urban obervation-zokak el blat- beirut - lebanon

7/22/2019 Urban Obervation-Zokak El Blat- Beirut - Lebanon

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URBAN OBSERVATION

ZOKAK EL BLATBEIRUT - LEBANON

Academic Urban ObservatoryInstitute of Urban Planning

October 2012



Rita E. ChedidMarieke KrijnenBruno MarotHala MoussawiJean-Marc Adjizian

Vicken AshkarianSerge Yazigi

Jennifer Casagrande PHD Student

Architecture Students (ALBA) for their contributionto Architectural and Economic Activities SurveysJamayla CahaccourClaudia SadakaEliane DaccacheLena OsseiranRacha Hajj ChahineChristelle KhalilMohammad Ajam

Wael Hajj

Written by

Collaborators

Cartography

Directed by

Acknowledgement



INTRODUCTION 51. THE CHOICE OF THE STUDY AREA 62. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 7

CHAPTER I: CASE STUDY 81. ZOKAK EL BLAT URBAN DEVELOPMENT 92. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ZOKAK EL BLAT 103. INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 163.1. Land Use And Exploitation 163.2. Laws Pertaining To Built Heritage 173.2.1. The Ottoman Period 173.2.2. The French Mandate: The Antiquities Regulation 173.2.3. The Urban Planning Law 173.2.4. The Building Law 173.3. Studies On The Protection Of Historical Buildings In Beirut Pericentral Areas 183.3.1. “Association De Protection Et De Sauvegarde Des Anciennes Demeures” (Apsad) Study 183.3.2. The Directorate General Of Urban Planning (Dgup) Study 193.3.3. The Khatib & Alami Study 204. DRAFT LAW FOR THE PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARD OF OLD BUILDINGS AND PATRIMONIAL SITES 21

CHAPTER 2: DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 221. STUDY OBJECTIVES 222. STUDY FRAMEWORK 223. DATA COLLECTION SOURCES AND FORMS 25

4. DATA SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINED 255. DATA PARTIALLY OBTAINED, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 256. DROPPED INDICATORS 267. CONCLUSION: MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE IN DATA COLLECTING PROCESSES IN LEBANON 267.1. Lack Of (Reliable) Statistical Data 267.2. Unwillingness Of Public Officials And Institutions To Collaborate 267.3. Unwillingness Of Private Officials In Institutions To Collaborate 267.4. Time Loss In Taking Appointments 267.5. Informal Contacts And Snowball-Effect 26

CHAPTER 3: SURVEY RESULTS 271. THE URBAN DIMENSION 271.1. Road Network 291.1.1. The Roads 291.2. Blocks And Parcels 291.2.1. The Disappearance Of Empty Lots 311.2.2 Residual Lots 321.3. Buildings 341.3.1. Occupation/Built-Up Area 341.3.2. Age 371.3.3. Typology 381.3.4. Use 391.3.5. State 401.3.6. Heights 411.3.7. Façade Materials 43

TABLE OF CONTENT



1.4. Demolition Of Listed Building 441.5. State Of Heritage And Classified Buildings 451.6 Skyline 461.7. Infrastructure And Services 471.7.1. Public Equipments 471.7.2. Upgrading of Public Services 48

1.7.3. Parking Facilities 491.8. Real Estate And Land Market 501.8.1. Real-Estate Transactions Between 2005 - 2011 501.8.2. Construction Permits 531.9. Real Estate And Land Market 571.9.1. New Projects Survey 571.9.2. Real Estate Land Prices 611.9.3. Speculation Process In Zokak El Blat 622. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 632.1. Zokak El Blat Social Fabric Evolution 63

2.2. Confessional Distribution 632.3. The Shiite And Sunnite Competitiveness On Territorial Appropriation 662.4. Worship Places 662.5. Cultural Function 672.5.1. Academic Institutions 673. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION 683.1. Economic Units Occupation 693.1.1 Occupation Status 693.1.2. Legal Status 703.1.3. Property Type 713.1.4. Rent Type 72

3.2. Economic Units Categories Of Activities 733.2.1. Economic Units Functions 733.2.2. Categories Of Economic Activities 753.3. Characteristics Of Economic Activities 763.3.1. Economic Units Surface 763.3.2. Economic Units State 773.4. Labor Market 783.4.1. Employment Rate 783.4.2. Size Of Businesses 783.4.3. Labor Force Gender And Age Distribution 79

3.4.5. Labor Force Confessional Distribution 803.4.6. Labor Force Education Level 803.4.7. Labor Force Place Of Residence 803.4.8. Labor Force Place Of Birth 813.5. Zokak El Blat’s Market Customers 823.5.1. Customers’ Origin 823.5.2. Price Categories 83

CHAPTER 4: SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 851. GENTRIFICATION 85

1.1. Gentrification In Beirut 851.1.1. Gentrification In Zokak El Blat 862. URBAN HERITAGE CONSERVATION 862.1. Property Co-Ownership 862.2. Obsolescence Of The Old Rent Law 86



2.3. Change In The Heritage Building Function 863. FRAGMENTATION 863.1. Significance 873.2. Explanation And Causes In Zokak El Blat 873.2.1. Zokak El Blat’s Spatial Division 873.2.2. Zokak El Blat’s Political Division 87

3.2.3. Zokak El Blat’s Social Division 874. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 884.1. Social Development Strategy 884.2. Economic Level 884.3. Urban Planning Level 894.3.1. Heritage Conservation 894.3.2. Spatial Planning 894.4. Governance Level 90

FIGURE 1: PLOTS’ AREAS IN PATRIARCHATE SECTOR 33FIGURE 2: PLOTS’ AREAS IN SOLIDERE SECTOR 33FIGURE 3: SALES TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 50FIGURE 4: SALES TO FOREIGNERS’ TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 51FIGURE 5: SUBDIVISION TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 21FIGURE 6: MERGING TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 51FIGURE 7: PROPERTY TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 52FIGURE 8: DEMOLITION TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 2005 - 2011 52FIGURE 9 CONSTRUCTION PERMITS IN BEIRUT 2002-2010 53FIGURE 10 : CONSTRUCTION PERMITS IN LEBANON 2002-2010 53FIGURE 11: EVOLUTION OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS 1997 - 2012 54FIGURE 12: NEW DEVELOPMENTS APARTMENT SIZES IN M2 60FIGURE 13: REAL ESTATE PRICES/M2 SOURCE: RAMCO REAL ESTATE 61FIGURE 14: VOTERS MOUHAFAZAT BEIRUT IN 2009, BY SECT 64FIGURE 15: VOTERS IN ZOKAK EL BLAT 65FIGURE 16: VOTERS IN ZOKAK EL BLAT IN 2000, BY SECT 65FIGURE 17: ECONOMIC UNITS OCCUPATION STATUS 69FIGURE 18: ECONOMIC UNITS LEGAL STATUS 70FIGURE 19: ECONOMIC UNITS PROPERTY TYPE 71

FIGURE 20: ECONOMIC UNITS RENT TYPE 72FIGURE 21: ECONOMIC UNITS FUNCTIONS 73FIGURE 22 : DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE PATRIARCHATE AREA 76FIGURE 23 : DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN SOLIDERE AREA 76FIGURE 24: ECONOMIC UNITS SURFACE 76FIGURE 25: ECONOMIC UNITS STATE 77FIGURE 26: EMPLOYMENT RATE 78FIGURE 27: SIZE OF BUSINESSES 78FIGURE 28: LABOR FORCE GENDER AND AGE DISTRIBUTION 79FIGURE 29: LABOR FORCE CONFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION 80

FIGURE 30: LABOR FORCE EDUCATION LEVEL 80FIGURE 31: LABOR FORCE PLACE OF RESIDENCE 81FIGURE 32: LABOR FORCE PLACE OF BIRTH 82FIGURE 33: CUSTOMERS’ ORIGIN 82FIGURE 34: PRICE CATEGORIES 83

TABLE OF FIGURES


http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/urban-obervation-zokak-el-blat-beirut-lebanon 6/92Urban Observation: Zokak el Blat |5

B

eirut is the capital of Lebanon. The urban area of Bei-rut contains about 50% of the Lebanese population. Itsstrategic location, south-east of the Mediterranean basin,

makes it a financial and commercial hub occupying an impor tantplace in trade. Besides its economic role, Beirut is a culturalcentre with many academic and cultural institutions.

Schematically, Greater Beirut, in its «physical» dimension maybe divided into three distinct zones that are:

• The city centre;• The peripheral area, that has a more disparate morphology

compared to the centre;• The pericentral belt, located between the two sectors. The

urbanization of this zone began in the nineteenth century and itis undergoing now radical transformations.

Pericentral districts are suburbs that stretch along the mainhistorical axes of the city of Beirut. Their spatial extent resem-

bles a spider web with an opening to the sea. The urbanizationof these areas began in the nineteenth century. The pericentralbelt, which has been previously neglected in favor of an «uncon-

trolled» expansion of peripheral districts, seems to be drawingattention today manifested by an extreme real estate activity. Inmany parts of the neighborhood, the old buildings are beingreplaced by modern high rise buildings.

Beirut city has five pericentral districts: Minet el Hosn, Zokakel Blat, Bachoura, Saifi and the Port. The pericentral ring occu-pies an intermediate position between the center and periphery.Urban and social criteria, prevailing on the fringes, bring thepericentral areas closer to the city center although they do notplay a prominent economic role. Inhabiting the pericentral area

means having access to the multiple services of the city centrewhile avoiding the commotion and the high land and real-estateprices of the latter. This helps us better understand the inclusionof this area in the urban dynamics, identify its potential to evolveand keep up with the transformation.

INTRODUCTION

Map 1: BCD and Pericentral areas



1. THE CHOICE OF THE STUDY AREA

Within its urban monitoring activities,

Majal is following up the development ofthe areas adjacent to Downtown Beirut.

The focus of this pilot-study is thedistrict of Zokak el-Blat, a neighborhoodthat has been researched by MAJAL at anearlier stage in the context of the urbanregeneration of the pericentral district(Archimedes Project, 2008) and estab-lishing a cultural trail along Zokak el Blatdistrict (From Alphabet to Nahda: Zokak

el Blat, Paths and Great Figures, BeirutBook Capital 2009).

Pericentral areas present many dynam-ics both spatially and socially. Moreover,MAJAL is conducting the study across Zokakel Blat since it is the first district to expandoutside the city centre. Zokak el Blat urbandevelopment observation constitutes a pilotproject through which we intend to developa reflection and a methodology that can bereplicated in all pericentral areas.

Zokak el Blat is currently divided in twospaces: the Patriarchate and Sérail. Thisdivision is underlined by the oppositionbetween the private and public urbanism.Moreover, the presence of a major roadinfrastructure within Zokak el Blat, namelyFouad Chehab Avenue, reinforces ruptureand dichotomy between these two spaces.

The accessibility to this district, com-

bined with its proximity to Beirut CentralDistrict is supposed to make it a very at-tractive economic hub, in particular forenterprises seeking to be establishednext to Beirut Central District. Neverthe-less, the undergoing radical urban trans-formations threaten these potentials:the urban degradation, the vast roadinfrastructure projects, the waves of mi-grations from and to the district, etc. aremajor elements that contribute to Zokakel Blat’s fragmentation.

The project has two objectives:

• Assessing, understanding and ana-lyzing the social, economic and spatial

changes, within this district. Contrary tothe Sérail sector, the pericentral areaswere not subject to a reconstruction plan.It is interesting to understand the devel-opment dynamics for Zokak el Blat districtin the absence of any strategic recon-struction plan;

• Predicting future consequences interms of regeneration, loss of identity,heritage conservation and fragmentation.

Findings and results will be dissemi-nated through:

• Bi-annual scientific and accurate

data and figures, in the objective to try tofill in the existing gap due to lack in exist-ing updated data;

• Reports that interpret these dataand predict trends; these reports will helplocal agents such as the municipality andother administrations in benefiting froma clearer understanding of developmentdynamics taking place on the ground;

• Recommendations based on this re-search that will help local agents in iden-tifying suitable strategies for sustainableplanning and other interventions.

Map 2: Zokak el Blat Area: Patriarchate and Sérail Sectors



2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The main hypothesis is that the district of Zokak el Blatfaces complex development dynamics differentiated in spaceand time, due to socio-spatial and politico-religious singu-larities. Some regions of Zokak el Blat neighborhood experi-

ence drastic and rapid mutation in function and morphology,accompanied by loss of identity and collective memory andthe destruction of built heritage.

To this end, the analysis will consist of a thorough spatialanalysis of the territory of Zokak el Blat. This analysis focuseson urban, social, cultural, economic and environmental dimen-sions while going through an observation of trends in land andreal estate markets. Moreover, a lateral dynamic is wor th explor-ing: the governance. Within the same territory, two governancesare prevailing: public and private.

Therefore, this report is the first step in the direction of real-izing this ambitious project. It consists of a pilot-study exploringthe feasibility of such a project and identifying a workable meth-odology, including a set of indicators, data collection methodsand applicable theoretical backgrounds.

The report is divided into four main chapters:

Chapter 1 is a case study that highlights the urban develop-ment of the district, the evolution of its role and the institutionaland legal framework.

Chapter 2 outlines the data collection methodology. It consists ofseveral interconnected steps that include: defining the objectives,identifying the obstacles and constraints that hinder the fieldwork

in order to select the study framework, determining the sample, de-signing the questionnaire and indentifying the source of information,collecting, processing and analyzing the collected data.

Chapter 3 presents the survey results while emphasizing onthe main issues and assets that characterize the area of study.To do this, chapter 3 will be divided into four sections.

Section 1 analyses Zokak el Blat’s urban morphology. It fo-cuses on the possible evolution of the urban structure, the fac-tors determining the urban cohesion or fragmentation and theissues determining the functioning of the studied area.

Section 2 tackles the social dimension. It focuses on Zokak el Blat’ssocial structure modification and change, the population pressure and

the integration of social groups that recently settled in Zokak el Blat.Section 3 details the economic dimension. It focuses on the

identification of the existent economic characteristics.

Section 4 studies real estate and land dynamics within Zo-kak el Blat district. It focuses on an identification of the markettrends, the urban restitution and the impact of the real estatepressure on historic buildings.

Chapter 4 concludes the report by interpreting findings andproviding recommendations for future interventions. It focuses

on the proposal of urban policies, the requalification of the exis-tent urban structure, the integration of migrant population andfinally the expansion of the district through its proximity to BeirutCity Centre and the other pericentral districts.



Zokak el Blat is located south of down-town Beirut a zone that has suffered the

consequences of war. Fouad Chehab Av-enue divides it into two: the north sideand the south one. Each side, althoughbelonging to the same city, has its owndevelopment dynamics.

The northern side, ravaged by war, ispart of Beirut Central District. It follows thereconstruction program entrusted to theprivate company SOLIDERE, while obeyingthe Master Plan that gave the city of Bei-

rut a modern infrastructure. This space ischaracterized by its elegantly refurbishedbuildings and its homogeneous urban fab-ric. However, Beirut City master plan stops atthe edge of pericentral districts. Thus, Zokakel Blat is divided into two spaces: SOLIDEREor Sérail district and the Patriarchate whichis the vicinity of the southern side. The Patri-archate area, the traditional neighborhood

of Zokak el Blat, was highly damaged by war.It owes its reconstruction and rehabilitation

to initiatives of the civil society and owners,and this, in the absence of urban planningand program prerequisites.

The Patriarchate area is bounded byFouad Chehab Avenue to the north andSalim Salam Avenue to the east. This tra-ditional area is characterized by a denseurban fabric. Like other pericentral neigh-borhoods, it witnesses urban dynamicsthat threaten its identity, its architectural

and urban heritage, its characteristics,the quality of life, etc. at a fast pace.These dynamics are related to the exis-tence of a spontaneous unplanned urbandevelopment, land speculation and realestate pressures.

The urban fabric of the Patriarchatearea is dense and varied. Its shape is

marked by a rugged topography. Socially,the bourgeoisie occupied the old man-

sions and villas while the middle class andthe poor ones resided in the same districtas well.

The district lacks of public spaces. Theneighborhood did undergo small urbanrehabilitation operations and beautifica-tion. These operations affected mainlybuildings such as schools, religious com-munities, NGOs, etc. However, the mor-phology of the area is threatened by the

process of land and property speculation.This process is accelerated by a buildingcode that allows the exploitation of ad-ditional areas. This major difference be-tween existing built areas and authorizedones jeopardizes the heritage characterof the neighborhood since it results in thedemolition of old buildings in favor of newhigh rise ones.

CHAPTER I: CASE STUDY



1. ZOKAK EL BLAT URBANDEVELOPMENT

Zokak el Blat’s origin is intimatelylinked to the history of the paved roador Zokak el Blat Street nowadays knownas the Amine Beyhum Street or Mau-

rice Barres Street. The paving of AmineBeyhum Street aimed to promote theneighborhood residential attractivenesswhile granting the district a pioneeringrole in the expansion of the city outsideits limits.

Zokak el Blat is one the first sites ofBeirut city’s urban expansion beyond itsboundaries. It is characterized by its di-rect access to downtown through Amine

Beyhum Street. The district’s official ad-ministrative boundaries go back to 1920,the time of the French mandate era inLebanon. During this period, the cadas-tral reorganization has made Zokak elBlat an electoral constituency and a realestate land «Mantaqa Aqariya” of the cityof Beirut.

The administrative limits of the districtare bounded by several streets:

• To the North: France Street sepa-rates the district of Zokak el Blat of Minetel Hosn;

• To the East: Capuchins Street, BastaStreet and Ahmad Tabbara Street definethe limits with Basta and Bachoura;

• To the South: Avenue of Independenceand street Osman Ben Affane mark the be-ginning of the district of Moussaytbeh;

• To the west: the streets, Mar-Eliasand Abdel Kader separate Zokak el Blat

from Zarif and Kantari localities.Moreover, two main roads go throughthe area:

• Fouad Chehab Avenue which is a maineast-west artery. This avenue isolates thenorthern area (Sérail or SOLIDERE) thatincludes the Grand Sérail from the southernpart (the Patriarchate);

• Salim Salam Avenue, located at theeastern end of Zokak el Blat, links down-town to the airport and splits the neigh-borhood.

The objective of the study is to conductan analysis on the state of the neighbor-

hood in order to analyze the factors thathave conditioned its urban transformationfrom a purely agricultural area, to a gar-den suburb and later to a dense pericen-tral area in an urban state of decline. Ourassumption consists of three interrelated

ways of thinking about the forces shapinga city:

• The process referred to as gentri-fication;

• The significance of urban heritage;• The process of urban fragmentation.

Gentrification, because we hypoth-esize that Downtown Beirut has a sig-nificant impact on its surrounding areasthat could be understood as a form ofgentrification, where a neighborhood un-dergoes significant socioeconomic and

demographic changes as a result of realestate investment in the area. Heritage,because tangible and intangible forms ofheritage, that characterize the district ofZokak el-Blat are disappearing at a fastpace. Urban fragmentation, because theneighborhood is increasingly fragmented

Map 3: Zokak el Blat Geographic delimitation and Bounding Streets

1 The majlis baladi is the Lebanese equivalent of a municipal council.



on the social, political and sectarian level.Together, these notions will hopefully ex-plain our findings; help us predict futuredevelopments and think of recommenda-tions that will help shape possible inter-ventions by local agents.

It is essential, before tackling the field-work findings, to go through the historicalevolution of the district as well as the in-stitutional and regulatory framework re-garding the land use and exploitation andurban heritage safeguarding.

2. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTIONOF ZOKAK EL BLAT

The Three Founding Stages of Bei-rut’s Modern History: Urbanity Under(Re) Construction

Phase One: From the Nahda to the1940s post-Independence period. Phaseone, between 1840 and 1975, corre-sponds to vibrant years of urban con-struction carried out successively by theOttomans and the French Mandate alongwith the first Lebanese governments afterthe 1943 Independence. After its subjec-

tion to the Ottoman Tanzimat, Beirut wentthrough a period of expansion outside itssurrounding walls essentially due to open-ing up to several influences - mainly Euro-pean - that significantly changed its urbanfabric. Between 1875 and 1912, the cityexpanded at a high rate as a result of mas-sive migration waves - mainly Christians -tied to the decline in the raw silk industryand the sectarian fighting in Damascus andMount Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Beiruti

bourgeoisie - highly represented within themajlis baladi1 - played a significant role inthe urban development and managementof the city mainly by relocating its residenc-es to pericentral areas like Zokak El-Blat,Minet El-Hosn and Rmeil. Led by the urbanelite essentially composed of Sunni andChristian populations - this Nahda-relatedmovement contributed to the emergence ofintellectual, dynamic and residential areasthrough the development of luxury man-sions at the edge of the economic centralareas; this also contributed in the destruc-tion of the traditional urban fabric and cul-tural heritage through the works conduct-

ed with the objective of modernization. Atthis time, according to Saliba (2000):

“The city center and its immediate sur-roundings formed a homogeneous town-scape and a continuous spatial entity with

no major breaks in its urban fabric, differen-tiated only by a gradual change in land usefrom office, commercial, and institutionaluse to high-density residential buildings”.

While these first initiatives of privatestakeholders could be considered as the

beginning of a creeping privatization ofurban affairs, the intellectual and creativedynamics occurring in Zokak El-Blat weremade possible by two major features of thelate 19th century:

• The cultural innovations developed ina fertile socio-cultural setting. Many Leba-nese figures of the Nahda used to teach,write and publish major pieces2 and con-cepts while they were established in thearea. This unprecedented and regionalcultural effervescence contributed to the

Map 4: Zokak el Blat’s Urban Fabric 1876

2 With the aim to make it printable, the simplified version of the Arabic alphabet was created in Zokak El-Blat.



quality of urban life and social relations inthe area. Associated with an efficient syn-ergy with other cultural institutions - Brit-ish, American, French along with the localcommunity -, this emulation reinforced thepolitical and cultural influence of Zokak El-

Blat from local to regional levels.• The coexistence of middle-class,

urban and poor families who set up acommunity based on mutual respect andsupport, often symbolized by the prac-tice of milk brotherhood3 (Hanssen andGenberg, 2002). By promoting sectariandiversity at the local scale and throughpositive economic and intellectual com-petitiveness with other pericentral areas,they strongly believed to contribute to

civil peace. This fine social and confes-sional architecture was mainly built onand around a dense network of worshipand education establishments.

With the beginning of the French Man-

date in the early 1920s, the pericentral

neighborhoods faced several major evolu-tions. In the case of Zokak El-Blat, it resultedin the increasing affirmation of its politicalrole through the presence of institutionalbuildings such as the political representationof Mandate authorities, combined with the

increasing number of of political discussionsheld in private mansions. In the meantime,new waves of Shiite migrants arrived, com-ing from two of the newly integrated areas inGreater Lebanon -Jabal Aamil (in the south)and Baalbeck Hermel areas, and were ac-companied by an influx of Kurd populationsfleeing Anatolia. Consequently, these newlyurbanized populations significantly contrib-uted to changing the confessional balanceof the district and reinforced - with the sup-

port of the French Mandate authorities - theempowerment of sectarian-based benevo-lent organizations in order to cope with fam-ine and epidemics following the First World

War and to facilitate the assimilation of newmigrants. In this regard, as the Mandatepower contributed to the emergence of the

confessional-based quota system for the po-litical representation of Lebanese society4,the French High-Commissioner encouragedthe establishment of the Amiliya Society ofBeirut dedicated to the Shiite populationof Zokak El-Blat in order to counterbal-

ance the growing dynamics of the Sunni’s Al Makassed El Kheiriyah that had started totake over the area at that time. In addition tothe political and cultural features explainedabove, the pericentral belt was also becom-ing an economically strategic area for urbanelites because of the exponential develop-ment of the port and its related services.

The Independence era that began in1943 also brought some key elements tounderstanding the different city-centered

historical and political layers. Three pa-rameters appear as especially crucial:• The growing power of sectarian-

based segregate trends where the 1958crisis and its related social discontent andstructural tension are often depicted as aprelude of the 1975-1990 civil war. Indeed,

Map 5: Zokak el Blat’s Urban Fabric 1920 Map 6: Zokak el Blat’s Urban Fabric 1945

3 The brotherhood of milk is a traditional practice where a woman was able to breastfeed babies in a village or neighborhood, regardless of their social or sectarian background.



it was especially noticeable in Zokak El-Blatwhere the fear produced by these firstcivil incidents led many Christian families toleave this mixed area in order to build theirhome in more homogeneous districts.

• The large-scale and state-led infra-

structure projects carried out in the early1960s under the Fouad Chehab govern-ment in order to respond to the 1958 socialunrest and to mostly facilitate the develop-ment of private economic initiatives. Thisincluded upgrading the major roads con-nected to downtown and the constructionof the pericentral expressway -also calledthe “ring”- that involved heavy destruc-tions of the city’s morphological fabric. InZokak El-Blat, it resulted in a clear division

between the northern part - adjacent todowntown - and the southern one. Thesedrastic changes in the neighborhood alsoled to the departure of many Maronite, Ar-menian and other Christian minorities. Asa result, new migrants -especially of theShiite community - moved into the emptyapartments and reinforced the incrementalconfessional imbalance.

• In parallel, while the successive pre-1975 governments favored a laissez-faireattitude - except with regards to infrastruc-

tures serving the development of eco-nomic interests as mentioned above - andleft to civil society and private institutionstheir planning obligations to ameliorate lo-cal living conditions, the Beirut Municipal-ity developed G. Riachi municipal masterplan (1954) including zoning regulations.These are based on a concentric gradientscheme where the highest building ratiosapplied to the center, before decreasing to-wards peripheral areas. Unfortunately, the

highest ratios matched the location of theoldest urban fabric described earlier andthat of highest quality. This outdated zon-ing scheme is still ruling the current urbandevelopment in Beirut with the tragic con-sequences we can imagine on the quality ofthe existing urban fabric, especially when,at the same time, the private sector keptprogressively taking over the urban de-velopment dynamics through the massivefinancial influx stemming from neighboringGulf countries.

Strongly influenced by exogenous fac-

tors, phase one of the creation of modernBeirut left a substantial heritage in termsof residential buildings and architecture,public infrastructure (schools, places ofworship, road networks, etc), intellectualand political culture, and local and re-gional identities. In this regard, the role ofthe first neighborhoods to be developedoutside the medieval city walls was centralbecause most evolutions and innovationsoccurred there, namely in areas like Zo-kak El-Blat. where we witnessed the de-velopment of original and complementary

functional connections with the historiccity center. In the meantime, because oftheir crucial role in the intellectual, po-litical or economic realms, urban elitesprogressively developed a private sector-oriented culture and system of urbangovernance based on specific balancesof power minimizing the role of publicauthorities in urban development policies.

Overall, phase one assembled differentlayers of a complex urbanity based on urbanlandscape and physical environment, modes


4 Created in 1932, the ‘national consensus’ was supposed to protect minorities from the dictate of majority rule, which generated a sense of communal mistrust, inferiority, vulnerability, persecution,and “on the popular level” ignited “fanaticism” as Carla Edde asserted in her article “Le mouvement associatif à Beyrouth” (2004). It consecrated the sectarian-based architecture of Lebanesesociety and authorities that are still in place today.



of urban management along with cultureand identities that started to be threatenedwith the outbreak of the 1975 war, as theseeds of conflict were already there.

Phase Two: The 1975-1990 Civil

War: During the fifteen-year war, ZokakEl-Blat experienced a limited amount ofdestruction, giving a frozen character tothe urban fabric. However, the neighbor-hood was divided into two sectors: thenorthern area- adjacent to the city centerand previously considered as the mostcosmopolitan part - became a continu-ously disputed area and a no-man’s land,

while the southern part - down from theFouad Chehab expressway - continuedto develop in its pre-war complex trendsand dynamics. Destruction happened intraditional houses that were squattedor destroyed to accommodate refugees

from Southern Lebanon fleeing the warwith Israel. More than physical, the war-related consequences were sectarian andspatial. Indeed, the different sectarian-affiliated militias took partial or total con-trol of the district, reinforcing the confes-sional fragmentation of the area wheremilitary control incrementally translatedinto urban appropriation. Militias also

provided municipal and social services totheir own communities in order to ensuretheir loyalty and encourage the enroll-ment in armed struggle. In parallel to theincreasing presence of Sunni and Shiitepopulations in this area located in West

Beirut, a large majority of the remainingChristian and Kurd populations migratedfrom Zokak El-Blat to East Beirut or evenabroad. Shiite populations fleeing the1982 Israeli invasion replaced them. Asa consequence, Zokak El-Blat becamea symbol of a large-scale upheaval ofsocio-demographic and sectarian-spatialgeographies leading to the emergence ofa divided city from the micro-local to themetropolitan scale. In terms of stakehold-

ers, the war confirmed and established aconstellation of sectarian-based militiasand political groups that annihilated theimplementation of any global approachto urban affairs even if two planning sce-narios were proposed in 1977 and 1986by French planning agencies, under theinitiative of the Municipality of Beirut andthe state Council for Development and Re-construction (CDR)5, respectively.

Consequently, the local ruling power of

sectarian and political groups has stronglycontributed to the emergence of ‘ideologi-cal territories’ (Davie, 1992) or ‘body poli-tics’ (Fawaz, 2007) associated with the re-lated political and spatial strategies. At thelevel of “In-Between Territories” (IBTs),they took the leadership of most religiousor educational institutions that were stillstrategic for the structuring of local urbanlife. Furthermore, the war upset the spatialand functional connections between Zo-

kak El-Blat and the city center where mostfighting and destruction was concentrated. As a result, the development of sectarian-based peripheral centralities favored therise of radial connections between pericen-tral districts and their sectarian hinterlandsand centralities. This pericentrality-inflictedbalancing set the ground for the interfaceposition of the IBTs with the post-war re-development of the city center. From thisset of major and multi-scalar upheavalsrelated to the war, Beirut inherited a frag-mented model of ‘territorialized confes-sionalism’ (Chapuis, 2009) that is still atthe heart of the current debate.

5 The planning scenarios proposed in 1977 and 1986 were developed by Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme (APUR) and Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Île-de-France (IAURIF), respectively.




Phase Three - The Post-1990 Era: If fragmented Territorializations are stillone of the driving forces of Beirut’s ur-ban development and management, thesetrends are now combined with formal andinformal reconstruction processes and theemergence of powerful neoliberal-baseddynamics of metropolization. Indeed, theseare impacting many aspects of the produc-tion of urban space from the axiology andframework of urban policy - market-drivenand competitiveness-based trends, flexibil-ity of planning laws to the benefice of realestate development - to urban forms - zon-

ing, car-driven infrastructures, high-risebuildings - and urban stakeholders. Theofficial objective of reconstruction is eco-nomic: to base the renewal of all of Leba-non on Beirut’s tertiary functions (Verdeil,2001) as defined by Sassen’s global cit-ies (1991). To meet with this purpose ofredeveloping the city center into a newCentral Business District (CBD), SOLIDERE- a private company - was created on theprimary principle that private investment isthe motor of urban regeneration (Samara,1996). But, as Saliba (2000) asserted:

“The CBD reconstruction plan evolvedwithout a clear strategy concerning its im-mediate surroundings. SOLIDERE seemedto have adopted the « island planning »approach. Both at the district and sub-district level, the BCD Master Plan turns its

back to its periphery”.

In other words, the Municipality of Bei-rut - and more generally the top-down andgovernment-based logic of reconstructionas implemented by the CDR - had no visionor reconstruction plan for the city, includ-ing its pericentral districts. This was still thecase till mid-2011, more than twenty yearsafter the end of the war.

In the case of Zokak El-Blat, SOLIDEREincluded the northern part of the district -until the Fouad Chehab expressway - in itsrevitalization perimeter, something that di-rectly created a multi-factorial division be-tween both parts of the neighborhood. Inthe northern part annexed by SOLIDERE,war refugees squatting in empty apart-ments benefited from compensations bythe private company in exchange for theirleaving. Amal and Hizbullah’s6 negotiatorsmanaged to get compensation for 5.000

to 6.000 Shiite refugees. In the meantime,compensated for their expropriated prop-erties by shares in SOLIDERE, legal own-ers and tenants were discouraged to comeback to the area. Accordingly, out of morethan one hundred old houses or man-sions only a few were preserved and lateron restored by SOLIDERE, most of themintended to be sold or rented out to newelites or foreigners working in embassiesand international agencies. In a couple of

years, both physical and social fabrics andspaces experienced a significant alterationwith the appearance of renovated build-ings with sidewalks and green areas cor-responding to specific and updated plan-ning regulation framed by SOLIDERE for itsperimeter. The beginnings of a large-scalegentrification process was in progress (theconcept in Beirut differs however from theone in unindustrialized states as it takeshere a more political configuration andit occurs mainly in a newly built fabric).However, for many years, this section ap-peared as especially empty of populationand activities - except for the presence of

6 Amal and Hizbullah – also called ‘Party of God’- are the two major political parties representing Shiite population in Lebanon.




the seat of the Prime Minister (also calledGrand Sérail), and its globalized urbanismand architecture signal a drastic changewith its neighboring southern part of Zo-kak El-Blat. The Fouad Chehab expresswayspatially indicates this break line between

the new city center and IBTs in landscapeas well as in use and representations.

Indeed, the southern part was exclud-ed from the project of downtown recon-struction and, as we explained earlier, itis still under the rule of the 1954 zoning

codes. Thus, the section is starting toexperience the diffusion of SOLIDERE’splanning and socio-economic patternleading to the emergence of territorial-ized and segregate processes of mar-ket-driven gentrification. We compare

it to a neoliberal shockwave producedby the project of downtown redevelop-ment - or earthquake - that is progres-sively impacting the IBTs. Moreover,while SOLIDERE was essentially drainingsome ‘happy few’ foreign investors anddevelopers, Lebanese Sunni and Shiite

developers seem to have appropriatedthese practices by developing most ofreal estate projects at SOLIDERE’s edgeof southern Zokak El-Blat. Even if thistrend already existed - to a limited extent- during the few golden years preceding

the civil war, one of the most represen-tative indicators of this current processis the incremental disappearance ofcultural heritage with an exponential de-struction of traditional mansions to bereplaced by high-rise apartment build-ings, exploiting the excessive floor arearatios, and the prime location next to theCBD (Saliba, 2000). The sociologist S.Khalaf already underlined “the impactssuch projects could have on de-facing

the city’s collective memory and distinc-tive heritage” during the early stages ofreconstruction in 1993. According to thefirst results of a survey carried out byMajal7, these luxury apartments wouldbe inhabited by newcomers composedof middle and high income Shiites andSunnis to a lesser extent. Therefore, realestate prices are under pressure and

jeopardize access to affordable housingfor original residents with all the risk ofincreasing socio-economic and sectarian

segregation, something we will analyzefurther in our report.

7 A comprehensive and multi-annual survey has been started by Majal in order to assess and monitor all the mentioned evolutions occurring in Zokak-el-Blat. If the first qualitative results seem to confirmthe described dynamics - and hence the validity of the notion of deconstruction-, the findings of the forthcoming quantitative results regarding households evolutions, real estate dynamics or heritagemanagement will be essential to take into account to validate - or not- the processes we introduced in this report.




3. INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULA-TORY FRAMEWORK

From the beginning, the urban devel-opment of Zokak el Blat occurred in aspontaneous and uncontrolled way espe-

cially within the absence of a strong legaland institutional framework governingurban development and protecting thepatrimonial built fabric.

The first municipal council was electedin 1868. The building code for Istanbuland its provinces is the first building codethat was implemented by Beirut munici-pality at that time. It covered Beirut citycenter and its pericentral districts that

have been incorporated to the city ofBeirut with the creation of the “Wilayatof Beirut”. During this period, the urbandevelopment of Zokak el Blat was the re-sult of private initiatives undertaken bythe notables of the neighborhood and theland owners and that, in order to ensurethe accessibility of their plots and facili-tate the movement of carriages. Theseinitiatives to create and widen streetsrequired a consensus between the landowners, on the one hand, and the munici-

pality on the other hand. Thus, during the19th century, urban planning was a pro-cess of consultation between local people(the notables) and the municipality thatwas the authority guaranteeing the en-forcement of laws.

The efforts of the French mandate inurban planning have mainly targeted thecity center of Beirut. In addition, the Frenchmandate has focused on infrastructure

projects that improve Beirut’s connectionsand its linkages with its hinterland in theaim of strengthening its urban functions.

Between the 1940s and 1960s, for-eign urban planners such as Ecochard,Egli and Doxiadis provided master plansfor Beirut with the purpose to assist themunicipality of Beirut in planning urbansprawl generated by the demographicpressure on the capital and its fringes.Extensions of streets, peripherals ar-teries, etc. were designed to decongestthe city in improving mobility within thoseneighborhoods. These plans had to faceprivate sector’s resistance and wheretherefore only partially adopted.

3.1. LAND USE AND EXPLOITATION

• Patriarchate Sector

The building ratio in the Patriarchatearea of Zokak el-Blat is, as in the rest of

Beirut, guided by a zoning plan that datesback to 1954. The district belongs to ei-ther zone 2 or zone 3.

In zone 2, the ground exploitationcoefficient is 100% for the ground floorand 70% for a floor. The total exploitationfactor cannot exceed 5. For zone 3, theground exploitation coefficient is 60%,

while the total exploitation factor cannotexceed 4 (see Map 11: Zoning Limits).

In 1992, a decree was issued(2791/1992) amending the implementa-tion framework of the national building law,

easing the construction of high rises. Thebiggest step towards increasing the ex-ploitation of land and real estate howeverwas taken in 2004 with the issuance of anew construction law (646/ 2004) and itsimplementation decree (15874/2005) in2005. The justification behind increasingland-use is the supposed scarcity of land inBeirut. Main changes included the removal

Map 11: Zokak el Blat Zoning Map



of staircases, maid’s rooms and double walls from the built-uparea (BUA) allowance, and an increase in balcony surfaces thatcan be deducted from the BUA. Other changes include safetyregulations and earthquake proofing measures, as well as

1500m2 extra areas in exchange for a public parking of fiftycars minimum. In total, an estimated twenty percent of BUA isnot included in the calculation of the total exploitation area, upfrom eight percent under the 1983 building law (Krijnen, 2010).

Foreign investment in real estate has been facilitated in sev-eral ways during the past years, for example with a law easingregulations applying to the acquisition of property by foreigners(296/2001), lowering real estate registration fees and provid-ing tax breaks and discounts for foreign investment companies(Krijnen, 2010).

• Sérail Sector

The part of Zokak el-Blat that stretches north of Fouad Che-hab ring road falls under the construction and planning rules ofSOLIDERE’s private real estate company that was put in chargeof reconstructing Downtown Beirut.

In 1991, Law 117 was passed, allowing a private real estatecompany to take charge of postwar reconstruction works. In1994, the “Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Re-construction” (SOLIDERE) was established to develop Downtown

Beirut into a high-end financial center. SOLIDERE is in charge ofdeveloping and reconstructing the area, selling lots to develop-ers or (re)constructing buildings themselves. Private propertyin the area was transferred to SOLIDERE, which issued sharesin return.

Construction in the SOLIDERE sector of Zokak el Blat is regu-lated by decree 5714/2001, an updated version of the initialmaster plan. The district belongs to either zone 1 or zone 2.

In zone 1, the ground exploitation coefficient is 100% for the

ground floor and 70% for a floor. The total exploitation factorcannot exceed 5. For zone 2, the ground exploitation coefficientis 60%, while the total exploitation factor cannot exceed 4.

The boundaries of Beirut Central District were determined in1991 but expanded by subsequent decrees. SOLIDERE compileda detailed master plan that is stricter than the general Plan-ning Code, particularly as far as Article 16 of the building lawis concerned. The DGA has to schedule excavations in such away as to minimally delay the reconstruction process. Buildingsthat SOLIDERE decided to retain cannot be increased in heightand should be restored following a restoration brief issued bythe DGU. They may or may not be classified in the Register ofRetained Buildings and/or in the National Inventory List. In somecases, built-up areas can be added, as long as they do not alterthe architectural character of the building. Demolition is allowed

when a building is too damaged to be rehabilitated or if laterconstruction is damaging the character of the building. Heritagebuildings should be rebuilt according to their original design.The HCUP has to approve all these procedures.

3.2. LAWS PERTAINING TO BUILT HERITAGE

Despite the importance of built heritage as an engine of de-velopment and preservation of collective memory and identity, itremains subject to threats and pressures. Indeed, the weaknessof the legal and institutional framework for the protection of ar-chitectural heritage as well as the land and property speculationputs the district at risk. This section reviews the texts of lawsgoverning the protection of heritage buildings.

3.2.1. The Ottoman Period

In Lebanon, the institutionalization of the notion of heritageconservation has emerged during the Ottoman period in 1869.During this period, the notion of heritage was reduced to ruinsand archeology. It was only in 1906, and after the massive de-struction of old buildings that the concept of heritage buildingswas introduced.

3.2.2. The French Mandate: The Antiquities Regulation

During the French mandate, the Antiquities Regulation is-

sued on 1933 defines the notions of antiques and real estate.It allows historic monuments listing, prohibits their manipulationwithout state consent and provides compensation to owners.

3.2.3. The Urban Planning Law

The construction law of 1983 requires obtaining a permit forconstruction in classified areas. This permit is subject to priorapproval of the Directorate General of Antiquities. Are exemptfrom the permit the works related to condition improvement thatdo not affect the building structure.

Moreover, this law defines neighborhoods, streets, historicbuildings or sites that should be protected and enhanced forartistic, historical or environmental reasons.

3.2.4. The Building Law

The building law, No. 646, promulgated on 11.12.2004,played an important role in heritage preservation. Section 13imposes on some buildings additional conditions related to pub-lic safety, health, landscape architectural, Lebanese art styles,and the provision of additional equipment corresponding to theimportance of the construction. Moreover, this law gives thepower to refuse a building permit if the building or buildings inquestion are likely to be harmful to health and public safety, thenatural landscape, the environment or architectural landscape.



3.3.1. “Association de Protection etde Sauvegarde des Anciennes De-meures » (APSAD) Study

In 1995, the Minister of Culture as-signed the APSAD to draw an inventoryof historic buildings in the pericentral ar-

eas of Beirut. This study identified 1019buildings focusing on two periods: the Ot-toman modernism (1860-1920) and theFrench Mandate (1920-1943).

94 buildings were identified in Zokakel Blat. 46 were considered of high ar-chitectural value while 25 were of mod-erate architectural value. Most of thebuildings with high architectural value liein the north-west along the streets Ab-del Kader and Amine Beyhum. A second

phase should have given more detailedinformation in order to establish the legalframework for preserving these buildings.

The Minister asked the President ofthe Municipality of Beirut to freeze thelisted buildings. This measure was ob-

jected by the owners who have put pres-sure on the state to remove their build-ings from the list. Map 12: APSAD Study

3.3. STUDIES ON THE PROTECTIONOF HISTORICAL BUILDINGS IN BEI-RUT PERICENTRAL AREAS

Since 1990s, several studies, aiming atthe conservation of architectural heritagein Beirut pericentral areas, were conducted.



3.3.2. The Directorate General of Ur-ban Planning (DGUP) Study

In 1997, Former late Prime Minis-

ter Rafic Hariri assigned the DirectorateGeneral of Urban Planning to conduct are-evaluation of the APSAD study. Thecommission was composed as follows: theDGUP, the DGA and the APSAD directors.The study identified 520 buildings to beranked on the entire pericentral belt.

In Zokak el Blat, the number of listedbuildings is 65. They are concentratedalong Abdel Kader Hussein Beyhum and

Amine Beyhum streets.The implementation of this study pro-

posed to suspend all activities of demo-litions until adopting new zoning regula-tions and the formulation of new legaland financial guidance to support thisconservation effort. The owners couldbenefit from a transfer of surfaces thatwere not exploitable to specific areaswhere high rise buildings do not disfigurethe urban landscape.

In October 1997, 98 buildings wereremoved from the list. The total numberof buildings was reduced to 469. Subse-quently, the High Council of Urban plan-ning approved this study unanimously.However, in 1998, the Council of Minis-ters rejected the results of this study.

Map 13: DGUP Study



3.3.3. The Khatib & Alami Study

In July 1998, the Council for Develop-ment and Reconstruction (CDR), pre-sented to the government a study con-ducted by Khatib & Alami private office.The approach focused on the classifica-tion of buildings into five categories: A,B, C, D and E according to their age andarchitectural value. The study states thatbuildings in categories D & E (250 build-ings) which construction dates back tothe French mandate would be exemptedfrom classification. In Zokak el Blat, the

study proposes the preservation of 26buildings in categories A, B & C and re-leases 30 others (D & E).

This study was approved by the Cab-inet although challenged by heritageactivists because it threatened the his-toric buildings.

Map 14: Khatib & Alami Study



4. DRAFT LAW FOR THE PRO-TECTION AND SAFEGUARD OFOLD BUILDINGS AND PATRIMO-

NIAL SITES

The draft law proposed in 2007, advo-cated plots preservation in three steps:

• Decision of Development and Protec-tion: The Minister of Culture decides wheth-er to protect a plot or not. The effects of thislaw extend to six months, after which mea-sures shall be repealed if the temporarydecision is not made on time;

• Temporary decisions: The Ministerof Culture, with the help of a technicalconsultation committee and the autho-rization of the Higher Council for Urban

Planning (HCUP), determines the areaand the plots to be protected. In addition,the Minister must set up the temporary

measures to which that area is subject.This decision extends over two years andmay be renewed only once;

• The decree related to final develop-ment is discussed and approved by theCouncil of Ministers following a proposal ofthe Ministers of Culture and Public Works.

The draft law suggests the establish-ment of two lists: “the list of temporaryprotected patrimonial plots” and “the pat-rimonial plots list”.

The draft law considers incentives thatwould facilitate and enhance the conser-

vation of the classified plots:

• Compensation equivalent to up to 75%

of the area of which the owner was de-prived. Such compensation shall be made bygranting a permit to add a building on otherplots located outside the protected area;

• Exemption of tax for built-up prop-erties and municipal taxes over a periodthat varies from one year to ten years, inaddition to taxes imposed when obtainingmodification and restoration permits;

• Exemption of 50% on transfer feesand registration fee.

It is worth noting that this draft law hasnot been voted so far.

Map 15: Classification of Historic Buildings



1. STUDY OBJECTIVES

Data collection is a key activity to implement our monitoring

and evaluation strategy for Zokak el Blat area. Before startingthe data collection process in Zokak el Blat area, we started apre-data collection planning. We tried to define the purpose ofthe data collection, identify what we want to know from this evalu-ation and finally, and who are the beneficiaries of the gathered,processed and analyzed data.

Our main objective is to identify indicators to monitor the ur-ban development in Zokak el Blat in order to generate recom-mendations and strategy proposals for local and public authori-ties. It is the first exercise done at Beirut City level.

Categories of indicators we are interested in correspond tothe problematic of a post-conflict city where the context is verycomplex. Local and public authorities are still failing in terms ofStrategic Planning and urban management to overcome territo-rial challenges: the existence of a dynamic entrepreneurial pri-

vate sector, the prevalence of community and political tensions,the threatened patrimonial urban fabric, the immediate proximityto SOLIDERE area, etc. This ter ritorial context led us to consider

indicators related to the notion of heritage conservation, urbantransformation and fragmentation.

2. STUDY FRAMEWORK

Based on the hypotheses we formulated, and after assess-ing in how far we would be able to collect data on them (forexample, in many cases it is impossible to measure an increaseor decrease of a cer tain aspect because there are no data avail-able for ten years ago), a set of indicators was devised to collectdata that would help us assess developments in the pericentral

area that have taken place over the past decade. While initiallywe designed a comprehensive list of indicators, several difficul-ties encountered during the data collection process forced us tolimit our study to four categories of indicators. Most impor tantly,the lack of socioeconomic and population/census data forced usto reconsider our entire framework.

CHAPTER 2: DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY



The initial list of indicators for the year 2010 was as follow:

Indicators of fragmentation

1. Real estate pressure

2. State of residences

3. Land and morphologicalrearrangements

4. Services and Facilities

5. Usage, habits

6. Social trajectory per sector

Number of real estate transactionsNumber of construction permits and their volumeLand prices per zoneReal estate prices per zoneMunicipal real estate tax rateDisappearance of empty landSurface Less than120 m2 Between 120 m2 and 240 m2

Over 240 m2Building AgeDate of OccupationRate of Occupation in buildings and squatsRate of ownership/ rent Old rent (before 1992) New rent (after 1992)Quality of residences (safety, equipment, comfort…)Quality of the Building FaçadeLot splitting and mergingDensity, building envelopes, setback

Architectural stylesPlanned and existing roads in 2010

Physiognomy and skylineExisting infrastructure Public Communal PrivateRoad Network Facilities•Garbage•Parking and valet parking•Lighting•School•Dispensary•Socio-cultural centers•Places of worship

•Social housing•“Public” transport•“Public” spaces

AccessibilityMotive Professional Residential Study purposes Worship Leisure ConsumptionOrigin of the populationSocio-professional categoryLevel of educationReligious confession

Average household size Average agePopulation growth



CulturalLeisureConsumptionProductionServiceResidential

Type Commercial WorkshopService

Number of jobs offeredMobility BusesPlace of originDestinationConfession

7. Identity function of the district

8. Economic polarity

9. Social mobility

1. Real estate pressure

2. Land and morphological rear-rangementst

3. Services and facilities

4. Role and identity of thedistrict

Because of severe difficulties experienced during the data collection process, our final indicators have been limited to those de-

scribed below:Indicators of fragmentation

Number and type of real estate transactionsNumber of construction permitsReal estate pricesLand pricesDisappearance of empty landDemolition of buildingsLot splitting and merging for new developmentsDensity, building envelopes, setback

Architectural stylesPlanned roads in 2010Demolition of classified buildingsBuilding ageQuality of building’s exteriorRoad and other networksFacilitiesBuilding useEconomic activitiesSocio-collective infrastructurePlaces of worship

Religious confession



3. DATA COLLECTION SOURCES AND FORMS

Once having specified our objectives and selected our studyframe, we decided to proceed with data collection using fivesources of information:

• Interviews: moukhtars, citizens, key stakeholders, etc.;• Field Observations: notes, photographs, mapping, etc.;• Bibliographic research: books, magazines, journals, news-

papers, etc.• Administrative data: Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques

(CNRS), Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), Société Libanaisede Développement et de Reconstruction (SOLIDERE), DirectorateGeneral of Antiquities (DGA), Ministry of Interior and Municipal Af-fairs (MOIN) through the Land Registry Office and the Civil Registry,Ministry of Education, Council for Development end reconstruction(CDR), Beirut Municipality, Order of Engineers and Architects in Bei-

rut (OEA), Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP), OrientInstitute, Private Real Estate Agencies (RAMCO and Abed Fahs), etc.• Field Surveys: architectural, economic activities, household,

academic institutions and community associations surveys.Data collection was made in two forms:• The empirical form, through field surveys and data collect-

ed at government and agencies. Some solicited public adminis-trations and agencies released full information while other haveprovided incomplete data or did not deliver anything. In addition,a series of field surveys covering social, economic, architectural,etc. aspects were considered for collecting data for the project.

However, access to information was hampered by tensions

and political problems and the lack of centralization of datafrom local and public authorities in Beirut urban management.Moreover, the realization of household survey and the censusof educational establishments and community institutions werehindered by the prevalence of political tension.

• The qualitative form, through interviews with residents,moukhtars and other key stakeholders in the area.

To this end, we dispatched official letters requiring informationfrom relevant authorities and administrations, interviewed sev-eral stakeholders, designed specific questionnaires for household,socio-economic activities, academic institutions and community in-

stitutions. However, as previously said, we could not have accessto all requested information and were obliged to drop the relatedindicators. Below is a list of the data that were successfully obtained,those partially obtained and a list of indicators that we had to drop.

4. DATA SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINED

For real estate pressure, the number of construction per-mits in Zokak el-Blat over the years 1998-2010 was obtainedsuccessfully from the Order of Engineers and Architects (OEA).Disappearance of empty land has been made visible by a mapcomparing built vs. un-built areas over time, based on a fieldsurvey in 2010 and older Cadastral maps.

For land and morphological rearrangements, we obtained

data on density, building envelopes and setback, as well as ar-chitectural styles and the exterior quality of the building, from anarchitectural survey carried out by ALBA students after obtain-ing permission from Hezbollah, as well as 3D GIS-models fromour cartographer. Physiognomy and skyline were later includedin the density, building envelopes and setback.

Planned and existing roads were lined out according to ourown updated maps and plans and maps by the Council for De-velopment and Reconstruction (CDR) dated 2004, providedto us by the CDR itself.

Services and facilities were lined out using existing Cadastralmaps and maps from the CDR. Additionally; data from the archi-tectural survey on public spaces was used.

Role and identity of the district comprised several different

aspects. Building use and economic activities were recordedduring the economic activities survey carried out by ALBA stu-dents and two MAJAL employees. Archeological sites were pro-vided to us by the Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA).

5. DATA PARTIALLY OBTAINED, ALTERNATIVESTRATEGIES

For real estate pressure, while we managed to obtain datafrom the Land Registry (Cadastre) on the number of real estatetransactions carried out between 2005 and 2010, they couldnot narrow these statistics down to the neighborhood of Zokak

el-Blat only. We were provided with Moussaytbeh and Zokak el-Blat combined. It is also important to note that many transac-tions are only recorded several years later or not at all, thelatter being the case when parties register their transaction witha notary. Moreover, when people do register their transaction,many do not quote the real prices, in order to avoid taxes.

As far as the land and real estate prices are concerned,we initially tried to contact the municipal tax authorities, whichshould keep a yearly estimate of land and real estate prices indifferent areas, to base their taxes on. We did not manage to get

insight into these data. We also did not get data from the Minis-try of Finance on these prices, and even if we had, data is notalways accurate because buyers and sellers seldom declare thetrue prices. As an alternative strategy, we interviewed severalreal estate developers and a real estate agent from the area, toget an idea of current prices in different zones of Zokak el-Blat.For older prices, we relied on estimates from the Lebanon Op-portunities magazine dating back to 1998.

To get an idea of the demolition of buildings, we asked the Orderof Engineers and Architects (OEA) to provide us with data (dates,lot numbers) about demolition permits issued over the past tenyears. We did not obtain these data via that body, and went to theDirectorate General of Antiquities (DGA) instead, where our requestwas finally rejected after having waited for five months. Requests atthe municipality and the Higher Council for Urban Planning led us



back to the DGA. Eventually, we relied on a field survey updating amap from 2007 and comparing the up-to-date map to older ver-sions showing of built vs. un-built areas, in order to get an idea ofthe amount of buildings demolished over the past years.

For the land and morphological rear rangements indicator,

we included some information about lot splitting and mergingin 2010 based on Cadastral records (the so-called “ifadet”)that we requested for lots where new projects were underconstruction. We could not identify all instances of lot re-arrangements because there was insufficient budget to re-quest the “ifade” for every lot number in Zokak el-Blat (thereare hundreds).

For role and identity of the district, we could not identify allsocio-collective infrastructure and places of worship becausewe were not allowed to interview subjects and locate all instanc-

es. The architectural and economic activities surveys identifiedas many as possible.

6. DROPPED INDICATORS

For real estate pressure, we did not manage to obtain the area ofconstruction permits issued. We did not get full insight into the permitsthemselves because the municipal authorities did not allow consultation.

The municipal real estate tax rate was not provided to us bythe authorities.

The state of residences (including apartment surface area, dateof occupation, rate of occupation in buildings and squats, rate ofownership vs. rent, type of rent and quality of the residence) was tobe determined in a larger socioeconomic survey that was plannedin the area. Unfortunately, we ultimately did not succeed in obtain-ing permission from the area’s main political actor Hezbollah to goahead with the survey.

For services and facilities, we were unable to collect data onplaces of worship and socio-cultural centers other than their loca-tion, if known, since we did not get permission to enter the locations

themselves. The same goes to any information on social housing,since the socioeconomic survey could not be carried out.

The usage and habits indicator could not be researched be-cause we did not carry out the socio-economic survey.

The same goes for social trajectory, including origin of thepopulation, socio-professional category, level of education,religious confession, average household size, average age,population growth.

The initial indicator identity function of the district was inte-grated into the final indicator “role and identity of the district”;economic polarity was integrated into “economic activities”,while social mobility, including place of origin, destination andconfession, had to be dropped because of lack of data.

For role and identity of the district, we could not identify religiousconfession since we did not carry out the socioeconomic survey.

Hence, circumstances forced us to severely constrain our in-quiry. The next paragraph will explain these circumstances inmore details.

7. CONCLUSION: MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE IN DATACOLLECTING PROCESSES IN LEBANON

7.1. LACK OF (RELIABLE) STATISTICAL DATA

As Verdeil (2005) noted in the context of a study of Beirut’s urbangrowth, there is a severe lack of statistical data in Lebanon. WhileVerdeil could resort to remote sensing techniques, our study requiressocioeconomic, demographic data that cannot easily be retrieved. Thelast census in Lebanon took place in 1932. Moreover, while individuals

are required to register in a population registry, many do so in theirvillage of origin in which they might have never lived, and not in Beirut.Hence, data such as electoral lists (that are based on the populationregistries), while eventually accessible via a professor at the UnitedNations Development Program (UNDP) on mission at the Ministry ofInterior, are not very useful in determining the demographic changesin a neighborhood in Beirut.

7.2. UNWILLINGNESS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND INSTITU-TIONS TO COLLABORATE

In general, public officials and institutions are not willing to

share their data even when one presents an official letter fromthe university. Examples abound: the Central Administration forStatistics, the municipality, the Cadastre, etc.

7.3. UNWILLINGNESS OF PRIVATE OFFICIALS IN INSTITU-TIONS TO COLLABORATE

Besides public administrations, private institutions are oftenunwilling to share any information. For example, political party He-zbollah did not allow us access to residents in Zokak el-Blat; henceour socioeconomic survey could not be carried out.

7.4. TIME LOSS IN TAKINGAPPOINTMENTS

People in general do not respond to emails and never callback, even though they say they will.

7.5. INFORMAL CONTACTS AND SNOWBALL-EFFECT

“It is customary … to say something about what is some-what pretentiously called ‘methodology’. My field method couldbe summed up as meeting people”. (Willis, 1981). Research inLebanon usually starts with contacting the right person. It isdifficult to identify the expert who can provide you with what youare looking for. Hence, the first weeks are hardly productive.However, as you proceed, many people will refer you to theiracquaintances and a snowball-effect will take place.



1. THE URBAN DIMENSIONThe urban analysis in this chapter is based on the field work

and surveys that were undertaken in Zokak el Blat, in addition tothe study of different maps of the neighborhood throughout theyears (1920-2011).

This section aims at analyzing the morphology of the urban fab-ric of Zokak El Blat: the road network, blocks, parcels and buildingsand their evolution throughout the years, in order to deduct theirimpact on the growth and development of the neighborhood.

1.1. ROAD NETWORK

The road network is the set of different roads that cross theneighborhood. They differ in their width, length, function and orien-tation, all adapted to the complex context of Zokak El Blat’s district.

Based on the maps of Beirut since the 1920s, it is obviousthat, besides the introduction of two major axes (the Fouad Che-hab Avenue and the Ahmad Beyhum Avenue), the street patternof Zokak El Blat did not witness major changes.

The following maps show that major changes occurred in1977 after the construction of the two main axes, which wascarried out at the end of the 1960s as part of the Ecochard planand the Chehabist reforms of 1964.

On another level, we notice very minor changes in the restof the street pattern; only some secondary and tertiary roadshave been added to serve the primary roads that existed sincethe 1920s. In addition to that, it is obvious that a large amountof “dead-end” roads have been added in different places in the

neighborhood, especially after 1991, which is the direct result ofan increasing number of parcels in one block and the need forsmall roads to serve them (as we will see in the section about theblocks and parcels).

In 2010, more dead-end roads were added, and the primaryand main roads were enlarged.

The road network map of Zokak El Blat is obviously not analigned grid with organized roads distributed perpendicularlythroughout the neighborhood, but rather a hazardous set of

streets that were existent and/or added to serve blocks and par-cels following uncertain and changing contexts on the site. Howev-er, it is obvious that the street pattern is made of primary, second-ary and tertiary roads, distributed along the entire neighborhood.

Only in cases of ultimate functionalism and organization, astreet pattern is accurately divided in a hierarchal and firm way.In Zokak EL Blat, the grid is not very firm, but it is easy to read thepresent street pattern, as it is obvious to distinguish the primaryroads from the secondary and ter tiary.

CHAPTER 3: SURVEY RESULTS

Map 16: Roads Pattern in 1920 Map 17: Roads Pattern in 1945



1.1.1. The roads

Zokak El Blat is a neighborhood lo-cated in the heart of the city, where nomajor intra-urban or national roads cross.It is articulated by a group of small ur-

ban roads that serves either directly theneighborhood or works as a connectionwith the adjacent neighborhood.

The main existing axis is the FouadChehab Avenue, with an East to Westorientation, crossing the neighborhoodfrom its Northern segment and divid-ing it into two major parts, the Northernone is owned and managed by SOLI-DERE. Another major axis is the Ahmad

Beyhum Avenue or Salim Salam Avenuethat is North-South oriented, traversingthe neighborhood at its East to cut out avery small part of the neighborhood, theEastern part from the rest.

Primary Roads

The primary roads are those thatserve the entire district and connect itwith its adjacent districts (Moussaytbeh,Bachoura and Minet El Hosn).

There are six primary roads that drawthe main grid of the district:

• Roads with North-South direction

These cross the entire district, perpen-dicular to the Fouad Chehab Avenue andconnecting it to Moussaytbeh (the South-ern boundary of Zokak el Blat). They arethe direct connection between Minet el

Hosn and Moussaytbeh.• Abdel Fattah Hamadeh road• Patriarchate road that merges with

the Amine Beyhum road towards the North.• Mar Elias road that merges with Ab-

del Kader road towards the North.

• Roads with East-West direction

These roads connect Zokak El Blat tothe Bachoura district from the East and toMoussaytbeh from the West

• Boutros Boustany• The Evangelical School that contin-

ues as Said Chartouny road to the East

• Rue Osman Ben Affan that marks theSouthern borders of Zokak El Blat.

Secondary Roads

The secondary roads serve to con-

nect primary roads, providing mobilityinside Zokak El Blat’s district. They aresmaller in width than the main roads andtheir length varies from one to another,depending on how many main roads theyconnect.

The spacing between the North-South-oriented roads is slightly greater thanthe one between the East-West orientedroads, which explains the domination of

North-South secondary roads, serving asconnections for wider spacing betweenprimary roads.

Among those roads are Khalil Sarkisroad, Youssef Kassar road, Kasti road,Daoud road and Abdul Rahman Nahas road.

Tertiary Roads

The tertiary roads are not really dif-ferentiated from secondary ones. They

serve as smaller connections betweensecondary roads.

1.2. BLOCKS AND PARCELS

The blocks in Zokak El Blat’s districthave irregular shapes and differ from oneto another, with a variety of sizes and pro-portions. A block takes its shape from theroad network and differs according to theshape of the roads that border it. As we

have previously seen, the road network isan irregular grid throughout the district,which explains the irregular shapes of the

blocks. Throughout the years, as the roadnetwork did not change much, the blockskept their shapes.

We notice the abundance of large-sized blocks, mainly those bordered by

primary roads that are not very closeto each other. This explains the use of“dead- end” roads in different places inthe district to serve the parcels in thosebig blocks.

The parcels are the main componentof the urban fabric dividing the districtinto small portions of land to be built on.Their shapes differ according to the roadnetwork, the operations of real estate

developers, the merging of lots and theland use.

We notice that parcels are abundant inone block; and that mainly explains the in-troduction of a lot of dead-end roads thatare meant to serve the enclosed parcels.

As for their shapes, we encounterrectangular parcels in some areas of thedistrict, but mostly irregularly shaped

parcels, none of them having a preciseproportion: sometimes the long side ofthe parcel is on the roadside to optimizethe penetration of light inside the build-ing; other times the short side is on theroadside to optimize the number of par-cels along the road.

On another note, many operations ofreal estate annexations have taken placeas the following map shows us. Parcels

or lots in different parts of the neighbor-hood have been merged to result in a big-ger lot that allows bigger constructions.

Abundance of parcels in one block

Different shapes of parcels



Map 22: Real Estate Annexations after 2000



1.2.1. The disappearance of empty lots

With the increasing number of real es-

tate transactions taking place in Zokak ElBlat in the last 10 years, empty lots aredisappearing to be replaced by buildings.In 2010, almost 45% of the empty lotsthat existed in 2000 have been replacedby buildings and 55% are still empty.

Moreover, we notice that there are alot of empty spaces and plots that are toosmall to be built on; 85% have an areathat does not exceed 200 square meters,

and the remaining 25% are of an area be-tween 200 and 249 square meters. Thiscan serve as another indicator of the lackof planning and urban management thatfocuses only on real estate transactions.The residues are also the result of the ad-dition of roads without a plan that consid-ers the whole district, and especially theaddition of dead-end roads to serve thebig number of parcels in one block.

While there is a lack of public open

spaces in Zokak El Blat, those emptyzones, however small and residual, mightserve as public spaces instead of beingneglected and left for cars and garbage.They can introduce some greenery andsmall get-together places in a neighbor-hood that has become a place for highrise buildings and cars but not for people.

Map 23: Disappearance of Empty Lots



1.2.2. Residual Lots

When looking at the plots’ areas in Zokak el Blat, we noticedthe presence of a large number of lands with an area of lessthan 100 m2. These plots are residual and not buildable. Thismatter is more relevant within the Patriarchate area. The num-ber of plots with an area inferior to 100 m2 is 125 in the Patri-

archate area and 4 in SOLIDERE area.Patriarchate Sector

43% of the plots have an area that is comprised between 0m2 and 249 m2;

32% of the plots have an area that is comprised between250 m2 and 499 m2;


6% of the plots have an area that is comprised between 750m2and 999 m2;

8% of the plots have area that is superior to 1.000 m2.

SOLIDERE Sector

18% of the plots have an area that is comprised between 0m2and 249 m2;




41% of the plots have an area that is superior to 1.000 m2.

The presence of such plots is an indicator of land propertyfragmentation. It is the result of land splitting or streets androads creation and therefore the lack of urban planning. Cur-rently, they are either abandoned or occupied by cars.

Table 1: Plots’ Areas in Zokak el Blat

Area

[0-249][250-499][500-749][750-999][1000-1249][1250-1499][1500-1749][1750-1999]

[2000-2249][2250-2499][2500-2749][2750-2999][3000-3249][3250-3499][3500-3749][3750-3999][4000-4249][4250-4499][4500-4749][4750-4999]

[5000-5249][5250-5499][5500-5749][5750-5999][6000-6249][6250-6499][6500-6749][6750-6999][7000-7249][7250-7499][7500-7749]

[8000-+]Total

Patriarchate

2311746034151082

010000000000

00010000000

0536

SOLIDERE

1117534321

012011102300

00100000000

260

Number of Plots



Figure 1: Plots’ Areas in Patriarchate Sector Figure 2: Plots’ Areas in SOLIDERE Sector

Map 24: Residual Lots



1.3. BUILDINGS

The Zokak El Blat neighborhood is fragmented and the architectural fabric is highly degraded, seldom renovated. The areaoccupied by buildings has considerably changed throughout the year which resulted in a different urban fabric and composition.Furthermore, the area is a mix of architectural styles and typologies, encompassing a wide variety of façade styles and materials.

1.3.1. Occupation/built-up area

Map 25: Empty v/s Built area 1945 Map 26: Empty v/s Built area 2011



Map 27: Built-up Area 1964 – 1977 Map 28: Built-up Area 1977 – 1991

Map 29: Built-up Area 1991 – 2003 Map 30: Built-up Area 2003 - 2010



The comparison of the maps shows us a change in thecomposition of the urban fabric of Zokak El Blat between1945 and 2011.

Four major demolition operations of the urban fabric tookplace in Zokak el Blat: the destruction caused by the addition ofthe two major axes: Fouad Chehab and Ahmad Beyhum or SalimSalam Avenue (1964-1977), the destruction caused by the civilwar (1975-1990), the destruction caused by the reconstructionprocess in SOLIDERE area and the destruction (1991-2003)caused by the land and real estate speculation (2003 – 2011).

1964-1977

Zokak el Blat lost a big part of its buildings with the addition ofFouad Chehab Avenue that divided Zokak el Blat into two partscausing the destruction of a great number of buildings. Thisprocess was repeated with the addition of the Ahmad Beyhum

Avenue. A great number of the buildings was demolished onboth sides of the added avenues. During this period, Zokak elBlat lost 36.918,50 m2 which is equivalent to 235 buildings.

1977 - 1991

Zokak El Blat has lost a great part of its built-up area, becauseof the civil war. During this period, the district lost 6.657,50 m2which is equivalent to 48 buildings. Surprisingly, the major de-struction occurred in the Patriarchate area.

1991-2003

Zokak el Blat’s urban fabric was tragically affected by thepostwar reconstruction process. During this period, the demol-ished built-up area exceeded by far the one that happened dur-ing the civil war. Thus, Zokak el Blat lost 28.372 m2 which isequivalent to 151 buildings. The major destructions occurred inSOLIDERE area where larger buildings replaced the older ones.The Patriarchate’s urban fabric was left slightly intact.

2003-2011

The land and real estate speculation in Zokak el Blat increasedthe demand within the district and especially within the Patriarchatearea. During this period, Zokak el Blat lost 4.941,50 m2 of its built-up area which is equivalent to 30 buildings. Most of those buildingsare located in the southern neighborhood. The scarcity of emptylots oriented the demand towards the old degraded fabric. The de-struction of the old fabric suited both the owners and the buyers. Infact, when they opt for the demolition, the buyers benefit from theadditional exploitation ratios while the owners can get rid of theirproperty issues and complexities. In the Patriarchate neighborhood,the urban fabric has changed to a greater extent, introducing newbuilding patterns, which testifies the destruction of a great numberof old buildings. The absence of planning explains the random com-position of the urban fabric with a wide variety of building shapestoday. It is very obvious that the new constructions are larger andthere is no room for small built-up areas anymore.



1.3.2. Building Age

The building age varies across theneighborhood, which shows the mixtureof styles we find in it, thus revealing thelack of planning and construction rules.The presence of new buildings from thepast ten years shows us that the districthas already entered a new phase and hasbecome subject to land speculation andnew real estate development.

According to the map, there is a high

number of buildings (41%) that datesback to the Ottoman period (1820-1920)and the period that followed, the FrenchMandate (1920 till 1943), which leadsto the conclusion that this neighborhood,encompassing such a great number ofheritage buildings of the Ottoman andMandate architectural style, dates back tothat phase and has ever since endured amassive change in its built-up fabric thathas been replaced by newer buildings.

A great number of buildings (25%)have been constructed in the post-Man-date period, between 1943 and 1975.The buildings that were constructed dur-ing the war represent only 10% of theentire urban fabric. The modern style hasby then started appearing and continuedafter the war until the year 2000.

The new constructions in the contempo-rary period, between 2000 and 2011, oc-cupy 9% of the urban fabric of the neigh-borhood, which is not a small number forten years. The neighborhood is thus pass-ing through a period of rapid development,as we had mentioned earlier. Map 31: Building Age 2011



1.3.3. Typology

Buildings represent 76% of the urbanfabric. They are the main existing typologyin the district, which marks a very urban-ized area where individual houses countfor less than 20% of the whole built fabric.

This is a sign of a lack of preservationof heritage buildings since there are veryfew individual houses left. Map 32: Building Typology 2011



1.3.4. Building Use

Being a residential neighborhood, 45%of the buildings in Zokak El Blat are resi-dential. Commerce is nevertheless enter-ing the district, but the neighborhood

preserves its main residential character.There is a very limited number, only four, ofexclusively commercial buildings, but a highnumber, 33%, of mixed used buildings,where the building is mainly residential buthas a commercial ground floor.

On another note, there are 15 institu-tional buildings and seven religious build-ings, which is a considerably high numberfor a neighborhood like Zokak El Blat.

6% of the buildings are of mixed use:a residential, commercial and institutionalcombination.

The administrative buildings are foundonly in the Northern part, being part ofthe Beirut central district built by SOLIDEREafter the war and encompassing the mainpolitical and administrative functions of thecity (like the Sérail for example). Map 33: Building Use 2011



1.3.5. Building State

There is a noticeable variation be-tween the states of the buildings all overthe neighborhood; while some are in verygood shape, a great number of building

are in a degraded state. It is very clear thatthe buildings in the western part of ZokakEl Blat are in better shape while the build-ings in degraded state are concentrated inthe center of the neighborhood. It is easyto conclude that the old buildings, datingfrom 1920 to 1943, also described as thehistoric and heritage buildings, are theones in bad state (This is to be elaboratedin the section about heritage buildings). Map 34: Building State in 2011



Map 35: Building Heights in 1977 Map 36: Building Heights in 1991

1.3.6. Building Heights

The buildings of 1 to 3 floors and those of 4 to 6 floors dominated the built-up fabric of Zokak El Blat in 1977 and 1991, cov-ering around 64% of the whole neighborhood. With the new construction and the new speculation and real estate developments,buildings of 7 to even more than 10 floors star ted appearing in different corners of the district, especially after 1991. The very highrise buildings, of more than 13 floors, appear in the neighborhood today, as shows the 2011 map, mainly with the new real estatedevelopment in the Northern western part and eastern part.



Map 37: Building Heights in 2003 Map 38: Building Heights in 2011



1.3.7. Building Façade materials

The major part of the built-up fabric,

almost 65%, has coated facades withprefabricated stones and marbles, a stylethat mainly defines the after mandate pe-riod of reconstruction and lasts till ourdays. The rest of the built-up fabric hasnatural stone facades that are sign ofbuildings of older period - the ottomanand the mandate period.

Map 39: Building Facades in 2011



Map 40: Classification of Historic Buildings in 2011 Map 41: Classification of Historic Buildings in 2011 show-

ing Demolitions

1.4. DEMOLITION OF LISTED BUILDING

Once listed, the buildings were not completely protected since,as mentioned earlier, there is an absence of a legal frameworkfor the protection of heritage buildings.

The maps above show that unclassified buildings are thosethat were more likely to be demolished; 36% of the unclassifiedbuildings were demolished in 2011 proving the absence of aprotection strategy for heritage buildings.



Map 42: Pre-independence buildings and their state Map 43: Pre-independence buildings and their state (Map

including classified buildings)

1.5. STATE OF HERITAGE AND CLASSIFIED BUILDINGS

On another note, we observe a direct link between thebuildings state and their age which reinforces the conclusionthat historic buildings undergo serious deterioration problemsand suffer from lack of maintenance and preservation. A greatamount of buildings dating between 1820 and 1943 are ina degraded state (almost 14%) while others are in a bad oraverage state (almost 59%). The rest of the buildings arein good shape which can be the result of the reuse of thosebuildings, thus their rehabilitation, conservation and adapta-tion for new usage.

As for the classified buildings, the map indicates that theclassification was not enough to protect the buildings; therefore19% of the buildings undergo serious deterioration and are ina degraded state, 26% are in a bad state and 41% are in anaverage state, while the rest, only 14%, are in good state.

In conclusion, it is proved that the classification of the build-ings is not enough for their preservation and that is mainly be-cause of the absence of a whole protection strategy and a legalframework that dictates the protection of the buildings.



Map 44: Zokak el Blat Skyline in 1991 Map 45: Zokak el Blat Skyline in 2011

1.6. Skyline

The analysis of the morphology of the urban fabric of ZokakEl Blat reveals to us the development of the district throughoutthe years. And this 3D map summarizes the fact that Zokak ElBlat underwent serious changes since its very early years, whichwe see clearly between 1991 and 2011.

The neighborhood, with its irregular road network and diver-sified shapes of blocks and parcels, got more dense with theconstruction of new buildings especially in the last 10 years,where we notice the domination of buildings replacing low risehouses that existed previously, and the empty lots that existed in1991 are almost all built on.



Map 46: Public Equipments

1.7. INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

1.7.1. Public Equipments

Zokak el Blat’s equipment in public services differsfrom one sector to another.

SOLIDERE Area

The northern part of Zokak el Blat district is charac-terized by the presence of big administrative buildingssuch as:

• The Grand Sérail that is the headquarters of theLebanese Prime Minister;

• The Council for Development and Reconstruction(CDR), a public body, that is enabled to carry out thereconstruction and development processes in Lebanon;

• The ESCWA Buildings representing the United Na-tions headquarter in Lebanon

Patriarchate Area

The southern part of Zokak el Blat is characterized bythe presence of a large number of educational institutions.

Both areas lack of public spaces and parking facilities.



1.7.2. Upgrading of Public Services

Population growth in Zokak el Blatputs pressure on public services such asdrinkable and waste water network, elec-tricity network, etc.

In SOLIDERE area, the reconstruc-tion plan envisaged the public servicesupgrading according to the needs, whilethe Patriarchate area, and within theframework of Beirut’s infrastructure up-grading project in 2002 launched by theCDR, benefited from the upgrading of itsboundaries’ public services. In 2002, theCDR appointed Dar el Handasah (NazihTaleb & Co) to undertake this task. Theproject’s objective addressed the urgent

need to improve, repair and replacesections of Beirut’s infrastructure. Theproject, designed in three phases, waslaunched along many axes in Beirut cityand affected the Patriarchate boundar-ies. It covered a 20 year infrastructuremaster plan and comprised the followingupgrading works: Storm water network,sewage network, potable water network,power and telecommunications network,pavement works, sidewalks, street light-ing, signing and marking, landscaping or

other street amenities.

The public services upgrading did notaffect the core of the Patriarchate sec-tor. The lack of public services upgrad-ing combined with the population growthwithin the district put pressure on the ex-isting infrastructure and left the area inbad sanitary conditions.

Map 47: Public Services Upgrading - 2002



1.7.3. Parking Facilities

Zokak el Blat’s parking facilities differfrom one sector to another.

Within SOLIDERE area, all the buildingshave their private parking facilities. More-over, the area has 5 public parking areas.

Within the Patriarchate area, only thenew developments are equiped with pri-vate parking facilities. To compensate this

shortage, sector’s residents and visitorsrecourse to public parking areas, park-meters spaces and sidewalk parking. Thelack of parking facilities combined withthe streets narrowness oblige users toopt for parking on the sidewalks whichdisturbs the pedestrian mobility. Further-more, the parking scarcity increases theconflict between users.

Map 48: Parking Facilities



1.8.1. Real-Estate Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

The land register established within the Ministry of Finance provided us with the following figures. These figures highlight landand real estate transactions within Zokak el Blat and Moussaytbeh. However, they do not provide us with plots’ number in order toextract data for our study area.

Table 2 Number of real estate transactions between 2005 - 2011

A. Real Estate and Land Sales

Over seven years, 11.867 sales transactions were conclud-ed. The above mentioned number covers land and real-estatetransactions. We could not separate real-estate transactionsfrom land transactions.

The average number is 1695.28 sales transactions per year.

The minimum number of transactions was recorded for theyears 2005 and 2006. The recession in the market is due to thepolitical and security instability that characterized these two years.

The number of transactions reached its peak in 2009 where1953 transactions were recorded.

Source Ministry of finance: Cadastre Register

Sales

Sales to ForeignersSubdivisionMergingProperty TransferDemolition

2005

1339

64925115

2006

1352

82216119

2007

1759

88014119

2008

1874

71112024

2009

1953

8629517

2010

1720

75021025

2011

1870

65132014

Total

11867

531151298133

Figure 3: Sales Transactions between 2005 - 2011

Sales Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

1.8. REAL ESTATE AND LAND MARKET

As mentioned above, we encountered several problems while

collecting data. For real estate and land market data collection,we faced the following difficulties:

• Project developers were not willing to provide us with an-swers to all our questionnaire sections;

• The Ministry of Finance and namely the land register couldnot deliver us information on Zokak el Blat area, despite the factthat the study area is a land constituency. They provided us with

monthly information on real estate transactions within Zokak elBlat and Moussaytbeh districts;

• The Order of Engineers and Architects “OEA” provided uswith the list of construction permits that were delivered from1997 till 2010.

In order to assess the market tendencies and dynamics, werelied on the information that we managed to collect from rel-evant authorities and administrations, our field observations,magazines and newspapers archives and interviews with projectdevelopers and experts in the field.



C. Subdivision Transactions

Over seven years, 15 subdivision transactions were concluded.

The average number is 2.14 subdivision transactions per year.

The minimum number of subdivision transactions was re-corded in 2007 and 2010 where zero subdivision transactionswere recorded.

The maximum number of subdivision transactions was re-

corded in 2005 where 9 subdivision transactions were record-ed. After this date, the subdivision transactions decreased.

This diminution could be explained by the fact that the landproperties are fragmented to a point that no more splittingtransactions could be made.

D. Merging Transactions

Over seven years, 129 merging transactions were concluded.The average number is 18.42 merging transactions per year.

The minimum number was 9 merging transactions recordedin 2009.

The number of merging transactions reached its peak in2011 where 32 merging transactions were recorded.

This augmentation in the merging transactions could be ex-plained in two ways:

• Property fragmentation has led to smaller plots;• Projects’ developers are targeting high-income custom-

ers that demand larger apar tments and more amenities withinthe building.

Figure 5: Subdivision Transactions between 2005 - 2011

Figure 6: Merging Transactions between 2005 - 2011

Subdivision Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

Merging Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

Figure 4: Sales to foreigners’ transactions between

2005 - 2011

Sales to Foreigners Between 2005 - 2011B. Sales to Foreigners

Over seven years, 531 sales to foreigners’ transactions wereconcluded.

The average number is 75.85 sales to foreigners’ transac-

tions per year.

The minimum number of transactions was recorded in 2005.

The number of sales to foreigners’ transactions reached its peakin 2007 where 88 transactions were recorded within the area.



Figure 7: Property Transfer Transactions between 2005

- 2011

Figure 8: Demolition Transactions between 2005 - 2011

Property Transfer Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

Demolition Transactions Between 2005 - 2011

E. Property transfer

Over seven years, 8 property transfer transactions wereconcluded.

The average number is 1.14 property transfer transactionsper year.

The minimum number of property transfer transactions wasrecorded in 2008, 2010 and 2011 where zero transactionswere recorded.

The number of property transfer transactions reached its

peak in 2009 where 5 transactions were recorded.

The lack of property transfer transactions combined with theage of buildings could explain that heirs, on a same plot, arewaiting for a potential buyer in order to get rid of the successionformalities costs.

F. Demolition Transactions

Over seven years, 133 demolition transactions were concluded.The average number is 19 demolition transactions per year.

The minimum number of demolition transactions was record-ed in 2011 where 14 transactions were recorded.

The number of demolition transactions reached its peak in2010 where 25 transactions were recorded.

The demolition is going at a fast pace and puts in danger thearchitectural heritage of Zokak el Blat



1.8.2. Construction Permits

A. Construction Permits in Beirut

The construction permits in Zokak el-Blat in 2010 will be compared to the databelow, listing construction permits for all of Beirut and Lebanon in 2010 and between

2002 and 2009.

Evolution of Construction Permits in Beirut

Evolution of Construction Permits in Lebanon

Figure 9 Construction Permits in Beirut 2002-2010.

Source: Lebanon Opportunities Business and Economy Database, data available at www.databank.com.lb.

Figure 10 : Construction permits in Lebanon 2002-2010.

Source: Lebanon Opportunities Business and Economy Database, data available at www.databank.com.lb.



The number of construction permits issued in Beirut has been relatively steady over the past ten years. What is striking, however,is the evolution in the area licensed. While this number is initially low, there seems to be a steady trend upwards starting in 2003,

peaking sharply in 2008, to go back and drop downwards.

This means that there has been a sharp increase in the amount of built-up area over the past ten years, something that is indeedvisible in Beirut’s skyline: the amount of high rises under construction is striking, to say the least.

Construction permit statistics in the rest of Lebanon shows a different picture, however: after starting at diverging points, thenumber of permits and areas licensed converge in 2007, and continue together in an upward curve until 2008, where we notice asmall peak in areas licensed, after which both go downwards again.

From this, we can deduct that, contrary to the situation in Beirut, there has not been a sharp increase in built-up area per con-struction permit in the rest of Lebanon.

B. Construction Permits in Zokak el Blat between 1997 and 2010: Order of Engineers and Architects in Beirut Figures

The Order of Engineers and Architects provided us with a list of construction permits delivered between 1997 and 2010. Thislist contains the plots’ numbers, the engineers’ and the owners’ names. However, we could not manage to get information about thebuilt-up area, and the demolitions that occurred.

Table 3: Construction Permits in Zokak el Blat 1997 - 2012

Figure 11: Evolution of Construction Permits 1997 - 2012

Evolution of Construction Permits in Zokak el Blat

Source Ministry of finance: Cadastre Register

Patriarchate

SOLIDEREZokak el Blat

1996

2

24

1997

2

35

1998

3

25

1999

0

00

2000

1

01

2001

4

15

2002

4

26

2003

2

02

2004

4

26

2005

3

14

2006

6

06

2007

4

15

2008

9

09

2009

1

12

2010

2

02

Total

47

1562



The observation of Zokak el Blat dis-trict shows differing development trendsand issues within the two segmented ar-eas. This is reflected in the issued con-struction permits that are unevenly dis-tributed along the district’s two sectors.In this regard, this section examines theevolution in the number of constructionpermits over 15 years in Zokak el Blat’sentire district with an emphasis on SOLI-DERE and the Patriarchate area.

Map 49: Construction permits between 2001 – 2010 (OEA Figures)



Zokak el Blat

The total number of construction per-mits is 62.

The average number of construction

permits per year is 4.13.

The minimum number of developmentprojects was recorded in 1999 wherezero building permit was issued.

The number of development projectsreached its peak in 2008 where 9 con-struction permits were delivered.

12 buildings are still under constructionin the entire area of Zokak el Blat.

SOLIDERE

The Total number of construction permitsis 15 which represents 24.19% of the to-tal number of construction permits.

The average number of construction per-

mits per year is 1.

The minimum number of developmentwas recorded in years 1999, 2000,2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 where zerobuilding permit was issued.

The number of development projectsreached its peak in 1997 where 3 con-struction permits were delivered

Only one building is still under construction.

The Table observation shows that 46.66%of the new constructions occurred between1996 and 1998 while 53.34% of the con-structions were spread over 12 years.

Patriarchate

The total number of construction permitsis 47 which represents 75.81% of the totalnumber of construction permits.

The average number of construction

permits per year is 3.13.

The minimum number of developmentprojects was recorded in 1999 wherezero building permit was issued.

The number of construction permitsreached its peak in 2008 where 9 con-struction permits were delivered.

11 buildings are under construction.

The table analysis shows that the realestate boom started in 2001 with a par-ticular increase between 2006 and 2008.The decrease in the development projectsbetween years 2009 and 2010 can be ex-plained by the fact that demolition permitsbecame harder to get since they requiredthe Minister of Culture’s approval.

Most of the development projects are concentrated within the Patriarchate area that undergoes important changes in itsurban fabric. In addition, those projects are mostly localized on the sector fringes along the major roads: 4 development projectsare located along Salim Salam Avenue while 6 development projects are situated along Fouad Chehab Avenue in close proximityto SOLIDERE. It should be noted that, despite the nuisances caused by the traffic on major roads, there is still an increasingdemand for housing near SOLIDERE area and down town area.



Map 50: New Development Map

1.9. REAL ESTATE AND LAND MARKET

1.9.1. New Projects Survey

A field survey of recently completed,planned and under construction real es-tate projects was carried out, where wecollected information about new projectsin Zokak el-Blat and contacted and inter-viewed as many developers as we could.The data below is based on this survey,complemented with information found on-line and in brochures.



Project name and developer

Basbous Building, by BasbousGECC

Beirut 298, by GECCRoyal View, by GECCRoyal Beirut Hills, by GECC and Moughir Sinjaba

Ibrahim Al-Hout Al Wazzan for Engineering and ContractingHighland, La Citadelle, Solitaireby Binadar

Spectrum Engineering ConsultantsHisham Mneimneh

Les Trois Palmes, by Khiami GroupHani MradVision 210, by Statumen

Al Sounboula 1, by Shaker Atriss & Abdel Fattah Ahmed Al Sounboula 4, by Shaker Atriss & Abdel Fattah Ahmed Al Sounboula 7, by Shaker Atriss & Abdel Fattah Ahmed Al Sounboula 9, by Shaker Atriss & Abdel Fattah Ahmed

Al Amira Building, by Sherri Real Estate Company

200 Zokak el-Blat, by Moughir Sinjaba

Moughir Sinjaba

Planned, under construction and completed projects in Zokak el-Blat

Information about the building

Lot 244, 10 floors residentialLot 622, 14 floors residential, apartments 520m2

Lot 298, 14 floors residential, apartments 230-410m2Lot 1089, 662-665, 14 floors residential, apartments 520m2Lot 689-692, 17 floors residential, two towers, apartments400-700m2Lot 824, 8 floors residential, apartments 100m2, $2050/m2Lot 624, 626-628, 631, 633-635, 14 floors residentialLot 610, 611, 1014, 14 floors residential, three buildings,apartments 210-250m2, $3,200Lot 526, 12 floors residential, apartments 170m2Lot 457, 7 and 17 floors residential, apartments 134-174m2,$2,000/m2Lot 966, 10 floors residential, apartments 200m2, $3,000/m2Lot 591, 9 floors residential, apartments 215m2Lot 210, 12 floors residential, apartments 215, 222, 405m2,$4,000/m2Lot 894Lot 577, 15 floors residential, apartments 150m2, $1,300/m2Lot 427, 13 floors residentialLot 927

Lot 861-862, 10 floors residential, apartments 150m2,$1,400-$2,100/ m2Lot 200, 11 floors residential, apartments 215-240 m2,$3,500/ m2Lot 199, 11 floors residential



Slogans and Advertisements Adopted by Projects’ Promoters

Big development projects adopt slogans that advertise for:

• Great panoramic view of downtown city, mountain and seain one great location.

• Building design that meets the needs for peace, serenityand tranquility amidst of Beirut whereas within the proximity tomany major places and destination spots.

• Amenities within the building such as parking spaces, gar-dens, etc. within an over-congested area that lacks of parkingspaces and green areas;

In our survey, we were able to work ona sample of seven new buildings. In fact,we managed to interview seven develop-ers while the rest showed a reluctance torespond to our questionnaire.

The new buildings surveyed have onaverage 12 floors (median 12). Build-ing amenities are not as luxurious as ob-served in other development projects in

Ain el Mreisseh or Achrafieh. No buildinghas a health club for example. Only twoprojects have a swimming pool. All have

a generator and extra water, but this isconsidered standard in every new build-ing in Beirut and does not constitute adistinguishing variable. Two buildingshad extra parking facilities, one projectcame with a so-called Smart House ap-plication.

All buildings are residential develop-ments with apartments. For all seven de-velopers eventually interviewed, middle-income groups are most targeted, withtwo buildings targeting high-income as

well, and two low-income.The average apar tment size for build-

ings surveyed, as per the provided in-formation, is of 283 m2 (median 215m2). According to a local broker we in-terviewed, the average apartment sizein most of the areas is 150m2. Higherprices because of less liquidity followingthe financial crisis, as well as an over-supply of large apartments led to a de-mand for smaller apartments, at sizessuch as 100 or 110 m2.

Binadar: Highland Tower

Binadar: Hi Shaker Atriss: Zokak el-

Blat Tower ghland Tower

Binadar: La Citadelle

Sherri : Al Amira Building

Binadar: Solitaire

Moughir Sinjaba: Zokak el-Blat



Figure 12: New Developments Apartment sizes in m2

New developments are generally not undertaken inside thedistrict but are mostly localized on its fringes: along the majorroads and Patriarchate. The proximity of SOLIDERE and SalimSalam and Fouad Chehab highways is seen as an advantage

by the developers, because it enables fast access to Downtownand the airport as well as other parts of the city.

New developments have not yet penetrated the poorer areas. When analyzing the brochures and websites of new projects inZokak el-Blat, it is clear that developers are not using the sametype or amount of slogans that can be seen in advertisements fornew buildings in Downtown and Ras Beirut/Achrafieh.

Regarding payment facilities, most developers give theirclients the opportunity to pay in installments after an initialdown payment. Some developers take installments directly,

other process them through banks where buyers take loans.Most of them do not like to deal with banks; only one said hecan be flexible about this. While all clients used their savings tobuy the apartments or paid part of the sum, half of them usedbank loans from local banks as well.

The occupation status of apartments is half permanent;half seasonal (in summer).All apartments are for sale only,although some new owners might rent them out afterwards. Inall projects, apartments are bought for residential needs, whilesome can be rented out and treated as an investment or are

bought for children.In most developments, the majority of demand comes from

Lebanese expatriates. In only one instance were apartmentsbought by foreigners, namely people from the Gulf. As for the ori-gins of the buyers, developers name different areas: Zokak el-Blatitself from before the war, Shiites from the South, expatriates fromno specific sect, people from the Gulf, etc. It is difficult to concludeon one area of origin. Area of origin: 5 developers have clientsfrom outside: the Gulf/expatriates (1), the South (2), or every-where (2). Two have clients from Zokak el-Blat.

All developers named famil ies as the main and only house-hold composition of their clients.

Occupation: business, services, engineers, managers. Auniversity education was cited as most common among buy-ers. Their occupation varies from white-collar jobs as profes-

sionals in the private and services sector in Europe and theGulf (managers, engineers) to self-made entrepreneurs whohave businesses in Africa. The average age is estimated at 40.

Before 2010

Around 1998, foreign investors (Gulf nationals and Lebaneseexpatriates) were returning to Lebanon. In 1998, there were489 foreign ownership transactions, an increase of 111 over1997, in all of Lebanon, mostly in Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

At this time, foreign ownership was still restricted by law, beforelaw 296 was issued in 2001. Saudi nationals were investing the

most8. Demand was mostly driven by Lebanese expatriates liv-ing in the Gulf, with Arab investors returning since 19989.

According to a survey conducted by Lebanon Oppor tuni-ties in 1999, most local Lebanese at the time were lookingfor an apartment in a new building, measuring 100 to 200square meters. Budgets cited by potential buyers were con-sidered unrealistic by developers, while supply for apartmentsunder $100,000 ran short and there was an oversupply inthe range above $100,000. Most popular were apartmentsunder US$60,000. Units over 200m2 and $175,000 were sell-

ing slower. Zokak el-Blat ranked second for demand on apart-ments, together with Mazraa, Sabra, Tareek el Jdideh, Bastaand Burj Abi Haidar. ‘Demand is up in traditionally popularareas. The southern suburbs are experiencing fast populationgrowth typical of poorer areas.’ However, for offices, store-fronts, restaurants or hotels, Zokak el-Blat was not listed asbeing in demand10. Many luxury apartments were left unsold,while small units were sold in record numbers before construc-tion even started11. This can be explained by the developers’behavior at the end of the war: they invested a lot in residen-tial properties in the city center at high prices that were rentedto employees of big companies, hence driving up the prices.

While by 1999 most companies had left, some landlords werestill waiting for better times, not lowering their prices. Devel-

8 ‘Return of the big spenders. Despite complex ownership laws, foreign investors are back in the market.’ Lebanon Opportunities, May 1999,pp. 16-19.9 Lebanon Opportunities, May 1999,pp. 12-1510 Lebanon Opportunities, April 1997, p. 32; June 1997, p. 36.11Lebanon Opportunities, June 1997, p. 9 and p. 26



opers of new apartments sometimes opted to rent out theirproperties, gaining 7 to 10% of the value of an old and 10to 12% of the value of a new apartment yearly. After 9 to10 years, a net profit can be gained, and the developer canstill sell the apartment. On average, developers waited up totwo years before they started renting. Rental prices in Beirut

were generally unaffordable for most people, especially in thecentral areas12. Compared to the massive construction takingplace at the time, the rental market picked up only minimally,and in Achrafieh mostly, even though renting out apartmentswas considered as a sound investment since the change of therental law (see section… on rental law)13.

The cost of most of the houses offered was over $50,000,while most of them were advertised at over $100,000. Withsalaries generally below $1,000 a month, this meant thatthere was a big gap between what people wanted and what

people could afford. Buyers surveyed were generally be-tween 20 and 39 years old and had an income of less than$2,000 a month. Most were couples looking for a home forlife. Loans were more readily available than before at thistime, by banks, developers and the Public Housing Institute,while installments were an option as well14. In 2001, the de-mand for apartments in Greater Beirut was beginning to re-cover. Surplus was declining, and inexperienced developershad left the market. The real market was for new and smallerapartments (135-160m2)15. Buyers were mostly middle-class two-income families with a household income of over$1,200 a month, and retired military servicemen16.

1.9.2. Real Estate Land Prices

Lebanon has witnessed a real estate boom over the past tenyears that was barely deterred by the global financial crisis, thecontinuing political turmoil and the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon(see Krijnen, 2010, who based this information on a press review

and bank reports). Investors and tourists have been flocking to thecountry in large numbers, with a record number of visitors notedin 2009. Land and real estate prices had grown exponentially, withapartments in Downtown Beirut selling anywhere from $5,000 to$8,000 per square meter (Krijnen, 2010). Demand was high due tocontinuing investment from the Gulf and Lebanese expatriates, withForeign Direct Investment (FDI) growing annually (Krijnen, 2010).

Before 2010

From 1997 to 1998, official figures stated that prices of real

estate units went up from $44,360 to $58,400 on average. Oneexplanation is the wider availability of loans allowing people to buymore expensive residences. In 1998, 17,000 home loans were pro-vided. Affordable neighborhoods were the congested side streets ofold Beirut: Moussaytbeh, Basta and inner Barbour. A two-bedroomapartment could be found there for US$60,000, while main streetsremained expensive, at US$600-700 per square meter. An increasein the development of small apartments was taking place becausepeople had less capital to spend, loans were limited and developerswanted 30 to 50% in down payments17. In 1999, developers wereturning towards the pericentral areas of Beirut, to avoid payingSOLIDERE’s high rates and being tied to their regulations18.

12 ‘Realty realty. Give the people what they want. But what do they want?’ Lebanon Opportunities, November 1999, pp. 12-15. Survey by Lebanon Opportunities, contacted hundreds of people usinga cell phone directory, interviewed 303 persons who were looking for a house.13 Lebanon Opportunities, February 1999,pp. 14-17.14 Lebanon Opportunities, December 1999, pp. 12-15.15 Lebanon Opportunities March 2001 Page 10-15: Back to ‘realty’: Developers see revival in apartment market.16 Lebanon Opportunities May 1999 Page 12-15: ‘More than 40,000 transactions registered last year. Is the $3 billion market gearing itself up?’17 “Buying on a budget.” Lebanon Opportunities, December 1998, pp. 14-17.18 “Hot areas.”Lebanon Opportunities January 1999, p. 15.

Figure 13: Real Estate Prices/m2 Source: RAMCO real estate



An example comes from a developer that we interviewed. Hebought a 200m2 plot, with an allowed built-up area of 2000m2.His construction costs were $450/m2. He paid $1,350,000for the plot in 2008-2009, which comes down to $6750/m2. An apartment now costs $3000/m2. Deducting the con-struction costs (US$900,000) from his turnover from sales

(US$6,000,000), we are still left with an enormous profit margin.

1.9.3. Speculation Process in Zokak el Blat

This part of the study looks at land and real estate prices ten-dencies in order to assess the speculation process within Zokakel Blat and therefore the gentrification process.

Following a field survey and information provided by D. Guil-laume Boudisseau (RAMCO), we were able to develop two maps:the first on land prices and the second on real estate prices.

To facilitate the reading of data, the study area was dividedinto 6 sectors:

• SOLIDERE area where land prices and real estate prices

exceed USD 4.000 per square meter;• The north-western fringe where the real estate prices can

reach SOLIDERE prices and land prices var y between USD 3.500and USD 4.000 /m2;

• The north-eastern fringe where land prices vary betweenUSD 3.000 and USD 3.500/m2 while real-estate prices vary be-

tween USD 3.500 and USD 4.000/m2;• The school area is excluded from land speculation;• The western part where land prices vary between USD

2.500 and USD 2.750/m2 while real-estate prices vary betweenUSD 3.000 and USD 3.500/m2;

• The southern part where land prices vary between USD2.000 and USD 2.500/m2 while real-estate prices are muchhigher in the section that represents the core of Zokak el BlatUSD 2.500 – USD 2.750/m2 than in the rest where real estateprices vary between USD 2.000 and USD 2.500/m2.

Prices are particularly high within SOLIDERE area, on the fringesthat lie near the city center along Fouad Chehab Avenue. This dem-onstrates that there is a very strong correlation between land andreal estate prices and the distance from downtown. In addition tothe location the price of land depends on the allowed built-up area.

Map 51: Land Prices in 2011 Map 52: Real Estate Prices in 2011



2. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

At the beginning of the study, we decided to conduct an ex-haustive survey on the district’s social fabric. To this end, wedesigned a questionnaire covering all the social aspects: age,

gender, education level, place of birth, occupation, number ofpersons per household, etc. However, the political tension pre-vailing prevented us from carrying out the survey.

To overcome this issue, we decided to formulate an official re-quest to the Ministry of the Interior to obtain information aboutregistered people from Zokak el Blat as well as the electorallists. Once more, due to the delicate situation prevailing in thecountry, we only managed to get the electoral list.

Therefore, we were constrained to rely on existing literaturessuch as “the Orient Institute” publications, the electoral lists and

interviews with citizens and Moukhtars to conduct the analysisof Zokak el Blat’s social fabric.

2.1. ZOKAK EL BLAT SOCIAL FABRIC EVOLUTION

Since the beginning, demographic changes within the districthave contributed to the change in its social landscape. Fromthe 19th century and until the first half of the 20th century, theneighborhood had a heterogeneous nature in terms of confes-sional constitution. The majority of residents of Zokak el Blatwere high-class intellectual Beirutis, working mainly in the ter tia-

ry sector in the city center and port in the region. The neighbor-hood’s population was mixed between Sunni and Christians (Ma-ronites, Greek Catholics and Armenians). These families werethe first to build houses and mansions in the neighborhood.

Migration to Beirut began in 1920 and was accentuated dur-ing the second half of the 20th century. The big working oppor-tunities in the capital attracted migrants from all over Lebanonand even from neighboring countries like Syria. This wave ofmigration has contributed not only to the diversity in terms ofsectarian composition but also in terms of income levels. Withthe increased attractiveness of residential neighborhoods, resi-dences and palaces were surrounded by houses of the middleand working classes. The majority of migrants belonged to theShiite unskilled working class employed in construction. Christianmigrants were absorbed by the functions of the state, financialand commercial companies. As for the Armenians, they migrated

to the area following the Armenian Genocide to join their fellow Armenians who had settled in the area around the Church ofSt. Nichan since the second half of the 19th century. Armenianfamilies of the district belonged to the upper-middle class andmanaged businesses in downtown.

Between 1960 and 1975, more than half of the Lebanesepopulation lived in Beirut and pericentral areas. Beirut areabecame congested especially within the absence of a planningpolicy to contain the population pressure. Congestion and nui-sances that resulted had led some families in the neighborhoodand especially Christian families to migrate to the eastern sub-urbs that were calmer and had a sectarian homogeneity.

At the beginning of the civil war, in 1975, Zokak el Blat waslocated on the eastern fringe of west Beirut and, close to thedemarcation line. This situation enhanced Christian migration to

East Beirut. In parallel, new Muslim migration flows toward thearea occurred. These flows led to the radical transformation inthe demographic structure of Zokak el Blat. The migration ofChristians had allowed poor Kurdish and Shiite families to squatvacant Christian families’ residential units. The families’ displace-ment movements from one region to another did not happen inan arbitrary way but according to the will of political actors: theyaimed at channeling the flow of migration to certain regionswhere they had the intention to develop or to extend their politi-cal influence. The massive displacement of Shiite families to theneighborhood induced an increase in demand for housing. This

demand was satisfied by an additional real estate supply andthe availability of empty houses and apartments to be squatted.

At the end of hostilities, the northern district of Zokak el Blatwas annexed to SOLIDERE that had a different reconstruction,management and development dynamic. The proximity of Zokakel Blat to prestigious downtown and land speculation attractedmany real estate developers to invest in the Patriarchate neigh-borhood and especially on the fringes.

2.2. CONFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION

To trace the religious mosaic in Zokak el Blat, we relied oninterviews with residents on the electoral lists and past studiesof the neighborhood. Interviews with Zokak el Blat’s inhabitantsgave us a great idea about the history of the social fabric, whileelectoral lists and studies provided us with some figures.



The confessional landscape in Beirutdiffers from one sector to another. Theeastern sector is predominantly Christianwhile the west has a Muslim predominance.

In 2009, in Mouhafazat Beirut:

• 44% of the voters were Sunni;• 15% were Shia;• 10% were Armenian Orthodox• 9% were Greek Orthodox

Map 53: Confessional Distribution in Beirut as per electoral Lists in 2010

Figure 14: Voters Mouhafazat Beirut in 2009, by Sect



In the western sector, except for Zokakel Blat and Bachoura neighborhoods, theproportion of Sunnis is far greater thanthat of the Shiites.

In year 2009,

• 51% of the voters were Sunni;• 39% were Shia;• 5% were Armenian Orthodox

In year 2000,

• 48% of the voters were Sunni;• 39% were Shiite• 6% were Armenian

Between years 2000 and 2009, wenotice a decrease of 1% of the Armenianvoters. Shiite rate is still the same while theSunni voters’ rate increased of 3%.

This variation in the voters’ rates couldbe explained as follows: on one hand, the

Armenian communities’ birth is lesser thanthat of the Muslim community. On the otherhand, this can be explained by the phe-nomenon of transfer citizenship of Sunni

to Beirut civil registers and to counteractthe Shiite presence in the neighborhood.

Figure 15: Voters in Zokak el Blat

Figure 16: Voters in Zokak el Blat in 2000, by sect



2.3. THE SHIITE AND SUNNITE COMPETITIVENESS ON TER-RITORIAL APPROPRIATION

The demographic development of both Shiite and SunniMuslim groups shows a remarkable increase in both populationgroups within the neighborhood.

Sunnis settled in Zokak el Blat because the neighborhood wastheir birthplace. As for the Shiites, they moved there becausethey were in search of employment or for security reasons or torejoin family members who preceded them to the neighborhood(Orient Institute Book)

The Kurds were unable to improve their economic conditionswhile some Shiites were able to do so through the repatriationof capital from Gulf countries and Africa and the availability ofeducation. Therefore, some Shiite groups invested in land and

real estate within the district. Thus, most buildings in the easternpart are the property of the Shiites. Nevertheless, Other Shiitesgroups suffer from poverty.

The Shiite presence in Zokak el Blat was consolidated by theconstruction of a hussayniya on Rue Boutros Boustany. The

Sunnis considered this location as a visible evidence of the de-sire of the Shiites to develop space control in order to becomea majority and take over the space. (Orient Institute Book) Theybelieve that this strengthens Hezbollah urban policy and allowsthem to control the space and keep an eye on the city center.

The conflict between Sunni and Shiite groups reveals a lackof integration of the Shiite population. Sunni groups considerthat the expansion of the Shiite presence in the neighborhoodthrough religious practices, lifestyle, etc. urges citizens to leavethe Sunni neighborhood of Zokak el Blat.

2.4. WORSHIP PLACES

Zokak el Blat’s religious communities’presence was supported by the buildingof worship places. The district worshipplaces are listed below:

• Zokak el Blat Mosque (1860);• Basta el Tahta Mosque (1865

south east);

• Moussaytbeh Mosque (south);• Kantari Mosque (1904);• Shiite Hussayniya (1982)• Kantari St-Elias Church (1850

north west);• Evangelical Church (1869);• Annunciation Church;• Patriarchate (1865);Orthodox Church on the hill of the

Sérail, that no longer exists

Map 54: Worship Places



2.5. CULTURAL FUNCTION

The district of Zokak el Blat is home to the Arab cultural re-

naissance. This renaissance was launched by Lebanese profes-sionals, journalists and politicians. In fact, Zokak el Blat played akey role in the development of the reformists Arab thoughts ofthe 19th century. Intellectual associations shared the neighbor-hood’s social space regardless of their religions and beliefs.

Since the 19th century, Zokak el Blat was the residence ofthe Syrian-Lebanese intellectuals, Arab, Ottoman and Egyptian.Through the efforts of intellectuals, Zokak el Blat enjoyed animportant cultural activity in terms of press and literature.

The cultural function development was mainly due to thepresence of several prominent Arab intellectuals. Furthermore,the neighborhood’s bourgeoisie lifestyle constituted a key factorthat enabled people to participate in regular literary salons. Thelocal press contributed to the coverage of this intellectual activ-ity and the social life of the neighborhood’s families.

Intellectual residents of the neighborhood of Zokak el Blatsuch as, Boutros Boustany, Khalil Sarkis, Abdel Kader Kabbani,Beyhum Hussein, etc., played a role in the cultural life in Leba-non and the Arab world. They wrote textbooks, published papersand drafted the texts laying the foundations of modern political

thought and social reform.

2.5.1. Academic Institutions

During the nineteenth century, Zokak el Blat’s urban developmentwas intimately linked to the growth in the number of schools andstudents that allowed the dissemination of literary thoughts.

The most important missionary institution in Zokak el Blat was“The Syrian Protestant College” that became later on the AmericanUniversity of Beirut. In the 1820s, this college was located in Zokak

el Blat at the Sérail Hill and then moved to Ras Beirut in 1870. The

protestant missionaries played an essential role in the developmentof the intellectual and cultural functions of the district.

In 1863, Boutros Boustany founded the National School or“Al-Madrasa Al-Wataniyya”. This institution was a preparatoryschool for the Syrian Protestant College and was known for itstolerance, diversity and quality of education. Boustany hadrecruited teachers with long experience who shared the sameprinciples of tolerance and rejection of discrimination. Mostteachers lived in Zokak el Blat and its surroundings, while thestudents were from Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Istanbul, Greece andLebanon. Some students later became teachers, publishers,

journalists and councilors.

A few years later, Muslim religious academics and activists,known as “Ulamas”19, founded the Society of Arts. In oppositionto the Syrian Scientific Society, the new “Society of Arts” focusedon arts and knowledge. The association interests’ focused main-ly on media and charity (Makassed Association) while the fund-ing for this association was provided by Muslim notables.

Nowadays, Zokak el Blat hosts a large number of academic andcultural institutions: Makassed, Global University, “Institut Supérieurdes Etudes Islamique”, Orient Institute, Annunciation School, GreekCatholic Patriarchal School, City International School, Hariri HighSchool, Al-Maanieh School, St-Joseph de l’Apparition School, Leba-

nese Universal College, Lycée AbdelKader, etc.

To assess the educational system prevailing in Zokak el Blat,we had recourse to two sources of information: the Ministry ofEducation and our own sur vey.

The Ministry of Education Figures

The ministry of Education provided us with information onsome of the existing academic institutions, regarding the num-ber of students, the number of teachers, the tuition fees and the

year of foundation.Table 4: Information on Zokak el Blat’s Academic Institutions - 1

19 Islam religion official experts

Academic Institution

Dar Al-HananGreen LebanonBeirut Arab CollegeGreek-Catholic Patriarchal SchoolCity International SchoolSt-Joseph de l’ApparitionHariri High School

Students

701724024486906941296

Teachers

416185512163135

Tuition Fees

LBP 1,900,000.00LBP 1,900,000.00LBP 2,193,000.00LBP 3,245,000.00LBP 7,774,000.00LBP 2,775,365.00LBP 5,790,000.00

Foundation Year

1971196319671950200319591991

Source: Ministry of Education, 2011



The figures delivered by the ministry of Education do not provideus with information on students’ origins and religion. However, wecan deduce from the tuition fees the class their students come from.

According to the Ministry of Education figures, Hariri HighSchool is the most important school in students and teachersnumber despite the fact that the tuition fees reach 5.790.000Lebanese Pounds. City International School is the most expen-sive institution while Dar el-Hanan and Green Lebanon are theless expensive ones and have the least number of students andteachers. Therefore, there is no correlation between the tuition

fees and the number of students and this could be explained bythe fact that parents seek good education level for their children.

MAJAL Survey

Our survey covered 4 schools in Zokak el Blat: Soeurs deSt-Joseph de l’Apparition, Lycée Abdel Kader, Greek CatholicPatriarchal School and City International School. The question-naire asked about the students’ place of residence, the type ofschool, the class that students come from, the previous functionof the building currently hosting the school.

Academic Institution

St-Joseph de l’Apparition

Lycée Abedl Kader/MissionLaïque FrançaiseGreek Catholic Patriarcal School

City International School

Students Origin

Zokak el Blat andother neighborhoods

Zokak el Blat andother neighborhoodsZokak el Blat andother neighborhoodsZokak el Blat andother neighborhoods

Type ofSchool

Private

Private

Private

Private

Students’ Class

Middle-Income

Middle-Income and HighIncomeLow-Income and MiddleIncome

Middle-Income and High

Income

Previous Functionof the Building

Demolished Palace

Palace

Nothing

Lycée Nichan Pa-

landjianSource: MAJAL School Survey

Table 5 : Information on Academic Institutions -2

Students’ Origin

All the schools reviewed attract students from Zokak el Blat andother neighborhoods. St-Joseph attracts students from Beirutin general, Southern Suburbs and Choueifat. Lycée Abdel Kaderstudents come from Zokak el Blat and other neighborhoods:45% of the students are alumni’s children and they have mostlyShiites, Sunni Druze and a Christian minority. Greek Catholic

Patriarchal school students are from Zokak el Blat and otherneighborhoods mainly Tarik el Jdideh and Aramoun while thevast majority of City International School students is from RasBeirut; 15% of their students are Christian.

Type of School

All the reviewed schools are private.

Students Class

St-Joseph students belong to middle income class while Lycée Abdel Kader’s students come from middle and high class back-ground. The Greek Catholic Patriarchal School targets the low-and middle income society while the City International School isreserved for middle to high income class.

Previous Function of the building

St-Joseph school was founded at the beginning of the twentiethcentury. The building was previously a palace belonging to JedayFamily; Lycée Abdel Kader was the residence of a French physi-cian from 1885 to 1926. In 1986, the Hariri Foundation boughtthe property that continued to be ran by the French. Finally, theCity International School was the French admiralty headquar-

ters till 1946, then, it was turned into the Nichan Paladjian HighSchool before becoming, in 2003, the City International School.

3. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The focal points to address this dimension are based on identify-ing the economic attractiveness of the neighborhood. Accordingto the exhaustive survey conducted in 2011, Zokak el Blat is asmall economic market characterized by the presence of microand small enterprises.

SOLIDERE and the Patriarchate areas have different economicdynamics: SOLIDERE is characterized by the presence of admin-istrative, diplomatic and media activities, while the Patriarchatearea is a small economic market characterized by the presenceof micro and small local enterprises.



A priori, the choice was to divide the study area into two sectors:SOLIDERE and the Patriarchate. However, the field study identi-fied within the Patriarchate’s urban fabric four areas: the heartwhere the genesis of the district took place, the school area,Salim Salam and the Shiite areas.

The Patriarchate area’s subdivision is based on a simple logic

assuming a functioning coherence. The division serves only as astarting point for reading and understanding the urban contextand may be modified in the recommendations process.

This section begins with a comparison between the north (SOLI-DERE Area) and the south (Patriarchate Area) to later focus onthe Patriarchate area.

3.1. ECONOMIC UNITS OCCUPATION

3.1.1 Occupation Status

527 economic units were surveyed in Zokak el Blat. They arespatially distributed as follows: 486 units in the Patriarchate

Area and 41 in SOLIDERE.

418 were occupied while 109 were vacant.Patriarchate area

78.40% of the economic units are occupied while 21.60%are vacant.

63.52% of the occupied economic activities are located alongSalim Salam Avenue and in the Shiite district located to the westof the same avenue.

60% of the vacant units are located in the Shiite district.

SOLIDERE AREA

90.24% of the economic units are occupied while 9.76%are vacant.

Table 6: Economic Units Occupation Status

OccupiedVacantTotal

Patriarchate

381105486

SOLIDERE

37441

Total

418109527

Source: MAJAL Economic Units Survey, 2011

Figure 17: Economic Units occupation Status



3.1.2. Legal Status

The 418 economic units’ legal status is divided as follows: 100

owned, 281 rented; 5 Wakf20

; 1 squatted and 31 did not pro-vide us with a clear answer.

Patriarchate Area

24.67% of the occupied units are owned by the private sectorwhile 68.24% are rented out.

SOLIDERE Area

16.21% of the occupied units are the ownership of the privatesector while 56.76% of them are rented out.

For more accuracy on the legal status, we highlighted the prop-erty and the rent type.

Table 7: Economic Units Legal Status

PatriarchateSOLIDERE

Ownership

946

Rent

26021

Wakf

14

Squat

10

N/A

256

Total

38137

Source: MAJAL Economic Units Survey

Figure 18: Economic units Legal Status

Map 55: Economic Units occupancy rate

20 Property belonging to religious community



Map 56: Economic Units Legal status (property type)3.1.3. Property Type

The 100 owned economic units property type is divided as follows:

25 co-ownership properties and 75 individual properties.Patriarchate Area

77.66% of the owned economic units are individual propertieswhile 22.34% are co-ownership properties. The existence ofco-ownership properties in this area could be explained by theexistence of several heirs on the same plot.

SOLIDERE Area

66.66% of the owned economic units are co-ownership proper-ties while 33.34% are individual properties.

Table 8: Economic Units Proper ty Type


Co-Ownership214

Individual732

Total946


Figure 19: Economic Units Property Type



Map 57: Economic Units Ownership3.1.4. Rent Type

The 281 rented out economic units rent type is divided as follows:

114 old law21

and 167 New Law22

Patriarchate Area

40% of the rented economic units are leased according the oldrental law while 60% of them are leased according to the newrental law.

SOLIDERE Area

33.33% of the rented economic united are leased according tothe old rental law while 66.67% of them are leased accordingto the new rental law.

Table 9: Economic Units Rent Type


Old Law

1077

New Law

15314

Total

26021


Figure 20: Economic Units Rent Type21 For units rented out before 199222 For units rented out after 1992



Map 58: Economic Units Rent Type

3.2. Economic Units Categories of Activities

3.2.1. Economic Units Functions

Zokak el Blat’s economic market is characterized by a predomi-

nant commercial function:303 Commercial Units, 43 industrial units, 54 services units, 3administrative units and 15 did not provide us with clear infor-mation about their activities.

Patriarchate Area

74.80% of the economic units are commercial; the services oc -cupy the second position with 11.54% while the industry consti-tutes 10.24% of the units.

SOLIDERE Area

48.65% of the economic units are commercial; the services oc -cupy the second position with 27.03% while the industry consti-tutes 10.82% of the units.

Table 10: Economic Units Functions


Commerce28518

Industry394

Services4410

N/A132

Admin-

istrative03

Total38137


Figure 21: Economic Units Functions



Map 59: Economic Units Functions



3.2.2. Categories of Economic Activities

Table 11: Categories of Economic Activities

Handicraft Shops

Petroleum Station

Building Materials

Carpentry & Metal Works

Food and Drink

EmbassyFurniture

Bookshop

Hardware

Health

Telecom

Restaurants

Administration

Clothing & Shoes

Printing and Editing

Travel Agencies

Insurance

Vehicles repairing

Service

Aesthetic Institute

Computer

Banking and Exchange

Entertainment

Other

N/A

Patriarchate

2315582

01743119380614

422321991144

13

SOLIDERE

00012

6100203211

500000182

2

Total

2315684

61843139412625

9223219924615


More than 20 categories of activities were identified in Zokak elBlat’s district. The most important activities are those that servedirectly local consumers. The main economic activities are:

84 Food and Beverage, 62 clothing and shoes, 46 entertain-ment, 41 Restaurants, 23 vehicles repairing, 23 handicraft andantique shops.

Patriarchate Area

We noticed in this area the predominance of proximity activi-ties such as: Food and Beverage (21.52%), Clothing and Shoes

(16.01%), small restaurants and snacks (9.97%), vehicles re-pairing (6.03%) and Beauty institutes (4.99%). Handicraft andantique shops constitute 6.03% of the economic market; Thoseshops are mainly located on the district’s fringes along SalimSalam avenue.

SOLIDERE Area

This area is characterized by the presence of large scale busi-nesses that would attract consumers from outside the area:Entertainment (21.62%), Embassies (16.21%), travel agencies(13.51%), etc.



Figure 22 : Distribution of Economic Activities in the Pa-

triarchate Area

Figure 23 : Distribution of Economic Activities in SOLI-

DERE Area

3.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

3.3.1. Economic Units Surface

When looking at the economic units surface table, we notice the pre-dominance of businesses with an area <20 m2.

In fact, 195 of the economic units have a surface <20m2, 117 unitshave a surface comprised between 20m2 and 50m2 while only 90

units have an area >50m2.However, this situation cannot be generalized in both areas of thedistrict.

Patriarchate Area

50.91% of the businesses have an area that is inferior to 20m2,29.92% have an area that is comprised between 20m2 and 50m2and 15.48% units have a surface that is superior to 50m2.

SOLIDERE Area

Unlike the Patriarchate area, 83.78% of the economic units havea surface that is above 50m2 while 8.10% have an area that iscomprised between 20m2 and 50m2. Finally, 2.7% have a surfacethat is inferior to 20 m2.

Table 12: Economic Units Surface


<20 m21941

<20 m2<S

<50 m21443

<50 m25931

N/A142

Total38137


Figure 24: Economic Units Surface



3.3.2. Economic Units State

The economic unit status varies betweenGood, Medium, Bad and Degraded.

Among 418 economic units, we couldidentify the following:

The state of 21 economic units could notbe defined because those businesseswere closed when we conducted the sur-vey. 111 units were in a good state, 159in a medium state, 95 in bad state and 32in a degraded state.

This situation does not prevail all overZokak el Blat it differs between the Patri-archate area and SOLIDERE area.

Patriarchate Area

20.47% of the economic units are in agood state, 40.68% are of medium condi-tions, and 24.93% are in bad state while10.06% are in a degraded state. Most ofthe degraded units are located within theShiite area while most of the units in badconditions are located on the western sideof Salim Salam avenue.

SOLIDERE Area

89.19% of the economic units are in goodconditions while 10.81% of the economicunits are in a medium state.


Good

7833

Medium

1554

Bad

950

N/A

210

Degraded

320

Total

38137


Figure 25: Economic Units State

Map 60: Economic Units State

Table 13: Economic Units Statet



3.4. LABOR MARKET

According to the survey conducted in 2011, Zokak el Blat’slabor market offers approximately 331 jobs spread over 325

economic units. This section provides an overview about thelabor market structure: The number of employees, the size ofbusinesses, the labor force gender distribution, confessional dis-tribution, education level, place of residence and place of birth.

3.4.1. Employment Rate

418 economic units offer 331 jobs unevenly distributed alongZokak el Blat’s district.

Patriarchate Area

316 employees work in 381 economic units. This indicates thatthe average number of employees per unit is 1.20.

SOLIDERE Area

The labor force survey results in SOLIDERE area are not ac-curate because most of the businesses were reluctant to offerinformation about the businesses’ sizes and employment rate.

Therefore, we will not interpret the survey results for SOLI-DERE’s labor market.

Table 14: Employment Rate

3.4.2. Size of Businesses

As previously said, most of the economic units are small busi-nesses. Among 418 economic units 248 employ one person, 53employ two persons, 13 employ 3 persons, etc.

Patriarchate Area

62.20% of the businesses employ one person, 13.38% provide

work for two, and 3.15% have 3 employees.This confirms that the Patriarchate area’s economic market is asmall one composed of micro and small businesses.

Table 15: Size of Businesses


Employees

31615

Nb of Units

38137



1

23711

2

512

3

121

4

61

5

10

6

10

7

00

8

10

9

00

10

10

N/A

7122


Figure 26: Employment Rate

Figure 27: Size of Businesses



3.4.3. Labor force Gender and AgeDistribution

Zokak el Blat’s economic market ensuresemployment for 331 persons. Jobs are

unevenly distributed among males andfemales: 276 males and 55 females.

The labor force age range varies between16 and 80 years.

The average age for the whole Zokak elBlat labor force is of 40.38 years.

The average age for female labor forceis 34.18 while the average age for male

labor force is 41.62 years.Patriarchate Area

In the Patriarchate area, 316 personsare employed. Jobs are distributed amongmales and females as follows: 265 malesand 51 females.

The average age for the Patriarchate la-bor force is 40.24 years.

The average age for female labor forceis 33.39 years and the average age formale labor force is 41.56 years.

16-20

21-25

26-30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

56-60

61-65

66-70

71-75

76-80

Total

Male252927203617282819141093

265

Male0020215010000

11

Male252929203818332820141093

276

Female8689674110100

51

Female00001120000004

Female8689786110100

55

Total

33353729

4526392921141193

331


Patriarchate SOLIDERE Total

Table 16: Labor Force Gender and Age Distribution

Figure 28: Labor Force Gender and Age Distribution



3.4.5. Labor Force Confessional Distribution

Zokak el Blat’s labor force confessional distribution is spreadas follows:

285 Muslims, 14 Christians, 2 Druzes and 30 persons refusedto give us information about their confession.

Patriarchate Area

87.65% of the labor force is Muslim, 2.22% are Christian and0.63% is Druze. It is worth noting that 9.50% of the surveyedemployees refused to give us information about their confession.

Table 17: Labor Force Confessional Distribution

The labor force education level could determine the labor forceskills. Among 331 employees 4 are illiterate, 68 have a primaryeducation, 71 reached the intermediate education level, 55 wenttill the secondary level and 11 chose technical education while52 reached the university education level.

Patriarchate Area

1.27% is illiterate, 20.57% went to primary school, 22.47%stopped their education at the intermediate level, 16.46% achieved

their secondary level and 3.16% chose technical education while14.24% reached the university education level. 21.84% of the sur-veyed employees refused to provide us with their education level.

3.4.6. Labor force Education Level

Table 18: Labor force Education Level

3.4.7. Labor Force Place of Residence

Table 19: Labor Force Place of Residence


Patriarchate

SOLIDERE

Total


Total

Muslim

2778

Christian

77

Druze

20

N/A

300

N/A

69170

N/A

22

426

Total

31615

Total

31615331

Total

316

15331




Figure 29: Labor Force Confessional Distribution

Figure 30: Labor force Education Level

Illiterate

404

Aramoun

10111

Primary

65368

Beirut

9010100

Intermediat

71071

SouthernSuburb

38038

Secondary

52355

MountLebanon

303

Technical

52355

Zokakel Blat

1480148

University

52355

Jbeil

303

Saida

101

Bourj

Hammoud

101



Figure 31: Labor Force Place of Residence

Map 61: Economic Units’ Workforce place of Residence

Zokak el Blat’s labor market attracts in ad-dition to local labor force residing in thearea, a workforce living outside the district.

148 persons live in Zokak el Blat while therest are distributed as follows:

11 in Aramoun, 100 in Beirut, 38 in South-

ern suburb, 3 in Mount Lebanon, 3 in Jbeil, 1in Bourj Hammoud and one in Saida.

Patriarchate area

The Patriarchate area’s workforce is dis-tributed as follows:

3.16% in Aramoun, 28.48 in Beirut,12.03% in Southern suburb, 0.95% inMount Lebanon, 46.84% in Zokak el Blat,0.95% in Jbeil, 0.32% in Saida and Bourj

Hammoud and 6.96% of the interviewedlabor force did not provide us with theirresidence address.

3.4.8. Labor Force Place of Birth

Table 20: Labor Force Place of Birth


Total

N/A

27027

Total

31615331


SouthernSuburb

303

Beirut

739

82

NorthLebanon

19120

MountLebanon

808

SouthLebanon

1492151

Armenia

101

Bekaa

224

Syria

617

Zokakel Blat

28028



Figure 32: Labor Force Place of Birth

Zokak el Blat’s labor market attracts in addition to labor force

whose place of Birth is Zokak el Blat, a workforce coming fromoutside the district.

28 persons are from Zokak el Blat while the rest are distributedas follows:

3 from Beirut’s Southern suburb, 82 from Beirut, 20 from NorthLebanon, 8 from Mount Lebanon, 151 from South Lebanon, onefrom Armenia, 4 from the Bekaa and seven from Syria.

Patriarchate area

The Patriarchate area’s workforce place of Birth is distributedas follows:

1.58% from Mount Lebanon, 47.15% from Beirut’s Southernsuburb, 23.10% from Beirut, 6.01% from North Lebanon,0.95% from Mount Lebanon, 44.62% from South Lebanon,0.32% from Armenia, 2.53% from Saida, 0.63% from theBekaa, 1.27% from Syria and 0.63% from Kurdistan; 8.86%from Zokak el Blat and 8.54% refused to provide us with infor-mation on their place of Birth.

3.5. ZOKAK EL BLAT’S MARKET CUSTOMERS

As we have already mentioned, Zokak el Blat’s economic mar-ket is small. This section highlights the price categories and thecustomers’ origin.

3.5.1. Customers’ Origin

Zokak el Blat’s economic market attracts mainly local custom-ers coming from Zokak el Blat. The district Customers’ origin is

distributed as follows:153 from Zokak el Blat’s area only, 165 from Zokak el Blat andoutside and 10 from outside Zokak el Blat. 90 units refused togive us information on their customers’ origin.

Patriarchate Area

The Patriarchate area customers’ origin is distributed as follows:

40.16% from Zokak el Blat only, 38.58% from Zokak el Blat andoutside, 2.62% from outside Zokak el Blat and 18.64% refusedto provide us with information on their customers’ origin.

Table 21: Customers’ Origin


Local

1530

Local &Outside

14718

Outside

100

N/A

7119

Total

38137


Figure 33: Customers’ Origin



Map 62: Economic Units Customers’ Origin

3.5.2. Price categories

Zokak el Blat’s economic market targetsmainly low and middle income customers.Price categories are distributed as follows:

93 are low, 227 are medium, 33 are highand 65 economic activities did not pro-vide us with any idea about their pricecategories.

Patriarchate Area

The patriarchate price categories are dis-tributed as follows:

24.14% are low, 58.52% are medium,4.98% are high and 12.36 did not giveus any idea about their price categories.


Good

921

Medium

2234

High

1914

N/A

4718

Total

38137


Figure 34: Price Categories

Table 22: Price Categories



Map 63: Economic Units Price categories



Based on the surveys’ results interpretation, the spatial analysisand the hypotheses formulated in the methodological approach, thepresent chapter represents the findings interpretation, synthesis,

recommendations and Conclusion for Zokak el Blat.

1. GENTRIFICATION

Gentrification is a term meaning the reoccupation of the towncenters by the upper classes (Brunet, 1993). We also refer togentrification as a consequence of the rehabilitation of olderneighborhoods near downtown. (Theys & Emelianoff, 2001).Moreover, the term gentrification is applicable to urban spacesthat have been abandoned for a certain period of time but,thanks to their geographical location and to their architectural

heritage, found a certain value. These spaces become acces-sible only for wealthy households.

Gentrification is one of the key concepts used to interpret andexplain urban (re)development in the late 20th and early 21stcentury, commonly referred to as the ‘neoliberal era’. In the con-text of increasing globalization, a redefinition of the urban scalehas occurred, a ‘new urbanism’ (Smith, 2002), resulting in a gen-eralization of gentrification as urban policy in the United Statesand Europe, and enormous urban growth in the Global South. Thecity of Beirut, situated at the crossroads between Europe and theMiddle East, has experienced its own variant of this new urbanism,

that was manifested in rapid changes in the built environment, anuncontrolled urban sprawl and a fast-paced demolition of (low-and middle-income) low-rise buildings to be replaced with (luxury)high-rises (see also Ross and Jamil, forthcoming).

1.1. GENTRIFICATION IN BEIRUT

Where in the literature most often renovation is mentionedas an aspect of gentrification, in Beirut the process is nearly –ifnot completely- new built (see also Ross and Jamil, forthcom-ing). It usually starts with the demolition of low-rise buildings,

whether they have been abandoned, or are inhabited by squat-ters, owners and tenants alike. Older buildings are simply notprofitable when a 20-story tower can replace them, even if theyare in good shape. The rent-gap is enormous (Smith, 1987).Moreover, these buildings have amenities corresponding to thedemands or taste of the new class (Ross and Jamil) includinghealth clubs, drivers’ rooms and landscaped gardening. Devel-opers hail from Lebanon and the Gulf region mostly and themajority of capital invested is of global origin, an indicator ofgentrification (see also Smith, 2002).

Demand for new property in Beirut is in general generatedby an upper-class consisting of Gulf residents and Lebaneseexpatriates, and to a lesser extent by highly-skilled local profes-sionals (Krijnen, 2010). They buy their properties using excessoil liquidity and capital made while working abroad (mostly in

West Africa and the Gulf Region).

Moreover, public-private partnerships as described by Smith(2002) are not occurring on a large scale; high-rises are builtmostly –if not all- as private developments. Public subsidies to

real estate developers are not taking the usual forms but doexist in a different way: the construction code has been adaptedin several ways to facilitate real estate developments. It has tobe noted, however, that public actors themselves have a vestedinterest in gentrification: they often own land. Public and pri-vate spheres are not easily separable in Lebanon (Krijnen andFawaz, 2010; Krijnen, 2010).

Gentrification in Beirut is influenced by the political situation ofthe country. In stable times, real estate prices soar, while in periodsof conflict housing becomes more affordable, although real estate

development continues as many developers count on future stabletimes to make their projects profitable (Ross and Jamil, forthcoming).

Smith (2002) signals an outward diffusion of gentrification,where the process spreads to areas outside the urban center. InBeirut, areas outside the city center are becoming more expen-sive, especially the pericentral areas that are the focus of ourstudy. It has to be noted that it is difficult to speak of a gentrifiedDowntown: the city center has not merely been gentrified; it hasbeen taken over completely by private interests.

Another observation by Smith (2002) is the sectored gener-

alization of gentrification: it spreads from housing to the spheresof recreation, production and consumption. In Beirut, this trendis visible up to a certain level: many leisure activities have be-come high-income directed and more exclusive: shopping malls,restaurants and hypermarkets.

To sum it up, gentrification involves a social, physical and eco-nomic change that manifests itself differently among differentcontexts. In every context, these changes need to be explained:where does it take place, where does it not take place, why inthose areas, who is involved, and when does it happen, when

does it not happen (Hamnett, 1991)?MAJAL proposes to use the following definition, adapted to

research in Beirut but still representing the core ideas behindthe concept:

Gentrification is a process during which high-income dwellersmove into low-income neighborhoods, economically and physi-cally displacing the original residents and economic activities.In Beirut, real estate developers move in first, acquiring anddemolishing low-rise, low-income properties and replacing themwith luxury residential skyscrapers, thus economically and physi-cally displacing low and middle-income residents. Moreover, anincrease in prices surrounding new developments lead to physi-cal and exclusionary displacement as well. Government agentssupport these developments by not acting or by enacting legis-lation in favor of high-rise development.

CHAPTER 4: SYNTHESIS



1.1.1. Gentrification in Zokak el Blat

From a land perspective, Zokak el Blat’s space is changingcontinuously. The district’s proximity to Beirut Central districtprompts many developers and investors to buying the neigh-borhood houses in order to replace them with high rise build-ings. These new development projects target new customers

with high purchasing level. The presence of aging and poorlymaintained houses that are occupied by large poor families at-test the continuous precariousness and insecurity in the neigh-borhood. The poor evicted population seeking homeownershipdoes not have the means to invest in the pericentral areas and isforced to leave Beirut’s agglomeration to exurban areas whereprices are more affordable. This phenomenon is at the origin ofa socio-spatial segmentation, favoring a concentration of thewealthiest people in the neighborhood.

The district’s degraded appeal favors a true neighborhood

speculation from developers. This gentrification process occursparticularly at the Northern neighborhood fringe along FouadChehab Avenue.

In parallel to this gentrification process, poor residents con-tinue to live in the neighborhood. However, real estate prices in theneighborhood do not correspond at all to the purchasing disad-vantaged residents of the neighborhood. In addition, the North-ern fringe saturation would favor the gentrification process spreadto other parts of the neighborhood. However, some areas of thedistrict would resist this process. Would this threaten the middle-class socio-professional categories often forced, for financial rea-

sons, to migrate to suburbs? Local and central authorities do nothave the means and a clear policy to maintain the social mix.

2. URBAN HERITAGE CONSERVATION

The studies tackling the conservation of built heritage inBeirut have almost failed to protect heritage buildings. Projectdevelopers rather prefer demolishing old buildings and housesthan preserving and renovating them in order to benefit fromthe additional exploitation ratio and optimize their return oninvestment. However, despite the weak legal and regulatory

framework and state measures to preserve the heritage, we no-ticed in Zokak el Blat the presence of an old fabric that survivedboth demolition and renovation. This section highlights the fac-tors that preserved some buildings from demolition.

2.1. PROPERTY CO-OWNERSHIP

In Zokak el Blat, old buildings are jointly the property of multi-owners. The law divides a property into 2,400 shares that aredistributed among successors. These regulations may createa very complex situation after two, three or four generationswhen the house becomes the property of a dozen or a hundredpeople. This factor can have a double effect on historic buildings.On one hand, any decision about the future use of the propertyrequires the approval of each joint owner. Moreover, the highreal estate value prevents most of the time a co-owner frombuying the rest of the shares which often generates conflicts

among heirs. On another hand, successors seek to get rid of theco-ownership by selling it to anyone who can afford the marketprice without caring about its fate.

2.2. OBSOLESCENCE OF THE OLD RENT LAW

The former Lebanese rent law, aiming at ensuring social stability

through protecting tenants, dates from the Second World War. In thislaw, owners can terminate the contract for two causes: the personaluse of the residential unit or its demolition. In both cases, the owneris assumed to compensate the tenant with an amount between 30%and 50% of the estimated value of the real estate property. If ten-ants do not agree with the amount offered in compensation, theycan initiate legal action. If the owner manages to empty the building,he generally opts for demolition because it allows him to benefit fromthe differential exploitation ratios and therefore is more efficient eco-nomically than the renovation.

Many economic and residential units in Zokak el Blat arerented out according to the old rental law. Since a great num-ber of owners cannot afford tenants’ compensations, many oldbuildings are still temporarily resisting demolition while awaitinga wealthy real estate developer to buy the property and com-pensate both the tenants and the owner.

2.3. CHANGE IN THE HERITAGE BUILDING FUNCTION

Change in the historical buildings’ function may promote theirrehabilitation and their physical conservation. However, those mea-sures would contribute to the social fabric transformation. Restored

buildings can host public institutions, non-governmental organiza-tions, research centers, museums, schools, etc. Moreover, reno-vated building can have a commercial use. Thus, some old housescould be transformed into restaurants or motels or hotels or inter-national enterprises. Although such measures were taken in otherpericentral districts such as Gemmayzeh, they were source of nui-sances for local residents. Applying such measures in Zokak el Blatshould respect the district’s unique identity and particularities.

3. FRAGMENTATION

A search for literature on urban fragmentation yielded manyarticles on gated communities, an aspect of urban fragmenta-tion. Regional differences abound, but most researchers con-tend that a gated community is a residential gated development,whether it is an apartment block or a neighborhood within a cityincluding formerly public streets (Low, 2007).

Gated communities are but one aspect of urban fragmenta-tion, as Coy (2006) argues. Studying Latin American cities, henotices that wealthy residents live their daily lives in a network ofinterconnected fragments of the city, including shopping malls,entertainment areas and business districts. In this sense, urbanfragmentation is a process of increasing socio-spatial differenti-ation. Islands of wealth pop-up in an ocean of poverty, excludingpoor citizens, while certain other informal areas become ‘no-go’for wealthier residents. Urban fragmentation hence works bothways: it creates separate spaces for rich and poor alike.



The manifestations of urban fragmentation can be found inBeirut. However, in addition to socio-spatial fragments, the cityis divided along political-sectarian lines. Hence, while many newresidential projects in Zokak el-Blat resemble gated communi-ties (they are guarded, gated and self-contained, often havingtheir own water and electricity supply), they are planted in the

middle of an urban fabric that is territorially politicized.

3.1. SIGNIFICANCE

Gated communities limit public accessibility, a socio-culturalquality of urban life (Coy, 2006). Moreover, municipalities arerequired to deal with increasing demands for infrastructure andservices by the residents of the new luxury developments. Thisrepresents a continuing strain on natural resources as well, asnoted by Gandy (2008) for the case of Mumbai where wealthyapartment blocks install illegal pumps to get extra water, or have

their own source and underground tanks, as is the case in Bei-rut, leading the irreversible saline incursion in coastal areas.

However, and most importantly in the context of Beirut, it isthe risk of civil conflict that comes with its increasing economic,social and political fragmentation. As contact between differentgroups of people diminishes and the number of people who feelleft out increases, the recurrence of civil strife is a real risk.

3.2. EXPLANATION AND CAUSES IN ZOKAK EL BLAT

While Beirut has arguably always been a fragmented city, the

sheer scale of urban change and fragmentation that we are wit-nessing today is new. Urban elites have been increasingly ex-posed to a globalized lifestyle, whether via media in Lebanon orlifestyles witnessed while working abroad. We hypothesize thatglobalization together with insecurity about Lebanon’s politicalfuture leads to increasing urban fragmentation in the city.

Urban fragmentation is very obvious in Zokak el Blat. It ismanifested through physical segmentation, political division andsocioeconomic disparities.

3.2.1. Zokak el Blat’s Spatial Division

Zokak el Blat’s space is physically fragmented by large in-frastructures: Fouad Chehab Avenue and Salim Salam Avenue.They constitute barriers preventing the connection betweenthe district’s segments. Fouad Chehab Avenue reinforces theseparation between the Northern (SOLIDERE) and the South-ern parts (Patriarchate), while Salim Salam Avenue isolates theEastern part of the Patriarchate area from the Western part.

The spatial division is enhanced by the chaotic urban devel-opment, heritage demolition and the proliferation of high risebuildings that has a negative impact on the remaining traditionalfabric. In addition, the spatial division creates, within the samearea, discontinuous fragments with heterogeneous typo-mor-phology and lost identity. The anarchy in the urban developmentproduces a big amount of residual plots and dead ends.

3.2.2. Zokak el Blat’s Political Division

Political division is reflected through territory appropriationcompetition between the different political parties. Political par-ties are fighting to take over the territory: flags, banners, lead-ers’ posters, religious events, etc. are invading Zokak el Blat.

This state reinforces social division between the different reli-gious communities and prevents communication between socialgroups. The political division affects negatively the neighbor-hood management and strengthens territorial fragmentation.

The opposition of private urbanism to public urbanism andthe lack of coordination between them promote fragmentation.

3.2.3. Zokak el Blat’s Social Division

Socioeconomic disparities reinforce the contrasts within the

district. In addition, the gap is not only huge between the Northand the South but also within the Patriarchate sector itself. In-deed, the population living on the fringes, especially on largeroad infrastructure, belongs to the upper middle class and up-per class, while the middle and the poor class share the heartof the neighborhood. The large rent gap and high profit-marginthat can be obtained by demolishing older buildings on largelots or merging lots accounts for the proliferation of high risesin ancient urban fabric. Public authorities are too weak to inter-vene, and alliances between politicians and real estate develop-ers prevent any attempts of reform.

It is worth noting that the lack of public spaces within the dis-trict reinforces the social fragmentation since it prevents contactbetween different social groups.

The political segmentation combined with the social divisionand spatial fragmentation increases the precariousness withinthe district and threatens the social cohesion.



4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Zokak el Blat’s district is the projection of a territory of con-trasts and antagonisms. It is characterized by a dislocated urbanspace. The current district is composed of two main territories:the first one suffering from the lack of planning while the second

one was subject to a particular reconstruction plan led by theprivate company SOLIDERE but not “recognized” by its inhabit-ants. Disparities are not only noticeable between the North andthe South of the district but within the same space of the Patri-archate sector.

In this regard, spatial planning in Zokak el Blat faces consid-erable challenges such as territory fragmentation, social andpolitical divide, heritage destruction, loss of identity, the limitsof traditional planning practices that mainly address the designand spatial forms and structures, lack of cooperation between

various stakeholders, deficiency at the institutional level, etc.Overcoming these constraints and difficulties require an inte-grated approach of territory management. The developmentstrategy of the area should develop synergies with the city ofBeirut and all its pericentral areas. Meet residents and usersneeds does not mean isolating Zokak el Blat from the rest of theterritory. Thus, the project must fit into an overall plan for urbandevelopment and avoid making from the neighborhood an ele-ment of spatial and social segregation.

Our recommendations are oriented toward an integrated devel-opment strategy takes into account Zokak el Blat territory priorities

and constraints. These recommendations identify tools and actionsto revitalize and reconquer the urban space, to recover its role ofsatellite district, to benefit from its proximity to Beirut downtown, toensure the integration of all social groups to community system andtherefore to revitalize Zokak el Blat district.

4.1. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The social development strategy should meet the commu-nity needs. It is based on solidarity, equity, par ticipation, fightingagainst social exclusion, improving the citizens living conditions,

etc. Achieving these targets is possible through:Introduction of a participatory approach and dialogue en-hancement

Residents’ active participation is essential for Zokak el Blatthe development process. It indeed encourages that people be-come real players in the local scene.

Thus, the introduction of participatory approach involves andmobilizes all the stakeholders, promotes equity, the integrationof all groups, and the citizenship concept while avoiding socialexclusion and a two speed growth within the same district. Theexistence of a multiplicity of actors promotes conflicts. It is ur-gent to enhance territorial dialogue between social groups in or-der to ensure the participation, the involvement and the projectappropriation by various stakeholders.

Reinforcement of the district cultural function

The social development strategy should seek the enhance-ment of the cultural function of district Zokak el Blat improvesthe lives of people and allows the opening up of the district.The cultural function development target is reached through

improving the education systems, organizing cultural events,highlighting on the figures that marked the cultural history ofZokak el Blat. Reinforcing the cultural identity promotes Zokakel Blat revitalization and gives the neighborhood a vocation thatdistinguishes it from other pericentral districts.

4.2. ECONOMIC LEVEL

The economic development strategy should revitalize theeconomic sector while capitalizing on the district’s assets to cre-ate new local jobs and enhance the district’s competitive ad-

vantages. The economic development policy should target theneighborhood poor and middle classes while promoting smalland medium enterprises. Therefore, this strategy should inte-grate vulnerable and marginalized social groups, contribute topoverty eradication and promote social equity.

The district patrimonial character combined to its culturalfunction is Zokak el Blat main asset. Capitalizing on this assetcould promote the cultural tourism within the neighborhoodand make from it a destination for tourist. Promoting culturaltourism within the district is made possible through organizingguided tours retracing the district’s heritage and cultural trails

and making from the district an outdoor museum for heritage.The enhancement of the cultural function can create jobs with-in the district and increase its attractiveness and contributeto its opening up to the rest of the city. In parallel, series ofeconomic activities related to tourism can support the devel-opment of this new district vocation, such as, restaurants, ca-fés, souvenir shops, motels, bed and breakfast, etc. Moreover,economic activities, especially in Patriarchate sector, attractmainly the district’s residents. In this regard, it is essential todiversify and improve the products supply in order to increasethe district attractiveness.

The success of the promotion of cultural tourism dependson the involvement Zokak el Blat various social groups’ mainlyvulnerable and marginalized people such as women, disabled,etc. Furthermore, the economic development strategy shouldprovide programs that aim at labor force building up skills.

It should be noted that planners must be careful that this newdistrict vocation does not interfere with the identity and soul of theneighborhood. Therefore, the development of the tourist functionrequires vigilance. Indeed, tourism can have a negative impact onheritage and social fabric and generate conflicts that are difficult tomanage. Thus, it is essential to avoid supplying products reservedfor tourists without respecting customs and traditions of the inhab-itants. In this regard, we must emphasize the authenticity of theenvironment and conserve the neighborhood initial functions as aplace of residence, work, study, entertainment, etc.



4.3. URBAN PLANNING LEVEL

Zokak el Blat urban planning strategy must ensure the rein-forcement of the neighborhood functions and identity. Indeed,the district Zokak el Blat benefits from an attractive location(near downtown Beirut, Connection to major roads) giving its

land and real estate sector an economic value. However, theabsence of an adequate legal and institutional framework cre-ates conflict between supporters of the rehabilitation of existingbuildings and property developers. In this regard, setting up anurban planning strategy for Zokak el Blat should include boththe heritage conservation and the spatial planning issues.

4.3.1. Heritage Conservation

Cultural heritage conservation requires the establishment ofan urban renewal policy. This policy involves improving heritage

buildings conditions, public spaces and the creation of publicfacilities equipment. It should ensure a mix of urban functions(economic and residential) as well as a mix of different popula-tion groups.

Heritage buildings conditions improvement

The uncontrolled urban development has resulted in theemergence of important precarious areas within Zokak el Blat.Degradation of the architectural fabric as well as the prolifera-tion of wasteland areas led to the deterioration of the urbanplanning and socio-economic conditions. To remedy this, the

public and local authorities should develop an integrated ap-proach of the heritage buildings conservation policy. This heri-tage conservation policy should set the following targets:

• Rehabilitate the existing degraded buildings while puttingin place an emergency plan for the conservation of historicbuildings;

• Respect the identity and the authenticity of the district in allits components;

• Create a cultural center for heritage conservation thatwould organize exhibitions, working sessions, animations, de-

bates, etc.;The rehabilitation of the existing built fabric should empha-size the neighborhood residential function and ensure the pres-ervation of existing social fabric. The aim of such policy is toprovide better housing conditions while allowing people to stayin their neighborhoods and prevent gentrification, the migrationof local residents and the heritage destruction.

The renovation of existing urban fabric could generate thegentrification process. This is reflected in a soaring propertyprices, massive real estate transactions and the migrationof poor and middle classes in favor of the wealthy class andthus in major segregation and a loss of social capital andidentity. To counter this phenomenon, the structure and thecomfort of housing should meet the local population needsand the urban renewal must avoid turning the neighborhoodinto a museum.

Public Spaces Conditions Improvement

Renovation of public spaces allows Zokak el Blat residents toreclaim public space. It protects users such as pedestrians andcyclists through the creation of public spaces, the enlargementof sidewalks or installing mechanisms to reduce vehicle speeds

in residential neighborhoods and schools sector.

Strategic priorities for public space conditions improvement are:

• The re-appropriation of public spaces by residents;• Benefit from the existence of residual plots in order to

transform them into green public spaces;• The safety in the development of recreational areas;• The creation and maintenance of green spaces;• The creation of spaces of conviviality all over the district

and namely at the entrances;

Public Facilities Equipment Creation

The creation of public facilities equipments plays a vital role inthe quality of life and the creation of social cohesion.

The area of Zokak el Blat is experiencing significant deficitin public facilities equipment. To this end, it is necessary tostrengthen the mesh of these equipments in accordance withthe following priorities:

• The creation of sporting facilities;

• The creation of cultural centers;• The development of childcare facilities.

4.3.2. Spatial Planning

The uncontrolled and anarchic urban development in Zokak elBlat area urges concerned authorities at both, local and nationallevels to collaborate in order to proceed to improving the districtspatial planning. This measure requires the following steps:

• Revision of the outdated master in order to reconsider the

exploitation ratios according to the territory identity and vocation;• Benefit from the district’s location in order to reconnect itwith down town and the other pericentral areas;

• Accelerate the strategic planning process and establish anobservation unit within the municipality of Beirut to monitor theurban development and collect and centralize all the databaseregarding pericentral districts;

• Allow high rise buildings in specific areas in order to pro -tect the remaining architectural patrimony within the district. Thetransfer of exploitation ratios is only allowed within the plannedareas for high rise buildings otherwise it would put the urbanfabric in danger;

• Integrate all the district fragmented sectors to the develop-ment process;

• Improve the sanitary conditions within the district andupgrade the existing infrastructure in order to respond to thepopulation growth;



• Embellish the district and remove all sectarian and politicalrepresentations

4.4. GOVERNANCE LEVEL

The development strategy for Zokak el Blat district can never

achieve its objectives without a municipal development strategy.In fact, local authority should collaborate with all concerned au-thorities in order to ensure the sustainability of Zokak el Blatrevitalization process. The success of such project requires thefollowing measures at the governance level:

• Improve the governance through reinforcing local authorities;• Enhance the coordination process between SOLIDERE and

the Patriarchate area in order to reduce the gap and create asynergy between both spaces;

• Improve the skills of local authorities’ staff in order to im-prove the urban management;

• Enhance transparency procedures, accountability to localpopulation;

• Foster foreign partnerships with other cities in order to ex-change experience and benefit from technical and financial support.

To conclude, the realization of such recommendations re-quires setting up a City Strategic planning that would lay thefoundations of the city development strategy. The city develop-ment strategy would constitute a monitoring char t since it identi-fies the goals and priorities in the city. This report is a profile ofthe district. It cannot forecast the space development tenden-cies. The second report envisaged within two years would allowus to make comparisons between both observation periods andget an overview of the district’s development dynamics.



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REFERENCES

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