7/29/2019 Transportation document

1/31

Transportation

Definition

Contract of Transportation One whereby a certain person or

association of persons obligate themselves to transport

persons, things or news from one place to another for a fixed

price.

Crisostomo v. CA, gr no. 138334 - By definition, acontract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain

person or association of persons obligate themselves to transportpersons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed

price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as

carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and

common or public carriers. It is obvious from the above definition

that respondent (travel agency) is not an entity engaged in the

business of transporting either passengers or goods and is

therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did

not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another

since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel

arrangements in their behalf. Respondents services as a travel

agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or

visas as well as booking customers for tours.

Parties:1. carrier or conductor - one who binds himself to transport

persons, things, or news as the case may be or one employed in or

engaged in the business of carrying goods for others for hire

2. consignee - is the person to whom the shipment is to be

delivered to whether by land, sea or air.

3. shipper - one who gives rise to the contract of transportation by

agreeing to deliver the things or news to be transported, or to

present his own person or those of other or others in the case of

transportation of passengers

Persons or corporations who undertake to transport or

convey goods, property, or persons from one place to another,

gratuitously or for hire, and are classified as private or special

carriers and common or public carriers.

Common Carrier

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or

goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering

their services to the public. (ARTICLE 1732, NCC)

Private Carrier

Those who transport or undertake to transport in a particular

instance for hire or reward.

Classification:

1. As to object: (1) things; (2) persons; (3) news

2. As to place of travel: (1) land; (2) water; (3) air

When is a contract of carriage perfected?

As to Goods

Art. 1736 NCCThe extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from

the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,

and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are

delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the

consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them,

without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.

Article 355, COGSA

The liability of the carrier shall begin from the moment he

receives the merchandise, in person or through a person entrusted

therewith in the place indicated for their reception.

As to Passengers

Dangwa Transportaion Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 95582 -by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already

considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection

pertaining to such a contractual relation.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation V. CA, G.R. No. 84458 - Theduty of the common carrier commence from the moment the

person who purchases the ticket from the carrier presents himself

at the proper place and in a proper manner to be transported. The

relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has

been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel

owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not

ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his

destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a

reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.

China Airlines V. CA, G.R. No. 129988 When CALconfirmed the reservations of private respondents, a contract of

carriage arose between CAL and private respondents

Alitalia Airways v. CA - when an airline issues a ticket to apassenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, acontract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to

expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.

Japan Airlines v. Simangan, G.R. No. 170141 - Thatrespondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from JAL and was

issued the corresponding boarding pass is uncontroverted. His

plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles

were subjected to rigid immigration and security procedure. After

passing through said immigration and security procedure, he was

allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California,

U.S.A. via Narita, Japan. Concisely, there was a contract of carriage

between JAL and respondent.

Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804 -a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment

Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premisesof the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection

under a contractual relation

Laws Governing Contract of Transportation

Coastwise Shipping.1. New Civil Code primary law

2. Code of Commerce governs suppletorily in the absence of Civil

Code provisions

Carriage from Foreign Ports to Philippine Ports1. New Civil Code primary law

2. Code of Commerce all matters not regulated by the Civil Code

3. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act suppletorily to the Civil Code

Carriage from Philippine Port to Foreign Ports1. the laws of the country to which the goods are to betransported

Overland Transportation1. Civil Code primary law

2. Code of Commerce suppletorily

Air Transportation1. Civil Code

2. Code of Commerce

3. For International Carriage Warsaw Convention

Law on Common Carrier

Articles 1732-1766, Civil Code

7/29/2019 Transportation document

2/31

Articles 349-379, Code of Commerce

Civil Code Provisions on Common Carrier

Definition Article 1732

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or

associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting

passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for

compensation, offering their services to the public.

Common carriers vs. Private carriers:

the common carrier holds himself out in common, thatis, to all persons who choose to employ him, as ready to carry For

hire; no one can be a common carrier unless he has held himself

out to the public as a carrier in such a manner as to render him

liable to an action if he should refuse to carry for anyone who

wished to employ him

the private carrier agrees in some special case with some private

individual to carry for hire

a common carrier is bound to carry all who offer suchgoods as it is accustomed to carry and tender reasonable

compensation

a private carrier is not bound to carry for any reason, unless it

enter into a special agreement to do so for carrying them a common carrier is a public service and is thereforesubject to regulation

a private carrier does not hold itself out as engaged in the business

for the public, and is therefore not subject to regulation as a

common carrier

the diligence required for a common carrier isextraordinary diligence

the diligence required for a private carrier is ordinary diligence

Test for a common carrier:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for

others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as

ready to engage in the transportation of goods for persons

generally as a business, and not a casual occupation.(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his

business is confined.

(3) He must undertake to carry by the methods by which his

business is conducted, and over his established roads.

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

The true test is whether the given undertaking is a part of the

business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the

general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent

of the business actually transacted, or the no. and character of the

conveyances used in the employment (the test is therefore the

character of the business actually carried on by the carrier.)

Characteristics of common carriers:(1) The common carrier undertakes to carry for all people

indifferently; he holds himself out as ready to engage in the

transportation of goods for hire as a public employment and not

as a casual occupation, and he undertakes to carry for all persons

indifferently, within the limits of his capacity and the sphere of the

business required of him, so that he is bound to serve all who

apply and is liable for refusal, without sufficient reason, to do so

(2) The common carrier cannot lawfully decline to accept a

particular class of goods for carriage to the prejudice of the traffic

in those goods

Exception: for some sufficient reason, where the discrimination in

such goods is reasonable and necessary (substantial grounds)

(3) No monopoly is favored - the Commission has the power to say

what is a reasonable compensation to the utility and to make

reasonable rules and regulations for the convenience of the

traveling public and to enforce them

(4) Public convenience - for the best interests of the public

Diligence required of Common Carriers Articles 1733, 1755, 1756

Cases on Common Carriers and Extraordinary Diligence

De Guzman v. CA. gr no. 47822 - Under Article 1745 (6),a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to

divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of

strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or

robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or

force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are

reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is

attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance, gr no. 148496 - Theextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered

for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow

the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of

the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires

common carriers to render service with the greatest skill andforesight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature

and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise

due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as

their nature requires. The rule is that if the improper packing or,

in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the

carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation,

but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or

exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of

liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner

accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent

defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of

petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in

the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from

liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art.1735 holds.

Asia Lighterage v. CA, gr no. 147246 - Common carriersare bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over

the goods transported by them. They are presumed to have been

at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,

destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of

negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the

goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised

extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this

rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances

when the presumption of negligence does not attach:

Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,

destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due

to any of the following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural

disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or

civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in

the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits

broke, resulting in the total loss of its cargo but petitioner failed to

prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss

of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during

7/29/2019 Transportation document

3/31

and after the occurrence of the typhoon to prevent or minimize

the loss. The evidence showed that, even before the towing bits of

the barge broke, it had already previously sustained damage when

it hit a sunken object while docked at the Engineering Island. It

even suffered a hole. Thus, when petitioner persisted to proceed

with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further

damage. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot invoke the occurrence

of the typhoon as force majeure to escape liability for the loss

sustained by the private respondent because the

officers/employees themselves of petitioner admitted that when

the towing bits of the vessel broke that caused its sinking and the

total loss of the cargo upon reaching the Pasig River, it was no

longer affected by the typhoon. The typhoon then is not the

proximate cause of the loss of the cargo; a human factor, i.e.,

negligence had intervened.

Philippine American General Insurance Company v. PKSShipping Co., gr no. 149038 - found that the loss of the goods was

sufficiently established as having been due to fortuitous event,

negating any liability on the part of PKS Shipping to the shipper.

Article 1733 of the Civil Code requires common carriers to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they

carry. In case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods,

common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have

acted negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests onthem. From the testimonies and sworn marine protests of the

respective vessel masters of Limar I and MT Iron Eagle, that there

was no way by which the barges or the tugboats crew could have

prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly tossed

by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and

buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of

water into the barges hatches.

Schmitz Transport And Brokerage v. Transport Venture,gr no. 150255 - As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it

should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it

exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before,

during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may

be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.

Loadstar Shipping Co. v. Pioneer Asia Insurance, gr no.157481 - As a common carrier, petitioner is required to observeextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it

transports. When the goods placed in its care are lost, petitioner is

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.

Petitioner therefore has the burden of proving that it observed

extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost

cargo.

Cebu Salvage v. Philippine Home Assurance, gr no.15043 - From the nature of their business and for reasons of public

policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary

diligence over the goods they transport according to the

circumstances of each case. In the event of loss of the goods,

common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove that this

was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of theCivil Code. In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to be

at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they

observed extraordinary diligence. Petitioner was the one which

contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had

control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings

with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that

it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the

contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a

common carrier. The MCCII (respondents subrogor) could not be

reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels

which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it

is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to

enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should

be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is. In fact,

in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated petitioner as

the "owner/operator" of the vessel.

Philippine Charter Insurance v. Unknown Owner of theVessel M/V National Honor, et al, gr no. 161833 The petitioner

failed to adduce any evidence to counter that of respondent ICTSI.

The petitioner failed to rebut the testimony of Dauz, that the

crates were sealed and that the contents thereof could not be

seen from the outside. While it is true that the crate contained

machineries and spare parts, it cannot thereby be concluded that

the respondents knew or should have known that the middle

wooden batten had a hole, or that it was not strong enough to

bear the weight of the shipment.

There is no showing in the Bill of Lading that the shipment was in

good order or condition when the carrier received the cargo, or

that the three wooden battens under the flooring of the cargo

were not defective or insufficient or inadequate. On the other

hand, under Bill of Lading No. NSGPBSML512565 issued by the

respondent NSCP and accepted by the petitioner, the latter

represented and warranted that the goods were properly packed,

and disclosed in writing the condition, nature, qual ity or

characteristic that may cause damage, injury or detriment to the

goods. Absent any signs on the shipment requiring theplacement of a sling cable in the mid-portion of the crate, the

respondent ICTSI was not obliged to do so.

The statement in the Bill of Lading, that the shipment was in

apparent good condition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of

absence of defects in the merchandise. Case law has it that such

statement will create a prima facie presumption only as to the

external condition and not to that not open to inspection.

Relevant Cases on Private Carriers

1. National Steel Corp. V. CA, gr no. 112287 - Article 1732 of the

Civil Code defines a common carrier as persons, corporations,

firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or

transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,

for compensation, offering their services to the public. It hasbeen held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of

passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail

themselves of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which

does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private

carrier. Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special

agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry

goods for the general public. The most typical, although not the

only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime

contract by which the charterer, a party other than the ship

owner, obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for

a period of time or a voyage or voyages.In the instant case, it is

undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general

public. As found by the Regional Trial Court, it carried passengers

or goods only for those it chose under a special contract ofcharter party. As correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals,

the MV Vlasons I was not a common but a private carrier.

Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including

their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined

primarily by stipulations in their contract of private carriage or

charter party.

2. Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc., vs. Court of

Appeals and Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation - in a contract of

private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and

obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a

contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not

involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the

7/29/2019 Transportation document

4/31

Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public

cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial

goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy

embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter

party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in

contracts involving common carriers.

3. Lea Mer Industries v. Malayan Insurance, gr no. 161745 -

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or

goods, or both -- by land, water, or air -- when this service is

offered to the public for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a

common carrier, because it offers to the public its business of

transporting goods through its vessels.

Thus, the Court corrects the trial courts finding that petitioner

became a private carrier when Vulcan chartered it. Charter parties

are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and

affreightment, which are distinguished as follows:

Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the

charterer will generally be considered as owner for the voyage or

service stipulated. The charterer mans the vessel with his own

people and becomes, in effect, the owner pro hac vice, subject to

liability to others for damages caused by negligence. To create a

demise, the owner of a vessel must completely and exclusively

relinquish possession, command and navigation thereof to thecharterer; anything short of such a complete transfer is a contract

of affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or not a charter

party at all.

The distinction is significant, because a demise or bareboat

charter indicates a business undertaking that is private in

character.

Consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties

to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their

stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.

The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment, as

shown by the fact that it was petitioners crew that manned the

tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII. Necessarily,

petitioner was a common carrier, and the pertinent law governs

the present factual circumstances.

Vigilance over Goods

Articles 1733-1753, Civil Code

Checked in baggages Art. 1733-1754

ARTICLE 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business

and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the

safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the

circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is

further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and

7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the

passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ARTICLE 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,

destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due

to any of the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or

calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the

containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

ARTICLE 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2,

3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed

or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at

fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they

observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.

ARTICLE 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common

carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in

the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation

until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the

carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to

receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.

ARTICLE 1737. The common carriers duty to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods remains in

full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or

stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner has made use of the

right of stoppage in transitu.

ARTICLE 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier

continues to be operative even during the time the goods are

stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination,

until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods

and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them orotherwise dispose of them.

ARTICLE 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted

from responsibility, the natural disaster must have been the

proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common

carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss

before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other

natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be

exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or deterioration

of the goods. The same duty is incumbent upon the common

carrier in case of an act of the public enemy referred to in article

1734, No. 2.

ARTICLE 1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay intransporting the goods, a natural disaster shall not free such

carrier from responsibility.

ARTICLE 1741. If the shipper or owner merely contributed to the

loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the proximate

cause thereof being the negligence of the common carrier, the

latter shall be liable in damages, which however, shall be equitably

reduced.

ARTICLE 1742. Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the

goods should be caused by the character of the goods, or the

faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common

carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.

ARTICLE 1743. If through the order of public authority the goods

are seized or destroyed, the common carrier is not responsible,

provided said public authority had power to issue the order.

ARTICLE 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the

shipper or owner limiting the liability of the former for the loss,

destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than

extraordinary diligence shall be valid, provided it be:

(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;

(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service

rendered by the common carrier; and

(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.

7/29/2019 Transportation document

5/31

ARTICLE 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be

considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:

(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or

shipper;

(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss,

destruction, or deterioration of the goods;

(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the

custody of the goods;

(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence

less than that of a good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary

prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;

(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts

or omission of his or its employees;

(6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by

thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible

threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;

(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss,

destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the defective

condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment

used in the contract of carriage.

ARTICLE 1746. An agreement limiting the common carriers

liability may be annulled by the shipper or owner if the commoncarrier refused to carry the goods unless the former agreed to

such stipulation.

ARTICLE 1747. If the common carrier, without just cause, delays

the transportation of the goods or changes the stipulated or usual

route, the contract limiting the common carriers liability cannot

be availed of in case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of

the goods.

ARTICLE 1748. An agreement limiting the common carriers

liability for delay on account of strikes or riots is valid.

ARTICLE 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is

limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading,unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

ARTICLE 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by

the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of

the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the

circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

ARTICLE 1751. The fact that the common carrier has no competitor

along the line or route, or a part thereof, to which the contract

refers shall be taken into consideration on the question of

whether or not a stipulation limiting the common carriers liability

is reasonable, just and in consonance with public policy.

ARTICLE 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting theliability of the common carrier in the vigilance over the goods, the

common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in

case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.

ARTICLE 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be

transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for

their loss, destruction or deterioration.

Hand-carried baggages Articles 1988, 2000-2008 NCC

Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by the travelers in hotels or

inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or

inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that

notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects

brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take

the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes

advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects.

Art. 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding

articles shall include the loss of, or injury to the personal property

of the guests caused by the servants or employees of the keepers

of hotels or inns as well as strangers; but not that which may

proceed from any force majeure. The fact that travellers are

constrained to rely on the vigilance of the keeper of the hotels or

inns shall be considered in determining the degree of care

required of him.

Art. 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the hotel

is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of

arms or through an irresistible force.

Art. 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the

loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or visitors,

or if the loss arises from the character of the things brought into

the hotel.

Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from

responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable

for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the

hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the

former as set forth in articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or

diminished shall be void.

Art. 2004. The hotel-keeper has a right to retain the things brought

into the hotel by the guest, as a security for credits on account of

lodging, and supplies usually furnished to hotel guests.

Art. 2005. A judicial deposit or sequestration takes place when an

attachment or seizure of property in litigation is ordered.

Art. 2006. Movable as well as immovable property may be the

object of sequestration.

Art. 2007. The depositary of property or objects sequestrated

cannot be relieved of his responsibility until the controversy which

gave rise thereto has come to an end, unless the court so orders.

Art. 2008. The depositary of property sequestrated is bound to

comply, with respect to the same, with all the obligations of a

good father of a family.

Presumption on Negligence Art. 1734 When Presumption of negligence does not arise Art1734; Read with Arts. 1735, 1739, 1741, 1740, 1742, 1743

Stipulations Limiting Carriers Liability

Stipulation printed bill of lading limiting the carriers

liability for loss or damage or destruction of a cargo to certain

sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a higher or greater

value is sanction by law (Art 1749) provided such stipulations are

reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely

and fairly agreed upon. (Everett Steamship Corp Vs CA. 297 SCRA

496, 98)

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly

stipulate that responsibility rests the charterer, exempting the

7/29/2019 Transportation document

6/31

carrier from liability for loss or damage of the cargo caused even

by the employees negligence. (Valenzuela Hardwood vs CA, 274

SCRA 642, 97)

Valid Stipulations (Art 1744)

a. in writing and signed by the shipperb. supported by valuable consideration other than theservice rendered by the carrier and

c. reasonable, just, fair and not contrary to law, moral andpublic policy etc

d. delay caused by riots or strikes (Art 1748)Void Stipulations (Art 1745)

a. goods are transported at the risk of the ownersb. not liable for any loss, damages or destructionc. need not to observe any diligence in the custody of thegoods

d. exercise diligence less than required of a good father ofthe family or men of ordinary prudence in the vigilance of the

goods

e. not responsible for acts or omission of its employee(except as stipulated in private carrier)

f. not responsible for act of robbers or thieves who did notact with grave, irresistible force, threat or violenceg. not responsible for loss, destruction or deterioration ofgoods on account of the defective condition of the carriers

equipments

Void because they are unjust, unreasonable and contrary to

law, customs, morale, public policy or public order.

Relevant Cases: Vigilance over Goods

1. Delsan Transport Lines v. American Home Assurance, gr. No.

149019, August 15, 2006 Delsans argument that it should

not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to

backflow because the same had already been actually

and legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore

tank holds no water. It had been settled that the subject cargowas still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging thereof

has not yet been finished when the backflow occurred. Since the

discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet been

completed at the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred,

there is no reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the

cargo to the consignee. Delsan is straining the issue by insisting

that when the diesel oil entered into the tank of Caltex on shore,

there was legally, at that moment, a complete delivery thereof to

Caltex. To be sure, the extraordinary responsibility of common

carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in

the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation

until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by

the carrier to the consignee, or to a person who has the right to

receive them. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk Depothas not yet been finished, Delsan still has the duty to guard and to

preserve the cargo. The carrier still has in it the responsibility to

guard and preserve the goods, a duty incident to its having the

goods transported.

To recapitulate, common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe

extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods and for the

safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the

circumstances of each case. The mere proof of delivery of

goods in good order to the carrier, and their arrival in the place of

destination in bad order, make out a prima facie case against the

carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury

occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is incumbent

upon the carrier to prove that the loss was due to accident or

some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability.

2. Belgian Overseas Chartering v. Philippine First Insurance, gr no.

143133 - mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a

common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their

destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence

against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how

the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods

happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.

3. Central Shipping Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, gr no.

150751 - Even if the weather encountered by the ship is to be

deemed a natural disaster under Article 1739 of the Civil Code,

petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or calamity was

the proximate and only cause of the loss. Human agency must be

entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In other words,

the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must

not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by the

presence of human participation. The defense of fortuitous event

or natural disaster cannot be successfully made when the injury

could have been avoided by human precaution. Hence, if a

common carrier fails to exercise due diligence -- or that ordinarycare that the circumstances of the particular case demand -- to

prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the

occurrence of the natural disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to

have been negligent. The loss or injury is not, in a legal sense, due

to a natural disaster under Article 1734(1).

4. Regional Container Lines of Singapore v. The Netherlands

Insurance Co., gr no. 168151 - A common carrier is presumed to

have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised

extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. When the

goods shipped are either lost or arrived in damaged condition, a

presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that

diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence

to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence, thecommon carrier must establish by adequate proof that it exercised

extraordinary diligence over the goods. It must do more than

merely show that some other party could be responsible for the

damage.

In the present case, RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to prove that

they did exercise that degree of diligence required by law over the

goods they transported. There is sufficient evidence showing that

the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container

van, as recorded in the temperature chart, occurred after the

cargo had been discharged from the vessel and was already under

the custody of the arrastre operator, ICTSI. This evidence,

however, does not disprove that the condenser fan which

caused the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated

container was not damaged while the cargo was being unloadedfrom the ship. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that

cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody

of the carrier; RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to dispute this.

5. Philippine American General Insurance Co. v. MCG Marine

Services, March 8, 2002 - The findings of the Board of Marine

Inquiry indicate that the attendance of strong winds and huge

waves while the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G was sailing through

Cortes, Surigao del Norte on March 3, 1987 was indeed

fortuitous. A fortuitous event has been defined as one which could

not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, is inevitable. An event

is considered fortuitous if the following elements concur:

7/29/2019 Transportation document

7/31

xxx (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or

the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be

independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee

the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be

foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must

be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his

obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free

from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to

the creditor. xxx

In the case at bar, it was adequately shown that before the M/V

Peatheray Patrick-G left the port of Mandaue City, the Captain

confirmed with the Coast Guard that the weather condition would

permit the safe travel of the vessel to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Thus,

he could not be expected to have foreseen the unfavorable

weather condition that awaited the vessel in Cortes, Surigao del

Sur. It was the presence of the strong winds and enormous waves

which caused the vessel to list, keel over, and consequently lose

the cargo contained therein. The appellate court likewise found

that there was no negligence on the part of the crew of the M/V

Peatheray Patrick-G, citing the following portion of the decision of

the Board of Marine Inquiry. Since the presence of strong winds

and enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987

was shown to be the proximate and only cause of the sinking of

the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of the cargo belongingto San Miguel Corporation, private respondents cannot be held

liable for the said loss.

6. FGU Insurance v. CA, gr no. 137775 - Art. 1739. In order that the

common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural

disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss.

However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to

prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence

of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order that the common

carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or

deterioration of the goods . . .

Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical insofar

as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are

extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events thatcould not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.

It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been

foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be

one impossible to foresee or to avoid.

In this case, the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was

not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. In fact, the other vessels

in the port of San Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another

place, a circumstance which prompted SMCs District Sales

Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise transferred,

but to no avail. The D/B Lucio had no engine and could not

maneuver by itself. Even if ANCOs representatives wanted to

transfer it, they no longer had any means to do so as the tugboat

M/T ANCO had already departed, leaving the barge to its own

devices. The captain of the tugboat should have had the foresightnot to leave the barge alone considering the pending storm.

While the loss of the cargoes was admittedly caused by the

typhoon Sisang, a natural disaster, ANCO could not escape liability

to respondent SMC. The records clearly show the failure of

petitioners representatives to exercise the extraordinary degree

of diligence mandated by law. To be exempted from

responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the

proximate and only cause of the loss. There must have been no

contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier. As

held in the case of Limpangco Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co.:

. . . To be exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug

must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by

which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For,

although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any

given instance may have been what is termed an act of God, yet, if

the tug unnecessarily exposed the two to such accident by any

culpable act or omission of its own, it is not excused.

Therefore, as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, there

was blatant negligence on the part of M/T ANCOs crewmembers,

first in leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the

storm without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to

heed the request of SMCs representatives to have the barge

transferred to a safer place, as was done by the other vessels in

the port; thus, making said blatant negligence the proximate cause

of the loss of the cargoes.

7. Sulpicio Lines v. First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation, gr

no. 140349 - Petitioner-carrier contends that its liability, if any, is

only to the extent of the cargo damage or loss and should not

include the lack of fitness of the shipment for transport to

Singapore due to the damaged packing. This is erroneous.

Petitioner-carrier seems to belabor under the misapprehension

that a distinction must be made between the cargo packaging and

the contents of the cargo. According to it, damage to the

packaging is not tantamount to damage to the cargo. It must be

stressed that in the case at bar, the damage sustained by thepackaging of the cargo while in petitioner-carriers custody

resulted in its unfitness to be transported to its consignee in

Singapore. Such failure to ship the cargo to its final destination

because of the ruined packaging, indeed, resulted in damages on

the part of the owner of the goods.

The falling of the crate during the unloading is evidence of

petitioner-carriers negligence in handling the cargo. As a

common carrier, it is expected to observe extraordinary diligence

in the handling of goods placed in its possession for transport. The

standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common

carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of

ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a

good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations

between members of society. A common carrier is bound totransport its cargo and its passengers safely "as far as human care

and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very

cautious person, with due regard to all circumstances. The

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered

for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow

the required precaution for avoiding the damage to, or destruction

of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. It

requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill

and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the

nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to

exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such

methods as their nature requires.

Thus, when the shipment suffered damages as it was being

unloaded, petitioner-carrier is presumed to have been negligent inthe handling of the damaged cargo. Under Articles 1735 and

1752 of the Civil Code, common carriers are presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods

transported by them are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated. To

overcome the presumption of liability for loss, destruction or

deterioration of goods under Article 1735, the common carrier

must prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required

in Article 1733 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner-carrier miserably failed to adduce any shred of evidence

of the required extraordinary diligence to overcome the

presumption that it was negligent in transporting the cargo.

7/29/2019 Transportation document

8/31

8. Savellano v. Northwest Airlines, gr no. 151783, - Petitioners

contract of carriage with Northwest was for the San Francisco-

Tokyo(Narita)-Manila flights scheduled for October 27, 1991. This

itinerary was not followed when the aircraft used for the first

segment of the journey developed engine trouble. Petitioners

stress that they are questioning, not the cancellation of the

original itinerary, but its substitution, which they allegedly had not

contracted for or agreed to. They insist that, like the other

passengers of the distressed flight, they had the right to be placed

on Flight 27, which had a connecting flight from Japan to

Manila. They add that in being treated differently and shabbily,

they were being discriminated against.

A contract is the law between the parties. Thus, in determining

whether petitioners rights were violated, we must look into its

provisions, which are printed on the airline ticket. Condition 9 in

the agreement states that a x x x carrier may without notice

substitute alternate carriers or aircraft, and may alter or omit

stopping places shown on the ticket in case of necessity. x x x.

The basis of the Complaint was the way respondent allegedly

treated petitioners like puppets that could be shuttled to Manila

via Los Angeles and Seoul without their consent. Undeniably, it

did not take the time to explain how it would be meeting its

contractual obligation to transport them to their final

destination. Its employees merely hustled the confusedpetitioners into boarding one plane after another without giving

the latter a choice from other courses of action that were

available. It unilaterally decided on the most expedient way for

them to reach their final destination.

After an examination of the conditions printed on the airline

ticket, we find nothing there authorizing Northwest to decide

unilaterally, after the distressed flight landed in Seattle, what

other stopping places petitioners should take and when they

should fly. True, Condition 9 on the ticket allowed respondent to

substitute alternate carriers or aircraft without notice. However,

nothing there permits shuttling passengers -- without so much as a

by your-leave -- to stopping places that they have not been

previously notified of, much less agreed to or been prepared

for. Substituting aircrafts or carriers without notice is entirelydifferent from changing stopping places or connecting cities

without notice.

The ambiguities in the contract, being one of adhesion, should be

construed against the party that caused its preparation -- in this

case, respondent. Since the conditions enumerated on the ticket

do not specifically allow it to change stopping places or to fly the

passengers to alternate connecting cities without consulting them,

then it must be construed to mean that such unilateral change was

not permitted.

Furthermore, the change in petitioners flight itinerary does not

fall under the situation covered by the phrase may alter or omit

stopping places shown on the ticket in case of necessity. A case of

necessity must first be proven. The burden of proving it

necessarily fell on respondent. This responsibility it failed todischarge.

Petitioners do not question the stop in Seattle, so we will not

delve into this matter. The airplane engine trouble that developed

during the flight bound for Tokyo from San Francisco definitely

merited the necessity of landing the plane at some place for

repair -- in this case, Seattle -- but not that of shuttling petitioners

to other connecting points thereafter without their consent.

Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the

stopping place from Tokyo to Los Angeles and Seoul. It is a fact

that some of the passengers on the distressed flight continued on

to the Tokyo (Narita) connecting place. No explanation

whatsoever was given to petitioners as to why they were not

similarly allowed to do so. It may be that the Northwest

connecting flight from Seattle to Tokyo to Manila could no longer

accommodate them. Yet it may also be that there were other

carriers that could have accommodated them for these sectors of

their journey, and whose route they might have preferred to the

more circuitous one unilaterally chosen for them by respondent.

In the absence of evidence as to the actual situation, the Court is

hard pressed to determine if there was a case of necessity

sanctioning the alteration of the Tokyo stopping place in the case

of petitioners. Thus, we hold that in the absence of a

demonstrated necessity thereof and their rerouting to Los Angeles

and Seoul as stopping places without their consent, respondent

committed a breach of the contract of carriage.

Explosion of tire:

Yobido v. CA, gr no. 113003 - Under the circumstances of this

case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a

fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the

situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was

entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly

mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought

and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality,

resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five

days use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident causedeither by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of

its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from

liability for damages.

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in

case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common

carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the

death or injury resulting from an accident. This Court has had

occasion to state:

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good

because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone

does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No

evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to

adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the

jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to causeaccidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been

caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by

the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time

of the accident.

Duration of Common Carriers Liability Articles 1736-1738 NCC

Stipulations Limiting Common Carriers Liability Articles 1744-1754 NCC

Safety of passengers

Nature of Obligation of Common Carriers

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengerssafely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the

utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all

the circumstances.

Liability of Common Carriers and Presumption of Negligence

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary

diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Stipulations limiting common carriers liability

7/29/2019 Transportation document

9/31

Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of

passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be

dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of

notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.

Effect of gratuitous carriage

Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation

limiting the common carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but

not for willful acts or gross negligence.

The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the

common carrier's liability.

Liability for acts of carriers employees

Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries

to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the

former's employees, although such employees may have acted

beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of

the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof

that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in

the selection and supervision of their employees.

Art. 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the

preceding article cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by

the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.

Contributory Negligence

Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good

father of a family to avoid injury to himself.

Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not

bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate

cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the

amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.

Liability for acts of co-passengers and strangers

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by

a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other

passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees

through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a familycould have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Damages

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be

awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning

Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger

caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be

awarded with the title XVIII of this book concerning damages.

Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by

the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Art. 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;

(2) Moral;

(3) Nominal;

(4) Temperate or moderate;

(5) Liquidated;

(6) Exemplary or corrective.

Articles Related on Actual or compensatory damages

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is

entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss

suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation

referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi contracts, the damages for which

the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are

natural and probable consequences of the breach of the

obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have

reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor

shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably

attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise diligence

of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting

from the act or omission in question.

Indemnity for death

(See Article 2206) The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict

used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil

Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through

the years because of the declining value of our currency. At

present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.

Loss of Earning CapacityComputation of loss of earning capacity is based on life expectancy

of deceased, not of heir.

The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors:

(1) the number of years on which the computation of damages is

based and

(2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed. The

first factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into

consideration the nature of the victims work, lifestyle, age and

state of health prior to the accident. The second refers to the

victims earning capacity minus the necessary living expenses.

Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the

earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have

received the net earnings of the deceased.

Moral Damages

Moral damages include moral suffering, mental anguish, fright,

serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral

shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. They may be recovered

in the cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Anent a

breach of a contract of common carriage, moral damages may be

awarded if the common carrier acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages

predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the

instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of

the New Civil Code. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap

results in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that

the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not

result.

Exemplary Damages

Exemplary damages is not a matter of right. It is imposed by way

of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,

temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and

quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the

defendant acted in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or

malevolent manner. It cannot, however, be considered as a matter

of right; the court having to decide whether or not they should be

adjudicated. Before the court may consider an award for

exemplary damages, the plaintiff must first show that he is

7/29/2019 Transportation document

10/31

entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages; but it is

not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.

Attorneys Fees

Although attorneys fees are generally not recoverable, a party can

be held liable for such if exemplary damages are awarded (Article

2208, New Civil Code). The award of damages as well as

attorneys fees lies upon the discretion of the court in the context

of the facts and circumstances of each case, and this judicial

discretion is largely addressed towards tempering any tendency to

award excessive damages so much so that it stands vulnerable to

and actually magnetizes, attacks as to its being a result of passion,

prejudice or corruption.

The law authorizes recovery of attorney's fees where the

defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate

with third person or to incur expenses to protect his interest, or

where the court deems it just and equitable.

Relevant Cases on Safety of Passengers:

R. Transport Corporation v. Pante, gr no. 162104 - Underthe Civil Code, common carriers, like petitioner bus company, from

the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are

bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of thepassengers transported by them, according to all the

circumstances of each case.28

They are bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,

using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due

regard for all the circumstances.

Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of death of or

injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that

they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles

1733 and 1755."

Further, Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that "[c]ommon

carriers are liable for the death or injury to passengers through the

negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such

employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority orin violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of

the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they

exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the

selection and supervision of their employees."

In this case, the testimonial evidence of respondent showed that

petitioner, through its bus driver, failed to observe extraordinary

diligence, and was, therefore, negligent in transporting the

passengers of the bus safely to Gapan, Nueva Ecija on January 27,

1995, since the bus bumped a tree and a house, and caused

physical injuries to respondent. Article 1759 of the Civil Code

explicitly states that the common carrier is liable for the death or

injury to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its

employees, and that such liability does not cease upon proof that

the common carrier exercised all the diligence of a good father ofa family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence,

even if petitioner was able to prove that it exercised the diligence

of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of

its bus driver, it is still liable to respondent for the physical injuries

he sustained due to the vehicular accident.

PAL V. CA GR NO. 123238 - Private respondents andpetitioner entered into a contract of air carriage when the former

purchased two plane tickets from the latter. Under this contract,

petitioner obliged itself (1) to transport Deanna and Nikolai, as

unaccompanied minors, on 2 May 1980 from Manila to San

Francisco through one of its planes, Flight 106; and (2) upon the

arrival of Deanna and Nikolai in San Francisco Airport on 3 May

1980, to transport them on that same day from San Francisco to

Los Angeles via a connecting flight on United Airways 996. As it

was, petitioner failed to transport Deanna and Nikolai from San

Francisco to Los Angeles on the day of their arrival at San

Francisco. The staff of United Airways 996 refused to take aboard

Deanna and Nikolai for their connecting flight to Los Angeles

because petitioner's personnel in San Francisco could not produce

the indemnity bond accomplished and submitted by private

respondents. Thus, Deanna and Nikolai were stranded in San

Francisco and were forced to stay there overnight. It was only on

the following day that Deanna and Nikolai were able to leave San

Francisco and arrive at Los Angeles via another airline, Western

Airlines. Clearly then, petitioner breached its contract of carriage

with private respondents.

When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a

particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The

passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that

flight and on that date, and it becomes the airline's obligation to

carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination without

delay. If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of

transporting, he dies or is injured, the carrier may be held liable

for a breach of contract of carriage.

Calalas v. CA, gr no. 122039 - It is immaterial that theproximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the

truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of

proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in

actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for

imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between

him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by

law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation

between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the

obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the

relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are

concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those

respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard

to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption ofnegligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil

Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been

at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they

observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755

of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common

carrier the burden of proof.

The driver of jeepney did not carry safely as far as human care

and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very

cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as

required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked,

its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad

shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in

a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengersthan the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. These are

violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore,

there is no assumption of risk by the passenger.

Victory Liner, Inc. v. CA, GR no. 159636 - Anent thesecond issue, petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of

contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,

using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due

regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is

presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent

when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28

7/29/2019 Transportation document

11/31

rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault

or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory

presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier

exercised extraordinary diligence.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption that the proximate cause of Marie Graces death was

the negligence of petitioner. Hence, the courts below correctly

ruled that petitioner was guilty of breach of contract of carriage.

Bachelor Express, Inc. v. CA, gr no. 159636 - The runningamuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident

as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers

such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving

each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter

and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the

passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the

context of force majeure.

However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from

liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident

was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove

that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such

accident.

Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, gr no. 145804 Asecurity guard assaulted Navidad, which caused the latter to fall

on the tracks. LRTA contended that it was an act of a stranger that

could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA added that

the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-

employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis

because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro

Transit and not of the LRTA. The law requires common carriers to

carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious

persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a

common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it

not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the

passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in

pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions

render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on

account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of

strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise

of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or

omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to

have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury,

the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or

negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts

upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen

event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory

explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which

petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show,

the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception

from the general rule that negligence must be proved.The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its

obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that

contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence

required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its

commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may

choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of

an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In

either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its

responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Fortune Express v. CA, gr no. 119756 - Art. 1763 of theCivil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for

injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other

passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have

prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good

father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of

the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by

Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro

that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the

petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of

petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the

necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to

protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its

employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the

malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the

circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the

safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting

their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as

metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been

employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.

The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito

because there was already a warning by the PC.

No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased.

The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two

Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus andthe jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed

men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the

bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the

driver of the bus by pleading for his life.

Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, gr no. 28589 -Filipino passenger who went to relieve himself was berated by the

captain for coming back late to the plane and was called a

monkey. Held: A passenger is entitled to courteous treatment

from the carrier and its EEs and failure of the common carrier to

comply with this obligation will entitle the passenger to damages.

The relation between common carrier and passenger involves

special and peculiar obligations and duties, differing in kind and

degree, from those of almost every legal or contractual relation.On account of the peculiar situation of the parties, the law implies

a promise and imposes upon the CC the corresponding duty of

protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the CC is under

the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or

insult by himself or his servants. A contract to transport

passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other

contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air

carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the

traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and

advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,

generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or

malfeasance of the CC's employees naturally could give ground for

an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for

transportation. They have a right to be treated by the CC'semployees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due

consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal

misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such

employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the

part of its employees towards a passenger gives the latter an

action for damages against the CC.

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v.Phoenix Assurance, gr no. 162467 - There is a distinction between

an arrastre and a stevedore. Arrastre, a Spanish word which refers

to hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of cargo on the

wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper

7/29/2019 Transportation document

12/31

and the ship's tackle. The responsibility of the arrastre operator

lasts until the delivery of the cargo to the consignee. The service is

usually performed by longshoremen. On the other hand,

stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the

vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The

responsibility of the stevedore ends upon the loading and stowing

of the cargo in the vessel.

It is not disputed that Mindanao Terminal was performing purely

stevedoring function while the private respondent in

the Summa case was performing arrastre function. In the present

case, Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedore, was only charged with

the loading and stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the ships

cargo hold; it was never the custodian of the shipment of Del

Monte Produce. A stevedore is not a common carrier for it does

not transport goods or passengers; it is not akin to a

warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit. The loading

and stowing of cargoes would not have a far reaching public

ramification as that of a common carrier and a warehouseman;

the public is adequately protected by our laws on contract and on

quasi-delict. The public policy considerations in legally imposing

upon a common carrier or a warehouseman a higher degree of

diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly

provides labor in loading and stowing of cargoes for its clients.

Liability of Successive Air Carriers

1. British Airways v. CA, gr no. 121824 - The contract of

transportation was exclusively between the passenger and

common carrier BA. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to

Hong Kong log of the formers journey to PAL, as its subcontractor

or agent. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air

transportation. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible

for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable

for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its

negligent act. When an action is based on breach of contract of

carriage, the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the

latter was not a party in the contract.

2. American Airlines v. CA, gr no. 116044-45 - The contract of

carriage between the private respondent and Singapore Airlinesalthough performed by different carriers under a series of airline

tickets, including that issued by the petitioner, constitutes a single

operation. Members of the IATA are under a general pool

partnership agreement wherein they act as agent of each other in

the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket

sales worldwide and at the same time provide passengers easy

access to airlines which are otherwise inaccessible in some parts of

the world. Booking and reservation among airline members are

allowed even by telephone and it has become an accepted

practice among them. A member airline which enters into a

contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be performed

by different carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the whole

trip and through the required process of interline settlement of

accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an airline is dulycompensated for the segment of the trip serviced.

Thus, when the petitioner accepted the unused portion of the

conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and

undertook to transport the private respondent over the route

covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, i e .,

Geneva to New York, the petitioner tacitly recognized its

commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent of

the principal contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to the

segment of the trip the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such,

the petitioner thereby assumed the obligation to take the place of

the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket.

The petitioner's argument that it is not a designated carrier in the

original conjunction tickets and that it issued its own ticket is not

decisive of its liability. The new ticket was simply a replacement

for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both tickets being

for the same amount of US$2,760 and having the same points of

departure and destination. By constituting itself as an agent of the

principal carrier the petitioner's undertaking should be taken as

part of a single operation under the contract of carriage executed

by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila.

3. China Airlines v. Chiok, gr no. 152122 - A common carrier has a

peculiar relationship with and an exacting responsibility to its

passengers. For reasons of public interest and policy, the ticket-

issuing airline acts as principal in a contract of carriage and is thus

liable for the acts and the omissions of any errant carrier to which

it may have endorsed any sector of the entire, continuous trip.

Involuntary upgrading of seats to first class

Cathay Pacific v. Vasquez, GR 150843 - they had priority for

upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an

opportunity arises. But, just like other privileges, such priority

could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first

whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would

consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat

assignments were given to other passengers. Normally, one

would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean abetter accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and

however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline

the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they

had booke