understanding the strategic and tactical considerations of drone strikes

7/29/2019 Understanding the Strategic and Tactical Considerations of Drone Strikes

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www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

Understanding the Strategicand actical Considerations

o Drone StrikesJoshua Foust

January 2013

In Brie:

o be eective or the long run there must be a broader strategic ramework placing drones in service o more undamental goals.

Drone strikes can only be understood by combining two dierent levelso analysis: the immediate, tactical eects, and the long-term strategicconsequences.

Tese two levels o analysis contain a mixture o data; ocusing on whatthe data say and dont say is vital or inormed debate.

From a tactical level, drones have been incredibly successul at killinghigh-level terrorist leaders everywhere theyre used.

From a strategic level, drones present long-term challenges that are notyet ully accounted or in U.S. policy decisions.

Introduction

Te United States rst used an armed drone to conduct a targeted killing on November 172001. It was a strike on a housing compound in Kabul, Aghanistan against Mohammed

Ate, an Egyptian al Qaeda militant who planned the 1998 embassy bombings in NairobiKenya, and Dar es-Salaam, anzania.1 Te Ate strike marked a sea change in how theU.S. would conceive o the use o orce: up to that point, ocials had been reluctant to use

manned aircrat to conduct strikes.2

A new era in warare had begun.

Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project
http://americansecurityproject.org/http://americansecurityproject.org/http://americansecurityproject.org/


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AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Over the next year, drones carried out two more strikes one in Eastern Aghanistan at al Qaedas ZhawKili encampment,3 and one against Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, a Yemeni member o al Qaeda who plannthe October 2000 attack on the USS Cole.4

Te U.S. military carried out the strike against Mohammed Ate; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIAcarried out the Zhawar Kili and al-Harthi strikes. Te rst barely elicited a shrug at the time it was one o

many precision air strikes by the U.S. military against al Qaeda leaders during the start o Operation EndurinFreedom. Te latter two raised some eyebrows: it wasnt the military wasnt conducting violent operations bthe CIA, and in the case o al-Harthi it was killing outside o a warzone.

In the years since, however, the U.S. government has used armeddrones or precision strikes at an increasing rate. Te CIA inparticular adopted the platorm as a reliable method or limitedstrikes against high-value targets in otherwise inaccessible places.Drone strikes expanded rom Aghanistan into neighboringPakistan, where Pakistani ocials quietly accepted their use.5 Asthe pace o drone strikes increased slowly at rst under PresidentBush and then rapidly under President Obama public debateabout lethal strikes intensied.

Yet, despite the growing public discussion about lethal dronestrikes, there remains little data to support many claims madeby critics and supporters alike. Without sound data about dronestrikes, there is no basis or evaluation. Te public needs acts tounderstand the policy.

Collecting data on drone strikes, however, is not simple. Te

program is classied to various degrees within the U.S. government:drone strikes in Pakistan, which are carried out by the CIA, areso secret the government cannot ocially acknowledge them.6 In

Yemen and Somalia, the U.S. military, through the Joint SpecialOperations Command, or JSOC, can also carry out drone strikes

which are classied dierently. When U.S. ocials discuss dronestrikes publicly,7 they are careul not to mention Pakistan; rather,they mention drone strikes elsewhere (most oten Yemen).

Dierent aspects o the program have been leaked to reporters.8 However, there is no way to conrm that the

accounts9 accurately reect the actual process by which drone strikes are decided and carried out. And becauthe U.S. government is not orthcoming about the drone strikes it carries out, researchers are let to gather much inormation as possible rom other sources. Tis severely limits any analysis o the program.

Many areas where drone strikes occur, such as the Federally Administered ribal Areas (FAA) o Pakistaare o-limits to oreigners. Additionally, most o the publicly available data about drone strikes is assemblrom government sources, either in the U.S. or in the host country, which introduces unavoidable bias

An Air Force Airman 1st Class coordinates

air cover during an operation in the Sroghar

Mountains o Aghanistan. U.S. Air Force


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reporting. As a result, there are almost no reliable data in the public about the targets and eects o dronestrikes, making rm conclusions about them extremely dicult.

Despite the undamental weaknesses o all data about drone strikes, it is possible to indirectly measure someeects they have.

Tis paper is intended to begin a new public discussion about how we can better understand the use o dronestrikes and their eects. It looks at drones rom two perspectives: the strategic level, where broad social andpolitical activity takes place, and the tactical level, where individuals experience conict and drones.

In doing so, we aim to tighten the ocus on data in the public debate both what we can know with the rightresearch and what we cannot reasonably know. Tere are some consequences o drone strikes that we can inerrom the inormation we have on hand, and there are some that we cannot reasonably iner. In discussing thisat two levels, we also demonstrate that drones are neither inherently good nor bad it is the policy to usethem that really matters.

Measuring Drone Efects: Direct versus Indirect MetricsBecause o the highly classied nature o drone programs, much o the data about them is dicult to collectdirectly. From a tactical perspective, the total number o drone strikes, casualties rom individual strikes,and other data about the intended targets o these strikes cannot be conrmed by outside researchers. At thestrategic level, the social or political eects o strikes are dicult to measure as well, since other actors externalto drone strikes can also inuence public opinion or the behavior o oreign leadership.

Nevertheless, there are indirect metrics that can indicate what eects drone strikes have. A tactical-levelindirect measure o drone strike eects is the ow o Internally Displaced People (IDP): do drone strikescreate the mass movement o civilians eeing conict? One example o an indirect strategic metric is the

political rhetoric about them over time: do drones drive anti-Americanism or political dysunction in the hostgovernment?

In an ideal world, this combination o direct and indirect metrics would create an expansive, comprehensivepicture o how eective drone strikes are in achieving counterterrorism objectives. However, because many othose metrics are not or cannot be measured, were let with a muddled, vague understanding o what eectsdrone strikes really have. For the sake o simplicity, we include both direct and indirect measurements in ourlist o metrics below.


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actical Metrics o Drone Strikes

1. otal number o strikes, by regionPut simply: the public does not know how many drone strikes the U.S. government has carried oin Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. No government involved with drones strikes the U.S., Pakista

Yemen, or Somalia has provided ocial tallies o the number o drone strikes, or even the locatiowhere the strikes occur.

Without data on the number and location o strikes researchers must rely on indirect measurementsdrone strikes, most oten inerring strike data rom ocials speaking to journalists. Relying on medreports as an indirect measure poses serious challenges to conducting a rigorous study o drone strikTe most basic problem with media reports is thatthey are unveriable. In Yemen, civilians near airstrike events tend to describe everything as a drone

regardless o the type aircrat carrying out the strikeclouding any eort to determine which strike wasthe result o drones.10 Relying on civilians to identiy

when drones are used in an air strike is problematic even in the U.S., drones are oten misidentied andspark public concern.11

Because ew claims can be veried, it is nearlyimpossible to reconcile dierent versions o strikeevents in media reports.

In Pakistan, too, strikes can be misreported. Many incidents are misreported by news agencies relyinon dierent sources within the governments o Pakistan and the U.S. (i they are reported at all)One research group suggested that the U.S. government underreports the number o drone strikes (in: it misreports drone strikes as coming rom other types o aircrat). 13 Yet U.S. military ocials hasuggested that some reported drone strikes were actually the result o manned aircrat, such as the 200strike that killed Pashtun militant Nek Muhammad.14

It is unclear why the military would be privy so such inormation, since the drones program in Pakistis run by the CIA and not the U.S. military. Regardless, outside researchers possess little capacity veriy or dispute incidents o misreporting.Pakistan may have the capacity to assist in the verication o some strikes. Military troops are on tground near certain strike zones, and might be able to assess the damage and report back who wkilled and injured. But ew military ocials ever comment on strikes, since they are coordinated by tInter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and not the Pakistani military.15

An MQ-1 Predator takes o rom Creech Air Force B

Nevada. U.S. Air Fo


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Military ocials o both the U.S. and Pakistan have a limited capacity to comment on drone strikesbecause intelligence services run the program.

While researchers can make broad guesses about how many drone strikes have occurred in anyindividual combat zone, it is important to remember that these gures are approximate at best.

Without ocial conrmation o drone strikes, determining the ull extent o the drone campaign in

any target area is dicult.

2. Casualties rom drone strikesDetermining the casualties caused by drone strikes how many people were killed or injured canhelp determine the scope and collateral damage o the campaign and thus help gauge public reaction touture strikes. But because the regions where drone strikes occur are so dangerous as to be inaccessibleto journalists and outside researchers, collecting this data on casualties is extremely dicult.

Journalists oten rely on government sources or their data on drone

casualties. Tis reliance poses serious drawbacks. Depending on theperspective o the media outlet, reports on the same strike event can varysignicantly. American media reports are likely to dier substantially romthose o Pakistani counterparts solely due to dierent national points oview, to say nothing o any one outlet willully manipulating acts orpolitical and social gain. Te vast majority o media accounts about dronestrikes are sourced rom the government, oten in the intelligence services.Tere is no way to conrm or reute the accounts in these reports.In Pakistan researchers cannot directly access drone-aected areas becausethe government denies them access.16 Without being able to directly visitthese sites, researchers are reduced to inormed guesswork about the natureand characteristics o any individual strike. While residents o the FAA canleave the area and head or other parts o Pakistan to talk with researchers,there is no way to veriy their stories, which leads to conrmation bias. 17

Without direct access to the FAA, researchers are not able to determinewhether the stories told outside o it are representative or not.Researching drones and their eects in Yemen and Somalia is dicult or similar reasons. Neither the

Yemeni nor Somali government ocially orbids oreign researchers to visit drone-aected areas, butthe poor security environment o these areas limits access.

Researchers also currently lack the means to account or injuries resulting rom drone strikes. Tecountries in question do not keep detailed records about births, deaths, or burials key data thatcould allow an analysis o the records to determine how people died.18 Te lack o data about dronecasualties severely limits any eort to understand their eects (this will be discussed urther in point5).

Members o the Pakistan milit

civilians rom multination

agencies carry an injuredto a U.S. Army UH-60 Bla

helicopter or a medical eva

in the remote Pakistani v

Rawalakot in the aerma

earthquake in 2005. U


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3. Identity o intended drone strike targets

Te identity o the targets red upon by drones is arguably one o the most contentious aspects o tdrones program. U.S. ocials have suggested that they do not always know the identity o the peopthey re upon the so-called signature strikes19 or errorist Attack Disruption Strikes (ADS).

U.S. ocials have also openly discussed the creation o a secret kill list that contains the names people they are pondering striking. Each uesday, President Obama sits down with his counterterrorissta to examine the list, and there he decides who will be killed that week. 20 More recently, Uocials have discussed making the kill list a permanent eature o counterterrorism policy and addiother options besides killing to the menu o choices they ace when deciding to take action against tnames on it (the so-called disposition matrix).21

Tis list o whom the government is targeting is highly classied revealing the names on the lcould, according to ocials, possibly reveal how they acquire inormation on terrorist groups, whi

would pose a steep risk to uture intelligence-gathering. But the lists classication presents a Catch-2

outside researchers are not privy to the list, so the identities and intended targets o drone strikcannot be conrmed.

In some high-prole cases, such as al Qaeda gureheads like Abdel Rehmal-Hussainan,22 AQAP leaders like Nadir Haider Nasser al Shaddadi,23

senior militants like Baitullah Mehsud,24 ocials will reveal who thintended target was. But naming the intended target o a drone does nalways assuage skepticism o the drone strikes. A November strike againAdnan al-Qadhi, a high prole gure in Yemeni politics long suspecto ties to al Qaeda, raised many questions among his community abo

why he was targeted.25 Yemen analyst Gregory D. Johnsen wrote thal-Qadhi was not actively plotting against the U.S. and wondered whcriteria lead to his targeted killing.26

Simply naming the targets o drone strikes may not be enough to assuapublic skepticism o the drones program.

In many cases the identity o the targets is let unclear suspected militants or operatives acommon terms used to describe drone targets.27 Tese strikes are less remarked upon in the meddiscussion about drones, but are the ocus o greater concern by several journalists and human righadvocates who argue that it is immoral or the government to kill people it cannot positively identi

Without more specicity about who the intended targets o drones are, it is impossible or outsiresearchers either to veriy or reute the U.S. governments claims to zero28 (or near zero)29 civilicasualties. Some researchers who rely on media reports have attempted to piece together a picture how many civilians are killed compared to militants. Te New America Foundation (NAF) compione set o data about civilian casualties,30 and the Bureau o Investigative Reporting (BIJ) compidierent data.31 Both dispute the others analysis.32

UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter depart rom

Combat Outpost Bari Alai north-east o

Jalalabad. U.S. Army


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Because both NAF and BIJ use unreliable sources to build their databases (like media reports),there is no way to mediate their conicting claims. Tere arent good sources o data to conrm theirdivergent assessments o alleged civilian casualties o drone strikes. No one in the public sphere isprivy to the intelligence or decision-making process that went into any single decision to launch adrone strike.

Without increased transparency rom the U.S. government about its targeting process, its targetinglists, and the intended targets o its drone strikes, it is unlikely outside researchers will be able toindependently veriy or dispute the eects o individual drone strikes.

4. Te behavior and movement o Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)In the three undeclared combat zones where drone strikes occur (Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen)civil conict has displaced large numbers o people.33 Te behavior o locals in all three countriessuggests that when locals ear or their saety, they ee the area. However, no international agency has

identied any signicant movement o displaced people rom drones themselves. Te lack o IDPscould mean that people are too besieged to leave; it could also mean that they do not view drones asa threat on par with local militants or military ground orces.In Pakistan, there are clear patterns to IDPows. In 2007, ater a tense stando, Pakistanisecurity orces stormed a radical mosque inIslamabad, killing 50 militants.34 It was a

watershed or many Islamists in Pakistan. One,Maulana Fazlullah, used the siege as a reason to

join orces with the ehrik-e aliban Pakistan(P), the Pakistani aliban then led byBaitullah Mehsud.35 Fazlullah leads a bannedPakistani Islamist undamentalist movementcalled the ehreek-e-Naaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (NSM).By the time o its alliance with the Pakistani aliban, the NSM hadraised ears among analysts as one o the most dangerous religious militantgroups in Pakistan.36 Over the next several months, the NSM occupiedlarge areas o the Swat Valley, plunging a ormer tourist haven into violence.

In response to this dramatic rise in violence, thousands o Swatis ed thearea.37

Te Pakistani military launched an oensive to clear out the Swat Valley, and by the end o 2008an estimated 250,000 Pakistani civilians had ed the ghting.38 As ghting between the Pakistanimilitary and the Pakistani aliban continued over the next year, more than a million people ed

U.S. Army soldiers and Pa

army personnel orm an honor

carrying the fags o both cou

during a transer o aut

ceremony in Muzaarabad, Pak

U.S. Air


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the area.39 Despite the many challenges o data collection in northwest Pakistan, the internationcommunity was nevertheless able to measure and report on the civilians eeing the Swat conicts.Swat is not alone in Pakistan. Just this year, even the threat o a Pakistani military oensive in

Waziristan, prompted thousands o civilians to ee the area in anticipation o the ghting.40

In contrast, there have been no reported mass movements o IDPs eeing drone strikes in Pakistan.Civilians in Yemen ollow a similar pattern o behavior. In 2011, when AQAP and its political win

Ansar al-Shariah, occupied several towns in the south o the country, civilians ed the area en masseWhen the Yemeni military orced them out a year later ater heavy ghting, residents had little return to; the area was devastated.42 In contrast, there are no known displacements o civilians rodrone strikes in the country.Somalia also adheres to this pattern: the reported IDP ows have been in response to ghting wial-Shabaab militants as well as the dire humanitarian situation in much o the country.43 Tere are n

reported movements o IDPs in reaction to drone strikes.

5. Forensic examinations o alleged drone strike victimsNo drones report published to date has included an expert who can analyze the blast eects o th

weapons drones re. Similarly, no drones report published to date has included medical experts whcould accurately diagnose the injuries attributed to drone strikes. Tough advocacy groups ansome reporters publish images and even video o disgured civilians,44 there is no way to determiconclusively i a drone actually caused those injuries.

Forensic examination o drone strike locations and purported victims is important to determine theeects these weapons have on communities, as well as to distinguish between drone strikes and otheorms o air strike.

Armed drones can re a variety o missiles, all o which have relatively small explosives on them. Tcommon MQ-1 drone can re missiles as small as the 44-pound AGM-175 Grin 45 or as big the 100-pound AGM-114 Hellre anti-tank missile. Te larger MQ-9 Reaper can carry the Hellmissile as well as the 500-pound GBU-12 Paveway laser-guided bomb and the 500-pound GBU-3

JDAM.Each o these weapons types are dierent in size and type o warhead, and thus will create diereblast patterns, explosive eects, and personal injuries when theyre used. Te Hellre, or exampcan be tted with either a metal slug that can kill a single person in place or with a small thermobar

warhead that can incinerate people while leaving a structure mostly unharmed.46 Te Hellre only habout 20 pounds o explosive, which means it wouldnt leave an enormous crater upon impact. TGrin has a warhead o only 13 pounds, which is why military and intelligence planners are interest


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in using it such a small amount o explosive promises to greatly curtail the collateral damage odrone strikes.In contrast, the Paveway and JDAM are much larger each weighs 500 pounds and would create aconsiderably larger explosion than the Grin or the Hellre. Tese weapons are not oten carried onmilitary drones, and they are almost never carried on CIA drones.47 Both types o bombs are carried

ar more oten on conventional aircrat.Tus, when assessing the damage allegedly caused by dronestrikes, understanding the type o weapon used by drones canhelp dierentiate legitimate claims to injury, and illegitimateclaims. I purported victims are claiming injuries that areinconsistent with the weapons drones re, then they shouldnot be given credence a determination only a weaponsorensics expert can make.

Groups like the United Nations Assistance Mission inAghanistan (UNAMA) possess the capacity to orensicallyinvestigate violent incidents.48 Tey even have an oce inPeshawar, Pakistan, near to the tribal areas where strikesoccur. Yet UNAMA have not been permitted to send itsexperts into the tribal areas to investigate alleged strikes.In addition, there has been no comprehensive record-keeping o burials, unerals, or other measurableconsequence o the victims o drone strikes in any country. Without this key data, it is impossible toveriy most allegations about the nature, extent, and requency o injuries and deaths resulting rom

drone strikes.Te covert nature o the drone program in Pakistan creates a dilemma or the U.S. Te Pakistanimedia (and the Pakistani government) are not similarly constrained, and have successully blamed theU.S. or injuries without properly investigating their real cause. Classication issues mean the U.S.government cannot publicly acknowledge or respond to such claims. Because the government cannotocially acknowledge that the program even exists, it cannot launch public investigations into anyclaims o collateral injury or death.

While the above tactical metrics can suggest what the immediate eects o any individual drone strike(including whether it targeted the right person) are, those measures do not indicate whether the campaignas a whole is eective or not. Tus, there must be a broader consideration o the strategic eects o thesestrikes: not just about an individual strike but about the total eects o these strikes over time. Five o thoseconsiderations are listed below.

An MQ-9 Reaper on approach or landing. U.S.


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Strategic Metrics o Drone Strikes

1. Te changing behavior o targeted groupsOne direct way to measure the eects o drone strikes is to see how drones prompt terrorist groups modiy their behaviors in response. It is reasonable to assume that as drones strike at terrorist group

those groups will modiy their behavior to try to avoid being targeted in the uture. However, tclassied nature o much reporting on the makeup and behavior o terrorist groups can limit homuch these changes can be measured.In general, drone strikes have resulted in three broad changes to terrorist group behaviors: rejectintechnology, going into hiding, and violently attacking those suspected o participating in the targetinprocess.

Pir Zubair Shah, a Pakistani journalist, recounted in a recent article how the Pakistani aliban hareacted to drone strikes: Te aliban and al Qaeda had stopped using electronic devices, they to

me. Tey would no longer gather in huge numbers, even in mosques to pray, and spent their nighoutside or saety, a lie that was wearing thin.49

Other journalists have described how the militants in Pakistahate and ear drones. Te strikes ueled a vicious paranoamong the aliban, wrote David Rohde, who was imprisonby militants or seven months in 2008. For months, oguards told us o civilians being rounded up, accused

working as American spies and hung in local markets.Reports o violently purging suspected inormants or th

drone program are routine.51

In Yemen, militants have adopted similarly brutal methods responding to suspected inormants. In one especially horriinstance in the summer o 2012, al Qaeda in the ArabiaPeninsula videotaped their crucixion o a Yemeni man onlamppost, accusing him o helping the U.S. drone campaignTey did this while eeing the town o Jaar in the ace o aonslaught by the Yemeni military that was supported by U.Sadministered drone strikes.

Other Yemeni groups have adopted complicated methods or hiding their training acilities rodrone reconnaissance. In at least one instance, Yemeni militants set up a pop-up training cam

where they drove into the desert in pickup trucks, set up some targets, red weapons at those targethen packed up and let within a matter o hours. Te idea was to set up a training session so quickthat they could avoid being targeted or a strike.53

Soldiers rom the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group

(Airborne) teach mounted inantry tactics to soldiers rom

the Malian Army in Timbuktu, Mali. U.S. Air Force


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In Somalia, drone strikes are reported to have limited al Shabaabs mobility, according to a localanalyst.54 Since the militants are araid to move around in large groups and operate openly, theirability to contest control o some areas is limited. In addition, al Shabaab militants have openlybragged o executing their own cohorts on suspicion o spying or the west.55

Academic studies are not in consensus about the overall eect drone strikes have on militant behavior.

Examining Pakistan, one study ound a strong correlation between drone strikes and a temporarydisruption in terrorist activity, specically suicide attacks involving improvised explosive devices.56 Ina comparative study between Yemen and Pakistan, however, another researcher ound that over timedrone strikes correlate with more attacks against local government orces, though in Pakistan, thenumber o militant attacks appears to have held steady.57

A third study suggests that ailed drone strikes, dened as strikes that miss their intended target,increase militancy in Pakistan, but successul strikes serve as a temporary deterrent. 58 Other studieshave suggested that drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan, do not noticeably aect the propagandaoutput o al Qaeda and associated groups, leading the researchers to question what other eects

drones may have on group dynamics.

59

aken together, these anecdotes and studies suggest some types o drone strikes are likely to temporarilydisrupt militant groups. However, they also suggest that researchers understand very little about howthese groups are coping with drones, and that groups may potentially become more violent than they

were beore the drone strikes.

2. Changes in targeted group size or recruitmentI drones are eective at degrading terrorist groups, then one can indirectly measure their eectsthrough how targeted groups react to them. Estimates o terrorist group sizes should reect theimpact o successul drone strikes. However, ocial estimates o terrorist group sizes are an imprecisescience, and reporting agencies oten have agendas or either inating or minimizing their estimatesor political purposes.In Pakistan, any estimation o the size o terrorist groups is complicated by the rich ecosystem o terrorgroups that operate there. In a 2008 testimony beore the South Asia Subcommittee o the HouseForeign Aairs Committee, Ashley ellis broke Pakistani terror groups into ve broad categories:sectarian, anti-Indian, Aghan aliban, and al Qaeda & aliates.60 O these groups, drones are knownto have targeted al Qaeda and aliated groups (the primary target o drone strikes in Pakistan), some

Aghan aliban groups (such as the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan), and possibly some

sectarian groups (such as Lashkar-e-aiba, along the border with Aghanistan).

As the pace o drone strikes increased in Pakistan in 2009, Canadian journalist Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy reported a rise in Pakistani militants recruiting children to carry out suicide attacks. 61 Otherreporting rom Pakistan suggests that militants recruit as oten rom afuent and well-educated areaso Pakistan as they do rom the tribal areas.62


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However even beore the use o drones in Pakistan, reports suggested that al Qaeda and aliatemovements already had active recruitment eorts in these same areas.63 U.S. ocials have reportthat the ow o western recruits to terror groups in Pakistan has increased, but hard numbers adicult to come by.64 Subsequent research in Pakistan suggests that other causes or recruitment, likchildhood education, also plays a strong role in radicalization and eventual recruitment.65

aken as a whole, it is dicult to single out drones as a major cause or either increasing or decreasinthe size o terrorist groups in Pakistan. oo many actors go into the decision to join one o the mandisparate groups to single out drone strikes.Other studies comparing Somalia and Yemensuggest structural actors, like ailed institutions,porous borders, and a lack o central control bythe government; all contribute substantially tothe growth o terrorist groups.66

Yemen presents an especially puzzling story.Former Ambassador Barbara Bodine says that

when she arrived in Yemen in 1997, therewas already an Al Qaeda presence.67 Despitethe 2002 drone strike in Yemen, al Qaeda didnot become a signicant presence again in thecountry until 2006, when 23 al Qaeda inmatesescaped rom prison.68 Tose escapees rebuiltal Qaeda in Yemen, eventually rebranding it

AQAP.Since then, its been dicult to get a solid grasp o how AQAP has changed. Te group grew rothe initial group o 23 escaped militants to upwards o 300 by the end o 2009. 69 By mid-2012, U.ocials believed AQAP had expanded to more than 1,000 members with connections to al Qaedleadership in Pakistan.70 Between 2009 and 2012, the U.S. dramatically increased the use o drones carry out air strikes in Yemen. Te correlation between the rise o AQAP and the rise o drone strikhas led some analysts to conclude that drones are driving AQAPs expansion,71 but such analysis ato account or the groups rise beore drone strikes began in 2010.Te data about how terrorist groups change over time in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia make

dicult to single out drones as a cause or any increases or decreases in recruitment.

A U.S. Army Sergeant trains Ethiopian National Deense For

soldiers. U.S. Air For


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3. Political and/or social efects in the host countryBased on anecdotal evidence, drone strikes seem to cause a rise in anti-American sentiment in everycountry they are used. Appearances can be deceiving, however. Te reality is that it is extremely dicultto single out drone strikes as a unique or even primary cause o anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, thepolitical and social eects o drone strikes can provide an indirect means o measuring their success.

In Pakistan, opposition to the drone strikes has become an issue o national politics, with an entirepolitical party organized around ending their use.72 In Yemen, there is a growing body o anecdotalevidence that drone strikes are driving anti-Americanism and opposition to the central government.73More broadly, airstrikes in Aghanistan some o which come rom drones have stirred protestsrom both the government and rom the population.74

However, these anecdotes are not conclusive about the negative eects o lethal drone strikes.

In Pakistan, people protest a variety o U.S. policies

they dislike, including the war in Aghanistan.75

Ondrones in particular, Pakistanis express a mixture oopinions. Sometimes, shocking incidents like theRaymond Davis incident can galvanize public reaction.In January o 2011, the Pakistani police caught

American Raymond Davis ater he killed twoassailants in Lahore, Pakistan. Te U.S. insisted he hadbeen granted diplomatic immunity, which Pakistanrejected. News o his arrest quickly spread along withpublic disagreements rom both governments over hisdiplomatic status.

Pakistani ocials began to leak sensitive inormationabout his employment, alleging that he was anoperative o the CIA76 collecting targeting inormationon local terrorist groups or eventual drone strikes.77

Te revelations about Davis employment sparked public outcry78 and resulted in anti-American riotsater his release rom Pakistani custody: many Pakistanis expressed outrage not only that he wasnttried or killing two men, but that he was collecting drone intelligence in the rst place.79

In contrast, reports rom the tribal areas also suggest there is some guarded support rom the peoplewho live there, who seem to preer the drone strikes over other alternatives like conventional militarycampaigns.80 Te contrast between the two views urban Pakistanis in the Punjab seem to hatedrones, while rural Pakistanis in the tribal areas seem to guardedly support them suggests a morecomplicated view o Pakistani reactions to the strikes than a simple pro- or anti-American narrative.

A U.S. Navy chaplain consults with local nun over U

provided donations to a Catholic school in Djibouti. U.S

F


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Yemen presents a similarly muddled case. When journalists have gained limited access to dronaected areas o the country, they have reported deep anger at the government in Sanaa as well the United States.81 Yet other researchers interviewing community elders rom non-urban areas repothe opposite: those communities seem to guardedly support drone strikes as a least-bad option countering al Qaeda groups.82 Both stories could conceivably be right, but without urther data, itdicult to say conclusively what can be drawn rom either account there just arent enough data

denitively identiy drones as the cause o anti-Americanism absent other actors (such as U.S. suppoor the Yemeni government).

Yemen aces many more political challenges than the challenge o countering AQAP. Te Houtrebellion in the north and the Southern secessionist movement in the south both pose substantchallenges to the central government. 2012 saw a historic change o power, when Ali Abdullah Saleabdicated the presidency and Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi replaced him.83 But Hadi has aced tsame restive population, unresolved political challenges, and threat rom AQAP that his predecessdid84. It is dicult to say that drone strikes have improved or hurt his standing or the ecacy o hgovernment.

4. Te enablement o local government orcesOutside o declared combat zones, drones are most oten employed as the last resort option or strikinterrorists. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, drones are used or lethal strikes because there arenalways suitable alternatives to accomplishing some counterterrorism goals. However, the data shothat drones dont have permanent eects local orces are needed to build any long lasting outcomrom drone strikes. Te way drone strikes enable local orces to accomplish counterterrorism goals isdirect measure o their eectiveness.Local orces does not necessarily mean the national army. In many disconnected periphercommunities in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, a national orce might be seen as an outside occupiand inspire resentment. Local representatives o the government, however, represent a theoreticsolution to the problem: they are still responsible to the capital, but come rom local areas and th

would be more responsive to local concerns.Creating a local orce is not easy, however, and the history o trying to (especially boutsiders, like in Aghanistan) is raught with challenges and ailure. Even so, local orcare the only easible way to build upon the political and security space drone strikes provid

In Pakistan, data suggest drone strikes have a temporary eect on militancy and violence but ma

actually lead to more violence over time (see point #1 above). Even so, i local orces could movinto drone strike areas, then the longer term increases in violence could, conceivably, be thwarte

In general, Pakistan presents a unique case or drone use. Drone strikes take place in the tribal areo the northwest, a legal wasteland that oers no means or law enorcement except or collectipunishment. For decades, residents o the tribal areas could not vote. When Islamabad granted the


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the right to vote in 1996, political parties were still orbidden in the area, so politicians could notbuild bases o support to run or oce. In the vacuum that resulted, Islamists build support throughmosques and madrassas and displaced civic and tribal leadership.85

Te residents o the tribal areas do not have normal politicalrights, and the Pakistani state does not exercise normal

sovereignty over the area. So there are no real local orcesto build upon the space that drones provide. Te Pakistani

Army is not suited to be a local orce: drones strike inpredominantly Pashtun areas, and the army is not mostlyPashtun. While ethnicity is not always destiny, surveys suggestthat locals do not nd the Pakistani Army very trustworthy.86

Additionally, news o Pakistani Army oensives tends tocreate thousands o IDPs eeing the area, suggesting thatthey are not an appropriate choice or lling the gap letby drone strikes. Given the tribal areas complicated history

with central control, its unclear what could, conceivably, bea viable replacement.

In other words, drones in Pakistan are, at best, a temporarytactic or managing part o the terror problem; there is noviable replacement that oers a better long-term outcome

just yet.

Yemen presents a dierent case. Tere, drones have been used in a ar more restrained ashion thanin Pakistan and have enjoyed open support by the government. More important, Yemen does nothave territories that are legally separate rom the rest o the country, the way Pakistans tribal areas are.

In mid-2011, AQAP occupied several towns in the southern province o Abyan. Zinjibar, the provincialcapital, and Jaar, a smaller city, were occupied by AQAPs political ront organization called Ansaral-Shariah.87 A year later, the new Hadi government launched a massive operation to clear Ansar al-Shariah out o the area. U.S. drones joined U.S. and Yemeni aircrat to bombard AQAP emplacementsand chase them out o town.88

Yemen did not only use air strikes, however. Ground troops managed to seize control o both Jaar89and Zinjibar.90 Tose ground orces had extensive help rom local orces (such as popular committees,many o which were composed o tribal leaders). It remains unclear whether this victory is meaningul

or the long run there are reports o AQAP ghters simply hiding to avoid reprisal by U.S. andYemeni orces91 but it did represent an important shit rom how drone strikes are used in Pakistan.Using local orces to ll in the gaps rom drone strikes is an important component to making anycampaign eective.Drones have played an even smaller role in Somalia than in Yemen. Tere are no data to suggest thattheyve played a decisive role in Somali and Arican Union orces establishing control o Mogadishu

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Michael Callan visits

graduating Senegalese inantry trainees. U.S. Air Force


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over the last year.

While drones can be eective at temporarily managing a terrorist challenge, the data are clear that a bare minimum, actual territory must be controlled by ground orces. Otherwise, any benet or edthat drone strikes might give vanishes and the targeted militants simply return to committing violenc

5. End State ConsiderationsUltimately, the question that must be answered when evaluating drone strikes is what is the end stateDrones have some discrete and measurable eects, but what purpose are the strikes meant to serve?Te stated U.S. policy is to destroy, degrade, and deeat al Qaeda. But determining what that looks liis no simple task. While drones can be eective at destroying parts o al Qaeda and thus degrading icapacity to launch attacks, they are also insucient on their own or accomplishing the broader goao U.S. counterterrorism policy.Most academic studies agree that targeted killing conducted by armed drones may be eective

part o a broader strategy.92

Drones, however, have limits. Where drone strikes are ound to havemeasurable eect, it tends to be temporary. Successul strikes correlate in some circumstances withtemporary reduction in the incidence and intensity o terrorist violence, 93 but may also correlate wilong-term increases in retaliatory attacks against local government and persistent instability.94 Tsuggests that while drones can manage the terrorist problem or a short time, they are not necessaricontributing to a long term reduction o the threat.

Te long term reduction o threat is absent in most discussions o the drone program. Drones hakilled many al Qaeda terrorists, but the threat appears to be migrating elsewhere and taking on neorms.95 So what is that end state drones are meant to accomplish, and can we measure whether th

end state is being reached?Tis is where understanding the dierence between strategic and tactical eects matters greatlParadoxically, the strikes are easier to measure and understand strategically than they are tacticallthe broad, social eects that accompany their use are plainly visible, but the minute details o anindividual strike (or even series o strikes) are dicult to determine. Strategic eects cannot bconstructed meaningully by aggregating the many poorly-reported tactical eects in the media anin various drone databases. Rather, developing a global perspective matters: are drones making thproblem o terrorism worse, or not?

From a tactical perspective, drones have been a stunning success by most measures. Tey kill dozens

al Qaeda-linked terrorists and put no Americans at risk in the process. Tere are many indications thnon-combatant civilians have also been killed in these strikes, but ew policymakers think the numbeare high enough to justiy a major rethink o the program.From a strategic perspective, however, the eects o the drone strikes are less clear. Its true that loo terrorists have been killed and the capacity or al Qaeda and its branches to directly attack th


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US has been curtailed. But that success has come at a steep price. Te strikes have poisoned thebilateral relationship with Pakistan even though the government privately consents to strikes, itspublic statements have used them to deect criticism onto the United States. Pakistan is hardly moresecure now than when drone strikes began in 2004, and militants have recently begun attackingPakistans nuclear weapons acilities.96 As a consequence, anti-Americanism is higher than ever whilethe Pakistani government is as dysunctional as ever.

In Yemen, too, drone strikes have killed many leaders o AQAP while also driving anti-Americanismand possibly aiding in militant recruitment. In Yemen a narrow view suggests drone strikes have beenstunningly eective: a drone strike has killed AQAP gures and contributed to a successul Yemenioensive to retake towns that had been occupied by AQAP. But the vast majority o reporting suggeststhat these same strikes also drive Yemenis to embrace al Qaeda.97 Drones are a minority o other U.S.spending in the country,98 and its ar rom clear that that spending is eective at the broader U.S.goals o promoting stability and the rule o law.99

Tis suggests that many studies about drones that ocus only on

casualties and strikes miss the larger eects and consequences olethal drones. Te ew studies that do try to account or larger socialand political eects o drone strikes ocus only on Pakistan and arelimited by selection bias issues.100 Partly, this is a result o the poorquality o available data. But partly, it is also because o the narrowscope o such research.

As its currently constructed, drone strikes are a narrow solution to anarrowly dened problem; they do not address the larger, systemicand structural issues that create environments welcoming to terrorists.Te mission o policymakers responsible or the drone strikes is tomake those strikes as eective as possible or killing terrorist leaders

while minimizing blowback, including rom civilian casualties; theyare not charged with saeguarding the long-term political or socialhealth o the countries where strikes occur.

Tis conclusion suggests a change in ocus is needed to make drone strikes more eective. Tey needto be considered beyond the narrow issue o how many they kill and instead viewed rom a broaderperspective. Tough U.S. ocials always insist in public statements that they are ocused on a broaderstrategy,101 the programs in place do not always eect such a consideration. While the amount o overtaid to Yemen has been almost evenly split between civilian and military/counterterrorism programs

(the U.S. has also sent an unknown amount o covert aid to the Yemeni government), the last threeyears have seen the rapid growth o an entrenched al Qaeda group, the collapse o the previous regime,and the growth o widespread anti-Americanism. 102

Te aims might be broader than the simple elimination o terrorists, but the policies enacting thecurrent strategy are not achieving those aims. Developing ideas and considerations or that strategy

will be covered in the next essay in this series.

U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter

landing in Somalia. U.S. Department o Deense


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Where to Go

Policymakers now ace a critical choice: how will drones be used in the uture? Many questions remain abothe current use o drones or striking at terrorists. Tey should be addressed beore the program is expandeto new areas o conict.

For starters, the U.S. government needs to provide better data about how and why it conducts drone strikes bolster public condence in the program. While the openness with which ocials have discussed the highclassied program is noteworthy, such talk has not provided data to substantiate the broad claims ociahave made such as extraordinarily low civilian casualties.103 Te scattered reporting about drone strikdisputes many o these claims. Ocial openness about drone strikes would enhance the public debate anbuild support or the program.However, increased government transparency is not a simple prospect. Te dierent organizations that operadrones do so under dierent parts o U.S. law. Te CIAs activities take place under one section o nationsecurity law (itle 50), while the military unctions under another (itle 10).104 Additionally, most o the dron

strikes in Yemen and Somalia are considered clandestine, which means theyre secret but the government caocially acknowledge. Drone strikes in Pakistan, on the other hand, are covert, which means the governmecannot even acknowledge their existence.

In addition, each organization has dramatically dierent reporting requirements the CIA reports tosmall group o cleared ocials in the administration and Congress, while the military has broader reportinrequirements throughout its chain o command. Resolving the dierent legal authorizations or drone strikeand uniying reporting requirements, is a vital step toward getting government data about drone strikes.

Drone strikes will be most eective i combined with broader policies to handle their many eects. Developin

those policies will be the subject o uture research at ASP.

Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project

.


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Further Reading:

PAPER: Te Strategic Context o Lethal Drones

Te US and its UAVs: Te Financial Cost versus Strategic Value o Drones

FAC SHEE: Fact Sheet U.S.C. itle 10, itle 22, and itle 50

FAC SHEE: Contextualizing the Drones Debate

Annotated Drones Bibliography

FAC SHEE: Yemen

FAC SHEE: Mali

Endnotes

1. Khaled Dawoud, Mohammed Ate, Te Guardian, 18 November 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituar-ies.aghanistan

2. Richard Clarke, Give drones a medal, New York Daily News, 02 December 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/give-drones-medal-article-1.1211249

3. Ann Scott yson, Does bin Laden matter anymore? Te Christian Science Monitor, 01 March 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0301/p01s02-usmi.html

4. ony Karon, Yemen Strike Opens New Chapter in War on error, ime, 05 November 2002, http://www.time.com/time/world/ar-ticle/0,8599,387571,00.html

5. Peter Bergen and Katherine iedmann. Washingtons Phantom War. Foreign Aairs. July/August 2011. http://www.oreignaairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-war

6. According to an o-the-record interview with a senior U.S. ocial involved in the drones program in Pakistan.

7. John Brennan, Te Ethics and Ecacy o the Presidents Counterterrorism Strategy, Te Woodrow Wilson International Center orScholars, 30 April 2012, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-ecacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy

8. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a est o Obamas Principles and Will, Te New York imes, 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all

9. Greg Miller, Plan or hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists, Te Washington Post, 23 October 2012,http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-or-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408be6a4b_story.html

10. According to an o-the-record discussion on 7 November 2012 with a journalist based in Yemen who covers drone strikes.

11. John Henrehan, Military drone mistaken or UFO along DC highways, Fox 5, 14 June 2012, http://www.myoxdc.com/sto-ry/18785637/beltway-uo-said-to-be-military-drone-aircrat#axzz2FPvIo4JL

12. Joshua Foust, Phantom Militias, Te Columbia Journalism Review, 3 November 2008, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/phan-
http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-strategic-context-of-lethal-drones-a-framework-for-discussion/http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-the-financial-cost-versus-strategic-value-of-drones/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-u-s-c-title-10-title-22-and-title-50/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-contextualizing-the-drones-debate/http://americansecurityproject.org/issues/asymmetric-operations/the-strategic-effects-of-a-lethal-drones-policy/drone-information-sources-annotated-bibliography/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-yemen/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/mali-timeline-and-factsheet/http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistanhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistanhttp://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/give-drones-medal-article-1.1211249http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/give-drones-medal-article-1.1211249http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0301/p01s02-usmi.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0301/p01s02-usmi.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,387571,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,387571,00.htmlhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-warhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-warhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategyhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.htmlhttp://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/phantom_militias.phphttp://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/phantom_militias.phphttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategyhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-warhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-warhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,387571,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,387571,00.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0301/p01s02-usmi.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0301/p01s02-usmi.htmlhttp://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/give-drones-medal-article-1.1211249http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/give-drones-medal-article-1.1211249http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistanhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistanhttp://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/mali-timeline-and-factsheet/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-yemen/http://americansecurityproject.org/issues/asymmetric-operations/the-strategic-effects-of-a-lethal-drones-policy/drone-information-sources-annotated-bibliography/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-contextualizing-the-drones-debate/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/fact-sheet-u-s-c-title-10-title-22-and-title-50/http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-the-financial-cost-versus-strategic-value-of-drones/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-strategic-context-of-lethal-drones-a-framework-for-discussion/


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tom_militias.php

13. International Human Rights and Conict Resolution Clinic, Stanord University and Global Justice Clinic, New York University School Law, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and rauma to Civilians rom US Drone Practices in Pakistan, September 2012, http://livinguderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanord-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pd, pp. 32-35

14. According to an o-the-record interview with a senior U.S. military ocial who was involved in the drones program in Pakistan, the 200drone strike that killed Nek Muhammed in South Waziristan was actually a missile strike by an F-16 ghter jet. Te author was unable toconrm or reute the claim.

15. Pir Zubair Shah, My Drone War, Foreign Policy, March/April 2012, http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/my_drone_war?page=ull

16. Daily imes, Ministry issues guidelines or oreigners visiting Peshawar, FAA, 25 June 2012, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/deault.aspage=2012%5C06%5C25%5Cstory_25-6-2012_pg7_18

17. Reporting rom advocacy groups in particular all prey to this orm o bias: in seeking out only aggrieved victims o drone strikes, they ex-clude potential access to both victims and non-victims who dont share that view.

18. For details, see the remarks o C. Christine Fair at the ASP Event, U.S. Drones Policy: Strategic Frameworks and Measuring Eects, 20August 2012, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/event-review-u-s-drones-policy-strategic-rameworks-and-measuring-eects/

19. Greg Miller, CIA seeks new authority to expand Yemen drone campaign, Washington Post, 18 April 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/18/gIQAsaumR_story.html?hpid=z1

20. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a est o Obamas Principles and Will, Te New York imes, 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all

21. Greg Miller, Plan or hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists, Washington Post, 23 October 2012, httpwww.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-or-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/20120/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408be6a4b_story.html

22. Ismail Khan, U.S. Drone Strike Kills a Commander or Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Te New York imes, 9 December 2012, http://www.ny-times.com/2012/12/10/world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-a-senior-al-qaeda-commander.html

23. Mohammed Mukhasha, Drone kills nine near ormerly rebel-occupied Yemen town: sources,Reuters, 18 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/us-yemen-usa-militants-idUSBRE89H0NW20121018

24. Declan Walsh, Pakistans top aliban leader Baitullah Mehsud killed in US drone attack, Te Guardian, 7 August 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/taliban-leader-baitullah-mehsud-killed

25. Adam Baron, Family, neighbors o Yemeni killed by U.S. drone wonder why he wasnt taken alive, McClatchy, 28 November 2012, httpwww.mcclatchydc.com/2012/11/28/175794/amily-neighbors-o-yemeni-killed.html

26. Gregory D. Johnsen, Why Did the US kill Adnan al-Qadhi?, Waq al-Waq, 13 December 2012, http://bigthink.com/waq-al-waq/why-did-the-us-kill-adnan-al-qadhi

27. See, or example, Rasool Dawar, US drones kill 3 suspected militants in Pakistan, Associated Press, 9 December 2012, http://news.yahocom/us-drones-kill-3-suspected-militants-pakistan-081710082.html

28. Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian oll in Drone Strikes, Te New York imes, 11 August 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html?pagewanted=all

29. Mark Landler, Civilian Deaths Due to Drones Are Not Many, Obama Says, Te New York imes, 30 January 2012, http://www.nytimecom/2012/01/31/world/middleeast/civilian-deaths-due-to-drones-are-ew-obama-says.html

30. See, or example, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones

31. See, or example, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/32. See, or example, Chris Woods, Analysis: CNN experts civilian drone death numbers dont add up, Te Bureau o Investigative Journal-

ism, 17 July 2012, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/07/17/analysis-cnn-experts-civilian-drone-death-numbers-dont-add-up/;and Meg Braun, Counting civilian casualties in CIAs drone war, Foreign Policys APak Channel, 2 November 2012, http://apak.oreigpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/02/counting_civilian_casualties_in_cia_s_drone_war

33. United Nations High Commission on Reugees. Country Proles. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

34. BBC World News, Pakistani soldiers storm mosque, 10 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6286500.stm

35. Hameedullah Khan, Swat cleric ends peace deal, Dawn, 22 September 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/09/22/top9.htm
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36. Hassan Abbas, Te Black-urbaned Brigade: Te Rise o NSM in Pakistan, Jamestown errorism Monitor, 30 November 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=986&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1

37. C. Christine Fair, Pakistan Loses Swat to Local aliban, Jamestown errorism Focus, 14 November 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4537

38. Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, Conronting aliban, Pakistan Finds Itsel at War, Te New York imes, 2 October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/world/asia/03pstan.html?pagewanted=all

39. Muhammad Imran, Majority o Pakistan Swat IDPs back home, Ground Report, 28 August 2009, http://www.groundreport.com/Poli-tics/Majority-o-Pakistan-Swat-IDPs-back-home_9/2906647

40. AFP, Tousands ee Waziristan in ear o military oensive, 26 August 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/426570/thousands-ee-wa-ziristan-in-ear-o-military-oensive/

41. Faisal Darem, Residents ee Zinjibar ater al-Qaeda takeover, al-Shora, 31 May 2011, http://al-shora.com/en_GB/articles/meii/ea-tures/main/2011/05/31/eature-01

42. Ahmed Dawood, Ansar al-sharia militants withdraw rom Zinjibar and Jaar to port o Shuqra, Yemen imes, 14 June 2012, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1581/news/988/Ansar-Al-Sharia-militants-withdraw-rom-Zinjibar-and-Jaar-to-port-o-Shuqra.htm

43. UNHCR, Almost 320,000 civilians ee Somalia this year, including 20,000 to Yemen, 21 October 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4ea185356.html

44. Spencer Ackerman, Rare Photographs Show Ground Zero o the Drone War, Wired Danger Room Blog, 12 December 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/photos-pakistan-drone-war/

45. William Matthews, Smaller, Lighter, Cheaper, Deense News, 31 May 2010, http://www.deensenews.com/article/20100531/DEF-FEA01/5310311/Smaller-Lighter-Cheaper

46. Michael Smith, Army vacuum missile hits aliban, Te imes, 22 June 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/ar-ticle4187835.ece

47. According to an o-the-record interview with a ormer intelligence ocial, 22 October 2012.

48. See, or example, here: http://unama.unmissions.org/Deault.aspx?tabid=12285&language=en-US


50. David Rohde, Te drone war, Reuters Magazine, 26 January 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-david-rohde-drone-wars-idUSRE80P11I20120126

51. Associated Press, Tousands Cheer as Pakistani Militants Decapitate, Shoot Aghans Accused o Spying or U.S., Fox News, 27 June2008, http://www.oxnews.com/story/0,2933,372883,00.html

52. Iona Craig, Little sympathy or crucied spy ater Islamists ee town, Te imes, 20 June 2012, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article3450564.ece

53. For details, see the remarks o Aaron Zelin at the ASP Event, U.S. Drones Policy: Strategic Frameworks and Measuring Eects, 20 Au-gust 2012, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/event-review-u-s-drones-policy-strategic-rameworks-and-measuring-eects/

54. Armin Rosen, How Aricas Most Treatening errorist Group Lost Control o Somalia, Te Atlantic, 21 September 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-aricas-most-threatening-terrorist-group-lost-control-o-somalia/262655/

55. Zoe Flood and Abdiaziz Abdinuur, Al-Shabaab execute British and American spies, Te elegraph, 23 July 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9420808/Al-Shabaab-execute-British-and-American-spies.html

56. See, or example, Patrick Johnson and Anoop Sarbahi, Te Impact o U.S. Drone Strikes on errorism in Pakistan, Working paper, Feb-ruary 25, 2012, http://patrickjohnston.ino/materials/drones.pd

57. Luke Olney, Lethal argeting Abroad: Exploring Long-erm Eectiveness o Armed Drone Strikes in Overseas Contingency Operations,Graduate School o Arts and Science o Georgetown University, Masters Degree Tesis, April 14, 2011, https://repository.library.george-town.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553552/olneyLuke.pd?sequence=1

58. David Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, Aghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics o Violence between the United States and the aliban,Institute or the Study o Labor Discussion Paper Series, December 2011, http://tp.iza.org/dp6262.pd

59. Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh, Do Drone Strikes Degrade al Qaeda? Evidence orm Propaganda Output, Forthcoming, errorismand Political Violence. January 27, 2012, http://www.jamesigoewalsh.com/tpv.pd
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60. Ashley ellis, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future o U.S. Policy, 16 January 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/les/testimony.pd

61. Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, Pakistans aliban Generation, CBC, 27 June 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/passionateeyemon-day/2009/talibangeneration/

62. Zia Ur Rehman, aliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi, CC Sentinel, 24 July 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/taliban-recruiting-and-undraising-in-karachi

63. C. Christine Fair, Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications or Al Qaeda and Other Organizations, Studies in Conict & error-ism, 27:489-504, 2004, http://home.comcast.net/~christine_air/pubs/AQ_pak.pd

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66. Chantel Carter, Pre-Incident Indicators o errorist Attacks: Weak Economies and Fragile Political Inrastructures Bring Rise to erroristOrganizations and Global Networks, Global Security Studies, Fall 2012, Vol. 3, Iss. 4, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Carter%20Pre%Final.pd

67. Azmat Khan, Understanding Yemens Al Qaeda Treat, PBS Frontline, 29 May 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/rontline/oreignaairs-deense/al-qaeda-in-yemen/understanding-yemens-al-qaeda-threat/

68. Mark revelyan, Jailbreak in Yemen stirs concern abroad, Reuters, 10 February 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/02/10/jailbreak_in_yemen_stirs_concern_abroad/

69. Steano Ambrogi, Yemen says may harbor up to 300 Qaeda suspects, Reuters, 29 December 2009, http://www.reuters.com/arti-cle/2009/12/29/us-yemen-qaeda-minister-idUSRE5BS2NR20091229

70. Pam Benson, New terrorist plot to attack plane oiled, CNN, 8 May 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/07/world/meast/yemen-qaeda-plot/

71. Michael Kelley, Obamas Drone War In Yemen May Be Al Qaedas Best Recruitment ool Ever, Business Insider, 30 May 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-yemen-prompting-more-terror-2012-5

72. Masood Salman. In Pakistan, Drone Protest akes Detour For Saety, Te New York imes, 08 Oct. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/in-pakistan-drone-protest-led-by-imran-khan-takes-detour-or-saety.html

73. Andrew Hammond, Yemeni debate over drones emerges ater Salehs all, Reuters, 17 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/arti-

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74. Laura King and Hashmat Baktash, Aghan leader says NAO airstrikes on homes absolutely banned, Te Los Angeles ime World Noblog, 12 June 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/06/aghan-karzai-nato-airstrikes.html

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understanding the strategic and tactical considerations of drone strikes

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