understanding iran
TRANSCRIPT
Understanding Iran
Iran is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by
natural uranium. It is declared as being to replace the old Teheran reactor. The IR-40 design is
very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons, and was
apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant
was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the reactor
vessel due to be installed in 2011. In July 2011 AEOI reported it as 75% complete. Iran has said
that it will be under IAEA safeguards, and has been subject to IAEA inspection during
construction. However, from 2006 Iran has declined to provide IAEA with detailed design
information on the IR-40 reactor to allay concerns regarding its precise purpose. An IAEA
design verification visit in February 2013 noted that cooling and moderator plumbing was almost
complete, though in November critical components were not yet installed. It is now expected to
start up in 2014, with a delay due to slow progress with fuel fabrication. The UN Security
Council has demanded that construction of IR-40 cease due to it’s" plutonium production
potential. Iran is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak
fuelled by natural uranium. It is declared as being to replace the old Teheran reactor. The IR-40
design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons,
and was apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET. Construction is under way and the incomplete
plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the
reactor vessel due to be installed in 2011. In July 2011 AEOI reported it as 75% complete. Iran
has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards, and has been subject to IAEA inspection during
construction. However, from 2006 Iran has declined to provide IAEA with detailed design
information on the IR-40 reactor to allay concerns regarding its precise purpose. An IAEA
design verification visit in February 2013 noted that cooling and moderator plumbing was almost
complete, though in November critical components were not yet installed. It is now expected to
start up in 2014, with a delay due to slow progress with fuel fabrication. The UN Security
Council has demanded that construction of IR-40 cease due to it’s" plutonium production
potential. - It's 2014 Iran is not about to give up its heavy water reactor.in a Nov 2011
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)report suggested the cylinder at Parchin was
intended for testing nuclear weapons designs and had been built with the assistance of a “foreign
expert.” Iran also agreed to respond in detail on the issue of the “foreign expert,” who has been
identified as Vyacheslav Danilenko, a Ukrainian specialist on Nano diamonds. While Iran’s
nuclear ambition cannot be underestimated, it does not seem to regard nuclear armament as an
existential issue. Instead, Iran is more likely to value nuclear armament as a matter of status for a
nation aspiring to become a dominant power in the region and, thus, to regain the glory of the
Persian Empire. There is also a clear difference in their respective capacity to sustain the
sacrifices involved. Iran is vulnerable to sanctions as its economy is more integrated into the
global economy. Moreover, in a more pluralistic and open society (with periodic elections) the
Iranian people have less tolerance for the economic disruptions caused by the sanctions.
North Korea’s determination for nuclear armament has been far stronger than the
combined determination of the international community to denuclearize it. The half-hearted
sanctions enacted by the Security Council and individual countries have proved affordable as an
insurance premium in view of the high value of insurance policy found in nuclear weapons.
Instead of crushing North Korea’s backbone, the actions of the Security Council ended up
strengthening its immune system against sanctions. Decisive difference lies in the nature of
alternatives to a diplomatic solution. For Iran, the alternative is not only more prohibitive
economic sanctions but a preemptive military strike from Israel. In the case of North Korea, the
military option has been ruled out from the beginning. The alternative to a diplomatic solution
was nothing more than partial sanctions without teeth and the absence of massive economic
assistance from the outside world and the Republic of Korea. Thus, North Korea sees no
convincing incentives to denuclearize through negotiations. The Fat Man nuclear bomb (20kt-
yield, implosion design) required 6.2kg of plutonium (or, if the country is unwilling to take the
extra step of converting its uranium to plutonium in nuclear reactors, about 13kg of highly
enriched uranium would give off a similar yield).
Nuclear bombs can be designed to detonate based on any number of conditions (specific
atmospheric pressure, sudden acceleration, manual command, etc.) and using a timer to trigger
the bomb would be very simple. The timer would send an electric signal to the control circuits
for the bomb, which would then trigger fast, synchronized pulses to special detonators (often
exploding-bridgewire detonators). The detonators would initiate a layer of conventional high
explosives, which would send a shockwave to compress a core of uranium or plutonium until it
reaches the critical density necessary to sustain a chain fission reaction, at which point it
explodes violently, releasing a lot more energy (several orders of magnitude) than given off by
the initial (conventional HE) explosion. Iran installs 3,000 advance centrifuges per month. For
peaceful purpose nuclear power centrifuges require 1,200 gas powered. I did the math off the fat
man nuclear bomb dropped on Nagasaki in WW2 and it takes around 9,000 advance centrifuges
interval for Iran’s nuclear ambition. Translating into the only way to resolve and bring them back
to negotiations for denuclearization is through heavy preemptive dismantling.