united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit addendum.pdf · united states court of...

United States Court of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit No. 15-2375 and No. 15-3225

Sheldon Peters Wolfchild; et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

Erick G. Kaardal, Plaintiffs’ attorney;

Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Plaintiffs’ law firm,

Appellants,

v.

Redwood County, et al.,

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS’ ADDENDUM

Erick G. Kaardal, 229647

Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A.

150 South Fifth Street, Suite 3100

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Telephone: (612) 341-1074

Facsimile: (612) 341-1076

Email: [email protected]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs-Appellants

and Appellant Erick G. Kaardal and

Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A.

October 19, 2015

Appellate Case: 15-3277 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/20/2015 Entry ID: 4328034

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees:

Corey J. Ayling

MCGRANN & SHEA

2600 U.S. Bancorp Center

800 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, MN 55402-7035

Bradley Beisel

David Krco

BEISEL & DUNLEVY

730 Second Avenue, S. Ste. 282

Minneapolis, MN 55402

Robert George Benner

Jennifer Marie Peterson

Ken Douglas Schueler

DUNLAP & SEEGER

P.O. Box 549

Rochester, MN 55903-0000

Michelle Christensen

MURNANE & BRANDT

30 E. Seventh Street, Suite 3200

Saint Paul, MN 55101-4919

Richard Alan Duncan

Michelle Weinberg

Christiana M. Martenson

FAEGRE & BAKER

90 S. Seventh Street, Suite 2200

Minneapolis, MN 55402-3901

Allan D. Eller (pro se)

33991 Noble Avenue

Redwood Falls, MN 56283

Joseph F. Halloran

Mary Magnuson

Michael L. Murphy

Sara K. Van Norman

Jeffrey K. Holth

JACOBSON & MAGNUSON.

180 E. Fifth Street, Suite 940

Saint Paul, MN 55101

Zachary W. Peterson

RICHARDSON & WYLY

P.O. Box 1030

Aberdeen, SD 57402-0000

Nicholas Matchen

Jessica E. Schwie

JARDINE & LOGAN

8519 Eagle Point Blvd, Suite 100

Lake Elmo, MN 55042-0000


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APPELLANTS’ ADDENDUM INDEX

Memorandum of Law & Order ― GRANTING (1)sanctions; (2)

GRANTING appeal bond; and (3) DENYING judicial notice of

Lower Sioux Indian Community Corporate Charter,

dated June 9, 2015 ........................................................................................... 1

Amended Memorandum of Law & Order ― (1) DENYING stay of

sanction proceedings; (2) awarding sanctions as attorney’s fees

and costs totaling $281,906.34; and (3) requiring payment of

sanctions within 30 days of the date of order,

dated September 29, 2015 ............................................................................. 37

Property Descriptions; Lower Sioux Indian Community ........................................ 57

Taxpayer-Owner Property Information; Taxpayer No. 20829, Parcel

No. 65-016-4020, Lower Sioux Indian Community of

Minnesota, as of October 6, 2015 .................................................................. 58











UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Sheldon Peters Wolfchild et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER

Redwood County, et al., Civil No. 14‐1597 (MJD/FLN)

Defendants.

___________________________________________________________________

Erick G. Kaardal and James V.F. Dickey, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson,

P.A., Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Joseph F. Halloran, Mary B. Magnuson, Sara K. Van Norman, and Michael

L. Murphy, Jacobson, Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C., and Jacobson Law

Group, Counsel for Defendant Lower Sioux Indian Community in Minnesota.

Bradley N. Beisel and David J. Krco, Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A., Counsel for

Defendants Dennis A. Auslam and Michelle D. Auslam, Lyle Black Living Trust,

Scott A. Olafson and Kimberly A. Olafson, John H. Reynolds and Jeanne A.

Reynolds, Allen J Kokesch and Jacalyn S. Kokesch, Prouty Properties, LLC,

Thomas J. Heiling, Paul W. Schroeder and Karen J. Schroeder, John Hogan, Bruce

Robert Black, Lila L. Black, Douglas Scherer and Brenda Scherer, Charles Case,

Enid Guggisberg, et al., Marlene A. Platt Revocable Living Trust, William

Schmidt and Norma Schmidt, Simmons Valley Trust, Willard Scherer and

Eugenie Scherer, Henry G. Oʹ Neil and Judith A. Oʹ Neil, Lee H. Guggisberg

Trust, Harold Guggisberg, Julie Anna Guggisberg, George F. Schottenbauer,

Sandra Clarken, et al., Keefe Family Farm LLC, John C. Simmons and Mary J.

Simmons, Neil and Donna Berger Family [Trust], TJ & CC Properties LLC,

Sherman Acres, LLC, and Charles D. Neitzel; Robert G. Benner, Dunlap & Seeger,

P.A., Co‐Counsel for Defendant Kenneth Larsen.

1

CASE 0:14-cv-01597-MJD-FLN Document 291 Filed 06/09/15 Page 1 of 36

ADD. 1Appellate Case: 15-3277 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/20/2015 Entry ID: 4328034

Garth J. Unke and Louise A. Behrendt, Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Dodge &

Unke and Richard A. Duncan, and Michelle E. Weinberg, Faegre Baker Daniels

LLP, Counsel for Defendants Elmer C. Dahms and Barbara L. Dahms, Melvin W.

Maddock and Kerry D. Maddock, Timothy Kerkoff and Theresa J. Kerkoff, Brent

Prouty (Prouty Properties, LLC) Charles Case, Kim M. Cunningham and Mitchell

H. Unruh.

Michelle Christensen, HKM Law Group, Counsel for Defendants Janie K.

Crooks, Rockford L. Crooks, Eugene A. Engstrom, Alice Goelz, Francis Goelz,

John Goelz, John Goelz III, Nancy S. Hansen, Patrick T. Hansen, Dawn R.

Helmer, Steven R. Helmer, Cynthia Johnson, Allen J. Kokesch, Jacalyn S.

Kokesch, Kelly M. Lipinski, Amy M. Lund, Chad M. Lund, Jon Lussenhop, Larry

Lussenhop, and Michael R. Rasmussen.

Ken D. Schueler, Robert G. Benner and Jennifer M. Peterson, Dunlap &

Seeger, P.A., Counsel for Defendants Julie Anna Guggisberg, Dale R. Hanna,

Nancy Hanna, Robert D. and Lori A. Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, John C. Simmons,

and Mary J. Simmons, Lee H. Guggisberg Trust UWT, Scott A. Olafson and

Kimberly A. Olafson.

Zachary W. Peterson, Richardson, Wyly, Wise, Sauck & Hieb, LLP, and

Kevin A. Velasquez, Blethen, Gage & Krause, PLLP, Counsel for Defendant

Edward J. Gaasch.

Jessica E. Schwie and Nicholas M. Matchen, Jardine Logan and O’Brien,

PLLP, Counsel for Defendants Redwood County, Renville County, Sibley

County, Paxton Township, Sherman Township, Honner Township, Birch Cooley

Township and Moltke Township; Glen Jacobsen, Renville County, Co‐Counsel

for Defendant Renville County (“Municipal Defendants”).

_______________________________________________________________________

I. Summary of Decision

In this case, Plaintiffs seek possessory rights and damages concerning a

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twelve square mile area of land in southwestern Minnesota. In order to obtain

such relief, Plaintiffs sought to eject an Indian Tribe from reservation lands and

seventy‐five private landowners who, together with their ancestors, have

possessed the land at issue for over one hundred and fifty years.

Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal,

litigated related claims against the United States before the Court of Federal

Claims for over eleven years, which resulted in nine published opinions. A

review of those nine opinions demonstrates the breadth and depth of the issues

that were actually litigated. Those nine opinions also assist in demonstrating that

the claims asserted in this case are so completely frivolous and without a factual

or legal basis that they had to have been brought in bad faith. As will be

discussed in detail below, such conduct warrants severe sanctions against both

Plaintiffs and their counsel.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for sanctions and

order Plaintiffs and their counsel to pay Defendants their reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs. In addition, Plaintiffs shall post an appeal bond in the amount of

$200,000.

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II. Background

On May 20, 2014, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages and

possession of certain lands on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

Plaintiffs claim to be the lineal descendants of a group of Mdewakanton Sioux

who assisted white settlers during the Sioux uprising in 1862, and whose conduct

was recognized by Congress in Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863 (“1863

Act”.

[T]he Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to set apart of the public

lands, not otherwise appropriated, eighty acres in severalty to each

individual of the before‐named bands who exerted himself in rescuing the

whites from the late massacre [by] said Indians. The land so set apart . . .

shall not be aliened or devised, except by the consent of the President of

the United States, but shall be an inheritance to said Indians and their heirs

forever.

1863 Act, 12 Stat. at 654.

Plaintiffs further allege that in 1865, the Secretary used his authority under

the 1863 Act to set aside a 12 square mile reservation for the loyal Sioux, and as a

result, Plaintiffs have the right to exclusive title, occupancy and use and the right

of quiet enjoyment to such 12 square mile reservation. The named defendants in

this case are those individuals or entities that currently possess lands or hold

property rights to land within the 12 square mile reservation at issue. Plaintiffs

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allege the proposed class is believed to exceed 20,000 members.

Despite the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims accrued approximately one hundred

and fifty years ago, Plaintiffs asked the Court to eject the defendants from the

land and to award Plaintiffs’ trespass damages. In other words, Plaintiffs sought

a remedy that would result in private landowners being dispossessed of lands

and real property that they and their ancestors had owned for over a hundred

years, an Indian tribe being dispossessed of reservation lands that are held in

trust for the tribe by the United States, municipalities losing the ability to obtain

reimbursement in the form of taxes and assessments for the building of roads and

other improvements, and a church being forced to move from land that was

transferred to the Reverend Henry Whipple, Episcopal Bishop, from Andrew

Good Thunder for the sum of $1.00.

By Order dated March 5, 2015, this Court granted Defendants’ motions to

dismiss this action with prejudice. The Court found that not only did Plaintiffs

fail to assert a claim for relief, but that the action had to be dismissed for the

equitable reason that Plaintiffs had waited too long to bring an action with

respect to the property at issue. In addition, the Court found that it had no

subject matter jurisdiction to address the claims against the Lower Sioux Indian

5



Community (the “Community”) as the Community was entitled to sovereign

immunity against the claims asserted. Plaintiffs have filed a notice of appeal to

the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals1.

This matter is now before the Court on the Defendants’ motions for

sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. §

1927 and this Court’s inherent authority on the grounds that Plaintiffs and their

counsel knowingly commenced and prosecuted this frivolous action on legal

theories that are not supported by existing law or that involve a nonfrivolous

argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing law or to establish new

law.

The Defendants also move the Court to order Plaintiffs to post an appeal

bond covering the costs of the appeal itself and the potential damages to be

incurred by Defendants as a result of having the titles on their property clouded

by the pending appeal. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to take judicial

1Although a notice of appeal has been filed in this case, the Court retains jurisdiction to

assess sanctions where the issue of sanctions is not before the court of appeals. Gundacker v.

Unisys Corp., 151 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that where the issue of sanctions was not

before the court of appeals when the notice of appeal was filed, the district court properly

decided whether sanctions were appropriate); Murphy, 859 F. Supp.2d at 1019 (finding district

court retained jurisdiction to impose sanctions, as sanctions are collateral to the merits of a

claim and where issue of sanctions not before the court of appeals). Here, the motions for

sanctions are not before the Eighth Circuit, therefore this Court has jurisdiction to decide the

motions for sanctions.

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notice and the Municipal Defendant’s motion to review taxation of costs.

III. Sanctions

A. Standard

Pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when filing

a complaint, motion or other pleading, the attorney:

certifies to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief,

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to

harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically

so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . .

“If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court

determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an

appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or

is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm

must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner,

associate, or employee.” Rule 11(c)(1).

Rule 11 further provides:

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A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion

and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).

The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be

presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,

or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after

service or within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may

award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorneyʹs

fees, incurred for the motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).

In determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11(b), the Court

must determine whether a reasonable and competent attorney would believe in

the merit of the argument contained in the pleading. Murphy v. Aurora Loan

Serv., Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (D. Minn. 2012) affʹd and remanded, 518 F.

Appʹx 511 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003)).

“Arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law do not

violate Rule 11 if they are not frivolous under an objective standard.” Charland

v. Little Six, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861 (D. Minn. 2000). Rule 11 is violated,

however, “when a party invokes jurisdiction of the federal courts without

justification.” Id. at 862.

When addressing a motion for sanctions, the Court should consider the

factual basis for the filing, the legal issue of “whether a pleading is warranted by

existing law or a good faith argument for changing the law” and whether an

8



appropriate sanction exists to deter the improper conduct. Murphy, 859 F. Supp.

2d at 1020 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990)).

In addition to the sanctions available pursuant to Rule 11, this Court

possesses the inherent authority to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct during

litigation. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). “These powers

are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts

to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious

disposition of cases.” Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 37 U.S. 626, 630‐31

(1962)).

Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with

restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to

fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial

process. As we recognized in Roadway Express, outright dismissal of a

lawsuit, which we had upheld in Link, is a particularly severe sanction, yet

is within the courtʹs discretion. Consequently, the “less severe sanction” of

an assessment of attorneyʹs fees is undoubtedly within a courtʹs inherent

power as well.

Id. at 44‐45.

Pursuant to its inherent authority, the Court “may assess attorney’s fees

when a party ‘has acted in bad‐faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive

reasons.’” Id. (citation omitted).

In addition, federal law provides:

9



Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the

United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in

any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to

satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneysʹ fees reasonably

incurred because of such conduct.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1927.

B. Safe Harbor Requirements

To comply with Rule 11(c)(2), a motion for sanctions must describe the

specific conduct that violates Rule 11(b), must be served pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 5 and must not be filed with the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,

contention or denial is withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service.

With respect to the motions before it, the record demonstrates that the

Community sent a letter to Plaintiffs, shortly after this action was commenced,

detailing the Community’s position as to the frivolous nature of the claims

alleged in the Complaint, and providing notice that a motion for sanctions would

be filed if the action was not withdrawn. (Halloran Aff. Ex. 1.) Specifically, the

Community asserted that Plaintiffs’ complaint: failed to state a claim for relief;

failed to join a necessary and indispensable party; the claims were barred by res

judicata and collateral estoppel; and lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign

immunity. After filing the Amended Complaint, additional correspondence was

10



sent to Plaintiffs informing them of the Community’s position that the Amended

Complaint did not cure any of the defects previously identified. (Id. Ex. 3.)

Finally, on November 25, 2014, the Community sent Plaintiffs a copy of the

Community’s motion for sanctions. (Id. Ex. 4.) In the accompanying letter, the

Community pointed out that Plaintiffs had 21 days from the date of the letter to

withdraw the asserted claims against the Community, and that if the Amended

Complaint was not withdrawn, the Community would file the motion for

sanctions with the Court. (Id.)

By letter dated November 21, 2014, the Landowner Defendants also

notified Plaintiffs of their position that this action is wholly unfounded in law

and fact, and that if the action was not withdrawn 21 days from the date of the

letter, that they would file a motion for sanctions. (Schueler Aff., Ex. 1.)

Attached to the letter was a motion for sanctions. (Id.) In the motion, the

Defendant Landowners asserted that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous as they had

failed to join an indispensable party, Plaintiffs’ lacked standing, the claims were

time‐barred and that the 1863 Act provided no private right of action.

On February 16, 2015, the Municipal Defendants served Plaintiffs with a

motion for sanctions. (Schwie Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A [Doc. No. 241].) The 21 day safe

11



harbor period to withdraw the Amended Complaint expired on March 9, 2015.

(Id. ¶ 3.) However, the Court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed the

action before the 21 day safe harbor period expired.

Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants’ Rule 11 motions must be denied as

Defendants did not comply with the safe harbor requirements set forth in Rule

11(c)(2). It is Plaintiffs’ position that the 21 day safe harbor period does not begin

to run until the moving party serves a motion and supporting memorandum of

law upon the offending party, citing to Local Rule 7.1(c)(1). Plaintiffs argue this

position is supported by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gordon v. Unifund CCR

Partners, 345 F.3d 1028, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003).

This is an incorrect interpretation of the Gordon decision. The Eighth

Circuit did not hold in Gordon that Rule 11ʹs safe harbor provision requires that a

motion for sanctions must be served pursuant to the forum court’s local rules for

civil motion practice. In fact, there is no language in the Gordon decision

discussing the district court’s local rules. Instead, the Eighth Circuit

acknowledged the reference to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 when it held

that a motion for sanctions should be served pursuant to federal service

requirements. Id. 345 F.3d at 1029. Rule 5 does not include the filing

12



requirement that a motion be filed with a memorandum of law, nor does it

require a party to comply with local rules that govern service and filing of

documents.

The purpose of the safe harbor provision is to provide the offending party

notice of the alleged improper pleading, and the opportunity to withdraw the

challenged pleading and escape sanctions. Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir.

1998). Other courts have found that the purposes of the safe harbor provision are

met when the motion served provides notice of the grounds for Rule 11

sanctions, even though the motion does not include supporting papers such as a

memorandum of law and exhibits. See e.g., Star Mark Mgmt, Inc. v. Koon Chun

Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2012).

[W]hile motions usually are accompanied by a memorandum of law and

exhibits, the issue here is not whether Koon Chun satisfied the district

courtʹs local rules or a judgeʹs individual practices, but whether it satisfied

Rule 11ʹs safe harbor provision. Indeed, the district court accepted the

motion. Moreover, under the federal rules, a motion need only: “(A) be in

writing unless made during a hearing or trial; (B) state with particularity

the grounds for seeking the order; and (C) state the relief sought.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 7(b)(1). A “motion” can take different forms, and it is distinct from

a memorandum of law or affidavit. The drafters of the rule surely

understood this distinction when crafting the safe harbor requirement.

Id.

The Court finds that the Community and the Landowner Defendants

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complied with the safe harbor procedural requirements of Rule 11. The same is

not true with respect to the Municipal Defendants. The Municipal Defendants

did not serve its proposed Rule 11 motion until February 16, 2015; the safe harbor

period expiring on March 9, 2015. On March 5, 2015, however, the Court

dismissed the action with prejudice. Because the safe harbor requirements were

not met with respect to the Municipal Defendants’s Rule 11 motion, the

Municipal Defendants are not entitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.

The Court can nonetheless entertain the Municipal Defendants’ motion for

sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority, or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See

VanDanacker v. Main Motor Sales Co., 109 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1046 (D. Minn. 2000);

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (finding that there is “nothing in the other sanctioning

mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a

federal court may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose

attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad‐faith conduct”).

C. Merits of Sanction Motions

1. The Community’s Motion for Sanctions

The Community argues that sanctions are appropriate in this case because

Plaintiffs were well aware that there was no legal basis for filing this action

14



against any of the defendants, and in particular the Community. Prior to

commencing this action, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal of Mohrman,

Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., had been involved in related litigation before the Court

of Federal Claims (“CFC”) for over eleven years. In that action, Plaintiffs brought

claims against the United States pursuant to the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1505. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all of Plaintiffs’

claims. See Wolfchild et al. v. United States, 731 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

(Wolfchild IX) petition for cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1516 (Mar. 10, 2014).

The Plaintiffs had advanced multiple and conflicting arguments in the

prior litigation based on facts that are also at issue here. For example, one

overlapping issue was whether the Secretary of the Interior set aside and/or

conveyed 80 acres of land to the loyal Mdewakanton under the 1863 Act.

Regardless of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim in this action, the Community

asserts that the law is clear that it is immune from suit based on its inherent

sovereign authority. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Bank Potawatomia

Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Indian tribes possess “common‐law

immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Michigan v. Bay

Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014). The Community asserts that

15



many courts, including the undersigned, have recognized and reaffirmed its

sovereign status as a federally recognized Indian tribe. See, e.g., In re Whitaker,

474 B.R. 687, 690 (8th Cir. BAP 2012) (“As a federally recognized Indian tribe [the

Lower Sioux Indian Community] enjoys sovereign immunity.”); Lower Sioux

Indian Community v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 329, 335 (1963); Maxam v. Lower

Sioux Indian Community, 829 F. Supp. 277, 281 (D. Minn. 1993).

In light of this well‐settled law, the Community asserts that Plaintiffs acted

in bad faith and with reckless disregard for the law, when they asserted their

possessory land claims against the Community. The Community further argues

that any reasonably competent attorney, even after a cursory review of the law,

would have concluded that the Community was immune from this suit. Also, a

reasonably competent attorney would know that a complaint had to plead some

basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. After receiving the Community’s letter which

pointed out its sovereign status, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint that only

generally pleaded jurisdiction. By failing to provide evidence to support the

Court’s jurisdiction, and by ignoring the well‐settled doctrine of tribal immunity,

the Plaintiffs and their attorney violated Rule 11(b)(2) and (3).

Plaintiffs assert that the law is not settled as to whether the Community is

16



immune from suit. In support, Plaintiffs claim that the CFC in the previous

action analyzed the Community’s sovereign immunity claims and found no such

immunity, citing to Wolfchild v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 511, 539 (2006)

(Wolfchild IV).

Plaintiffs have again put forth an incorrect interpretation of a published

court decision. At issue in Wolfchild IV was whether the CFC could issue

summonses to the Prairie Island and Shakopee Mdewakanton Communities

under 41 U.S.C. § 114(b). Section 114(b) provides:

(b) Procedure. The United States Court of Federal Claims, on motion of

either of the parties, or on its own motion, may summon any and all

persons with legal capacity to be sued to appear as a party or parties in any

suit or proceeding of any nature whatsoever pending in said court to assert

and defend their interests, if any, in such suits or proceedings, within such

period of time prior to judgment as the United States Court of Federal

Claims shall prescribe.

In their attempt to obtain a share of the casino revenues for those casinos

operated by the Communities, the plaintiffs sought the summonses given the

Communities interests in such revenues. The government opposed the motion,

arguing that § 114(b) could not be used to bring third parties into an action. The

CFC disagreed, finding that joining the Communities was appropriate under §

114(b) because such joinder would promote judicial economy and would aid

17



resolution of the accounting that was requested because the Communities were

acting as agents for the federal government in administering the trust. The CFC

further recognized that participation by the Communities under § 114(b) was

subject to limitations, as the plaintiffs could only pursue damages against the

United States. Wolfchild IV, 72 Fed. Cl. at 535.

The government also opposed the issuance of summonses on the basis that

the Communities enjoyed sovereign immunity and were therefore not subject to

being summoned. The district court noted that tribal sovereign immunity applies

to an Indian tribal entity that is recognized by the federal government, and when

the Communities were organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,

they were not considered “tribes.” Wolfchild IV, 72 Fed. Cl. at 536. The district

court addressed a number of historical documents which seemed to indicate that

the Communities were not recognized as tribes, but also noted that in 1969, the

Communities were added to the list of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to

Receiver Services maintained by the BIA. Id. at 537. The court also recognized

that “[t]he listed entities ‘are acknowledged to have the immunities and

privileges available to other federally acknowledged Indian tribes.’” Id. (quoting

68 Fed. Reg. at 68180). The court then assumed, without deciding, that the

18



Communities possessed some sort of sovereign immunity. Id.

As applied to the motion for summonses, however, the court held that

because the Communities were acting as agents of the federal government by

controlling and administering the trust properties, they were not acting in a

sovereign capacity and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to

the summonses. Id. at 538. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the Court of

Federal Claims did not hold that the Community did not enjoy any sort of

sovereign immunity.

Plaintiffs cite to a footnote in which the district court commented on

arguments put forward by Amici that certain amendments to the Indian

Reorganization Act (“IRA”) ensured that the Communities would receive the

benefits incidental to tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 537 n.30. The district

court found such amendments vague and ambiguous, but declined to resolve the

issue based on its decision to assume without deciding that the Communities

enjoyed sovereign immunity. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ reliance on this

footnote for their position that the Community did not enjoy sovereign immunity

is disingenuous, in light of the prevailing authority to the contrary.

The Court finds that a reasonable and competent attorney would have

19



recognized that, given the well settled law that the Community was entitled to

sovereign immunity, the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over

asserted claims against the Community. Thus, by bringing this action against the

Community, the Court finds that Plaintiffs violated Rule 11(b)(1).

Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted

against the Community, the Court finds that such claims are frivolous and

without a factual or legal basis. In addition, a portion of the land at issue is

located within the Community’s reservation, and that land is held in trust for the

Community by the United States. A reasonable and competent attorney, in

particular one who had been involved in the related litigation for over eleven

years, would know that the United States held title to such land, not the

Community, and as a result, the United States was an indispensable party with

respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages and ejectment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs and their counsel acted in bad

faith and with reckless disregard for the law when it pursued this action against

the Community.

2. Landowners’ and Municipal Defendants Motion for Sanctions

Private landowner defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop,

20



Dale and Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Guggisberg, Lee

Guggisberg Trust, Scott and Kimberly Olafson and Kenneth Larsen (“Landowner

Defendants”) and the Municipal Defendants move for sanctions against Plaintiffs

and their attorneys for bringing frivolous claims against them.

In support of their motion for sanctions, the Landowner Defendants argue

that by defending against a frivolous lawsuit, they have suffered substantial

hardship. They have had to deal with the enormous stress of having a federal

lawsuit pending against them and of not knowing whether their homes and land

would be taken away. This action has also clouded titles to their land, making it

impossible to conduct any transactions involving their land. For example,

Kenneth Larsen had an easement application denied as a result of this action.

(Larsen Aff. Ex. 1.) Had the easement been granted, Larsen would have been

entitled to a payment of approximately $95,000. The Landowner Defendants

have also suffered the hardship in the form of attorneys’ fees and expenses.

The Municipal Defendants assert they suffered additional and unique

burdens in having to accommodate, comply with and adduce voluminous public

records in response to data practices requests and for their own defense.

As to the merits of the claims asserted against these defendants, in the

21



prior litigation, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ claims against the United

States grounded in the 1863 Act were without merit. Wolfchild et al. v. United

States, 101 Fed. Cl. 54, 76 (2011). The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the

1863 Act did not impose a money mandating duty upon the United States, and

that even if the Secretary had set apart the land under the Act, the claim was

untimely. Wolfchild IX, 731 F.3d at 1292‐93.

Although the claims at issue here are directed to those individuals and

entities that are in possession of the lands at issue, rather than the United States,

the claims are also without merit. First, as this Court held in its March 5, 2015

Order, there is no private right of action under the 1863 Act. But even if there

were such a right of action, it is abundantly clear that the land was sold no later

than 1895, id. at 1293, and that a reasonable and competent attorney would know

that claims raised over one hundred years later would be equitably barred.

In opposition to the motions for sanctions, Plaintiffs raise a number of

arguments including that courts are hesitant to issue sanctions in cases involving

race discrimination. Plaintiffs argue this case involves white hostility towards

Native Americans. The fact that a claim involves allegations of race

discrimination does not provide a party or counsel leave to litigate such claim in

22



bad faith, or without a legal or factual basis.

Plaintiffs also argue that sanctions are not warranted because the Court

dismissed the Amended Complaint ‐ not for failure to state a claim ‐ but upon the

affirmative defenses of sovereign immunity, no private action and laches.

Plaintiffs argue that because the Rules of Civil Procedure put the burden on

Defendants to plead affirmative defenses, the Rule 11 certification as to the

Amended Complaint is not at issue. This argument is not persuasive.

Rule 11 requires a party to consider whether any obvious affirmative

defenses bar the case. FDIC v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing

White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 682 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1069 (1991)); see also Friedler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of United States,

86 F. App’x 50, 56 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that Rule 11 imposes duty upon counsel

to research applicable statute of limitations period prior to filing complaint).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith and with

reckless disregard for the law when it pursued this action against the Defendants.

3. Appropriate Sanction

The Court must now determine the appropriate sanction. The sanction

imposed “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or

23



comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Id. The option of sanctions to

be imposed include both monetary and non‐monetary penalties, up to and

including dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Brown v. Ameriprise Fin.

Servs., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 599, 606 (D. Minn. 2011).

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 provide the following criteria

for determining whether and what kind of sanction is appropriate.

Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was

part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the

entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; whether the

person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was

intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or

expense; whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what

amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed

to deter that person from repetition in the same case, what amount is

needed to deter similar activity by other litigants.

The Defendants argue that monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs and their

counsel is warranted as their improper conduct was willful and part of a pattern

of activity that included over ten years of related litigation in the Court of Federal

Claims. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980). The previous

litigation demonstrates that this case is not the product of naivety, ignorance or

negligence, and that Plaintiffs and their attorneys acted in bad faith. The

Defendants further argue a monetary sanction is necessary to prevent similar

24



conduct in the future and to protect the due and orderly administration of justice

and maintain the authority and dignity of the courts.

Rule 11 provides that sanctions shall be limited to what is sufficient to

deter repetition of the conduct at issue. “Deterring frivolous litigation is an

important goal; it is valued highly by the judiciary and by the attorneys

practicing before it.” Charland, 112 F. Supp.2d at 867 (citation omitted). Rule 11

also provides that sanctions may include “an order directing payment to the

movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly

resulting from the violation.”

The Court finds that Plaintiffs and their counsel brought this action in bad

faith. After eleven years of unsuccessful litigation in the Court of Federal Claims,

it should have been clear that this action had no basis in fact or law. In addition,

the Court finds that in response to the motions for sanctions, Plaintiffs’ counsel

continued to engage in vexatious and wanton conduct by asserting frivolous

legal arguments and misrepresenting the law.

As the matter has been dismissed, the Court finds that a monetary sanction

in the form of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs is necessary in order to deter

Plaintiffs and their counsel from engaging in frivolous litigation in the future.

25



The Defendants shall submit to the Court, within thirty days from the date of this

Order, itemized billings statements for such fees and costs, to allow the Court to

determine an appropriate sanction.

IV. Defendants’ Motions for Appeal Bond

The Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 7, for a Court order

requiring Plaintiffs to post an appeal bond sufficient to protect Defendants from

any costs incurred because of an unsuccessful appeal. Rule 7 provides: “In a civil

case, the district court may require an appellant to file a bond or provide other

security in any form and amount necessary to ensure payment of costs on

appeal.” The term “costs” as used in this Rule include “all costs properly

awardable in an action.” In re Gen. Elec. Co. Sec. Litig. 998 F. Supp.2d 145, 151

(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)). The

district court has the discretion to determine whether to order an appellant to

post an appeal bond. Id.

As to the amount of the bond, Defendants estimate that the costs associated

with the generation and reproduction of the record, preparation of briefs and

other costs will be at least $25,000. (Schueler Aff. ¶ 2.) This estimate is

reasonable, given the fact that there are 84 named Defendants, twenty‐seven

26



attorneys and a docket that currently lists 270 docket entries. See In re Uponor,

Inc. F1807 Plumbing Fittings Prod. Liab. Litig., Civ. No. 11‐MD‐2247, 2012 WL

3984542 at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2012).

Defendants further assert that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P 38 an appeal

bond can include damages, and single or double costs to the appellees, for filing a

frivolous appeal. In re General Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 998 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (citing

Adsani, 139 F.3d at 73). Defendants assert that damages have been incurred by

certain Landowner Defendants because the titles to their land have been clouded

by this litigation. As discussed above, landowner Kenneth Larsen applied to the

Board of Water and Soil Resources for an easement on his property. The

application was denied “due to the property lying within the area being

contested under lawsuit being pursued by the decedents of the Dakota Indians.”

(Larsen Aff., Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 203].) Larsen learned that the Board had been

advised by an attorney that the title insurance would not insure the integrity of

the easement if the lawsuit was successful. The Board further informed him that

it did not want to risk spending money on an easement without the assurances of

permanency. (Id.) The easement payment Larsen would have received would

have totaled $95,308.58. (Id.) Landowner Defendant Gary Guggisberg has also

27



submitted documentation as to the costs he has incurred as a result of this

litigation. (Guggisberg Aff. ¶ 2 (noting that he had to purchase owner’s title

insurance prior to selling property, at a cost of $2,603.50).) Defendants assert that

the total amount of damages cannot be determined exactly, but that potential

damages could range from $175,000 to $1,000,000. (Schueler Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5.)

Defendants ask the Court to order Plaintiffs’ to post an appeal bond in the

amount of $200,000 to cover both costs of appeal and damages.

In determining whether an appeal bond is warranted, the Court should

consider the following factors: “(1) the appellantʹs financial ability to post a bond,

(2) the risk that the appellant would not pay appelleeʹs costs if the appeal loses,

(3) the merits of the appeal, and (4) whether the appellant has shown any bad

faith or vexatious conduct.” In re Uponor, Inc., Civ. No. 11‐MD‐2247, 2012 WL

3984542 at *2 (citing Berry v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 632 F. Supp. 2d

300, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).

The Court finds that the above factors all weigh in favor of a cost bond in

this case. Defendants point out that the Plaintiffs are financially able to post a

bond in this case, given the fact that they have already participated in twelve

years of litigation in the case before the Court of Federal Claims, and now have

28



the funds available to appeal this Court’s decision dismissing this action.

Defendants further assert they are concerned that Plaintiffs have yet to suffer any

repercussions in the form of sanctions or otherwise, arising from their frivolous

litigation, heightening the risk that Plaintiffs will not pay costs if they lose on

appeal.

In response, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Tom Smith, who,

speaking on behalf of Plaintiffs, assert that they do not have the financial ability

to post a bond in the amount of $200,000, and their ability to post a bond in any

amount is limited. (T. Smith Decl.) Smith asserts they could post a bond in the

amount of $505 which reflects costs associated with filing an appellate brief.

There are multiple plaintiffs named in the complaint. The Court thus finds

the costs of the appeal bond can be shared by the Plaintiffs “which alleviates the

financial burden and increases the ability of the [Plaintiffs] to post the bond.” In

re Uponor, Inc., 2012 WL 3984542 at *2.

Finally, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs brought this action even though

it had no basis in the fact or law. The Court dismissed the Amended Complaint

on multiple grounds, therefore the Court finds there can be little merit to

Plaintiffs’ appeal and that such appeal was brought in bad faith. The Court will

29



grant the motion for bond pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 7 in the amount of

$200,000.

V. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs move the Court to take judicial notice of the Community’s

Corporate Charter (“Charter”), attached as Exhibit A to the declaration of Erick

Kaardal. The Charter provides:

The Community, subject to any restrictions contained in the Constitution

and laws of the United States, or in the Constitution and By‐Laws of the

said community, shall have the following corporate powers, in addition to

all powers already conferred or guaranteed by its constitution and by‐laws:

* * *

(I) To sue and to be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within

the United States; but the grant or exercise of such power to sue and

to be sued shall not be deemed a consent by the Community or by the

United States to the levy of any judgment, lien or attachment upon

the property of the Community other than income or chattels

specially pledged or assigned.

Plaintiffs claim that through a chance review of the Library of Congress

records relating to the Community on April 11, 2015, they discovered the Charter.

Plaintiffs assert the above provision, in which the Community agrees “to sue and

to be sued” is a very important document and relevant to the Court’s sovereign

immunity determination. Similar charters were located for the Prairie Island

Indian Community. (Kaardal Decl, Ex. B.) Plaintiffs assert that Defendants failed

30



to disclose the Charter in their motion to dismiss. The Community has

demonstrated, however, that the Charter was not concealed from Plaintiffs, as it is

easily obtainable through an internet search.

Plaintiffs next assert that in the previous action, the court granted motions

for judicial notice for a number of documents. (See Kaardal Decl., Exs. C. D and

E.) Plaintiffs further note that in granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, this

Court considered matters of public record outside the four corners of the

Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs argue that the Court made the decision to dismiss

on an incomplete record, because a document relevant to the Court’s

determination as to sovereign immunity, the Charter, was not before it. Further, it

is Plaintiffs’ position that the Charter would have completely altered the Court’s

analysis of the issue.

The Rules of Evidence 201 provides that a court can take judicial notice of

the following:

(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not

a legislative fact.

(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court may

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:

(1) is generally known within the trial courtʹs territorial jurisdiction; or

(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) Taking Notice. The court:

31



(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or

(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is

supplied with the necessary information.

(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.

(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. On timely request, a party is entitled to be

heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to

be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the

party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.

(f) Instructing the Jury. In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to

accept the noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must

instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.

The Court will not take judicial notice of the Charter because it is clearly

subject to dispute so far as whether the “sue or be sued” provision waives the

Community’s sovereign immunity. See Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 885

(8th Cir. 2010) (finding district court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice

of a document that was subject to a reasonable dispute). Rather than support

Plaintiffs’ position, federal law allows the Community to form business

corporations, and that the formulation of such a corporation does not affect the

power of the tribe to act in a governmental capacity. United Keetoowah Bank of

Cherokee Indians v. State of Okl. ex rel. Moss, 927 F.2d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1991).

Further, the law provides that the “sue and be sued” clause in the Community’s

corporate charter does not operate as a general waiver of the its immunity from

suit. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val‐U Const. Co. of S.D., Inc., 50 F.3d 560, 563

32



(8th Cir. 1995).

VI. Motion for Review of Taxation of Costs

Following the Court’s Order dismissing this matter, the Municipal

Defendants filed their Bill of Costs with the Clerk of Court, seeking $305.25 in

printing costs for making courtesy copies of pleadings for the Court and

$37,635.40 in exemplification2 costs, incurred in procuring and preparing the

public record for use by the Court. The Clerk awarded the Municipal Defendants

their printing costs and $93.30 of their exemplification expenses. The Clerk

denied the exemplification fees to the extent they represented attorney’s fees

incurred in preparing the public record for the Court.

The Municipal Defendants now move this Court for an award of

exemplification expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) in the amount of

$37,542.50.

The Municipal Defendants argue that they are entitled to reimbursement of

all exemplification fees incurred, as they were necessary for the Court to rule on

the motions to dismiss. Such fees were incurred by attorneys reviewing the public

record of their meeting minutes for 150 years, who identified the portions relating

2Exemplification fees are defined as the “official transcript of a public record,

authenticated as a true copy for use as evidence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 692 (10th ed. 2014).

33



to the land at issue, prepared the documents to be presented to the Court as

evidence and authenticated the same as a true and correct copy of the original

public record. They argue that such fees are taxable even if incurred by attorneys.

See Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294‐95 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that

exemplification costs are reasonable out‐of‐pocket expenses normally charged to

clients by attorneys). The Municipal Defendants argue that while the professional

expenses incurred by them in collecting, organizing and otherwise amassing the

public records were borne in the form of attorney’s fees, this was solely because

the collection of records required the expertise of an attorney. See Appliance Inv.

Co. v. Western Elec. Co., 61 F.2d 752, 756‐57 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding that costs for

the preparation of drawings to simplify patents for use at trial were recoverable,

as such costs were not a mere matter of convenience and there was no claim of

bad faith or wastefulness in connection with such costs).

The Municipal Defendants note that the Clerk of Court deemed the costs

spent on a title company was taxable. Here, however, the title company’s

expertise was limited and did not include the knowledge required to properly

identify and copy the relevant documents at issue, which was an understanding

of the nature, type, manner of location of public records relating to notice, land

34



use proceedings, hearings, recordings of objections, formation of rights of way,

erection of public buildings, regulation of economy and taxation.

Plaintiffs object to the Bill of Costs submitted by the Municipal Defendants,

as they seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees, and that such fees are not

recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

The Court finds that as the Municipal Defendants are entitled to recover

their attorney’s fees as a sanction in this matter, the Court need not decide

whether the attorney’s fees sought by this motion are taxable as exemplification

fees. Accordingly, this motion will be dismissed as moot.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motions for Sanctions [Doc Nos. 200, 206 and 239] are

GRANTED. Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal, Mohrman,

Kaardal & Erickson, P.A. shall pay to the Defendants, as a sanction,

Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending this

action. Within thirty days from the date of this Order, Defendants

shall submit a detailed accounting of the attorney’s fees incurred.

Plaintiffs shall submit their objections, if any, to the amount of fees

within thirty days from the date Defendants file their accounting.

35



2. Defendants’ Motions for an Appeal Bond [Doc. Nos. 215, 223, 224,

225, 235, 247 and 252] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall post a bond,

pursuant to Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in the

amount of $200,000.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Review [Doc No. 261]

is DENIED.

4. Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Review of Taxation of Costs [Doc.

No. 283] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Date: June 9, 2015

s/ Michael J. Davis

Michael J. Davis

Chief Judge

United States District Court

36



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Sheldon Peters Wolfchild et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF

LAW & ORDER

Redwood County, et al.,

Civil No. 14‐1597 (MJD/FLN)

Defendants.

___________________________________________________________________

Erick G. Kaardal and James V.F. Dickey, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson,

P.A., Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Joseph F. Halloran, Mary B. Magnuson, and Sara K. Van Normand,

Jacobson, Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C., and Michael L. Murphy,

Jacobson Law Group, Counsel for Defendant Lower Sioux Indian Community in

Minnesota.

Bradley N. Beisel and David J. Krco, Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A., Counsel for

Defendants Dennis A. Auslam and Michelle D. Auslam, Lyle Black Living Trust,

Scott A. Olafson and Kimberly A. Olafson, John H. Reynolds and Jeanne A.

Reynolds, Allen J. Kokesch and Jacalyn S. Kokesch, Prouty Properties, LLC,

Thomas J. Heiling, Paul W. Schroeder and Karen J. Schroeder, John Hogan, Bruce

Robert Black, Lila L. Black, Douglas Scherer and Brenda Scherer, Charles Case,

Enid Guggisberg, et al., Marlene A. Platt Revocable Living Trust, William

Schmidt and Norma Schmidt, Simmons Valley Trust, Willard Scherer and

Eugenie Scherer, Henry G. Oʹ Neil and Judith A. Oʹ Neil, Lee H. Guggisberg

Trust, Harold Guggisberg, Julie Anna Guggisberg, George F. Schottenbauer,

Sandra Clarken, et al., Keefe Family Farm LLC, John C. Simmons and Mary J.

Simmons, Neil and Donna Berger Family [Trust], TJ & CC Properties LLC,

Sherman Acres, LLC, and Charles D. Neitzel; Robert G. Benner, Dunlap & Seeger,

1



P.A., Co‐Counsel for Defendant Kenneth Larsen.

Ken D. Schueler, Robert G. Benner and Jennifer M. Peterson, Dunlap &

Seeger, P.A., Counsel for Defendants Julie Anna Guggisberg, Dale R. Hanna,

Nancy Hanna, Robert D. and Lori A. Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, John C. Simmons,

and Mary J. Simmons, Lee H. Guggisberg Trust UWT, Scott A. Olafson and

Kimberly A. Olafson.

_______________________________________________________________________

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to stay the sanctions

proceedings [Doc. No. 321] and to review the submissions for attorney’s fees and

costs.

I. Background

By Order dated March 5, 2015, this Court granted Defendants’ motions to

dismiss this action with prejudice. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to assert

a claim for relief and in the alternative, that the action must be dismissed

pursuant to the equitable doctrine set forth in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian

Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202 (2005). In addition, the Court found that it had no

subject matter jurisdiction to address the claims against the Lower Sioux Indian

Community (the “Community”), as the Community was entitled to sovereign

immunity against the claims asserted. Plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from the Court’s March 5, 2015 Order.

2



Following the dismissal of this action, certain Defendants moved the Court

for sanctions on the grounds that Plaintiffs and their counsel knowingly

commenced and prosecuted this action on legal theories that are not supported

by existing fact or law, or did not involve a nonfrivolous argument for extending,

modifying or reversing existing law. By Order dated June 9, 2015, this Court

granted the Defendants’ motions for sanctions and ordered counsel to submit a

detailed accounting of the attorney’s fees incurred. Plaintiffs were provided the

opportunity to object to those submissions, and they have submitted written

objections. Plaintiffs have also filed an appeal to the Eighth Circuit from the June

9, 2015 Order. Plaintiffs now move to stay the sanctions proceeding pending

appeal.

II. Standard for Motion to Stay

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8, Plaintiffs move to stay the sanctions

proceedings pending appeal. The Court should consider the following four

factors in determining whether to issue the requested stay: “(1) whether the stay

applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)

whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether

issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

3



proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Brady v. Nat’l Football

League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.

770, 776 (1987)). The movant bears the burden of proof on all four factors. James

River Flood Control Ass’n v. Watt, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1982).

A. Analysis

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs argue they are likely to succeed on the merits on appeal based on

the same arguments that were included in their opposition to the motions to

dismiss. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the factual background of this case

and all of the arguments submitted, and again finds Plaintiffs’ arguments

without merit. The Community is immune from suit, Plaintiffs failed to state a

claim for relief and under the equitable Sherrill doctrine, Plaintiffs are not

entitled to the relief sought: ejecting defendants from land they and their

predecessors have occupied for more than one hundred years because of an

allegedly illegal act committed by the United States government. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits on

appeal.

Plaintiffs further argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of their

4



appeal of this Court’s Order granting Defendants’ motions for sanctions.

Plaintiffs again argue that the motions for sanctions was granted in error because

Defendants did not follow the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because this Court did not issue an order to

show cause as to why sanctions should not be granted pursuant to the Court’s

inherent authority or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

In its Order granting sanctions, the Court found that, with the exception of

the Municipal Defendants, the Defendants moving for sanctions had properly

followed the procedures set forth in Rule 11. The Court also held that it could

entertain the Municipal Defendant’s motions for sanctions under the Court’s

inherent authority and § 1927. Plaintiffs argue that a court cannot impose

sanctions under its inherent authority or § 1927 unless the Court first issues an

order to show cause.

The Supreme Court holds that pursuant to the court’s inherent authority,

“[l]ike other sanctions, attorneyʹs fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or

without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But in a

proper case, such sanctions are within a courtʹs powers.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v.

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). Here, the Community argued that pursuant to the

5



court’s inherent power and Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Court could impose sanctions against Plaintiffs for knowingly making legal

assertions that were contrary to settled law. (Doc. No. 208 (Memorandum of Law

in Support of Sanctions, p. 6, 8, 16‐18, 20).) The Municipal Defendants also

moved for sanctions “based on the same law that is more explicitly set forth in

the memoranda of the Tribe and the Landowners relating to their requests for

sanctions.” (Doc. No. 239 (Municipal Defendants’ Motion p. 2).) Plaintiffs and

their counsel were thus given fair notice that they could be sanctioned under the

court’s inherent authority or Rule 11. Plaintiffs were also provided the

opportunity to submit a memorandum and were provided a hearing to present

argument in opposition to the motions for sanctions.

Plaintiffs also argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal of

the sanctions Order, as Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits issues. In support,

Plaintiffs reassert arguments previously submitted. Those arguments have been

reviewed and rejected by this Court, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any

grounds upon which this Court should reconsider its prior rulings. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their

appeal of the sanctions Order.

6



2. Irreparable Injury/Substantial Harm to Nonmoving Party

Plaintiffs argue they have already been injured by the Court’s decision to

impose sanctions, which has injured their ability to prosecute their appeal by

diverting time and resources from that process. Plaintiffs further argue that had

the Court taken judicial notice of the Community’s Corporate Charter, the Court

would not have issued sanctions against Plaintiffs because the Court would have

found the Community did not have sovereign immunity. Further, Plaintiffs’

counsel assert they face irreparable injury to their reputation so long as the

sanctions order is pending.

Defendants assert that staying the sanctions proceedings will extend and

augment the substantial injury they are already experiencing, having to defend

against a frivolous lawsuit. In addition, judicial economy and efficiency support

one motion to stay the entire June 9, 2015 Order, yet Plaintiffs have chosen to

bring two separate motions to stay. Defendants ask the Court to issue sanctions,

thereby transferring jurisdiction to the Eighth Circuit.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they will be

irreparably injured absent a stay. First, Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to the

Community’s Corporate Charter are without merit. As recognized in this Court’s

7



June 9, 2015 Order, the Eighth Circuit has already held that a “sue and be sued

clause” in a Tribe’s corporate charter does not operate as a general waiver of the

Tribe’s immunity from suit. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val‐U of South Dak., Inc., 50

F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1995). Second, sanctions are designed to publically

admonish, reprimand or censure individuals who advance frivolous litigation in

bad faith, therefore harm to reputation is not a basis to stay the order. Plaintiffs

can still seek relief through their appeal of the sanctions order.

3. Public Interest

The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of denying the stay and

allowing the appeal process to proceed without further delay. See In re Uponor,

Inc., No. 11‐MD‐2247, 2012 WL 4328370, at * 3 (D. Minn. Sep. 20, 2012)

(recognizing that public interest favors swift resolution of action).

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate that a stay of the sanctions order is warranted. Accordingly, the

motion to stay will be denied.

IV. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Rule 11 (c)(4) provides:

A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to

8



deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly

situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to

pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for

effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or

all of the reasonable attorneyʹs fees and other expenses directly resulting

from the violation.

In determining what amount of monetary sanction will deter repetition of

the conduct or comparable conduct by others, courts have considered the

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended by defendants in defending a

frivolous action. See, e.g., Murphy v. Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, 859 F. Supp.2d

1016, 1023 (D. Minn. 2012).

The lodestar method is frequently used to determine a reasonable

attorneys’ fee award. Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir.

2012). This method requires the Court to multiply the reasonable amount of

hours spent on the case by a reasonable hourly amount. Id. The resulting figure

may be adjusted at the discretion of the Court after considering factors relevant

to the case, including:

the experience and ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to

perform the legal service properly, the amount involved in the case and the

results obtained, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee

customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, whether the

fee is fixed or contingent, the time limitations imposed upon the client or

by the circumstances, and the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the

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acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment

by the lawyer.

All‐Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511, 520‐21 (8th Cir. 2009).

To determine a reasonable hourly rate, the Court should consider the

prevailing rate for similar services in the community where the litigation took

place when performed by lawyers with similar skills, experience and reputation.

McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456,1458‐59 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court may

also rely on its own experience and knowledge of the prevailing market rates.

Warnock v. Archer, 397 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th 2005).

A. The Lower Sioux Indian Community

On behalf of the Community, Joseph Halloran, Shareholder with Jacobson,

Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C. (“the Firm”) submitted an affidavit with

attached exhibits setting forth the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending

this action. Halloran states the Firm has served as general counsel for the

Community for more than 30 years and has represented the Community in this

action. (Halloran Aff., ¶¶ 2, 3.)

Exhibit 2 to the Halloran Affidavit is the accounting of the attorneys’ fees

and costs incurred by the Community in defending this matter. (Id. ¶ 6.) Exhibit

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2 demonstrates that the hourly rates charged by the Firm’s attorneys in this

matter range from $175 per hour to $125 per hour. To demonstrate these rates

are reasonable, the Firm has submitted as Exhibit 1 a copy of the Laffey Matrix

for 2014‐15 which provides hourly rates for attorneys with varying years of

experience. According to this Matrix, the prevailing rate for an attorney with

more than twenty years experience is $520 per hour. Three of the attorneys

working on this case, Halloran, Mary Magnuson and Mark Anderson, have over

twenty years experience, but have billed only $175 per hour.

In addition to the Laffey Matrix, this Court relies on its own knowledge of

the prevailing hourly rates charged by attorneys in the Twin Cities area, and

finds that the hourly rates charged by counsel in this matter are substantially

lower than the prevailing market rate.

The billings statements from the Firm show total attorney’s fees of

$106,902.02, and the costs in the amount of $42,296.39, for a total amount of

$149,063.89. Plaintiffs have submitted objections to certain entries on the basis

that they appear excessive and demonstrate a lack of billing judgment. The

Court has reviewed the entries identified in Plaintiffs’ objections and finds the

entries to be reasonable.

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With respect to the costs that were billed to the Community, Plaintiffs

generally object to the fact that Defendants are seeking costs, allegedly in

contravention to the Court’s sanctions order. However, the Court’s sanctions

order specifically stated that “a monetary sanction in the form of reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs is necessary in order to deter Plaintiffs and their counsel

from engaging in frivolous litigation in the future.” (Doc. No. 291 (June 9, 2015

Order at 25).)

Plaintiffs also object that the Firm included in its accounting costs and non‐

taxable costs, such as $15,719.72 for Westlaw charges and $25,586 for expert

expenses, without providing a supporting invoice, identification of the expert

and the purpose of the expert.

The Court agrees that the Firm did not submit sufficient documentation

concerning the Westlaw charges and the expert fees, therefore such costs will not

be considered in the sanction award. Subtracting these costs results in reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs totaling $107,758.17.

B. Defendant Kenneth Larsen

On behalf of Defendant Larsen, Robert G. Benner, with Dunlap & Seeger,

P.A., submitted an affidavit with attached exhibits setting forth the attorney’s

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fees and costs incurred in defending this action. Exhibit A is a detailed billing

statement which demonstrates that the hourly rates charged are $145 per hour for

Benner, $140 per hour for associate work and $70 per hour for paralegal work.

Again, based on this Court’s knowledge of the prevailing hourly rates charged by

attorneys in the twin cities area, the Court finds that the hourly rates charged by

counsel in this matter are substantially lower than the prevailing market rate.

Dunlap & Seeger billed for 69.30 hours for a total attorney’s fee of $8,173.50. (Ex.

A p. 8.)

Plaintiffs claim that the entries are vague, excessive and unreasonable,

which demonstrates a lack of billing judgment. Plaintiffs further assert that

including fees related to the appeal are improper per se.

The Court agrees that the Eighth Circuit should determine whether fees

related to the appeal can be recovered by Defendants. Based on the Court’s

review, it appears that the total fees related to appeal are $549.50, and that

amount will not be included in the final sanction. With respect to the remaining

entries, the Court finds them to be reasonable.

Plaintiffs also object to the inclusion of costs totaling $485.11. Based on its

review, the Court finds the costs listed in Exhibit A are reasonable. Accordingly,

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the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on behalf of defendant Larsen

by Dunlap & Seeger total $8,109.11.

C. Larsen Affidavit

Defendant Kenneth Larsen has submitted an affidavit in which he states he

incurred attorney’s fees totaling $1,000 from Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A. As there is

no invoice or affidavit from Beisel & Dunlevy, P. A., the Court will not include

this amount in the final sanction.

D. Defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, Dale and

Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Anna Guggisberg,

Lee Guggisberg Trust UWT and Scott and Kimberly Olafson

On behalf of the above named Defendant Landowners, Ken Schueler, with

Dunlap & Seeger, submitted an affidavit concerning the attorney’s fees and costs

incurred in defending this matter, together with the relevant statements of

services. (Doc. No. 310.) Schueler attests that he and an associate agreed to

defend this action at the reduced rate of $160 per hour for attorneys and $100 per

hour for paralegal work. (Schueler Aff. ¶ 3.) As set forth in the attached exhibit,

the total fees are $33,096.00. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)

Plaintiffs object to entries in the statement of services as vague and

excessive, which shows a lack of billing judgment. Plaintiffs also object to those

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fees related to the appeal.

The Court has reviewed the statement of services and will deduct from the

requested attorney’s fees those fees related to the appeal of this Court’s Order

granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. Upon review, the Court also finds that

certain entries were vague to the extent that the Court could not discern whether

the hours billed related to the appeal, and those entries will be deducted as well.

Accordingly, from the requested fees, the Court will deduct $5,252.

Schueler included in his affidavit a request for fees paid to Beisel &

Dunlevy, P. A., by defendant landowners Julie Guggisberg and John Simmons.

Again, as there is no invoice or affidavit from Beisel & Dunlevy, P. A., the Court

will not include this amount in the final sanction.

Finally, with respect to costs, the Court will not include costs associated

with the appeal. The Court will include costs of $507.49 in the sanction award.

Accordingly, the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on behalf of

the above named Defendant Landowners is $28,351.49.

E. Municipal Defendants

On behalf of the Municipal Defendants, Jessica Schwie, with Jardine, Logan

and O’Brien, PLLP, has submitted an affidavit with attached Exhibit A setting

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forth the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this action. Schwie

states the hourly rates charged range from $210 per hour for partners, $190 per

hour for associates, $100 per hour for law clerks and $100 per hour for paralegals.

As set forth above, based on this Court’s knowledge of the prevailing hourly

rates charged by attorneys in the Twin Cities area, the Court finds that the hourly

rates charged by counsel in this matter are substantially lower than the prevailing

market rate.

Exhibit A to the Schwie Affidavit is the itemized billing records. The total

amount of fees billed by the Jardine, Logan and O’Brien law firm is $161,427, plus

costs of $947.57. The Municipal Defendants further seek to include the expenses

incurred by the Assistant County Attorney Glen Jacobsen. Pursuant to the

Declaration of Glen Jacobsen, he incurred fees totaling $2,550 and costs of $123.

(Jacobsen Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. B.)

Plaintiffs object to Exhibit A to the Schwie Affidavit to the extent that many

of the entries include redactions which prevent the Court from determining

whether the fees incurred were reasonable. Plaintiffs also object to the fees

related to the appeal in this matter. Finally, Plaintiffs object to the Declaration of

Glen Jacobsen, as such declaration does not provide an explanation of the work

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performed by him.

The Court will deduct those fees related to the appeal, and will also deduct

the fees incurred by Glen Jacobsen, as there is no explanation for the work

performed. As to the remaining billings, the Court finds that despite the

redactions, there is sufficient information in the billing statements to allow the

Court to make a reasonableness determination. Following the entry of judgment

on March 5, 2015, any billing entry that is unclear as to whether it is related to the

appeal will be deducted. Based on its review of the fees, the Court will deduct

$24,810 from the fee request. Accordingly, the reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs incurred on behalf of the Municipal Defendants is $137,687.57.

F. Inability to Pay Sanction

The grand total of the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs is $281,906.34.

Plaintiffs and their counsel ask the Court to further reduce the sanction award

based on their ability to pay. In support, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations

from lead counsel Erick Kaardal, and the six named Plaintiffs in order to

demonstrate an inability to pay a sanction award near the $350,000 amount

initially requested by defendants. Counsel also asks that the Court not impose

the sanction against his law firm, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A. (“MKE”),

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because such a sanction would cause significant financial harm to its business

and employees, given that MKE is a small firm with only three partners. In

addition, Kaardal asserts that no one else at MKE worked on this case, therefore

no sanction should be imposed on MKE.

Rule 11(c)(1) provides that “Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm

must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner,

associate, or employee.” There is little guidance as to what constitutes

“exceptional circumstances.” Plaintiffs cite to the decision in Rentz v. Dynasty

Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396‐97 (6th Cir. 2009) in support of their claim

that a small law firm should not be held jointly liable for a Rule 11 violation

committed by one of its members. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rentz is misplaced,

however, as the court found exceptional circumstances existed to exempt the law

firm from paying the ordered sanction because the sanctioned attorney began to

practice with the firm at issue after the case had already been pending for nine

months. Id. By contrast, in this case, Kaardal has practiced with MKE for the

entire time this matter was pending, and for the entire eleven years during which

the case was pending before the Court of Claims.

The Court also takes issue with Kaardal’s representation that he was the

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only attorney at MKE handling this case. In addition to Kaardal, attorney James

V.F. Dickey, an associate with MKE, is named as lead counsel and attorney to be

noticed in the Court’s docket. Dickey is also included in the signature block of

Plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss, (Doc. No. 185 p.

46.) and Plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motions for

sanctions. (Doc. No. 251 p. 38.)

Further, MKE did not submit any financial information to the Court,

therefore Kaardal and MKE have not met their burden of demonstrating that

MKE is unable to pay all or part of the sanction. The Court thus finds that

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist which

exempt MKE from being held jointly liable for the sanction imposed herein.

The Court has reviewed the declarations of Kaardal and the individual

Plaintiffs. It is clear that each stands in a different financial position, and some

have established that alone, he or she could not pay a large monetary sanction.

However, Plaintiffs and counsel are jointly liable for the sanction, and sharing the

burden of the sanction between them will decrease the financial burden on each

and increase the ability to pay.

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay the Sanctions Proceedings [Doc. No. 321] is

DENIED; and

2. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

Court’s inherent authority, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal

and MKE, jointly and severally, shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs as follows: $107,758.17 to the Lower Sioux Indian

Community; $8,109.11 to Defendant Kenneth Larsen; $28,351.49 to

Defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, Dale and

Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Anna Guggisberg, Lee

Guggisberg Trust UWT and Scott and Kimberly Olafson; and

$137,687.57 to the Municipal Defendants. These payments shall be

made within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Date: September 29, 2015

s/Michael J. Davis

Michael J. Davis

United States District Court

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