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Turkish Societal Perceptions
Concerning Combat against
PKK Terrorism
Dr. Salih AKYÜREK
Mehmet Ali YILMAZ
WISE MEN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
REPORT # 51
SEPTEMBER 2012
Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism
Questionnaire and Results Analysis: Dr. Salih Akyürek
Consultant and Statistical Support: Prof. Dr. Cengiz Yılmaz
Documentation: Dr. Salih Akyürek, M. Ali Yılmaz, Erdem Kaya
English Translation and Interpretation: Cihan Erkli
Front Page Design: Kaan Tuğcuoğlu
BILGESAM PUBLICATIONS
Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies
Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi No: 10 Celil Ağa İş Merkezi Kat: 9 Daire: 36 Mecidiyeköy / İstanbul / Turkey Tel: +90 212 217 65 91 Faks: +90 212 217 65 93 Atatürk Bulvarı Havuzlu Sok. No: 4/6 A. Ayrancı / Çankaya / Ankara / Turkey Tel : +90 312 425 32 90 Faks: +90 312 425 32 90 www.bilgesam.org [email protected] Copyright © BILGESAM SEPTEMBER 2012 All publishing rights reserved. Publishing this report, either on paperback or electronic, is prohibited without the permission of BILGESAM.
Questionnaire Design From: Teorem Research and Consulting Ltd.
Foreword
The Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) closely follows the issues pertaining
to the Kurdish Question, combat against PKK terror and the democratic opening process. In
this regard, BILGESAM has tried to compensate the general lack of empirical data on matters
relating to any of the issues mentioned above. To this end BILGESAM, instead of relying on
the discourses of the actors speaking on behalf of the Kurds, has resorted to polling the
Kurdish population and their thoughts on these topics and problems. Field research was
conducted to attain the data presented within this report.
During 2008-2009, BILGESAM conducted a thorough research in which 8,607 were polled
from 17 different eastern and south-eastern provinces, along with a relatively high number
of migrants of these regions in Istanbul and Mersin, and this research was presented under
the title, “A Sociological Analysis of the South-eastern Question”. Later, results from this
inquiry were incorporated into the, “What are the Kurds and Zazas thinking about?
Perceptions on Common Values and Symbols” report and this report was presented to the
public. Concerning the democratic opening process was BILGESAM’s publication of (Ret.)
Ambassador Özdem Sanberk’s analysis, “Democratization, Political and Social Solidarity
Opening for the Solution of the Kurdish Question” and the Wise Men Board report, “The
Democratic Opening and Social Perceptions”. During the 2009-2010 period and within the
eastern and south-eastern parts of Anatolia where a majority of Kurds resides, BILGESAM
conducted a survey in 19 provinces and migrant-heavy Mersin, along with 5 provinces in the
western part of Turkey, where 192 people in total were interviewed as to establish a
comprehensive sampling as possible. Consequently, these interview results were published
within the book, “Kurds in Turkey and Social Perceptions”.
In order to ascertain the ethnic/religious composition of regional neighborhoods where
Kurdish majorities reside, BILGESAM published the 2010 report, “The Ethnic and Religious
Identity Composition of 19 Turkish Provinces in the Eastern and South-eastern parts of
Anatolia”. BILGESAM, trying to partake in the resolution of the Kurdish Question has
developed a comprehensive strategy that takes into consideration four different dimensions
of the issue. This strategy was encapsulated in a Wise Men Board report and its contents
made available for the public and decision-makers’ benefit in 2011 with the title, “Turkey’s
Counter-Terrorism Strategy against the PKK”. Following up this report, and to complement
its religious/ethnic lines of argument, was the “Conflict Resolution Approaches and the
Kurdish Question in Turkey” report.
With this new survey report, BILGESAM is continuing to follow the developments around the
Kurdish Question. To understand and quantify the societal perception of the Turkish state’s
counter terror operations and the democratic opening process, BILGESAM surveyed 2922
people via an online poll and is presenting its findings now in the “Turkish Societal
Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism” report. This report tried to be as
thorough as possible and many sub-layers of analysis were entertained for achieving a
holistic analysis as possible. Among some of the sub-sections were: the desire for Turks and
Kurds to live together in Turkey, the KCK arrests, the democratic opening process, counter
terrorism and state policies, military operations against terrorism, foreign support for the
PKK, the effects of terror acts in the regions and societal perceptions on solution proposals
of Kurdish Question.
The report “Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism” was
originally published in Turkish and presented to the public through a press conference that
took place at BILGESAM headquarters in September 2012. This copy is an abridged version of
the original report and includes only the major tables and graphs.
We hope that this study and its results will be informative and useful for the general public
and those within the decision making process and academia. We would like to extend our
gratitude to Şikayetvar for providing us the means online to gather the data, Dr. Salih
Akyürek and Mehmet Ali Yılmaz for authoring and co-authoring this report, Prof. Dr. Cengiz
Yılmaz for his consultation support and all those who contributed to the publication of this
report at BILGESAM.
Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı
President of BILGESAM
Abbreviations
AKP Justice and Development Party
BDP Peace and Democracy Party
CHP Republican Peoples’ Party
KCK Kurdistan Communities Union
The PKK terrorist organization formed the KCK system in 2007 in order to move to the
state-building phase of its strategy by directing pro-Kurdish political parties and
controlling all Kurdish nationals across Turkey and within the Middle East. KCK has a
state-like structure including legislative, executive, and judiciary branches along with
an armed wing –HPG: People’s Defense Forces- and a contract comprising 47 articles
which define a new citizenship status based on KCK membership. The KCK is
organized in municipalities of the eastern and south-eastern Anatolian provinces,
various nongovernmental organizations, national and local media, trade unions and
at universities. The KCK, in the first stage, aspires to be a parallel state within Turkey
through seemingly democratic organizations while gaining ability to use force in cities
and aims finally to establish an independent confederation of Kurdistan over the
territories of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In 2012, the Turkish Supreme Court ruled
that the KCK is an armed terrorist organization by ratifying the verdict issued by the
Van Criminal Court in 2011.
MHP Nationalist Movement Party
MIT National Intelligence Organization
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
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The Common Desire of Turks and Kurds to Live Together
One of the main purposes of this study was to assess whether or not Turks and Kurds wish to
live and mold a common national future together and, depending on their answer, to what
degree. In other words, their social attitudes towards each other were assessed. To this end,
four main research questions guided the entire study.
Perhaps surprising, while 70% of the Turks indicated that they wished to live together with
Kurds, this figure was roughly 90% with the Kurds that desire to live together with Turks.
Kurds, in this sense, seemed more receptive to at least living together with Turks within the
same borders.
The Common Future of Turks and Kurds in Turkey
This study also sought to measure the societal gap between Turks and Kurds via a different
set of questions and approach. With regard to the conclusions derived from this approach,
statistics indicated that Turks whom consented to living together with Kurds—at least as
approving them as neighbors or possible familial relatives—was around 24%. This figure was
the same when asked to Turks that did not desire to live with the Kurds. However, and from
a wider perspective, Kurds seemed again more receptive and accommodating to living with
Turks. This fact was indicated with their low rate disapproval figure (only 2.4% of Kurds
wished to live apart from Turks) while Turkish participants indicated that 24% of Turks
desired to live apart.
Nearly 78% of Kurds consented to living with Turks or becoming relatives with them. This
overwhelming approval rate is truly surprising. From this same group, nearly six out of seven
(67%) indicated that they would like to marry a Turk and thus become relations with them.
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Regrettably so, the same question yielded an astonishingly low figure from the Turks. Here
nearly one out of four Turks disapproves of intermarriage or of becoming a relative with a
Kurdish person. Disapprovals, especially when quite high like this, firmly cement societal rifts
between the two ethnicities.
Social Gap and Level of Segregation between Turks and Kurds
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Among party lines, the most receptive constituents of pro-Turkish/Kurdish intermingling and
co-habitation belonged to AKP supporters and voters. The least welcoming were those that
voted along the MHP-BDP lines. As far as education is concerned, the least receptive
group—on all sides—were those that had only finished or were doing their secondary
education (mostly high school level). Unexpectedly, Kurds and Turks that lived in or near
conflict zones turned out to be more sympathetic towards living with one another.
It is important to stress, however, that well over 70% of both Turks and Kurds wish to live in
and share common borders. This seriously undermines the arguments of those seeking to
distance Turks and Kurds away from one another and those actively promoting nationalistic
causes. These statistics will force them to rethink and re-evaluate their causes and
arguments—much to their chagrin no doubt.
As far as common norms and symbols are concerned, both Turks and Kurds alike have
indicated that they share common societal values—such as the national flag and anthem. In
fact, well over 90% of those that were polled indicated as such. Only among the BDP party
constituents did their numbers drop; 76% approved of the current Turkish national anthem
as their own and 59% indicated that they approved and identified with the Turkish national
flag.
Views on Common Values and Symbols (Turkish Flag and National Anthem)
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When all the results are aggregated, this study can decisively conclude that most Turks and
Kurds do indeed wish to live together and believe they have a common future with each
other. The only outstanding exception and slightly confounding variable in this study has
been the higher rate of Turks wishing not to live together with the Kurds than the other way
around as initially expected. Perhaps the increased PKK attacks of late have effectively
disenchanted some Turks and have provoked them to refrain from welcoming a Turkish-
Kurdish common future and co-habitation.
The results of this study reaffirm and are congruent with many other research study results
BILGESAM has produced within the last three years. Results ascertained have directly and
positively demonstrate how flawed some researchers and academics that advocate the
‘Kurds wish to live apart’ thesis are. These claims had never been substantiated and, with
this study, we can safely conclude that their hypothesis were unsound and have been
rendered invalid. If anything, results here have proven quite the contrary: Kurds wish and
strive to live together with Turks—perhaps even more so than Turks themselves! High rates
of approval even from nationalist parties like the MHP and the BDP illustrates just how
unfounded and irrelevant these manipulative claims had been. Now these claims are
undermined and can be effectively refuted.
KCK Arrests
The KCK arrests and their effects were measured with two different questions. With regard
to the belief that arrested KCK members are, in fact, PKK or KCK operatives question got an
88% approval rate among Turks and a 71% from Kurds. Whether the KCK arrests were
warranted or not question received an 83% yes from Turks and 61% from the Kurds. Hence,
with these results in mind, this report concludes that most of Turkey’s population approved
of the KCK arrests and deemed them warranted.
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Turks that supported the KCK arrests came mostly from the AKP and MHP party supporters
(90% approval rate). This figure dropped to around 70% amongst the CHP party constituents.
Results were similar with the Kurds. Pro-AKP Kurds supported the arrests (80%) while pro-
CHP Kurds were divided in the middle at 50%. BDP voters overwhelmingly resisted the
arrests and only 10% of them indicated that the arrests had been warranted. In terms of
regions, Kurdish participants that reside in the conflict zones supported the arrests much
less than those that lived elsewhere. Pro-arrest supporters were significantly higher more
present among the ranks of the Sunni Muslims than in the Alawite sect.
The Democratic Opening Process
Six different questions pertaining to the 2009 initiated and ongoing democratic opening
process were incorporated into this study and asked to its participants.
One out of 3 Turks and Kurds supports and has greeted positively the democratic opening
process and its influence on changing the public officials’ attitudes. Nearly 40% of both Turks
and Kurds believe that the democratic opening has furthered cultural and ethnic rights of
minorities in Turkey. 20% of Turks and 41% of Kurds concurred with a statement concerning
how the democratic opening has positively helped the state gain credibility in the eyes of its
populace. However, and contrasting sharply, 84% of Turks believe that the democratic
opening has aided terrorist causes and that discussions with its captive leader, Abdullah
Öcalan, was wrong. 52% of the Kurds concurred with Turks regarding the same question. In a
similar enquiry, 83% of Turks and 51% of Kurds believed that the democratic opening vastly
disadvantaged the state and helped the PKK and KCK gain societal traction. However, a vast
majority of Kurds (75%) believed the opening to be necessary while only 36% of Turks joined
this belief.
This vast difference in support demonstrates an important rift in perception along ethnic
lines; while many Kurds believe in the democratic opening to be necessary and pressing, an
overwhelming number of Turks do not. Though improved in many regards, the democratic
opening initiated in 2009 has apparently done little to further the state’s reassurance and
amiability in the eyes of its population. Little in improving rights, freedoms and good
governance has been accomplished according to Kurds and Turks within this process. If
anything, terrorist organizations and the KCK have stood to gain from it the most.
Major factional rifts exist on party lines concerning the democratic opening subject. While
AKP voters believe the process to be a positive one (50% approval rate), voters of the other
three mainstream Turkish parties believe it to be highly counterproductive with only 3-30%
support for it at most.
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It is mostly among CHP and MHP party supporters that believe the democratic opening
efforts aided terrorist organizations (90%). This figure is significantly lower among AKP
voting Kurds (50%) and AKP voting Turks (65%). This means, in essence, those two out of
three AKP voting participants believes the democratic opening to be highly disadvantageous
for Turkey. The only major party to not agree to the premise that the democratic opening
supported the PKK or KCK is again the BDP and its constituent participants. This figure, in
sharp contrast to others, is only at 25%.
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Turks and Kurds that live in or near conflict zones alike showed a greater interest in the
democratic opening process. They have a more amenable intake of its contents than do
Turks and Kurds that live further away from these areas. The same could be said regarding
the religious sects in Turkey: Sunni Muslims are more receptive of the process than the
Alawites.
State Counter Terrorism Policy
The state’s counter-terrorism policy was assessed with five questions. The isolation and
imprisonment of Öcalan, for example, garnered a 64% Turkish approval rate and 56%
Kurdish support. However, and again sharply contrasting, only 21% of Turks wished to see
their state coordinate efforts and relations with Barzani of Iraq. Contrary to this low figure,
roughly 61% of Kurds desired Turkey to continue cooperating and working with Barzani.
Regarding negotiations and dealing with Öcalan, only 14% of Turks believed in this policy
while 53% of Kurds stood opposite this number. That being said, nearly a majority of both
Turks and Kurds alike believed that the state was doing a poor job at countering terrorism
and failing to garner international pressure and policy (15-21% approved and only 18-23%
believed the state strategy was of the right kind).
Unlike previous polls, a party/voter differentiation did not exist with regard to the perceived
state counter-terrorism strategy. 25-43% of pro-AKP voters approved and CHP/MHP voters
had only 4-13% of their samples believe the state counter-terrorism strategy was along the
right course of action. Within these distinctions, however, an important observation stands
out: nearly 53-67% of Kurds voting for the AKP approved of direct negotiations with Öcalan
and continued cooperation, relations with Barzani. Kurds from the main opposition party—
the CHP—did not exhibit an anomaly as such. And, like previous times, the BDP fell directly
contrary to mainstream voting behavior; nearly 97-100% voted in favor of talks with Öcalan
and only 4-20% approved of the state’s current counter-terrorism strategy.
A general assessment of all these conclusions can allow one to soundly infer that the AKP
government has been perceived as lacking and/or downright failing with regard to its
counter-terrorism efforts. Accepting the unanimous congruence of approved for isolating
Öcalan, most Kurdish participants were more approving and receptive towards the AKP
counter-terrorism strategy. As before, people living in the conflict regions and Sunni Muslims
rather than the Alawites, were more welcoming of the state’s counter-terrorism policy.
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Security Forces and Counter-Terrorism
Assessment of the security forces and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) were
done with three questions. Only 26% of Kurds and 33% of Turks believed that the Turkish
Armed Forces had been successful in combating terror. Slightly better, but in no real way
successful, was the Turkish police and their own counter-terrorism strategy—37% of Kurds
and 36% of Turks rated them positively. Performing the most dismal of all these three
institutions was the Turkish intelligence. The MIT was rated with only a 33% approval rate by
the Kurds and 21% by the Turks.
Regardless of the minor differences, all three institutions seemed to have failed in the
public’s eyes. No real or noteworthy difference was observed between Turks and Kurds with
regard to this section. Instead, these 3 institutions need to be contextualized within the
government-policy-institution triangle, for security forces mirror the political will to execute
operations—both in scope and intensity. Therefore, it is only normal that within a period of
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diplomatic/civilian democratic efforts—in which even the terrorists organized via the civilian
KCK—that the armed forces are viewed in a negative light.
Contributing to these lowered perceptions and context were some scandalous and
downright fraudulent publications aimed at the Turkish Armed Forces mostly for political
interests. These articles, comments and insidious attacks all undermined the popular
confidence in the Turkish Armed Forces and their effects when trying to understand these
low figures is important to remember.
The police, relatively perceived with more confidence (56-53% approval rates) from both
Turks and Kurds alike, have apparently outclassed the armed forces and the national
intelligence. Here party preferences mattered somewhat: pro-AKP participants voted more
in favor of the intelligence organization, while pro-MHP tended to vote up the armed forces.
The CHP party supporters voted along similar lines, no matter if Turk or Kurd. According to
them, the armed forces deserved a better reputation than the intelligence organization or
the police. The BDP voting participants eschewed all three institutions and voted hardly in
support of them at all.
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The pattern of ‘better approval’ as to where the participants lived continued here: these,
especially Turkish, living in the conflict regions voted in approval of all three institutions
more so than those living further away. Kurds living in the region, however, were less
receptive to the institutions than their fellow neighbor Turks. Interestingly though were sect
differences; though support for the armed forces was relatively similar from all sects, while
the policy and intelligence had a significantly higher approval rate from Sunni Muslims than
the Alawite minority.
As far as military or police operations against the PKK are concerned, nearly 94% of Turks
and 64% of Kurds were in favor of having them continue. These high approval rates from
both Turks and Kurd alike demonstrate the necessity and perceived warranting welcome it
receives from all aspects of Turkish society. All three main parties’ constituents highly
approved of these operations---with AKP at 97%, MHP at 94% and the CHP voters at 91%.
Kurdish pro-AKP supporters backed and even welcomed the operations with an 80%
approval rate while CHP supporting Kurds were measured in at 64%. BDP party sympathizers
were the only ones disapproving of operations against the PKK: only 14% of them rated the
operations as a positive development.
An important sub-question of the military operations research was that concerning the
deaths of the smugglers at Uludere. While two out of three Kurds perceived the event as a
mistake of the Turkish and state forces, Turkish—two out of three—did not consider it as a
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truly deplorable incident, though certainly tragic. Among the Turks, especially, only 47% of
the CHP voters believed the event at Uludere was a deplorable incident. Pro-AKP and MHP
voters only measured in at 26% and 14% dissenting rate to the event among the Turks.
Kurds, on the other hand, lamented the incident and reacted strongly to it with 93% of BDP
voters deploring it while 86% of CHP and 53% of AKP voters believing it to be deplorable.
*This question was formulated so that responders can have more than one selection.
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Turks, unlike Kurds, believe the PKK terrorist organization receives support and funding from
abroad. Regardless, however, both Kurds and Turks think alike as to which countries provide
this kind of support: Israel, the US and the northern Iraqi-Kurdish authorities were all
shortlisted by the polled—with a nearly 71-82% approval rate. Other highly likely supporters
of the PKK and their perceived order of relevance were: Assad’s Syria 65-70%, European
states 58-64%, Russia 49-52% and Iran with 44-51%. Only 5.8% of Kurds and 2.1% of Turks
believed the PKK was not getting any form of support from these states.
Of a worthy mention is how Iran is perceived to be in support of the PKK with nearly a 50%
confirmation rate of this thesis. However, this number is likely to go up since this poll was
conducted in August 29 2012—before the capture and arrest of an Iranian spy in Iğdir of
Turkey. This spy was caught in negotiations with PKK terrorists.
Poll results illustrated that the more educated both Turkish and Kurdish participants are, the
more they believe that terrorism in Turkey receives foreign support and funding. Along party
lines, pro-AKP or MHP party constituents registered a higher approval rate of this believe,
while pro-CHP voters registered less. Pro-BDP voters were again the anomaly and they
registered the least in terms of believing whether or not terrorism in Turkey had foreign
backing. This result only confirms that the BDP perceives the PKK to be an independent actor
and, thus, how legitimate it really is.
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Grand operations conducted against the PKK and how these were perceived was assessed
with three different questions. Military operations against PKK camps and safe havens in
northern Iraq received a 90% approval rate from Turks and 65% from Kurds. Both ethnicities
believed conducting operations against the border PKK camps was especially important—
even more so than operations aimed at PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq.
AKP and MHP voters tended to support these operations more so than their CHP
counterparts. Of the BDP voters, only 7-12% approved of military operations. However,
Turks living in the region were more supportive of these operations while Kurds of the
region were less receptive of them. Sunni Muslims supported these operations substantially
more than the Alawite minority.
This study also sought to inquire and measure the effects of terrorism with regard to how it
curtails or derails economic and social growth. 95% of Turks agreed to the premise of
terrorism’s negative influence while 88% of Kurds thought the same. In terms of terrorism’s
stunting influence on Kurdish rights, 85% of Turks and 83% of Kurds thought the same.
Therefore, one can safely conclude that both Turks and Kurds believe that the PKK does
nothing but hinder progress and development--especially where it is needed the most. AKP
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voting and higher educated participants agreed with this conclusion, while most BDP voting
participants disagreed.
These results demonstrate how many Kurds in Turkey believe that the PKK does not look out
for their interests; if anything, the PKK seems to be a tool piece of others, fighting for their
cause more than that of the Kurds. Moreover, results—especially those of the Kurdish
participants—demonstrated how many believe the KCK organization had, in essence, a
Baath party-esque design armed at goading the Kurdish population. After all these
conclusions, the most important final assessment regarding this section can be made: the
PKK terror problem and the Kurdish issue are two different matters and the Turkish/Kurdish
people agree almost unanimously.
Resolving the Kurdish Question
The Turkish state’s resolve, determinate and measures in its quest to resolving the Kurdish
Question were assessed with 5 different questions. 50% of Kurds and 44% of Turks believed
the Turkish state’s honest determination to resolving this issue. In terms of whether or not it
can resolve it, 51% of Kurds believed it could while only 33% of Turks believed it would if it
could.
Generally speaking, both ethnicities seem quite disillusioned as neither party believed over
50% that this issue could and will be resolved. Kurds, however, were a bit more optimistic
than their Turkish counterparts. Turks seem relatively disparate and tired while Kurds have
retained a bit of optimism and determination.
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AKP supporting participants believed that the issue could be resolved more so than other
party constituents—regardless of ethnicity. With the results in mind, this study can conclude
that, along party lines, state measures are often associated with the policy government and
support for them is pursuant and dependent on it.
Those residing in the conflict zones, both Turks and Kurds alike, believe with steadfast
determination of the state’s resolve and determination in addressing this issue, more so
than those that live further away. Sunni Muslims—no matter Turkish or Kurdish—approve of
the state’s policy and believe it can resolve this issue more than their Alawite counterparts.
Several reasons can account for this low morale and apparent hopelessness with the state’s
efforts and policy for the Kurdish issue: for one, recent terror attacks could have sapped the
public’s morale and, more importantly, the now awry political will at confronting this issue
by the political parties.
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Six more questions were asked on this Kurdish Question and what the supposed obstacles to
resolving it were. Among those that replied, only 2.3-5.7% fully or partially saw a federal
solution to this problem (in other words, whether or not federalism could resolve it). The
popular statements of the BDP, those that seemed to have at least gained a popular
traction, were all proven false with the low approval rate of the autonomous argument—
only 11.9% of the polled believed this to be a viable solution. Only 20% of the Kurds, and
more surprisingly, only 40% of the BDP party voters concurred with the greater autonomy
arguments.
Of the more popular solutions, the more comprehensive ‘equal citizenship’ alternative
gained a 33.5% approval rate (one out of three) among the Kurds while the ‘strengthened
local administration’ solution offer only 14.8%. Only 31.9% of the Kurdish participants
believed current ‘more-rights’ indicated to be sufficient for resolving this issue. On the other
hand, of the Turks polled, 79.2% of them believed that the current ‘improved rights’ for the
Kurds were sufficient enough to resolving this matter. The equal citizenship rights and the
strengthened local administration solutions only garnered 12.3% and 5.3% approval rates,
respectively. The lowest argument to gain approval from the Turks, with only a 3.3% rate,
was the federal/autonomous Turkey/Kurdistan proposal.
As far as political parties were concerned, 92% of pro-MHP and 80% of the pro-AKP
participants believed enough rights had been given as to resolving this issue. 72% of the pro-
CHP participants concurred with them. Among those living in the region, 88% agreed while
only 77% believed elsewhere. Sunni Muslims were again more compliant with an 82%
approval rate over the Alawite Muslims polled (53% approved). Among these high rate
approvals, more increased rights and the option of equal citizenship were quite unpopular.
With a 12% approval rate, most Kurdish participants opposed the ‘democratic autonomy’
option. Even among the pro-BDP party members polled only 41% opted for this option. 5.7%
of Kurdish participants wanted to see a federal Turkey, while only 11% of BDP party voting
participants desired this option. The desire for a fully independent Kurdistan was quite
unpopular; only 2.3% of Kurdish participants indicated that they wanted this and just 7.4% of
BDP voting Kurds agreed. Thus, of all the Kurds polled, only 20% believed in extreme
solutions and even within BDP voting groups this number is just at 59.2%
Among the topics polled was the often debated and polemical topic of Öcalan’s and other
PKK members’ absolutions and release. The radical proposal of forgiving and releasing
Öcalan was able to only gain a 7.7% approval rate from amongst the Kurdish participants.
The more the participants were educated, the higher this rate was. Among the most
educated, for example, only 14.3% approved of this suggestion. This figure was around 39%
of the BDP voting participants. The house-arrest of Öcalan proposal gained a 17.4% approval
rate from the Kurds and a 54% approval rate from pro-BDP voting participants.
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* This question was formulated so that responders can have more than one selection.
The general amnesty of PKK members proposal gained roughly around 28% support from
Kurdish contributors. This figure reached a staggering 77% approval rate from the pro-BDP
voting Kurds. Oddly enough, this figure improved as the participants’ education levels
increased. For example, highly educated and post-secondary school participants approved of
this proposal with a 38% approval rate.
With these results in mind, it is safe to conclude that general amnesty among Kurds is a
more popular choice than granting amnesty to just Öcalan. However, it is important to note
that one out of every four Kurds wishes to see PKK members granted such an amnesty.
Lastly, but extremely worthy to note, is how only 50% of BDP voting participants believed
Öcalan or any other PKK member should be granted amnesty—a figure initially expected to
be significantly higher.
All results obtained indicate to a very important grand conclusion: the problems vexing
Turkey do not stem from Kurdish or generally ethnic issues, but originate from that of a
modern state’s challenging narrative. As the participants have mostly indicated, Turkey is
not in need of short-sighted ‘ethnic’ solutions, but rather must draft a modern and relevant
constitution in which modern legal and normative values can be institutionalized to
guarantee permanent and lasting solutions to social problems. It is only through such an
approach that a modern, pluralistic society can establish viable solutions and peace at home.
In summation, the results obtained within this study suggest—without a doubt—the
importance of not allowing security concerns to endanger or derail the democratic opening,
the well-being of Turkey’s citizens, rights and freedoms. Equally at risk is the economic and
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Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism
Terrorism
social well-being of Turkey. The participants have all had the foresight to see and perceive
these issues in this regard. Some positive results have been obtained as well: the PKK terror
problem and the Kurdish Question are now decoupled and are two different issues. With
this, Turkey needs to ensure the continuation of peace and prosperity in the highly sensitive
areas of conflict. Finally, and this report cannot stress this enough, combatting the PKK
needs to be done within the framework of human rights and this issue needs to stand above
partisan politics and gains. The speedy resolution of this matter is more telling than it ever
has been.
Regarding the democratic opening process, Turkey needs to continue with the enthusiasm
and resilience it initially displayed at its earlier stages. This can only be done within the
framework of a modern state system—coincidently, the problems of it stem from the same
framework. Turkish sensitivity and disillusionment on the matter needs to be taken into
account and sincere measures as to resolving the initiated process need to be implemented.
To this end, European Union (EU) reforms and devising a new constitution can only help
within this greater process of democratization and modernization.
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Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism
Terrorism
BILGESAM PUBLICATIONS (in English)
Books
China: A New Superpower? Dimensions of Power, Energy, and Security
Edited by Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI
Turkey’s Strategy in the Changing World
Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI
Turkey’s Today and Tomorrow
Ret. Minister/Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN
Middle East Policy of the Republic of Turkey
Ret. Minister/Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN
Reports
Perception of Nationalism and Independence in Turkey (Report # 8)
Assoc. Prof. Ayşegül AYDINGÜN
Democratization, Political and Social Solidarity Opening for the Solution of Kurdish Problem
(Report # 20)
Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK
Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy (Report # 21)
Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK
Alevi Opening: Deepening of Democracy in Turkey (Report # 22)
Assoc. Prof. Bekir GÜNAY-Gökhan TÜRK
Republic, Modern Democracy and Turkey’s Transformation (Report # 23)
Prof. Sami SELÇUK
Turkey-Armenia Relations (Report # 25)
Wise Men Board Report
Assist. Prof. Fatih ÖZBAY
What are Kurds and Zazas Thinking About? Perceptions on Common Values and Symbols
(Report # 26)
Dr. Salih AKYÜREK
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Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism
Terrorism
The Democratic Opening and Social Perceptions (Report # 30)
Wise Men Board Report
Dr. Salih AKYÜREK
Armed Forces and Democracy (Report # 33)
Prof. Ali L. KARAOSMANOĞLU
Iran, Shia Crescent and the Arab Spring (Report # 35)
Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Emin SALİHİ
Expectations of the Turkish Society from the New Constitution (Report # 35)
BILGESAM
Iran at the Center of Chaos Scenarios (Report # 40)
Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Bilgehan EMEKLİER
Possible Effects of the Iranian Crisis on Turkey (Report # 47)
Wise Men Board Report
Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Bilgehan EMEKLİER
Journals
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 1, Fall 2009
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 2, No 2, Spring 2010
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 2, No 3, Fall 2010
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 3, No 4, Spring 2011
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 3, No 5, Fall 2011
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 4, No 6, Spring 2012
Wise Strategy Journal Vol 4, No 7, Fall 2012
Wise Talks
Wise Talk- 3: Nuclear Iran
Interview with Ret. Minister-Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN
Elif KUTSAL
Wise Talk- 6: Turkey-Israel Relations in the Last Period
Interview with Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK
Merve Nur SÜRMELİ