家还没有对拥堵或环境影响直接收费，优化整个交通行业的业绩表明从私家车使用者处收费来资助公共交通改进是合理的。只要经过适当成本效益分析，公有投资可以结合通过竞争招标获得的私营部门投资，用于交通基础设施。There are different ways of securing fungibility of funding. In a well-managed unitary authority, such as in Singapore, this occurs through the normal budgetary process. In more complex, multitiered administrative systems, achieving this flexibility may require the pooling of urban transport financial resources within an urban transport fund administered by a strategic transport authority at the municipal or metropolitan level. Under such an organization, all local transport-user charges, including congestion charges and any allocations of local taxes or intergovernmental transfers for transport, should normally be made to the fund. 有多种方式保障资金可替换性。在管理良好的单一当局，如新加坡，可通过正常预算过程进行。在更复杂、多样性的行政体系中，达到这一灵活性要求将城市交通财政资源集中到一个城市交通基金，由市级或都市级的战略交通当局管理。在这样的机构下，所有地方交通使用者收费，包括拥堵费和其他地方税收分配或政府间交通财政转移，都应该交给基金。Urban transport funds do not imply earmarking of taxes. Earmarked taxes, such as the payroll tax on employers, that supports the public transport agency Régie Autonome desTransport Parisiens (RATP) in Paris, have the advantage of a secure legal and budgetary foundation, and are often the basis on which sound long-term service planning can be undertaken. However, the value of having an integrated urban transport fund does not depend on any specific tax source being earmarked for transport. Moreover, in order to develop the credibility of the fund, and particularly to gain political and popular support for the payment of congestion charges, it is essential that the objectives and scope of an

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urban transport fund be clearly defined, that allocations be subject to rigorous appraisal, and that the operations of the fund be transparent.城市交通基金并不指定税收用途。在巴黎，指定用途的税收，如员工的收入所得税支持公共交通机构Régie Autonome des Transport Parisiens (RATP)，胜过安全的法律和预算基础，而且是一些可靠的长期服务规划进行的基础。但是，整体城市交通基金的价值并不在于指定任何特定税收用于交通。而且，为了发展基金的可信度，尤其是在收取拥堵费上获得行政和民众的支持，明确城市交通基金的目标和范围是很必要的，分配必须经过严格评估，基金的使用也应该是公开透明的。INSTITUTIONS机构Policy integration has significant institutional implications. In the interests of urban transport integration and sustainability, developing countries could therefore profitably move toward prices reflecting full social costs for all modes, to a targeted approach to subsidization reflecting strategic objectives, and to an integration of urban transport funding, while still retaining supply arrangements for individual modes that give an important incentive to operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The implementation of such a policy package has significant institutional implications, requiring close coordination both between jurisdictions and between functions, as well as between private and public sector planning and operating agencies.政策整合有强烈的机构含义。为了城市交通整合和可持续性，发展中国家应该将原来反映所有模式的全部社会成本的票价方式改变为采取针对性的措施来补贴战略目标，整合城市交通融资，但仍然保留个人模式供应来推动运行效率和成本效益。这一政策的执行有巨大的机构含义，要求管辖权限和职责之间，及私营和公有部门规划和运行机构之间紧密配合。The basis for institutional coordination is often very weak. Few cities have a strategic agency for land-use and transportation planning, or a competent traffic management unit. Traffic police are therefore often involved with traffic management planning, for which they are ill equipped and untrained. Public transport planning and regulation is also often tied to operations. The few institutions that do exist tend to be understaffed and their staff poorly trained.机构配合的基础很弱。很少有城市拥有土地使用和交通规划的战略机构，或有能力的交通管理单位。因此，交通警察局往往参与交通管理规划，但他们在这方面配备不良，训练不足。公共交通规划和规范也往往与运营捆绑在一起。存在的少数机构人员不足，也缺乏训练。Urban transport institutions need both restructuring and strengthening. Action is required on two levels. First, authorities need to recognize what kind of technical organization is necessary to address urban transport issues. Second, the organizations need adequate human, as well as physical, resources to perform their functions. While no

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single institutional blueprint for public transport is appropriate for all countries, there is enough experience to establish some general principles for the reduction of institutional impediments to effective policy integration.城市交通机构需要重组和加强。需要在两个层面上采取行动。首先，当局需要认识到哪种技术组织可以处理城市交通问题。其次，组织需要充分的人力和物质资源来执行职能。尽管没有适用于所有国家的单独公共交通机构蓝图，有足够的经验来建立一些基本原则，以降低制度阻碍，提高政策整合效用。Jurisdictional coordination may be facilitated through the clear establishment in law of the allocation of responsibility between levels of government. Formal institutional arrangements can be made for collaboration where multiple municipalities exist within a continuous conurbation. The process of decentralization in developing countries may offer an excellent opportunity to address the problems. In particular, intergovernmental transfers need to be carefully planned to be consistent with the allocation of responsibility, but structured to avoid distorting local priority setting. Central governments might also encourage coordination at the metropolitan level; in France, for example, the central government made both local taxation powers and intergovernmental transfers conditional on appropriate jurisdictional and functional collaboration.可以通过明确各层政府间的职责分配来协调管辖权限。在包括卫星城的大都市内，可通过正式机构安排其多级政府机构合作。发展中国家分散进程提供了处理这些问题的良好机会。尤其政府间转移需要仔细规划，以符合职责分配，但要避免扭曲地方优先设置。中央政府可以鼓励都市区层面的合作，如在法国，中央政府在恰当权限和职责合作的条件下，进行地方税收权利和政府间转移。Functional coordination should be based on a strategic land-use and transport plan . Detailed planning, both of transport and land use, should be aligned with a municipal or metropolitan structure plan. Coordinated operation is further enhanced by the clear allocation of functions among agencies, with the more strategic functions being retained at the metropolitan level. Obligations statutorily imposed on local authorities should be linked to specific channels of finance (such as direct line agency funding of reduced public transport fares). Responsibility for traffic safety should also be explicitly allocated, with an institutional responsibility at the highest level of the local administration. Traffic police should be trained in traffic management and safety administration, and involved in transport and safety policy planning.职责合作应该基于战略土地使用和交通计划。交通和土地使用的详细规划，应该与市政或都市结构计划联系在一起。明确机构职责分配可以进一步促进合作，多数战略职责仍然保留在都市级别。地方当局的义务应该与特定融资渠道融合（如降低的公共交通票价由直接管理机构出资）。交通安全职责应该明确分配，最高的职责机构应该是地方行政。交通警察应该接受交通管理和安全行政的培训，并参与交通和安全政策规划。Responsibility for planning and operating public transport should be institutionally separated. For effective involvement of the private sector, technical regulation should be

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separated from procurement and economic regulation. A clear legal framework should be established for competition in public transport supply, either in the market or for the market. Operations should be fully commercialized or privatized, and the development of new competitive private suppliers of service encouraged through legal recognition of associations, and so on. The public sector should develop strong service procurement and contract enforcement skills.应该分离规划和运营公共交通的机构职责。为了私营资本有效参与，技术规范应该与采购和经济规范分离。应该建立清晰的法律框架，让公共交通供应市场存在竞争，运营应该全面商业化或私有化，通过法律承认协会来鼓励新的竞争私营服务提供商发展等。公有部门应该发展强大的服务采购和合同执行技能。POLITICS, PARTICIPATION, AND PERFORMANCE行政、参与和业绩Decentralized democratic process must be complemented by high technical competence. Ultimately, transport policy formulation involves an element of tradeoff between conflicting interests. It is therefore bound to be a political process. Too often (not least in Latin America) bad investments have been made, and serious urban transport issues trivialized, by the political process. Cities that have exhibited good transport planning and management, such as Curitiba and Singapore, have often developed under strong leadership and have been founded on a high level of technical and professional competence in the planning function. The question is how to reconcile coherent technical vision with more decentralized and fragmented democratic processes.分散的民主过程应该有高技术能力来补充。最终，交通政策是冲突利益的折衷。因此这一定是个行政过程。行政过程往往（不仅仅在拉美国家）做出糟糕的投资，并将严重的城市交通问题变得无足轻重。那些展现出良好交通规划和管理的城市，如库里提巴和新加坡，使在强有力的领导下发展起来的，其规划功能也有高级的技术和专业能力支持。问题是怎样调和一致的技术观点和分散的民主过程。Public participation and technically strong planning can be complementary. The development of public participation and consultation, in parallel to the local democratic process, is an important means of improving local policy design. This may occur through advance exposure of plans to a free press and other media, as well as through more formal processes of public consultation or public inquiry. For small scale, very localized, infrastructure projects it may be possible to incorporate local preferences in the design process itself. Public transport users may also be involved in service franchising arrangements by complaints and consultation processes and by linking bonus payments for franchised operators to public or media appraisal. At a more strategic level, and for larger, more complex projects, consultation often functions more as a means of trying to reconcile inherently competing or conflicting interests; it is nevertheless central to the development of consensus-based city development strategies.公众参与和技术上强大规划可以是补充。公众参与和咨询发展，与地方民主过程一样，是改善地方政策设计的重要手段。可通过向免费报刊或其他媒体提前公布计划，及通过更正式的公众咨询和听证程序来达到。对于小规模的地方性基础设施项目，

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可以整合地方对设计过程本身的偏好。公共交通乘客也可以通过投诉和咨询程序参与服务经营权安排，将获得经营权的运营商奖金支付与公众或媒体评估联系起来。在战略层面，对于更大更复杂的项目，咨询不仅仅是作为协调竞争或利益冲突的手段，在基于多数意见的城市发展战略中也处于核心地位。Public participation must be timely and well structured. Developing strategic involvement requires action at two levels. First, the public processes must be organized to facilitate timely but well-informed consultation. Second, particularly where formal local political processes are weak, the existence of effective local community groups is extremely important. In developing countries, such groups are often well developed in rural areas but much less so in cities. As both policy and financial responsibility for urban development is decentralized to the cities, it is thus possible to create institutional and financial arrangements that better reflect the complex interactions both within the urban transport sector and between urban transport and the rest of urban development strategy. It is only on such a carefully considered institutional and financial basis that the fundamental paradox of urban transport can be resolved.公众参与必须及时、结构严谨。发展战略参与要求两个层面的行动。首先，必须组织公众程序推动及时和消息灵通的咨询。其次，尤其是在正式地方行政程序较弱的地方，有效地方社区群体的存在十分重要。在发展中国家，这些群体在农村地区发展很好，但在城市较差。因为城市发展的政策和财政职责分散到城市，因此可能创立机构和财政安排，能够更好反映城市交通部门内以及城市交通和其他城市发展战略之间的复杂作用。只有在仔细考虑的制度和财政基础上，城市交通的基本矛盾才能解决。

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